THE JCQMMWib "AND- GENERAL:STi!ip<SCIlboLi .;. ; l 9 3 0 - 3 l . .




The Director, fjecond *ear ulKga, 1930-31, Ocmm/md and General staff School, Port Leavenworthj, Kansas.

1 study of the r e l i e f of the *d division on 19 duly,1918, 1 reasons, and conditions*

1 # A bibliography for this study#
2* A copy of report (letter) from oommandinp; «eneral,fcd division, to
uatanandinfr ^ereral,lJOth Army Uorps, dfcj^d 19 duly,1918* Appended
because of its direct bearing on nnswors to the questions
contained in the subjeot of the study•

3* Maps* Idap Map Map Map Map No No ho )io No 1 2 3 * 6 wrtteneral - yhowing - allowing - yhovdng - shoeing map of the bat T* area and the ftpproaohes thereto tho pl*n of advmoe of ?.d i/ivision* situation as of 11:00 JM,18 duly*1918« situation as of 7j00 Afc,19 duly,1918. situation *s of 11*00 Fid, 19 duly,1918*

11 • TliisfcTUDi^KisbawTJijj." wh> was the 2d Division relieved 19 'July,!!918?
and thereasons?* Was the relief besed on normal conditions?*
ill* lUM'UttlUi^i r A U W K K L A T I U G TO THK STUDY*— In order to understand the
reasons for the relief of the 2d Division on 19 0uly,1918, and the
conditions upon which the relief was based, it is neoessary to
oonoider the movement of the division to the battlefield and the
operations during 18 and 19
rrior to 16 tmly the 2d Division was holding p*\rt of the sedond ( y ;
line west of chateau ihierry* The first intimation thatthe divisior
to move or go into battle was information on the 14 duly that it waa
placed at the services of the French 10th Army and at the same time
ordering the artillery brigade (2d) of the division to bet«# The
artillery brigade moved *t 9:00 tfo, that date 1
on 15 duly, e new division ommnnder, Major General dames Cre harbord,
was assigned,relieving J^ajor General bundy# The commnnders of both
3d and 4th brigades were changed at theswne time (2)
un 16 duly Information was received implying an immediate move of the
division, but the destination and purpose of the move were not
known to those concerned most - the division commander andstaff
That division ^less the artillery brigade which hadmoved on 14th; mov*<
on 16 duly, starting about 6«00 wa* The foot troops :aoved by cflmi
^rench; and the motor and animal elements by marching overland*
They were not informed then of their destination or mission,but thai
futther orders or directions would bo given them upon arrival at
designated places* Neither the division commander and staff nor th<
troops knew where they were going or what they were to do other thai
that they were moving towardthe trench 10th Army. The troops moving
by oamion, after many difficulties due to misdirections and absence
of instructions as to destination mnd movements, arrived on the
morning of 17 duly in the idoinity of ^ierrefonds,Ketheuilf Talle­ fontaine* They debussed end marched toward the front, still withou"
definite information aa to destination andmission* The motor and
animal elements,marching overland, had not rejoined. The 2d Field
Artillery brigade was also separated from the rest of the division*
During the night, 16-17 duly the division command post was establish*
at v>arefour-de-wemours, north of villers-uotterets
«l-afb#°,r,q« 4-315)•
U-d#«* 4-314,316*.
(Z) U-f f g,h f i f q # g)»

The division oommander and the chief of staff preceded the division,
going via 10th Army Headquarters to the headquarters of the 20th
Army Corps and there received copies or tho oorpw orders .for the
attack on the 18th and sane maps. At that time,night 16-17 July,
the division commander did not know when,where,or in what order
the division would arrive in the trucks and debuos* Then the division
commander and chief of staff went to the headquarters of the III Corps
(US) arriving there about midnight (night 16-17 duly) where they fouijui
General Bullard end part of his staff with scow office facilities*
Here General harbord received a brief description of the ground over
which the attack was to be made from a French officer with lii Corps
headquarters* This description together with the maps was the only
information available from whioh to prepRre the division orders for
the attaok* Reconnaissance by division commander and staff could
be made in time* ueneral harbord and his chief of staff,Colonel
Preston Brown, spent tho remainder of the night studying the maps,
and preparing ahd mimeographing the division attack order• They had
no information as to the occupied areas,enemy strength,roads,traffic
oontrol, or arrival of the division* They started back about; daylight
on the 17th in a motor car to find the division end distribute the
orders* They found the 2d irield Artillery Brigade,whioh had arrived
some time before,near carrefour - d e - Nemours ready for the attack*
They met part of the troops on tha road and sent out officers to finl
others, iunued orders to concentrate units on their battle positions
The assembly and attack had to be nade to fit an order prepared at
a time when the location and order of arrival of the division were
not known to the division commander* Th^ remainder of the 17th v/ag
spend by the division commander and staff in locating elements of
the division,directing their movements to positions,getting ammuniti|3n
for the troops )
After debus sing on the morning of 17 July the troops learned that they
were to participate in the attack of the 10th inrenoh Army the next
day* They were now several kilometers behind their attack positions
and in a very, congested rear area* They spent the remainder of the
day marching toward the front* Orders were received during the march
for the attacking units* The march was difficult. Part of it was mad*
during a heavy rain,darkness, without prior roconnaisoanoe by oanma
ers,lack of information and instructions as to their destination in
many cases, misdirections,over congested and blocked roads• Some trojops
marched for hours along sides of roads and in ditches(6)*
The latter part of the movement to attack positions on the night 17-18
July was particularly difficult due to darkness#blocked roads,un­ familiar routes and terrain,rain,mud,delays. The mops available
showed only approximate positions and boundaries* The division was
not responsible for traffic control, in addition the troops were
very tired having had no sleep for two nights (16-17, 17-18),no
water except what the men carried , only reserve rations carried on
the men since separation from their trains on 16 July, loaded with
packs and ammunition, and they had been almost constantly on the
move sinoe evening of the 16th# The division commander and staff
and the brigade and regimental commanders were doing their utmost
to get the troops through the strange,dark, Foret de Ketc to their
positions* Machine gun units and trains had not arrived* T^e infantxjy
trains did not arrive in time for the battje. Evacuation establishments
and equipment were delayed (6)*
Under these conditions and with great exertion on tho part ofcammandex s
and troops, the attacking infantry units renohed their attack positions
in time to follow the barrage, some units moving at double time for
hundreds of yards to do it. Machine gun units did not got up in time
for the attack* A small-arms ammunition dump was found in the foresH
and ammunition issued to the men as they passedV7)
(4) (5) (6) (7) (1-f* 2-a* 4-317,318,319,320,321,323* 6-217).
U-b,i,p,q,s* 4-323,325} 8-a,b,o,d,eJ
(l-J,pfq,s* 4-323,324,325* 8-a,b,o,d,e)
(l-q,r,8,t,u* 3-n,b,c,d,e* 4-323* 6-215 to 217* 8-*,o).

