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NU Debate

Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 1 of 40

Love and Stuff


Love and Stuff......................................................................................................................................................1 1NC 1/5.................................................................................................................................................................2 1NC 2/5.................................................................................................................................................................3 1NC 3/5.................................................................................................................................................................4 1NC 4/5.................................................................................................................................................................5 1NC 5/5.................................................................................................................................................................6 Link: Compassion Behind Plan (a2: you K Pity not Compassion).......................................................................7 Link: Religion/Buddhism .....................................................................................................................................8 Link: Universal Morality.......................................................................................................................................9 Link: Universal Rights Defense of Inequality..................................................................................................10 Impact: Extinction...............................................................................................................................................11 Impact: Pity=Antihuman.....................................................................................................................................12 Impact: V2l/Case Turn........................................................................................................................................13 Impact: V2L Embrace Suffering......................................................................................................................14 Impact: Tyranny/Violence...................................................................................................................................15 Solvency Indeterminate Overstretch................................................................................................................16 Alt = Absolute Love for Life...............................................................................................................................17 Alt Recognizes Suffering Reorientation...........................................................................................................18 Alt Solves Case Noble Gift Giving..................................................................................................................19 Alt: Master Morality Freedom.........................................................................................................................20 Alt Solves Case Self-D.....................................................................................................................................21 Alt Solves Value..................................................................................................................................................22 Must Embrace Suffering Positive Attitude Key...............................................................................................24 Proposing Alt Key A2:Suicidal Nihilism.......................................................................................................25 A2: Alt = Screw the Poor Oversimplification..................................................................................................27 A2: Alt of Agonism Violence.........................................................................................................................28 A2: Alt Destroys Social Structures/Abandons Politics.......................................................................................29 A2: Alt Kills Democracy Link Turn................................................................................................................30 A2: Ethical Relativism........................................................................................................................................33 A2: Motivational Purity Its Power Thirst........................................................................................................34 A2: Narcissism Link Turn ...............................................................................................................................35 A2: Nietzsche = Capitalist Poor Person Hater....................................................................................................36 A2: Objective Morality........................................................................................................................................37 A2: Perm Bankrupts Alt...................................................................................................................................38 A2: Suffering Bad Its Part of Life...................................................................................................................39 A2: Youre Insensitive to Suffering....................................................................................................................40

lolcatz

NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 2 of 40

1NC 1/5
The affs ethic of charity is self-negating its just an exercise of power Quain 9 (Tony, freelance writer on contemporary economic, political, and philosophical issues, achelor of Arts in Economics from
Georgetown University and a Master of Arts in Economics from George Mason University, author of The Political Reference Almanac, last updated july 13, Nietzsche and the Welfare State, http://www.tonyquain.com/philo/200611NW.shtml) Zanezor
"Whether

I contemplate men with benevolence or with an evil eye, I always find them concerned with a single task : to do what is good for the preservation of the human race. Not from any feeling of love for the race, but merely because nothing in them is older, stronger, more inexorable and unconquerable than this instinctbecause this instinct constitutes the essence of our species, our herd."1
With this grand assertion, the 19th century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche opens Book I of The Gay Science, a work encompassing most of his influential ideas on morality, religion, and man and society. But does the preservation of the species imply the need to ensure the preservation of every individual? Even if it did, does Nietzsche believe that this primal instinct has served man well? Is there a basic human dignity that demands that our herd take care of all of its members? What does Nietzsche have to contribute to our understanding of the charity and benevolence of a political society? Specifically, would Nietzsche favor or oppose a generous, redistributive welfare state? I shall argue that in his writing Nietzsche makes it quite clear that he would oppose state redistribution of wealth, both from the point of view of those from whom wealth is taken and those to whom it is given.2 While he does not in The Gay Science directly confront or discuss the merits of welfare politics, his views on pity, benevolence, dignity, morality, equality, pain, and happiness all contribute to a mosaic quite contemptuous of charity and its motives and consequences. Nietzsche would reject the welfare state as being, at the same time, both weak submission to self-negating

morality and a projection of power of the strong over the weak.


Nietzsche's approach is individualistic. While he often speaks of the origins, development, and ails of society in general, his writing is nowhere intended to sway the designs or designers of the collective; he directs his attention always to the individual as an individual. Following this style, the evidence of his rejection of the welfare state shall be presented as the admonitions he dispenses to three kinds of people3: the Benefactor, who gives what he has to assist those in need; the Moralist, who demands that others do the same; and the Recipient, who accepts the charity of others or the manna of a compassionate state. The argument will conclude with a possible alternative Nietzsche offers to the welfare state.

The Benefactor is held up for contempt mainly because his acts originate from a contemptible feeling of pity. Throughout The Gay Science, Nietzsche makes clear that pity is an enervating emotion of the weak-willed. "What is needful is not pity for [the evil and unhappy]. We must learn to abandon this arrogant fancy."4 Further, he admires the absence of pity: "At times, our strengths propel us so far forward that we can no longer endure our weaknesses and perish from them Thus we become hard against everything in us that desires consideration, and our greatness is also our lack of compassion."5 Pity is also tied directly to a notion of charity, as when he says, "Indeed, those who now preach the morality of pity even take the view that precisely this and only this is moralto lose one's own way in order to come to the assistance of a neighbor."6 Those who give of themselves out of
pity simply do not deserve our respect. While Nietzsche often singles out pity as a deplorable affection, virtues of self-negation in general are held in low regard. "I do not like negative virtuesvirtues whose very essence is to negate and deny oneself something."7 Also: "'Selflessness' has no value either in heaven or on earth."8 Benevolence is thoroughly linked in Nietzsche's mind to self-negation, as when he cries "No altruism!"

and then describes people who desire to be a "function" of someone else and thus fail to live for themselves.
Yet even as he pours derision on self-negation and pity, Nietzsche does not deny that these feelings have personal utility, even if they are misplaced. Pity moves us to take possession of the pitiful, to exert power over them. "When we see somebody suffer, we like to exploit this opportunity to

take possession of him; those who become his benefactors and pity him do this and the pleasure they feel is comparable to that aroused by the prospect of a new conquest."10 This makes it less clear that selfless virtues such as pity do not hold some positive value
for the individual. When Nietzsche says, "Benefiting and hurting others are ways of exercising one's power upon others; that is all one desires in such cases,"11 he extends power as a motivation not just for those who are charitable, but also for those who would redistribute wealth from benefactors (willing or unwilling) to recipients. Hurting unwilling benefactors through taxation

and benefiting poor recipients through public welfare spending ultimately serves the power instincts of those who may be neither. Here we are speaking of the Moralist. For Nietzsche, there is no special place for humans in nature and no minimum acceptable human condition. He claims that we should "remove humanity, humaneness, and 'human dignity.'"12 Indeed, he sees the Moralist as too involved, too caring of others, too unconcerned for the self. "I do not want to wage war against what is ugly Looking away shall be my only negation."13 Ultimately Nietzsche wants the Moralist to reserve judgment for others and instead look to oneself. In his criticism of the Kantian categorical imperative and 'universal laws,' he counters, "We, however, want to become those we arehuman beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves."14 He seeks a moral anarchy, which by extension appears to imply political anarchy. Indeed, he proclaims that the message of "'equal rights,' 'a free society,' 'no more masters and no servants'" has no allure. "We simply do not consider it desirable that a realm of justice and concord should be established on earth," since this would be the "realm of the deepest leveling."15 While this does not conclusively determine that Nietzsche believed in total anarchy, it does show that with specific regard to notions of equality he is strongly disposed to anarchy and opposed to all order and leveling. lolcatz

NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 3 of 40

1NC 2/5
This obsession with assisting others turns the case and destroys humanity Bruckner 86 (Pascal, Associate professor, Institut dtudes Politiques de Paris) The Tears of the White Man, p.66-68 //WLT
That is the wellspring of this religion of compassionate sympathy, which strives to outdo itself with regard to everything that lives, suffers, and feels-from West African peasants to baby seals, to Amnesty International prisoners and fur-bearing animals that have been skinned to warm the shoulders of elegant ladies. The glorification of benevolent impulses is an instinctive morality that has no head, but appears to be composed only of a heart and helping hands, as Nietzsche said. It is a glorification chanted day and night by the media, press, politicians, and literary and artistic personalities, and it wallows in the most bastardized form of Christianity. This religion affliction says that you have to suffer from life as if it were sickness. As long as men are dying, children are hungry, or prisons are full, no one has the right to be happy. It is a categorical imperative that imposes on us the duty to love man in the abstract, preferably when he is far away. Exactly as Jesus said that the poor are our masters, Third-Worldists make the suffering of the countries of the Southern hemisphere into a kind of virtuous model. These tropical lands are beloved because of their failings and their want, and hunger and evil are simultaneously fought, but subtly enhanced. This is the deep ambiguity from which the Catholic Church has never escaped, and it is the same one that contaminates all organizations providing assistance to the Third World. Even where suffering does not exist, it has to be created, and where it exists, it has to be accentuated. Everywhere, the worship of doom requires that we uphold the principal of universal human suffering. Of course, epidemics, wars and millions of children with empty stomachs are intolerable, because my fellow man is my brother. But such pain is also necessary, because a world without misfortune is one that has taken the place of heaven. In this way, people are put in the service of the poor, but also in the service of poverty, of sacrifice itself. There must be homeless people and orphans upon whom our liberalism can be practiced to remind us constantly that my Kingdom is not of this world, and to make all joy suspect. As appeals for solidarity are made, the blows of misfortune are celebrated, because they are pretexts for humility. At a time when the Church, through its most qualified spokesmen, is questioning the ambivalence of Christian charity, it is the laity-usually Marxists- who are reviving its most dubious reflexes. To take the most oppressed as a measure, as our good Samaritans do, is to imply that suffering and death are not just failures of an unjust worldwide economic system, but are also part of the immemorial drama of our relation to the Creator. It means that, far from being abominable and outrageous, the oppressed embellish and typify the human condition. This bottomless pit of suffering becomes the tribunal, the supreme court that admonishes the privileged and leisured members of the human race. The fact that people are wallowing in rags and mud strengthens the indictment of silk and ermine. The intolerable disorder of the world is

constantly underlined, the eye of an avenging God is cast on it, and he watches over it and endlessly enumerates its weaknesses and faults. The West is satanized and the Third World becomes fixed in its role of the persecuted, the better to show that no compromise at all is possible between them, aside from the infinite repentance of the West. With a remarkable talent for spotting every ethnic group, or others who have been subject to persecution in some way, the world is searched for sadness, bad luck and misfortune. An obscene joy lists the millions of alarms ringing in the world, and a sort of morbid delight is taken in the systematic ruin of the thousands of forms of life on the globe. Such liberals are like hemophiliacs in love with human suffering, ready to bleed for any case; they are the professional mourners of modern history. They have no sooner dried their tears when a new subject for lamentation makes them start weeping anew. Failures and distress are collected because they serve as a clear warning-you have enjoyed yourselves too much, you have wasted too much. You must prepare yourselves for abstinence, chastity, and a return
to the land. Hunger in the world is the punishment for our own European sinfulness. Supermarkets, naked women, homosexuality, paper money, Coca Colaall these are the corruptors of the healthy young of the underdeveloped world. The theme of atonement used to be one of the political Right, but it is now that of the Left. It is a miraculous reconciliation of the ashes of Marshal Petain and Lenins tomb under the patronage of a weeping Jesus Christ of Naples.

lolcatz

NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 4 of 40

1NC 3/5
Alternative: Vote Negative to reject the affirmative truth claims in favor of complete nihilism. This halts our drive for perfection fostering a vibrant humanity White 90 (Alan, Professor of Philosophy at Williams College, Within Nietzsches Labrynth, 1990, http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/WNL%20contents.htm ) //WLT
All of this suggests that radical nihilism remains "something to be overcome." The questions arise: by whom, and how? A passage already introduced provides a hint concerning the first: what I have been calling radical nihilism results when "all one has left are the values that pass judgment." This suggests that one for whom those values have "devalued themselves" must be left with nothing at all. Etymologically, it would certainly make sense to call such a person a "nihilist." In addition, Nietzsche suggests that one who is left with nothing in this manner has gained rather than lost: in denying that the world requires "purpose," "unity," or "truth" of the sort posited

by religious nihilists and despaired of by radical nihilists, one may regain the world of becoming in its original innocence:
one cannot judge, measure, compare, or even deny the whole! Why not? -- For five reasons, all accessible even to modest intellects; for example, because there is nothing besides the whole [weil es nichts gibt ausser dem Ganzen]. [...] And, once again, this is a tremendous restorative, for herein lies the innocence of all existence. (N:15[30] / WP:765; cf. TIVI:8) The Nietzschean term that suggests itself for the resulting position is "complete [vollendeter] nihilism," but this term must be used with care. I take it from Nietzsche's description of himself as "Europe's first complete nihilist, who, however, has himself already lived nihilism through to its end, within himself -- who has it behind him, beneath him, outside of him" (N:11[411] / WP:P). The wording of this passage indicates that Nietzsche, although Europe's first complete nihilist, is no longer a nihilist. I will nevertheless characterize this position as "complete nihilism" in the sense of completed nihilism, nihilism that has been lived through entirely, "the logic of our great values and ideals, thought through to its end" (N:11[411] / WP:P).

