Edmund Husserl's

Orgin of Geometr:
An Introduction
Jacques Derrida
TRANSLATED, WITH A PREFACE AND AFTERWORD,
BY JOHN P. LEAVEY, JR.
University of Nebraska Press
Lincoln and London
Copyright © 1962 by the Presses Universitaires de France
Translation copyright © 1978 by John P. Leavey, Jr.
Afterword copyright © 1989 by the University of Nebraska Press
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
First Bison Book printing: 1989
Most recent printing indicated by the frst digit below:
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Derrida, Jacques.
Edmund Husserl 's Origin of geometry: an introduction / Jacques Derrida;
translated, with a preface and afterword, by John P. Leavey, Jr.
p. cm.
"First Bison Book printing"-T.p. verso.
Reprint. Originally published: Stony Brook, N.Y.: N. Hays, 1978.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-8032-6580-8 (alk. paper)
1 . Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938. Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geo­
metrie als intentional-historisches Problem. 2. Phenomenology. I. Title.
QA447.D4713 1989
142' . 7-dc 19 CIP 88-38638
Reprinted by arrangement with Presses Universitaires de France and John P.
Leavey, Jr. Translated from the revised edition of Introduction a "L'Origine
de la geomerrie" de Husserl.
The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of American National
Standard for Information Services-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface: Undecidables and Old Names, by John P. Leavey
Undecidables and Deconstruction
Derrida's Introduction to The Origin oj Geometry
Deconstruction and the Science of Old Names
Translator's Note
Introduction to The Origin ofGeometr
*1. The Sense of Sense-Investigation: Responsibility.
Consciousness. and Existence
I. The Historical Reduction and the Necessity for
Return Inquiry (RiickJrage) in Reactivation
III. The Ego as Fundament and the Reduction of
Factuality
IV. Objectivity. Historicity. and Intentionality
V. Language, the Possibility of Transcendental
Historicity
VI. The How of Ideality: the Earth and the Living
Present
VII. The How of Ideality: Writing and Unil'ocity as
the Telos of Reactivation
.
VIII. Horizon: the Absolute of History. and Imaginar
Variation
IX. The Suspension of Ideality: Scient(fc Study of
the Life- World (Lebenswel)
X. Geography, Injnitization, and the Idea in the
Kantian Sense
XI. The Historicity of the Idea: Diff erence, Delay,
Origins. and the Transcendental
Appendix: The Origin of Geometry, by Edmund Husserl,
trans. David Carr
Coda: contrpunctus and translation, by John P. Leavey
Index of Passages Cited from Husserl
Index
v
1
7
18
20
23
27
34
51
62
66
76
87
107
117
122
141
155
181
193
197
¯ These headings, added for the convenience of the reader, do not appear in the
French edition.
Acknowledgments
The 1 974 second, revised French edition of EDMUND HUSSERL'S
L'ORIGINE DE LA GEOMETRIE. traduction et introduction par JAC­
QUES DERRIDA, in Epimethee, Essais Philosophiques, Collection
fondee par Jean Hyppolite, copyright © 1 962 by Presses U niversitaires
de France, 1 08, Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris, is the source of this
English translation.
We are grateful to the PRESSES UNIVERSITAIRES DE FRANCE
for their authorization to present this text in English.
HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY is here reprinted from THE
CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY by EDMUND HUSSERL, translated by David
Carr. Copyright © 1 970 by Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
Pp. 353-78.
We are also grateful to NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS
for their authorization to reprint Husserl's text in full.
Preface
Undecidables and Old Names
UNDECIDABLES AND DECONSTRUCTION
Tympaniser-la philosophie.
Marges
Oaiaeç:eseair:eaea. aie||eeiaa| seeae. iaeaaveaiaaaaem.seei
si:aeia:a| . smaaveaeee¬çaa.ea«aaiaas|eeaea||eaiae|ee| ssaçe:·
seaa:e|,iaeiexi. 1aei:eaeaça.|eseçae:aaae:.i.e¡ae¡aesDe::.aa
.ss.iaaieaaiiae] aaeia:eeiiaei«e. iae|ee|aaaiaeiexi,ae«:.ies
a|eaiiaee:. ,. as . ae|a,s, aaaa.ne:eaiçaias aiiae.:e:ess:eaas

H. s
¬eiaea¨. siae aeeeasi:aei.ea¨eiiaeve:,. aeaeiwriting.
1exiseeea:ie:De::.aaea|y.a«:.i.a,.a«:.i.a,aaae:sieeaaei.a
iaee:a.aa:y sease.|aiasiaeç|aeeeim·«·e-iaea|«ays .aeemç|eie
e:asa:e e: se:aiea.a,eai eiwesie:ameiaçays.es.· 1ae |ee|as aa
I
See, for exampl e, Eugenio Donato, "Structuralism: The Afermath, " Sub-Stance,
NO. 7 (Fall 1 973) , 9-26; Phillippe Sollers, "Programme, " in his Logiques (Paris: Seuil ,
1 968), pp. 9-1 4; or Julia Kristeva, Semei6tike: Recherches pour une semanalyse (Paris:
Seuil , 1 969); as well as any number of works by Roland Barthes or Derrida hi mself.
� "Like all the notions I am using, it belongs to the history of metaphysics and we can
onl y use it under erasure [sous rature ( added by tr. ) ] , " Jacques Derri da, Of
Grammatology, tf. Gayatri Spi vak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1 977) , p. 6. Since this translation, with an excellent preface by the translator, appeared
afer the present work was completed, I was unable to compare translations for consis­
tency of terminology (a I did with Allison' s translation of Speech and Phenomena), nor
was I able to comment on Mrs. Spi vak' s Preface. However, I have added references in
the notes to relevant sections of her preface. Her discussion of rature occurs on pp.
xi i i-xx. I t forms the backdrop for her lengthy discussion of Drrida' s " acknowledged
' precursors' -Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Husserl , " pp. xxi-liv. I n his translation of
" La ' differance, ' ' ' contained in Derrida' s Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on
Husserl ' s Theor of Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1 973) , p. 1 43,
David Allison notes : "Derrida ofen brackets or ' crosses out ' certain key terms taken
from metaphysics and logic, and in doing this, he follows Heidegger' s usage in Zur
Seinsfrage. The terms in question no longer have their ful l meaning, they no longer have
the status of a purely signifed content of expression-no longer, that is, after the decon­
struction of metaphysics. Generated out of the play of diference, they still retain a
vestigial trace of sense, however, a trace that cannot simply be gotten around
(incontourable) . "
1
2
Preface
archives of metaphysical inscriptions, as the encyclopedia of knowl­
edg� or the complete presence of the signifed (transcendental or not), is
foreIgn to Derrida's new "concept" of writing, l'ecriture. Derrida ex­
plains: "If I distinguish the text from the book, I shall be saying that the
destruction of the book, as it is now under way in all domains, denudes
the surface of the text. That necessary violence responds to a violence
that was no less necessary." The book's own violence, its "protection
of �heol
.
ogy and
.
o
.
f logocentrism against the disruption of writing,
agamst Its aphonstic energy, and . . . against diference in general,"3
forces the present-day violent distinction of the book and the text, in
order for "writing" to be understood.
Rature and the text ofDerrida wherein it occurs are themselves crossed
out or somehow suspended in his thought,- a thought seemingly too
abstract. His method of criticism, deconstruction, could be seen, as
Ricoeur says, as "consisting in laying waste to metaphysical discourse
by aporia"5-i.e., as a kind of mental gymnastics. This common, but
important, criticism of Derrida actually strikes at the heart of his enter­
prise. His continual insistence on the failure of metaphysics as onto­
theo-Iogy seems to support Ricoeur's criticism. Derrida still writes
"book�" in the ordinary sense, and all the words of his text are, by
necesSIty, not erased. In fact, deconstruction seems to be the violent
misinterpretation of Wester thought. However, the above criticism
also misses the point, or preferably, the non-point, of Derrida's work,
all of which could be considered as outside of books, hors-livre, as
´ Of Grammatology. p. 1 8 .
� " If there were only perception, pure permeability to frayi ng [facilitation, Bahnung J.
there would be no frayi ng. We would be written but nothing would be recorded; no
writing would be produced, retai ned, repeated as readability. But pure perception does
not exist [my emphasis] : we are written only by writing . . . by the i nstance wi thi n us
which always already governs perception, be i t i nternal or external. The ' subj ect' of
writing does not exist if we mean by that some sovereig solitude of the author. The
subject of wri ti ng is a system of relations between strata: of the Mystic Pad, of the
psyche, of society, of the world. Withi n that scene the punctual simplicity of the classical
subject is not to be found. In order to describe that structure, it is not enough to recall that
one always writes for someone; and the oppositions sender- recei ver, code-message, etc . ,
remain extremely coarse i nstruments. We would search the 'public' i n vai n for the frst
reader: i . e . , the frst author of a work. And the ' sociology of literature' i s blind to the war
and ruses-whose stakes are the origin of the work-between the author who reads and
the frst reader who dictates. The sociality of writing as drama requires an entirely
diferent discipli ne" (Jacques Derrida, "Freud et la sd:ne de I ' ecriture, " in his L' Ecriture
et la diff erence [Paris: Seuil, 1 967] , p. 335; ET: "Freud and the Scene of Writi ng, " tr.
Jefrey Mehlman, i n Yale French Studies, No. 48: French Freud [ 1972] , 1 1 3- 1 4) .
5 La Meraphore vive (Paris: Seui l, 1 975) , p. 365.
3
Preface
prefaces, as marginal comments written in the margins of other books
or texts."
The preface, Derrida says, is "a fourth text. Simulating the postface,
the recapitulation. and the recurrent anticipation, the auto-moveme�t of
the concept, it is an entirely other, diferent text, but �t the sam:
,
tIme,
as 'discourse of assistance,' it is the 'double' of what It exceeds. Th
.
e
fourth text, as text, is "the beyond everything [which] insofar
.
a� It
withstands all ontology . . . is not a primum movens. However, It Im­
parts [imprime] to everything . .. a movement of fction. _´ Derridafc­
tionalizes Western tradition, an action, in part, of teanng down or
apart, deconstructing or demolishing.9
. .
How does Derrida fctionalize? In other words, what IS the fctIonal
motion that his prefaces impress on everything? As the fourth text, it is
dissemination, 10 deconstruction, diferance: `
´ "All these texts . . . no doubt are the i nterminable preface to another text that I
would one day like to have the strength to write , or again the epigraph to anoth�r [te�t] ?f
which I would never have had the audacity to write . . . " (Positions [Pans: MlnUl t,
1 972] , p. 1 4) . On margi nality, see David Allison, "Derrid�' s C�itique of Husserl : The
Philosophy of Presence, " Diss. The Pennsyl vani a State Umverslty, 1 974, p. 1 77.
´
Jacques Derrida, La Dissemination (Paris : Seuil , 1 972) , pp. 33-35.
� Ibid., p. 65: my emphasis onfction.
� This unbuilding at times seems close to the negative moment often assigned to the
creati ve imagination. See Ray Hart, Unfnished Man and the Imagination (New York:
Herder, 1 968) , pp. 247-49.
'
¤ "
Dissemination ulti mately has no meaning and cannot be channeled i nto a defnition.
. . . If it is not possible to summarize dissemi nation, the seminal diferance, in i ts conce�­
tual tenor, it is because the force and form of its di sruption break through the
.
semantIc
horizon . . . . Dissemination . . . by produci ng a non-fnite number of semantIc efects,
does not allow itself to be reduced ei ther to a present of simple origin (La Dissemination,
La Double Seance. La Mythologie Blanche are practical re-stagings of all the false starts,
beginnings, i nci pits, titles , exergues, fctitious pretexts , etc. : decap�ta�i�ns) or to an e�­
chatological presence. It marks an irreducible and generative mul tJp!tclty. The s
.
lIpple­
men! and the turbulence of a certain lack break down the li mit of the text, exempt It fr�m
exhaustive and enclosing formal i zation or at least prohibit a saturating taxonomy of I ts
themes, of i ts signifed, of i ts i ntended meani ng ( vouloir-dire).
"Here we are playing, of course , upon the fortui tious resemblance, upon the purely
si mulative ki nshi p between seme and semen. They are in no way interconnected by
meaning. And yet, i n this skiddi ng and this purely exteral collusion, �he �ccident d
.
oes
produce a sort of semantic mirage: the deviance of the i ntended meant��, I ts refl ectlve­
efect (efet-refet) in wri ti ng sets a process i n motion. " Taken from �OSI!/Ons, pp. 6
.
1 -62:
ET: "Positions, " Diacritics, 2, No. 4 (Winter 1 972) , 37. See SPI Vak s Preface I n Of
Grammatology, pp. lxv-l xvi .
'' Alli son in hi s Translator' s Introduction to Speech and Phenomena notes: "The term
' deconstruction' (deconstruction), while perhaps unusual , should present no difculties
4
Preface
Dissemination diplces the three of onto-theo-logy according to an
angle of a certain bending-back. A crisi of versus: these marks no
longer allow themselves to be resumed or 'decided' in the two of the
binar opposition nor sublated [relever] in the three of speculative
dialectics . . . they destroy the trinitarian horizon. They textually
destroy it: they are the marks of dissemination (and not of polysemy)
because they do not allow themselves at any point to be pinned down
by the concept or content of a signifed. They 'add' there the more or
less of a fourth term. 1:l
here. It signifes a project of critical thought whose task is to locate and ' take apart' those
concepts which serve as the axioms or rules for a period of thought, those concepts which
command the unfolding of an entire epoch of metaphysics. ' Deconstruction' is somewhat
less negative than the Heideggerian or Nietzschean terms ' destruction' or ' reversal' ; it
suggests that certain foundational concepts of metaphysics will never be entirely elimi­
nated, even if thei r i mportance may seem to be efectively diminished. There is no simple
' overcoming' of metaphysics or the language of metaphysics. Derrida recognizes,
nonetheless, that the system of Wester thought is fnite; it has a fnite number of axioms
and a fnite number of permutations that will continue to work themselves out in a gi ven
period of time as particular moments within this tradition, e . g. , as particular schools or
movements of philosophy. I n this sense, Derrida also speaks of the ' completion' of
metaphysics, the terminal point of ' closure' (cloture) for the system. But the work of
deconstruction does not consist in simply pointing out the structural limits of
metaphysics . Rather, in breaking down and disassembling the ground of this tradition, its
task is both to exhibit the source of paradox and contradiction within the system, within
the very axioms themsel ves, and to set forth the possibilities for a new kind of meditation,
one no longer founded on the metaphysics of presence" ( pp. xxxii -xxxi ii ) .
` � The a of diferance inscribes the at onceness of difering and deferring i n diferance
(the French verb diferer has both signifcations: to difer, to defer or delay ; etymologi­
cally the English words "difer" and "defer" stem from the same root) . Derrida explains
in "La diferance, " translated in Speech and Phenomena, p. 1 37: "the word ' diference'
(with an e) could never refer to difering as temporalizing or to diference as polemos [to
diference as di vision or spacing] . It is this loss of sense that the word diferance (with an
a) will have to schematically compensate for. Diferance . . . refers to [its] whole com­
plex of meanings not only when i t is supported by a language or interpreti ve context (like
any signifcation) , but it already does M somehow of itself. Or at least i t does so more
easily by itself than dos any other word: here the a comes more immediately from the
present participle [diferant (added by tr. )] and brings us closer to the action of ' di fering'
that is in progress . . . . But while bringing us closer to the infni tive and active core of
difering, 'diferance' with an a neutralizes what the infniti ve denotes as simply acti ve, in
the same way that ' parlance' does not signify the simple fact of speaking, of speaking to
or bing spoken to . . . . Here in the usage of our language we must consider that the
ending -ance is undecided between active and passive. And we shall see why what is
designated by ' diferance' is neither simply active nor simply passive, that i t announces or
rather recalls something like the middle voice, that it spaks of an operation which is not
an operation, which cannot be thought of ei ther as a passion or as an action of a subject
upon an object, as starting from an agent or from a patient, or on the basis of, or in vi ew
of, any of these terms. "
I´I
La Dissemination, p. 32.
5
Preface
1a.siexiaa|crisi ,ae:.s.seiiae|.ae.eiiae| .aeei«:.i.a,, .ia.sacc. i. ea
eiiae iea:ia ie:m-iaai ei]ction-masi |e eeaee.vecei.a ie:ms
eiae:iaaaasaea|ea|ase:meeaaa.eseieae.ee. i aeiae:«e:cs. a
ae« ea|ea|as . iaaieic.ae:aaeee:c. ssem.aai.ea. .saeecec. s.aeeiae
e:.s.seiiae iexi .saei|:ea,aia|eai|yçe|ysemye:iaeeve:a|aa·
caaeeeimeaa.a,. |ai:aiae:|yiaeve:y. aa|. |.iyiecee.cemeaa.a,
Nea·eae.ee :aas ia:ea,aeai De::. ca s iexis. i a si:aeia:e. s.,a.
aac r|ay .a iae D.seea:se eiiae uamaa se.eaees. eeaee:a.a,iae
i«e .aie:ç:eiai.eas ei . aie:ç:eiai.ea. iaai «a.ea c:eams ei ce·
e.çae:.a,iaei:aiae:e:.,.aaaciaai«a.ea am:msi:eeç|ayaaci:. es
ieçass|eyeacmaaaacaamaa. sm.De::.casays aeceesaei|e|.eve
iaaiiecay iae:e . saay¡aesi.ea eichoosing. "15 O: a,a. a. . a 1ae
ÐacseiHaa.iae:e. saes. mç|eaacaa.¡aeeae. ee|ei«eeai«e
ie:ms eiceeeasi:aei.ea. e.iae: ue.ce,,e: s ceeeasi:aei.ea ei eaie·
iaee·|e,y |y meaas ei.is e«a|aa,aa,e e:iae si:aeia:a| .si«ay-|y
am:m.a, a|se|aie :açia:e aac c.ae:eaee ~ ae« «:.i.a, masi
«eaveaac. aie:i«.aei|ei«emei.is"16 1a. s|e,.eeiaea·eae.ee.siae
ve:yieaacai.ea..iiae:e.seae.eiDe::.ca seaie:ç:.se. ii.siaeaei.ea
eiiaeaacee.ca||e-iaai«a.ea.by analogy, De::.casays-eaaaei|e
cee.cec nyaaa|e,y|eeaase. assa:aakeimaaaeies. aacee.ca|. |.iy
aas a :eie:eaee ie cee.ca|. |.iy. a :eie:eaee iaai masi |e e:essec
eai

·
1ae aacee.ca||e' ia|es .aie. ise|iia. saea·eae.ee. as «e||as iae
a,a:eeiiaee||. çs. s De::.casays. are:maacHeaa. a,.
There is, then, probably no choice to be made between two lines of
thought; our task is rather to refect on the circularit which makes the
'` "Freud et la scene de l ' ecriture, " p. 302; ET p. 81 .
`´ I n L'Ecriture e t fa diference, pp. 427-28; ET: i n The Structuralist Controversy: The
Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man ( Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1 970) , pp. 265-66.
I6
"The Ends of Man, " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 30, No. 1 ( 1 969) ,
56. A French version of this article was published in Derrida' s Marges de la phiLosophie
(Paris: Mi nui t, 1 972) . The above ci tations occur on pp. 1 62-63.
I7
Sarah Kofman, " Un philosophe ' unheimlich, ' ' ' in Ecarts: Quatre Essais a propos
de Jacques Derrida (Paris: Fayard, 1 973) , p. 1 48, n. 1 . The whole essay of Kofman is
i nvaluable for "understanding" Derrida.

" It was necessary to analyze, to put to work, in the text of the history of philosophy
as well as in the so-called 'li terary' text . . . certain marks . . . which I called by analogy
(I emphasize this) undecidables, i . e . , simulative units, ' false' verbal, nominal or semantic
properties, which escape from inclusion in the philosophical (binary) opposition and
which nonetheless inhabit it, resist and disorganize it, but without ever constituting a third
term, without ever occasioning a solution in the form of speculative dialectics" (Po­
sitions, p. 58: ET p. 36).
6
Preface
one pass into the other indefnitely. And, by strictly repeating this
circle in its own historical possibility, we allow the production ofsome
elliptical change ofsite, within the dif erence involved in repetition; this
displacement is no doubt defcient, but with a defciency that is not yet,
or is already no longer, absence, negativit, nonbeing, lack, silence.
Neither matter nor form, it is nothing that any philosopheme, that is,
any dialectic, however determinate, can capture. It is an ellipsis of
both meaning andform; it is neither plenar speech nor peiectly
circular. More and less, neither more nor less-it is perhaps an
entirely dif erent question.
1aeaacee.ca||e s |e,.e.siaaieiiaee||.çs. seiiaee.:e| e. aceie:mec.
ceeeaie:ece. :e|e ~|ea,«.iaiaee.:e|e.ia. s|e,.eeiiaeaacee. ca|| e.
eic.ae:aaee .aaa.a,esiaeçe.ai .| .ae.aacsçaeeaaci.meiaemse|ves .
diferance already suggests a mode of writing (ecriture) without
presence and absence-without histor, cause, arche, or telos-which
would overturn all dialectic, theology, teleology, and ontology. This mode
ofwriting would exceed everything that the histor ofmetaphysics has
conceived in the form ofthe Aristotelian grmme: the point, the line, the
circle, as well as time and space themselves.
2
0
1a.s|e,.eeic.ae:aaee.s«aaiaa. maies. aaa||y.iaeea:|yiexiei
De::.cai:aas|aiecae:e .a. sIntroduction ieuasse:|

sOrigin ofGeome­
tr. ia Of Grammatology, De::.casa,s «aai eaa a|se|e sa.ceiia. s
Introduction: ue:e as e| se«ae:e. ie çese iae ç:e||em . aie:ms ei
eae.ee.iee|| .,ee: ie|e| .eveeaese|i e|| . ,ecie aas«e:.i|,ayes e:
no, ieeeaee.·eeiaçça:ieaaaeeasaaa| |e,.aaeee:aeaaçça:teaaaeeas
ç|a. asçeas.a,..sieeeaiaseve:,c.ne:eai|eve|s .çaias .aacsi,| es

la
iae ceeeasi:aei.ea ei iae a:eae ¸ iae ç:eie·} . eae cees aei mase a
eae.ee ¯tveame:e. mçe:iaaii e:ea:ça:çeses. s iae| . ae]asi|eie:e
ia. s De::.casa,s. "That is why a thought ofthe trace [diff e rancej can
no more break with a transcendental phenomenology than be reduced
to it. "21
iaeiae:«e:cs. De::.ca. sasmaeaaçaeaemeae|e,.siasaei . . sas
´ � "La Forme et Ie voul oi r-dire: note sur l a phenomenologie du langage, " i n Marges, p.
207: ET i n Speech and Phenomena , p. 1 28.
�" "Ousia et gramme: note sur une note de Sein und Zeit, " i n Marges, p. 78; ET:
'Ousia and Gramme': A Note to a Footnote in Being and Time, " tr. Edward S. Casey,
in Phenomenology i n Perspective, ed. F. J . Smi th (The Hague: Nijhof, 1 970) , p. 93.
�` P. 62.
7
Preface
maeaasi:aeia:a|.siasaei.aaaiae.sias«e| | asia.a|e:eiiaesae:ec.··
asae.iae:. Cae.eesaeecaei|emaceae:e.. aiaei. eaaaei|emace
DERRIDA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY
"To deconstruct" philosophy would. . . be to think the
structured genealogy of its concepts in the most faithful or
interior manner, but at the same time it woul be to determine
from a certain outside unqualiable or unnameable by
philosophy itself what this history could dissemble or prohibit,
becoming history through this somewhere interested
suppression.
Positions
Speech and Phenomena, De::.ca says. .s iae essay i va| ae iae
mesi ·iaia. s«e:|ae¡aesi.easiaeç:. v.|e,eeiiaeve.ee¸sçeeeì}
aac çaeaei.e«:.i.a,.a:e|ai.eaie a||eiwesie:aa. sie:y.

saeaa

i�. s
¡aesi.ea| eis. ise|i|eceç.eiec.aiaea.sie:yeimeiaçays.esaacII .is
mesi mece:a. e:.i.ea| . aac v.,.|aai ie:m. uasse:| s i:aaseeaceaia|
çaeaemeae|e,y·· iieaa|eeeas.ce:ec.De::.caiee| s. asa|ea,aei

e
ieOf Gram mato logy , |ai a aeie iaai aas iae a:siç|aee .a ae|ass..
ça. |eseça.ea:ea.ieeia:e. O:.aesays. Speech and Phe

omena eaa|e
eeas.ce:ec as iae eiae: s.ce,i:eai e:|ae|asyea«.sa,eiaaeiae:
essay. ça|| . saec .a i º-:. as aa iai:ecaei.ea ie uasse:ì s O�gin of
Geometr. 1ae:eiaeç:e||emseeaee:a.a,«:. i.a,«e:ea|:eacyII ç|aee
as saea aac eeaaeeiecie iae .::ecae.||e si:aeia:e ei'diferer' .a .is
:e| ai.easieeease.easaess. ç:eseaee. se.eaee.a. sie:yaaciaea.sie:yei
se.eaee.iaec.saççea:aaeee:ce| ay. a,eiiaee:.,.a.aacseea. ·
2'
E. Donato in " Structuralism: The Aftermath," p. 25, sees OJ Grammatology, along
with Foucaul t's The Order oj Things, as "the only quest for ti me past and ti me regained
that a fundamentalIy atheist [my emphasis] epistemological confguration might ofer. "
Al so see on this Mi kel Dufrenne, "Pour une phil osophi e non theologique, " i n hi s Le
Poetique, 2nd revised and enlarged ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 97�) ,
pp. 7-57. On Derrida and the sacred, see Henri Meschonnic , Le Signe e t Ie poeme ( ParIs:
Gal l i mard, 1 975 ) , pp. 401 -92.
¯`´ Positions, p. 1 3 .
¯ Ibid.
¯`´ Ibid. Derrida has an even earlier essay on Husserl , gi ven at a conference i n 1 959,
entitled" 'Genese et structure' et l a phenomenologi e. " It was reprinted i n L' Ecriture et
La diference i n 1 967, but frst appeared i n 1 965 i n Entretiens sur les notions de genese :t
de structure, ed. Maurice de Gandi l lac et a. (Paris: Mouton, 1 965) , pp. 243-6. ThIS,
then, is both before and after the work on the Origin, having obviousl y undergone
changes by the time of i ts reprinting in L'Ecriture (the use of the concept dif erance on p.
239 is the cl earest and si mplest exampl e of thi s change) . The article is very hel pful for
understanding Derrida's Introduction.
8
Preface
ia iaese eemmeais De::.ca ç:eseais as «.ia aa eçi.ea. ~s ae
sa,,esis, «eeea|cia|eSpeech and Phenomena asiae :eve:seeia. s
Introduction, «a.ea|eeemesiae e|ve:se, iae :.,ai e:ç:eçe:(recto)
s.ce.i a| .,aieiiaeeemmeaisa|eve, iaeIntroduction «ea|ciaea|eiae
essayDe::.cava|aeciaemesi. O:,.iia.s. sie,eieeia: , asiae:eve:se
, e: . mç:eçe:, s.ce, De::.ca sIntroduction . s si.||ie |e a.,a| yç:.zec
,aac. sse|yDe::.ca·, , s.aee.i.siae«ae|e«a.eaaasva|ae ue:e
çe:ve:se|y, iae . mç:eçe: s.ce , aiiae|.a, |y .isve:y . mç:eç:.eiy iae
ç:eçe:s.ce, saçç|emeaisiaeva|aeeiiaeæeeacessay, Speech and
Phenomena. iaia.seçi.ea,iaeIntroduction . s|eiaç:eçe:,s. aee.i«as
«:.iiea a:si, .a1961, s.xyea:s |eie:e iaeça||.eai.ea eiSpeech and
Phenomena) aac.mç:eçe:,s.aee.i.siae:eve:seeiiaeseeeacessay, .
1aea|eveeemmeais, ia|eai:emHea:.xeases.aie:v.e««.iaDe:·
:.ca.a1967, aaciaeeçi.easiaeyç:eseaiç:ev.ceia:iae:]asi.| eai.ea
ie:ae|ese:eac.a,eiDe::.casa:sima]e:ça||.saecessay, a.sIntro­
duction ieThe Orgin ofGeometr. ii.sa|seaa.ai:ecaei.eaieiae«e:|
eiDe::.ca.a,eae:a|aacia:a.saesa|as.eça:ieiiaei:ame«e:|ie:a. s
|aie:, ç:eseai«e:|.That basic framework-and ae:ei:ame«e:|saea|c
çess.||y|eeaaa,ec.mmec.aie| yieseieiç:e||ems, eçi.e,meiaec, .i
a||iaese ie:ms «e:e aeia|:eacy.aace¡aaie ie«aai«ea:e ,e.a,ie
eeas.ce:-s phenomenology. He«eve:, as «.|| |eeeme e|ea:, iae
çaeaemeae|e,y.a¡aesi.ea.saeiiaai:e] eeiec|yu.eae| reaeaa|i.a
a.s re:e«e:c ie iae Ða,|.sa ec.i.ea ei The Order of Things, a
çaeaemeae|e,y «a.ea ,.vesa|se|aieç:.e:.iy ie iae e|se:v.a,sa|·
]eei, «a.eaaii:.|aiesaeeasi.iaieai:e|eieaaaei, «a.eaç|aees.ise«a
çe.aieiv.e«aiiaee:.,.aeia||a.sie:.e.iy-«a.ea,.asae:i ,|eacsiea
i:aaseeaceaia|eease.easaess. ··waaii«.saiee|a.m |ysay.a,iaai
De::.ca s i:ame«e:|.sçaeaemeae|e,.ea|.saeiiaaiae.sHasse:|.aae:
He.ce,,e:.aa, e: evea .cea| .si e: ex. sieai.a| , e: iaai a. s meiaec .s
çaeaemeae|e,.ea| .xaiae:,i«aaiiesa,,esiiaaiDe::.caaasieaac.a
aacat the limits ç:ee.se|y «ae:e çaeaemeae|e,y ia.|s, . . e . , «ae:e.i
|eeemes iae mece:a, exemç|a:y :eeaç.ia|ai.ea ei wesie¬ meia·
çays.es, a ie:i.|e ,:eaac ie: ea|i.vai.a, ¡aesi.eas a|eai iae aea·
¹
´ Derrida often refers to and summarizes the resul ts obtained in this study in his later
work. See, for example , Speech and Phenomena, pp. 80-8 1 ; or L' Ecriture et la diff er­
ence, pp. 22 and 248.
°` The Order of Things: An Archaeology ofthe Human Sciences (New York: Vintage
Books, 1 973) , p. xiv. I cannot resist ci ti ng Foucaul t' s statement to the " English-speaking
reader" concering his relation to the other half of the phenomenological-structural de­
bate: "In France, certain half-witted 'commentators' persist i n label l i ng me a 'struc­
turalist' . I have been unable to get it i nto thei r tiny minds that I have used none of the
methods, concepts, or key terms that characterize structural analysis" ( xi v) .
9
Preface
ça.|eseça.ea|per se ,iae | . m. is e: ma:,.as ei ça.|eseçay,, a|eai
«:.i.a,,e:.,.asaaca.sie:y, aacc.ae:oaee.
ue:eeve:, iaeçaeaemeae|e,yDe::. caexam.aesaaca:,aes«.ia. s
iae çaeaemeae|e,yeis.,a.| eai.ea.··sa|i.i|eciai:ecaei.eaieiae
r:e||em ei s.,as .a Hasse:| s raeaemeae|e,y, Speech and
Phenomena |eacsie iae eeae| as.ea. 1ae:e aeve:«as aay çe:eeç·
i.ea. · ra:iae:. ~aceeai:a:yie «aaiçaeaemeae|e,y-«a.ea .s
a|«ays çaeaemeae|e,yeiçe:eeçi.ea-aasi:. ec ie ma|e as |e|.eve,
eeai:a:yi e«aaiea:ces.:eeaaaeiia.|i e|eiemçiec.aie|e| .ev.a,,the
thing itself always escapes.
¹
nasec ea iae "absolute will-to-hear­
onesel-speak, ¯ çaeaemeae|o,y masi a|«ays ia.|, masi a|«ays
ce|ay·ceie:·c.ae:eai. aiethe thing itsel, eveatae a|se|aie ieaacai.ea
ie:semaeaeiiecay s iaea,ai, . e , se|i·eease.easaess waai:ema.as
.s ie: asiespeak, iema|eea:ve.ees:eseaaieia:ea,aeaiiaeee:·
:.ce:s .ae:ce:iema|eaçie:iae |:ea|aç eiç:eseaee, .ae:ce:ie
saçç|emeaiiae.mçaeieieae sç:eseaee.
¹
¹
¿
De::.ca s«e:|iecaie:ema. asinside thi s failure aacneed to speak ei
çaeaemeae|e,y ~saesae«s,çaeaemeae|e,y|:ea|saçeaiae:ee|ei
ç:eseaee..i. sasa|]eei.eaeisense iesee.a,, eiseaseieiaeseaseei
s.,ai , s.aee sease .a ,eae:a| .s .a iaei iae eeaeeçi ei eve:y
çaeaemeae|e,.ea|| e|c. Yei|eie:eia.s|:ea|.a,aç,.aiaem.csi
ei. i, . s«ae:e De::.ca «e:|s. r:.e:ie iae meiaçays.ea| e| a.ms iaai
çaeaemeae|e,yexe:e. sesaac«.ia.aiaeçess.|.|.iyeiaceeeasi:aei.ve
:eve:sa| ei iae a.e:a:eay ei s.,ai aac sease, s.aee iaey a:e
aacee.ca||e-iaai.s«ae:ei:a.iia|Hasse:|.aa«e:|eaa|eceae 1ae
ç:e||emeimeiaec«.ia.aiaese| .m.i..s«aai«e«.||seeceve|eçec.a
De::.ca sIntroduction.
1aeIntroduction ieThe Orgin ofGeometr .sa|ea,, exieas.veessay
eeaee¬ec «.ia a sae:i.aceçeaceaii:+,meat .ae|acec, aeee:c.a,ie
Hasse:| s ç:e|a||e .aieai, asaa ~ççeac.x ie The Crisis of European

See Paul Ricoeur, "Negati vity and Primary Afrmation, " i n hi s Histor and Truth,
tr. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1 965) , p. 3 1 2.
¯´ p. 1 03 . Al so see the comments of Newton Garver i n hi s Preface to thi s work, xxi i i ­
xxi v, as well as Note 4 above.
´´Ibid. , p. 1 04.
´`Ibid. , p. 1 02.
¦

Ibid., p. 1 04 and xxvi i i-xxi x.
´`' "Form and Meaning, " in Marges, p. 1 88; ET in Speech and Phenomena, pp. 1 08-09.
10
Preface
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. 1aema]e:ia:eac,a. c. a

uasse:| s:eaeei.eas.aiaeOrigin .siae¡aesi.eaei|e,.aa.a,se:en·
,.ns«.ia.ahistor aaciae. :sease.De::.ca sIntroduction

esçeeisu


se:| s maaae: eiç:eeeec. a, iae:e.a. u. s eemmeaia:y¬ie:ç:eiai.ea
ie| | e«siaee:ce:ei¡aesi.ea.a,aaciaeç:e||ems:a. sec|yuasse:| ,aac
«.ia.a ia.s si:aeia:e De::.ca e|a|e:aies aac e|ae. caies-aac aaa|�y
saçç|emeais«aaiuasse:|«:.ies i a«aaiie||e«s, ae«ev�:, i«. | |
aei ç:eeeec se :.,e:eas| y iasieac, i «. | | e|ae.caieiaea:ea.ieeia:a|
eeaeeçieia.sie:.e.iy,sease·a. sie:y·aaciae:�|

ieca:easei¡aes·
i.ea.a,.ieaia. | s. |aa,aa,e,«:. i.a,,.cea|.iy,iaei.v.