j j! i] j|

I • | ! j : | j jj ]j jj I]

The fcd Division was tho right flank division of the FrenchfcOthiirmy Corps* The French 30th Army oorpc attacked on the right of the division and the French First Moroccan Division on i t s l e f t . The division tone of action was about l£ miles wide, in general,the j south boundary was from south of Uhavigny-Ferme-VauDcoastille-Hartennei at Taux-, ftnd the north boundary fenorftlly the lineiViviores-Le rransjon rerme-ville ivionterie, attacking in the general direction of Tigny and Droizy* This necessitated a change of direction during the attack as the attnck i n i t i a l l y wa« north of east and changed to southeast after about 8^ miles advance* jthe normnl objective of the f i r s t ett&ek was a goner*1 nofcth < n south line through the eastern edge of vierty, a vd depth of about 5 milee* with two intermediate objectives wean of t l o t line* Tho Una of departure was the existing front line, the division to relieve or pas3 through French troops then holding it* The time of attach was 4t36 Ak,10 July* Tho 3d Brigade,on the right, attacked with 23d Inf and 9th Inf nbroast from right to left in the order given, eaoh regiment i n i t i a l l y in column of tittalions* Tho 6th Marines attaokod on l e f t of 3d Brigade* The6th Marines in corps reserve, and tho 2d Knflneers and 4th Kaohine Gun Battalion in division reserve* Tho 2d Field Artillery brigade with a regiment of French artillery f<ttn.che<3 supporter1 the attack* The 11th indl2!:h oroupings of Tanks ^French) assisted the attack^)* The Jit'ack started at 4:35 AM, 18 «)uly, the infantry precodod by an artillery barrage and accompanied by French tnnks In the f i r s t wav** Rapid progress vras made in the i n i t i a l stages* ttnomy artillery fire was weak. The effect of surprioo vms evident* By 6:00 AM,Beaupaire b't\?m was captured and tho division had suffered only slight, casualties so far* By lljOO A r»as^ult elomonts had ro^ched a nortli and south M line through v*uxcastille* Continuing rapid progress by liOO PM, the normal objeotivo for the f i r s t attack had been r»aaohed except part of tho tov/n of Vieray on the south* U to this point losses p had not been s3ver'j*Here tho onemy resistance stiffened and the fighting for Vierzy continuing during the afternoon* The attack slowed down beforo 4:00 PM#^nd tho troops ht\& be cane intermingled* The 5th Marines on the l e f t of the division had been delayed for » time at Vierre Fieuilles Forme but overcame this resistance (9)*

The division commander issued orders, the written order is dated 1:30
18 July, for a renewal of the attack-* This became known as the soconjl
attack* The objectivo was ftartennes et Ta\«-Bois de Oonoroia* Oeneval
81jfji5d Brigade* on his wry back to the division command post to ixiform
the division commander of the situation met the latter enroute and j
from him received the order for the second attack* The written order
of the division prescribed that the attack be mada on receipt of the
order* tfenerai Ely made his way back over the congested road« to
the location of his regimental commanders *iv';Beftup^ire Farm and ther
issued his orders for \ho second attack between 4j00 and 6:00 PM,
the orders prescribing that the attack be made*JL* soon as possible
and not later than 6jC0 PM8* Due to the battlefield congestion,
mixture of units, and lack of communications, i\: was impossible to
get orders to tho troops quickly* The orders did not reach all of
the units concerned until som e time after 6:00 PM* The division
The 3d Brigade
artil£ ry had displaced forward early in the dayv attacked on the whole division front; 23d Infantry on the rightfindI
9th Infantry on the left* The 5th Marines,originally attacking on the
left of 3d Brigade,and now pinched out, were attached to the brig^deL
one battalion,the 2d weia attached to nnd Joined9th Infantry ond participated in the fight* The 1st battalion waa attached to 23d Infkntry
but did not join the regiment in tho attack* Later, on orders of th«
brigade commander, it advaned through Vieray about tho s*me time ate
the 23d Infantry got thoough there. The 3d Battalion had been ordered in
brigade reserve but it had been used up in reinforcing the otherA
battalions of theregiment # provos$ guards and carrying patties* left the brigade without a. reserve in the seoond nttaok 110)*