My use of the term receives some justification from Nietzsche's claim of having brought nihilism to its end, albeit only within himself; its advent within the world at large, he tells us, is to dominate "the history of the next two centuries." Following those two centuries, "in some future or other," there will be a countermovement, a transvaluation, that will "absolve [abl sen] this complete nihilism" (N:11[411] / WP:P). If Nietzsche cannot accomplish this transvaluation, he can at least foresee it, and thereby, within himself, bring nihilism to its end; but, again, he can be aware of doing so, can be aware that the end is end, only if he is beyond the end, only if he sees that what follows the end is no longer nihilism. One is a complete nihilist only when one has completed nihilism, thereby ceasing to be a nihilist. And indeed, in the continuation of the passage defining nihilism as the condition of one who has left only "the values that pass judgment -- nothing else," Nietzsche describes the "problem of strength and weakness" in terms that clearly place the strongest beyond the so-defined nihilism: (1) the weak collapse (2) the stronger destroy what does not collapse; (3) the strongest overcome the values that pass judgment. (N:9[107] / WP:37) The religious nihilist, unlike the radical nihilist, denies being a nihilist; what about the complete nihilist? Certainly, the latter acknowledges that
our world does not correspond to the traditional "highest values," and that we "have no right" to any other world; but this acknowledgment is paired with the denial that any other world "ought to be," and that our "world of becoming" ought not to be. For the complete nihilist, denigrating the world for

its lack of purpose is as senseless as denigrating a philosophical treatise for its lack of plot, a symphony for its lack of text, or a painting for representing, rather than containing, motion or depth. In non-Nietzschean terms: the complete nihilist considers nihilism itself to be the result of a category mistake. The complete nihilist thus returns to a position abandoned with the step to religious nihilism: the complete nihilist "deifies becoming and the apparent world as the only world, and calls them good"
(N:9[60] / WP:585).

lolcatz

NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 5 of 40

1NC 4/5
Active celebration of individual life avoids their debasement of humanity Celtel 5 (Andre, Professor @ Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology at Oxford, Categories of Self, 187-8, google books) Zanezor
A great deal of what Kierkegaard stood for was undone in the latter half of the nineteenth century by Nietzsche (184419(X)). In particular. Klerkegaards idealisation of the religious life, his high estimation of Christian self-denial, finds little resonance In Nietzsches hypercritical philosophy. For the latter, It is the aesthetic life that Is favoured freedom, if anywhere, is to be found in expressive, creative. Independent individuals, giving free reign to their emotions, to their Intrinsic will to power. While Kierkcgaard hoped to salvage Christianity from the absurdities of Christendom, Nietzsches attitude is far more damning: Christianity amounts to a deep-seated debasement of that human ideal that finds its highest expression in purely aesthetic values (Kenny 1988: 301). According to Nietzsche, the history of Western morality should be read as the reversal or transvaluatlon of two distinct moralities. In place of a master-morality espoused by the powerful or noble, the ruling elite, one that emphasizes strength, bravery. riches. luxury an overall zest for life: in place of this, a slave-morality, that of the lowly and disappointed, had gained ascendancy. This slave- or herd-morality

puts a premium on character traits befitting the underdog. traits such as solidarity. humility, self-denial, tolerance, and benevolence the Christian gospel of love Is among Its most exemplary expressions. What motivates Christianity Is not a selfless. spiritual piety, but a deep resentment, a spirit of revenge the meek shall inherit the earth against those who are stronger, happier, more noble, and powerful. Christianity encourages a view of worldly existence as empty and unfulfilling. It points to the vanity of even the greatest earthly accomplishments, the worthlessness of luxury and ambition, the inherent evil concealed in power, wealth, and excessive leisure. In short. Christianity denies, transvaluates, all those things enjoyed by the master class and unattainable to slaves it breeds contempt, even disdain, for life (Solomon 1988: 11522). Vulgarity and mediocrity arc the modern ideals: modern man is hardly a man at all. Nietzsches philosophy Is thoroughly this-worldly and Individualistic. In his view, to Impose a single universal standard. a categorical Imperative. Is to limit those with the greatest talents and abilities, to level out society to the lowest common denominator. Rational universal imperatives deny those inclinations and instinctual promptings that lie at the very heart of what it is to be a human being. Any imposition of universal standards equates to a morality of the masses, of the weak and downtrodden. Opposed to this pitiable leveling out of humanity. Nietzsche encourages a masterly morality, one that places individual excellence and creativity above obedience and social conformity. Christianity, like all metaphysical escape from this world, places the greatest obstacle to the fulfilment of human life. The death of God should thus be celebrated, since once again those basic instincts that have always been an essential part of humankind can freely and creatively resurface. The most fundamental of these Is the will to power, the secret of all existence, even of non-human life. Every living thing strives to fulfill its potential, to discharge its essential life-force. in the realm of humanity. the will to power Is the power of great souls, of artists, of self-sufficient and self-confident individuals, of a creative and expressive life. The ideal of Nietzsches ethical vision is realised In the person of the Ubermensch, (lie Superman or Overman. in a sense, this figure represents (lie quintessence of Romanticism, the total, harmonious, complete Individual. The Ubermensth is the completely self-realised Being toward which humanity as a whole should strive; although there is no guarantee, no evolutionary certainty, that humankind will ever attain to such great heights: man Is a rope tied between beast and Ubermensch,. Although human, all too human, we should strive to cultivate a state of mind In which we readily embrace our existence amor fati. This condition is manifest
in the joyful attitude towards the doctrine of eternal return, the hypothetical test or act of the imagination whereby everything that has happened, and will happen. throughout the course of ones life must be repeated again and again an Infinite number of limes. Amor fati is far removed from the passive, resigned response to life cultivated by the Stoics. It is an active celebration of ones own existence, much more in keeping with the Romantics the product of a strong, independent, energetic. superior. masterly life managed Spontaneously out of the creative will to power. Here there are no universal moralities, no necessary truths, no metaphysical holism, not even God. This Is my way. teaches Zarathustra. where is yours? Each masterly individual must forge their own way in life; each must uncover their own (ruti) or morality; each must locate their own certainty summoned up from the depths of their own individual being.

lolcatz

NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 6 of 40

1NC 5/5
Suffering is inevitable we must fully embrace it without a middle ground Wrisley No Date (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be, Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of
Attitudes and Ideals, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi=) Zanezor We have now come back to our original question. I said at the beginning of this paper that I would try to answer it indirectly by looking at two different ways of giving suffering meaning. The first way involved the ascetic ideal, which turned out to be a mendacious and deleterious means. Correlated with the ascetic ideal is the idea that suffering is to be avoided as far as possible: suffering is undesirable. But while it is

undesirable, it is ultimately unavoidable. But worse than not being able to avoid suffering is not being able to see it as meaningful. The ascetic ideal provided a meaning, which is essentially that we suffer as punishment for our sins; however, this turns out to actually increase our suffering through our intense feelings of guilt. At first the guilt acts as a narcotic for our suffering, but it ultimately gives way to more suffering. The unavoidability of suffering, and the mendaciousness and deleteriousness of the ascetic ideal and its associated idea that suffering is undesirable, I take as evidence that our attitude toward suffering should not be one of avoidance. Further, I take the life enhancing attributes of suffering and its subsequent meaningfulness coupled with the eternal recurrence to be a positive alternative ideal. It is an ideal that involves the wholehearted embracing of ones suffering, an attitude that seeks not to avoid suffering, but to see it as necessary and an opportunity for growth and strengthening. This I take to be evidence that our attitude toward suffering should not be one of avoidance. However, when I say that our attitude toward suffering should be one of embracement and not avoidance, I do not mean to suggest that we not try to avoid sickness or pain. Rather, the idea is that while we should neither seek out suffering nor never seek to circumvent it, when it does happen we should not bemoan or lament our situation, but seek to embrace it as an opportunity for enhancing ourselves in some way. At the same time, however, we should not try to make things too easy for ourselves, for it is harsh conditions that make strong; in this sense we should seek
great responsibilities and take much upon ourselves. There is a problem, however. We have seen that this alternative ideal is not open to all. There are some, the lower types, who are predisposed to suffer poorly. What should they do? Presumably they should stick with the ascetic ideal; however, I am reluctant to suggest that anyone stick with something mendacious and deleterious. This leads to an important question that I must leave unaddressed: is it possible for a lower type to struggle to become a higher type? From what we have seen, Nietzsche probably would say no; but while a lower type, because of his natural capacities, may not be able to become one of the highest types, I do not see why he would not be able to become a type higher than before. Further, insofar as there is truth to what I have argued, it will have profound implications for ethics: for example, in how we ought to treat others, in particularly how we ought to respond to the suffering of children and the sick. I said at the beginning of the paper that there is not a middle position between the two ideals available. That is, the attitude of avoiding suffering as far as possible and embracing it when it actually does happen, as it inevitably must, is not really a possibility. This is because to really adopt the Nietzschean alternative ideal, as I have tried to spell it out, is not compatible with trying to avoid suffering as far as possible, for reasons already given. Again this does not mean that one does not avoid an oncoming car or that one blithely walks into a pit of snakes.

lolcatz

NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 7 of 40

Link: Compassion Behind Plan (a2: you K Pity not Compassion)


Their appeal to compassion is more dangerous than pity we should help the poor without identifying with their weaknesses or risk negative life Tevenar 5 (Gurdren von, Prof of Philosophy @ Birkbeck University, Nietzsches Objections to Pity and Compassion,
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/gemes-work/GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05) Zanezor
Regarding the question whether Nietzsche truly believed that mere pity is all there is to Mitleid, one must concede that much speaks for such a conclusion since, as we have seen, most of the objections put forward by Nietzsche against Mitleid apply to Mitleid understood merely as pity and not as compassion. Because of this some

commentators that pity is all there is to Nietzsches Mitleid and thus to doubt that Nietzsche had any inkling of the existence and power of compassion. In what follows I will argue that Nietzsche was aware of the existence of compassion and, indeed, feared its power. Let us focus again on the difference between pity and compassion with the help of Nietzsches own words. Zarathustra declares [part
and translators believe II: Of the Pitiers]:

But I am a giver: gladly give I as a friend to friends. But strangers and the poor may help themselves to the fruit of my trees: it shames less that way. Let us leave aside the question of shame and concentrate solely on the attitude of the speaker who describes himself as a giver. He gladly gives to friends presumably out of friendship and also gives to strangers and the poor presumably out of Mitleid. So Zarathustra gives to both, but note the difference in his attitude towards them! With the first group Zarathustra identifies because of the bond of friendship, he is attentive to them as someone like himself as a friend to friends. But the second group, the strangers and poor, he keeps at a distance, a distance defined by their condition of strangeness and poverty. This is precisely the distance we have earlier defined as characteristic of the attitude of pity. It separates the needy by defining them as with a label by their condition of strangeness and poverty thus
failing to attend to them as persons, as someone like oneself. One consequence of keeping strangers and the poor in this way separate and at a distance is that, after opening the gates to ones orchard, nothing stops one now from happily continuing ones own pursuits such as, perhaps, feasting with ones friends while the needy are away in the orchard. Contrast this with what Nietzsche writes in On the Genealogy of Morals [III:14] where he speaks of the danger the weak pose for the strong as well as of the danger of great Mitleid. Nietzsche

informs us that the failed, downcast, and broken are the ones who most dangerously poison and call into question our confidence in life, in man, in ourselves. And so he warns us against what he calls the conspiracy of the sufferers and against a time when the weakest. .might succeed in shoving their own misery, all misery generally into the conscience of the happy: so that they would one day begin to be ashamed of their happiness and perhaps say to each other: it is a disgrace to be happy! there is too much misery! [my translation] But how do the weak manage to shove their misery into the conscience of the happy? They do it by inducing in them great Mitleid. It begins, according to Nietzsche, with the veiled look in the eyes of the wretched which produces in the strong a deep sadness. Nietzsche eloquently describes that veiled look as a dangerous mixture of pain and secret resentment: dangerous, because the resultant deep sadness is just the beginning. For Nietzsche predicts that this sadness will eventually grow into guilt and shame until, in the end, the happy begin to doubt their very right to happiness in face of too much misery. In other words, the misery and wretchedness of the weak has potentially serious consequences for the strong inasmuch as it undermines their hitherto unquestioned
confidence in the superior value of themselves and their lives. Please note that the objection to Mitleid in the Genealogy [III;14] is also of the detrimental-to-givers kind, but, unlike Zarathustra earlier, the agent now experiences and succumbs to great Mitleid, and is thus unable to simply cleanse herself of its effect by washing her hands and wiping her soul. The difference between the attitude of Zarathustra and Nietzsches description of great Mitleid in the Genealogy captures an important difference between pity and compassion. Remember the description of pity as agent distress at the suffering of others. There is ample everyday evidence that the distress of pity generally leads to action that relieves, at one and the same time, both the suffering of others and the distress of agents. This is precisely the case with Zarathustra: feeling pity for the hungry, he opens the gates of his orchard [or makes a credit card donation] thus relieving the hungry and his own distress. And now he can switch off, as it were, and continue untroubled with his previous lifestyle. Not so, however, with the agent Nietzsche describes in the Genealogy! Having looked deeply into the eyes of the wretched, that agent now experiences a deep sadness; a sadness, furthermore, which Nietzsche believes will eventually undermine her previous enjoyment and affirmation of life. In other words, after

looking deep in the eyes of pain, even if they also harbour secret resentment, things no longer remain the same, since the agent is now troubled by doubt about her previously unquestioned right to happiness, unsettled by the thought that it is a disgrace to be happy! there
is too much misery! So, unlike Zarathustra, this agent will be unable to merrily feast with her friends while the hungry are away in the orchard. So what is the difference? The difference is that Zarathustra feels Mitleid merely as pity while the deeply sad agent feels what Nietzsche

calls great Mitleid, which we can now confidently translate as compassion. By allowing the pain of others to move her in such a way as to feel solidarity with them, this agent bridges the gap of separation and otherness by acknowledging them as persons with whom she has a common bond. That very acknowledgement prevents her now from continuing to enjoy the kind of untroubled outlook that Nietzsche believes is - and wants to maintain as - the birthright of the strong. Moreover, that acknowledgement also initiates the dreaded slide into degeneration, since Nietzsche believed that once tempted by great Mitleid to succumb to sadness and feelings of guilt, the agent has forfeited, as it were, her right to membership of the strong for she now identifies with miserable members of the herd. And I suggest that this very power to tempt the strong to identify with the weak, thus subverting confidence in their own superiority, is precisely what Nietzsche most fears about great Mitleid or compassion. Hence the polemic, hence the passionate rhetoric of his objections, for Nietzsche certainly has no objections to feeding the hungry! Indeed, it would be a mistake to conclude, as Nussbaum seems to have done, that Nietzsche rejects feeding the hungry when he rejects Mitleid. Feeding the hungry is perfectly all right as long as it is done from an overflow of strength, from an abundance of happiness, and not from Mitleid, especially not from great Mitleid with its temptation to identify with the weak thus opening the sluice gates of degeneration. [see also Beyond Good And Evil 260 and Daybreak 103] lolcatz

NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 8 of 40

Link: Religion/Buddhism
Religion and Buddhism are obsessed with abolishing suffering Wrisley No Date (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be, Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of
Attitudes and Ideals, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi=) Zanezor

There may be various ways that one might try to do away with or avoid suffering, but religion provides a good if not paradigmatic example of such a way. In his explication of basic Buddhist concepts, Kogen Mizuno writes, The major purpose of all religions is to cure the illness of the spirit and create a wholesome, integrated psychological condition[their] major task is the essential improvement of the psychological being to ensure spiritual health and immunity to spiritual illness. There are surely those who might disagree to this being the major project of religion;
To begin I will look at the possibility of desiring the abolishment or minimizing of suffering. however, it is not objectionable that many turn to religion for solace from their suffering.

In Buddhism we can most easily find a direct expression of the notion of abolishing suffering. At the center of the Buddhas teachings are what are usually called the four noble truths: that life is suffering, that ignorance is the cause of suffering, that suffering can be eliminated, and that the Eightfold Path is the way to eliminate suffering. The Buddha is said to have been shaken out of his nave view of life by viewing the suffering of sickness, old age, and death. It was upon seeing these that he realized the true nature of life. The Dalai Lama often says that all sentient beings desire happiness and freedom from suffering. Here we find the idea that happiness and suffering are separate; the latter interferes with the former. We all want happiness, so we all desire freedom from suffering. Buddhism supposedly offers a way to achieve this freedoma freedom which is ultimately to be found in enlightenment and the cessation of the cycle of births and deaths; however, Buddhism also tries to cultivate happiness and the cessation of suffering
caused by such things as sickness and death even before enlightenment occurs and Nirvana is found.