,�eseai

aa

ciae
i:aaseeaceaia| . 1aeseeemmeais«.|||eça:saec«. iamDe:ncas ai·
ie¬çiieaace:siaaciae. aie:ç|ayeiçaeaemeae|e,(s

ç:.ae.�| eeia||
ç:.ae.ç|es aac.isaaa|. asi.iai.ea. iae.aie:ç�ayº.iameeas..easaess
eiiaeceaa.ieia.a,ç:eseai.açe:seaaaciae¬aa.iei ceaasaaa|

a

s
ceie::ec 1e| es. De::.ca«aais ie aace:siaacçaeaemeae|e,y as .i . s
., stretched |ei«eeaiaejnitizing eease.easaessei. ispririple a

ciae
injnitizing eease.easaessei.is aaa|institution,
.
iaeE

ds

iftung ¬c�

a.ie| y ceie::ec .a .is eeaieai |ai a|«ays ev.ceai II .is :e

a| ai.ve
va|ae 1ae c. a| eei.eei iaesei«e, çaeaemeaea aac i c�a, .s «�ai
De::icaseemsieiee| . mç| .e.i|,,aicecuasse:|. aa. s:eueei.easeaa. s·
ie:ie.i,, aaca siac, ei De::.cas eem

m

eaia:, :evea| s «aaiaaççeas
«aeaiaese. mç| .eai.easa:emaceexç| . .. i
Hitoricity
re:uasse:| ,a.sie:.e.iy(Geschichtlichkeit)35 eeaee:asiaee:i,.asaac
i:ac.i.easei.cea|e|]eeis, aaci:ac.i.ea.ise|i.saace:sieecie|e|eia
iae ç:eeess ei aaac.a, ce«a aac iae eaca:aaee ei ia.s ç:eeess , a
`´ Jacques Derrida, Introduction et Traduction de L'Origine de fa g�omet�ie de Hus­
serl , 2nd ed. (Pari s: Presses Uni versitaires de France, 1 974) . Tran
.
slatl?ns will be t�ke
.
n
from the text as presented below and the page references wi l l be CIted lU the text withm
parenthesi s. For this quote: ( 1 38) .
• . It should be noted that Geschichtlichkeit is the term used many years e�rlier
.
b
,

Martin Heidegger in Being and Time, §§72-77: "Temporal i ty and Ges�hichtl!chkel t.
Al though the English translators of Heidegger' s work, John Macqu�ITle �nd Edw
.
ard
Robinson, have rendered the term as historicality. most translators, I ncl udI�g D
.
ern�a,
prefer the term historicity for Geschichtlichkeit. I have followed the latter, usmg hlston�­
ity throughout . However, although both Heidegger and Husserl use the same term, theIr
senses are different . as Derrida's Introduction should make clear
: . .
In addition, David Carr, who translated Husserl ' s Crisis, explaI�s In �IS Phenomenol­
ogy and the Problem of History ( Evanston: Northwest�rn UOl:ersity �ess, 1 974� ,
pp. 66-67 , that Husserl ' s concern wi th the problem of hIstory dId not anse from hIS
l
11
Preface
ae:.ia,e. i cea| e|]eeis a:e «aai a|eae ,aa:aaiee iae çess. |.| .iy ei
a. sie:.e.iy, . . e. , iaea|«ays .aie:sa|]eei.veeease.easaesseia.sie:y
(29). i aeiae:«e:cs, a. sie:.e.iy. sa|«aysasense-histor. iieçe:aiesea
iae |eve| eiseaseaac .s:e|aiecieiaeç:e||emsei|aa,aa,e, .cea| . iy,
i:aia,aacaamaas. ac. a.isi.v.a,r:eseai-iaesea:eeeia||seaseaac
a.sie:y
~eee:c.a,ie De::.ca iae:e a:e i«e eease¡aeaeesie ia.sv.e«ie:
uasse:| . r.:si, uasse:| s .a¡a. :y |aes ie iae e:.,.a ,. aia.s ease, ei
,eemei:y.saa. a¡a. :y. aieiaesease·a.sie:yeigeometrical i:aias, .aie
iaee:.,.aaaci:aasm. ss. eaeigeometrical .cea|e|]eei.v.i.ese:e|]eeis,
aa. a¡a. :yiaaieaaea|y|easease·.avesi.,ai.ea(a uasse:|aseciae
ie:m,ofgeometr. 36 De::.casaysa|eaiia. s. 1emec.iaieeae:.aves·
i.,aieiaesease(besinnen) eie:.,.as. saiiaesamei.meie.maseeaese|i
:esçeas.||e(verntworten) ie:iaesease(Sinn) eise.eaeeaacça.|ese·
çay,|:.a,ia. sseaseieiaee|a:.iyei. is ia|a| ,meai} , aacçaieaese|i.a
açes.i.eaeiresponsibility ie:ia. sseasesia:i.a,i:emiaeieia|seaseei
ea:ex. sieaee (31). sease·.avesi.,ai.ea:evea| siaeeeac.i.easie:aac
iae seaseeia. sie:.e.iy. |ai ea| yia:ea,açe:seaa| :esçeas.|.| .iyaac
:esçease
seeeac| y, iaee:. ,. aei.cea|e|]eeis, asorigin, :a. sesie:uasse:|iae
ç:e||emeiiae.:eaca:.a,ae:.ia,e , iae. :i:ac.i.ea ia eiae:«e:cs. .i
.cea|e|]eeisa:ei:a| ye:.,.aa|aacç:.me:c.a| ,ae«eaaiaey|e:eee,·
a.zec e:sae«a waaiç|aeesiaem. aa.sie:y.siae.:"essence-of-the-
jrst-time, " iae. :Erstmaligkeit; iaey ceaei eeea:, uasse:| says, .a a
acquaintance with Heidegger' s Being and Time: " It is hardly to be expected, however,
that a problem with which Husserl is so preoccupied could have occurred to hi m over­
night, as i t were, or even have entered his thi nki ng from an outside source-such as
Heidegger' s Being and Time (with its chapter on Geschichtlichkeit) , which HusserJ seems
to have studied careful l y, for the frst time, in 1 932. We intend to show, i n fact , that the
concept of historicity has its roots in refections on various subjects going back as far as
1 9 1 3, and that i ts emergence i n the Crisis i s the efect of an accumulation and confuence
of trains of thought which ul timately force HusserI' s new introduction to phenomenology
to take on its pecul i ar form. " Carr refers, then, to Gadamer' s support of this position i n
his Truth and Method, tr. ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury
Press, 1 975) , p. 2 1 5: "These statements of the later Husser! [concering historicity] might
be motivated by the debate wi th Being and Time, but they are preceded by so many other
attempts to formulate his position that it i s cl ear that Husser! had always had in mind the
application of his ideas to the problems of the historical sciences. "
´ Sense-i nvestigation, Besinnung, prise de conscience-George Steiner explains thi s
notion wel l i n After Babel: Aspects ofLanguage and Translation (New York: Oxford
Uni versity Press , 1 975): "The complete penetrative grasp of a text , the complete dis­
covery and 'recreative apprehension of its l ife-forms (prise de conscience), is an act whose
realization can be precisel y felt but is nearly i mpossible to paraphrase or systematize" ( p.
25) .
+
12
Preface
"topos ouranios, " .a semeaeavea| y |eea| e, aaciaea ceseeacie iae
ea:ia.xaiae:,.cea|e|]eeisa:eirac.i.ena|e|]eeis, aaciaeyçesæss
a. sie:.e.iy as eaeeiiae.: e. cei.e eemçeaeais (48) . 1aasaayai·
iemçiie,eiaiiaee:.,.n eiiaese .cea|e|]eeis, anya. sie:.ea|:e·
caei.ea, «ea|c |e "reactivating anc aeei.e, aac . i«ea|caaveie
«e:|ia:ea,ai:eeçaaaiasy,. ma,.na:y,va:.ai.ea. ue«eve:,astradi­
tion, . cea|e|]eeisaaveaee:eiec,anceeni.aaeiecese,sec.meaiai.eas
.niae.:i:ansm. ss.ea,iae.:ce|.ve:yieiaeç:eseaianciaia:e.1aeyaave
ç.e|ec aç|aie:a|anc|a:enisi:aia«a.eaiaea.sie:.ea|:ecae:.eamasi
anaIIy recaee :n ercer :e :eaea iaei anc çrasç :ae enç:ns ei:ae
: ceaI:::esanueru:seass: en.
s.nee:aee:.,.n.a¡aesi.enae:e.saçaeaemeneIe,:ea|eae,::s:eae·
i.vai.enenia.| sa:e:ara.n¡a. :y(Ruckfrage). 1a. s.n¡a.:ya|«ayss:aris
«.iaaa e:.,.n s tradition, «a.ea masi .aia:a|e:ecaeecieiaeve:y
e:.,.aiae.n¡a.:y. ssee|.a,ie:eaei.vaie. iaeiae:«e:cs, i:ac.i.ea . s
esseni.a|ie|eiaiae.a¡a.:y|ae|ieanciae:eaei.vai.eaeiaae:.,.a.
Ruckrage .s iae ¡aesi.en. a, |ae| through tradition ie iae e:. ,. aei
.cea| .iy. Yei , asuasse:| s ie:m sa,,esis, ia. s¡aesi.ea.n,:esçeacsie
aaa|:eacy:eee.vecmessa,eiaaiiaei:ac.i.eaaancseve:.Reactivation
.siae aamaneaçae.iye:a|.|.iyie:ea«a|eaiaeç:. me:c.a|senseiaai
sec.meaiec,i:ac.i.eaa|,seaseeeve:seve:~aa.ieancmec.aieeaçae·
.iy, :eaei.vai.ea masi «e:i ia:ea,a e¡a.veea| |aa,aa,e ie :e,a.a a
ç:.me:c.a|sease. ii. s, aeee:c.n,ieDe::. ca,Verantwortung aacBesin­
nung, iae:ea«a|ea.n,aac|e.a,:esçeas.||eie:iaeç:.me:c.a|sease
iaai iae e¡a.veea| i:ac.i.ea eeneea| s . ~s aa.ie aac mec.aie ,. . e. ,
i:ac.i.eaa|, , iae a|.|.iy ie :eaei.vaie sease eaa |e |esi, a ç|.,aiiaai
uasse:|ie|i,ave :.seie iae e:.s.s .a ça. |eseçay«a.eaeaa:aeie:.zec
mece:ai.mes . ~ncyei,uasse:|eoai.aaec, :eaei.vai.en asaeaçae.iy
eiaamaa|.nc.a,eae:a|eaa|e.nan.i.zecia:ea,aiae.cea| .z.n,çe«e:
ei,eemei:y.
1ae :e|e eii:ac.i.ea.a uasse:| siaea,ai|eeemese|ea:e:, De::.ca
çe.aiseai, «aea«enei.eeiaaii:ac.i.eaeçe:aiesaaa|e,eas|yieiae
c.a|eei.e¯ ei.nie¬a|i.me·eease.easness, iaec.a|eei.eeiç:eieai.ea
aac:eieai.ea«.ia.niaei.v.a,r:eseai.1aea.sie:.ea|sec.meaiai.eaei
sense .aie:ç|ays«. ia iaee:eai.eaeiae« sease«.ia. aiaeae:.zeaei
ç:eseni sease. ~|| ei«a.ea .s çess.||eie:uasse:| , «e saa|| see, |e·
eaaseei|aa,aa,e,ça:i.ea|a:|y«:.iiea|aa,aa,e,s:, .1aas, a.sie:. e.iy
|eeemesçess.||eia:ea,a:eia¬.n¡a.:yaac:eaei.vai.ea,ancyei|eia
a:e çess.||een|y|eeaaseiae:e. sane:.,.aanci:ac.i.eaei.cea|e|·
]eeis,|eeaaseiae:e. sa.sie:.e.iy.1a.se.:e|e,De::.caexç| a.as, . s«aai
eeaee¬suasse:| . «aaiseemsie|eeiaimesi.mçe:iaaeeieuasse:|
. s as maea aa eçe:ai.ea ,:eaei.vai.en .iæ|ias iae a|. |.iy ie eçea a
13
Preface
a.ccena.sie:.ea|ae|c,asiaeaaia:eeiiaeae|c.:se|i,asiaeçess.|.|.iy
eisemeia.a,|.|e:eaei.vai.en· (51).
seia:«eaave seea iaaia.sie:.e.iy.seeaee:aec«.iaiaee:.,. aaac
i:ac.i.eaei.cea| e|]eeis. re:uasse:| iae |aiie: aei.ea, iaai ei.cea|
ei]eeis, :e¡a. :esexam.nai.eaei|eiae|]eei.v.iyaac.cea|.iy.r.:siiae
ç:e||emeiiaeie:me:,iaeaiae|aiie:.
O:.,.as a:e |e,.na.n,s eiseneia.n, ae«. as saea, iaey :a.se iae
ç:e||emei:eee,a. za|.| .iy. uasse:|aas«e:s|ysay.a,iaaiiae:emasi
|esemeei]eei.v.:y .a:aee:.,.a eian .cea|.:yie::ae .ceaI.:y:eie
reeeçn:zaiIe.`¯:a:s means, oe:r:ua says, :aa::ae senseei:aeeen·
s:::a::nçae:eaneniyieuee:çae:eu:n:ae«eiei:aeeens:::a:euei·
)ee: .Anu:a: sneeess::y:sne:anex:ernaIia:e, ia:aaessea::aIneees·
s::y ei.aieai.eaa| .:y. 1aeprmordial senseeieve:y:niea::eaa| aei.s
only .isfnal sease, . . e. , iae eeasi.iai.eaeiaa e|]eei (64). iaeiae:
«e:cs, e|]eei.v.iy ,aee::e|aieei. aieni.eaa|.iy,ie:ees.aiea:.ena|.iy-
iae ç:e||em ei :eee,a.za|.|.iy-ie |e ,:asçec a:si ia:ea,a .is aaa|
ç:ecaei. iae eeasi.iaiec e|]eei. se iae ¡aesi.ea .s aa::e«ec. «aai
a||e«sie:iaee|]eei.v.iyeiaç:.me:c.a|sease ,aae:. ,.a·a|sease,s.nee
iaeeeac.i.easeie|]eei.v.iya:eiaeseeia.sie:.e.iy:
1a. s |:. a,s as ie iae ç:e||em ei | an,aa,e, iaai |y «a.ea sease
. ise|i-e::aiae:, exç:ess.ve meaa.a,, | . a,a.si.e meaa.a,-|ia.as .is
.cea|e|]eei.v.iy. iaa. seemmeais, De::.cae|a|e:aiesia:eece,:eesei
.cea|e|]eei.v.iy. mç|.e.i.auasse:| s ana| ys. s .r.:si, iae:e.siae|eve|ei
iae«e:c s .cea|e|]eei.v.iy.1ae«e:c|.ea, ie:.asiaaee,.s:eee,a. z·
a||e«.ia.aseve:a||aa,aa,es , |ai. s|eaacieiaese|aa,aa,es. a«a.ea
iae«e:c. ise|ima|essease . seeeac|y, iae:e.siae|eve|eiiae«e:cs
sease.1ae.aienceceeaienie:s.,a.aeai.eaeiiae«e:c| .ea.sava.|·
a||eie maay|an,aa,es, ie:examç|e,Leo, Lowe, |.ea, saeaiaaiiae
.cea|.iys. ,n.aec iae:e|y .si:ee i:em a||iaeiaa| |.n,a.si.e sa|]eei.v·
. iy(71). 1a.:c|y,iae:e. siae|eve|eia|se|aie.cea|e|]eei.v.iy, saea
´` Dorion Cairns, in his review-abstract of Husserl ' s "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung
der Geometrie al s intentional-historisches Problem" ("I nqui ry Concerning the Origin of
Geometry: a Problem of I ntentional Hi story")
'
Philosophy and Phenomenological Re­
search, I, No. 1 ( 1 940), p. 1 00, accurately presents Husserl ' s answer to this problem (he
is abstracting from the German transcription Fink publ ished in the same journal in 1 939) :
"Our mathematics, however, exists as an age-long advance from acquisition t o acquisi­
tion. Therefore i t must have been a more pri mi ti ve sense that frst was projected and
appeared in the evidence of a successful execution. But the phrase i s redundant. Evi­
dence means the grasping of a bei ng in the consciousness of its original 'itslf-thereness. '
And grasping covers other acts besides simply perceptive seei ng. The sense of the meant
object indicates the way to grasp it originaliter. Sense-formations whose nature it is to
exist as subjecti vel y prouced resul ts are 'grasped' originaliter in being produced . Suc­
cessful l y realizing a project is evidence; i n the reali zi ng, the efect is there as 'itself. · "
14
Preface
asiaei:ee.cea|. i. esei,eemei:y1ae.cea| .iy.a¡aesi.eaae:e.siaaiei
iaee|]eei.ise|i. Oaia. s|eve|eie|]eei.v.iy.iae:e. saeacae:eaeeie
aayceiaeie|aa,aa,e.ea|yacae:eaeeieiaeçess.|.|.iyei| aa,aa,e. a
,eae:a| .� 1a. smeaas iaai i:aas|ai.ea . s.aaa.ie|y eçea. De::.caaas
e|ae.caieciaeseia:eece,:ees. ae:ce:iesae«iaai«aeauasse:| . .a
iaeOrigin, ceesaeic.si.a,a.sa|ei«eeaiaee|]eei. ise|iaac.issease .
ia.s eaa ea|y eeea: «.ia.a iae ia.:c :e,.ea ei .cea| e|]eei.v.iy. iae
a|se|aie| yi:ee.cea|e|]eei.v.iyei|aa,aa,e 1aas|aa,aa,e.s iaeiee|
ie::evea| .a,.cea|e|]eei.v.iy.«a.ea.aia:a:evea|s. s.aee. iceesaei
| .ve. aa"topos ouranios, " iaaie|]eei.v.iy.ise|i. s.ai:.as. ea||ya. sie:.ea|
aac masi|eeeaaeeiec«.iai:aaseeaceaia| sa|]eei.v.iy. 1ae,:eaac
ie:i:aaseeaceaia|a. sie:.e.iy. saaeeve:ec.
uasse:| s ¡aesi.eaiaea|eeemesiaeae« ei.cea|.iy,aacaeiyei
iaaiei.ise:.,.a· . ae«cees.cea|.iy. ça:i.ea|a:|y,eemei:.ea|. cea|.iy.
a::.veaia|se| aie. cea|e|]eei.v.iyi:em .is·»··.çe:seaa|e:.,.a .aiae
.aveaie: s m.ac:ra:acex.ea||y. ae,ees|ae| eaee a,a.aie|aa,aa,e.
ue says iaai . cea|.iy a::.vesai .is a|se|aie e|] eei.v.iy |y meaasei
|aa,aa,e. iae ve:y ia.a,i:em «a.ea .i «as i:y.a, ie eseaçe]asi a
memeaia,e. 1aeça:acex. De::.casays. .s iaai. «. iaeaiiaeaç·
ça:eaiia|| |ae|.aie |aa,aa,e aac iae:e|y .aie a. sie:y. aia||«a.ea
«ea|ca|.eaaieiae. cea|ça:.iyeisease.sease«ea|c:ema.aaaemç.:. ·
ea|ie:mai.ea. mç:.seaecasiaei.aaçsyeae|e,.ea|sa|]eei.v. iy»the
inventor's head. u.sie:.ea| .aea:aai.ea ,.a |aa,aa,e} seis i:ee iae
i:aaseeaceaia| ..asieacei|.ac.a,. i . 1ae|asiaei.ea.iaei:aaseeacea·
ia| . masi iaea |e :eiaea,ai (77). i «. | | :eia:aie ia.s :eia. a|. a, .a
amemeai
1a. sae«.saea. evec|eeaaseaamaa|.ac.s.aeaeaaciaesame
«e:|c. aaceease.easaesseiia.siaeiesia||.saesiaeçess.|. |.iyeia
aa.ve:sa||aa,aa,e. uaa|.ac. s a:sieease.easei. ise|i¸uasse:| says}
as aa.mmec.aieaacmec.aie |. a,a.si.eeemmaa.iy (79). iaacc.·
i.ea. ea:Ða:ia. asiaeç|aeeeia||e|]eeis. . saeiaae|]eei.ise|iaac
eaaaei |eeeme eae ie: aa e|]eei.ve se. eaee. ia iaei . De::.ca eem·
meais. iaeçess. |.|.iyeia,eemei:ysi:.ei|yeemç|emeaisiae. mçes·
s.|. |.iyei«aaieea|c|eea||eca ,ee·|e,y. iaee|]eei.vese.eaeeeiiae
Ða:ia. ise|i (83) . Cee|e,y .s as :ac.ea||y . mçess. || e. iaea. as . saa
e|]eei.vese.eaeeeii:aaseeaceaia|sa|]eei.v. iy. ~ac,eemei:y.sçes·
s.||eea|y. aseia: asiae a|eve . si:ae. s.aee çaeaemeae|e,y s |as.e
ç:.ae. ç|e eiaa.iacea|«ays .aie:ç|ays «.iaaa. aaa.ie ,aacaeae|]ee·
´' However, as Derrida poi nts out i n a note, p. 72 below, thi s ideality occurs and i s di s­
covered in a factual language, and thi s occurrence is "the crucial difculty of al l
[ Husserl ' s] philosophy of hi story: what i s the sense of thi s l ast [type of factuality?"
15
Preface
i.ve,.cea|çe|e-ae:e .ea:Ða:ia-iaeze:e·çe.aieia||çe:eeçi.ea iae
.aaa.ieae:.zea eieve:ye|]eei.

1aeç:e||emei|aa,aa,eaac. cea|.iy. ae«eve:..si.:sieaeeaaie:ec
intraçe:seaa||y.1aer:si. aveaie:ei,eemei:y.ie:examç| e. masiaave
|�eaa||� i� �eee,a.zeaaceemmaa.eaiea,eemei:.ea|. cea|.iy«.ia. a
a.se

«a.ac.v.caa|eease.easaess .seasemasi|e:eee,a.zecaaceem·
maa.eaiecasiaesameseasei:emeaememeaieiiaee,eieaaeiae:
a|se|aie|yc.ae:eai memeai eiiae same e,e. ue:ea,a.a uasse:| :e·
i�:asi? iaeaa.¡aeie:meiiemçe:a|.zai.ea.iaei.v.a,r:eseai. «aese
c. a�eei.ea|eaa:aeie:aac ç:. me:c.a| .iyçe:m.i.ai:açe:seaa|eemmaa. ·
�ai.ea. � a � �ease
iaea. De::.ca eeae| aces . ·»·c· sa|]eei.v.iy .s r:si
lntrasa|, eeilv. iy.aiaeiiaaiesç|a. asuasse:| s :eve:s.eaeaeeme:eie
iae i.

v.a,r:eseai.a a.sc.seass.era|eaiiaee:ae.a|:e|eei«:.i. a,.
~s¬·e·çe:seaa|eemmaa.eai.eaça:exee| |eaee. «:.i.a,,aa:aaiees
ie: uasse:|iaeçess.|.|.iyeia|se| aie . cea|en]eei.v.iy. ~ac De::.ca
a:,aesiaai. s.aee iaepossibilit ei«:.i.a, ,.ves sease iae a|.|. iy ie
|eeemenonspatiotemporal, «:. i.a, saaei.easaaceemç| eiesiaeex.s·
ieaeeeiça:e i:aaseeaceaia| a. sie:. e.iy (87) , iaas çasa.a, aamaa·
|.ac. uasse:| iee| s. ae:ess a ae« ia:esae|c-iaai eii:aaseeaceaia|
eemmaa.iy De::.ca seemmeaieaia.s :esa|i. iaaiiae aaiaeai.eaei
ei«:.i.a,. sai:aaseeaceaia|:ecaei.eaçe:ie:mec|yaacie«a:ciae
�e
.
" (92), . ac. eaiesiaai«:.i.a,.saeeaaie:ça:iieiaei.v. a,r:eseai
.a.aie:çe:seaa|eemmaa.eai.ea. iae:ce:aeiieaave i:aia c. saççea:
i:emiae«e:|c.i:em·»·c· sa|]eei.v.iy. |eiamea:eve:iieiaei.v. a,
r:eseai. ie iae .aieai.eaa| aei eiiae e,e. ieintra sa|]eei.v.iy. s. aee
«:.i. a,.sintentional-i . e. , .ima|essease-uasse:|a:,aes|ae|ie«:.i·
.a, s .