«B • • • • _ • > • • ~ w M • • • • mm • > « . _ Qm, m.— — M . » ^ mm mm w mt a> . . —

(8)* (1-Jfq*r#s* 2-a* 4-324)*
(9)* Cl-J,k,q f r,s* 3-f,g,h,i* 8-a,o,d*)*
(lO)*(l-q.r,s,t,u # T. 2-b* 8-a,b,o,d« 9-a)*

Due to disorganisation of the troops m& laok of communications the
attack oould not bo coordinated. It got started between 7|OO and
7* 30 PM# Vieray was soon captured and the assault elements pushed
on until dusk when they had reached a general north and south line
about one mile east cf Viersy, and the commanders not believing a
farther advance practicable that night the troops, on orders from
division, dug in and held that line* The later stages of the day's
advance had encountered increasing energy resistance particularly in
the Vierzy area* Ty,e division was ahead of the French troops on
its flanks and contact with them had been lost* Th* divisi6n had
pushed a salient into the German lines * At ono time the 9th Infantry
ocone under severe flanking fire on its left: wid suffered its hea\~ies^
losses because of erroneous reports that French cavalry nnd other
troops were on the left of the regiment,when actually the French were
some distance behind and the flank of the regiment exposed (11)•
At the end of the advance on the 18$h the situation was as fblloirs:
The front line of the division sone was held by the 3d Brigade and
its attached units* The 23d Infantry with about ono-half of the 5th
Marines held the southern half and the 9th Infantry and nbout one-hal:
of the 5th Marines held the northern half. Seme machine gun units had
gotten tip and joined the infantry and marines* Oenoral Bowley,(2d
Field Artillery Brigade),during the afternoon had ordered the 4th
Machine Gun Battalion to raport to tho 9th or 23d Infantry,two of its
companies having already joined the 5th Marines * At the end of "the
advance part of this battalion hnd been withdrawn to positions in reai
of the line* The 2d Engineers,division reserve, had been ordered up
to of Vau^caatille during theafternoon by the division chief of I
staff, ai d the rogimental oominander told that he might have to use !
his own judgment as to future actions as communications had not been
good. When the regimental commander heard that Vierxy had been captured,
about 9j30 PM, on his own initiative he took his regiment forward to
the f ront line to consodidate the position or assist the infantry, anc.
was now on or immediately in rear of the forward line, a battalion
with each infantry regiment* T^e artillery brigade had displaced for4
ward early to positions east of Beaupaire ?arm© The 6th Marines,in
corps reserve, were east and southeast of Beaupaire Farm* The division
command post had waved to Beaupaire Fatn ,tho 3d Brigade command post j
at Vierzy* Infantry trains had not arr/ived* liorses aiui motorcycles j
sent overland were not available*(Efforts to get train? up were being
made (32)
The division had advanced about 5 miles from its initial line of de­ parture, had made a change of direction of several degrees during the
attack, had launched a second,or renewed, attack *uid finally reached
a line beyond thu normal objective for the first attack. The flanks '
were exposed* The attr.oking broops had been engaged with the onemy
all day, about 16 hours* uonununications were unsatisfactory after the
attack had passed Beaupaire Farm* Distances between command posts werd
too great to permit effectively connecting them by runners, and runners
were about the only practicable means available in the forward areae. !
Uommunioations almost completely broke dora in 9th Infantry after manj
of the officers were killed or wounded* The attacking troops were inter­ mingled* It was inpossible for regimontal commanders to locate whole
units, or the flanks of units* Losses had been heavy* In the 9th
Infantry all battalion oommanders had beon killed or wounded* Lieutenants
now coarananded the battalions* Colonel Upton (9th Infantry), in his
report says: "My front,line, now a mere skirmish line, all that wao
left of the regiment11 * The 23d Infantry hadlost over 1400 offioers
and men* All elements of the 3d Brigade were in the lines* Evacuation
of casualties was difficult and slow* Th© attacking troops were
exhausted* They had hadno rest sinoe the 16th of July* little or no
water, and no hot food (15-)•
(11) pq O
(12) (l~j,k # r # s # u f v* 3-k # l f m f n,o # p# (13) (l-j,k#p,qfr,§*
8-a,b,cfd,e,f* 10-a,b*)*