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Link: Universal Morality


Universal moralities are dangerous for all parties Wrisley No Date (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be, Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of
Attitudes and Ideals, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi=) Zanezor

None of these ponderous herd animals with their unquiet consciences (who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as the cause of the general welfare) wants to know or even sense that the general welfare is no ideal, no goal, no remotely intelligible concept, but only an emeticthat what is fair for one cannot by any means for that reason alone also be fair for others; that the demand of one morality for all is detrimental for the higher man; in short, that there is an order of rank between man and man, hence also between morality and morality. There is a great deal going on in this passage. Nietzsche is arguing against the idea that English utilitarianism should be viewed as right for humanity as a whole. Nietzsche wants to make clear that a desire for a universal morality is not only a bad ideabecause of the order of rankbut also a dangerous one. The morality of the ascetic priest is dangerous to the higher type of man, for it is the morality of the meek and those that do not suffer well. And a morality that would be appropriate for the higher type would be dangerous for the lower type. Those in the lower ranks could not bear the burden of responsibility and suffering that comes with the higher type. This is, in part, why Nietzsche says that a further difference among people, one that further differentiates the order of rank, is their table of goods (what they take to be good) and what they take to be having something good. The higher type, for example, takes strength, self-reverence, and the ability to bear heavy responsibility as goods; the lower type takes timidity, humbleness, and altruistic ideals as goods (or poverty, humility, and chastity).

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Link: Universal Rights Defense of Inequality


Universal rights are a myth inequality is inevitable Wrisley No Date (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be, Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of
Attitudes and Ideals, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi=) Zanezor As we have seen, Nietzsche essentially advocates inequality. In todays world of political correctness and attempts by universities to push multiculturalism, to advocate inequality is blasphemous. But however distasteful the idea might be, we should give it a fair hearing. To begin, it is undeniable that humans are born with greatly unequal natural characteristics, abilities, and capacities. I will not try to list all the ways, but some of them include size, physical strength, metabolism, genetic predisposition to disease, eyesight, mental acuity, ability to concentrate, general disposition, demeanor, and so on. It is true that if you are not naturally a fast runner, you can train very hard to improve; nevertheless, if you are not predisposed to being really fast or to having great endurance, regardless of how hard you train, someone who is predisposed to these things will be faster or have greater endurance. We might be willing to acknowledge that people are physically and psychologically different, at which point we say that though they are different in body and mind, everyone should have equal rights and equal opportunities. But from what we have already seen, even this is repugnant to Nietzsche. For example, the higher types should have the right to rule, whereas the lower types are not fit to rule. Speaking disparagingly of those he takes to be falsely called free spirits in his time, Nietzsche writes, the two songs and doctrines which they repeat most often are equality of rights and sympathy for all that suffersand suffering itself they take for something that must be abolished. For Nietzsche, those who want to guarantee equality of rights and opportunity also want to do away with suffering. Their

hearts bleed for the suffering and inequality that they perceive. They do not realize the importance and necessity of suffering, Nietzsche would say. This is not to say that there are not actual cases where individuals are done wrong. Racism, in the sense, for example, of taking an individual of one race to be boorish or stupid simply by virtue of being of a particular race, can rightly be seen as doing that individual wrong. However, there is also the case of the violation of the rights of the higher type by the lower types calling for equality: Todaywhen only the herd animal receives and dispense honors in Europe, when equality of rights could all to easily be changed into equality in violating rightsI mean, into a common war on all that is rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, and the abundance of creative power and masterfulness.Equal rights, when preached by the lower type, mean the violation of the higher types rights, since the equal rights preached by the lower type are befitting the lower type alone. Kaufman writes:
In our timeequality is confused with conformityas Nietzsche sees itand it is taken to involve the renunciation of personal initiative and the demand for general leveling. Men are losing the ambition to be equally excellent, which involves as the surest means the desire to excel

one another in continued competition, and they are becoming resigned to being equally mediocre. Instead of vying for distinction, men nurture a ressentiment against all that is distinguished, superior, or strange. Wanting equal rights is a mark of shallownesssuch a shallow thinker fails to see the depth of distinctions that lie in human natures. A great many people easily feel nervous when they see others excel; they do not like to be reminded that they are not equal. This can be seen in
certain initiatives to do away with grades in schoolthe general desire by some to spare children, if not adults, the feeling of not being as good as someone else.

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Impact: Extinction
Compassion causes extinction it paralyzes progress Frazer 6 (Michael, Ph.D in political philosophy from Princeton, postdoctoral research associate in the Political Theory Project at Brown
University. Proferssor of Enlightenment polyphi @ Harvard, On Nietzschean Ethnic: The Compassion of Zarathuras: Nietzsche of Sympathy and Strength, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=421638) Zanezor
These are all strong arguments against compassion, to be sure. But Nietzsche insists that there is still a more important one. . . . Quite in general, compassion [das Mitleiden] crosses the law of development, which is the law of selection. It preserves what is ripe for destruction, it defends those who have been disinherited and condemned by life (AC 7, p. 573).35 The eugenic argument against compassion is a direct extension of the medical nature of Nietzschean ethics. Life itself recognizes no solidarity, no equal rights, between the healthy and the degenerate parts of an organism: one must excise the latteror the whole will perish, Nietzsche explains. As a result, Compassion for [Mitleiden mit] decadents, equal rights for the ill-constitutedthat would be the profoundest immorality; that would be antinature itself as morality! (WM 734, p. 389). The physician to humanity, in order to save it from its degenerate

parts, must therefore first play physician to the individual psyche, for it is the compassion in the individual that feeds the degeneracy in the collective. To be physicians here, to wield the scalpel here, Nietzsche explains, that is our part; that is our love of man; that is how we are philosophers (AC 7, p. 574).
Even this eugenic view, however, fails to capture the full danger of compassion, for it portrays the weak and sickly who are its objects as mere passive recipients of aid. To the contrary, compassion is actively wielded as a weapon in the hands of the weak. For the most degenerate of the degenerate, it is the one weapon they have left, the one last strength which shows that they are still alive as manifestations of the will to power. They therefore wield compassion with relish. When the weak beg the strong for sympathy, the compassion [Das Mitleiden] which these [the strong] then express is a consolation for the weak and suffering, inasmuch as it shows them that, all their weakness notwithstanding, they possess at any rate one power: the power to hurt (MAM I:50, p. 39). The result is not only the objective

degeneration of humanity over the generations, but also a subjective sense of shame on the part of those who remain strong. Full power over another, remember, is control over his values. The ultimate victory of the slaves over the masters thus comes when they have succeeded in poisoning the consciences of the fortunate with their own misery, with all misery, so that one day the fortunate begin to be ashamed of their good fortune and perhaps say to one another: it is disgraceful to be fortunate: there is too much misery (GM III:14, p. 560).

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Impact: Pity=Antihuman
They deny human vitality we need to embrace strength Porter 1 (Burton, prof of Philosophy at Amherst, The Good Life, Page 245, google books) Zanezor
Nietzsche singled out democracy. socialism, and Christianity as oppressive forces, lie regarded democracy and socialism as enemies of the vital spirit of humanity because they maintain that all people are equal and should have the same proportion of the worlds goods and an equal voice in government; the idea of someone being Superior and entitled to greater consideration is anathema to their values. Everything must he decided by majority rule, which means that bourgeois morality will carry the day We do not take a vote in order to decide the merits of a work of art or a scientific theory, but oddly enough we allow the masses to decide the social morality under which we live daily; the norms of mediocrity arc allowed to rule our social existence. Nietzsche criticized Christianity on similar grounds, for it seems in league with everything that is common and timid. To Nietzsches mind, Christianity favors humility and self-denial, pacifism, conservatism, and mutual helpfulness. This is a manifestation of herd morality which Christianity reflects and supports, and it is founded on weakness rather than strength. Christians are merely extolling their own inadequacies and transforming them into virtues because they do not have the courage to assert themselves. They believe the meek shall inherit the earth because they lack the strength of will to master the earth. Christianity is the religion of pity, Nietzsche wrote, and pity stands opposed to the tonic emotions which heighten our vitality; it has a depressing effect (and) makes suffering contagious. .. . In Christianity the instincts of the subjugated and oppressed come to the fore: here the lowest classes seek their salvation. Christian too is mortal enmity against the lords of the earth, against the noblealong with a sly, secret rivalry (one leaves them the body, one wants only the soul). Christian, finally, is the hatred of the spirit, of pride, courage, freedom, liberty of the spirit; Christian is the hatred of the senses, of by in the senses, of joy itself. Nietzsche thought Christianity not only antivital hut distracting in that it draws peoples attention away from real issues of human progress and personal growth. Like Marx. he did not want to understand the world so much as to change it, and Christianity stood in the way as a conservative force that persuades people to pin their hopes on the life to come and to control their earthly longings.

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Impact: V2l/Case Turn


The affs motivations delink humanity from pleasure and value worsens the problem Quain 9 (Tony, freelance writer on contemporary economic, political, and philosophical issues, achelor of Arts in Economics from
Georgetown University and a Master of Arts in Economics from George Mason University, author of The Political Reference Almanac, last updated july 13, Nietzsche and the Welfare State, http://www.tonyquain.com/philo/200611NW.shtml) Zanezor [Footnotes added in for explanation at 16]
Although Nietzsche has been shown to offer much disdain for benefactors and moralists, it is the Recipient who he by charitable intentions. This arises out of a fundamental misunderstanding of human happiness.

believes is harmed most

Discomfort and displeasure are necessary for us to experience and appreciate true pleasure and true happiness: "To this day you have the choice: either as little displeasure as possible, painlessness in briefand in the last analysis socialists and politicians of all parties have no right to promise their people more than thator as much displeasure as possible as the price for the growth and abundance of subtle pleasures and joys that have rarely been relished yet. If you decide for the former and desire to diminish and lower the level of human pain, you also have to diminish and lower the level of their capacity for joy." 16 (It should be noted that Nietzsche's aside in this quote about "socialists and politicians of all parties" is quite instructive. It indicates that politics can not increase our pleasure but only diminish our displeasure, i.e. only close the gap and thus reduce our capacity for joy. This presents a connection between Nietzsche's discussion of pleasure and his views on welfare statism). Without their opposites, pleasure and happiness have no relative value for us and no vivacity. More importantly, pain and misfortune provoke personal growth and evolution; loss brings with it new and increased strength.17 Those who face great pain with pride and happiness are heroic; "pain itself gives them their greatest moments They contribute immensely to the preservation of the species, even if it were only by opposing comfortableness and by not concealing how this sort of happiness nauseates them."18 Indeed, such "comfortableness" for Nietzsche is vegetative, a retreat from life. Further, "our 'benefactors' are, more than our enemies, people who make our worth and will smaller." In his concern for the Recipient, Nietzsche returns to an attack on pity: "It is the very essence of the emotion of pity that it strips away from the suffering of others whatever is distinctively personal."19 Ironically, this appears to be an appeal to a respect for human dignitynot the material dignity which Nietzsche disparages elsewhere (as shown), but a dignity of true individuality. Lest Nietzsche himself show pity for the Recipient, he reserves much of the blame for the recipients themselves. In receiving charity, they are all too willing to submit to the stronger. "Hence, we should make a distinction in benevolence between the impulse to appropriate and the impulse to submit, and ask whether it is the stronger or the weaker that feels benevolent joy and the wish to be desired appear together in the weaker that wants to become a function."

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Impact: V2L Embrace Suffering


Focusing on suffering of the weak devalues life we need to affirm existence Tevenar 5 (Gurdren von, Prof of Philosophy @ Birkbeck University, Nietzsches Objections to Pity and Compassion,
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/gemes-work/GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05) Zanezor
Yet before we can answer these questions we must gain an understanding of Nietzsches attitude towards suffering, ones own and the suffering of others. Nietzsche was highly critical of the attitude towards suffering prevalent at his time, and indeed now, where suffering, particularly the suffering of others, of the multitude of others, mattered and mattered greatly. He blamed Christianity for this and also, more narrowly because applying only to the educated, Schopenhauer. Nietzsche observed how both Christianity and Schopenhauer ascribe to our suffering empirical as well as metaphysical significance. Christian dogma links empirical suffering here on earth to both original and personal sin and promises release via purification and atonement as well as salvation via Christ; while Schopenhauer states that our empirical suffering is but the inevitable outcome of a metaphysical reality governed by a blind, relentless drive to life the Will. Thus both theories offer an explanation why suffering is so pervasive and the seemingly inescapable lot of each and everyone. In view of these explanations, one can

readily see why both theories value and promote Mitleid as an appropriate because somewhat soothing and consoling response. Yet Nietzsche utterly rejects this response, particularly its passivity and easy slide to resignation. Nor is that all. Even more abhorrent, because more threatening to Nietzsches revaluation project, are the wider consequences of the Christian and Schopenhauerian views, inasmuch as both drain value out of this our earthly lives. Christianity postulates life on earth as a mere testing station and hence just preliminary to the real life to come in the beyond; and Schopenhauer, with his well-known pessimism, goes even further by claiming that it would be better for us not to be born, thus rejecting life altogether. Given that one of Nietzsches most urgent aims was the affirmation and, indeed, re-affirmation of life, it is not surprising why the combination of Mitleid and negative significance of suffering should be seen by him as a threat and odious obstacle to his aim.
Against Mitleid and against the negative significance of suffering Nietzsche puts forward his own proposals. He argues in On the Genealogy of Morals [III:14] that suffering and particularly the suffering of others, i.e. the suffering of the sick, weak, and misshapen multitude of the herd, must not be

allowed to obstruct the life of the strong - those lucky, talented, healthy few who must be promoted because needed as blueprint for future men. He warns us therefore against what he calls the conspiracy of the sufferers against the well-formed and victorious and makes his famous claim that the weak pose the greatest danger to the strong, and that the strong and healthy have to be shielded from polluting contact with the sick with their secret resentment and veiled pleas for Mitleid. On a more positive note, Nietzsche urges us to accept our suffering as an integral part of a worthwhile life, to actively and purposefully master it and not just passively suffer it. Active acceptance and mastering are not just better ways of coping with suffering, they function at the same time also as an affirmation of life. Hence Nietzsche despised the feeble resignation and impotent resentment with which members of the herd fail to accept their suffering, thus fail to cope, thus fail to affirm.