ai

eai.eaa| .iy.ieiaee,e s . aieai.eaa|aei.aiaeaeiei«:.i. a,. ie
iae i.v.a, r:eseai «a.ea ,:eaacs eve:y .aieai.eaa| aei .a |eia .is
a|ie:.iyaacsameaess. ~caçi.a,De::.ca ssaee.aei:ema:|sa|eaiiae
i.v.a,r:eseai.«eeea|csay. iaea.iaai«:.i.a,eeasi.iaiesiaeeiae:
aseiae:.a.ise|iaaciaesameassame. aiaeeiae:(86) .
Historicity and the Transcendental
u.sie:.e.iy. uasse:|says. .saamaa|. ac sesseai.a|ae:.zea. iaei.v·
.a, r:eseai ieaacs iae a.sie:.e r:eseai. aac iae a.sie:.e r:eseai as
i:ac.i.eaa|.zai.ea,iae. aeessaaiieia|.zai.eaeiiaerasi.aiaer:eseai·
:evea|s�aeaa.ve:s�|~ç:.e:.eia.sie:y.1aei.v.a,r:eseaii, ieacaçi
uasse:| s«e:csiw.ee¡aeiec|yDe::. ca. iaev.ia|mevemeaieiiae
eeex. sieaee aac iae .aie:«eav. a, . . . ei ç:.me:c.a| ie:mai.eas
aac sec.meaiai.eas ei sease (109). uamaa|. ac . s a eemmaa.iy
16
Preface
eisçea|.a,|e.a,s.aiae.:i.v.a,r:eseais .iaei.v.a,r:eseai|e.a,iae
aaa| :ei:eaeameai aac seea:.iy. De::.ca says. ei eve:y
çaeaemeae|e,.ea|:ecaei.ea( 1 1 01 1 ) . ue«eace:s.iuasse:| sme:.i
«asaei. aaav.a,cese:.|ec.. aai:a|ytranscendental meve. iaeeeac.·
i.easeiçess. |.|.iyie:a.sie:y«a.ea«e:eaiiaesamei.meconcrete . .
|eeaaseiaeya:eexçe:.eaeecaace:iaeie:meihorizon " ( 1 1 7) ? ue:. ·
zea.siaei.v.a,r:eseai s c.a|eei.ea|ie:m.iaeae«ei. isiemçe:a| .za·
i.ea. iae a| :eacyiae:eei. isc.a|eei.eseisease
se ia: iae ç:e||em ei. cea|.iy s e:.,.a aas |eea |eu .a a|eyaaee
De::.caçe.aiseaiiaaiuasse:|«.|||eaveiae¡aesi.eaeçeaCeemei:.·
ea|.cea|.iy. sa|«aysbased on iaeme:çae|e,.ea|. cea|.i.esei. ma,.aa·
i.ea aac sease. yei .i .s a|«aysa|:eacy a:açia:e«.ia iaai seas.||e·
me:çae|e,.ea|. cea|.zai.eaweeea|csay. çe:aaçs. iaaiuasse:| | eaves
eaeasi:aacaacee.cec.,eemei:y. s«aaiaasia|eaç|aee.aiaeC:ee|
e:eai.ve.aaa.i.zai.ea.aacyeiia.sscientifc, theoretical | eaç. sa|«ays
|asec ea iae me:çae|e,.ea| . seas.||e .cea| .zai.ea eiiae ç:ese. eai.ae
«e:|c. iaeLebenswelt. 1aas ae saves. n::.ca eeae|aces. |eia iae
a|se|aie|ye:.,.aa|seaseeieaeai:ac.i.eaa|| .ae,.isa.sie:.e.iy,aac. is
:e|ai.v.iy «.ia. aa. sie:y. a,eae:a|( 1 3 1 ) .
ue«eve:. iae .cea|.z.a,aei.v.iyei understanding, eiça:e ia.a|·
. a,. . e . eiiae aea.ma,.aai.veaacaeaseas.||e. . saeve:siac. ec .a
.ise|i.ae:a:e.iseeac.i.eas ii. sa:ac.ea|eçe:ai.ea. apassage to the
limit «aese si:aeia:e . siaaieimaiaemai.ea|. cea|.zai.ea. iae a,a.a
aaca,a.a «a.eaDe::.caiee| smasiaave. isprotentional ee::e|aie. a
.aieai.eaa|.iy Oaeea,a.a«ea:e|ec|ae|ieiaei.v.a,r:eseai. iae
çaeaemeae|e,.ea| a|se|aie. iae ae« aeec.a, a çasi «a.ea .a ia:a
aeecsaiaia:eie«a:c«a.eaiaeç:eseaia|«aysa|:eacyieacs.seiaai
iaeç:eseai.siaeae:.zeaie:çasiaaciaia:e ue«eve:. De::.casays.
iaeaa.iyeiia. smevemeai. saeve:,.vea. . imasi|eexçe:.eaeece:
thought ,iae:e|yma|.a,iaeçaeaemeaa|.zai.eaeii. meçess.||e, 1a. s
aa.iy.iae«e:|eiiaeicea.aiaekaai.aasease.. saeve:çaeaeme·
aa|.zec.a. ise|iue:ea,a.a«eseeiaeeeaa.ei|ei«eeaiaeaa.i.z.a,
eease.easaesseiçaeaemeae|e,y s ç:.ae.ç|e aaciae .aaa.i.z.a, eea·
se.easaess ei . is aaa| . asi.iai.ea. iae .aaa.ie i cea iaai aaiae:.zes
aa.iace
waai iaea .s iae a.sie:.e.iyeiiae maiaemai.ea|,ça.|eseça.ea|,e:.·
,.a. .iiaei cea.s«aaia||e«sie:. cea|.iy s e:.,. a:neiaiae iceaaac
xeaseaa:ea. sie:.e.i.es. |eiamasiexçeseiaemse|ves.ae:ce:ie|e.
a|iaea,aae. iae:a:eexaaasiec. aia. sexçes.i.ea1aeya:eeie:aa|yei
``´ See L' Ecriture, pp. 242 and 250 on the concept of the Idea i n the Kanti an sense.
17
Preface
a.sie:.ea| . s.aee eie:a.iy .s a mece eia. sie:.e.iy De::.casiaies. .aa
cee.s.veseaieaee.iaaiiaea|se|aieaesseiiaeicea.siae~|se|aieof
. aieai. eaa|a. sie:.e.iy( 1 42) , acc.a,iaaiiaeeices.,aaiesae.iae:a
sa|]eei.veae:e|]eei.ve,eaei.ve.. e . ae.iae:iae ~|se|aieae:. a·
ieai.eaa| a.sie:.e.iy aas| :siç|aee iaeiae:«e:cs. iaei ceaasaa·
iae:.zai.eaei.cea|.iy.asiae|.m.iie«a:c«a.ea.cea|.iyçasses. reveals
iae |.m.ieia. sie:.e.iy ,aac iae:e|y .ise«a | .m.i, . iae ç:e,:ess.ve-
:·ea··.e-mevemeai ei.aieai.eaa|.iy 1a. s ç:e,:ess.ve mevemeai .s
i:ac.i.ea. e: as De::.ca says. .aieai.eaa|.iy .s i:ac.i.eaa| .iy
ue:eeve:.s.aee. i . siaec. a|eei.ea|:eeiei iaei.v. a,r:eseai. .aiea·
i.eaa|.iy. siae:eeieia. sie:.e.iy Cease¡aeai| y. De::.caeeae|aces.
iae:e. saeaeeci e.a¡a.:ea|eaiiaeseaseeia.sie:.e.iy. a.sie:.e.iy.s
sense" (150). iaeiae:«e:cs. sease.straditionality aac iaeAbsolute is
Passage " ( 1 49) . 1aea|se|aie. s iaeaeieia| | i:ac.i.ea,aac ei a. sie·
:.e.iyaac. aieai.eaa|.iy, . i:aasm. ss.ea.aiaeaeieie:eai. ea
�e«De::.caa| sesaysiaaisease.siaeaççea:.a,ei|e.a,¯( 1 48) ,
«a.eameaasiaai|e.a,.sa. sie:.ea| seiae¡aesi.eaie:a. m|eee¬es .
«aai .s iaee:.,.aeine.a,asu.sie:y ( l 5 1 ) ? Oaie| e,ymay as|iae
¡aesi.ea. |aiea|yçaeaemeae|e,y eaa ç:ev.ce iae açça:aias ie: aa
aas«e:ne. a,. De::.casays. .ssilently sae«aaace:iae ae,ai.v.iyei
iaeapeiron " (ibid) . 1aedelay e:lateness eisçeeea.aia. smaa.iesiai.ea
eine.a, . s | aa||y iae ça.|eseça.ea| . aei]asi iae çaeaemeae|e,.ea| .
a|se|aie De::.casays.
Here delay is the philosophical absolute, because the beginning of
methodic refection can only consist in the consciousness ofthe
implication ofanother previous, possible, and absolute origin in
generl. Since this alterity ofthe absolute orgin structurally appears in
my Living Present and since it can appear and be recognized only
in the primordiality ofsomething like my Living Present, this ver fact
signies the authenticit ofphenomenological delay and limitation. In
the lackluster guise ofa technique, the Reduction is only pure thought
as that delay, pure thought investigating the sense ofitsel as delay
within philosophy. ( 152 -53)
ra:e iaea,ai .s a|«ays ce|ay Cease.easaesseiia.s ce|ay. De::.ca
says. . seease.easaesseiD. ae:eaee . eease.easaesseiiae.mçess.|.| .iy
ei:ema.a.a, . aiae s.mç| eae«eiiae i.v.a,r:eseai as «e|| asiae
.aa|.|.iyie|.veeae|esec. aas.mç|eaac.v.cec~|se|aie 1aei.v.a,
r:eseai .iaeaeve:ç:eseaie:.,.aeine.a,aacsease. . aie:ç|ays«.ia
iaea|«aysceie::ec~|se|aie «.ia.aia.seease.easaess. aeease.eas·
aess «.iaeai «a.ea. De::.ca eeae|aces. aeia.a, «ea|c aççea:
18
Preface
w.iaeai .ise«aç:eçe:cea.seeaee. iae:e«ea|c|eaea.sie:.e.iy.ae
sease.aeia.a,
Me:e a|si:aei|y.iaea. aaO:.,. a. aaa|se|aieO:.,. a. masi|eac.i·
ieaaiO:.,.a-iaeaeve:-yei-a| «ays-a|:eacy-iae:easiae|eyeace:
|eie:e iaaima|esa||seaseçess.||e. 1aai D.ae:eaee. De::.caeea·
]eeia:es. . sçe:aaçs«aaia| «aysaas|eeasa.caace:iaeeeaeeçiei
' transcendental' ia:ea,a iae ea.,mai.e a. sie:y ei.is c. sç|aeemeais
ser:.me:c.a|D.ae:eaee«ea|c|ei:aaseeaceaia|-asmasi|e.aaa||y.
a. sie:.e.iyaac:ereei.easiae:eea.
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE SCIENCE OF OLD NAMES
The "rationalit"-but perhaps that word should be abandoned
for reasons that will appear at the end of thi sentence-which
govers a writing thus enlrged and radicalzed, no longer
issues from a logos. Further, it inaugurates the destruction, not
the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of
all the signifcations that have their source in that of the logos.
Particulrly the signicatin of truth.
Of Grammatology
r:.e:iee|a|e:ai.a, iae si:aeia:e eia. sie:.e.iy. i cese:.|eciae
ceeeasi:aei.ve |e,.eeiiaeaacee.ca|| e. eiaea·eae.ee. eidif erance.
ue«eve:,c.ae:aaee.sa|seaaold name, aname sous rature, e||.ie:aiec
|ye|cseases. ça:eaiaes.zec.1aeceeeasi:aei.eaeic.ae:aaee.ae| aces
iaeaace· sec.meaiai.eaaacsaçç|emeaiai.ea, e:sa|si.iai.ea,eiaae|c
aameie:aae« eeaeeçi. 1a.sça|eeaym.esaçç|emeaia:.iy.sasee·
eacmemeaie:|eve|eiDe::.casceeeasi:aei.ea. seeeacmemeaie:
| eve||e.a,aace:sieecae.iae:a. e:a:ea.ea||yae:ea:eae|e,.ea||y.1a. s
saçç|emeaia:y ,:au.a, . s aeie«e:iay .a De::.ca s Introduction. ue
aas added semeia. a, ae«. semeia.a, c.ae:eai. i eiae e|c aame ei
çaeaemeae|e,y.aiaaiiexi.
1aemevemeaieisaçç|emeaia:.iy. aseaeei a ee:ia.aaam|e:ei
aeasyaeaym.e sa|si.iai.eas ie: c.ae:aaee.· .ave|ves. aeee:c.a,ie
De::.ca. i«ema]e:seases,ia|eai:emiaer:eaeave:|suppleer) : iea||
aceae.eaey,ieeemç|eie,aacieia|eiaeç|aeeei,ie:eç|aee, ·· 1a. s.s
�´ "Diferance, " in Speech and Phenomena, p. 147.
4 1 0n the "concept" of supplementarity, see: Speech and Phenomena, ch. 7; Of
Gram ma to logy y Part I I, ch. 2 ; L Dissemination, pp. 1 80-96; and Alan Bass,
" ' Literature '(Literature, " Velocities ofChange: Critical Essays from MLN, ed. Richard
Macksey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press , 1 974), pp. 348-49.
19
Preface
ceeeasi:aei.eaasiaese.eaeeeie|caames. .ia| |sace| e.eaey.aiaee| c
eeaeeçiaac:eç|aees.i«a.|eas.a,. ise| caame De::. caas|s .
What is, then, the "strategic" necessity which sometimes requires that
an ol name be preserved in order to initiate a new concept? With all
the reservations imposed by the traditional distinction between the
name and the concept, one ought to be able to begin to describe this
0
I
er
!
i

n: aware ofthe fact that a name does not name the punctual
slmpliClty ofa concept but the system ofpredicates defning the
concept, the conceptual structure centered on such and such a
predicate, one proceeds: (1) to the setti,!-aside (prelevement) ofa
reduced predicative trait, which is held in reserve and limited within a
given conceptual structure (limitedfor some motivations and relations
offorce which are to be analyzed) named x; (2) to the de-limitation, the
grafting, and the controlled extension ofthis predicate which was set
aside, the name x being maintained as a tool ofinterventin (levier
d'i

te
n
e

tin) in
.
order to maintain a hold on the former organization
which It IS efectively a question oftransforming. Setting-aside,
grafting, extension: you know that this is what I called, according to
the process that I have just described, writing. -:
1aese.eaeeeie|caames. s«:.i.a,.aae|caame. ise|i.
ieimeae«:eaea:sesemeeiiaesaçç| emeaiai.easiaaiDe::.caac·
vaaees .a iae Introduction . ue says D.ae:eaee .s i:aaseeaceaia|-
i:aaseeaceaia| |e.a, iae ç:.me:c.a| D.ae:eaee eia c.ae:eai O:.,. a
1aasi:aaseeaceaia|. se¡a.va|eaiiec.aeaai,«.iaaaa) .
Ce�se.easaesseiD.ae:eaee . iaai«.iaeai«a.eaaeia.a,«ea|caç·
çea:. .si:aaseeaceaia|eease.easaess. . e . . c.ae:aaieease.easaess se
«eeea|csayiaaieease.easaess. sc.ae:aaee,«.iaaaa) . -:l
s.m.|a:|y. iae xecaei.ea. ça:e iaea,ai ei . is e«a ce|ay. .s
i:aaseeaceaia| . De::.casays . 1aeça:eaac. aie:m.aa||ec. s¡a. eiace
?iiaea,aisi:.v.a,ie :ecaeeD.ae:eaee|y,e.a,|eyeaciaeiaa|.aaa·
.i� ie«a:c iae .aaa.iy ei.is sease aacva|ae . . e . . «a.|ema.aia.a.a,
D.a�:eaee-iaaic. sça.eiace«ea|c|ei:aaseeaceaia| ( 1 53) . 1aexe·
caei.ea.iaea,ai s e«ac.s¡a.eiaceaiD.ae:eaee . eaaea| y|eac.ae:·
aaixecaei.ea.
r:.me:c.a|D.ae:eaee .s i:aaseeaceaia| ~ac i:aaseeaceaia| D.ae:·
eaee . . e . iaea|«aysceie:cec·c.ae:.a,c.ae:eaeeeiiaee:.,.a .sc.i·
ie:aaee,«.ia aaa) .
7
`� Positions, p. 96; ET: Diacritics, 3 , No. 1 (Spring 1 973) , p. 37.
4:1 See Speech and Phenomena , ch. 5 : "Signs and t he Blink of an Eye . " pp. 60-69. as
well as Note 4 above .
20
Preface
~ac, aaa| | y. |eeaase .i . s a meiaec ie: :eaeei.a, ea a.sie:.e.iy,
Ruckfrge .s iae:e|yi:aaseeaceaia| .i.s a c.ae:aai ç:eeess De::.ca
says ~ac1aea,ai s ça:e ee:ia.aiy«ea|c|ei:aaseeaceaia| . s.aee
.ieaa|ee|ie:«a:cieiaea|:eacyaaaeaaeec1e| esea| y|yacvaae.a,
ea ,e: |e.a, .a acvaaee ei· iae O:.,. a iaai . aceaa.ie|y :ese:ves
.ise|i saeaaee:ia.aiyaeve:aacie|ea:aiaai1aea,ai«ea|ca|«ays
|eieeeme (ibid. ) .
1aasiaexecaei.ea,Ruckfrge, eease.easaess, aac.aieai.eaa|.iy-
a|||as.eeeaeeçiseiçaeaemeae| e,y-aave|eeasaçç|emeaiec|ydi­
ferance; iaeya||ça:ia|eei.is|e,.eYeiiaeya:esi.||named xecaei.ea,
Ruckfrage, aac se ea raeaemeae|e,y aas |eea saçç|emeaiec, .is
meiaçays.ea| iexi ceeeasi:aeiec, aac iae e|c aames :eia.aec
raeaemeae|e,y. sae|ea,e:, |aisi. | | . s, çaeaemeae|e,yiis .s .siaai
eia|| meiaçays.es , sous rature: �.
i s iae:eaneed ieeaeeseae:e|ei«eeaaacee.ca|| esaace|caames :
i seaeeae.eeme:eia.iaia|ieDe::.ca s .aieaiiaaaiaeeiae:,. s eae.a
iaei c.ae:eai i:em iae eiae:: 1ae exemç|a:y ease ae:e seems ie|e
diernce .ise|i,.a«a.eaaacee.ca||esaace|caamesa:e|eiapresent
aacdeferred .aiaes.|eaiiem|eiiaea, .aai:a,.|e|eiie:iaai.seas. | y
e:asec, e:esseceai, e:m.sç:.aiec, aaÓ iaai .s aa:c|y :eaca||e aac
ceaa.ie|yaacee.ca||e
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE
1aei:aas|ai.eaeae:ecae:e.siaaieiiaeseeeacec.i.eaeiDe::. ca s
Intrduction, ça||.saec |y r:esses ua.ve:s.ia.:esce r:aaee . a 1 974.
1aea:siec.i.ea«asça||.saec.a 1 962. iaiaeiexi. ise|i,iaave.ac.·
eaiec:eie:eaeesieç:eseaiÐa,|.sai:aas|ai.easei«e:|sie«a.eaDe:·
:.ca :eie:s, |ai aave mec.aec iaem «ae:e aeeessa:y ie aace:see:e
De::. ca s a:,ameaiai.ea 1aesemec.aeai.easaave|eea .ac.eaiec|y
iae «e:c mec.aec . ase:iec«.ia.a |:ae|eis .a iae iexi 1exisaa·
ava.|a||e.aÐa,|.sai:aas|ai.eai aavei:aas|aieci:emiaer:eaea1ae
uasse:| iexis aave |eea mec.aec .a aeee:caaee «.ia maay eiiae
sa,,esi.easeiDe:.eaCa.:as Guide for Translating Husserl, ça:i.ea|a:|y
«aeaiaey|ea:eaaçe.aiiaaiDe::.ca. sar,a. a,
~|| Ce:maaie:ms.a ça:eaiaesesa:e De::.ca sacc.i.eas s.m.|a:| y,
a|| exç|aaaie:y |:ae|eis iaai eeea: «.ia.a ¡aeiai.eas a:e De::.ca s
acc.i.eas i aave . ae|acecee:ia.a r:eaea aac Ce:maa ie:ms «.ia.a
|:ae|eis«ae:eaeeessa:y.aiaeiexi
saeaie:msasde facto aacde jure aave|eeaaace:see:ecea|y«ae:e
De::.caaassi:esseciaema.mse|i,s. aeeiaeya:eeueai:aas|ai.easei
21
Preface
iaer:eaeaeaia.iaaceac:e.i. 1aesame. si:aeeiapriori ,ac] ee·
i.va|ie:m,aaca priori ,acve:|.a|e:sa|siaai.veie:m, .i.|e«.se,iaave
ie| |e«ecCa.ms sa,,esi.ea.ac.ae:eai.ai.a,|ei«eeaObjektivitit aac
Gegenstindlichkeit |yiaeeaç.ia|e:|e«e:ease
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:esçeei.ve| y ,De:·
:.ca,ie||e«.a,iaer:eaeai:ac.i.ea,. ac.eaiesGegenstindlichkeit |yiae
aee|e,.smobjectite aacObjektivitit |yobjectivite. ) ue«eve:, s.aeeiae
r:eaeaobjet eemç:.ses |eiaiae meaa.a,eiGegenstand aaciaai ei
Objekt, aec.ae:eai.ai.ea. sçess.||eie:iae«e:ce|]eei , a|iaea,a.a
¡aeiai.easi:emuasse:|. iaas|eea:eia.aec. re:ia:iae:ceia.| seaia.s
ç:e||em, seeiae1:aas|aie: sr:eiaeeeiiesie:Ð Ðm|:eeiesazaaae
naeae|a:c s A Study of Husserl's re:ma| aac 1:aaseeaceaia| ie,.e
r.aa| | y, iaei:aas|ai.eaaas|eeaceae.a|.,aieiaac.aaeee:caaee«.ia
Dav.c~||. sea sea:|.e:i:aas|ai.eaeiDe::.ca sSpeech and Phnomena.
i «ea|c| .|eieiaaa|va:.eas çeeç|eie:iae.:.ava|aa||ea.c.a iae
ç:eeesseiia.s i:aas|ai.ea 1e r:eiesse:sxe|e:i Dei«e.|e:, w.||.am
nea:cs|ee , aac~:iaa:Ðvaas, i exieacmys.aee:esiiaaa|sie:iae.:
|ea,·ie:meaeea:a,emeai i «ea|aa|se|.|eieiaaa|r:eiesse:Ðvaas
ie:a.sçai.eaieaee|.a,eiiaeeemç|eiea:sic:au«.iaiaer:eaeaiexi
1aesameaçç:ee.ai.ea. sexieacecier:eiesse:¡amesDa,eaa.sie:a.s
.ava|aa||esagesi.eas.a:e|ai.eaieiaea:siaa|ieiiaei:aas|ai.ea ~ac
i amça:i.ea|a:|y,:aieia| ie r:eiesse:Dav. c~| |.sea ie: a.s çe:seaa|
i:.eacsa.ç aac ec.ie:.a| a.c, as «e|| as a.s .ava|aa||e i:aas|ai.ea ei
De::.ca s eiae:ma]e:«e:|eauasse:| r:eiesse:J. u.| |.su.||e:«as
a| seve:yae|çia|«.iaa. smaay|.|| .e,:aça.ea|a.csaac,eec«.|| .~ac,
aaa| | y, iammesiceeç|y.ace|iecier:eiesse:De::.caa. mse|iie:a.s
çe:seaa|ae| çaac çai.eaiacv.ee ca:.a,ia.si.me u.s ee:c.a|.iy aac
saççe:i«e:e,:eai|yaçç:ee.aiec
i«ea|ca|se| .|eieiaaa|i:.eacs«ae|.ac|yae|çec.aiaeç:eça:a·
i.eaeiiaeaaa|c:aii.ne¬a:cuaii, xeaxem|e:i, aacmesiça:i.ea·
| a:|yna:|a:aDeCeae.a.aacCa:|asea. sse| ~| se. iewa|ie:xasse||i
«aaiieexieac,:ai.iaceie:çe:s.sieai,eecaame:aaci:. eacsa.çca:·
.a,ia.sçe:.ec. r.aa||y, i «ea|c | .|e ieiaaa|iae ne|,.aa ~me:.eaa
Ðcaeai.eaa|reaacai.eaie:ç:ev.c.a, me «.ia i.me ie eemç|eieia.s
«e:|
i «.saiecec.eaieia.s«e:|ie iae meme:yeimyiaiae:, «ae ea|y
sa«aa|i.iseemç|ei.ea,aaciemymeiae:
Louvain-Leuven
December 1976
John P. Leavey
Introduction
to
" The Orgin of Geomet"
ny.is caie aac iaemes. ia. s mec.iai.eaei uasse:| [The Origin of
Geometr] ie|ea,sieiae|asi,:eaçei «:.i.a,siaaisa::eaacThe Crisi
ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. i i .sceeç| y
:eeieciae:e aacieiaaiexieai.ise:. ,.aa| .iy:aasiae:.sseiaeiie.a,
.mmec.aie|yaçça:eai iiThe Origin ofGeometr .sc. s:.a,a. s aai|ei:em
iaeCrisi, .i .s aeiieeaase ei .is cese:. çi.ve aeve|iy Nea:| ya| | . is
mei.i s a:e a|:eacy ç:eseai . a eiae: .avesi.,ai.eas. «aeiae: iaey ie
|a:,e|yç:.e:iee:a|mesieeaiemçe:a:y«.ia. i i aiaei.The Origin of
Geometr s:. | | eeaee:as :ae s:aiasei:ae . cea| ei]eeis eise. eaee ei
«a.ea,eemei:y.seaeexamç|e, .iae.:ç:ecaei.ea.iy.ceai.iy. a,aeis.
asiaesame . aaciaeeeasi.iai.eaei exaei.iaceia:ea,a.cea| .zai.ea
aacças sa,eieiae| . m.i-aç:eeess«a.easia:is«.ia iae| .ie·«e:|c s
seas.i|e . aa.ie . aac ç:ese.eai.ae maie:.a| s ~| se .a ¡aesi.ea a:e iae
` Die Krisis der ellropiischen Wissenschaften und die tranzendentale Phanomenologie:
Eine Einleitllng in die phanomenologische Philosophie, ed. Walter Biemel , in HlIsser­
liana, Vol . 6 (The Hague: Nijhof, 1 954); English translation [hereafer abbreviated as
ET]: The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduc­
tion to Phenomenological Philosophy, tr. David Carr ( Evanston: Northwestern Uni ver­
sity Press , 1 970) . [Since the ET does not contain al l the appendi ces that the German
edi ti on does, it wi l l be necessary at ti mes to refer to the German pagination. ] Hereafter
the ET wi l l be ci ted as C, the German as K. The Origin ofGeometr (C, pp. 353-78) is a
text appended to §9a on "Pure Geometry" (C, pp. 24-28) . In a forewording note Derrida
says, after stating that he will translate the version presented in K: "The original manu­
script dates from 1 936. Its typed transcription bears no title . The author of this transcrip­
tion, Eugen Fi nk , has also publ ished an elaboration of it in Rel ' lIe Interationa!e de
Philosophie , I , No. 2 (January 1 5, 1 939) . pp. 203-25 , under the ti tle ' Die Frage nach dem
Ursprung der Geometrie al s i ntentional -hi storisches Problem: Since then, this text has
been read and frequently ci ted under this form. Its hi story, at l east , then. al ready con­
ferred on i t a certain right to i ndependence. "
25
26
Jacques Derrida
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e|]eeis . |aa,aa,e. .aie:sa|]eei.v.iy. aac iae «e:|c as iae aa.iy ei
,:eaacaac ae:.zea r.aa||y. iae ieeaa.¡aeseiçaeaemeae|e,.ea|ce·
se:. çi.ea,aeia||yiaeseeiiaeva:.eas:ecaei.eas, a:ea|«aysai.| . zec
iessiaaaeve:ce iae.:va|.c.iy aaci:a.iia| aessaççea: .mça.:ec . a
uasse:| seyes
Ne:, .a.i.a| | ,, . s The Origin of Geometr c. si.a,a. saa|| e |, . is
cea||ee|asie:eie:.i.¡aesiaaia:ec. :eeiec, eaiaeeaeaaac,a,a.asia
ee:ia.aieeaa.e.siaace|]eei.v. si.::esçeas. |. | .i,.a iaeç:aei.eeeise.·
eaee aacça. |eseça,, aacea iae eiae: aaac, a,a.asi a a. sie:. e. sm
|| .acec|,iaeemç.:. e. si ea|ieifact aaceaasa| . siç:esamçi.ea 1ae
a:sie:.i. e. sm«as iae sia:i.a,çe. ai ie: Formal and Transcendental
Logic, iae Cartesian Meditations, aac iae Crisis. 1ae seeeac aac
aççea:ecmaeaea:| . e:, . aiaeLogical Investigations, . a ra. |eseça,
as k.,e:eas ·e. eaee¯ ,. a «a.ea . i«as iae iaacameaia| ç:eeeeaça
i.ea), aac.aIdeas I. 1ae:ecaei.ea ,.iaeieeacemaai.ea ,eia. sie:. e. si
,eaei. e. sm «as a|«a,s .aie::e|aiec «. ia iaai eiçs,eae·,eaei. e. sm,
evea«aeaaee:ia.aa. sie:.e.i,aas |eeemeçaeaemeae|e,, siaeme.
cesç.ieiaea. ,a eesiei.isc. tä ea|i.es , ia. s aei.eaeaaaeiçess.||,|e
:ei:aeiec

naiaeve:aaciae i«eceaaae.ai.easeia.sie:.e.smaace|]eei.v.sm
|eease e:,aa.ea|| yaa.iec as .aThe Origin of Geometr, «ae:e iaey
ç:eeeeci:emiae same. mça| seaaca:e maiaa| | y.ave|vecia:ea,aeai
aa.i.ae:a:y«aese|ea:.a,. ssemei.mesc.seeaee:i.a,