The 20th Army Corps ordered f resumption of the attack for 4|00 All, 19
t July to aeoure the final objective of the 10bh Army attack* The
order waa received at headquarters of the 2d Division at 2jOO AM, 19th*
orders could not be issued and the troops prepared for the attaok at
the time given consequently the attack waa dolayed for some hours*
Due to the existing dispositions, exhausted condition, and losses, :
the troops employed in the battle on the 18th were not included in the
attack on the 19th* This left the 6th Marines and 2d engineers
available to resume the attack* The division cannwnder regarded this
force as inadequate but the attack was ordered* The objective waa
tho Bois de hartennes-Bois de Concrois,both inclusive* The infantry
attaok to be m^de by 6th Marines and 6th Machine Gun Battalion, with
the 1st Battalion of the 2d Engineers in reserve* Available tanks
^French) were attached to *asault units* Th© attacking troops were
ordered to effeot passage of front lines at 7tOO All, the troops then
in line to remain in position until passed through* The 6th Marines
»nd 2d Engineers received these orders between 5t00 and 6s 00 AM on
The attacking troaps passed through the 3d Brigade after 7s00 AM and
advanced on their objective* They met strong resistance early and
it continued* Th« uerraans had superiority of the iir and their planet
operating at low altitudes over the division sone attacked the troops
rnd directed artillery fire* The enemy artillery and machine guns we'r«
very active all dny and thoir fire effective* Karly in the morning
a liorman counterattack agrvinst the left of the 9th Infnmtry was re­ pulsed* Advancing against strong enemy resistance, especially from
vicinity of Tigny, and suffering severe casualties, by Is00 Hi, the
6th Marines had gained a line, generally north and south, just west
of Tigny* They could advance no farther* All supports *nd reserves
of. -thfrnregiment had been put in the line* Finding that farther advande
oould not be made, the attacking troops dug in and held their po3itioi^#
Th* losses of the 6th Marines in this attack were estimated as 40 per
cent of effectives* Th« tanks (French) assisted tha attaok and sustain­ ed heavy losses« The 1st Battalion of the 2d Engineers,which had
been in division reserve, first took a position in rear to support thi
attack, but later moved up end assisted in consolidating the position
gained by the attacking line* The 4th aia^hine gun bBttalian remained
behind tho position of the 3d Brigade* The 3d Brigade and 6th Marin­ remained on the saiue general line held by them whon passed through*Th<
division oonunfcnder 3ent a battalion to protect the left flnnk« Again
the flanks of the division were exposed until tho J*'irat Moroooan
Division moved up on th* left about 3tOO HI, and a French cavalry
brigade covered the right of the division during the afternoon*(15)*
Again the communications ware poor, and in some oases failed altogether
During the day *bher« were many conflicting reports of the looations
and status of units .Evacuation of casualties did not meet the re­ quirements du» to insufficient personnel, transportation,equipage,
and the congested traffio conditions*Map No 5 shows the locations of
the troop8 at the end of the fight on the 19th 16)
The infantry and marines lost heavily in battle casualties, estimated
at the time as over 60 peroent in 9th and 23d Infantry and 40 percent
in the 6th Marine*, the numbers and percentages for the other units
not being given* What appears to be the best ovidence of the losses
of ths whole divlaion during thebattle is the war diary of the
division* x^e vmr diary for 17 July shows a total of 1149 officers
and 24006 men available for duty, and th<* war diary for 21 July shows
867 officers and 19657 men available for duty{17)*
1#qtrf«« 2-f* 3-t* 4-327,328* 8-a,b*o)
l-l f p # q # r* 3«-w,x,£,*a« 4-326f327* 8-f
3-s,t,u#x,aa* 4-327,328# 16-367,371)•
l-i,q,s,w* 8-a,b,o,d,e* 16-371*


On 19 July, hour not indicated, the division oomm»nder, General Harbord in a report to the uommanding ueneral, 20th Army Corps, stated that the troops engaged i n the fight on the 18th were exhausted and that i t was neoessary to mala* tha ati;aok on the 19th with the 6th Marines supported by a battalion of the 2d engineer<s, which he regarded as an inadequate force* ha further stated that the line then was approximately north and south through rigny «nd was held up, that his l e f t flank was threatened by being exposed and that jnrenoh troops were not yet im posession of paroy-xigny on the right of the division but did not oon­ sider the right flank i n danger beoaus* of trench cavalry being between the d i v i s i o n s right and the *renoh 56th Division. This report contained the following! M I do not anticipate that my division w i l l not be able to hold what i t has already gained, but I desire to i n s i s t most strongly1 that they should not be oalled upon for further offensive effort* •[ 7h©n followed a resume of the conditions under *fchioh the troops entarea the battle, the lack of food # water, r e s t , eto, end the report ended irith the follcmring recommendation? 11 I t i s earnestly recommended that this condition, whioh e x i s t s as a result of no fault of anyone oonxieoted with tMs division, bo reoognized and the further prosecution of the offensive on our front be done by divisions in IJthe second l i n e , passing them through our present p03itiori8 438) # /. copy of thin report i s pppended to t h i s study Appendix Z)% At about 5*00 PM,19 uuly, the division received orders for i t s r e l i e f
by the jrrenoh 68th Uolcmial uivision* The r e l i e f wae mede the night
19-20 July, the division ^less the 2d uield Artillery Brigade;, moving
to v i c i n i t y of rierrefonds ?nd Tallefontaine in army reserve• The
artillery brigade remained in positions nnj later continuedto support
the attack until the nipht 25-26 Uuly, when i t was relieved and
rejoined the division' (16) •