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Impact: Tyranny/Violence
Their benign mission is informed by a lust for power their herd instinct makes violence inevitable Yovel 86 (Yirmiahu, Schulman Professor of Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Hans Jonas Professor at the
Graduate Faculty, the New School, Nietzsche as an affirmative thinker, 49-50, google books) Zanezor
Nietzsches account began with two types, the aristocratic master, the servile slave. The

master is, and his morality extols, health, competition, beauty. independence, power, self-control, pride, spontaneity, and passion. The self-directed master derives his values not from the community, not from the herd, but presumably from the abundance of his own life and strength. The slave, however, fears the strength and power of the master; and he despises him. He is dependent, powerless, without self-direction, discipline or self-control. To seize control over his own psychic destiny, the slave must curb and tame his master. He must displace him in a sense. And the method of overcoming the master arid his morality, the means to his displacement, is to render the values of the herd absolute and universal. This revolt of the slaves in moral matters is both creative and resentful. Powerless to effect a fundamental change in his condition, he wreaks vengeance against the master by converting the masters attributes into vices. And while
master morality sanctions coexistence with inferior types and morals, the resentment of the slave yearns for universality. Nothing is to escape its moral clutches alive. Nietzsche does not mean to suggest that the slaves resentment of and revenge against the master is either direct or conscious. It is in this context, the context of moral-psychological imperialism, that the slaves resentment is to be understood. Since the slave cannot displace

the master in reality, he avenges himself symbolically, mythically. Hence the triumph of the religion of the slave Christianity (and Judaism). Christianity is first of all the Ideology of slave morality for Nietzsche. It expresses the slaves resentment against the attributes of master morality by vilifying them. The virtues of the muter become sin. In place of power, it is said that the meek shall inherit the earth. Pride is sin. Humility is virtue. Charity, chastity, and obedience replace competition, sensuality, and autonomy. Finally, the innocence of existence, its topic neutrality, too, is abolished in the triumph of slave morality qua Christianity. On this view, Christianity is the fruit of resentment. As a product of weakness it represents the decline of life, decadence, degeneracy, in contrast to the exuberant ascent of life which seeks expression in master morality. And so it also follows for Nietzsche that Christianity, like Platonic philosophy, severs body and soul, that it deprecates the human body. Impulse. instinct, passion, beauty, the intellect, as well as aesthetic values generally. Nietzsche goes so far as to see even in the rise of democratic and socialist movements the vestiges of Christianity. vestiges of the slave morality I have been mentioning: We shall wreak vengeance and abuse upon all whose equals we are not thus do the tarantula-hearts vow. And will to equality shall henceforth be the name for virtue; and against all that has power we want to raise our clamor. You preachers of equality, the tyrannomania of impotence clamors thus out of you for equality: your most secret ambitions to be tyrants thus shroud themselves in words of virtue! Aggrieved conceit, repressed envy perhaps the conceit and envy of your fathers erupt from you as a flame and as the frenzy of revenge. (Z On the Tararnubs) Note that the will to equality is here characterized by Nietzsche as a disguised lust for power. The objective as in all slave morality, is to slake the thirst to be tyrants. Tyrannomania is possible only for those who feel and indeed are unequal, for those who must legislate to others in order to feel equal, for those who must dominate. For those who are genuinely superior, domination is cultural. It is self-directed. It needs no other. For Nietzsche this struggle between spirit and power is always and everywhere
in evidence. In the end, no one can spend more than he has: that is true of the individual. it is true of a people... culture and the State one should not deceive oneself about this are antagonists... One lives off the other, one thrives at the expense of the other. (TI What the Germans Lack 4) We may now be in a better position to appreciate the force of Nietzsches claim that democracy and socialism are to be understood as growing on the soil of Christianity; for we now need to see the state as the supplanting deity in the lives of Europeans. The state is a surrogate god. Even Hegels philosophizing is sometimes understood by Nietzsche in the coarse sense in which it was later to be assimilated by other authors, as providing nurture for authoritarian-totalitarian readings of history and destiny. For example, Hegel: ...Right is with the victorious: they represent the progress of mankind. Attempt to prove the dominion of morality by means of history. (WP 415) The significance of German philosophy (Hegel): to evolve a pantheism through which evil, error, and suffering are not felt as arguments against divinity. This grandiose project has been misused by the existing powers (state. etc.). as if it sanctioned the rationality of whoever happened to be ruling. (WP 416) The nation-state retains a transcendent value and mission, a providential role which history expresses and seeks to realize. Bismarckophobia and virulent nationalism may generally be read as interchangeable expressions in Nietzsches litany without much loss of sense. And

again it is the herd instinct. The morality of the slavish, which seeks expression here. Dreams of universality now attach to the nation and its state with missionary fervor and zeal. The slaughter of rivals and the conquest of the earth proceed under the banner of universal brotherhood. But that is merely symptomatic of the tyrannomania of impotence. Again, the herd instinct, the need to be in it together, collective revenge. is what runs rampant in nationalism. And just as the God of Christianity represented life
at ebb tide, at bottom, just as God represented a force essentially hostile to life, so the nation-State, too, represents the aspirations of the base, the despicable, the slave, on this view.

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Solvency Indeterminate Overstretch


Attempts to relate to all acts of suffering makes real resistance impossible Bruckner 86 (Pascal, Associate professor, Institut dtudes Politiques de Paris) The Tears of the White Man, p 68-69//
WLT Supposedly, we do not have the right to rest as long as a single child continues to suffer, because our moral monitors have ordained that we take on the whole human race as our responsibility. We must give up family ties, friendship, and nationality so as to honor only the universal figure of suffering Man. Any struggle against oppression becomes my struggle. It does not occur to our good apostles that there is no common denominator to these conflicts and that justice varies from one country to another, depending on its context. I am supposed to extend myself everywhere, and in the same day I am supposed to mobilize for Nicaragua, the guerillas in
El Salvador, mutilated Moslem women, and vivisected cats, dogs, and mice, without forgetting the latest strike in a Parisian factory or some demand students have hurled at their professors. Everything concerns me, and I must put myself into the midst of the welter dying, suffering, agonized people, those in protest, the misunderstood, and the weak. All the world is my garden, and I must tend to it. I embrace the whole gamut of affliction around the globe, in one oceanic and inclusive emotion. I am a soldier of famine and a soldier of God. I indignantly refuse all thought of private pleasure. I will be on alert till the end of the world. I am a hero of unselfishness.

We cannot pretend to imitate Jesus. People exist for us only in situations where we encounter them. If course, in all our actions the rest of the world is somehow involved and the extent of our responsibilities is related to the dimensions of our actions. But certain people need help from us right now, because they are our neighbors, and their expectations define our priorities of action. Even if every enterprise is ultimately tied to the rest of the human race, our solidarity is primarily local or national. What relation is there
between a taxi drivers strike in Marseille and a demonstration by peanut farmers in the Ivory Coast? What do road blocks put up by wine growers in southern France have to do with the struggle of Arizona Indians against the U.S. federal government? The situations are not interchangeable.

If you try to be everyones neighbor, you will end up as nobodys neighbor. For me to proclaim my solidarity with the sufferings of the human race, to give up friends, relatives, and fatherland for some vague universal feeling of sympathy, is literally a mockery. It is impossible to escape ones time and country with a wave of the hand, and the attempt to assert world citizenship carries with it its own failure. An overblown conscience is an empty conscience.

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Alt = Absolute Love for Life


The alt is an absolute embrace of all parts of life generates true meaning Wrisley No Date (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be, Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of
Attitudes and Ideals, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi=) Zanezor The greatest weight. What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequenceeven this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust! Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine. If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, Do you desire this once more

and innumerable times more? would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? Relating this back to suffering, if one cannot embrace all that one lives through, which includes profound suffering, then one cannot embrace the idea of the eternal recurrence. In embracing the eternal recurrence one embraces every aspect of ones life. I want to say that part of this embrace involves the recognition of the necessity and life enhancing aspects of sufferingthe recognition that suffering thereby has a meaning. To my knowledge, Nietzsche does not say directly that suffering can or cannot be given a meaning through the acknowledgment and embracement of its necessary and life enhancing aspects. But it is clear that insofar as Nietzsches alternative ideal involves the eternal recurrence it also involves embracing ones suffering: My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal itall idealism is mendacious in the face of what is necessarybut love it. To live is to suffer; to be able to embrace ones life means being able to embrace, to love, ones sufferingones fate as a creature who is born to suffer. Seeing our suffering as meaningful for its necessary and life enhancing aspects should mean a rejection of suicidal nihilism. For suffering would then no longer be without a meaning, which is the central motivating factor of suicidal nihilism; further, if we couple this alternative ideal with the eternal recurrence, we affirm life and thus do not want to end it.

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Alt Recognizes Suffering Reorientation


The alt doesnt ignore suffering we positively redefine our relationship Frazer 6 (Michael, Ph.D in political philosophy from Princeton, postdoctoral research associate in the Political Theory Project at Brown
University. Proferssor of Enlightenment polyphi @ Harvard, On Nietzschean Ethnic: The Compassion of Zarathuras: Nietzsche of Sympathy and Strength, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=421638) Zanezor

In contrast to this compassion which gets things wrong, Nietzsche paints a rather mysterious alternative which somehow gets things right. This is a more manly brother of compassion [mannlicheren Bruder des Mitleidens] (MR I:78, p. 79), Nietzsche writes; it is a feeling for which I find no name accurate (WM 367, pp. 198199). At one point, this unnamable Ubermitleid is identified with the species of suffering experienced only when the genius of ability and of knowledge is amalgamated with moral genius in the same individual. Such a man has an extra- and suprapersonal sensibility attuned to a nation, to mankind, to a whole culture, to all suffering existence [allem leidenden Dasein], which acquires its value through its connection with very difficult and remote forms of knowledge. In contrast to such a sensibility, compassion itself [Mitleid an sich] remains of very little value (MAM I:157, p. 84). At another point, Nietzsche insists the sensibility he is advocating is actually not a sort of suffering, not a sort of Leid or Mitleid, at all. It is not compassion, he writes, that opens the gates to the most distant and strange types of being and culture but rather a kind of empathy that does not suffer with [nicht mitleidet] but on the contrary takes delight in a hundred things that led people to suffer. This manlier brother of compassion is a sort of feeling-with and knowing-with [Mitempfindung und . . . Mitwissen] which is nonetheless far from being compassionate [mitleidig] (MR II:113, p. 113). In todays English terminology, it is a joyous, sometimes cruel empathy that pitilessly penetrates into anothers experience of suffering without ever coming to feel this suffering itself. This empathy may emotionally overwhelm those who experience it, but Nietzsche insists that their delightful pain is not compassionate. Even when we are shaken by the sight of suffering and moved to tears, he writes, we do not by any means for that reason feel like helping (WM 119, pp. 7273).

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Alt Solves Case Noble Gift Giving


The alt enables noble gift giving solves the case Frazer 6 (Michael, Ph.D in political philosophy from Princeton, postdoctoral research associate in the Political Theory Project at Brown
University. Proferssor of Enlightenment polyphi @ Harvard, On Nietzschean Ethnic: The Compassion of Zarathuras: Nietzsche of Sympathy and Strength, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=421638) Zanezor
Nietzsche is undoubtedly filled with rage at those who bring about the degeneration of humanity by obtaining the compassion of their natural superiors, rage seemingly justified from the perspective of life. Nonetheless, his precise feelings toward compassion take a rather surprising form. Anyone . . . who approached this almost deliberate degeneration and atrophy of man represented by the Christian European . . . would surely have to cry out in wrath, in compassion [mit Mitleid ], in horror: O you dolts, you presumptuous, compassionate [mitleidigen] dolts, what have you done! (JGB III: 62, p. 265). Nietzsche, in other words, reacts to the sight of humanity diminishing itself through compassion with compassion, albeit a higher and more farsighted compassion [Mitleiden] than the Christian and quasi-post-Christian moralists foolish hatred of sheer suffering. Thus, Nietzsche concludes, it is compassion versus compassion [Mitleid also gegen Mitleid] (JGB VII:225, pp. 34344). Given all of Nietzsches arguments outlined above, however, how can he possibly endorse compassion in any form? Can there really be a compassion of strength? One might answer in the negative, while finding some appropriately noble disposition that could perform an analogous function in the case of the strong and pitiless. Such a sentiment would lead the naturally healthy aristocrat to the service of a degenerating humanity without dragging him into the great cesspool of human suffering. To the contrary, it would grow naturally from the very health and power which keeps the nobleman at such a distance from his miserable inferiors. If Nietzsche, at times, still speaks of this sentiment as a sort of compassion, he is using the word very loosely, and primarily for ironic effect. And the best candidate for such a noble replacement for compassion is the gift-giving virtue discussed throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In the prologue of that epic work, our hero at first tells the saint that he has left his lofty seclusion out of a (compassionate?) love of lesser men. Quickly, however, Zarathustra corrects himself. Did I speak of love? I bring men a gift (Z Prologue:2, p. 123). Nor is the gift-giving virtue a mere quirk of Nietzsches protagonist; on the contrary, it is integral to the authors conception of health and strength. Those poor in life, the weak, impoverish life, he writes. Those rich in life, the strong, enrich it. The first are parasites of life; the second give presents to it (WM 48, p. 30). If you are naturally, vitally noble you will inevitably force all things to and into yourself that they may flow back out of your well as the gifts of your love (Z I On the Gift-Giving Virtue, 1, p. 187). The gift-giving virtue, however, is by no means a form of compassion, let alone a compassion of strength. Instead, it is compassions usurper and replacement. The noble human being helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from compassion [nicht oder fast nicht aus Mitleid], but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power (JGB IX:260, p. 395). Yet one should not overlook or underestimate that fast.36 To suggest that Nietzsche is discussing the gift-giving virtue when he approves of compassion does violence to his insistence that his higher Mitleid still deserves that otherwise lowly appellation. A genuinely compassionate form of compassion is, for Nietzsche, still actively present in the noble soul.

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Alt: Master Morality Freedom


We need to embrace a master morality allows for new freedom Porter 1 (Burton, prof of Philosophy at Amherst, The Good Life, Page 245, google books) Zanezor
In place of the herd or slave morality promoted by democracy, socialism, and Christianity, Nietzsche advocated a master moralitvat least for the outstanding individuals who have the courage to adopt it. Slave virtues may be fine for the masses who endorse their own mediocre and obsequious slate but these virtues must not be allowed to govern the strong, decisive, daring. and creative individuals whom Nietzsche called the masters. They must have a new ethic founded on the will to power rather than on safety and conformity one that brings about a transvaluation of all values or is beyond good and evil. The masters can transcend conventional morality and, creating their own code, assume leadership of the world, guiding it out of the lethargy and stagnation into which slave morality has plunged it. Nietzsche advocated a dualistic theory of morals, with one set of principles for masters and another for slaves, although he hoped for the eventual dispersion of the mass of slaves as they achieved progressive self-awareness. For no man is a slave or a master by nature, but only through cowardice or courage. The master asserts his will and uses his capacity for free action to escape the abject state; he takes the risk of freedom to create himself according to his own lights and raise humanity to a new level. Master morality was obviously Nietzsches ideal and he affirmed it even though social turmoil would result.

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Alt Solves Case Self-D


The alternative solves self-determination allows social mobility and avoids unnatural inclinations Quain 9 (Tony, freelance writer on contemporary economic, political, and philosophical issues, achelor of Arts in Economics from
Georgetown University and a Master of Arts in Economics from George Mason University, author of The Political Reference Almanac, last updated july 13, Nietzsche and the Welfare State, http://www.tonyquain.com/philo/200611NW.shtml) Zanezor
Yet there

is an escape from this desire to submit. He asserts that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severelya god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience." Here, Nietzsche's solution is to will one's own command: "Conversely, one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self-determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty Such a spirit would be the free spirit par excellence."21 In this way, the Recipient can acquire strength and overcome. Whether one's point of view is that of the Benefactor, the Moralist, or the Recipient, it is quite evident that the redistributive welfare state is abhorrent to Nietzsche. It is natural and proper that man should attempt to increase his power to achieve happiness; it is distasteful and indecent that he should do this by appropriation of or submission to another's will. In his own words: "Is it not clear that with all this we are bound to feel ill at ease in an age that likes to claim the distinction of the most humane, the mildest, and the most righteous age the sun has ever seen?"22 Is our own age thus any less repugnant to Nietzsche?