Ne«iaes.a,a·
|a:.iy eiea:iexi :esis ea iae iaeiiaai iae eea]aaei.ea eiiaese i«e
siaac.a,aaciesiec:eiasa| se:eaiesaae«seaeme.eaiaeeaeaaac,.i
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aactrdition ,.aiae am|.,aeasseaseeiia. s«e:c«a.ea. ae|aces|eia
iae mevemeaieii:aasm.ss.eaaaciaeçe:ca:aaeeeiae:.ia,e· . e|eys
c.ae:eai:a| es. «a.eaa:eae.iae:iaeiaeiaa|.aie:eeaaeei.easeiemç.:.·
ea| a.sie:y. ae: aa .cea| aac aa.sie:.e acc.a, ea. 1ae |.:ia aac
ceve| eçmeaieise.eaeemasiiaea|eaeeess.||eieaaaaaea:c·eisiy|e
ei a.sie:.ea| .aia.i.ea . a «a.ea iae .aieai.eaa| :eaei.vai.ea eisease
saea|c�c,.·c~ç:eeeceaaceeac.i.eaiaeemç.:.ea|ceie:m.aai.eaei
iaei
2 I n efect these pages of H usserl . frst written for hi mself. have t he rhythm of a thought
feel ing i ts way rather than setting i tsel f forth . But here the apparent di sconti nui ty al so
depends on an always regressive method. a method whi ch chooses i ts interruptions and
mul ti pl i es the returns toward i ts beginning in order to reach back and grasp it again each
ti me i n a recurrent l i ght .
27
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
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Origin of Geometr aas|eiaaç:e,:ammai.eaacaaexemç|a:yva| ae
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eease.easaessç:eçe:iea||e. cei.eaiieai.eaaac|e,a.cec|yiaeçe| e
eiia. s .aaa.ie ias|. i:em «a.ea çaeaemeae|e,y a|eae eaamase. is
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aeisece]a:e uasse:|:eçeaiec|yseemsiea,:ee«.iaia. s 1ae:eie:e.
«e«. | | a|«aysi:yie|e,a.cec|ya. se«a. aieai.eas. evea«aea«e,ei
eaa,aiaç.aee:ia.ac.mea|i.es
I
1ae maiaemai.ea| e|]eei seems ie |e iae ç:.v. |e,ec examç|e aac
mesiçe:maaeaiia:eac,a.c.a,uasse:| s:eaeei.ea1a.s.·|eeaaseiae
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eiemç.:.ea|sa|]eei.v.iy. .iaeve:iae|ess. sea|y«aai. iaççea:sie|e
1ae:eie:e..i.sa|«aysa|:eacyreduced ie. isçaeaemeaa|sease .aac. is
|e.a, . s. i:em iae eaisei. ie |e aa e|]eei [etre-objet ] ie. a ça:e
eease.easaess ·
´ In our translation [of The Origin of Geometry] , we wi l l i ndi cate t he di stinction be­
tween Historie and Geschichte i n parentheses only when t his di sti nction correspnds to
Husserl ' s expl ici t intenti on. which i s not-i ndeed . far from it-always the case.
� On the questi on of knowi ng whether. for HusserI
.
t he mathematical obj ect is the mode
of every object' s consti tution. and on the consequences of such a hypothesis
.
cf. the
di scussion i n which Walter Bi emel , Eugen Fi nk, and Roman I ngarden parti ci pated fol l ow­
i ng Bi emel ' s l ecture on " Les phases deci si ves dans I e devel oppement de la phi l osophi e
de Hu sser\ . · · i n Husser/ ( Cahiers de Royaumont . Phil osophi e No. 3 ) ( Paris: Minui t. 1 959) .
pp. 63 -7 1 .
28
Jacques Derria
1aePhilosophy of Arithmetic, uasse:| sa:si. mçe:iaai«e:|. eea|c
aave|eeaeai.i|ecThe Origin of Arithmetic. Desç. ie açsyeae|e,.si.e
. areei.ea«aesee:.,.aa| .iyaaseuea aac]asi|y|eea emçaas. zec. . i
a|:eacyeeaee:as . asceesThe Origin of Geometr, iae:eaei.vai.eaei
iaeç:.me:c.a|seaseeia:.ia¬ei.e s . cea| aa. i. es|y :eia:a. a, ieiae
si:aeia:eeiçe:eeçi.eaaaciaeaeiseiaeeae:eiesa|]eei.v.iy uasse:|
a. mse|ia|:eacyç:eçesecieaeeeaaiat once ie:iaeae:mai.ve. cea| .iy
eiaam|e:,«a.ea.saeve:aaemç.:.ea|iaeiaeeess.||eieaa. sie:y.a
ç:ee.se|yia.ssamesiy| e·aacie:.is,:eaac.a,.aaacia:ea,aiae| . vec
aeiei.is ç:ecaei.ea
i asaeaaease .ae«eve:.iae,eaes. seia:.iamei.e. saeiiaea,aieias
aa.sie:yeia:.iamei.e.. e . asaea|ia:a|ie:maacacveaia:eeiaamaa·
. iy ia 1 887-91 , iae e:.,. aei a:.iamei.e «as cese:.|ec . a ie:ms ei
psychological genesis. ia The Origin of Geometr, arie: auy yea:s ei
mec.iai.ea. uasse:| :eçeaisiae same ç:e]eei aace: iae sçee. eseia
phenomenological histor. 1a. sace| .iy.sa||iaeme:e :ema:|a||es. aee
iaeçaiai:ave:sec. s. mmease iiçassesa:siia:ea,aiae:ecaei.eaei
a||a. sie:.ea|e:çsyeae|e,.ea|,eaes. s ~rie:iaai . «aeaiae,eaei.ec.·
meas.eaeiçaeaemeae|e,y. sc.seeve:ec.,eaes.s. ssi.||aeia. sie:yi a
çass.a,i:emsiai.ei e,eaei.eeeasi.iai.ea.as aaaeaaeec. aIdeas I aac
iaeaaeeemç|.saec|ei«eeaiaeyea:s1 91 5 aac 1 920, uasse:|si. | | aac
aeiea,a,ecçaeaemeae|e,.ea|cese:.çi.ea.aiaeç:e||emseia. sie:.e·
.iy1aeiaemai.zai.eaeii:aaseeaceaia|,eaes. sma.aia.aeciae:ec�e·
i.eaeia.sie:y.a||iaaieea|c|eç|aeecaace:iaeeaie,e:yeie|,eei.ve
: ; Cf. in particular Biemel , ibid. , pp. 35f. [ A German version of Bi emel ' s l ecture, "Di e
entscheidenden Phasen in Husserls Phi losophie , " ' appeared i n ZeitschriJt fijr phi­
losophische Forschung, 1 3 ( 1 959) , pp. 1 87-2 1 3 . An ET of thi s German version, enti­
tled "The Deci si ve Phases in the Development of Husseri ' s Phi l osophy, " is i n The
Phenomenology of Husser!: Selected Critical Readings, ed. and tr. R. O. El veton
(Chicago: Quadrangle, 1 970) , pp. 1 48-73. Reference above begins on p. 1 48f. The Ger­
man and Engl i sh versions di fer from the French version publ i shd i n Husser; they also
do not i ncl ude the di scussi on mentioned in note 4 above. ] Despite hi s severity as regards
thi s psychologi stic tendency, Husserl conti nual l y refers to hi s frst book , especi al l y in
Formal and Transcendental Logic.
"Numbers are mental creations i nsofar as they form the resul ts of activi ti es exerci sed
upon concrete contents : what these acti viti es create, however, are not new and absol ute
contents whi ch we could fi nd again in space or in the ' external worl d' : rather are they
uni que relation-concepts which can onl y be produced again and again and which are in no
way capable of bei ng found somewhere ready-made. " This remakable �ass��e , wh�ch
already desi gnates the production, therefore the primordi al historiCIty, of ldealt tles whIch
no longer wil l ever belong to the time and space of empi rical hi story , i s from Con­
cerning the Concept of Number ( 1 887) , whi ch is taken up again as the frst chapter of
Philosophy of Arithmetic ( 1 89 1 ) . The passage is translated in Bi emel ' s articl e , in Husserl,
p. 37 [ ET: p. 1 50] .
29
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
sç.:.iaac iaeea|ia:a|«e:|c«as:eç:essec«.ia. aiae sçae:eei.ai:a·
«e:| c|. aess 1ae:eia :aieç:eç:ec.eai. ·eesçe:. eaee..aExperience and
Judgment aac.aFormal and Transcendental Logic, exieacecce«aiea
ç:eea| ia:a|aacç:ea.sie:.esi:aia¬ei|.vecexçe:.eaee
~ac .a iae Cartesian Meditations, «aea uasse:| sçeass a|eai iae
aa.iyeiaa.sie:y..i.sa¡aesi.eaeiiaeaa.iyeii:aees. ei:eie:eaees .
eisyaiaei.e:es.caes within iaeça:ee,e|e,.ea|sçae:e · uasse:|aa·
ce:see:es ia. s. iae .cea| eo]eeis. iae a. ,ae: ie:¬s eiproducts ei
:easea. «a.eaa| eae assa:e iae çess.|.| .iyeia.sie:.e.iy. . e iaea| ·
«ays .aie:sa|]eei.ve eease.easaesseia. sie:y. ce aei|e| ea, ieiae
eidos eiiae eeae:eieego (CM, §38. ç 78) . ~iiae eac eiiae1a.:c
Ca:ies.aa Mec. iai.ea. iae . avesi.,ai.eas iaai ça:i.ea |a:|yeeaee:a iae
"theor o ei¬aa. eiaa¬aaee¬¬aa.iy.eiea|ia:e .aac seie:ia.
a:eceaaecasa| ie:.e:.:e,.eaa| .aacceçeaceaiias|s( ibid. , §29, ç 63) .
~||iaese :ecaei.eas ae|c a fortiori ie:iae cese:.çi.eas ei ç:.me:c. a|
iemçe:a|.iyaac .¬maaeaica:ai.ea
1aas iaeaeai:a|.zai.eaeiçsyeae|e,.ea|,eaes. saaciaaieia. sie:y
a:e si.||ea e¡aa|ieei.a, .a iae iexis«a.ea ç|aee iae i:aaseeaceaia|
ceve|eçmeai .aieeas nai«aea. .aiae çe:.ec eiiaeCrisis, a. sie:y
.ise|i|:ea|sia:ea,a.aieçaeaemeae| e,y.aae«sçaeeei¡aesi.ea.a,.s
eçeaec.eaeiaai«.|||ec.mea|iiema.aia.a. aiae:e,.eaa||. m. is«a.ea
«e:ese| ea,ç:ese:.|ecie:.i
wa.|e eeasiaai| ypracticed .a iae Crsis .ise|i.ia. s ae« aeeessie
a. sie:y. saeve:made a problem. ~i| easiaeic.:eei|yaacassaea Oa
iae eae aaac. iae eease.ea saesseia e:.s.saaciae am:mai.ea eia
ie|ee|e,y ei :easea a:e only ae« çaias e: ¬eaas ie: |e,.i. m.z.a,
i:aaseeaceaia|.cea|.smeaeea,a.aOaiaeeiae:aaac.ieçaiiae«ae|e
ceve|eçmeai ei wesie:a ça. | eseçay .aie çe:sçeei. ve. ie ceaae iae
ra:eçeaaeidos aaciae¬aaei.aaa.ieiasss . aacie:eeeaaiiaeacvea
ia:esaac ¬.sacveaia:es eiiae i:aaseeaceaia|mei.i.eeaeea|eceaea
i.me|yiaeve:y,esia:eiaaiaaeeve:s.ia| |ia. s«ea|c,. vee:ec.iiea
|.aceisyaeçi.e:ei:esçeei.eaiaaiaee:.i.e. sm eia. sie:.e:easeaaac
exç| .e.iy]a si.aeci:e¬iaesia:iNe.iae:iaesi:aeia:eseia. sie:.e.iy.a
´ Edmund Husser! , Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, tr.
Dorion Cairns ( The Hague: Nijhof, 1 970) ' Medi tation I V, §§37 and 38, pp. 75-80
-hereafter ci ted as CM.
� On the probl em of hi story in Husserl ' s phi l osophy , we refer particularl y to Paul
Ricoeur' s very fne arti cl e, " Husserl and the Sense of Hi story ," in Paul Ricoeur, Husserl:
An Analysis of His Phenomenology, tr. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree
( Evanston: Northwester Uni versity Press, 1 967) . pp. 1 43-74. On what obstructs the
di rect thematization of hi story in a transcendental phenomenology which at the same time
calls for this thematizati on, cf. more part icularl y pp. 1 45-5 1 .
30
Jacques Derrida
,eae:a|,aac«e ceaei,ei|ae««aeiae:iaea. sie:.e.i,eise. eaeeaac
iaai eiça. |eseça,a:eexa¬ç|ese:exeeçi.eas . «aeiae:iae,a:eiae
a. ,aesiaac¬esi:eve|aie:,çess. |. | .i.es .e:.iiae,a:es. ¬ç|,|e,eac
a. sie:,.ise|i) .ae:iae¬eiaecseiiaeçaeae¬eae|e,,eia. sie:,«e:e
¬aceiaee|]eeiseisçee. ae . e:. ,.aa| ¡aesi.eas

1a. seeaaceaee«as
saççe:iec|,iaes,sie¬eiaçec.ei.eee:ia.ai.eseiçaeae¬eae|e,,.i
se|i.«a.eaeea|c|eeeas. ce:ecasae:.i. e. s¬ei:easea.a,eae:a| i i
ia. sie|ee|e,.ea|:eac.a,eia. sie:,eea|caei|eeaa:aeie:.zec. auas·
se:| se,es|,iaece,¬ai.e. ¬ç:aceaee«. ia «a. ease¬aa,ça. |ese·
çae:s,i:e¬A:.siei|eieue,e|ien:aaseav.e,)çe:ee. ve. aiaeçasiea|,
iae|a|e:ecç:eseai|¬eaieiiae. :e«aiaea,ai.|i| s|eeaaseia. s :eac|a,
:eie::ecieiaeve:,i ceaeii:aaseeaceaia|çaeae¬eae|e,,-«a.ea. s
aei.ise|iaça. |eseça. ea|s,sie¬
naiia.s :eac.a, :eie::ec ie iaai iceaea|ymediately. ii «as si.||
aeeessa:yiesae«.aasçee.ae.eeae:eie.aacc.:eei¬aaae:.
i iaaia.sie:y.asemç.:.ea|se.eaee. «as.| .|ea||emç.:.ea|se.eaees .
ceçeaceaieaçaeae¬eae|e,y~«|.eaa|eaeeea|c:evea|i e. i. isiaac
eie.cei. e ç:esaççes.i. eas ,ia. sceçeaceaee. i:eçaeai|y am:mec. aac
a|«ays|eeai:eaiec|yç:eie:.i.ea. s.,aa|ec:aiae:iaaaexç|e:ec· .
2 . iaai a. sie:y-«aese e«a eeaieai ,eeai:a:y ie iaaieiiae eiae:
maie:.a|aacceçeaceaise.eaees·«as. |yv.:iaeei.isseaseei|e.a,.
a|«ays ¬a:|ec |y eaeaess aac .::eve:s. |.|.iy. . e . |y aea·
exemç|a:.aess-si.|||eai .ise|iie .ma,.aa:y va:.ai.ea·aac ie e. cei.e
.aia.i.eas .
3. iaai . .aacc.i.ea ie iae emç. :.ea| aac aea·exemç|a:y eeaieai ei
a.sie:y. ee:ia.ae.cei.e eeaieai,ie:exa|e. iaai ei,eemei:y as iae
e.cei.eaaa| ys.seisçai.a|aaia:e·aac.ise|i|eeaç:ecaeece::evea|ec
.a aa. sie:y«a.ea.::ecae.||y. aaa|.is. is|e.a,· sease ii. asuasse:|
am:ms. iaea. sie:yeiiae,eemei:.ea|e.cei.e.sexe|a:y.iaeaa.sie:y
.a,eae:a| ae |ea,e::. s|s|e.a, ac.si.aeiaacceçeaceaiseeie:eia
¬e:e:ac.ea|çaeaemeae|e,y ny:ema.a.a,ee¬ç|eie|y«.ia. aaceie:·
m.aec :e|ai. v.iy. a. sie:y .a ,eae:a| ae | ess eemç|eie|y ea,a,es
çaeae¬eae|e,y«.ia a||. isçess.|.|.i.esaac:esçeas. |. | .i.es. .ise:.,.aa|
ieeaa.¡aesaacaii.iaces
¯ That, for exampl e, was not the case wi th psychology, whose relati ons wi th
phenomenology have been most abundantly defned, notably in ldeen II [ldeen ZI¡ einer
reinen Phinomenologie und phinomenologischen Philosophie, Vol . I I , ed. M. Biemel , in
Hllsserliana, Vol . 4 (The Hague: Nijhof, 1 952) ] . in the Cartesian Meditations, and i n the
third part of the Crisis . The recent publ ication by Walter Bi emel of the Lectures of 1 925
and of appended texts devoted to Phinomenologische Psychologie ( in Husserliana, Vol .
9 [The Hague: Nijhof, 1 962]) is a very rich testi mony to thi s.
r
31
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
Ne cea|i:aeseia:eea¬|.i.eas. «a. eaa:ea|sec. uea|ieaes. aa. ·
¬a:e:
¿
eCrisis aae.: ea| ||aiea:saaeça:çeses . :
¿
eea:| .e:«e:ss na: . :
. s.aThe Origin of Geometr aac. aiaesae:ii:a,meaiseiiaesa¬e
çe:.eciaaiiaesea¬|.i.eas. .iseems .a:e¬esi.¬¬ec.aie| yassamec
wemasi|eea:eia|ae:e. iaeseam|.i.easa:eea|yserved |ya|:eacy
iam.| .a:iae¬es«a. eaiaeye:.eai. aaae«c.:eei.ea

i asieaceisee. a,. i
asaç:e|ea,ai.eaeiiaeCrisis, «em.,ai|esi:ea,|yiemçiecieseeThe
Origin of Geometr ,aiie:ia|.a,.aieaeeeaaiiae|:ev.iyeiia.ss|eiea·
ea|y as iae ç:eiaee ie a:e·. ssaeeiFormal and Transcendental Logic,
«aeseça:çeses. mç| y«ea|c|eacaçiecieamaie:.a|eaie|e,yi aa.s
i ai:ecaei.eaie iaai «e:|. uasse:|çe:ee.vesiae mei.iei:ac.ea| .a·
vesi.,ai.easeisease «.ia. aiaeç:eseaieeac.i.eaeira:eçeaa se.·
eaees nai«e|ae«iaaiie:uasse:|iaee:.i.ea|s.,a.aeaaeeeiia.s
s.iaai.ea:esa|is|essi:e¬semeeç.sie¬e|e,.ea|eeaa .ei. aae:eai.aiae
.aie¬a|ceve|eçmeaieiiaesese.eaeesiaaai:emac.ve:ee|ei«eeaa·
iaeiaee:ei.ea|aacç:aei.ea|aei.v.iyeiiaese.eaee.aiaeve:y:eae«a
ei.isç:e,:essaacsaeeess. aac|·.isseaseie:| .ieaaciaeçess. |. |.iyei
|e.a,:e|aiecieour «ae|e«e:|c

1a. si:ee.a,eise.eaee«.ia:esçeeiie
.is|ases.aiaeLebenswelt aac.isieaac.a,sa|]eei.veaeisaacea|iec|y
:ema. asaaeees sa:yeeac.i.eaie:.iseea¡aesi s naiia. si:ee.a,a|se
.ave|vesiaeia:eaieiaae|]eei. v. sia| .eaai.ea.«a.eaeeaeea| siae.a·
si.iai.a,e:.,.asaac:eace:siaemsi:aa,eaac. aaeeess. ||eieas 1a. s
eeea|iai. ea.«a. ea. sa| seaieeaa. e. zai.eaaacsaççesesiae"naivete of
a higher level" eiaa . avesi.,aie:|eeeme .::esçeas.||e. aas s.ma|ia·
aeeas|y:a.aeciae ,:eai |e|.ei eiiae se.eaees aac ça. |eseçay .a
iaemse|ves . .iaas¬aceea:«e:|caa.aie| |.,.||e. 1emec.iaieeae:
.avesi.,aieiaesease(besinnen) eie:.,.as.saiiaesamei.¬eie. ma|e
eaese|t:esçeas.||e(verantworten) ie: iae sease(Sinn) eise.eaee aac
ça.|eseçay .|:.a,ia.sseaseieiaee|a:.iyei.isia|a|,¬eai} . aacçai
eaese|i.a açes.i.eaeiresponsibility ie:ia. sseasesia:i.a, i:em iae
ieia|seaseeiea:ex. sieaee
1ae sa¬e c.s¡a.eiace aac iae same «.|| a:e aace:see:ec aac ex·
ç:essec. a:.,e:eas| y. ceai.ea|ie:msi:emiae| :siça,eseiThe Origin
1 0 Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhof, 1 969) , p.
5-hereafter ci ted as FTL. Al so cf. the commentary of Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of
Husserl' s Formal and Transcendental Logic, tf . Lester E. Embree ( Evanston: North­
wester Uni versi ty Press, 1 968) , notably pp. xxxi i i-l i i i .
I I
"We must place oursel ves above thi s whol e life and all t hi s cultural tradition and, by
radical sense- investi gations, seek for oursel ves si ngly and i n common t he ul ti mate pos­
si bi l i ti es and necessi ti es, on t he basis of whi ch we can take our position toward
actual i ti es in j udging, val ui ng, and acting" (FTL, pp. 5-6) . The citations are from
FTL, pp. 2, 5, and 9.


i
32
Jacques Derrida
of Geometr. ~actaeçaest.eaas|ectae:eaççea:sata:sts.,atte|e
ea|yasçee.| eat.eaeitae,eae:a|¡aest.ea|e,aaaacce| aec. aFormal
and Transcendental Logic. is.taetaçaest.eaae:eeiaçç|y.a,a,eae:a|
ç:e]eet«aese ç:e,:amaac a|:eacy|eeae:,aa.zectea s. a,a|a:aac
ceçeaceatse.eaee:D.caetuasse:|«:. te. 1aese. avest.,at.eas. eea·
eeo.a,taeçess.||eseaseaacçess.||emetaecei,eaa.aese.eaee as
saea.a:eaata:a|ìyc.:eetec| :steia||te«aat.sesseat.a| |yeemmeate
a|| çess.||e se.eaees 1aey saea|c|e ie| |e«ecseeeaca:.|y|yee::e·
sçeac.a, sease·.avest.,at.eas ie: ça:t.ea|a: ,:eaçs ei se.eaees aac
s.a,|ese.eaees(ibid. , ç -· :

·
1aeaate:.e:.tyeiFormal and Transcendental Logic .a:e|at.eatetae
ç:e||emseie:.,.aie:taeetae:se.eaeesaasasystemat.eaac]a:.c.ea|
s.,a.aeaaee 1a.saeeessa:yaate:.e:.ty| :stce:.vesi:emtaeaata:eei
t:ac.t.eaa| |e,.e. «a.ea .s a|«ays ç:eseatec astae ,eae:a| taee:y ei
se.eaee. as tae se.eaee ei se.eaee 1a.s statemeat a| se :eie:ste tae
a. e:a:eayeieate|e,. esa|:eacye|a|e:atec.aIdeas I. uate:.a||ycete:·
m.aeceate|e,.esa:esa|e:c.aatecteie:ma|eate|e,y.«a.eat:eatstae
ça:e:a|eseiO|]eet.v.ty.a,eae:a| ' ·Ne«,eemet:y. samate:.a|ea·
te|e,y«aesee|]eet. scete:m.aecastae sçat.a|.tyeitaeta.a,|e|ea,·
.a,teNata:e
1aeiaettaateve:yc. meas.eaeiThe Origin of Geometr aeeeataates
ta. sceçeaceaeeaacta. s:e|at.vesaçe:ae. a| .tyeicese:.çt.ea«. ||taas
|eexç|a. aecOaseve:a|eeeas.eas uasse:|aetestaataeç:esaççeses
tae eeast.tat.ea eitae . cea| e|]eet.v. t. es ei|e,.eaac |aa,aa,e . a
I �
On the "di recti ve" character of logic, al so cf. FTL, §7 1 , pp. 1 8 1 -82.
I I
Cf. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. tr. W. R. Boyce Gibson
( 1 93 1 ; rpt. New York: Col l ier Books, 1 962) , § § 8-1 O. 1 7 . pp. 56-62 and 70-71 -hereafer
cited as Ideas I. [At times Derrida refers to the notes of Paul Ricoeur in his invaluable
French translation. Idees directrices pOllr line phenomenologie et line philosophie phe­
nomenologique pures . Tome I: Introduction Jenerale a la phenomenologie pure (Pari s:
Gal limard. 1 950) . We wi l l refer to thi s translation as Idees . ] Here formal ontology desig­
nates formal logic "in the narrower sense" and "al l the other di scipl ines which constitute
the formal ' mathesis universalis ' (thus arithmetic also. pure anal ysi s. theory of mul ti ­
pl i ci ti es) . " Ideas I, p. 57 [ modi fed] .
´� "I t is clearl y realized that it is the essence of a material thing to be a res extensa, and
that consequently geometry is an ontological discipline relating to an essential phase of
sllch thinghood (Di ngl ichkei t) . the spatial form" ( Hu sserI ' s emphasi s) . Ideas I, §9. pp.
58-59.
Al so cf. Ideas I, § 25. p. 84: there geometry and ki nematics (which HusserI always
associates with geometry in the Crisis and in the Origin) are al so defi ned as " pure
mathematical . . . material" di scipli nes.
1 5
0n the translation of Gegenstindlichkeit by objectivity [F: objectite (and Objektivitit
or objectivite by Objectivity)] , cf. the French translation of FTL, p. 1 8, n. 3 . and the
f
33
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
,eae:a|.taeee::e|at.veeeast.tat.eao .ate:sa|]eet.v.ty.aaca||:e|atec
. avest.,at.eas iaaee:ta.asease . .t. st:a|yaeeessa:yteseetaatta. s
e:ce:eiceçeaceaee. saet:eve:sec 1ae çaeaemeaeaeie:. s. s. as
ie:,etia|aesseie:.,. as. aasç:ee.se| ytaeseaseeita.styçeei :eve:·
sa|( Umkehrung) .
nat«a.|eeemç|ete|y]ast.iy.a,taeç:.e:.tyeia.s:ea eet.easea|e,.e .
uasse:|a| se sçee.aes.aFormal and Transcendental Logic taat ta.s .s
ea|y eae çata amea, etae:s "Other paths a:e çess.||e ie: sease·
.avest.,at.eas«.taa:ac.ea|a. m. aactaeç:eseat«e:|attemçtsteeçea
aç. �t |east .a