l l


1« Disoussion.—• The foregoing historical information does not give
a speoific answer to the question as to why the 2d Division was
relieved on 19 July, as there is no record of the decision of m
the commanding ueneral,20th Army uorps, to make the relief or
his particular reasons Tor it. However, it is reasonable to
assume that the relief was ordered as a direct result of the
report and recommendation of the division commander made on 19
ouly. This report, indicating that the infantry elements em­ ployed in the attack on the 18th were exhausted, and that the
owlyoavnilable troops for the attack on 19th were engaged and
had been stopped before reaching their objective and were unable
to advance, tnat one flank v.ras in danger, the condition of the
troops, coupled with the division ccmmanderla recommendation
that if further offensive effort be made that it be done by
possing passing other divisions -through the position, is certainly
sufficient reasons for the corps commander's decision to
relieve the division, it was necessary for the oorps to continue
the offensive*
Then the actual reasons for the relief were those which caused the
division connuandor to make the report and recommendation re­ ferred to. The information of the division commander at that
time was probably incomplete and to some fcxtent inaoourat©.
iiowevor, the historical facts show that the situation in respec£
to the attacking line was as reported, although during the
afternoon of the 19th jprench troops came up on the left flank !
of the division and thus secured it« The losses in the infantry!
regiments of the 3d Brigade hr.d been 50 percent or more of their
effective strength,and about 40 percent in tho 6th Marines, and
heavy losses in other infantry and marine units* The 3d Brigade
arid attached units might have been reorganised and prepared
for further offensive effort, but instead these troops held
during the 19th the approximate lines they teached during the lt}th.
This was probably vriso, because this position could have been
hold against a successful counterattack of the enemy on the 19tl.
when the 6th fcarineo, after severe losses, had been stopped and
offered excellent opportunity for counterattack. That the tro<jrps
were tired, probably to the point of exhaustion, there can be
no question, iwo nights and one day of marching and traveling
by truek,part of which was under diffiouljr conditions, immediately
entering battle and fighting on the 18th# holding night 18-19thJ
and continuing the on the 19thf it may bo snid that they
had had no rest or sleep since tho evening of the 16th, except
suoh rest as the 6th Marines had while in corps reserve pripr tc
19th# The trains had not joinedthe troops* They had been without
food other than reserve rations carried by men, little or no
water. The communications wore inefficient, and at time failed
completely. This situntion seems to justify the division
ocaumander's recommendation*
conditions leading up to this condition are to be considered.
The division and brigade commanders were changed just before the
movement to the battle area started. Lack of information es to
the destination and mission of the division and its components
was « handicap, separation of the artillery brigade from the
L division prior to the movement added to the difficulties of
effective liaison and preparation for the bAttle. separation
offlniineland motor elements from rest of the division for the
movement resulted in the troops entering the battle without
them and had no hot food,bo water, lacked mounts and motorcycles
for communications,delayed evecuation of casualties, the inffcintry
entered the battle without the machine gun units,. Th« tank uniijs
supporting the division were trench troops and joined on the
battle fie irt. The division commander and staff had no knowledge
of -the terrain over whioh the division was to attack except suo*
as fuanished by a *renoh staff officer, and had no time for
reoounaissanoe. ihe division cootmnnder and the ohief of staff
had to prepare the attack order from a. map and without knowing
when,where,or in what order the troops would arritw. Then th»
troops had to be assembled and moved to positions to fit in with
this order.

liiatribution of the orddr was difficult due to the short time available
widlaok of ctamunioationa facilities* The march to position* over
muddy end pongested roads might be considered as normal, but in this
oase it was over unfamiliar routes over which the division exeroised
no control of traffic and under confusion and lack of direction* The
subordinate commanders, particularly regimental and battalion, had
little or no time for reconnaissance, and scant time for issue of thejlr
orders • Yrfhile seme of the leading elements had a little time to
prepare for the attack others had to move at double time in order to
follow the barrage when it started* The troops were tired v/hen they
started the attack on the morning of the 18th* The rapid advance
made communication difficult, especially in the forward areas* The
failure of oontact on flunks with mrench troops addod to the difficulties
of the attack.

2* conclusion*— careful consideration of the foregoing justifies the
conclusion that the ?d Division was relieved on 19 July,1918*
because of the report andreoommondation of the division commander*
for the reasons that th^ division ?/as unable to continue the
offensive duo to the exhausted condition of the troops and their
losses* And further, that the conditions under which the division
moved to the battlefield, entered, and carried on the battle were
not normal*


JippndlT Ho I. Key: Notei


(l-afb) - No 1 text (bolow) items a and b.
(4-3£6#327) • No 4 text (balow) pages 326 and 327.
The Records of Second Division, used in this study, are mimeographed
oopiesof source records, arranged by volume nooording to general
classification of subject matter and contents of each volume
grouped by divisional units. The volumes are not page numbered.
Within each voltume and unit group the contents are arranged gen­ erally in chronological order, but haveno other identification
except date,form, and consent* of the items. In this study the
texts of the Second Division Records us*d are numbered in the
bibliography by volume and items selected nte identified by lettejr
in each numberod texttfithfurther identification of each item by
shewing origin,destination,dnta,etc.