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Alt Solves Value


The selflessness of the aff is parasitic only an individualist paradigm has value Hunt 6 (Lester, Philosophy Prof at U of Wisconsin-Madison in in the areas of moral, political, and legal philosophy, THUS
SPAKE HOWARD ROARK: NIETZSCHEAN IDEAS IN THE FOUNTAINHEAD, MUSE) Zanezor
In his courtroom speech, he makes an important move that he refrained from making in the last dialogue with Wynand: he specifies and describes the way of life that he takes to be the only alternative to the second-handers way. The name he gives to the alternative charactertype has an eminently Nietzschean clang to it: he calls contrasting type the creator.15 His initial description of it suggests a much deeper connection than merely verbal echoes: The creators are not selfless. It is the whole secret of their powerthat it was self-sufficient, self-motivated, self-

generated. first cause, a fount of energy, a life force, a Prime Mover. The creator served nothing and no one. He had lived for himself. (p. 737)16 Here Roark characterizes the positive pole of his distinction between the two ways of life first of all in terms of its power, and he
characterizes the nature of this power as a process that, because its activity flows from its own internal nature and not from external stimuli, presents itself to an external point of view as spontaneous. So far, the point of view is thoroughly Nietzschean. The anti-Nietzschean moment comes near the end of the speech, when he says that the sphere of activity of the creator includes the whole sphere of his creative faculty, his work, but does not include the sphere of the gangster, the altruist and the dictator (pp. 74041). The reason he immediately gives for this pronouncement is however strikingly Nietzschean:

Rulers of men . . . create nothing. They exist entirely through the persons of others. Their goal is in their subjects, in the activity of enslaving. They are as dependent as the beggar, the social worker, the bandit. The form of dependence does not matter. (p.
741).

As a criticism of the rulers of men, this line of thinking has two essential elements that are quite different and become explicit in different parts of his speech. On the one hand, he is alleging parasitism of a physical sort. Part of his concern, as he indicates earlier, is with the ways in which human beings manage to survive. As he says: Nothing is given to man on earth. Everything he needs has to be produced. And here man faces his basic alternative: he can survive in only one of two ways by the independent work of his own mind or as a parasite fed by the minds of others. The creator originates. The parasite borrows. The creator faces nature alone. The parasite faces nature through an intermediary. (p. 738) Part of the criticism of ruling lies in the simple fact that, in so far as hegemony functions as a way of making ones way, of surviving, then what one is doing is getting others to provide one with the wherewithal to live. It is the original producers who are using their powers to make human life possible, the ruler is simply, in this respect, a parasite, physically dependent on others.
As Roark puts it, the basic need of the secondhander is to secure his ties with men in order to be fed (p. 738). It is easy to see how someone could use this idea to argue that this way of life represents a low grade or quantity of power. There is, as I have said, another aspect of Roarks critique of hegemonic power. It is less obvious than this one but necessary to the unity of his position. He touches on this aspect when at one point in his speech he says: The man who attempts to live for others is a dependent. He is a parasite in motive and makes parasites of those he serves (p. 738). There are two completely different sorts of parasitism being alleged here. The sort of parasitism that he says is brought about by one who attempts to live for others is obviously the physical

dependence that I have just addressed: he is saying that if one is the recipient of the altruistically donated services of others one is, in that respect, physically dependent on the productive capacities of others for the wherewithal to make ones way in the world. But the other sort of parasitism, the parasitism in motive, this exists in the one who renders the services, and just because one has made the attempt to live for others, is an entirely different sort of thing. So, for that matter, is the sort of
dependence that he was alleging in the description of Keating in the earlier dialogue with Wynand. There the dependence, the secondariness, of the secondhander was located not, primarily, in the realm of physical fact, but in that of the consciousness of the facts. As Rand puts it earlier in an earlier passage summarizing Keatings psychology: He was great; great as the number of people who told him so. He was right; right as the number of people who believed him. He looked at the faces, at the eyes; he saw himself born in them, he saw himself being granted the gift of life. (pp. 19697) For Keating, the standard of value, the one feature of the world that is an infallible indicator of value, is not in his own consciousness, nor in the facts, but in other peoples estimates of the facts. Keating is not only a physical parasite but, one might say,

an axiological parasite, in that the consciousness of others is what puts the stamp of value one his own life. At the basis of his system of values is thus a certain compulsion to look outward. He does not seek the other in order to gratefully affirm a pre-existing conviction of his own value, but for the foundation of his values. To understand fully his way of life is to see it as a reaction to external stimuli. All this of course is in accord with Nietzsches way of thinking on these matters. But Roark suggests by implication that those whose fundamental value is to rule others are open to the same sort of critique. He does not explicitly say why this is so in his courtroom speech,
but Rand hints at the reason in the novel, primarily in the characterization of Keating. At first glance, this seems odd. Keating, one might suppose, is a quite different sort of character from the predatory Wynand. He is the charming young man who makes his way by pleasing othersby flattering them and imitating them, and not by overcoming and subduing them. Actually, Rand is careful to indicate that there is a darker site to Keatings second-handedness, and her treatment of Keating is meant to show how both sorts of parasitism are essential to the character-type that seeks power over others. Keatings character has always had a predatory side, an aspect that he describes (using the term in an un-Roarkian sense) as selfish. Soon after he goes to work for the architectural firm of Francon and Heyer, he goes to work on Tim Davis, the favored draftsman in the office; eventually, as a series of devious favors for him, he takes over most of Davis responsibilities in the office, so that he is eventually fired. Keating takes his place. He then manipulates the head designer, Claude Stengel, into leaving the firm in order to start one of his own. Then, when he comes to face his first assignment as designer, the thought of the men he defeated in order to win this opportunity is deeply meaningful to him, and yet at the same time somehow meaningless. He thought of Tim Davis, of Stengel, of many others who had wanted [this opportunity], had struggled for it, had tried, had been beatenby him. It was a triumphant

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feeling. Yet as far as the actual execution of this assignment itself is concerned, these victories are no help at all. Instead of seeing the building, a simple residence, rise up before him, he saw it sinking; he saw its shape as a pit in the ground; and as a pit within him; as an emptiness, with only Davis and Stengel rattling uselessly within it (p. 70).

When he has drawn up a plan for the house he is, in spite of many hours of work on it, still radically uncertain of its value; and he decides to do the same thing he had done with his most important projects in college: he seeks Roarks help. Later, when he is attempting to design a
submission for a highly publicized building competition, his one great chance for early fame, the incident is narrated in a manner calculated to underline the parallel with his designing his first residence. Keating finds himself thinking of the man who might win and be proclaimed publicly his superior, of the absolute necessity of defeating that man. As to the inner resources he might use to beat him, there was no Peter Keating, there was only a suction chamber that sucked other beings dry and thus acquired its own substance. Again, he goes to Roark for help (p. 180). Overcoming and subduing other

people is not merely a side-effect of Keatings achieving his goals, nor is it a means to an end. It is one of his values, in the sense that it is something that he pursues as good in itself. What Rand is suggesting is that if such things are pursued as good in themselves, then the there is no way to satisfactorily explain why it has this sort of value except by supposing that it rests on the sense of validity one derives from the consciousness of others, either of the defeated rivals or those who are impressed by it. The point of the activity lies in either case in the substitution of the recognition by some other person for ones own judgment. The seeking of hegemonic power, then, is an instance of the axiological parasitism of the second-hander in fundamentally the same way that Keatings less malevolent activities are. Those who seek ultimately to rule or hurt others are selfless in the same way that those who seek ultimately to serve or please others.

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Must Embrace Suffering Positive Attitude Key


Embracing suffering as a tool to produce greatness is key we access human strength Wrisley No Date (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be, Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of
Attitudes and Ideals, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi=) Zanezor Can we say now, as Hillesheim does, that since

harsh conditions and suffering can function as a psychological stimulant to further growth that Suffering is thus not without meaning; mans suffering is transfigured by the knowledge that it serves a lifeenhancing end? Or as Sefler says, in regard to an individual giving meaning to her suffering, The proper way of understanding suffering, Friedrich Nietzsche proposes, is to acknowledge its existence and to give it a positive and necessary status within human life?
We still have yet to look at the role of the eternal recurrence, which is what Leiter takes to be the center of Nietzsches offered alternative ideal to the ascetic ideal, yet at this point we can say, pace Leiter, that suffering can be given a meaning, we can answer the question Why do I suffer? with, I suffer, not as a punishment, but in order to become better and stronger; it is up to me to use my suffering. This answer differs in an important way from that of the religious answer, say, that of the Christian or Buddhist. Whereas they are backwards-looking, looking for a cause or reason for our suffering, our Nietzschean answer is forward-looking: suffering has meaning not because it is deserved but because of its possible life enhancing capabilities. Suffering is not to be endured as a deserved punishment, but embraced because it is pregnant with possibilities for growth and power. We must, however, be careful with this answer. The idea that suffering is somehow justified through its life-enhancing capabilities does not mean that the great joy that may result from profound suffering is a justification for our suffering. At least this is not what Nietzsche wanted to say: The more volcanic the earth, the greater the happiness will be - but it would be ludicrous to say that this happiness justified suffering per se." But this brings to light another issue: if the joy that might result from suffering does not justify suffering, why should the strengthening aspect of suffering justify or give meaning to suffering? After all, if both happiness and enhancement are possible results of suffering, and happiness does not justify suffering, why should enhancement? For Nietzsche, the answer might be that human greatness is a goal, but human happiness is not. It is suffering, not happiness, that makes great. So, since happiness is not

to be desired over suffering to begin with, any happiness that results from volcanic earth is not going to justify our suffering. But the life-enhancing aspects of suffering do give suffering meaning because human greatness is more desirable than human happiness per se. However, this possible response to suffering and its meaning is still incomplete. We must turn to further considerations. The strengthening role of suffering in human life is another mark against religious morality for Nietzsche. He saw the strengthening of the species as desirable; or more precisely, he saw the cultivation of higher types of humans as desirable (more on this below). This is one
of the reasons his tongue was so sharp in his polemic against religious morality. In previous sections we witnessed his reasons for considering the ascetic priests method of giving meaning to our suffering mendacious and deleterious. Here we can bring forth another reason for his distaste for religious morality. We saw the various palliatives provided by the ascetic priest for his flocka flock that consists of the meek, those who have twisted earlier valuations and who have found ways to protect and propagate themselves. As such, Nietzsche sees them as weakening the species, and this is why he says of Buddhism and Christianity: They seek to preserve, to preserve alive whatever can possibly be preservedthe sovereign religions we have had so far are among the chief causes that have kept the type man on a lower rungthey have preserved too much of what ought to perishto preserve all that was sick and that sufferedwhich means, in fact and in truth, to worsen the European race.

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Proposing Alt Key A2:Suicidal Nihilism


The mere proposal of the alternative sparks change reorients our relationship to suffering and stops dangerous nihilism Wrisley No Date (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be, Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of
Attitudes and Ideals, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi=) Zanezor Leiter notes rightly that if

the ascetic ideal has been the only ideal so far available, the appearance of an alternative ideal would be of enormous significance. Nietzsche writes concerning the ascetic ideal, Above all, a counterideal was lackinguntil Zarathustra. So it seems Nietzsche sees himself as offering such a counterideal with his Zarathustra. Leiter writes that a new ideal
must be able to answer the question Suffering for what? and thus be able to block suicidal nihilism. But what kind of ideal is Nietzsche offering? In his discussion of Thus Spoke Zarathustra in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche writes that the penultimate section of the fourth book of his The Gay Science contains the basic idea of Zarathustra. As Kaufman notes, the idea here referred to is the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche starts the discussion by writing that, The fundamental conception of [Thus Spoke Zarathustra] is the idea of the eternal recurrence, this highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable. To this Leiter adds that the embracing of the eternal recurrence would remove suicidal nihilism, since someone who is nihilistically suicidal is not going to want to repeat life eternally, but end it prematurely. From this Leiter concludes that the teaching of the eternal recurrence is the alternative ideal offered by Nietzsche through Zarathustra, for whom, Pain is not considered an objection to life (EH III: Z-1) and who says Yes to the point of justifying, of redeeming even all of the past (EH III: Z-8). Further, Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil that if we look down into the most world-denying of all possible ways of thinking, free of the delusive force of religious morality, we may see the opposite ideal:

The ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but who wants to have what was and is repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably da caponot only to himself but to the whole play and spectacle.
If the ideal that Nietzsche offers is the eternal recurrence and this ideal can stave off suicidal nihilism, there still remains the question of what meaning, if any, can be found for suffering in relation to the eternal recurrence. According to Leiter, the whole-hearted embracing of the eternal recurrence involves an acceptance of there not being any meaning to our suffering. To substantiate this claim Leiter quotes Nietzsches claim that the human will needs an aim and it would rather will nothing, i.e., the ascetic ideal, than not will. The eternal recurrence provides no meaning or justification for our suffering but it does provide another aim for the will: rather than will the ascetic ideal, one can will the eternal recurrence of every pleasure and pain, every small detail of ones life. There is the problem perhaps that only the strongest can embrace the idea of the eternal recurrence, and therefore, the ascetic ideal will still be needed for the majority of wretched souls. But the eternal recurrence is at least a true and great possibility for those great human souls who are strong

enough to handle its consequences.