ma.a seet.eas . eae sa,,estec|ytaea.ste:.ea||y,.vea
:e|at.eaeitae.ceaei,eaa.aese.eaeete|e,.eas.tsaateeeaceatae:¬
(FTL, ç 7; uasse:| semçaas.s·
~| se. |yaspirling movement «a.ea.stae ma]e:|aceiea:text. a
ET. p. 3 , tr. note 2 . Of course the notion of objectiv ity here is not in any snse tied to
Schopenhauer' s concept of Objektitit. [On matters of translation related to Husser! we
have fol lowed i n the main the suggestions of Dorion Cairns in Guide for Translating
Hlisser! (The Hague: Nihof, 1 973) . ] As for translations which we have had to do, we wi l l
be l ed to justify them i n the cours of thi s Introducti on.
| 6
Cf. FTL, p. 2: " the original relati onshi p between logic and sci ence has undergone a
remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themsel ves independent . With­
out bei ng able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-j ustifcati on. they fashioned
extremel y diferentiated methods. whose frui tful ness. it i s true . was pract ically certai n.
but whose productivity (Leistung) was not clarifed by ulti mate i nsight . " Our emphasi s.
�oreover, concerning geometrical science and mathematics i n general . Husser! has prin­
ci pal l y and most often defned thi s Umkehrung as the fal sifcation of sense . the di splace­
ment of ground, and the forgetti ng of origins . He has done this under at least three forms:
1 . Geometry. the model of exact science. i s responsi ble for the naturalization of the
psychic sphere-a fact that was pointed out i n the fi rst part of " Phi losophy as Rigorous
Science, " in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, tr. Quentin Lauer (N ew York:
Harper and Row, 1 965) , pp. 7 1 -1 47-hereafter ci ted as "PRS" ( cf. in particular pp. 82,
84, and 93) . We should also remember that i n Ideas I (§§72-75 , pp. 1 85-93) Husser! de­
no�nces the absurdity of geometrizing l i ved experience, on account of both geometrical ex­
actitude and deductivity.
2 . The geometrical ideal (or that of mathematical physics) , dogmatically recei ved, i s
what impel l ed Descartes t o cover over again the transcendental motif that he had ingeni­
ou�ly broug�t to l ight . The certitude of the cogito becomes the axiomatic ground, and
phi l osophy lb transformed i nto a deductive system. ordine geometrico: "only thi s
axio�atic fou�dation l i es even deeper than that of geometry and is called on to partici­
pate In the ul timate groundi ng even of geometrical knowledge" (CM, §3, p. 8) ; cf. al so C,
Part II, i n particular § 2 1 .
3 . Final l y, the whole Crisis tends to show how geometry, the ground for the mathemati­
zation of nature, hides true Nature. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why later on
Husserl will hardl y us-yet without expli ci tl y questioni ng again-the defni ti on of
geometry as an eidetic sci ence or as the material ontology of spatial l y extended, natural
thi ngs, a defni ti on often proposed as an example up to Ideas I.
· -
34
Jacques Derrid
|e|ce|ea:.a,.s|:ea,aia|eai«.ia.aiae:e,.eaa||.m.iseiiae.avesi.,a·
i.eaaaci:aas,:essesiaemie«a:caae«ie:mei:ac.ea|. iyCeaee:a.a,
iae .aieai.eaa| a.sie:y ei a ça:i.ea|a: e.cei.e se.eaee, a sease·
.avesi.,ai.eaei. iseeac.i.easeiçess.|.|.iy«.| | :evea|ieasexemç|a:. |y
iaeeeac.i.easaacseaseeiiaea. sie:.e.iyeise. eaee.a,eae:a| ,iaeaei
aa.ve:sa|a.sie:.e.iy-iae| asiae:.zeaie:a| |seaseaacO|]eei.v.iy. a
,eae:a| . Cease¡aeai| y, iaea:ea.ieeiea.e :e|ai.eas eve|eca memeai
a,ea:eeemç|.eaiec, .iaei.ave:iec.1a.s«ea|ccemeasi:aie ,.i . i«e:e
si.||aeeessa:y,ai«aaiçe.aiiae]a:. c.ea|e:ce:ei. mç| .eai.eas. saeise
|. aea:aacae«c.mea|i.i. sie:eee,a.zeiaesia:i.a,çe.ai .
ii.s.aiaem. csieiiaesec.mea|i.esaac«. iaexi:emeç:aceaeeiaai
uasse:| i:.es ie ma|e a.s ça:çese aace:sieec .a The Origin of
Geometr.
II
ua sse:|ia|esaame:eas, c.ve:se ,aac:aiae:. ai:.eaiemeiaece|e,.ea|
ç:eeaai.eas.aiaea:siça,es .
1 . r:ev.ceciaeaei.ea eia.sie:y. s eeaee.vec. aaae« sease, iae
¡aesi.eaçesecmasi|eaace:sieec.a.ismesia.sie:.e:eseaaaee ii.sa
¡aesi.eaei:eçeai.a,aae:.,.a.i aeiae:«e:cs, :ereei.eaceesaei«e:|
açeae:«.ia.a,eemei:y.ise|ias:eacy·mace,aaacec·ce«a( 1 57) . 1 7
1aeaii. iaceia|ea,iaea,.saeiiaaieia,eemeie:. iae| aiie:aasaia.s
c.sçesa|aaa|:eacy,.veasysiemeii:aiasiaaiaesaççesese:ai. | .zes
.aa. s,eemei:.z.a,aei.v.iy.e:.ia:iae:,aia.sc.sçesa|a:eçess.|.| . i.es
eiae«ax.emai.zai.eas«a.ea ,evea«.ia iae. :ç:e||emsaacc.mea|·
i.es,already a:eaaaeaaeecasgeometrcal çess.|.|.i.es . 1ae :e¡a.:ec
aii.iace.sae|ea,e:iaaieiiaee|ass.eeç.sieme|e,.si«ae,«.ia.aa|.ac
eiae:.zeaia|aacaa.sie:.eeai,«ea| csiacyiaesysiemai.esi:aeia:eei
,eemei:.ea| se.eaee e: eiva:.ea s ,eemei:.es . neia iaese aii.iaces
«ea|c ceçeac ea «aai uasse:| aac ceaaec .a Formal and
Transcendental Logic aac:eea||ec.aiaeCrisis asa aa.vei-eiaç:.e:.
se|i·ev.ceaeeiaai|eeçs eve:yae:ma|,eemei:.ea|ç:e]eei.amei.ea
(C, §9b, ç 29) . Nei ea|y a:e iae . aie||.,eaee aaciae ç:aei.ee ei
,eemei:ya|«aysçess.||eaaceeas.eaa||yç:eieaacaace:eai.ve, |ai
se. saee:ia.aseeeac:ereei.eaeaeeasi.iaiec,eemei:y, a||«.iaeai
c.sia:|.a,e:saa|.a,[solicitee] ,eemei:y.a.is|a:.ecseaseeie:.,. a.
1aeCrisis a|«ayseeaeecia.s 1ae:e. saeaeecie:,iae¡aesi.eaeiiae
e:.,.a} .a iae aii.iace ei iae ,eemeie:. eae aas, arie: a|| , siac.ec
,eemei:y, eae aace:siaacs ,eemei:.ea|eeaeeçisaacç:eçes.i.eas, . s
' The Origin of Geometry. p. 1 57 i n Appendi x. Hereafter all references t o the Origin
wi l l be placed in parentheses, as done here. [When placed in brackets , they indicate the
addition of the translator. ]
,
35
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
ia¬. |.a:«.ia ¬eiaecs ei eçe:ai.eaas«aysei cea| .a,«. ia ç:ee.se|y
ceiaecsi:aeia:es . . . " (ibid. ).
l 8
Ne,eemei:.z.a,aei.v.iyassaea, ae«eve:e:.i.ea| ,eaa:eia:aiea
çe.aisae:ieiiaai iam.| .a:.iy
2. nai .i «e |eave iae aeiaa| e: v. :iaa| ,.veas ei iae :eee.vec
,ee·nei:y. aac.i«eiaeaeemeiea.sie:y sve:i.ea| c. meas.ea, ia:ee
eeaias.easa,a.a|.e .a«a.iie:as
A) i aiaei:siç|aee,«ea:eaei. aie:esiecae:e. a iaemaaae:ei
|e.a,«a.eaiaesease,ei,eemei:y}aac.a,Ca|.|ee s}ia.a|.a,, e:.a
iaai eia| | iae | aie . aae:.ie:seiiae e|ce:,eemei:.e sae«|ec,e ( 1 57
, mec.aec} , Desç.ie iae va| ae «a.ea «ea|c |e aiiaeaec ie saea aa
açç:eaea,iae|aiie:ceçeacs ,.aiae|esiayçeiaes.s ,ea|yeaaçsyeae|·
e,ye:a. sie:yeiee,a.i.ea ~aceveai, |yv. :iaeeiiae.:cese:.çi.ve
siy|e , ia. sa.sie:yaacçsyeae|e,y eseaçec«aai uasse:|a|«ayssas·
çeeiec,evea.iiaeyc. caei:ecaeeiaeae:mai.v.iyei.cea|e|]eeisaac
,eemei:.ea|truth ieiaeemç.:.ea|iaeisei| .vecexçe:.eaee, iaey«ea|c
ea|y.aie:m asa|eaiiaeiaeiaa| :eeiecaesseii:aia .aaa. sie:.ea|e:
çsyeae| e,.ea|m.|.eaeiiaei. Necea|iia.s:eeiecaessmay|eaeeess. ·
|| eieacese:.çi.veçaeaemeae|e,y«a.ea«ea|c:esçeeia| | . ise:.,.aa|·
.iy. |ai.i«ea|cieaeaasaeia.a,a|eaiiaei:aiaei,eemei:yaac. is
seaseeie:.,.a
re:Ca| . |ee-«aeseaame ae:e.siaeexemç|a:y.acexeiaaaii.iace
aacamemeai ,:aiae:iaaaaç:eçe:aame· -«asa| :eacyaa.aae:. ie:ei
,eemei:y · ii, .a iaeCrisi, ave:y .mçe:iaai ç|aee . s :ese:vecie:
Naturall y, here "geometry" serves i n an exemplary way t o designate mathematics
and even l@gic in general .
l !|
Cf. C, §9 1 , p. 57: . . . I have l i nked all our consi derations to hi s name [Gali leo' s] ,
i n a certain sense simplifying and ideali zi ng the matter; a more exact hi storical
anal ysi s would have to take account of how much of his thought he owed to hi s
predecessors. ' ( I shal l conti nue, i ncidentall y, and for good reasons, i n a similar
fashion. ) "
20
What Galileo inaugurated, openi ng the way for objecti vi sm by making mathematized
Nature an " in i tself, " marks the birth of a cri sis in the sciences and in philoso­
phy. All the more, then, does i t command the attention of the author of the Crisis.
Besides, Husserl already i nsists a great deal on the secondary character of Galileo' s
revol uti on and on the scientifc heritage that i t supposed , notably that of . . ' pure
geometry, ' the pure mathematics of spatiotemporal shapes in general, pregiven to Galileo
as an old tradition" (C. §9a, p. 24) , "the relatively advanced geometry known to Galileo,
already broadly applied not only to the earth but al so i n astronomy" (ibid . . § 9b , p. 28) .
For Galileo, the sense of the geometrical tradition' s origin was already lost: "Gali leo was
himsel f an heir i n respect to pure geometry. The inherited geometry. the inherited manner
of ' intuiti ve' conceptual i zing, provi ng, constructi ng, was no longer original geometry: in
this sort of ' intuiti veness ' it was already empty ofits sense" (ibid. , §9h, p. 49 [modifed] ;
Husserl ' s emphasis) .
36
Jacques Derrid
Ca| . |eeaaca. s:eve|ai.ea, «a.eauasse:|s.iaaies aiiae e:.,.aeiiae
mece:asç.:. i s çe:. | s· . ae:eiae :ac.ea| . sicemaac«aaisie aaceiae
sec.meaiai.easaçea«a.eaiaeeaie:ç:.seeiaa.aaa.iemaiaemai.zai.ea
«as |asec we masireduce iaeve:y :ema:|a||eaesseiiaeCa|.|eaa
aa.vei-iei:eeiae¡aesi.eaasieiae e:.,.aei,eemei:y
ia iae Crisis, «a.|e . ave|.a, Ca| .|ee s ||.acaess ie iae i:ac.i.eaa|
sçaeeeia. se«aacveaia:eaacces. ,aai.a,a. siaieia| em. ss.ea.
"Z
l
uasse:| aaaeaaeesve:yç:ee.se|yiaeias|iaaiae«.||aace:ia|ea|.ii|e
|aie:ea. aiaeOrigin: re:Ca|.|ee.iaea. ,ça:e,eemei:yasi:ac.i.ea}
«as ,.vea-aac eieea:seae. ¡a.ieaace:siaaca||y. c. caeiiee| iae
aeecie,e. aieiaemaaae:.a«a.eaiaeaeeemç|.sameaiei. cea| .zai.ea
e:.,. aa||ya:ese ,. e . ae« .i,:e«ea iae aace:|y.a,|as.seiiae ç:e·
,eemei:.ea| . seas.||e«e:|caac.isç:aei.ea|a:is·e:ieeeeaçya. mse|i
°' " It was a fateful omission that Gal i l eo did not i nquire in retur as to the original
sense-bestowi ng production whi ch, as ideali zation practiced on the original ground of all
theoretical and practical l ife-the i mmedi ately i ntuited world ( and here especial l y the
empirical l y i ntui ted world of bodi es)-resulted in the geometrica ideal formations)" (C,
§9h, p. 49 [modi fed] ) .
Li ke al l forgetful ness i n general , the "fatefl ness" of t hi s "omission" or negligence
( Versiumnis) , which is never questioned for or i n itself, assumes one of the three fol low­
ing signifcations, each varying according to text and context:
a) that of an empirical necessity (on the order of i ndi vi dual or soci al psychology as
well as that of factual history) , and thus, of an extrinsic necessity , one which is thereby
contingent i n comparison with the sense and teleology of reason. This necessity, then,
has the inconsistent negati vity of the "non-essence" (das Unwesen), of the "apparent "
defeat of reason. I ll uminated by the tel eology of Reason, i t ceases to be "an obscure fate,
an impenetrable desti ny" (cf. "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity, " Ap­
pendi x I in C, p. 299) . [The ET of das Unwesen ofered by Carr is "disarray. " Paul
Ricoeur in his French translation of thi s text points out the l i teral translation as "non­
essence": "La Crise de I ' humanite europeenne et la phi l osophi e, " Revue de
Meraphysique et de Morale, 55, No. 3 (Jul y-October, 1 950) , p. 258. For the relation of
Ricoeur' s translation and the English one, see note 1 49 below. ]
b) that of a radical ethico-phi l osophical fault : the bankruptcy of philosophical fee­
dom and responsi bil ity.
c) that of an eideti c necessity: th necessity of sedimentation prescribed for al l
constitution and al l tradi tionalization of sense , therefore for al l hi story . Thi s prescription
i n turn is sometimes valued as the condition of hi storicity and the progressive advent of
reason, sometimes deval ued as what makes origins and accumulated sens become dor­
mant . It trul y is a threatening val ue.
I t is a matter of course that these three sigifcati ons, appaentl y i rreducibl e t o one
another, are concei ved by Husserl on the basis of one and the same latent i ntuition.
History itsel f is what this i ntui ti on announces. Even if we managed si multaneousl y and
without contradiction to think the uni tary ground on the basis of which these three
propositions can be recei ved, i t i s history itself that would be thought . But then the
possi bi li ty of a crisis of reason woul d disappear, the negativity of which ought to be
unthinkable in itself.
r
I
37
Introductin t o the Origin ofGeometr
«.ia ¡aesi.eas a|eai iae e:.,.as ei açec.ei.e. maiaemai.ea| se|i·
ev.ceaee (C, §9b, ç. 29) .
~ac. i . aiaeOrigin uasse:|sçea|sei ea,a,.a,a. mse|i .a :eree·
i. eas«a.easa:e|yaeve:eeea::ecieCa|.|ee( 1 57) , .i. s|eeaase.asae
iacsa.c. aiaeCrisi: i ic.caeieaie:iaem.aceiaCa| . | eeiaai. i
«ea| ceve: |eeeme :e|evaai . .aceec eiiaacameaia| .mçe:iaaee. ie
,eemei:y.asa|:aaeaei aaa.ve:sa||ae«|ec,eei«aai. s,ça.|eseçay· .
iema|e,eemei:.ea|se|i·ev. ceaee-iae ae«ei. ise:.,.a-.aieaç:e|
| em re:as. ç:eeeec.a,|eyeacCa|.|ee.aea:a.sie:.ea|:ereei.eas. .i
«.|| |e eieeas.ce:a||e .aie:esi ie see ae« a sa.u eiieeas |eeame
a:,eaiaacae«iae e:.,.aei|ae«|ec,eaacie|eeemeama]e:ç:e|·
|em (§9b, ç. 29) . z
Z
iiiaeCa|. |eaac. seeve:y:es. cesesçee.a||y.aaie:ma| .z.a,.aaa.i.za·
i.eaeiaae.eaimaiaemai.es. ceesaeiiae:eia:aieiaemasaae:.,.ai. e
ç:.me:c.a|.iyieaee:ia.aaa.iace: Nes. mç|e:esçease . sçess.||eie
saea a ¡aesi.ea we «.|| see iaaiiae . aaa.ie aac a|:eacy |:e|ea
ia:ea,a.«asa|:eacyai«e:|.«aeaiaea:si,eemei:y|e,aa-iaai. i.
iee.«asa|:eacyaa.aaa.i.zai.ea
B) nai.i«e:eia:aieaçe.aiia.ss. ce eiCa|.|ee. .siae¡aesi.ea
ae«eaeeisiacy.a,ie:.ise|iiaeae:.ia,e«a.ea«as,.veaiea. m:Nei
aayme:e 1ae ¡aesi.eaeie:. ,.a«.||aei|eaça.|e|e,.ea|· a.sie:.ea|
sea:ea . aiae. avesi.,ai.eaei ça:i.ea|a:ç:eçes.i.eas ( 1 58) iaai
iaea:si,eemeie:sc.seeve:ece:ieuaa| aiec 1ae:e..i«ea| cea| y|ea
maiie:ie:iae a.sie:yeise.eaee.a iaee|ass.ea|seaseieia|e siee|ei
iaea|:eacyeeasi.iaieceeaieaisei,eemei:.ea|ee,a. i.eas. .aça:i.ea| a:
eiiae a:siçesia|ai-·. ax.ems. iaee:ems. aac seie:ia. eeaieaisiaai
masi |e exç|e:ec aac ceie:m.aec as ç:ee.se|y aac as eemç|eie| yas
çess.||ei:ema:eaee|e,.ea|ceeameais Desç.ie. is.aeeaiesia||e.aie:·
esi. saea aa. avesi.,ai. eaeaaieaea as aeia. a,+|eaiiae,eemei:. ea|
seaseeiiaea:si,eemei:.ea|aeis iieaaaeievea:eee,a.zeaac. se|aie
iaese aeis as saea exeeçi |y saççes.a,iaaiiae ç:. me:c.a| sease ei
,eemei:y.sa|:eacy|ae«a
c, r.aa|| y. .ieaemasi:eia:aieiae.asi.iai.a,seaseeia:siaeis. .i
.saeiaia||a¡aesi.eaeiceie:m.a.a,«aaiin fact «e:eiaea:s|aeis.
iaea:siexçe:.eaees . iaea:si,eemeie:s«ae«e:ein fact :esçeas.||e
22
These sentences announce what follows i n the Crisis, devoted to the transcendental
motif i n post-Galilean phi l osophy, as well as i nvesti gations like that of the Origin .
°`´ "Fi rst" (erste) nearly always designates in Husserl ei ther an undetermined primacy,
or, most ofen, a de facto chronological priority i n constituted cosmic time, i . e . , an
original factuali ty. Proto-, Arch-, and Ur- refer to phenomenological primordi ali ty. i . e . .
to that of sense, of ground, of the de jure, afer the reduction of all factuality.
I
38
Jacques Derrida
ie: iae acveai ei,eemei:y saea a ceie:m.aai.ea. evea .i çess.||e .
«ea|caaiie:ea:a.ste:.ea|ea:.es.iy,aaceve:yia.a,iaaiuasse:|aii:.·
|aies ie aee:ia.a:emaai.e. sm, . i«ea|c ea:.eaea:|ae«|ec,eei
emç.:.ea|e.:eamsiaaees. eiaames. caies. aacseie:ia naievea.i.ai
.is |. m.i. ia. sceie:m. aai.ea«ea|cem|:aeea||iaea.sie:.ea|iaeisiaai
aaveeeasi.iaieciaeemç.:.ea|m.|.eaie:i:aia s ieaac.a,..i«ea|csi.||
|eaveas||.aca|eaiiaeve:yseaseeisaeaaieaac.a,. aseaseiaai.s
aeeessa:y aac eemça:ec ie «a.ea iaeseiaeisaave ai |esiea|y aa
exemç|a:ys.,a.aeai.ea saeaemç.:.ea||ae«|ec,eeaa]asi.aa|| yç:e·
seai. ise|iasa.sie:.ea||ae«|ec,eofia.a,s:e|aiecie,eemei:yea| y|y
saççes.a, a ia||y ceve|eçec e|a:.iy a|eai iae ve:y sease ei«aai .s
ea||ecthe ,eemei:.ea| se.eaee ~ac ae:e. ia. smeaase|a:.iya|eai. is
seaseeie:.,. a 1ae]a:.c.ea|ç:.e:.iyeiiae¡aesi.eaeiçaeaemeae|e,.·
ea|e:.,.a.siae:eie:ea|se|aie
naiia.s¡aesi.eaeaa|eas|ecea| ysecondarily aacat the end eiaa
.i. ae:a:y«a.ea. .a. isia:a.ea]eysameiaece|e,.ea|aac:.,aiia|ç:.e:·
. iy iaiaei . a||iaeseva:.eas|.acsei.a¡a.:.es«e]asic. sm. ssecaave
|eeaeaa,aiaç.aiaee|emeaieiaeeasi.iaiec,eemei:y 1ae. :e|]eei
saççesece:«aseeaiasec«.ia iae :esa|iseiaready-made ,eemei:y
iaai«ea|caaveie|ereduced .ae:ce:ieaiia.aaeease.ea saessei.is
e:.,.a. aeease.easaess«a.ea«asaiiaesamei.meaa .aia.i.eaei. is
esseaee ia eiae:«e:cs. a|iaea,a.i ea|y aas ie:.iseeaieai.cea| es·
seaees. ready-made ,eemei:y ae|cs ae:e.a |a||iae siaias eia iaei
«a.eamasi|e:ecaeec.a .isiaeiaa|.iyseiaai.is sease eaa|e :eac
i aceec..aia.sease.iaefact aasiaeie:,eiieaseaseeiiaeready-made.
nai ia. s:ecaei.ea aeecsas.is sia:i.a,çe.aiiae eeasi. iaiec:esa| i. i
aeai:a|.zes 1ae:emasia| «aysa|:eacyaave|eeaiaeiaeieiaa.sie:y
ei,eemei:y . seiaaiiae :ecaei.eaeaa|eçe:ie:mec i masia|:eacy
aaveaaa.ve|ae«|ec,eei,eemei:yaacmasiaeibegin ai.ise:.,.a
ue:eiaemeiaec s] a:.c.ea|aeeess.i,eve:|açsa. sie:, siaeiaa|aeees·
s.i,Desç.ieee:ia.aaççea:aaees. ça. |eseçae:seimeiaeca:eçe:aaçs
me:eç:eieaac|,seas.i.veiea. sie:.e.i,.eveaiaea,aiae,seemie:e
mevec. ,:ess. easi:ema. sie:, sçaia
neiaiae aeeess.iyieç:eeeec i:em iaeiaei eieeasi.iaiec se.eaee
aac iae :e,:ess.ea ie«a:cs iae aeaemç.:.ea| e:.,. asa:e ai iae same
i.meeeac.i.easeiçess.|.|.iy.saeaa:e .as«e|ae«.iae.mçe:ai.vesei
eve:yi:aaseeaceaia|ça.|eseçayiaeec«.ia semeia. a,|.|eiaea. sie:y
eimaiaemai.es ·~·aacameaia|c.ae:eaee:ema. as. ae«eve:.|ei«eea
¯` On the necessity of starting from existing sci ences that are util ized as the thread
guidi ng the transcendental regressi on, cf. FTL, pp. 8-9: "Thus we are presupposing the
sciences, as wel l as logic itself, on the basi s of the ' experience' that gi ves them to us
39
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
kaai s . aieai.ea aac iaaieiuasse:| . eae iaai . sçe:aaçs |esseas.|y
c.si.a,a.saa||eiaaa«ea|ca:si|e . ma,.aec
ia aa. sie:.ea|:ei:esçeei.eaie«a:cs e:.,.as. kaai a|se eve|es ia.s
maiai.eae:i:aasie:mai.ea( Uminderung), ia.s revolution" «a.ea,ave
|.:iaiemaiaemai.eseaieisemeemç.:.ea| ,:eç.a,s .aiaeÐ,yçi.aa
i:ac.i.ea(Kritik der rein en Ver u nft, r:eiaeeie:acec . ç x,
1aea. sie:yeiia. s:eve|ai.ea. aii:.|aiecieiaeaaççyiaea,aiei
as.a,|emaa .a aa exçe:.meaii:em«a.eaiae çaiaiaaihad ie|e
ia|eamust ae|ea,e:|em. ssecaaci:em«a.eaiaesa:e«ayeise.eaee
«asopened aacprescribed (eingeschlagen und vorgezeichnet war) for all
times and in endless expansion (fur aile Zeiten und in unendlich Weiten),
«asme:ecee.s.veiaaaiaeemç.:.
¸
a|c. seeve:yeiiaeçaiaa:eaac
iaeiameasCaçe ¸eiCeec ueçe} (ibid. , ç x.,
1aas. | .|euasse:| . kaai.s aiieai.ve ie iae a.sie:.ea| c. meas.eaei
aç:.e:.çess.|.|.i.esaac ieiae e:.,.aa|,eaes. seiai:aia. «aese |.:ia
,e: |.:ia ee:i.aeaie, . ase:.|es aac ç:ese:.|es ema. iemçe:a|.iy aac
aa.ve:sa|.iy-aei ea|yie:iaeeçea.a, ei.is çess.|.|.iy. |ai a|se ie:
eaea ei. is ceve|eçmeais aac ie: iae ieia|.iy ei . is|eeem. a, i.|e
uas se:| . aeaeai:a| .zesiaeiaeiaa|eeaieaiseiia.s :eve|ai.ea. aiae
mece eiia.a|.a, «.iaiae same.ac.ae:eaee. i aeiieei. .i .s ei|. ii|e
eease¡aeaee ie: a.m iaai .is a. sie:y aas aei :eaeaec as 1ae
seaseeiiaea:sicemeasi:ai.eaeaa|e:.,e:eas| y,:asçec.eveaiaea,a
«e|ae«aeia.a,eiiaea:siiaeiaa|exçe:.eaeee:iaea:si,eemeie:.
«aeiae:. as kaai sçee.aes. ae |e ea||ec1aa|ese:«aaieve:eae
ces. :es(ibid.).
Neve:iae|ess. kaai s .ac.ae:eaeeieiaeiaeiaa|e:.,.a,as«e||asie
iaeeeaieaieiiaeexamç|e-iae. sesee|esi:.aa,|e-eeaee:a.a,«a.ea
ae ceve|eçs iae .mç|.eai.eas ei . is c.seeve:y, . s me:e .mmec.aie|y
|e,.i.maieiaaauasse:| s re:iae .aaa,a:a|maiai.ea«a.ea.aie:esis
kaaihands over ,eemei:y:aiae:iaaae:eaies.i ..iseisi:eeaçess.|.|·
.iy. «a.ea. saeia.a,|essiaaaa. sie:.ea| . . ae:ce:ieaaac.iieas ~i
a:siia. s:eve|ai.ea. sea|ya:eve|ai.eaie:iaea:si,eemeie:ii. s
beforehand. Because of thi s, our procedure seems not to be at al l radical , since the
genui ne sense of al l sciences . . . i s the very thi ng i n quest ion . . . . Nevertheless,
whether sciences and logic be genui ne or spurious, we do have experience of them as
cul tural formations gi ven to us beforehand and bearing withi n themsel ves their meani ng,
their ' sense. '
. .
Cf. also on thi s FTL. I ntrod . , pp. 1 3-1 4
.
and § 1 02, pp. 268-69 : and
eM, §3, pp. 8-9.
¯ ´ We emphasize those Kantian expressions which are also among t he most frequent i n
The Origin of Geometry. [The bracketed expression "of Good Hope" i s added i n con­
formi ty to the Engl i sh translation of Norman Kemp Smith. ]
40
Jacques Derrid
aeiç:ecaeecoya. m. ii .saace:sieecaace:acai.veeaie,e:y, aaciae
aei.v.iyeiiae,eemeie:ie«a.eaiaeaaççyiaea,aieeea::ec.sea|y
iaeemç.:.ea| aaie|c.a,eia ç:eieaac:eeeçi.ea waai .s mesieriea
i:aas|aiecoy:eve|ai.ea . siaea||as.eaie a | .,aiiaai.s,.vea, ie
a| .,aica«asea . "Dem ersten . . . dem ging ein Licht auf" (ibid. , ç
X
)
. 26
uaceaoiec|y, uasse:| s ç:ecaei.ea (Leistung)
2
7 a|se .ave|ves a
si:aiamei:eeeçi.ve. aia.i.eanai«aaimaiie:sae:e.siaaiia.suas se:·
|.aa.aia.i.ea, as.ieeaee:asiae.cea|eo]eeiseimaiaemai.es , .saose·
|aie|yeeasi.iai.veaace:eai.ve. iaeeo]eeise:eo]eei.v. i.esiaai. i.a·
ieacsc.cft ex.sibefore .i. aacia.s before" eiiae. cea|eo]eei.v.iy
ma:ss me:e iaaa iae ea:eae|e,.ea| eve eia iaei. .i ma:ss a i:aas·
eeaceaia| ç:ea. sie:y i a iae kaai.aa :eve|ai . ea. ea iae eeai:a:y.
iae |:si ,eemeie: me:e|y oeeemes eease.eas iaai .i saueesie: a. s
maiaemai.ea| aei.v.iyie :ema.a«.ia.aaeeaeeçiiaai .ialready pos­
sesses. 1aeeeasi:aei.eaie«a.eaae,.vesa. mse|i,iaea, .sea|yiae
exç|.eai.eaeiaaa|:eacyeeasi.iaieceeaeeçiiaaiaeeaeeaaie:s , as.i
«e:e, .a a. mse|ia cese:.çi.ea «a.ea ae ceaoiie: uasse:| as «e||
«ea|coei:aeeieve:yaeae:eai.ve,eemei:.ea|aei, aac«a.eaieaeaes
as aoeai iae sease ei :eacy·mace ,eemei:y as saea, oaiaei aoeai
,eemei:y .a iae aei ei oe.a, . as..iaiec re:, as kaai says. ae
c.seeve:eciaaiaemasiaeiie||e«iaei:aeeei«aaiaesa«.aiae| ,a:e
26
Cf. for example the French translation of A. Tremesaygues and B. Pacaud, Critique
de la raison pure (Paris: Presses Uni versitaries de France, 1 950) , p. 1 7. Of course , we are
authorized to pay such attention to these Kantian expressions only by the confrmation
that all of Kant' s phi l osophy seems to give them.
¯´ Among all the translations already proposed for the notion of Leistung, so frequently
utilized i n the Origin, the word "production" seemed to overlay most properly all the
signifcations that Husserl recognizes in thi s act that he al s designates by some com­
plementary notions: pro-duetion, which leads to the l ight , constitutes the "over against
us" of Objecti vity; but this bringing to l ight i s also, l ike all production (Erzeugung) in
general , a creation (Sehopfung) and an act of formation (Bildung, Gestaltung), from
which comes ideal objectivity as Gebilde, Gestalt, Erzeugnis, and so on. To be clear on
this, we have translated by "formation" the notion of Gebilde, which appears so often in
the Origin, and which up to now has been very di versely translated. The very vague
character of the word "formation" seemed to us to suit the indetermination of Husserl ' s
notion. I t also agrees with the geological metaphor which runs throughout t he text, where
all usions to sedimentation, to deposits, to stages, to strata, and to substrata of sense are
everywhere. But we were also unable to designate the act which engenders das Gebilde.
namel y, die Bildung, except by "formation. " Each time BiLdung has th i s active sense,
we wi l l insert the German word between parentheses. Do not forget, fi nally (and thi s i s
especially important here), that i n German Bildung also carries the general sense of
culture. There again, the notion of formation seemed the least foreign to thi s vi rtual
signifcation.
41
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
e:.aiaeoa:eeeaeeçieiiaaisamea,a:e kaiae:aemasioe,ei(hervor­
bringen) , .iseo]eei,w.iaiaeae|çei«aaiaea. mse|içai.aie.iaac«aai
a priori «as :eç:eseaiec .a.iia:ea,a iaeeeaeeçi,ia:ea,a eeasi:ae·
i.ea, .~actesae«semeia. a,a priori «.iaeemç|eie seea:.iy,aemasi
aii:.oaieieia.a,s(Sache) aeia.a,oai«aaiaeeessa:. |yie||e«eci:em
«aaiaeaacçaiiae:ea. mse|i.aaeee:caaee«.iaa. seeaeeçi(ibid. ) . 21
Neceaoi, eaee iae ,eemei:.ea| eeaeeçiaas:evea|ec .is i:eecem
«.ia :esçeeiie emç.:.ea| seas.o.|.iy, iae syaiaes.seiiae eeasi:ae·
i.ea . s . ::ecae.o|e ~ac .aceec .i . s aa .cea| a.sie:y nai .i . siae
a.sie:y eiaa eçe:ai.ea, aac aeieiaieaac.a,. iiaaie|csexç|.eai.ve
,esia:es. aiaesçaeeeiaçess.o. |.iya|:eacyeçeaieiae,eemeie:1ae
memeai ,eemei:y . sesiao|.saecassaea, iae memeai, iaai .s, seme·
ia.a,eaaoesa.cei. i, iaea,eemei:ya|:eacy «.||oeeaiaeçe.aiei
oe.a,:evea|ecieiaeeease.easaesseiiaefrst ,eemeie:,«ae. saei ,as
.a iae Origin, ç:eie,eemeie:, iae ç:.ma| | y .asi.iai.a, (urstiftende)
,eemeie:.~i|easi.i«. ||oe:eacyieoe:evea|ec.a.is.a. i.a|eeaeeçi.
iaaieeaeeçi«aeseaç:.e:.Oo] eei.v. iy«.||ç:eseai|ysi:.seaaysao]eei
«aaieve: «.ia ,eemei:.ea| . as.,ai [lumiere] . ~ac s.aee kaai . s .a·
ie:esiec.aiaeçess.o.|.iyei,eemei:yie:asao]eei.a,eae:a|,.i.saei
ea|y |ess eeasi:.ei. a,. oai a| se ce]a:e aeeessa:y. iaai iae ce iaeie
sao]eeieisaeaa:eve|ai.eaoe aayeaeaia|| , aaciaaiiae,eemei·
:.ea| examç|e se:v.a, as ,a.ce-iae cemeasi:ai.ea ei iae . sesee|es
i:.aa,|e-oe.ac.ae:eai. 1aeaç:.e:.aaia:eeiiaaieeaeeçi«.ia. a«a.ea
«eeçe:aieç:ee|acesa| |a. sie:.ea|.avesi.,ai.ea«aaieve:aoeai.issao·
]eeimaiie:Ceai:a:yie.issyaiaei.eexç|.eai.ea.iaeeeaeeçi.ise|i,asa
si:aeia:eeiaç:.e:.ç:ese:.çi.ea. eea|caei oea.sie:.ea| , oeeaase .i .s
aei , assaea .ç:ecaeecaac,:eaacecoyiaeaeieiaeeae:eiesao]eei
2
!1
ue:e a|| a. sie:y eaa ea| y oe emç.:.ea| ~ac .i iae:e .s a o.:ia ei
,eemei:yie:kaai , .iseemsie oe ea| yiae exi:.as.ecircumstance ie:
iaeeme:,eaeeeiai:aia,«a.ea.s . ise|ia|«aysa|:eacyeeasi.iaiecie:
aay iaeiaa| eease.easaess, 1aas iae sçeaiaaeeas e.cei.e :ecaei.ea
«a.eai:eesiae,eemei:.ea|esseaeei:ema||emç.:.ea|:ea|.iy-iaaiei
seas. o|ea,a:ai.eaas«e||asi:emiae,eemeie: sçsyeae|e,.ea| |.vec
exçe:.eaee-.sie:kaaia|«aysa|:eacyceae ª si:.ei|ysçeas.a,. iae

The Erdmann edition notes that hen10rbringen has no "object" i n Kant' s text.
¯�The absence of the deci si ve notion of "material" or "contingent" a priori , such as
Husserl defned it, thus seems to uproot Kant ' s formalist apriorism from all concrete
hi story and to inhi bit the theme of a transcendental hi story.
On the notion of the contingent a priori , cf. in particular FTL. §6, pp. 29-30. The level
of geometry as a material ontology i s precisely that of such a . 'material a priori . "
´Thi s seems true, furthermore, of the whole of Kant' s transcendental analysi s.
, I
42
Jacques Derrid
:ecaet.ea. saetie:e:|yasa|]eet«aema|esa. mse|i:esçeas.||eie:.t
. aat:aaseeaceata|acveata:e.aç:ete,eemete:e:ça. |eseçae::ereet·
.a,eaç:ete,eemet:y..t.sa|«aysa|:eacymaceçes

.||ea

caeeess

:y
|ytaeaata:eei,eemet:.ea|sçaeeaactae

,eemetne

|

|,

et .na:na,
a sea:ee| y a|te:ec eeaveat.eaa| r|atea. sm. kaats mc.ae:eaee te
emç.:.ea|a.ste:y. sea|y| e,.t.mateci:emtaememe

ttaata

e:

ç:e·
ieaac a. ste:yaas a|:eacy e:eatec aeaemç.:.ea| e|,eets 1a.s a.

te:y
:ema.asa.cceaie:kaat Caa«eaetsayae:etaat

ta

taee:�ei. cea|
sçaeeaact.me|eta:e¡a.:esaac

açç:essest�e|na,m,te| .,ateiaa
.at:.as.eaacaeaemç.:.ea|a.ste:.e.tyeitaes.. eaeeseisçaeeaacme·
t.ea: iisçaeeaact.me«e:et:aaseeaceata|:ea|.t.e