1. Keoords of Second Division (Regular),Operations Reports, War Diaries,
Journals of Operations, 2d Division, 2d Fiold Artillery Brigade,
2d Trench Mottar Battery, 3d Brigade,4th brigade (1918). Volume 8 ,
a. War Diary,2d Div., 13 July,1918.
b. Journal of Operations,2d Div,,July 14,1918.
0. War Diary,2d Dir%9 14 July,1918.
d. JtfonrnQl of Operations,2d Div.,15 July,1918.
e. Wnr Diary,2d Div.,15 July,1918•
f. Journal of Operations,2d Div, 18 July, 1918.
g. War Diary,2d Div., 16 July, 1918.
h. Journal of Operations,2d Div.,17 July, 1918.
1. War Diary,2d Div.,17 July,1918.
j. Journal of Operations,2d Div., 18 July,1918.
k. W*r Diary, 2d Div., 18 July,1918*
1. Journal of 0perations#2d Div.,19 July,.l918.
m. War Diary,2d Div., 19 July, 1918.
n. Journal of Operations,2d Div.f 20 July,1918.
o. War Diary,2d Div., 20 July, 1918.
p. Report (letter form) frau Commanding General,2d Division, to
Commanding General,20th Army Corps, 19 July, 1918. (G-l).
q. Special Report,2d Division, July 17-21,1918,Attack of 20th Army
Corps,10th French Anny,near Sciseons, by CG,2d Div (Signed
by Maj Gen Lajeune)#
r. Report of Operations,2d F.A.Brig.ybatvreen July 14-26,1918.
s. Report of Operations,3d wig.,July 17-21,1918, in attack of
20th Army Corps, 10th French Army.
t. Keport Liaison Officer wit'h 4th Brigade (Marine),night 17-18
July, 1918.
Letter,CG,3d Brig,21 July, Reportof Operational
Letter CO,U S lhrine«',2S July^Operationt, 18*19 July11, and
1st Ind*, and 2d Ind. thereon.
lst,2d, and 3d Ind.,(following) no basic lettershown.
Lettered Bn,5th ^arines, Keport of ieoond attaok northeast
of Viercy 18-19 July, 1918.
Bxtract,leport of Aotion,3d Brig.,June 1 to July 16,1918.
w. War Diary,2d Div., 21 July,1918.
2. Records of tha Second Division (Regular), Field Orders 1918-191i«
Volume 1.
a # Field order No 16,2d Div.,17 July 1918.
b. Grdern (letter form),2d Div., li30 P1C#18 July,1918#
c. Orders to Major ZAne (4th MG Bn),lt30 PM,18 July, by C of S,2d
d. Orders to CO., 6th Marines (to corps reserve), 17 July, 1918, by
C.of I., 2d Div.
*• Orders to 6th Marine§,18 July,1918, by O.of S., 2d division,
f. Field Orders Ko 16,2d Division,3t00 AM,19 July,1918.


3 . Reoords of the Second DiTision (Re b ular), Field Messages, 2d DiT., 2d FA Brig,,3d Inf Brig.,4th Inf Brig., 1918, Volume 4 . a* Messages 17 July,1918, fron Offioer in Charge of Trine t o trains and machine gun u n i t s . b. Message No 1,156 AM, 18 July, from CO,23d Inf., to CG,2d DiT. 0. Telephone oonTersation C of S,2d DiT#,to Hq.2Oth Army Corps,

2 f 00 AM, IS July.
d. Message from M*jor Hall,3d Brig.,(apparently to 2d DiT),6126 AM,
18 July.

e. f. g. h. 1. j . k. 1* m. n. o. p. /(• q. r. s . t . u. T. yr. x. y. «. aa. Message from CO,23d I n f . , t o CG,3d Brig and 2d DiT.,6:36 AM, 18 Julj Message from C0,23d I n f . , t o C 3d Brig and 2d DiT.,6jll AM,18 Julj G Message from Major Hall,3d Brig.,6x00 AM,18 July, Message from O "A",5*50 AM, 18 July. P Message No 4 from Mai Hall,Adjt.,3d Urig.,to 2d DiT.,8i30 AM,18 Ji Message ( l e t t e r form; 2d Engineers,9t25 PM,18 July. Messages from brig G^n A.JJ3owley,2d FA B r i g . , t o 2d DiT.,3$05 PM,' 18 July. Message from C0,2d Engrs.,to C of S.,2d DiT.,9:25 PM,18 July, Message (No l)CG,3d Brig.,to CG>?d DiT.,9*30 PM,18 July, Message Cren Ely,3d Brig.,to C of S.,2d DiT (for CG),9:30 PM,18 Jul|y. (I) Message, Upton,9th I n f . , t o 2d DiTHq«,12j30 PM,18 July,1918. (2) Message Hq 23d Inf,to CG,2d DiT.,Reod 8s26 PM,18 July, 1918. Memo for Col Brown,4:50 PM,18 July,from AC of S.,G-3. Memo for Col Brovm,8:25 pM,18 July from AC of a,G-3.
toemo for C of S.,8:30 PM,19 July,from A of S.,G-3«
C Message from Upton (9th Inf) to Ctr,2d DiT.,1:116 PM,18 July, Message from 4th ^rig.msigned fKeyser«, 11*30 AM, 18 July. Message (No 4) C0,2d Engrs,to 0 of S,2d DiT.,2ilO AM, 19 July, Message (No 5) C0,2d Kngrs.,to C of 8,6t00 AM,19 July, Message C0,2d Gngrs,to C of S,2d DiT.,10|37 AM,19 July. Message,CO,6th Marines,to C0,2d DiT., 11*45 AM, 19 July.
Message C (Harbord) to 0G,3d brig, 11%45 AM, 19 July.
G ttsssag* CO,3d urig.j-ho CG,2d DiT.,12 : 40 PM,19 July, Message of C of S (Preston Brow) 1:50 P 19 July. M Message CO,4th Brig.,to 2d DiT., 11-36 PM,19 July,
Message CG,3d Brig., to CG,2d DiT., 4:25 PM,19 July.