To be fair, the least developed part of Leiters interpretation of the Genealogy of Morals is this last part, where he speaks of the eternal recurrence as an alternative to the ascetic ideal. Nevertheless, this is where is interpretation is weakest and, I believe, needs to be revised. A case can be made, and I will now attempt to make it, that suffering can be given a meaning along the lines of the eternal recurrence by way of acknowledging the necessity of suffering for greatness in human achievement and development. Let us now turn to this possibility. If we are not to try to abolish all suffering, which ultimately amounts to merely avoiding suffering some of the time, then how can we view suffering in a way that is fecund and best for the enhancement of life? Perhaps one way to change our view of suffering is through the sincere acknowledgment that suffering has positive aspects, some of which might be necessary for human greatness. Nietzsche addresses the positive aspects of suffering from many different directions. Unfortunately, I will only look at two of them in turn. First, there is the idea that suffering and joy (happiness) are inseparable; further, to enjoy great joy requires submitting oneself to (at least the possibility of) great suffering. Second, suffering makes one strong. Commenting on what he calls the religion of pity, Nietzsche writes the following about suffering and happiness: If you, who adhere to this religion, have the same attitude toward yourselves that you have toward your fellow men; if you refuse to let your own

suffering lie upon you for an hour and if you constantly try to prevent and forestall all possible stress way ahead of time; if you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, hateful, worthy of annihilation, and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the religion of comfortableness. How little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together.
Here Nietzsche plainly disparages the preference for comfortableness over pain: those who worship comfort know so little of happiness, for since happiness and unhappiness are twins, when you avoid unhappiness in your pursuit of comfort you avoid happiness as well. The obvious question is why should we believe that happiness is so tied to unhappiness? In Nietzsche And Dostoevsky On The Meaning Of Suffering, George F. Sefler offers a possible answer. Unfortunately without citing his quotations, Sefler writes that for Nietzsche it is a philosophical prejudice of the metaphysician to postulate antithetical absolutes; for every good or pleasurable concept there exists an opposite concept: pleasure and pain are paired but antithetical. Further, according to Sefler, the metaphysician has claimed the impossibility of the generation of one absolute from its respective opposite. Nietzsche, according to Sefler, thinks these prejudices need to be reexamined, the implication being that the metaphysician is wrong to postulate such absolute opposites and that pleasure and pain really are not opposites in this sense. But so presented the case for great pleasures requiring great suffering remains unconvincing. James W. Hillesheim, discussing Nietzsche and selfovercoming, writes that we must get rid of the dualistic view of pleasure and pain. Appealing to Ryles notion of a category mistake, he calls this dualistic view of pleasure and pain a misclassification. In making the case on Nietzsches behalf that pleasure and pain really are connected, in particular for one

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engaged in self-overcoming, he cites a strange passage from Nietzsches The Will to Power:

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Nietzsche cites examples of pleasures in which a number of painful stimuli are necessary: This is the case, e.g., in tickling, also the sexual tickling in the act of coitus: here we see displeasure at work as an ingredient of pleasure. It seems, a little hindrance that is overcome and immediately followed by another little hindrance that is again overcome this game of resistance and victory arouses most strongly that general feeling of superabundant, excessive power that constitutes the essence of pleasure.
The opposite, an increase in the sensation of pain through the introduction of little pleasurable stimuli, is lacking; for pleasure and pain are not opposites. Citing tickling and sexual tickling as examples of the combination of pleasure and pain hardly proves the case that great pleasure requires great pain. However, the idea we find here, that the constant overcoming of hindrances gives rise to feelings of excessive power, which in turn is the essence of pleasure, is important. It is at least plausible to view hindrances as, in some sense, displeasurable in themselves, and their overcoming as giving rise to feelings of power, which are, according to Nietzsche, the very essence of pleasure. If they are the essence of pleasure, or at least give rise to pleasure, it further seems plausible to say that the greater the hindrance, i.e., the greater the displeasure, the greater the feeling of power, and therefore, pleasure that will result. Further, we do find here some reason to disregard the idea that pleasure and pain are strict opposites. That is, Nietzsche points out that while certain kinds of pain will give rise to pleasure, certain types of pleasure will not give rise to pain in the same way. If we accept the idea that overcoming certain hindrances can lead to pleasure, and that the greater the hindrance the greater the pleasure, we do not thereby have to accept that this is the only way to bring about great pleasure. That is, we do not have to accept it as the only means to pleasure unless we really take Nietzsches assertion that the essence of pleasure is the feeling of superabundant, excessive power; and it is not obvious that Nietzsche is right about this. It is easy to imagine great pleasures that do not require feelings of excessive power. For example, I can love my job, earn money by it, and then go on a wonderful vacation where everything runs smoothly: I relax, play, perhaps on a deeper level I commune with nature, and thereby experience great, nonshallow pleasure. Nietzsche could argue that such pleasures are not really pleasures after all, much like Socrates does in Platos Republic, when he argues that physical pleasures are really illusions and therefore not real pleasures at all. But without serious argumentation, such a move would be a cheap trick. Nevertheless, there is something to the idea of great pleasure being cultivated by the overcoming of great hindrances, even if it does not turn out to be the only means for experiencing great pleasure. Sefler tries to tie pleasure and pain together in another way. Life, he writes, is situational; it is made up of interrelated elements whose configurations determine the meaning of the overall whole: Elements of experience are such because of their relationality to their co-elements. Pain has no meaning in-itself; it is meaningful only in

reference to pleasure.Andhappiness has no meaning in-itself, it is meaningful only in reference to suffering. If suffering were to disappear from the world, happiness would likewise disappear; that is, the happiness-suffering dimensions of life would combine into a constant, unchangeable state which would be indifferentiable.

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A2: Alt = Screw the Poor Oversimplification


The alternative doesnt doom the poor it unmasks power politics Hatab 2 (Lawrence, Louis I. Jaffe Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University, Prospects for a Democratic Agon:
Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, MUSE) Zanezor
The seven chapters of Appels book provide a vivid and fair reading of Nietzsches texts that exhibit a forceful call for aristocraticism based on rank, domination, and exploitation, which should be an embarrassing obstacle to embracing Nietzsche in the service of egalitarian political movements. Appels position, however, depends upon an unnuanced reading of Nietzsches motifs of domination and power, which is at least a risky proposition with a thinker as elusive and complicated as Nietzsche. The genealogical narrative of master and slave morality need

not be read as a call for domination of the weak by the strong, but as an unmasking of the power plays of the weak and as an ambiguous blending of master and slave forces in cultural production, taken as a spiritualization of erstwhile natural forces of
power.7 While we might never be sure of the meaning of Nietzsches rich and elusive texts, this should not blind us to the seeming aristocraticism in much of Nietzsches writings. We should admit that such elitism is alive in the texts, and in this respect Appel is right. Yet the complexity of the texts should alert us against both easy dismissals and selective embraces of Nietzsche when it comes to the question of democracy. My take has been that Nietzsche indeed is anti-egalitarian but that egalitarianism may not be the sine qua non of democratic politics, and that many elements of democratic practice and performance are more Nietzschean than he suspected (or we have suspected). More on this shortly.

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A2: Alt of Agonism Violence


Agonism makes violence impossible opponents are necessary Hatab 2 (Lawrence, Louis I. Jaffe Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University, Prospects for a Democratic Agon:
Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, MUSE) Zanezor
How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of all, contestation and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social phenomenon. Agonistics helps us articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsches concept of will to power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; it seeks that which resists it (KSA 12, p.424). Power, therefore, is not simply an individual possession or a goal of action; it is more a global, interactive conception. For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an overcoming of some obstacle or counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces. Opposition generates development. The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then secondarily

exposed to external relations and conflicts. The self is constituted in and through what it opposes and what opposes it; in other words, the self is formed through agonistic relations. Therefore, any annulment of ones Other would be an annulment of ones self in this sense. Competition can be understood as a shared activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-development, and therefore as an intrinsically social activity. In the light of Nietzsches appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between agonistic conflict and sheer violence. A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an impulse to eliminate conflict by annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end.11 In a later work Nietzsche discusses the spiritualization of hostility (Feindschaft), wherein one must affirm both the presence and the power of ones opponents as implicated in ones own posture (TI Morality as Antinature, 3). And in this passage Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that
the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to political relations.

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A2: Alt Destroys Social Structures/Abandons Politics


The alt embraces innovative politics their method derails social structure Hatab 2 (Lawrence, Louis I. Jaffe Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University, Prospects for a Democratic Agon:
Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, MUSE) Zanezor
Before exploring these questions and confronting Nietzsches attitude toward democracy, it is important to set the stage by considering the matter of institutions, without which political philosophy could very likely not get off the ground. Modern societies, at least, cannot function without institutions and the coercive force of law. Appel, like many interpreters, construes Nietzsches political thought as advancing more an aesthetic activity than institutional governance (NCD, p.160ff). Supposedly Nietzsche envisions an elite who compete with each other for creative results in isolation from the mass public; indeed the elite simply use the masses as material for their creative work, without regard for the fate or welfare of the general citizenry. Appel maintains that such a political aesthetics is problematic because it is incompatible with the maintenance of stable institutions. And Nietzsche is also supposed to eschew the rule of law in favor of the hubris of self-policing (NCD, p.165). If this were true, one would be hard pressed to find Nietzsche relevant for any political philosophy, much less a democratic one. It is a mistake, however, to read Nietzsche in simple terms as being against institutions and the rule of law on behalf of self-creation. First of all, even Nietzsches early celebration of the Dionysian should not be taken as an antior extra-political gesture. In BT 21, Nietzsche insists that the Apollonian has coequal status with the Dionysian, and the former is specifically connected with the political order, which is needed to temper the Dionysian impulse toward ecstatic brooding and orgiastic self-annihilation. Those who read Nietzsche as resisting normalization and discipline (this includes most postmodern readings and Appels as well13), are not on very firm ground either. For one thing, Nietzschean creative freedom is selective and most people should be ruled by normative orders, because universal unrestricted freedom would cause havoc.14 Moreover, even selective creative freedom is

not an abandonment of order and constraint. Creativity breaks free of existing structures, but only to establish new ones. Shaping new forms requires formative powers prepared by disciplined skills and activated by refined instruments of production. Accordingly, creativity is a kind of dancing in chains (WS 140).15 Creative freedom, then, is not an abandonment of constraint, but a disruption of structure that still needs structure to prepare and execute departures from the norm.
Those who take Nietzsche to be diagnosing social institutions as descendants of slave morality should take note of GM II,11, where Nietzsche offers some interesting reflections on justice and law. He indicates that the global economy of nature is surely not a function of justice; yet workable conceptions of justice and injustice are established by the historical force of human law. Nietzsche does not indict such forces as slavish infirmities. Legal arrangements are exceptional conditions that modulate natural forces of power in social directions, and that are not an elimination of conflict but an instrument in channeling the continuing conflict of different power complexes. Surprisingly, Nietzsche attributes the historical emergence of law not to reactive resentment but to active, worldly forces that check and redirect the senseless raging of revenge, and that are able to reconfigure offenses as more impersonal violations of legal provisions rather than sheer personal injuries. Here Nietzsche analyzes the law in a way analogous to his account of the Greek agon and its healthy sublimation of natural impulses for destruction. A legal system is a life-promoting cultural force that refashions natural energies in less savage and more productive directions. Finally, those who read Nietzsche as an anti-institutional transgressor and creator should heed TI (Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 39), where Nietzsche clearly diagnoses a repudiation of institutions as a form of decadence. Because of our modern faith in a

foundational individual freedom, we no longer have the instincts for forming and sustaining the traditions and modes of authority that healthy institutions require. The whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its modern spirit so much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called freedom. That which makes an institution an institution is despised, hated, repudiated: one fears the danger of a new slavery the moment the word authority is even spoken out loud. That is how far decadence has advanced in the value-instincts of our politicians, of our political parties: instinctively they prefer what disintegrates, what hastens the end. In the light of these remarks, a Nietzschean emphasis on power and agonistics offers significant advantages for political philosophy. In some respects we are freed from the modern project of justifying the force of social institutions because of a stipulated freedom from constraint in the state of nature. With a primal conception of power(s), we can retrieve an Aristotelian take on social institutions as fitting and productive of human existence. Forces of law need not be seen as alien to the self, but as modulations of a ubiquitous array of forces within which human beings can locate relative spheres of freedom. And an agonistic conception of political
activity need not be taken as a corruption or degradation of an idealized order of political principles or social virtues. Our own tradition of the separation of powers and an adversarial legal system can be taken as a baseline conception of the nature, function, and proper operation of government offices and judicial practice. The founders of the Constitution inherited from Montesquieu the idea that a division of powers is the best check on tyranny. In other words, tyranny is avoided not by some project of harmony, but by multiplying the number of power sites in a government and affirming their competition through mutual self- assertion and mistrust.16 Our common law tradition is agonistic in both conception and practice. Most procedural rules are built around the idea of coequal competition in open court before a jury who will decide the outcome, where the judge in most respects plays the role of an impartial referee. And the presumption of innocence is fundamentally meant to contest the governments power to prosecute and punish.17 I think that both

notions of separation of powers and legal adversarialism are compatible with Nietzsches analysis of the law noted previously that a legal order is not a means of preventing struggle, but a means in the struggle between power-complexes (GM II,11).

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A2: Alt Kills Democracy Link Turn


The alt embraces a better form of democracy solves all of our links and their offense Hatab 2 (Lawrence, Louis I. Jaffe Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University, Prospects for a Democratic Agon:
Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, MUSE) Zanezor
Appel concedes that a (NCD, p.162). But he

political agon can be healthy and prevent the establishment of entrenched, permanent hierarchies poses an important question, which is in the spirit of French neo-liberal critics of Nietzschean politics: Might not a radical agon all the way down in political life debunk important democratic verities such as universal suffrage, equal respect, and human rights? This is indeed a pressing question that many postmodern writers have not addressed adequately. Yet Appel, like many critics of postmodernism, simply assumes the truth and necessity of these traditional democratic notions, without much articulation of how agonistics threatens these notions, and without any defense of the viability of these notions in the wake of Nietzschean genealogical criticisms. Such criticisms have been effectively advanced by Foucauldian appropriations of Nietzsche that reveal how modern reason
cannot help being caught up in what it presumes to overcomenamely regimes of powerand consequently cannot help producing exclusionary effects and constraints that belie the modern rhetoric of emancipation. Nietzsches genealogical critique of liberal democratic ideals, I think, is important and still relevant for political philosophy. The question at hand turns on two possibilities: Does the critique presume a refutation of these ideals or does it open up the possibility of redescribing these ideals in quasi- Nietzschean terms? Appel presumes the former possibility, I take up the latter, while agreeing that most postmodern appropriations of Nietzsche have not done much to address either possibility. We cannot assume the truth of universal suffrage, equality, and human rights by ignoring Nietzsches trenchant attacks. My strategy has been to redescribe democratic ideals in the light of Nietzschean

suspicions of their traditional warrants. Universal suffrage, equality, respect, and political rights can be defended by way of a postmodern via negativa that simply rules out grounds for exclusion rather than postulates conditions that warrant inclusion.
Nietzschean perspectivism, metaphysical suspicion, and agonistics simply destabilize politics and prevent even ostensibly democratic propensities from instigating exclusions or closed conceptions of political practice. In what follows I will briefly address two questions: How can a Nietzschean agonistics be extended to the body politic so as to be viably democratic? How can agonistics redescribe respect and political rights without the baggage of traditional egalitarianism so forcefully assailed by Nietzsche? Appel does indicate that his appraisal of political Nietzscheanism is not meant to discredit Nietzsche but to invite democrats to face Nietzsches challenge and defend democratic ideals (NCD, p.167). He admits that Nietzsche forces us to ask: Why equality? Equality of what? (NCD, p.169). We cannot dismiss Nietzsches aristocraticism as irrelevant, uninteresting, or trivial (NCD, p.170). The strategy of my work has been to take up this challenge, not by reiterating or renewing defenses of egalitarianism but by trying to show that democracy need not be committed to traditional egalitarian rhetoric and so can approach a Nietzschean comfort with social stratification in ways that Nietzsche did not expect or think through. Appel is right in calling to account selective appropriations of Nietzsche by postmodern democrats who ignore or sidestep his elitism. Few writers who celebrate difference and democratic openness in Nietzsches name have embraced his affirmation of excellence. There is difference and then there is difference. Excellence is a form of difference that implies gradations and judgments concerning superior and inferior, better and

worse performances. Many have embraced a Nietzschean openness to difference on behalf of a generalized liberation of diverse life styles and modes of self-creation.19 Such a generalized emancipation, however, would repulse Nietzsche. He was interested in fostering special individuals and high achievements. I wonder whether certain postmodern celebrations of difference conceal a kind of egalitarianism in their avoidance or suppression of Nietzsches clear comfort with social stratification. And it is important, in my view, to sustain a sense of excellence that is vital for both democratic politics and cultural production. Excellence and democracy are compatible as long as excellence is understood in a contextual and performative sense, rather than a substantive sense of permanent, pervasive, or essential superiority.
I argue for a meritocratic sense of apportional justice modeled on Aristotles conception of justice in the Politics (1280a1015).21 What is usually missed in Aristotles formulation is that sometimes it is just to treat people unequally, if they are unequal in a certain attribute relevant to a certain context. For example, it is just to deny children the right to vote since they do not have the maturity to engage in political practice. Similarly, we can grant praise, status, even privilege to certain performances in social and political life as long as they exhibit appropriate levels of distinction that fit the circumstances. We can still be democratic in opening opportunity to all to prove themselves, without assuming fixed or protected locations of excellence. Yet we can be aristocratic in apportioning appropriate judgments of superiority and inferiority, depending on the context, and thus we can avoid what Nietzsche took to be the most insidious feature of egalitarianism, resentment in the face of excellence. We can also borrow from Nietzsches denial of a substantial self on behalf of a pluralized sphere of actions (see BGE 1921) in order to keep the contextual apportionment of excellence open both between and within selves, so as not to slip into any essentialist aristocratic confidences about superior selves per se. What is helpful to democratic political philosophy in appropriating a Nietzschean comfort with stratification is that we are no longer bedeviled by puzzles surrounding so-called democratic elitism. Whenever democratic practice has exhibited unequal distributions of power, authority, function, or influence, it has seemed to be incompatible with democratic ideals because equality has usually been the baseline principle defining democratic life. But as long as opportunities are open in a democratic society, a meritocratic, contextual apportionment of different roles and performances need not seem undemocratic. Such phenomena as

representative government, executive and judicial powers, opinion leaders, and expertise can be understood as appropriate arrangements in political practice. One way to ascertain this is to realize that the only way to guarantee purely egalitarian practices would be to have all political decisions produced by direct tally of all citizens, or to have political offices distributed by lot. Any CONTINUED - NO TEXT REMOVED... lolcatz