. a
*�
y«ea�c

|e
eçeaec|etaie:aaaa.ste:.emetaçays.esaacie:aa. stene. stemç.ne

|
se.eaee t«e .ate::e|atecçess.|.|.t.estaat kaat a|«ays ceaeaaeecm
eaeaad taesamemevenatteave.cemç.:.e.smi:emtaesta:taacat
aayç:.ee .kaataacteeeaiaea. st:aaseeaceata|c.seea:s

tea«e:|c
ei. cea|eeast.tatece|]eets .«aeseee::e|ate«astae:

ie:e.tse|iaeea·
st.tatec sa|]eet · 1a. saet.ea eiaç:etea. ste:y. «a.ea t�e

ae|e

ei
kaat.aaça.|eseçayseemstema|eeeat:ac.ete:yevea«a.|emve|m,
.t |eeemesuasse:| s taeme

uasse:| stas|.staasa||taeme:eaaza:ceas. aaca. si:eecem

.ta
:esçeetteemç.:.ea||ae«|ec,e. sme:ec.mea|tte]ast�i;ati:sts.,a�
iaiaet «eae««eace:a|eattaeseaseeitaeç:ecaet.ea
^
i,eemetn·
ea|ee�eeçts|eie:e aacta.ss.ceeitaekaat.aa:eve|at.ea. |eie:e
aacta.ss.ceeitaeeeast.tat.eaeiaa.cea| | yça:eaacesaetsçaeeaac
t.me s.aeeeve:y.cea|e|]eet.v.ty.sç:ecaeec|ytaeaeteiaeeae:ete
eease.easaess ,tae ea|y sta:t.a, çe.at ie: a t:

as

eaceata|
çaeaemeae|e,y, .eve:y.cea|e|]eet. v.tyaasaa�ste:y«a.ea.sa� «ays
a|:eacyaaaeaaeec.ataateease.easaess. evea.i«e|ae«aetam,ei
.tscete:m.aeceeateat .
uçteIdeas I tae metaece|e,.ea|e:eeast. tat.veaaa| yses:em�mec
stn.eta:a| aac stat.e. aac a|| a.ste:y «as "reduced" as iaetaa| . ty e:
` ´´ Here we fnd, locally and through a diferent approach, the i nterpretatio� pro��sed
by Fi nk and approved by H usserl concerning the intraworldliness of t�e Kantlan cntl
.
que
compared wi th Husserl ' s investigation of the "origin of the world. Cf. Eug�� �m�:
"The Phenomenological Phi losophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Cntlcl sm,
.
in R. O. Elveton, ed. , The Phenomenology of Husserl, pp. 73- 1 47 . [The above quote I S
found on p. 95. ]
.
'
.
"I
'
't t'
,
.
can only be measured by
´ ¯Perhaps the depth of vigi lance H thIS Kantmn I ml a Ion
its difcul ty, its failure.
´ Husserl often stresses that the reference to a hi storical birth be i n�cribed wi
.
t�i n the
sense itself of every cultural ideal i ty, especiall y in Beilage XXVI I m the KnS1S, pp.
503-07.
43
Introductin to the Origin of Geomety
se.eaeeeieeast.tatecaac.at:a«e:| c|yiaetaa|. ty1aas . ta.sa. ste:yei
,eemet:yaac:ema.aec.ataeca:|aac«as]ac,eceicea|tia|çess. |. |·
. tye:mec.ee:e.ate:estie:taeçaeaemeae|e,.ste:mataemat.e.aaas
saea ¹Ceemet:y s t:ata..tsae:mat.veva|ae. .s:ac.ea|| y.aceçeaceat
ei.tsa.ste:y«a.ea.atta.smemeateiuasse:|s. t.ae:a:y..seeas. ce:ec
ea|y as a iaetaa| a.ste:y ia| | .a, aace: tae st:e|e eitae sasçeas. ea
(Ausschaltung) . 35 uasse:| says ta. s , .a tae çe:.ec ei ra.|eseçay as
x.,e:eas se.eaee aacIdeas l) .a seme i:aa| ça:ases«a.ea. .itae
|eve|seiesç|.eat.eaaactaeseaseseitae«e:ca. ste:yaacaet|eea
e|ea:|yc.st.a,a.saec. «ea|c|e.ara,:aateeat:ac.et.ea«.tataese ei
tae Origin. 1aas . Ce:ta.a|y tae mataemat.e.aa tee «. | | aet ta:a te
a.ste:.ea|se.eaeete|etaa,ata|eattaet:ataeimataemat.ea|taee:. es
it«. ||aeteeea:tea.mte:e|atetaea.ste:.ea|ceve|eçmeateimatae·
mat.ea| :eç:eseatat.eas ¸tae Ce:maa aac r:eaea ec.t.eas acc aac
]ac,meats}«.tatae¡aest.eaeit:ata , rxs. ç 1 26) . O:a,a.a. at
tae eac eie:.t.e.z. a, aa emç.:.e.sttaee:y eitae e:. ,.aei,eemet:y
iasteac ei ça. | eseça.z.a, aac çsyeae|e,.z.a, a|eat ,eemet:.ea|
taea,ataac.ata.t.eai:emaaeats.ce staacçe.at .«e saea|ceate:v.·
ta||y.atetaeseaet.v.t.es. aacta:ea,ac.:eetaaa|ysesceie:m.aetae.:
. mmaaeatsease.itmay«e|||etaat«eaave.aae:.tecc.sçes. t.easie:
ee,a.t.eai:em tae ee,a.t.easeiçast,eae:at.eas . but for the question
concering the sense and value of what we cognize, the history of this
heritage is as indif erent as is that ofour gold currency to its real value "
(Ideas 1, §25 , çç. 85-86 ,mec.iec} .ea:emçaas.s· .
´` Cf. in particular Ideas I, § 1 , n. I , p. 45, and p. 46, where both hi storical origin and
hi story as a human science are excluded. Conceri ng the human sciences, the question is
"provi si onally" lef open whether they are "natural sciences or . . . sciences of an
essentially new type. "
Of course, i t i s as facts and not as norms that the hi storical gIvens are pa­
renthesized. I n asking hi mself, ' which sciences' " can phenomenology " ' draw from' "
i nsofar as phenomenology is itself "a science of ' origins, ' " and what sciences must i t
. . ' not depend on: " Husser! writes: "I n the frst place i t goes without saying that wi th
the suspending of the natural world, physical and psychological, all individual objecti vi ­
ties whi ch are constituted through the functional acti vi ti es of consciousness in valuation
and i n practice are suspended-all varieties of cultural expression, works of the technical
and of the fi ne arts, of the sciences also (so far as we accept them as cultural facts and
not as validity-systems) [our emphasi s] , aesthetic and practical values ofe very shape and
form. Natural in the same sense are al so reali ties of such kinds of state, moral custom,
law, religion. Therewith all the natural and human sciences, with the entire knowledge
they have accumulated, undergo suspension as sciences which require for their develop­
ment the natural standpoint" (Ideas I, §56, p. 1 55 [modifi ed]) .
``´ Cf. the defnitions of hi story as an empirical human science in "PRS , " in particular
pp. 1 24-26.
I
f
44
Jacques Derrid
1aeeeat.aa.tyaaceeae:eaeeeitaesee|se:vat.easa:et:a|y:ema:|·
a||e.i:st, iaetaa|a.ste:ymast|e:eaaeec.ae:ce:te:esçeetaacsae«
taeae:mat.ve.aceçeaceaeeeitae. cea| e|]eet.a. ts e«a:.,at� taea
aacea|ytaea,|ytaasave. c.a,a||a.ste:.e. ste:|e,.e.steeaias.ea, .a
e:ce:te :esçeetaac sae« tae aa.¡aea. ste:.e.ty eitae .cea| e|]eet
.tse|i.1aat. s«aytaesei:st:eaaet.easeiiaetaa|a.ste:y«.||aeve:|e
:emevec.ataeo··,·»-evea|esssetaaae|se«ae:e
1a.s .s |eeaase ra. |eseçay as x.,e:eas se.eaee «as eeaee:aec
«.ta:esçeac. a,tetae|.aceia.ste:.e.sm«a.ea:ecaeecae:mteiaet.
aacIdeas I, «.tas. taat.a,,eemet:y. aaaesemç|a:yiasa.eaamea,tae
ça:e esseat.a| se.eaees s.aeeaeexistential thesis (Daseinsthesis) «as
aeeessa:ye:çe:m.ttec.taesese.eaees«e:e. mmec.ate|yi:eeci:ema||
iaetaa|.ty. Ne seas.||ei,a:at.ea.atae:ea|«e:|c,
·aeçsyeae|e,.ea|
esçe:.eaee , ae iaetaa| [ evenementiel] eeateataave, as saea, aa, . a
st.tat.a,sease1ae,eemet:.ea|eidos . s:eee,a.zec. ataat.t«. tasteec
taetesteiaa||ae.aat.ea.
There are pure sciences of essences, such as pure logic, pure
mathematics, pure time-theor, space-theor, theor of movement, etc.
These, in all their thought-constructions, are free throughout from any
positings of actualfact; or, what comes to the same thing, in them no
experience qua experience, i.e. , qua consciousness that apprehends or
sets up reality or factual existence, can take over the functin of
supplying a logial grounding. Where experience functions in them, it
is not as experience. The geometer who draws his fgure s on the
blackboard produces in so doing strokes that are actually there on a
board that is actually there. But his experience of what he thus
produces, qua experience, afords just as little groundfor his seeing
and thinking of the geometrical essence as does the physical act of
production itself. Whether or not he thereby hallucinates, and whether
instead of actually drawing lines he draws his lines and fgures in a
world of phantasy, does not really matter. The scientic investigator of
Nature behaves quite diff erently. (Ideas I, §7, p. 55 [modied ]; Hus-
serl's emphasis) :n
`Iö
The essential usel essness or the "inadequacy" of sensibl e " i l l ustration" i s already
underscored in the Logical Investigations, tr. J. N. Findl ay, 2 vol s. (New York:
Humanities Press, I 970)-hereafter cited as L/. [ All future references wi11 l i st the vol ume
number, the i nvestigation number or Prologomena, the s ection number, and the page:
e. g. , L/, I , I , § 1 8 , pp. 301 -02 means the frst volume, First Investigation,
.
etc. � �uss
.
erl
does this i n a passage (LI, 1, I , § 1 8 , pp. 301 -02) where he recalls the Cartesian dl stmctlon
between imaginatio and intellectio concerning the chiliagon and very preci sel y an­
nounces the theory of geometrical " idealization" that he wil l maintain in the Origin.
`I ¯
Thi s autonomy of mathematical truth compared to perception and natural reality (on
which mathematical truth could not be based) is described here only in a negative way.
Non-dependence is what is stressed. The positive ground of truth is not i nvestigated for
45
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr

ue

:e taeayçetaes.seiaa||ae. aat.ea ta|es aç tae :e| eass.,aec. .a
e. cet.. cete:m.aat. ea. |e ãet.ea .a ,eae:a| "the vital element ofphe­
nomenology" (Ideas /, §70, ç 1 84 ,mec. ãec}· nat.iaa| |ae.aa|.eacees
aetaace:m.ae taeeidos eitae eeast.tatec . cea| e|]eet ,|eeaase tae
eidos .a,eae:a|aac tae .cea|e|]eet.a ça:t.ea|a:a:e .::ea| . taea,a
aetçaaa|asy:ea|.t.es-vea.iaa||ae. aat.ea:evea|staemassaea· . .i.
eat

ae?tae:aaac

taeeidos aactae.cea|e|]eetceaetç:ees.steve:y
sa|]eet.veaet,asma¸eeaveat.eaa|¦r|atea. sm, .itaeatae,aaveaa. s·
�e:,,tae,mast|e:e|atecte,. e ,tae,mast|eç:. me:c.a||,,:eaacec
m

tae ç:ete. cea|. zat. eas |asec ea tae sa|st:ate eiaa aetaa| | , çe:-
�e. ve� :ea|«e:|cuattae,mastceta. sta:ea,ataee|emeateiaae:.,-
ma|a.ste:,

�tself. S
.
tarting from an anal ysi s of the mathematical " phenomenon: ' or in order to better
Isolate ItS "sense, " one simpl y reduces what is i ndicated in this sense as what cannot
presently be
.
retained by vi rtue of this gound. Husserl measures the eidetic intangibil ity
of mathematIcal sense by hallucination. In the Theaetetus ( 1 90b) , Plato had recourse to
dream. Huss�r\ ' s devel
.
opment is al so situated on the same plane and dons the same style
as the �arteslan anal YSI S before the hypothesi s of the Evi l Demon i n the First Meditation:
"At thl
.
s rate we might be justified in concl udi ng that . . . arithmetic, geometry, and so
on, whIch treat onl y of the simplest and most general subject-matter, and are i ndiferent
whether i t exi sts i n nature or not, have an el ement of i ndubi table certainty. Whether I am
awake
.
or asle

p, two and three add up to fve, and a square has onl y four sides; and it
see�s ImpOSSIble for
.
such obvious truths to fall under a suspicion of being fal se" [par. 7:
ET: In Descartes: Phi losophical Writings, tr. El i zabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach
(New York: Bobbs-Merri l l , 1 97 1 ), p. 63] .
For Descartes, only after this phenomenology of mathematical evidence and with the
hypothesi s of the Evil Demon wi l l the critical or juridical question be posed of the ground
that guarantees the truth of naive evidence. The description i tsel f and the "natural "
val i dity of t�is tru
.
th , moreover, wi l l never be put i nto question on their own specific
level . The pn�ordlal �round of these constituted truths, whose mode of appearing is thus
clearly recogmzed, WIll be delegated to a veracious God who i s al so the creator of eternal
�rut�s .
.
Husserl . afe� an analogous descriptive stage, will investigate this in primally
mstttutmg acts ( Urstiftung) , themsel ves hi storical. In this respect, Descartes' God, like
�?at of the gre
.
at �� assic rational i sts, woul d only be the name given to a hidden hi story and
woul� funct� on as the necessary reduction of empi rical hi story and the natural world . a
reductIon which pertains to the sense of these sciences.
But we wi l l see that, despite thi s extraordinary revolution which grounds the absolute
a�d eteral truth without the aid of God or infnite Reason, and which seems thus to
dl sc
.
l o
.
se (and
.
�e�escend toward) a primordial l y i nst ituted fnitude while completel y
a:OIdmg �mpl ncl sm, Husserl i s less di stant from Descartes than it seems. Thi s hidden
?Ist�ry WIll take its sense from an i nfnite Tel os that Husserl will not hesitate to call God
m hiS
.
l ast unp�b
.
l i she
.
d writings. It is true that this i nfnite, which i s always already at
work
.
I n the ongms, IS not a positive and actual i nfnite. It i s given as an I dea i n the
KantJan sense, as a r
.
egulative .. indefnite" whose negativity gives up i ts rights to history.
�ot ?nl y
.
th�
,
moraltty but also the historicity of truth itself woul d here prevent thi s
f�lslfcatton of the actual infnite i nto an indefnite or an ad infnitum, a fal sifcation of
whi ch Hegel accused Kant and Fichte.
46
Jacques Derrid
ua||ae.aat.ea. taea. .s t:ata s aeeemç|.eeea|y .a a st

t.e «

e:|c ei
eeast.tatecs.,a.ieat.eas 1eç:eeeectetae,:eaacaacçome:c.a|eea·
st.tat.eaeit:ata. «e mast :eta:a. sta:t.a,i:emtae :ea|«e:| c.

te a
e:eat.veesçe:.eaee Ðvea «e:e .t aa.¡ae aac |a:. ec.ta. sesçeneaee
:ema. as. ce]a:eas«e||asceiaete.i:stwe:eee,a.ze.t�ea. t�at!e:
taesçae:eeisease.taet:aeeeat:a:yeia

| | ae. aat.ea

,aac.ma,ma�.

a
.a,eae:a|·.saetc.:eet|yçe:eeçt.ea.|ata. ste:y�:. .iyea
(

:eie:..t.s
tae eease.easaesseia.ste:.e.tyaac tae :ea«a|ema,eieo,ms .
1aasea|y at tae | eve| aac çe.atma:|ec |yIdeas I cee

uasse:|
:e]e.a kaat s .ac.ae:eaee te a |.ac eia.ste:y ta�t «ea|c s.mç|y |e
est:.as.e aacemç.:.ea| ~| se. as seeaas uesse:|s aeeeaat|e

emes
eeaeeoec«.tatae,eaes.sei,eemet:y aac ,ett.a,|eyea� ta.

s ç:e·
|. m. aa:y sta,e. «e m.,at esçeet te see a.m :emeve tae e.cet..

ac
t:aaseeaceata|:ecaet.easça:e|yaacs.mç|y. aac:etaoteaeeast.ta·
t.ve a.ste:y. aa. ste:y . a«a.eatae eeas. ce:at.eaeiiae�s taems�| ves
«ea|c|eeeme. ac.sçeasa||e.|eeaaseae:eie:taei:stt.me.assm,a·
|a:a.ste:.ea|e:.,. a. tae. ast.tat.a,iaet«ea|c |e.::eç|aeea||e. tae:e·
ie:e invariable. 1a.s .ava:.aaeeeitae iaet,ei«aateaa aeve:|ere­
peated assaea·«ea|cce]a:ee

::y ev

e:. ts

e.cet.e � ava:.aaee�

aat
eaa|erepeated ve| aata:.|yaacmceimte|y·mteaa.ste:yei

:�
,·�s
u.ste:yas .ast.tat.ve«ea|c|etaeç:eiea
�c

a:

a«�e:esease. s mc. s·
see. a||ei:em |e.a,. «ae:e taeceiaete .smc.ssee.a||e i:em�ae �e
]a:e 1aeaet.eaeie:.,. ae:,eaes.seea|cae|ea,e:|e:eee,mzecm
'I×
The interpretation of Trfm-Duc-Thao, Phenomenologie et materialisme di

le

tique
( 1 95 1 ; rpt. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1 97 1 ) , i s strongly oriented t�ward thIs kmd �f
a conclusion. At the end of Husser\ ' s i ti nerary, the return to the " 'technical and economic
forms of production" (namel y, i n Husserlian langu�ge, �he retur to real , factual,
.
and
extri nsi c causality outside of every reduction) seems mevI
.
table to that a�t�or, who thmk�
Husserl was himself "obscurely" resigned to thi s at the tme of The Orzgm ofG

0
m
etr.
" Moreover, this i s what Husserl was obscurely presenting when he
.
was search 109 10 the
famous fragment on The Origin of Geometr to ground geo�etncal truth on hum�n
praxis " (p. 220). "The phenomenological explication is thus onented towards determm-
i ng the actual conditions in which truth is engendered" (p. 2 2 1 ) .
.
Husserl ' s reduction never had the sense (quite the contrary) of a negatIon-f �n
ignorance or a forgetfulness that woul d ' ' leave" the real conditions of sense and factualIty
in general in order to " come back" or not, in order to "pass on"
.
or not, to th�
.
real
anal ysis [of what i s] (for sense is nothing

ther thQ1

the se�se of realIty o
,
� of fa��ual It�).
Otherwise, his reduction mi ght seem vam and dIssembl Ing, and the r�tu� to
.
an
empiricist histori ci sm, fatal . That does not appear to be the case, since, WIth dl �lectIcal
material ism "we fnd oursel ves on a plane subsequent {posterieur] to the reductIOn, the
latter havin� suppressed the abstract conception of nature but �ot
.
t�e
,
�ctually real �ature
which implies in its development the whole movement of subjectiVity (the author s em-
phasis; pp. 227-28).
47
Intrduction to the Origin of Geometry
tae ça:e çaeaemeae|e,.ea| sease taat uasse:| se ce,,ec|y
c.st.a,a.saeco:¯
neeaase. ie:uasse:| . .t aastae eaa:aete:.st.e«a.eaceiaesiaet-
aame| y. s.a,a|a:aac emç.:.ea|es.steaee. tae .::ecae.|.|.ty eiahere
and »o«-tae teta| iaet ma:|.a,,eemet:y s esta|| . sameat «ea|c |e
.ava:.a||ei aceec.uasse:|saystaattaeaçsa:,eei,eemet:y.ate:ests
a.mae:e. aseia:as.taacta|eaç|aeeeaee(dereinst), ie:taei:st
t.me(erstmalig), sta:t.a,i:ema"frst ae¡a.s.t.ea(aus einem ersten
Erwerben) ( 1 58-59) . nat «aat aatae:. zec tae esseat.a| :eac.a,of aac
within eeast.tatec,eemet:y«astaeçess.|.|.tyei. ma,. aat. ve| yva:y.a,
taeaata:a|here and now eitaei,a:ee:taeçsyeae|e,.ea|esçe:.eaeeei
tae,eemete:«ae. as«eaaveseea.«asaet.ts. ast.tate:ue:e .eatae
eeat:a:y.taehere and now eitae i:stt.me¯. s. ast.tat.veaace:eat. ve
i s ta.sesçe:.eaee ,aa.¡aeei. ts|.ac .aetas.a,a|a:iaet-eaeie:«a.ea
«esaea|caet|ea||etesa|st.tateaaetae:iaetasaaesamç|e.ae:ce:
tecee.çae:.tsesseaee:
i sta. stesaytaatta.s.aseça:a|.|.tyeiiaetaacsease.ataeeaeaess
eiaa.ast.tat.a,aetç:ee|acesaeeessie:çaeaemeae|e,ytea| |a. ste:y
aactetaeça:eeidos eiaie:eve:sa|me:,ece:.,.a:
Netat a| | 1ae .ac.ssee.a|. |.ty. tse|iaas a:.,e:eas| ycete:m. aa||e
çaeaemeae|e,.ea| sease 1ae .ma,.aa:y va:.at.ea ei stat.e çae·
aemeae|e,y s.mç|y saççesec a tyçe ei :ecaet.ea «aese sty|e «.||
aavete|e:eae«ec. aaa.ste:.ea|çaeaemeae|e,y.1aee. cet.easçeetei
ta. s:ecaet.ea«astaeiteration eiaaeema s.aeetaeeidos . seeast.tatec
aace|]eet.ve. tae se:.es eiaets«a.ea.ateacec .teea|caet|at. a·
ceia.te| y:este:etae. cea|.ceat.tyeiasease«a.ea«asaete|sea:ec
|yaaya.ste:.ea|eçae.ty,aac.t«ea|cea|y|ea¡aest.eaeie|a:.iy.a,.
. se|at.a,,aaccete:m. a.a,.tsev.ceaee..ava:.aaee.aace|]eet.ve.ace·
çeaceaee 1aea.ste:.ea|:ecaet.ea. «a.eaa| seeçe:ates|yva:. at.ea.
«. | | |e reactivating aacaeet.e. i asteac ei:eçeat.a, tae eeast. tatec
seaseeiaa.cea|e|]eet. eae«.||aavete:ea«a|eataeceçeaceaeeei
´´ Opening Ideas I (Chapter 1 , § l a, p. 45, passage already ci ted), this defnition of
phenomenological origin ( in disti nction to genesis in the worldly human and natural
sciences) was already clearly specifi ed i n the LI, I , Prol. , §67, pp. 237-38; i n The
Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, ed. Martin Heidegger, tf. James S.
Churchill ( Bloomington, I nd. : I ndiana University Press, 1 97 1 ) , §2, pp. 27-28; and i n
"PRS," pp. 1 1 5-1 6. This di stinction, whi ch Husserl wi l l always j udge as deci sive, wil l
sti l l be underscored qui te frequently i n Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a
Genealogy of Logic, tf. from rev. ed. of Landgebe by Jaes S. Churchi ll and Karl
Ameriks ( Evanston: Northwestern Uni versity Press, 1 973)-hereafer cited as E­
paricularly § 1 , p. 1 1 ; i n FTL, in parti cular § 1 02, p. 269; i n the eM, §37, pp. 75-76; and of
course in the Origin.
48
Jacques Derrid
sease«.ta:esçeetteaa.aaa,a:a|aac. ast.tat.»eaeteea�ea|ec

aace:
seeeaca:y çass.».t.es aac .aia.te sec. ¬eatat.ea·a çn¬e:

c.a| �et
«a.ea e:eatec tae e|]eet «aese eidos .s cete:¬.aec|y tae .te:at.»e
:ecaet.ea ue:ea,a.a«ea:e,e.a,te seetaattae:e. saes.¬ç|e:e·
sçeasetetae¡aest.eaeitaeç:.e:.tyeieae:ecaet.eae»e:aaetae:

1ae s.a,a|a:.ty eitae .a»a:.a||efrst time a|:eacy aasa aeeess.ty
«aesee.cet.eiaac. s.aceec:atae:ee¬ç|es.
First, t|e:e. s aaessence-of-the-frst-time . a,eae:a| .anErstmalig�eit, ·
aa. aaa,a:a|s.,a.ieat.eataat.sa|«ays:eç:ecae.||e. «aate»e:.tsce
iaete esa¬ç|e ¬ay |e waate»e: «e:e tae e¬ç.:.ea| eeateat eitae
e:.,.a..t. saçec.et.ea| |yaacaç:.e:.aeees sa:ytaat,ee¬e�:yaas

aac
aae:.,.aaactaas aasaççea:ecai:stt.¬e .i cea|,ee¬etnea|e|,eets
eaaaetaa»etae.:e:.,.aa|ç|aee.ase¬etopos ouranios. uas�e:|a|:eacy
e¬çaas.zec ta.s . ataeLogical Investigations, «ae:e ae

c. seasseca

||
. cea|s.,a.ieat.easaace|]eets. · ' 1ae. :a.ste:.�.ty.

t�ea. .s

eaeeitae.:
e.cet.eee¬çeaeats. aactae:e. saeeeae:etea.steoe. ty:a.�acees�et
aeeessa:.| y. |. eate. a. tse|itae:eie:eaeeteaaEr

tmaltgkelf. wesa.c.
a¬e¬eata,e.taat.t«ea|c|e. ¬çess.||eteSa|st¡tate.anothe� iaetie:
taeaa. ¡aeiaeteitaefrst time. uacea|tec| y natea|y.iother .s¬�aat
te¡aa|.iy esseaee aacaet e¬ç.:.ea| es. ste�eeas sa�a. re:� am¡ae
iaeta|:eacyaas.tsesseaeeasaa.¡aeiaetwa..a.|y�em� aet�m,etae:
taaataeiaet.tse|i,ta. s.staetaes. seitaeaea·iet. »e.::eaaty?itae
esseaee, ..saettaeiaetaa| .tyeiiaet|attaeseaseei iaet-ta�t«�taeat
«a.eataeiaeteea|c aetaççea:aac,.»e:.seteaaycete:¬m�t.eae:
c.seea:se . ~| :eacy. «aeauasse:|«:ete. a ra.|eseçayasx. ,e:e�s
se.eaeetaat. ie:¸taeçaeae¬eae|e,.ea|sa|sa¬çt.ea} .�aes. a�a| a� . s
ete:aa||y taeapeiron. raeae¬eae|e,y eaa:eee,a.ze w.ta ?|,eet. »e
»a|.c.ty ea| yesseaeesaacesseat.a|:e|at.eas , ç 1 1 6 ,¬ec!i�c}, . ae
e».ceat|yaace:steec|ys.a,a|a:.tyea|ytaeeaeaesseiiaet�a.tsça:e
iaetaa|.ty aac aet taat ei tae e. cet.e s.a,a| a:.t. esceiaec mIde