4* Leaves 1*TGBI a War idary, By w ajor General Oames G. Harbord,U.S.Army, Retired List. Dodd,Mead and Company, New York, 1916. 5. Personalities And Remirdsioenoe* of the War, By Roberl Lee Bullard, Major ueneral,U.S.A., Retired. Doubleday, Page & Company, wew York, 1926. 6. A.E.F. (Ten Years Ago in France), By Mftjor (ieneral Hunter Liggett. Dodd, Mead, & Company, New York, 1928. 7. A Guide To The American Battlefields In Europe. Prepared by The American Battle Monuments Commission. U.S.GoTernment Printing Office, Washington, 1927. 8. Reoords of the Second DiTision (Regular), Operations lv eportt, War
Diaries, patrol Reports; 9th Infantry, 23d Infantry, 6th and 6th
Uarines*2d Jttngineers, 1918, Volume 7.
a. Report of Operations,23d Infantry,July 17,18,19,1918# . b. Report of Operations,2d Engineers,July 16-21,1918. o. Report 9th Infantry, battle of beaupaire Farm, 18 July, 1918, aad same 21, July. d. Reports,5th Marines ­ 1st Battalion, Operations 16-20 July, 1918• 2d battalion, Attack northeast of Viersy,18-19 July,1918. 3d Battalion, dated 21 July,1918, ueoent Operations. 5th Marines, Operations 16-20 July,1918« 8th Machine Gun Compary - Mepo»t of Operations* e. Reports and *eoords,6th Marines ­ History of 2d Battalion, July 13-26,1918* Military history,3d battalion, June 1-August 10,1918. Report of Operations^H^adquarters CcmpAny, 19-July. Synopsis of Attack on Tigny by 74th uompft«or#la^ Battalion. AdTanoe of 2d Battalion,6th Marines, 19 July. f. Report,00 2d £ngrs« # to C 3d brig.,Operations of 2d Engineers G under oommnnd of 3d Brig. > History of lv M,9th Inf., Soissons-Reims OffensiTe.
Co Operations eport f oo 1,9th Inf•^oissons Seotor.



9. Records of the Second Division (Regular), Field Brderg 3d and 4th Brigades. 1918-1919,Volume 2 #
a* Field orders No 26, Td brigade,18 July 1918, 4*30 PM.
10• xteoords of the Second Division (Regular)Operatione reports And War Diajbios, 12th Ml, 16th FA, 17th FA,4th M Bn,6th M Bn,6th *iG B n . , l s t Field SigjBnt, O O 2d T n8 «, 1918, Volume 8* *• War Diary,4th M Bn,vJuly 19,1918* O b# Operations deport,Go A,4th M Bn#yApril 6-<July 29,1918* O o. War Diary,4th M Bn«,19 July,1018# O d« Report of Operations!6th M Bn«>,dated 21 duly,1918,to UG,3d G Brig # 1U Records of thefcleocmdDivision (Regular), Field Messages of 9th Inf#,
23d Inf # ,6th and 6th Marines,12th FA,15th FA,17th *A,2d Kngrs#4th
6th 6th M Bns#,1918, Volume 6*
O &• Message 2d Bn,5th Marines,to CO,5th M arineo, lOiOO P 18 July M 12• Monograph Soissons*
a # Book 7, Order Ho 1262/3,2pth Army Oorps, 18 duly*
13• 9th b 9 g«infantry In The World war, published at Niefwied,Germany,Feb
and M 1 U
14« Official History,Second Engineers and Seoond engineer Train, U.S .Army,
in the World War• (Publishers and date not given)•
15. The United States Marines in the World War, by Edwin N MoClellan,
toajor,UtS#Marines, Washington, Government Printing Offio«9il920«
16c The Medical Apartment of the United States Army in the World War,
Prepared uAder the direction of the Surgeon ueneralf Washington,
Government printing Offioe#1926#
A Military History of the World War, by Colonel O.R.Hcfwland, Infantijy
U^S.Amy,Volumes I and II, The uenaral Service Schools Preti,
Fort Leavenworth,Kansa§, 1923#

A l l sources were obtained from the library of the Command and General
Staff School, Fort ^earenworth, Kansas*


Appendix 2*
A copy of report ^letter) Iron ucannanding *eneral,2d Division, to O C M *
Branding General,20th Army Oorps, 19 July, 1918* Jiartracted trcm Keoord*
of Second idvisiou Regular; # 1918 # volume 6* Appended because pf its
direct bearing on answers to the questions residing in the subjeot of
the study*
19 »uly 1918 •

if rant Tot ucwmanding ueneral* ocmmanding Seneral,20th Array corps* -taport*

1* The order of the 20th Ansy Corps to the 2d Division to attaok at
4:00 iij&jthis date, was reoeiTsd at 2|00 Alt* It was impossible to oonply
with the order to attaok at 4*00 All due to the delay i» receiving the
2« With the exception of the 6th Marines, kept out of the fight as
oorps reserve yesterday, and the 2d Kegiment of Engineers whifc are tee
armed with rifles, every infantry unit of the dirision w%s exhausted
in the fight yesterday* It was necessary therefore,' to make the attaok
this morning with one regiment, the 6th Marines, supported by a battalia i
of the engineer regiment, a force regarded by me as inadequate to the
task, but no other was available * The attaok has progressed favorably
until the line has come to a north and south line approximately through
TIttiu* It is held up on the right frcm the direotion of PAKUi-THtMc, a
place previously reported to us as being rrenoh possession* On the left
it is being held up and our left flank threatened due to the fact that
the Hirst Moroccan Division has not apparently advanced as fay as
2* I do not anticipate any great danger to «y right flank, having a
brigade of the- 6th dragoons constituting the liaison between ny right
and the left of the jnrsneh 38th Division* The effect, however, of this
cavalry is principally a moral one *s 1 hai»b#en informed by their
ueneral and by the Birgade Conaander himself that he preferred not te> be
in actual lighting unless a gap oecurred in the line* on the left X
h£i» sent a fraction of a battalion which was at vi£k&i and which suffer >3
< the least of any battalions employed In the fight yesterday* This battalion
has been sent to occupy the former Jrrench trenches along the front nouth •
west and south of
4* The tank oaranander, who employed this morning 28 tanks, just now
reported that 11 of his tanks h a w been put out by uerman artillery fire
5* I do not anticipate that ny division will not be able to hold what
it has already gained but i desire to insist most strongly that they
should not be called upon for further offensive effort* Due to the con­ gestion of th8 roads through the irore^c de **ts, the regulation of whioh
was not under our control,and the circumstances of our arrival from the
VXth Army without information as to destination or manner of employment
after arrival, the troops in the fighting line of the division ha*v» Many
of them been without water or food for orer twenty-four hours* This
statement applies to practically the whole division, including the anine
of the 2d Field Artillery brigade*
6* it is earnestly reoosnmended that this ocndition whioh exists as a
result of no fault of anyone connected with this division, be recognised
and the further prosecution of the offensive intfurfront be dene by
divisions in the second line, passing them through our present position*