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Democratic politics can avoid many of the difficulties attached to egalitarian assumptions by trading the notion of equal respect for agonistic respect.24 I believe that the latter notion can capture all of the practical features of egalitarianism without the theoretical puzzles concerning how and in what sense human beings are equal. Nietzsche had a strong case that
traditional egalitarian ideals were animated and prepared by transcendent warrants that are no longer philosophically viable. He thought that such a critique would doom democracy and open the way for an aristocracy of artisttyrants, whose selective agon would create cultural and political values that would guide humanity and be liberated from metaphysical fictions. Any democratic appropriation of Nietzsche must face the question of how and whether the agon can be extended to the body politic and still be viably democratic and Nietzschean in significant senses. My contention is that Nietzsches aristocratic, artistic agon applied to politics is either unworkable or itself susceptible to a Nietzschean suspicion (or both). We need a distinction between: 1) the aristocracy-democracy encounter in the cultural sphere pertaining to matters of creativity and normalcy, excellence and mediocrity; and 2) the aristocracy-democracy encounter in the political sphere pertaining to the formation of institutions, actual political practices, the justification of coercion, and the extent of sovereignty. I maintain that Nietzsches aristocraticism is defensible regarding the first encounter but not so regarding the second encounter. How would a Nietzschean political elite be identified? How would their rule be set up? What would their rule entail? What would be their function? How would their creative genius and production apply to normal political matters of governance such as economic policies, criminal justice, national defense, the everyday needs of citizens, and so on? More pointedly, the kind of closure and unchecked power implied in political authoritarianism seems to run afoul of the nonfoundational openness of Nietzsches own perspectivism and agonism. Perhaps one could argue for a coexistence of a Nietzschean cultural elite and a democratic egalitarian politics. Some of Nietzsches own remarks suggest as much (see HAH I,438 and KSA 10, p.244). One passage seems to imply that a fortified democratic egalitarianism would spur even higher forms of creativity (BGE 242), which would be consistent with Nietzsches overall agonistics, in the sense that part of creativity is a resistance to, and dissatisfaction with, the established norm. Nietzschean cultural creators could simply coexist with a democratic polity, even be given some honor, yet not be given unchecked political power. A restricted agon might be appropriate for the arts, lets say, but context is everything. The context of political practices and milieus is such that artistic genius seems out of place. Such an interpretive outcome might be satisfying, but I would not want to establish it by separating the cultural and political spheres, as some would be happy to do in order to either preserve democratic ideals from Nietzsches critique or rescue Nietzsche from reprobation by sidestepping his frightful political remarks or decoding them as simply metaphors for self-creation. I think that Nietzsches attack on democracy ought to be challenged, but not by reasserting democratic traditions, but by showing that much of Nietzsches cultural and philosophical outlook is compatible with, even constitutive of, much of democratic politics. So the distinction between cultural and political spheres allows us to challenge some of Nietzsches political vision; but overlaps between the spheres show that Nietzsches authoritarianism is weakened by his own philosophical orientation, and that democratic political life can exhibit certain creative, nonegalitarian, and agonistic elements to a degree that may warrant calling it Nietzschean enough to support a democratic appropriation of Nietzsche (thus answering Appels challenge). Assuming that politics should not be restricted and reserved for an elite, but open to the participation of all citizens, can we retain a sense of respect and political rights in appropriating Nietzsche for democracy? I think so. In fact, Nietzschean conceptions of agonistics and nonfoundational openness can go a long way toward articulating and defending democratic practices without the problems attaching to traditional principles of equality.

If political respect implies inclusiveness and an open regard for the rightful participation of others, an agonistic model of politics can underwrite respect without the need for substantive conceptions of equality or even something like equal regard. I have already mentioned that agonistics can be seen as a fundamentally social phenomenon. Since the self is formed in and through tensional
relations with others, then any annulment of my Other would be an annulment of myself. Radical agonistics, then, discounts the idea of sheer autonomy and self-constitution. Such a tensional sociality can much more readily affirm the place of the Other in social relations than can modern models of subject-based freedom. Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any victory I might achieve demands an able opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants.25 In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of tolerance, a sloppy relativism, or a misplaced spirit of neutrality. Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy com petitors in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with? In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving ones own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse.26 An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights, not as something natural possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice. Constraints on speech, association, access, and so on, simply insure lopsided political contests. We can avoid metaphysical models of rights and construe them as simply social and political phenomena: social in the sense of entailing reciprocal recognition and obligation; political in the sense of being guaranteed and enforced by the state. We can even defend socalled positive rights, such as a right to an adequate education, as requisite for fair competition in political discourse. Rights themselves can be understood as agonistic in that a right-holder has a claim against some treatment by others or for some provision that might be denied by others. In this way rights can be construed as balancing power relations in social milieus, as a partial recession of ones own power on behalf of the power of otherswhich in fact is precisely how Nietzsche in an early work described fairness and rights (D 112). And, as is well known, the array of rights often issues conflicts of different and differing rights, and political life must engage in the ongoing balancing act of negotiating these tensions, a negotiation facilitated by precisely not

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defining rights as discrete entities inviolably possessed by an originating self. Beyond political rights, a broader conception of rights, often designated as human rights as distinct from political practice, can also be defended by way of the kind of nonfoundational, negative sense of selfhood inspired by Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the self is a temporal openness infused with tragic limits, rather than some metaphysical essence, stable substance, or eternal entity. A via negativa can be utilized to account for rights as stemming not from what we are but from what we are not. So much of abusive or exclusionary treatment is animated by confident designations and reductions as to natures having to do with race, gender, class, role, character, and so on. Nonfoundational challenges to identity may seem unsettling, but if we consider how identities figure in injustices, a good deal of work can be done to reconfigure rights as based in resistance. It is difficult to find some positive condition that can justify rights and do so without excluding or suppressing some other conditions. But a look at human history and experience can more readily understand rights and freedom as emerging out of the irrepressible tendency of human beings to resist and deny the adequacy of external attributions as to what or who they are. It may be sufficient to defend rights simply in terms of the human capacity to say No. Appel insists that a radical agonistics is a significant threat to democratic ideals and principles. Although he does little to develop how and why this may be so, the charge raises important questions facing postmodern, and particularly Nietzschean, approaches to democratic politics. In my work I have tried to face this question, admit the difficulty, and suggest a tragic model of democratic openness, to borrow from Nietzsches interest in tragedy.27 Many democratic theorists insist that politics must be grounded in secure principles, which themselves are incontestable, so as to rule out anti-democratic voices from having their day and possibly undermining democratic procedures or results. A radically agonistic, open conception of democracy that simply invites any and all parties to compete for favor seems utterly decisionist, with no justification beyond its contingent enactment. But from a historical perspective, despite metaphysical pretenses in some quarters, democratic foundings have in fact emerged out of the abyss of conventions and decisional moments.28 And with the prospect of a constitutional convention in our system, it is evident from a performative standpoint that any results are actually possible in a democracy, even anti-democratic outcomes (not likely, but surely possible). The tragedy is that democracy could die at its own hands. Foundationalists would call such an outcome contradictory, but a tragic conception would see it as a possibility intrinsic to the openness of democratic practice. Can there be more than a simply negative register in such a tragic conception? I think so. Just as, for Nietzsche, the tragic allows us to be sensitized and energized for the fragile meanings of existence, thus enhancing life, a tragic politics could wean us from false comforts in foundations and open us to the urgent finite conditions of political life in an enhanced way. And even if one conceded the existence of foundational self-evident political principles, would the force of such principles by themselves necessarily be able to prevent non-democratic outcomes? If not, the force of such principles would be restricted to the solace of intellectual rectitude that can comfort theorists while the walls are coming down. The nonexistence of foundational guarantees surely does not prevent one from living and fighting for democratic ideals. What is to be said of someone who, in the absence of a guarantee, would hesitate to act or be obstructed from acting or see action as tainted or less than authentic? Nietzsche would take this as weakness. The most profound element in Nietzsches conceptions of will to power, agonistics, and eternal recurrence, in my view, can be put in the following way. For Nietzsche, to act in the world is

always to act in the midst of otherness, of resistances or obstacles. Hence to dream of action without otherness is to annul action. To affirm ones Other as necessarily constitutive of oneself is not only to affirm the full field of action (which is the sense
of eternal recurrence), but also to affirm action as action, that is to say, a real move in life amidst real resistances, as opposed to the fantasy of self-sufficient, fully free, uncontested occurrences born in Western conceptions of divine perfection and continued in various philosophical models of demonstrative certainty and theoretical governance. The irony of a tragically open, agonistic politics is that it need not infect political life but in

fact spur it toward the existential environment of it enactment. And as radically open, an agonistic politics has the virtue of precluding the silencing of any voice, something especially important when even purportedly democratic dispositions are comfortable with exclusions (frustrated by citizens who will not come around to being impartial enough, rational enough, secular enough, deliberative enough, communal enough, virtuous enough, and so on), thereby becoming susceptible to the most ironic and insidious form of tyranny done in democracys name.

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A2: Ethical Relativism


Were not relativist the alt is an authoritative ethic of strength Frazer 6 (Michael, Ph.D in political philosophy from Princeton, postdoctoral research associate in the Political Theory Project at Brown
University. Proferssor of Enlightenment polyphi @ Harvard, On Nietzschean Ethnic: The Compassion of Zarathuras: Nietzsche of Sympathy and Strength, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=421638) Zanezor

Nietzsches demand for a new, higher morality can be harmonized with his perspectivism when one acknowledges, following not imply ethical relativism.15 Specifically, perspectivism is entirely compatible with the idea that certain perspectives are better than others. Nietzsche captures this idea by rejecting interpretations of the world that represent only provisional perspectives, perspectives . . . from some nook, perhaps from below, frog perspectives, as it were (JGB I:2, p. 200). Nietzsche can even take this one step farther and consider that there might be one privileged perspective which is better, not just than some others, but better than all othersnot in the sense of being more objective or giving a truer picture of things, but in the sense of being more urgent or more commanding. Such a perspective would be the single best perspective for human beings to take on the world; its view on existence would be ethically authoritative for creatures such as ourselves.
Nehamas, that Nietzsches perspectivism need

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A2: Motivational Purity Its Power Thirst


Theyre not benign theyre motives are selfish Tevenar 5 (Gurdren von, Prof of Philosophy @ Birkbeck University, Nietzsches Objections to Pity and Compassion,
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/gemes-work/GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05) Zanezor Schopenhauer, famously, celebrated Mitleid as the greatest of all virtues and as the sole basis of genuine morality. He argued that Mitleid alone is able to overcome our naturally selfish inclinations and thus to motivate agents to act solely for the well-being of others, this being the characteristic of morally worthy actions. Nietzsche vehemently rejected this elevation of what he considered to be one of the more regrettable outcomes of slave morality. And while objections against Mitleid are voiced throughout Nietzsches work, Daybreak 133 is notable for its strong polemic against Schopenhauers psychological explanations of Mitleid. In Daybreak 133 Nietzsche alleges that Schopenhauer could not possibly have had much relevant experience of Mitleid because he observed and described it so badly. In particular, Nietzsche utterly dismisses as mere inventions Schopenhauers psychological foundations of Mitleid such as its supposed motivational purity of selflessness. Nietzsche derides the superficial evidence of selflessness and claims, in opposition, that subconsciously we are always and throughout concerned with our own selves. We therefore never act solely for the sake of others but usually harbour a variety of motives which include, in the case of Mitleid, the co-motivations of subtle self-defence or even a piece of revenge. Two sections on, in Daybreak 135, Nietzsche provides us with a particularly vivid detrimental-to-recipient objection. He states that the mere idea of being pitied evokes a moral shudder in savages, because to savages, being still, we are meant to assume, uncorrupted by conventional morality, to offer pity is as good as to offer contempt. Indeed, should a defeated enemy weep and plead then savages will, out of Mitleid and contempt, let him live, humiliated like a dog, while those who endure suffering with defiant pride repulse Mitleid and thus earn their admiration and praise. Regarding the detrimental-to-givers objection, Nietzsche has Zarathustra declare, in the by now familiar detrimental-to-recipients tone, that he badly wronged a sufferers pride when he helped him. But, importantly, Zarathustra also declares that he washes his hand and also wipes clean his soul because he has helped a sufferer, and he admits, furthermore, that he feels ashamed because of the sufferers shame. These latter statements show quite conclusively that Nietzsche believed agents pollute and degrade themselves when they show Mitleid and that Mitleid is therefore detrimental to its givers.