s I
(§§ 1 1 , 1 4, 1 5 .çç62-63 aac66-69) asa|t.¬ate¬ate:.a|esseaeeswa..a.
`´ In its substantive form, this notion does not seem to have been employed b� Husserl
himself. It is found i n place of the adverbial expression erstmalig in the transcnpt of the
Origin published by Fink in Revue Internationale de Philosophie ( 1 939), pp. 203-225:
Fink, who also italicizes erstmalig (p. 207), speaks of Erstamaligke�tsmo�us [po 208] and
thus gives a thematic value to a sigifcation aimed at by a profound mtentIon of Husserl .
`´ Cf. in particular I , 1 , § 3 1 , p. 330. There Husserl completely condem�s i
,
n a �latonic
manner those who, like the "sons of the earth, " can "understand by ' bemg (Sem) �nlY
I b · "
.
e "being" in the world of natural reality, and he simultaneously rejects rea emg, ¡ . . ;
h the hypothesis of the intelligible heaven. " They [the significat�on�] are not for t a� reas�n
objects which, though existing nowhere in the world, have bemg m a top�� ouramos or U
a divine mind, for such metaphysical hypostatization would b absurd.
49
I ntroductin to the Origin of Geometry
as x.eeea:aetes. ese|aceea|ye¬ç. :.ea|. ac. ».caa| .ty .eai y iaetaa| ·
.ty " (Idees I, ç. 239, a 1 eit: , . . e .taetode ti ei|:atees.steaee 1ae
ç:e||e¬eiceçeaceaeee:.aceçeaceaee. eitae a|st:aete:eeae:ete
eaa:aete:eitaesee.cet.es..,a|a:.t. es . çesec. aIdeas I i:e¬taeaet.eas
eitae1a.:cie,.ea|i a»est.,at.ea..s:ea||y¬e:ec.meaatese| »e«aea
.teeaee:asa. ste:.ea|s.a,a|a:.t.es . «aesee¬ç.:.ea|).:·. sae»e:. ¬¬e·
c.ate|y ç:eseat . it eea|c |e sa.c taat tae e.cet.e çaeae¬eae|e,y ei
a.ste:y. aa».a,tet:eatea|ys.a,a|a:. t.esassaea . .s.aeaeseasetae
¬estceçeaceataactae¬esta|st:aeteise.eaees . nat. a»e:se| y. s. aee
ee:ta.aaeae.:.ea|s.a,a|a:.t.es. asuasse:|says. eaa|eeeas. ce:ec.a
ee:ta.a:esçeetsastae¬esteeae:eteaac¬est.aceçeaceat .s.aeetae
s.a,a|a:.t.es ei e:.,.as a:e taese ei .ast.tat.a, aets ei e»e:y .cea|
s.,a.ieat.ea aac. .a ça:t.ea|a:. ei tae çess.|.|.t.eseise.eaee aac ei
ça.|eseçay. taea tae.:a. ste:y .s tae ¬est.aceçeaceat. tae ¬esteea·
e:ete.aactaei:steise. eaees
i aceec.taetae¬eeie. cet.es.a,a|a:.t.es. sa|:eacyt.es| . saeaea,a. a
Ideas I. ue«e»e:. s.aeetaee|aetae:e. stae. ¬¬aaeat| .»ecesçe:.eaee
e:taeseas.||eta.a,çe:ee.»ecoriginaliter, s. a,a|a:iaetaa| .ty.sa|«ays
ç:eseat . a|taea,a :ecaeec. te ,a.ce aac eeat:e| tae .ata.t.ea eitae
a|t. ¬ate¬ate:.a|esseaee. nat as seea as a. ste:.ea|c. staaee .s . ate:·
çesec. tae . a»est.,at.eaeie:.,. asae |ea,e:ç:eeeecs .a ta.s «ay ~
ceet:.aeeitradition astaeetae:eia. ste:.ea|çe:eeçt.eataea|eee¬es
aeeessa:y .t. sattaeeeate:eiThe Origin of Geometr.
Oa|yaace:taeseeeac.t.easeaauasse:|«:.te ea:. ate:estsaa|||e
tae. a¡a.:y|aes.atetae ¬este:.,.aa| sease .a «a.ea ,ee¬et:yeaee
a:ese.«asç:eseatastaet:ac.t.eaei¬. ||eaa.a . «e.a¡a. :e.atetaat
sease.a«a.ea.taççea:ec.aa. ste:yie:taei:stt. ¬e»which it must
have appeared ,ea:e¬çaas. s} .e»eataea,a«esae«aeta.a,eitaei:st
e:eate:saaca:eaete»eaass. a,aite:tae¬ ( 1 58 ¸¬ec.iec}, .
ue:e.tae"in which it must have appeared" e|ea:|y:e»ea| suasse:| s
.ateat. eaaacsa¬saçtaeseaseei e»e:y:ecaet. ea1a. s"must " ,aa»e
aççea:ec,¬a:|staeaeeess.tyae«:eee,a.zecaact.¬e| ess| yass.,aec
teaçastiaeteiaae.cet.eç:e· se:.çt.eaaaceiaaaç:.e:.ae:¬ i eaa
state ta.s »a|ae ei aeeess.ty .aceçeaceat|y ei a|| iaetaa| ee,a.t.ea .
He:ee»e:. ta.s .s a cea||e aeeess.ty .t .s taat ei a Quod aac a
Quomodo, aaeeess.ty eihaving had a a.ste:.ea|origin aaceiaa».a,
aacsuch aae:.,.a.saeaaseaseeie:.,. a. nataa.::ecae.||ea.ste:.e. ty
.s:eee,a. zec.ataatta.s must" .saaaeaaeecea|yafter taeiaeteitae
e»eat .i eea|caetceiaetaeaeeessa:yseaseaactaeaeeess.tyeitae
�� Thi s notion of "must , " of apriori requi si te, concerning H past is frequently util ized i n
the Origin. It marks the possibility of a recurrent structural determination i n the absence
50
Jacques Derrid
e:.,.a|eie:e,eemet:y«asin fact |eoaac|eie:e.taac.a iaet|eea
,.veateme. ~|se|ate|yi:ee«.ta:esçeette«aa|.t,eveos. tae|a«·
ia| aesseisease. saeta.a,.a.tse|i
~|se. aacsecond, «aateve:in fact taei:stç:ecaeece:c.seeve:ec
,eemet:.ea|. cea|.t.es«e:e . .t.sa priori aeeessa:ytaattaeyie||e«ec
i:em ase:teiaea·,eemet:y. taattaey sç:aa, i:emtae se.| eiç:e·
,eemet:.ea|esçe:.eaee~çaeaemeae|e,yeitaeesçe:.eaee.sçess.||e
taaa|stea:ecaet.eaaacteaaaçç:eç:.atece·sec. meatat.ea
Third, aac | aa| |y. «aeeve:in fact tae | :st ,eemete:s «e:e . aac
«aateve:in fact taeemç. :.ea| eeateateitae.:aets«as . .t. sa pror
aeeessa:y taat tae esta||.sa.a, ,esta:es aac a sease . saea taat
,eemet:y . ssaeci:emtaemwith the sense as we now know it. re:. ei
eea:se . tae :eaet.vat.a,:ecaet.ea saççesestae.te:at.ve:ecaet.eaei
taestat.eaacst:aeta:a|aaa| ys. s.«a.eateaeaesa s eaeeaacie:a||«aat
tae ,eemet:.ea| çaeaemeaea .s aac «aea .ts çess.|.| . ty .s eeast.·
tatec. 1a.smeaas-|yaaeeess.ty«a.ea.sae|esstaaaaaaee.ceata|
aaceste:.e:iate-taatimaststa:t«.ta:eacy·mace,eemet:y.saeaas
.t . s ae« . ae. :ea|at.ea aac «a.eai eaa a|«ays çaeaemeae|e,.ea||y
:eac..ae:ce:te,e|ae|ta:ea,a. taac¡aest.eataeseaseei.tse:.,. a.
1aas . |eta taaa|s te aac cesç.te tae sec.meatat.eas . i eaa:este:e
a.ste:yte.tst:ac.t.eaa|c.açaaae.ty.uasse:|ae:esçea|seiRuckfrage,
aaet.eaaecea|tea::eateaea,a .|at«a.eaae«ta|eseaasaa:çaac
ç:ee.se sease. weaavet:aas|atec. t|yretur inquir (question en re­
tour) . i.|e. tsCe:maasyaeaym.:eta:a.a¡a.:y,aacquestion en retour
as«e| |· .sma:|ec|ytaeçesta|aaceç.ste|a:y:eie:eaeee::eseaaaee
eiaeemmaa.eat.eai:emac. staaee i.|eRuckfrage, :eta:a. a¡a. :y.s
as|ec ea tae |as.s eia i:st çest.a,. r:em a :eee.vec aac already
:eaca||edocument, taeçess.|.|.ty.seae:ecmeeias|.a,a,a.a.aacin
return, a|eattaeç:. me:c.a|aaciaa| .ateat.eaei«aataas|eea,. vea
me|yt:ac.t.ea.1ae|atte:.«a.ea. seo|ymec.aey.tse|iaaceçeaaesste
ate|eeemmaa.eat.ea. a,eae:a| .. staea.asuasse:|says. eçea. te
eeat. aaec.a¡a.:y ( 1 58) .
1aeseaaa|e,.es. taemetaçae:.ea|ieeaseiea:test. eeai:mat«aat
çe.at.s:e¡a. :ectae"zigzag" «ayeiç:eeeec.a,-aç:eeeca:etaattae
of every material determi nati on. And if thi s apriori normativity of hi story is recognized
starting from the fact , after the fact, thi s after i s not the i ndication of a dependence. The
fact does not teach us through its factual content but as an example. It i s due to thi s
qfters own specifc character, in the necessity of preserving transcendence or reduced
factuality as clue , that the parti cular hi storicity of phenomenological di scourse is
announced.
51
Introduction to the Origin ofGeometry
Crisis ç:eçesesas ase:teiaeeessa:y "circle "":l aac«a.e|.s ea|yt|e
ça:eie:meieve:ya.ste:.ea|esçe:.eaee
xeta:a. a¡a. :y. tae:eaet.eaa:yaactae:eie:e:eve| at.eaa:ymeaeat
ei ta. s .ate:ç|ay ( Wechselspiel) , «ea|c |e . mç:aet.ea|| e .i,eemet:y
«e:e esseat.a||y semeta.a, «a.ea eeat.aaa||y e.:ea| atec as eemmea
ee.a.ataeva|.c.tyei.cea|.ty. tacea|t-c|y.aeme:etaaatae|. ste:y
ei.tst:aasm.ss.ea,:eaacstaeva|aeei,e|c.·eaaaay«e:c|ya.ste:y
,.vetae seaseeita.se.:ea|at.eaaseemmeaee.a. s.aee . ea tae eea·
t:a:y. a. ste:y saççeses. t xatae:. taema.ateaaaeeeita.se. :ea|at.ea
çe:m.tstaeaeat:a| .zat.eaei«e:|c|ya.ste:y. Neat:a| . zat.eataeaeçeas
taesçaeeie:aa.ateat.eaa|aac. at:.as.ea.ste:yeita. sve:ye.:ea|at.ea
aacçe:m.tstaeeemç:eaeas.eaeiae«at:act.eaeit:ata.sçess. ||e.a
,eae:a| . iasae:t.«aatseemste|eeiatmest. mçe:taaeeteuasse:|.s
asmaeaaaeçe:at.ea,:eaet.vat.ea.tse|iastaea|.|.tyteeçeaaa.ccea
a.ste:.ea| ie|c· as tae aata:e eitaat ie|c .tse|i,astae çess.|.|.ty ei
semeta.a,| .|e:eaet.vat.ea·
1aas ea|yaace:taeeeve:eistat.eçaeaemeae|e,y s :ecaet.easeaa
«ema|eetae:.aia.te|yme:e sa|t|eaacaaza:ceas :ecaet.eas. «a.ea
y.e|c |eta tae s.a,a|a: esseaees ei . ast.tat.ve aets aac. .a tae.:
esemç|a:y«e|.tae«ae|eseaseeiaaeçeaa. ste:y.a,eae:a| w.taeat
taeWechselspiel eita.s cea||e:ecaet.ea. tae çaeaemeae|e,y eia.s·
te:.e.ty«ea|c|eaaese:e.se. avaa.ty.as«ea|c|ea||çaeaemeae|e,y.
ii«eta|eie:,:aatectaeça.|eseça.ea|aeaseaseeiaça:e|yemç.:.ea|
a. ste:yaactae. mçeteaeeeiaaaa.ste:.ea|:at.eaa| .sm.taea«e:ea|.ze
taese:.easaessei«aat.satsta|e
III
~||taeseç:eeaat.easaavemaceasseas.t.vete taeest:emec.mea|ty
ei tae tas| 1aas uasse: aace:see:es tae ç:e|.m. aa:y aac ,eae:a|
eaa:aete:eita. smec.tat.ea. aaseateaee«a.eaaççea:s|e::e«ec«e:c
` "Thus we fnd oursel ves i n a sort of circle. The understanding of the begi nni ngs i s to
be gained ful l y onl y by starting with science as gi ven i n its present-day form, looking back
at its development. But in the absence of an understanding of the beginnings the
development i s mute as a development ofsense. Thus we have no other choice than to
proceed forward and backward in a ' zigzag' pattern . . . " (§91 , p. 58 [modifed]) .
¯ [ Derrida puts the phrase "pas plus que I ' hi storie de sa transmi ssion ne fonde la
valeur de I ' or" in quotations . I have been unable to locate thi s phrase, and Professor
Derrida himself does not remember from what i t is taken. It might simpl y be an adapta­
tion of the l ast phrase quoted from Ideas I on p. 43 above. ]
I
52
Jacques Derrida
ie: «e:ci:emFormal and Transcendental Logic ,i at:ecaet.ea, ç. 6) :
1a. s :eta:a . a¡a.:y aaave.ca||y :ema.as «.ta.a tae sçae:e ei,ea·
e:a|. t.es , |at , as«esaa| | seeasee,taesea:e,eae:a| . t.es«a.eaeaa|e
:.ea|yesç|.eatec . . . " ( 1 58 , mec.iec},
Dea|t|ess, as aç:.e:. cete:m.aat.ea, çaeaemeae|e,y «. | | aeve: |e
a||eteea:.eataese,eae:a| .t.es , «aese.ac.,eaee.sesseat.a| .~actaey
«.|| |e :.ea|yesç|.eatec ea|y .aaç:esçeet.ve, :e,.eaa| , aac, .aa
ee:ta.a sease, naive sty|eei«e:|. natta. saa.vet- «ea|cae |ea,e:
aave tae sease .tasecte aavebefore tae sease·.avest.,at.eaeitaese
,eae:a|.t.es . asease·.avest.,at.eataatuasse:|te:msae:.t.e. smaac
«a.ea«.||aave a:e,a| at.veaacae:mat.ve va|aeie:ta. s«e:|. Cea·
t.aaa||yea| | . a,as|ae|tetaeaaaet.eecç:esaççes.t.easeieve::eea:·
:.a,ç:e||ems, sease·.avest.,at.ea«. | | |eeçasi:ema|e::at.ea,ie:,et·
ia|aess, aac . ::esçeas.|.| .ty. ii se.eaee, «.ta :ac.ea| :esçeas.|. | .ty,
aas :eaeaec cee.s.eas, taey eaa .mç:ess ea | .ie aa|.taa| ae:ms as
ve| .t.eaa||eats,asç:ece|.aeatecie:ms«.ta. a«a.eatae.ac.v.caa|cee.·
s.easea,at. aaayeaseteeeaiaetaemse| ves, aaceaaeeaiaetaem·
se| vesseia:astaeseaa.ve:sa|cee. s.easaave|eeemeaetaa| | yaçç:e·
ç:.atec. re:a:at.eaa|ç:aet.ee, taee:yaç:.e:.eaa|eea|yace| .m.t.a,
ie:m..teaaea|yç|aatieaees, taee:ess.a,ei«a.ea. ac.eatesa|sa:c.ty
e:a|e::at.ea (FTL, ç. 6) .
1ae | :st ei taese :ac.ea| ,eae:a| .t.es .s ç:ee.se|y taat «a.ea aa·
tae:. zestae:eta:a.a¡a.:y. taeaa.tyei,eem
¸
t:y s sease .staateia
t:ac.t.ea. Ceemet:y s ceve|eçmeat .s ahistor ea| y |eeaase .t .s a
a. ste:y. ue«eve:ia:. ts|a.|c.a,açç:e,:esses, ae«eve:,eae:eastae
ç:e| .ie:at.eaei.tsie:msaacmetame:çaesesmay|e .taeyceaetea||
a,a.a.ate¡aest.eataeaa.iecseaseei«aat, .ata.sceve| eçmeat ,.ste
|etaea,ateiasthe ,eemet:.ea|se.eaee .1ae,:eaaceita.saa.ty.stae
«e:|c .tse|i. aet as tae ia.te teta| .ty ei seat.eat |e.a,s , |at as tae
.aia.teteta|.tyeiçess.||eesçe:.eaees.asçaee.a,eae:a| .1aeaa.tyei
the ,eemet:.ea|se.eaee .«a.ea. sa| se.tseaeaess, . saeteea| aectetae
systemat.eeeae:eaeeeia ,eemet:y«aeseas.emsa:ea|:eacyeeast.·
tatec. .tsaa. ty. staateiat:ac.t.eaa|,eemet:.ea|sease. aia.te|yeçea
tea||its own :eve|at.eas . 1eçesetae¡aest.eaeita. st:ac.t.eaa|aa.ty. s
teas|eaese|i.ae«, historically, aavea||,eemet:. es|eea,e:«. | | taey
|e,,eemet:.es :
ra:tae:me:e,ta. saa.tyei ,eemet:y s sease, saeaas . t . s announced
.ataeOrigin, . saeta ,eae:a|eeaeeçttaat. sest:aetec e:a|st:aetec
i:em va:.eas|ae«a,eemet:. es . Oataeeeat:a:y, .t. staeç:.me:c. a|
eeae:eteesseaeeei,eemet:ytaatma|essaeaa,eae:a|.z.a,eçe:at.ea
çess.||e . Ne:.sta.ssease·aa.tyte|e eeaiasec«.tataeeeaeeçttaat
uasse:|in fact cete:m.aecastae. cea|e:.eat.a,,eemet:.ea|ç:aet.ee. a
53
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometry
,eemet:y s objective taemat.eie|c ·1a.seeaeeçt,a|:eacyma:|ec|y
a.ste:y, .s,as«e|ae«,taateia"defnite" aeme|e,yaacaaesaaas·
t. vececaet. v.ty.·sta:t.a,i:emasystemeias.ems«a.ea ,eve:as a
ma|t.ç|.e.ty,eve:yç:eçes.t.ea.scete:m.aa||eeither asaaa|yt.eeease·
¡aeaeeor asaaa|yt.eeeat:ac.et.ea. ··1aat«ea|c|eaaa|te:aat.ve«e
eea|caet,et|eyeac.saeaeeaiceaeec.caetaave|ea,te«a.t|eie:e
|e.a,eeat:ac.etec. .aceec.ts va|ae:a|. |.tyaas|eea«e||sae«a, ça:·
t.ea|a:|y«aea Cece|c. seeve:ectae :.ea çess.|.| .tyei"undecidable"
ç:eçes.t.eas.a 1 93 1 .
nata|| tae¡aest.easa|eattaeçess. |.|.tye:. mçess. |. |. ty eima.a·
ta.a. a,uasse:| s cemaacs~e.tae:asaaesseat.a||y. aaeeess.||e:e,a·
| at.ve.cea|e:asametaece|e,.ea|:a| eaacaetaa|teeaa.¡ae,«a.eaae
| ea,e:. a,eae:a|seemsçess.||e,~a:etaeyaetas|ecç:ee.se|ywithin
ta.saa.tyeitae,eemet:.ee·mataemat.ea|ae:.zea.a,eae:a| ,«. ta.atae
eçeaaa.tyeiase.eaee:~ac.t.s«.ta.ataeae:.zeataatuasse:|ae:e
¡aest.eastaattaeç:eeeeaçat.ea«.tacee. ca|. | . ty|e|ea,s . | a.tsve:y
ae,at. v.ty, taeaet.eaeitaeaa·cee.ca||e~aça:ti:emtaeiaettaat .t
ea| y aas saea a sease |y seme .::ecae.||e :eie:eaee te tae .cea| ei
cee. ca|.| .ty·~a|se :eta.as a mataemat.ea| va|ae ce:.veci:em se¬e
aa.¡aesea:eeeiva|aevaste:taaataeç:e]eeteidefniteness .tse|i.1a. s
«ae|ece|ate. sea| yaace:staaca||e«. ta. asemeta.a,|.|ethe ,eemet·
:.ea|e:mataemat.ea|se.eaee, «aeseaa.ty.sst.||to come eatae|as.sei
«aat. saaaeaaeec .a.tse:.,.a. waateve:may|etae:esçeaseseea·
t:.|atec|ytaeeç. steme|e,.ste:|ytaeaet.v.tyeitaese.eat.| e.aves·
´�On the two ' ' faces" of science' s thematic and the objecti ve character of the thematic
on which the sci entifc researcher i s excl usi vel y focused in his activity as researcher. cf.
FTL, §9, pp. 36-38. "Thus the geometer . . . wi l l not think of explori ng, besides geomet­
rical shapes, geometrical thi nking" (p. 36) .
``On these questions, cf. i n particular Jean Cavai l l es, Sur f a Logique et f a theorie de fa
science (Pari s: Presses Uni versitaires de France, 1 947) , pp. 70f. : Tr�m-Duc-Th{,
Phenomenofogie, p. 35 : and especi al l y S. Bachel ard, A Study ofHusserl' s Logic [Part I ,
Ch. 3] . pp. 43-63.
´´ Thi s i deal is cl early defi ned by Husserl , notably in the LI, I , Pro! . , §70, pp. 24 1 and
243, before a section in which the relations of the phi losopher and the mathematician are
defned: in Ideas I. §72, pp. 1 87-88: and in FTL. §3 1 , pp. 94-97.
`' Moreover, that the anal yses of the Origin concerning the synthetic style of mathe­
matical tradition serve as an example of tradition i n general is thus confrmed. The very
movement whi ch enriches sense retains a sedimentary reference to the antecedent sense
at the bottom of the new sense and cannot di spense with i t . The intention which grasps
the new sense is original i nsofar as the prior project stil l remains and the i ntention wi l l
si mpl y not "gi ve way" to i t. Thus, undecidabi l i ty has a revolutionary and di sconcerti ng
sense, i t i s itsel onl y if i t remains essentially and intrinsically haunted i n its sense of
origin by the te/os of decidabi l i ty-whose di sruption i t marks.
54
Jacques Derrid
t.,ate:tetaese.mçe:taat.at:a·mataemat.ea|¡aest.easeiceia.teaess
aac eemç|eteaess. taey eaa ea|y|e.ate,:atec. ate ta.saa. ty eitae
mataemat.ea|t:ac.t.ea«a.ea.s¡aest.eaec. ataeOrigin. ~actaey«. ||
aeve:eeaeeo. .a tae e|]eet.ve taemat.e sçae:e eise.eaee «ae:e
taeymastexe|as.ve|y:ema.a. aayta.a,|attae cete:m.aecaata:e ei
taeax.emat.esystemsaaceitaececaet.ve.ate:eeaaeet.eastaattaey
cee:ceaetaatae:.ze natt|ee|]eet.vetaemat.eie|ceimataemat.es
masta|:eacy|eeeast.tatec.a.tsmataemat.ea|sease ..ae:ce:ie:tae
va|aeseieease¡aeaee aac. aeeas.steaeyte|e:eace:ecç:e||emat.e.
aac .a e:ce:te|ea||etesay.a,a.asttae e|ass.eam:mat.easeiuas·
se:| . "tertium datur. " ·
Cease¡aeat|y.. itaee:.,.aeimataemat.esaactaeaa.tyei.tssease
«e:e .auasse:| s eyes esseat.a||yt.ecte ta. s.cea|eiexaaast.vece·
caet.v.ty.aacevea .itaey«e:e .ceat.ea|«.tata.s. cea| .taeOrigin' s
¡aest.ea«ea|c|eta.atecattaeeatset|yaee:ta.aa.ste:.ea|:e|at. v. ty.
aematte:«aatuas se:|a. mse|imay|avetaea,ata|eatta. s:e|at.v.ty
aaccesç.te«aateve:.ate:est.tmayst.||ae|cassae| iaetae:«e:cs.
.itaeç:.me:c.a|aeteia:eaac.a,taatuasse:|«.saestee|.e.t[solliciter ;
ae:e«astae.ast.tat.eaeiaaax.emat.eaaccecaet.veie|ce:eveatae
.ast.tat.eaeiax.ema t.esaactae. cea|eicecaet.v.ty.a,eae:a|-aac.i
ta.s. ast.tat.ea «as cese:. |ec as taat eimataemat.es. tse|i-taeatae
uasse:|.aaç:e]eet«ea|c |e se:.eas|yt|:eateaec|y tae eve|at.eaei
+x.emat. z. at.eate«a:cateta|ie:ma|.zat.ea«. ta. a«a.eaeaeaeeessa:·
.|yeemesaça,a.asttae|.m.tsstatec|yCece| staee:em,aac:e|atec
taee:ems· natt|at. saetse Ðvea.iuasse:|ateaet.meaceçtectae
eeaeeçt.eaei,:eaac.a,ax.emat.esaaceveaç:eçesec. tastae .cea|
ie: a|| exaete.cet.ec. se.ç| . aes(Ideas I, §7, ç 56) , .tseems|eea|y
eeas.ce:ecta.ste|easecondar ,:eaac.a,1ae:e.saecea|t. . aaay
ease.t|att|e|.acseiç:. me:c.a|ev.ceaeeae.avest.,atesae:ea:eie:
+' l
Husserl wri tes i n FTL, �3 1 , p. 96: "the idea of a ' nomolofical science ' , or correla­
ti vely the idea of an infnite province (in mathematico-logical parlance , a multi pli ci ty)
goverable by an expl anatory nomology, includes the idea that there is no truth about
such a province that is not deduci bly i ncluded i n the 'fundamental l aws' of the corre­
spondi ng nomological science-just as, in the ideal Euclid, there i s no truth about space
that is not deducibly included in the ' complete' ( vollstindigen) system of space-axioms . "
Then , defi ning the "multiplicity-form in the pregnant sense, " Husserl conti nues: "Such a
multi pli ci ty-form is defi ned, not by just any formal axiom-system, but by a 'complete'
one. . . . The axiom-system formally defni ng such a mult i plicity i s di sti ngui shed by the
ci rcumstance that any proposition (proposition-form, natural l y) that can be constructed,
in accordance with the grammar of pure logi c, out of the concepts (concept-forms) occur­
i ng [sic] i n that system, i s either ' true'-that i s to say: an anal ytic (purely deducible)
consequence of the axioms-or 'false'-that is to say: an analytic contradiction-; ter­
tillm non datllr . . .
55
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
a. mç:.e:tet|eseeiax.emsaacse:veastae.:,:eaac i aiaet. «eeaa
:eac .a taeOrigin ( 1 68) : eaemasta| seta|eaeteeitaeeeast:aet.ve
aet. v.t.estaateçe:ate«.t|,eemet:.ea|.cea|.t.es«|.e||ave|eea ex·
ç| .eatec |ataet|:ea,atteç:.me:c.a|ev.ceaee ,r:. me:c.a|ev.ceaee
mastaet|eeeaiasec«. tataeev. ceaeeei ax.ems ; for axioms are in
principle the results ofprimordial sense-fashioning , s. aa|.|caa,·and al­
ways have this behind them)" ,mec.iec} .
~x.emat.es .a,eae:a|,i:em«a.e| a|eaeeve:y .cea| eiex|aast.ve
aacexaetcecaet.v.tyeaata|e.tssease .i:em«a.e|a|eaeeve:yç:e|·
|em ei cee.ca|.|.ty eaa taea sç:.a,· a|:eacy saççeses. tae:eie:e . a
sec.meatat.ea ei sease . . e . ax.emat.es saççeses a ç:.me:c.a| ev. ·
ceaee .a:ac.ea|,:eaac«a.e|. sa|:eacyçast it. staeaa|:eacyex.|ec
i:emtaee:.,.aste«|.eauasse:|ae««.saeste:eta:a
Cease¡aeat| � . .iuasse:|,i:em taeLogical Investigations teIdeas I
aac teFormal and Transcendental Logic) .aceecass.,aectae aa::e«
seaseeicee.ca|. | . tytetaeaet.eaei,eemet:.ea|cete:m.aa|.| .ty.ta.s.s
|eeaaseae|eta. mse|i|e,a.cec.aa.s aeaa.ste:.ea|.avest.,at.eas|y
taeç:eseatstateeiaready-made se.eaee natasseeaastae¡aest.eaei
e:.,.a a:.ses. ,eemet:.ea| cete:m.aa|. |.ty seems .aceec te aave tae
seaseei,eemet:.ea|cete:m.aa|.|.tyin general, astae.aia.teae:.zeaei
ase.eaee.«aateve:iata:eie:msceve|eç. waeauasse:|sçea|s.atae
:;O Our emphasi s. "Expl i cati on" ( Verdeutlichung) i s not to b confused either with
clarifcation (Klirung) or reacti vation: remai ni ng wi thi n const ituted sense, expl ication
makes that sense distinct wi thout restoring i t to its ful l clarity, i . e. , to i ts value as present
cognition, and above all without reactivating its primordi al intention. It is for reasons of
grammatical construction (the use of past or present parti ci pl es, of substanti ve or infni­
ti ve forms, etc. ) that we have kept the classic translation of Verdeutlichung as expl i ca­
tion. S. Bachel ard comments more rigorousl y on the sense of thi s notion by translating i t
as "process of di sti ngui shi ng" or "process which renders di sti nct . " On al l the problems
concerning expl i cation, clarificat ion, and reactivation of proposi tions in general . problems
to whi ch al l usi on is made i n the Origin, cf. notably FTL, § § 1 6 and 1 7, pp. 56-63, and
Appendix I I , pp. 3 1 3-29: also S. Bachelard, A Stlldy ofHusserl ' s Logic, Ch . 1 , pp. 1 4-23 .
I n his formulation of the Origin, Fi nk specifi es these di stinctions. Instead of opposing
"reacti vation" and "expl ication, " he di sti ngui shes between two moments or types of
reactivation in general: reactivation as "l ogical explication" and reactivation of the
"tradi tion of sense-formation (Sinnbildungstradition) i nternally present i n a t hemati c
sense-formation. " "When reactivation i n the first sense i s completed, when i t comes to
an end, only then does reactivation as return i nquiry concerning the ' pri mal i nstituting'
begi n" ( "Die Frage, " p. 2 1 5) . Thus, t hi s formulation confi rms and underscores the
necessary anteriority of the static analysi s and the static fi xi ng of sense, both of whi ch
must control al l genetic bearing [demarche] .
´' Geometrical determi nabi l i ty i n the broad sense would onl y be the regional and
abstract form of an i nfnite determi nability of being in general , which Husserl so often
called the ultimate horizon for every theoretical attitude and for al l phi l osophy.
. ·
{
.� · ,
56
Jacques Derrid
Origin eia ae:.zeaei,eemet:.ea|iata:e.aç:ee.se| yta. ssty| e , i ·º, .
ta.ssty|e.saettaateicecaet.».ty.|atei,eemet:ye:mataemat.es.a
,eae:a| . i:em«a.eaasyetaaca|«aystaeaacee.ca||ese:aayetae:
iata:emataemat.ea|ie:mat.ea«.||stem
1a.smeaas taat i:em ae« ea «aea .a»est.,at.a,e:.,.as. tae . cea|
.tse|ieicee.ca|.|.ty. a|ea,«.tae»e:yiaetaa| sta,eeitaea.ste:y ei
mataemat.es as saea . . sreduced; se. tee. .s eaea cete:m.aeciaetaa|
t:ac.t.ea-|y c.se|es.a, tae ça:e|y mataemat.ea| t:ac.t.ea aac ça:e
t:ac.t.eaa|.ty.a,eae:a| .1aas«eaace:staacuasse:| s :eçeatecst.ça·
|at.ea.ataeOrigin taat .eeaee:a.a,esaetse.eaees. ae.ssçea|.a,a|eat
taese·ea||ec cecaet. »ese.eaees . acc.a,.seea||ec. a|taea,ataey
|yaemeaasme:e|ycecaee , | -s, 1ae:e.staasat:ata.e::atae:a
,eemet:.ee·mataemat.ea|t:ata· sease.a,eae:a| .«a.eaceesaetçe:m.t
.tse|ite|e|eaac|ytaea|te:aat.»eei"true" e:ia|se. asç:ese:.|ec
|ytae.cea|eiace| a.tema|t.ç|.e.ty..a«a.ea"the concepts ' true' and
'formal implication of the axioms' are equivalent, aac|.|e«.sea|setae
eeaeeçts ia| se aacie:ma||y. mç|.ecastaeeççes.teeiaie:ma|. mç| .·
eat.eaeitaeas.ems (Ideas I, §72, ç | ss, 1aeaa.tyei,eemet:.ea|
t:ata sç:.me:c.a|sease.taataa.ty«a.eae:.eatstaeOrigin, eea|ctaea
|eçesec.aa¡aest.eaeita.s|.ac «aat. smataemat.ea|cete:m.aa|.|·
.ty. a,eae:a| ..itaeaacee.ca|.| .tyeiaç:eçes. t.ea.ie:esamç|e.. sst.||
amataemat.ea|cete:m.aat.ea:Ðsseat.a| | y. saeaa¡aest.eaeaaaetes·
çeetacete:m.aec:esçease, .tsaea|cea|y.ac.eatetaeça:eeçeaaess
aacaa.tyeiaa.aaa.teae:.zea
s. aeeaiaet seçae.tyeea|c|e:ecaeeci:emtae »e:y|e,.aa. a,|y
tae ç:ecaet.ea ei.cea|e|]eets. a.ste:.ea| .ate:eeaaeet.eas a:e .ate:·
eeaaeet.easeiseaseaac»a|ae. «a.ea-|yeaç.ta| .z.a,ad infnitum aac
aeee:c.a,teaae:.,.aa|mece~aaae»e:|eeçtae.:sec.meata:yce·
çes.tseateie.:ea|at.ea1aat. saçess.|.|.ty.|ataetaaeeess.ty.s.aee
tae.ate:estaactae c.mea|ty eiuasse:| s aaa|ys. s :esa|ti:em «aat
ta.saaa| ys.saee:aesea|eta ç|aaesateaee
Sometimes uasse:|eeas.ce:s,eemet:yaacse.eaee.a,eae:a|asee:·
ta.aie:msamea,etae:sei«aataeea||staeea|ta:a|«e:|c iaeaeet
taey|e::e«a||tae.:eaa:aete:.st.esi:em.t 1a. s«e:|ces.stseat.:e|y
ta:ea,at:ac.t.ea, | ·s, ~actae se.eaeesa:e ea|y semet:ac.t.eas
amea,etae:s Oatae sa|]eeteit:ac.t.ea .a,eae:a| . «e aa»e seme
aç:.e:.e».ceaeetaatae.,ae:aaeeeiiaetaa|a. ste:yeaaaace:m.ae Oa
tae eae aaac. «e |ae« «.ta a |ae«|ec,e ei aaassa.|a||e
e».ceaee-aa.mç|.e.t|ae«|ec,e«a.ea.aaa|.tsta.siaetaa||ae|
ei|ae«|ec,e.e»e:y«ae:eaacesseat.a|| y¯( I ·s,-taatea|ta:a|ie:¬a·
t.eas a|«ays :eie:te aamaaç:ecaet.eas . taea. taey :eie:te sç.:.taa|
aets.asuasse:|. mmec.ate|yeeae|aces. aame»e«a.ea«e «.||eea·
57
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
s.ce: |ate: 1a. s :eie:eaee te tae ç:ecaet.»e aet .s . ase:.|ec .a tae
ie:mat.ea.tse|i.|at.teaaçassaaaet.eeceaaeeeaateitae.cea|ie:ma·
t.ea s aateaemy ueaee tae aeeess.ty te :eea|| tae aç:.e:. |aaa| .t.es
|a:.ec |y se.eaee aac ea|ta:e � ia a s.m. |a:iasa. ea. «e |ae«taat
aamaa.tyaasaçastaactaat . i:em ta.siaet. .t.s.ataeçasttaattae
r :st.a»eate:s, | ·s,taemse| »esa:eieaac.aaca|taea,ataeyaa»e
.ast.tatec ae« sç.:.taa| ie:ms. taeyaa»e|eeaa||etece se ea|y|y
c.sçes.a, ei :a« e: a|:eacy t:ac.t.eaa| . . e . sç.:.taa||y saaçec.
mate:.a| s
natea tae etae:aaac. t:ac.t.eaa| ce»e|eçmeat . i:em «a.ea e»e:y
ea|ta:e ae¡a.:esteta|.ty at eaea memeat, .a amec.atee:.mmec.ate
syaea:eay, . cees aet aa»ea eaasa| sty|e ei,eaes. s ia tae «e:|c ei
aata:a|:ea|.tysa|]eetteaeaasa|tyçeeice»e|eçmeat.sec.meatat.ea.s
aettaateiaaae¡a.:ecseasetaat.seeat.aaa||yaac.ate:aa| |y:eeaç.ta·
|atec1ae:e. saeaata:a|a.ste:yie:uasse:|aayme:etaaaie:ue,e| .
aacie:taesame:easeas 1aeaaa|e,y«.|||ee»ea,:eate:«aea«esee
taat .ie:uasse:|asie:ue,e| .ea|ta:e.tse|i.a.ts| a.teemç.:.ea|aa.ts.s
aetsame.eatteeeast.tatetaeça:eaa.tyeiaa.ste:y 1a.s«.|||etae
ease ie:a|| aata:eçe|e,.ea|ea|ta:es «a.ea ce aet ça:t.e.çate . atae
Ða:eçeaaeidos.
ue:etaeOrigin :eçeatsuasse:| s e:.t.¡aeei D.|taey. ara.| eseçayas
x.,e:easse. eaee wa.|eeemç|ete|yaeeeçt.a,D.|taey s e:.t.e. smei
tae eaasa|.st aata:a|.zat.ea eisç.:. t aactae ç:.ae.ç|e eiaa e:.,.aa|
tyçe·me:çae|e,y eiea|ta:a| teta|.t. es. uasse:| «.saes te est:aet tae
.ceaeise.eaee,. e .a|e»ea|| .ça.|eseçay,i:emtaesa|] eet.»e.mma·
aeaeeeitaeWeltanschauung.
~sea|ta:a|ie:m.tae.ceaeise.eaee. saacea|tec|ya|seça:teitae
Weltanschauung, aactaeeeateateise.eaeeaacça.|eseçay.saacea|t·
ec|yt:aasm.ttecaeee:c.a,tetae sameç:eeessasa||etae:ie:¬s ei
ea|ta:eaact:ac.t.ea. a,eae:a| 1aeç:eeess. saaa|e,eas..iaet.ceat.ea|
te taat ei .ate:aa| t.me·eease.easaess cese:.|ec i:em tae aeemat.e
».e«çe.at.atae 1 904-1 0 |eeta:es 1aeç:eseataççea:sae.tae:astae
�açta:eae:taeeaeeteiaçast. |atastae:eteat.eaeiaç:eseatçast.
. e . astae:eteat.eaeia:eteat.ea.aacseie:ta s.aeetae:eteat.eaa|
çe«e:ei|. ».a, eease.easaess .s |a. te , ta.s eease.easaess ç:ese:»es
s.,a.ieat.eas. »a|aes. aac çast aets as aa|.taa|.t.es (habitus) aac
sec.meatat.eas 1:ac.t.eaa|sec.meatat.ea.ataeeemmaaa|«e:|c«.||
aa»etaeiaaet.eaei,e.a,|eyeactae:eteat.eaa|| a.taceei.ac. ».caa|
eease.easaess Oieea:se .sec.meata:y:eteat.ea.saetea|ytaeeeac.·
�¯ This requirement ofTrivialitit i s frequently justified by Husserl, notably i n C. §9h, p.
50.
58
Jacques Derrid
t.eaie: tae çess.|. | .tyeiç:eteat.ea. .t a|se|e|ea,sesseat.a| | yte tae
,eae:a|ie:meiç:eteat.ea. «a.ea .s .tse|ieeaee.vecaace:tae a|se·
|ate|y aa.¡ae aac aa.ve:sa| ie:m ei tae i.v.a, r:eseat 1ae | atte:.
«a. ea. staeç:.me:c.a|a|se| ateeitemçe:a|.ty..sea| ytaema.ateaaaee
ei«a+t.aceecmast|eea||ectaedialectic eiç:eteat.eaaac:eteat.ea.
cesç.te uasse:| s :eça,aaaeeie:taat «e:c ia taemevemeateiç:e·
teat.ea. tae ç:eseat . s :eta.aec aac ,eae |eyeac as çast ç:eseat . . a
e:ce:teeeast.tateanother ç:.me:c.a| aac e:.,.aa|~|se|ate. aaetae:
i. v. a,r:eseat.w.taeatta.sest:ae:c.aa:ya|se|atea|te:at.eaei«aat
a|«ays:ema.as.ataeeeae:eteaac|.vecie:meiaaa|se|ater:eseat .
«.taeatta. s a|«ays:eae«ece:.,.aa| .tyeiaaa|se| ateç:. me:c.a| .ty.
a|«aysç:eseataaca|«ays|.vecassaea .aea. ste:y«ea|c|eçess.||e
~| se. «aat.st:aeeitaei.v.a,r:eseat.st:aeei«aatsaççeses.tas.ts
,:eaac.taea. ste:.eç:eseat .tae|atte:a|«ays:eie:sme:ee:|ess. mme·
c.ate|y te tae teta|.ty eia çast «a.ea . aaa|. ts . taac «a.ea a|«ays
aççea:saace:tae ,eae:a| ie:m eiaproject . ~t eve:y memeat eaea
a.ste:.eteta|.ty. saea|ta:a|st:aeta:eaa.matec|yaç:e]eet«a.ea.saa
.cea 1aas " Weltanschauung, tee. .saa .cea ,rxs . ç 1 35) .
natat other times, eatae eeat:a:y. uasse:|cese:. |es se.eaeeas a
aa.¡ae aac a:eaetyça| ie:m ei t:ac.t.eaa| ea|ta:e. nes. ces a|| tae
eaa:aete:.st.es taat .t aas .a eemmea «.ta etae:ea|ta:a|ie:mat.eas.
se.eaee e|a.msaaesseat.a| ç:.v.|e,e . . t cees aet çe:m. t . tse|it e|e
eae| esec.aaaya. ste:.ea||ycete:m.aecea| ta:eassaea.ie:.taastae
aa.ve:sa|va| . c.tyeitruth. ~saea|ta:a|ie:m«a.ea. saetç:eçe:teaay
ce iaete ea|ta:e. tae . ceaei se.eaee .s tae . aces eiça:e ea|ta:e .a
,eae:a| . .tces.,aates ea|ta:e s eidos par excellence. iata.s sease . tae
ea|ta:a|ie:m se.eaee ,ei«a.ea,eemet:y .s eaeesamç|e, .s . tse|i
esemç|a:y .ataecea||eseaseeita. s«e:c.e. cet.eaacte|ee|e,. ea|
.t.staeça:t.ea|a:esamç|e«a.ea,a.cestaee. cet.e:ecaet.eaaac.ata.·
t.ea.|at.ta|se.staeesamç|eaacmece|«a.eamaste:.eatea|ta:eas
.ts . cea| . se.eaee . s tae . ceaei«aat . i:em tae i:st memeat ei.ts
ç:ecaet.ea.mast|et:aea|«aysaacie:eve:yeae.|eyeaceve:y,.vea
ea|ta:a|a:ea. i t. stae.aia.teeidos eççesectetaeia.te.cea|«a.ea
aa.matestaeWeltanschauung:
Weltanschauung, too, is an "idea, " but ofa goal lying in the fnite , in
principle to be realized in an individual lie by way ofconstant
approach . . . . The "idea" ofWeltanschauung i consequently a
dif erent one for each time. . . . The " idea" ofscience, on the
contrar, is a supratemporal one, and here that means limited by no
relatedness to the spirit ofone time. . . . Science is a title standing for
absolute, timeless values. Every such value, once discovered, belongs
59
Introduction to the Origin ofGeometr
thereafter to the treasure trove ofall succeeding humanity and
obviously determines likewise the material contel1t ofthe idea of
culture, wisdom, Weltanschauung, as well as ofWeltanschauung
philosophy. (Ibid. , pp. 135-36)
iaaaea·cese:.çt.veça:ese. eaee .taemeceeisec.meatat.ea. ssaea
taataes.,a.ieat.eaeeasestee.:ea|ateataaymemeataaceaaa|«ays
|e:eeeaee.vecaac:ea«a|eaec. a.tse.:ea|at.ea. ii. t«asaeeessa:y
taea te c.st.a,a.sa |et«eea aata:a| :ea| .ty aac sç.:.taa| ea|ta:e. «e
mast ae« c.se:.m.aate. .a e:ce: te aace:staac ça:e ea| ta:e aac
t:ac.t.eaa| .ty. a,eae:a| .|et«eeaemç.:.ea|ea|ta:eaactaateit:ata i a
etae:«e:cs. |et«eeaceiaete a.ste:.ea| ea|ta:e.eataeeae aaac. . a
«a.ea sease·sec.meatat.ea cees aet ese| ace tae iaet taat va| .c.ty
,«a.ea. s:eetec.aa|aa,aa,e.te::a. a. eçeea. aacseie:ta·eaa|eeeme
catec[eremption] , aaceataeetae:aaac. taeea| ta:eeit:ata.«aese
. cea|.ty.sa|se|ate| yae:mat.ve. Necea|t. tae|atte:«ea|c|einfact
. mçess.||e«.taeattaeie:me:nateataeeaeaaac. taeea|ta:eeit:ata
. staea.,aestaacmest.::-cae.|| eçess. |. | .tyeiemç.:.ea|ea|ta:e .ea
taeetae:aaac. taeea| ta:e eit:ata . s. tse| iea| ytaeçess.|.| . ty eia
reduction eiemç.:.ea|ea|ta:e aac .smaa.iestecte. tse|iea| yta:ea,a
saeaa:ecaet.ea.a:ecaet.ea«a. eaaas|eeemeçess.|| e|yaa.::aç·
t. eaeitae. aia.teasa:eve|at.ea«.ta.aemç.:.ea|ea| ta:e
~ttae same t.me. tae ea|ta:e aact:ac.t.ea eitaetruth a:eeaa:ae·
te:.zec |y a ça:aces.ea| a.ste:.e.ty ia eae sease. taey eaa aççea:
c. sea,a,eci:ema||a.ste:y.s.aeetaeya:eaet. at:.as.ea| |yaaeetec|y
taeemç. :.ea|eeateatei:ea|a.ste:yaac|ycete:m. aecea|ta:a|.ate:·
eeaaeet.eas 1a.semaae.çat.eaeaa|eeeaiasec«.taa|:ea|.a,i:em
a.ste:y.a,eae:a| re:taese«aeeeaiaetaemse| vestea.ste:.ea|iaeta·
a| .ty. as «e|| asie:taese«ae eae|esetaemse| ves . atae .cea| .ty ei
va| . c.ty.taeaa::at.eaeitaet:ataeaaea| yaavetaea. ste:.ee:. ,.aa| .tyei
myta
nat.aaaetae:sease.eaetaatee::esçeacsteuasse:| s . ateat.ea.tae
t:ac.t.eaeit:ata.staemestç:eieaacaacça:esta. ste:yOa| ytaeça:e
aa.ty ei saea a t:ac.t.ea s sease .s açt te esta||. sa ta. s eeat.aa. ty.
i aceec. «. taeatta. saeaataeat.ea.ste:y«ea|c|etaea,ate:ç:e]eetec
assaea. tae:e«ea|cea|y|eaaemç.:.ea|a,,:e,ateei| a.teaacaee.·
ceata| aa.t s ~s seea as çaeaemeae| e,y |:ea|s i:e¬ |eta eea·
veat. eaa| r|atea. sm aac a. ste:. e.st emç.:.e. sm. tae mevemeat ei
`´´ As Husserl had already stressed in the LI (I, I , §32, p. 3 3 1 ) , ideality i s not always
normative. Validity is a higher ideality which can or cannot be attached to ideality i n
general. We wi ll see this much later: the sense of error has i ts own particular i deality.
60
Jacques Derrid
i :aiaiaai.i«.saesiecese:.|e.s :ea||yiaaieiaeeae:eieaacsçee. ie
a. sie:y-iae ieaacai.eas ei «a.ea a:e a iemçe:a| aac e:eai.ve sa|·
]eei. v.iy s aei s|aseceaiaeseas.||e«e:|caaciae|.ie·«e:|casea| ia:a|
«e:|c.
1a.s ç:e,:ess .s |:ea,ai a|eai |y iae çe:maaeai ieia|.zai.ea aac
:eçei.i.eaei.isae¡a. s.i.eas . Ceemei:y. s|e:aeaieiafrst ae¡a.s.·
i.ea.eaieii:sie:eai.veaei.v.i.es .weaace:siaac. isçe:s.si.a,maaae:
ei|e.a,. .i. saeiea|yame|.|eie:«a:cç:eeessi:emeaeseieiae¡a. s. ·
i.easi eaaeiae:|aia eeai.aaeas syaiaes.s. a«a.ea a||ae¡a. s. i.eas
ma.aia.aiae.:va|.c.iy.a||ma|eaçaieia|.iysaeaiaai .aieve:yç:eseai
sia,e. iaeieia|ae¡a.s.i.ea .s. se ie sçea|. iae ieia| ç:em.se ie: iae
ae¡a.s.i.eas eiiae ae« |eve| . . . . 1ae sameia.a,. si:ae eieve:y
se.eaee ( 1 59) .
iei as aace:siaac ia. s as i:ae ei eve:y aea·cese:.çi.ve se. eaee .
1aese syaiaeses ce aei eeea: .a a çsyeae|e,.ea| meme:y. ae«eve:
ee||eei. ve. |ai :aiae: .a iaai "rational memor" se ç:eieaac| y ce·
se:.|ec|yCasieanaeae|a:c.ameme:y|aseceaa"recurrent fruitul­
ness, " «a.eaa|eae .seaça||eeieeasi.iai.a,aac:eia.a.a,iae"events
of reason. " · ia a.sPhilosophy of Arithmetic, uasse:|a|:eacy c.si.a·
,a.saec |ei«eea çsyeae|e,.ea| iemçe:a|.iy as saeeess. veaess ,«aai
uamecese:.|ec,aaciaeiemçe:a|.iyeiiaesyaiaei.e. aie:eeaaeei.eas
eisease. ue eeai.aaecieesç|.eaieia. sc.ne:eaee . aac.aiaeOrigin
( 1 66) aeemçaas.zesiaaiase.eai.iesia,e.saeiea|yasease«a.ea.a
iaei eemes|aie:. |aiiae . aie,:ai.eaeiiae «ae| eea:| . e: sease. aa
ae«ç:e]eei.
Ð,e|e,.ea|sa|]eei.v.iyeaaaei|e:esçeas.||eie:ia. sceve|eçmeai .
«a.ea.seeai.aaa||yieia|. zec.aaaa|se|aier:eseai.Oa| yaeemmaaa|
sa|]eei. v.iyeaa ç:ecaeeiaea.sie:.ea| sysiemeii:aiaaac|e«ae||y
:esçeas.||eie:.i.ue«eve:.ia. sieia|sa|]eei.v.iy.«aeseaa.iymasi|e
a|se|aieaaca priori ,eiae:«.seeveaiaes|.,aiesii:aia«ea| c|eaa·
. ma,.aa||e, .s |ai iae eemmeaç|aee eia|| e,e|e,.ea| sa|]eei.v. i. es.
«aeiae:aeiaa||yç:eseaie:çess.||e. «aeiae:çasi. ç:eseai.e:iaia:e.
«aeiae:|ae«ae:aa|ae«a. Ðve:yse.eaee. s:e|aiecieaaeçeaeaa.a
eiiae ,eae:ai.eas eiiaese «ae «e:|ie:aac «.iaeae aaeiae:. :e·
sea:eae:se.iae:|ae«ae:aa|ae«aieeaeaaeiae:«aeæeiae ç:e·
caei. vesa|]eei.v.iyeiiaeieia||. v. a,se.eaee ( 1 59 ,mec|iec}, .
s.aeeiae ieia|.iyeise. eaee.s eçea. iae aa. ve:sa|eemmaa|iya|se
aasiaeaa.iyeiaae:.zea.ra:iae:me:e.iae. ma,eeiiae eçeaeaa|a
cees aeiesaaasiiae ceçia eiia.seemmaaa| sa|]eei. v.iy. re: |iaei
,'4 Cf. in particular Le Rationalisme applique, 4th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1 970), pp. 2 and 42-46.
61
1 ntroduction to the Origin ofGeometr
ea| yaasiaeaa.iyei.aie::e|aieaaess aac ee·:esçeas.|.| .iy-eaea. a·
vesi.,aie:aeiea| yiee| sa. mse|itied to a| |iaeeiae:s|yiaeaa.iyeiaa
e|]eeie:ias|-|aiiae. avesi.,aie: se«asa|]eei.v.iy.seeasi.iaiec|y
iae.ceae:ae:.zeaeiia. sieia|sa|]eei.v.iy«a.ea.smace:esçeas. || e
.aaacia:ea,aa. mie:eaeaeia. saeisasase.eai.ie.avesi.,aie:. ia
aacia:ea,aa.m.iaaimeaas«.iaeai|e.a,sa|si.iaiecie:a. m. |eeaase.
ai iaesamei.me.ae:ema. asiaea|se| aie e:. ,. a. iaeeeasi.iai.a,aacç:es·
eaisea:eeeii:aia. raeaemeae| e,.ea| |y.iaei:aaseeaceaia|we .saei
something other iaaaiae i:aaseeaceaia|Ego . 1ae |aiie: s aei· .e»ea
«aeaiaeyseemmaacaiec|yaa.cea|eemmaa.iy.ceaeieeaseie|e. ::e·
cae.|| yiaeseeiameaac.e"[ think" -ie«a.ea.isameesie:ecaeeiae
emç. :.ea|e,e| e,.ea|eeaieaieiiaeego .ae:ce:iec.seeve:iaec.mea·
s.eaeiiae"we" asamemeaieiiaeeidos "ego. Oae«ea|c. aceec
|eiemçiecieia.a|iaai.i. siaewe iaaima|esçess.|| eiae:ecaei.eaei
iae emç.:.ea|ego aac iae eme:,eaee eiiaeeidos "ego, " .isaea aa
ayçeiaes.sc.caei| eac. a,a.asiuasse:| s mesiesç|.e.i.aieai.eas. ie
ç|ae.a, iae e,e|e,.ea|meaac.aa|si:aei:e|ai.eaie iaeieia|sa|]ee·
i.v.iy. ia aay ease. .iiae:e .s a a. sie:y eii:aia . .ieaa ea| y|e ia.s
eeae:eie .mç|.eai.eaaacia.s:ee.ç:eea|eave|eçmeaieiieia| .i.esaac
a|se|aies . 1a. s. sçess.||eea| y|eeaase«ea:ecea|.a,«.ia.cea|aac
sç.:.iaa| . mç|. eai. eas. 1ae cese.. çi.ea eiiaese i«e eaa:aeie:. si. es.
. cea|.i,aacsç.:.iaa| .i,. sei:e¡aeai|,evesec.aiaeOrigin, ceesaei
ee::esçeac. as«esae«.ieaa,meiaça,s.ea|asse:i.ea taacc. i. eaie
«a.ea. iae,a:e"founded" .aiaeseaseeiFundierung.
1ae.::ecae.||ea.sie:.e.iyei,eemei:.ea||eeem.a,. seaa:aeie:.zec
|yiaeiaeiiaaiiaetotal seaseei,eemei:y ,aac.isaeeessa:yaeei.e
ee::e|aie .ieia|sa|]eei.v.iy,eea|caeiaave|eeaç:eseaiasaç:e]eei
aaciaeaasme|.|eia|i||meaiaiiae|e,.aa.a,( ] 59) . iiiaea.sie:yei
,eemei:y«e:eea|yiaeceve|eçmeaieiaça:çese«ae||yç:eseaii:em
iae |e,.aa.a,. «e «ea|c aave ie cea| ea|y «.ia aa esç|.eai.ea e:a
¡aas.·e:eai.ea. we «ea|c aaveea eae s. ce a syaea:ea.ee: i.me|ess
[uchronique p6 ,:eaacaac.eaiaeeiae:s.ce.aça:e| yemç. :. ea|c.aea·
:eay «.ia .is . ac. eai. veiaaei.ea|ai«.iaeaiaayç:eçe:aa.iy ei.is
e«a.Ne. iae:ça:ec.aea:enyae:ça:esyaea:eayma|eaa. sie:y.1ae
´´Then begins the formidable difculties grappled with in the ffth of the Cartesian
Meditations, and into which we do not want to enter here.
´´[Derrida wants to suggest by the word uchronie a temporality akin to the spatiality of
utopia. We should also note Derrida' s use of the roots "temporalite" and "chronie" in
various words: panchronie and uchronie versus omnitemporalite and intemporalite (as
�ell as synchronie, diachronie, and anachronie) . When uchronie occurs again on p. 73 , i t
lb translated as intemporality. ]
· |
I
¸ * |
·
i
J
62
Jacques Derrda
:e]eetec ayçetaes.s .s eaee ¬e:e taat ei a ee¬ç| .e.ty -et«eea
r|atea.s¬aace¬ç.:.e.s¬
~sa¬atte:eiiaet. evea-eie:etaeçess.-.|.tyeitaeeçeaç:e]eetei
,ee¬et:y. a ¬e:eç:.¬.t.veie:¬at.eaeisease(Sinnbildung) aeeessa:·
.|y«eat-eie:e. tasaç:e|. ¬. aa:y sta,e. aacea-tec|y. asaeaa«ay
taat.taççea:ecie:taei:stt.¬e.ataeev. ceaeeeisaeeessia|aetaa| .z+·
t. ea( 1 59-60 ¸¬ec.r ec} ,
IV
uav.a, :eaeaec ta. s çe.at . uasse:| çe:ie:¬s a cetea:«a.ea ¬ay
see¬c.seeaee:t.a,i asteaceicese:.-.a,ta. sç:.¬.t.ve,eaes.seisease
.a. tse|iaac.a. tsErstmaligkeit, aetae.t|yaacç:ev. s. eaa||yeeas. ce:s. t
te-ealready ceae. . tssease-e. a, a|:eacyev.ceat ue. seeateatte
:eea||taat«e|ae«tae,eae:a|ie:meita.sev.ceaee. ·tae|atte:mast
-e~.teaaaetaet-e-|.|ea||ev. ceaee,«aetae:çe:eeçt.vee:e.cet.e, .
tae.ata.t.eaeiaaata:a|:ea| .tye:eiaa.cea|e|]eet .. e .,:asç. a,aa
es. steat . a tae eease. easaess ei.ts e:.,.aa| |e. a,·.tse|i·tae:e ( 1 60
,¬ec.iec}, 1a.s:eea||stae"principle ofall principles" ceiaec.aIdeas
I. ue«eve:| .tt|e«e¬ay|ae«a-eattaei:st,ee¬et:.ea|ev.ceaee. «e
ce|ae«a priori taat. taasaacteassa¬e ta.sie:¬ uateveataea,a
açç|.ecteaa. ste:.ea|e:. ,.a. ata.sease. ta.sa priori |ae«|ec,eeea·
eeo.a,taeie:¬eiev. ceaee. saeta.a,| esstaaaa. ste:.ea| Deia. a,a
"source ofauthority" [Ideas I, §24, ç.s·} ie:taeee,a.t.eaeiaaye-]eet
. a,eae:a| ..t. seaeeitaeseformal a prori saççesec-yeve:y¬ate:.a|
se.eaee.ae:e|y,ee¬et:yaaca. ste:y s.aeetaei:st,ee¬e::.ea|ev. ·
ceaeeaasaacteeeaie:¬teta.sçatte:a.«eeaaaaveai:stee:ta.aty
a-eat.t .a tae a|seaee eiaay etae: ¬ate:.a| |re«|ec,e ueaee tae
content ei,ee¬et:.ea|ev. ceaee,aeeateat«a.ea. sa. ste:.ea|-eeaase
e:eatecie:taei:stt. ¬e,.saetceiaecie:tae¬e¬eat uasse:|eeas. c·
e:s .ta|:eacyae¡a.:ec
1a.sa|steat.ea-eie:etaeeeateateitaeç:.¬e:c.a|aetaacev. ceaee
. sç:ev.s.eaa| i t . sa¡aest.eaeia¬etaece|e,.ea||. ¬. tat.eaaac.eaee
a,a.a. eitae aeeess.tyteta|eeae s sta:t.a,çe.at. ataeeeast.tatec
uatta. s¬etaece| e,.ea| aeeess.ty .s ea|y|e,. t.¬ate ea tae -as. s eia
ç:eieaacça. |eseça.ea|cee.s.ea uav.a,e|ea:ecta. ssta,e.uasse:|. a
eaeeteeat.aaesa.s¬ec.tat.ea,ae«ç:eteetec-ytaatie:ma| |e,. t.¬a·
t.ea,as.ia. stae¬e«e:eae|ea,e:taee:.,.aei,ee¬et:.ea|sease.|at
´` Thi s i s done i n terms which recall those of Ideas I, no doubt, but above al l those of
FTL: cf. notably FTL, § 59, pp. 1 56-59.
63
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
tae genesis of the a-se|ate. . e . .cea| ·Objectivity eisease. ta. ssease
|e.a, a|:eacyç:eseatie:aay eease.easaess«aatseeve: uasse:|:e·
çeatec|yaace|st.aate| y:eta:astea¡aest.ea«a. ea. sat-ette¬tae
ie||e«.a,. ae«eaataesa-]eet.vee,e| e,.ea|ev.ceaeeeisease|eee¬e
e|]eet.veaac.ate:sa-]eet. ve:ue«eaa.t,.ve:.seteaa.cea|aact:ae
e-]eet. «.ta a||taeeaa:aete:.st.estaat«e|ae«.tteaave. e¬a. te¬
çe:a| va|.c.ty. aa. ve:sa| ae:¬at. v.ty