Major ueneral,n#A*

! {•' -n'

Ho 1 . -i pro*eh«l

To <»ccai^ -ny n A Study Of The . Id Divi-sion On 10 J u l y , 1911,. •nyi • l e f i o l d s In E by Tl.n .•••neric'.n B' 1'- I onucwnt Coti i s ^ i ^ n . Ubt«in»d frc« ^i\a o (iSS.



»V rr­



t •«•! - r o u t t i U





• •


p No Z* Shovln, pl^n of *dvn.nco of tho v& Division* To ncocrmpAny "* Study Of Tho K*Hof of The <d Division on 19 0uly,19l8,*^8on8,/nd J Conditions* neproduo«d frco sooond Division ubfe«inod ff«n Library, u&0SSt

(Editor's note: There i s no date on original. Thio .nap applies to Operations of the 3coond Division, July 13 ­ 20, 191S. SECTION I

Map reference:

0ULCHY-le-CIUT2AU) «,/




30 T - H CORPS

!.!ap No 2 , Shcyrin, rl"n of «dvnnco of tho
fc'd Divisiont
To nocoRt^nny "A. Study Of Tho rioliof Of rho
V& Uivi a ion on 19 July, 1918,K*rson8,/nd
? ^ fron Sooond Division
obWnod from U/brnry,t;<s'O&S,

( E d i t o r ' s note: There i s no date on o r i g i n a l .
This .nap a p p l i e s to Operations of the Second D i v i s i o n , July 13 - 20, 1918

Map reference:


.«. ...ML.


AN Oh AOVANJ^iKfe^^v


^W(Cor«e/-< <9 fc

v " \/




3O T - H C0PPS

No 3 . Showing the s i t u a t i o n <KS of 11:00 ] ' PM.18 July,1918. To aocampany "A Study Of The Relief Of The 2d Division on 19 July,1918, Kelsons, Conditions. Reproduced from Second Division Kocords. Obtained from Library,C&GSS. c o

IPt. 0 Co.3 0


MG o







v" HI

Co.E Be aurepa.

3 Hi
6 MCKO 2Engrs Co.D \ 2Engra 2Pt8. Co.c\ 2
Biif **

SlCo.n 6 MG o Hdqrsa T. vV*'^*.6 Ma

*0 Mauaolee

V;/0 d u


IPt Co A 5K0

less C08.L&M

VIERZY 3ECT0R Dravm b y direction of Division Engineer SECOND U.S. DIVISION SCALE; 1:20,000 July ?0, 19

UP 10, 3 BATTLE of VIERZY Situation at 11:00 P.J£. 16 *uly, 191S. Dravm under Direction of D,vision Engineer 2nd U.S. DIVISION Scale: l:20,o<0

• Infantry & Marines based on best available data • M.G. Battalions based on beet available data EngineerH .Germane, outlined

Map No 4 , Showing situation as of
19 July,1918.

mm) 0mj OB «V ^V W
M • • •• •• <A W •# MM W

AV •• •• ^** ••

To accompany "A Study Of The rtolief Of The
2d uivision on 19 July, 1918, Kelsons,And

mm> ^m m^

mm a m ^ B m

^ » mm mm OM • • • • • • • • • • ^ ^ ^ * • •

Reproduced from yecond Division records.
Obtained frcm Libraryf8&GrSS

1 Pt 0
D 0 ••

k M 0* G

Pt Co.C




W. y$#\
VIERZY SECTOR Drawn by direction of Division Engineer SECOND U.S. DIVISION
Scale 1:20.000
July 20,1913


to 6 O

BATTLE of VIERZY/^ Situation at 7:00 A.M.,*6 July,191S. Drawn under Direction of Division
Scale 1*20,000



Infantry & Marines based on best available data
M.O. Battalions based on beet available data
* * • • » Commas, outlined

Map i\io 5. Shoving s i t u a t i o n as of 11-00 Vi\ 19 July,1918• lo ao Compaq -A Study Of The KG l i e f Of Vhe 2d Division on 19 duly, 1918, ue*isons,y.nd Conditions* Koproduoort from 8dcond u i v i s i o n Hecords. Obtained from librnry, C&GSS.

CO.D J Vulernori^oir


tvCo Engrs _Co.F 2Engre q.6Har.



t.Co.A Engrs


Drawn by direction of Division Engineer SECOND U.S. DIVISION Soalc 1:20,000 July 30, 1918
BATTLE orf VIERZY S i t u a t i o n a t 11 P.M. 19 J u l y , 1 9 1 S .
Drawn under D i r e c t i o n of Division
Engineer 2nd U.S. DIVISION
Sc al a 1:20,000
• • 1


1 Infantry & Marines based on beet available data
G IA.G. Battalions based on best available data
CEi Engineers

# •

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