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A2: Narcissism Link Turn


They conceal narcissism Ure 6 (Michael, Prof of German Philosophy @ Monash U, Ph. D in history of modern social and political theory and modern
German philosophy from Melbourne, The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 32, 2006, pp. 68-91, MUSE) Zanezor Nietzsche is intent on stripping away pity's golden luster. He builds his case against piti/Mitleid largely on the basis of his suspicions about
the psychological dynamics that, so he claims, we can use to lay bare Schopenhauer's and Rousseau's gilded rationalizations of this pathos. According to Nietzsche, the type of piti/Mitleid they expound is symptomatic of what we might call, drawing on psychoanalytic terms, the narcissistic malaise.4 Boldly stated, he argues that as a psychological transaction Mitleid satisfies the ego's desire to assuage its loss of narcissistic plenitude. In making this case, Nietzsche dramatically [End Page 68] reverses their perspective, arguing that Mitleid should not be understood as an affective bond with the other, not as a sign of living for others, but, rather, as a veiled means of restoring self-affection at the other's expense. To show this he analyzes the moral psychology that underpins the precepts of the ethics of pity. If Nietzsche's psychological analysis is correct, then Mitleid is not antithetical to revenge against others but, in fact, closely linked to one of its subtle shadings and masks, which he calls envy. "In the gilded sheath of pity," as he puts it with signature pithiness, "there is sometimes stuck the dagger of envy" (AOM 377). Whereas Rousseau and Schopenhauer claim that Mitleid is the only source of ethical concern for others, Nietzsche argues that their psychology of Mitleid uncritically accepts a paranoid-schizoid splitting of the object world, to borrow Melanie Klein's terminology, into the enviable and the pitiable.5 He claims that because these forms of pity are generated by a paranoid-schizoid psychological constellation, they are better characterized as what we might call "hateship" rather than friendship. In this respect, Nietzsche sees in the psychology of the pitier an immature or infantile attempt to resolve the narcissistic malaise. Nietzsche pursues this critique of Rousseau and Schopenhauer as part of a broader concern that informs his middle period: his concern with theorizing a mature transformation of narcissism that does not entail such damaging splitting and projection. We can reconstruct and elaborate three steps in Nietzsche's critical analysis of the psychological configuration that engenders the type of pity that Rousseau and Schopenhauer advocate: his claim that pity is deeply complicit in envy and its projective identifications; that it ultimately tends toward a diminution of others; and, finally, that the twinning of pity and envy in the construction of the object world blocks our ability to live well with others. In other words, Nietzsche builds a strong case for reversing Schopenhauer and Rousseau's central, unexamined presumption: he shows that far from overcoming our "colossal egoism," as Schopenhauer calls it, pity is a species of pathological narcissism that damages the individual's capacity for composing or "restoring" balanced (gleichgewicht) relations with others (HAH 376). Nietzsche especially underscores the point that a morality built on these psychological foundations prevents individuals from developing a subtle, penetrating, and therapeutically efficacious understanding of another's intrapsychic world and experiences. In criticizing the ethics of pity, then, Nietzsche specifically targets the conceptualization of this pathos or affect that lies at the heart of both Rousseau's and Schopenhauer's ethical philosophy. In prosecuting his case against their ethics he brings to bear his method of "psychological dissection," claiming that it can help explore and fathom pity's intrapsychic significance in a way that sheds new light on both Rousseau's moral pedagogy of piti and Schopenhauer's metaphysically based ethics of Mitleid (HAH 35, 37). His core thesis is that piti/Mitleid, as they conceive it, merely crystallizes the structure of affects and [End Page 69] defenses characteristic of a psyche ensnared by a primitive means of soothing the narcissistic wound.6 Contextualized this way, Nietzsche argues, Mitleid should be treated first and foremost as a pathological stratagem through which the psyche seeks narcissistic gratification. His analysis might stand as an illustration of his broader claim that moral philosophy should not be based on or give credence to belief in conceptual oppositions (HAH 1). For he turns common sense inside out and claims that piti/Mitleid, which Schopenhauer identifies as action devoid of "all egoistic motivations," has its roots in envy.7 It is his psychological dissections that place Nietzsche several steps ahead of not only Rousseau and Schopenhauer but also those critics who invoke this tradition of pity against Nietzsche without carefully examining, as he does, its theoretical and psychological presuppositions.8 We can orient ourselves to Nietzsche's critique of this type of pity by briefly examining Rousseau's and Schopenhauer's very similar treatments of the origins and worth of pity.

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NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 36 of 40

A2: Nietzsche = Capitalist Poor Person Hater


The alt allows for the poor to have real value their focus on economic assets causes extinction Del Caro 4 (Adrian, Associate Vice Chancellor for Graduate Education, the University of Colorado, Prof of German and
Comparative Literature, Ph. D from U-Minnesota Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of Earth, 216-217 google books) Zanezor
We should also make note of the fact that when Nietzsche speaks of the quotidian and the finite, it is not necessarily in connection with solitude and certainly it is not in the context of asceticism, which he justifiably regards as life denying. Nussbaum is right to emphasize that Nietzsches vision of the solitary, struggling individual is bourgeois and does not address the plight of the poor. who are present everywhere on the earth and deserve a share in defining any purported meaning of the earth. Still, I regard Nietzsches choice to not speak as a champion of the

poor as another expression of his view of nature as superabundance he is the prophet of abundance, of a world (nature) rich in things great and small, of nature as it encourages us to honor and value the finite poverty in the natural sphere does not exist as far as he is concerned, or if it does only as an exception. Of course he admits of poverty in the social sphere where, it could be argued, humans who are out of touch with the finite and intent on hoarding, on bulwarking against the transient are spreading their disease of consumption and life denial across the planet, dragging both the planet and its life forms down with them. And before anyone, socialist or otherwise, slams the door on the potential of Nietzsches philosophy of nature to effect changes in the gross imbalances that cover our planet in social and economic terms, perhaps greater attention should be paid to the quotidian Nietzsche, the one who teaches gratitude and modesty and love for earth the last time I looked these were not bourgeois values. In other words, I believe Nietzsche does in fact draw the condition that Nussbaum finds lacking in him,
and that his formulation of the conclusion and his suggestions for change are miles apart from those of Marx and other socialist and democratic thinkers, and because they are so different both from Marxian ideology and the image of Nietzsche which is lodged in peoples minds, his alternatives have only begun to percolate to the surface of Western cultural consciousness. The Marxian strategy to redistribute wealth is one ecumenical vision.

Nietzsches is quite another, but make no mistake: Nietzsche has an ecumenical vision, a vision for the earth and lot humanity, and it is neither religious nor revolutionary. There is no reason to expect that one as anti- democratic as Nietzsche would have anything resembling a platform for egalitarian social reform. And by the same token, there is no reason to expect that one as adamant about working creatively within the finite, about affirming the earth with gratitude and humility, would not be interested in empowering human beings to whatever extent possible to begin dwelling affirmatively and intelligently on the earth there are other moralities.
Mller-Lauter wants to ensure that Nietzsches protective conservationist attitude toward the earth is visible despite what readers may have been led to believe by Heidegger. In Zarathustra but also in earlier and later writings the earth is supposed to maintain its own within the whole process of human creation of meaning. While for Heidcgger the earth becomes the errant star (der lrrstern, also wandering star), Muller-Lauter focuses instead on Nietzsches steady insistence that humans must remain conscious of their own earthiness as well as their rule of the earth, in order to appropriately exercise any such rule. Our earthiness (Erdhafiigkeir) is precisely the feature of human being that Nietzsche foregrounds when he alerts us to the presence of the closest things and the quotidian. Earthiness cannot be demonstrated by simply professing a view of the earth and installing oneself as earth ruler by definition earthiness requires a closeness and bonding with the earth, as suggested by the German haften, to bond or to stick, as it forms the compound erdiiafiig, earthy or of the earth. On this accounting the poorest, least refined human who is bonded to the earth, who displays earthiness in her living, is as capable of

earth affirmation as a professor or a philosopher.

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NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 37 of 40

A2: Objective Morality


Objectivity is a link concealing your own subjectivity is dangerous Frazer 6 (Michael, Ph.D in political philosophy from Princeton, postdoctoral research associate in the Political Theory Project at Brown
University. Proferssor of Enlightenment polyphi @ Harvard, On Nietzschean Ethnic: The Compassion of Zarathuras: Nietzsche of Sympathy and Strength, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=421638) Zanezor
Something resembling the traditional ethical appeal to an objective teleology embedded in human nature is the most likely candidate for such a foundation. Yet it is precisely such an objective ethics which those who describe Nietzsche as a genealogist insist that the author cannot provide. This impossibility is often attributed to Nietzsches perspectivismthe doctrine that an objective ethics, like any objective knowledge, is unattainable because there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing (GM III:12, p. 555).13 Yet perspectivism obviously does not rule out all critique or revaluation of our moral evaluations. Alexander Nehamas, for one, argues that the great crime of slave morality, the fundamental reason for its low valuation by Nietzsche, is a crime against perspectivism itself. The Christian morality of the weak, he claims, seeks to conceal

and to deny its own interpretive status by maintaining that it is true and authoritative for all, weak and strong alike, rather than a perspectival expression of the needs of the weak alone.

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NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 38 of 40

A2: Perm Bankrupts Alt


The perm bankrupts the alt there is no middle ground for their motivations Wrisley No Date (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be, Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of
Attitudes and Ideals, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi=) Zanezor How should we comport ourselves to the suffering we find in our lives? When touching a hot stove or confronted with danger, our natural reactions are to pull back, to flee, to find safety. In general it seems that we naturally shy away from discomfort and painsuffering of all types. The child laments his boring afternoon and the adult fears the impending death of a parent and the subsequent anguish the loss will bring, hoping and wishing they will never come. Suffering, it seems, is quite rightly seen as undesirable. However: When a misfortune strikes us, we can overcome it either by removing its cause or else by changing the effect it has on our feelings, that is, by reinterpreting the

misfortune as a good, whose benefit may only later become clear.


So, should we seek to abolish suffering as far as we can by removing its cause, or should we attempt to change our attitude toward suffering such that it is no longer seen as (always) undesirable? Taking Nietzsche seriously when he says that it is the meaning of our suffering that has been the problem, I will attempt to indirectly answer this question by looking at two possibilities found in Nietzsche for giving meaning to our suffering. The first possibility concerns a religious ethic that, according to Nietzsche, views suffering as undesirable, but which ultimately uses mendacious and deleterious means to provide a meaning for human suffering. The second possibility concerns the extent to which we can say Nietzsche endorsed the idea of

giving meaning to suffering through acknowledging its necessary role in human enhancement and greatness. Since the religious ethic sees suffering as undesirable and thus something ultimately to be avoided (being itself the paradigmatic means for easing suffering), and the means it uses to give suffering meaning are ultimately mendacious, I will argue that if Nietzsche is significantly correct in both his attack on religious morality and his alternative ideal, we can take this as evidence that the avoidance of suffering is not the proper attitude. Unfortunately, I will not be able to address the question of whether Nietzsche is significantly correct in this paper. Secondly, given Nietzsches positive alternativeone that embraces the necessary role suffering has for the enhancement of human lifeI will argue that we can take this as evidence that it is our attitude toward suffering that needs to be modified, i.e., we should modify so that we no longer see suffering as something to be avoided. Because of this, the middle position of avoiding suffering when possible and then seeing its positive attributes when it does occur does not recommend itself. That is, since it will be argued that suffering has a positive and necessary role to play, to seek to avoid it as far as possible and then to acknowledge its positive aspects when it does occur, is not really to acknowledge and accept sufferings positive and necessary role.
However, as we will see, all of this is complicated by the issue of the order of rank as found in Nietzsches writings.

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NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 39 of 40

A2: Suffering Bad Its Part of Life


Suffering is structurally inevitable life is hard and joyous simultaneously Wrisley No Date (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be, Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of
Attitudes and Ideals, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi=) Zanezor To live is to suffer: this is only contentious if we thereby mean that to live is only to suffer. If we say that suffering pervades life, that need not mean that there are no pleasures in life. Even still, is it true that for every individual, life will involve suffering? Other than those who are born and die a quick, painless death shortly thereafter, the answer is surely going to be yes. However, before we rightfully answer whether life automatically means suffering, we should say what is meant by suffering. If we look at suffering as a genus, we can say that psychological suffering and physical suffering are its species. It is easy to think of examples of both kinds. Under mental suffering we find depression, anxiety, fear, unsatisfied desires (perhaps even desire itself before it is satisfied), loneliness, loss, anguish, grief, separation, lamentation, distress, dissatisfaction, rejection, failure, hopelessness, stress, boredom, ennui, angst, weltschmerz, existential malaise, and so on. While all of the above admit to degrees, one could argue that any degree of any of them constitutes suffering. Physical suffering presents more of a variety of clear and unclear cases of suffering due to degrees. There is painreally the paradigm of physical suffering in its various degrees (passing a kidney stone to a mild, dull, almost unnoticed ache), hunger, which can range from mild discomfort to actual pain, itching in its various degrees (most of ones body covered in a rash to the itch one offhandedly scratches), degrees of being too hot or too cold, being tickled until one cannot stand it, and so on. One becomes acquainted with more kinds of suffering the longer one lives. But even a very young sheltered child has experienced many of the above kinds of suffering. At the very least, any child will experience hunger and unsatisfied desires; in all likelihood, however, a child will experience much more suffering. When we consider the full range of possible human suffering, it is hard to deny that to live is to suffer, as long as we do not mean that to live is only to suffer.

lolcatz

NU Debate
Zanezor/T-Bro

Compassion K
Page 40 of 40

A2: Youre Insensitive to Suffering


Suffering may be bad but the fact that individuals let it happen to themselves is WORSE Tevenar 5 (Gurdren von, Prof of Philosophy @ Birkbeck University, Nietzsches Objections to Pity and Compassion,
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/gemes-work/GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05) Zanezor
With the above in mind, let

us now turn to the second of our two questions and Nussbaums claim [see bibliography] that Nietzsche lacked inner understanding of the misery and contingency of suffering. Nussbaum accuses Nietzsche of insensitivity for the way suffering can be erosive of human
well-being. She argues that Nietzsche had no grasp of the simple truth that one functions badly when one is hungry and that stoic self-command is just not possible when suffering from what she terms basic vulnerability. Nussbaum contrasts basic vulnerability, which comprises deprivations of resources utterly central to human mental, physical, and intellectual functioning, from bourgeois vulnerability with its relatively comfortable pains of loneliness, ill health, bad reputation, and so on. These latter pains, Nussbaum argues, are indeed painful enough but not such as to impair human functioning altogether. She insists that Nietzsche simply ignored basic vulnerability since he apparently believed that even a beggar could be a stoic hero so long as socialism and Mitleid did not keep him weak. Thus

Nussbaum concludes that despite all his famous unhappiness Nietzsche was without inner understanding of the ways contingency matters for virtue. These are powerful and thought provoking objections. However, I suggest that they somewhat miss their point because Nietzsche was not interested in virtue, did not address himself to the multitude, and did not, therefore, envisage the possibility of members of the herd growing into stoic heroes. Moreover, there is ample evidence throughout his writings as well as in his letters that he was not insensitive to the fact that deprivation mental and physical stunts growth and that severe pain and misery not only hurts but also harms people. Yet Nietzsche nonetheless, and here lies the highly controversial nature of his thought, refused to grant suffering, even severe suffering, the kind of significance assigned to it through the influence of Christianity and Schopenhauer, which leads, almost inevitably, to Mitleid and hence, Nietzsche feared, to erosion of the will to power of those precious, privileged few by undermining their confidence in themselves and in their lives. The truly objectionable feature of suffering, Nietzsche holds, is not the well-acknowledged fact that it hurts and harms people, but the non-acknowledged and deeply deplorable fact that so many sufferers simply fail to respond appropriately to their suffering and thus allow themselves to become feeble, impaired, wretched in other words, they allow themselves to suffer hurt and harm. We can conclude, then, that Nietzsche was not insensitive to the misery and contingency of suffering but simply refused to accept its alleged wider significance.

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