.ate| | . ,.-.|.tyie:"everyone, " aç·
:eetecaesseateia||"here and now" iaetaa|.ty.aacseie:
¡
a:1a. s.stae
a. ste:.ea|:eçet.t.eaeitae¡aest.eaeiO-]eet.v.tysei:e¡aeat|yas|ec.a
taeive|eeta:eseiThe Idea ofPhenomenolog: ae«eaasa|]eet.v.ty,e
eatei. tse|i. ae:ce:teeaeeaate:e:eeast.tatetaee-]eet:·
uasse:|aas. taea. ç:ev.s.eaa|| ya|sta.aec-eie:e tae a.ste:.ea|eea·
teat eiErstmaligkeit ea|y te as| tae ¡aest.ea ei .ts e-]eet. ieat.ea
[objectivation], . e . ei.ts|aaaea.a,.atea. ste:yaac.tsa.ste:.e. ty re:a
seaseaaseate:ec.atea.ste:yea|y.i.taas-eee¬eaaa|se|atee-]eet.
Husserl had posed thi s question i n the same terms but in i ts most inclusive extension
and with a more cri tical , but less historical, infl exion i n FTL, § 1 0, pp. 263-64. There,
however, i t is l i mited to the egological sphere of Objecti vity. Here it i s focused on the
possibi l ity of objecti ve spi ri t as the condition for history and i n thi s respect takes the
opposite vi ew to Di lthey' s questi on. Di l they, in efect, starts fom the already constituted
objective spi ri t . For hi m, what matters i s knowing how the signifcations and the values of
thi s objecti ve mi l i eu can be interiorized and assumed as such by i ndi vidual subjects-first
of al l in the hi stori an' s work on the basi s of testionies which are i ndi vidual in thei r origin
or object . Moreover, this question led Di lthey to di scover, like Husserl , a non­
psychological di mensi on of the subject. Di lthey writes: "Now the followi ng question
ari ses: how a nexus which i s not produced as such i n a mind [tete], which consequently i s
not di rectly experienced and can no more be l ed back t o t he l i ved experi ence of a person,
how can it be constituted as such i n the historian on the basis of the statements of thi s
person or of statements made about t hi s matter'? Thi s presupposes that some logical
SUbjects, who are not psychological subjects, can be constituted" (Part I I I : "Plan der
Fortsetzung zum Aufau der geschi chtlichen Wel t i n den Geisteswi ssenschaften. En­
twiirfe zur Kritik der hi storischen Verunf" [ "Plan for the Continuation of the Forma­
tion of the Hi storical World in the Human Studi es. Sketches for d Critique of Historical
Reason"] , in Di l they' s Der Aufau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaf­
ten, ed. Bernard Groethuysen, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: B . G. Teubner and Gottingen: Van­
denhoeck and Ruprecht, 1 958), Vol . 7 of Gesammelte Schriften, p. 282.
Thi s question i s "turned over" i n the Origin i n formulas which are strangel y si milar to
those of Di lthey. Thi s "reverse si de" of the question concers the radical origin and the
conditions of possi bil i ty for the objecti ve spirit itself. Afer the interconnections of sense
and the evidences of a monadic ego from which we cannot not start , de facto as wel l as de
j ure, how can an objecti ve spirit i n general be constituted as the pl ace of truth, tradition,
co-responsi bi l ity, and so forth? We wi l l see that, according to Husserl, a "logical "
subject wi l l no more be able to be responsible for such a possi bi l ity than could the
psychological subject .
'
64
Jacques Derrid
. . e , aa .cea| e|]eet«a.ea, ça:aces.ea||y, mastaave|:esea a|| tae
mee:.a,s«a.easeea:ec.ttetaeemç.:.ea|,:eaaceia. ste:y.1aeeea·
c.t.easeiO|]eet.v.ty+:etaeataeeeac.t.easeia.ste:.e.ty.tse|i.
waeauasse:|ia:tae:eacevetesaie«| .aestetaeç:ecaet.eaaac
ev.ceaeeei,eemet:.ea|seaseassaeaaac.tse«aç:eçe:eeateat, ae
«.||ce se ea|yafter aav.a, cete:m.aectae ,eae:a| eeac.t.eas ei . ts
O|]eet. v.ty aac eitae O|]eet. v.ty ei.cea| e|]eet.v.t.es 1aas. ea|y
retroactively aaceatae|as.sei. ts:esa|tseaa«e.|i am.aatetaeça:e
sease eitae sa|]eet.ve ç:as. s«a.ea aas ea,eace:ec ,eemet:y. 1ae
seaseeitaeeeast.tat. a,aeteaaea|y|ecee.çae:ec.atae«e|eitae
eeast.tatece|]eet ~ac ta.saeeess.ty .saet aa este:aa|iate, |ataa
esseat.a|aeeess.tyei. ateat.eaa|.ty 1aeprimordial seaseeieve:y. a·
teat.eaa|aet.sonly . tsfnal sease, . e ,taeeeast. tat.eaeiaae|]eet,.a
tae|:eacestseaseeitaesete:ms, 1aat. s«ayea|yate|ee|e,yeaa
eçeaaçaçassa,e,a«ay|aeste«a:ctae|e,. aa.a,s
ii tae sease ei,eemet:.ea| sease .s O|]eet.v.ty e:tae .ateat.eaei
O|]eet.v.ty,.i,eemet:y.sae:etaeesemç|a:y. acesei|e.a,se.eat.ie ,
aac.ia.ste:y.staea.,aestaacmest:eve|ate:yçess.|.| .tyie:aaa.ve:·
sa|a.ste:y,taeeeaeeçtei«a.ea«ea|caetes.st«.taeat.t, , taeatae
seaseeisease .a,eae:a| .s ae:e cete:m.aecasobject: as seme ta.a,
taat.saeeess.||eaacava.|a||e. a,eae:a|aaci:stie:a:e,a:ce:,aze
1ae «e:|c|y .ma,e eigaze «ea|caet|etae aaaet.eecmece| eitae
|aee:et.ea|att.taceeiça:e eease.easaess|at , eataeeeat:a:y,«ea|c
|e::e«.tsseasei:emtaatatt.tace1a.s. sve:ymaea.aaeee:c«.tatae
. a.t.a| c.:eet.ea ei çaeaemeae|e,y tae e|]eet .a,eae:a| .s tae iaa|
eate,e:y eieve:yta.a, taat eaa aççea:, . e , taat eaa |e ie: a ça:e
eease.easaess .a ,eae:a| O|]eets .a ,eae:a|]e.a a|| :e,.eas te eea·
se.easaess, taeUr-Region. 59
~| se. «aeauasse:|am:ms taat asease· ç:ecaet.ea mastaavefrst
ç:eseatec. tse|iasev.ceaee.ataeçe:seaa|eease.easaesseitae.avea·
te:, aac «aea ae asss tae ¡aest.ea ei .ts subsequent ,.a a iaetaa|
ea:eae|e,.ea|e:ce:,e|]eet. ieat.ea.aee|.e.tsas.aceiiet.eacest.aec
te mase tae eaa:aete:.st.es ei .cea| O|]eet.v.ty ç:e||emat.e aac te
sae«taat taeya:eaeta matte:eieea:se 1:a| y, tae:e. saeti:sta
sa|]eet. ve,eemet:.ea|ev.ceaee«a.ea«ea|c taea |eeemee|]eet.ve
Ceemet:.ea|ev.ceaeeea|ysta:tstaememeat tae:e. s ev.ceaeeeiaa
. cea|e|]eet.v.ty.1ae|atte:.s saeaea|y aue:aav.a,|eeaçat. ate
. ate:sa|]eet.vee.:ea|at.eaCeemet:.ea|es.steaee.saetçsyea.ees. s·
teaee� .tceesaetes.stassemeta.a,çe:seaa|«.ta. ataeçe:seaa|sçae:e
eieease.easaess . . t.s tae es. steaee ei«aat .s O|]eet.ve|ytae:eie:
´ Cf. Ideas I. in particular § 76, pp. 1 94-97.
65
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
eve:yeae ,ie:aetaa|aacçess.||e,eemete:s, e:taese«aeaace:staac
,eemet:y, i aceec, .t aas, i:em .ts ç:. ma| .ast.tat.ea, aa es.steaee
«a.ea. sçeea| .a:|ysaç:atemçe:a|aac«a.ea-eita. s«ea:eee:ta.a-.s
aeeess. ||e te a|| mea, i:st ei a|| te tae aetaa| aac çess.||e matae·
mat.e.aaseia|| çeeç|es , a||a,es. aac ta.s . st:ae eia|| .ts ça:t.ea|a:
ie:ms ( 1 60 ¸mec.iec},
neie:eaacaue:masttaea|eaeat:a| .zec. atae.:iaetaa| . tyaac
asec .a ¡aetat.ea ma:ss nat eaa «e s.mç|y :eç|aee taem «. ta tae
t.me|ess.iaacç:ev.cectaateitaeeeac.t.eaeiçess. |.| .ty:
1ae |aa,aa,e ei,eaes.s eea|c «e|| seemiet.ve at ta. s çe.at . tae
cese:.çt.eaeiaay:ea|ceve|eçmeat,aeat:a| .zec.aç:.ae.ç|e,«ea|caet
ea||ie:. t, |at|:.a,.a,te|.,attaeie:ma|eeac.t.easeiçess.|.| .ty,tae
ce]a:e .mç| .eat.eas. aace.cet.e st:at.ieat.eascees ~:e«eaettaea
cea|.a,«.taa.ste:y:Deesta. saet:eta:aasteae|ass.et:aaseeaceata|
:e,:ess.ea: ~ac .s aet tae . ate:eeaaeet.a, eit:aaseeaceata| aeees·
s.t. es , evea .inarrated aeee:c.a, te ae«. tceve|eçs, at|ettemtae
stat.e. st:aeta:a| ,aacae:mat.veseaemaie:taeeeac.t.easeiaa.ste:y
:atae:taaaa.ste:y. tse|i:
Qaest.easeita.ss.acm.,atse:.eas|y. mça,atae«ae|ee:.,.aa|.tyei
ta.s attemçt nat. t seems taey :ema.a eats.ce uasse:| s .ateat.ea
uacea|tec|ytae:e.saet.ata. saccount tae|east,:a.aeia. ste:y.i«e
aace:staac|ytaattaeiaetaa|eeateateiceve|eçmeat. nattaeaeees·
s.tyeita. s:ecaet.eaaas|eea]ast.iecattaeeatset ~actaeaaaeyec
| etce«aeitaese«ae«ea|c esçeetuasse:| tete||taemwhat really
happened, tete||taemaste:y[leur raconte une histoire], eaa|e saa:ç
aac eas.|y.ma,.aa||e ae«eve:, ta.sc. saççe.atmeat.s . ||e,.t.mate.
uasse:|ea|y«.saectecee.çae:.aacvaaeetaetesta. cceaaace:eve:y
emç.:.ea|ste:ya|eat«a.ea«e«ea| c|eea:.eas raetaa|a.ste:yeaa
taea |e ,.vea i:ee :e. a ae matte: «aat .ts sty|e, . tsmeiaec, e:.is
philosophy, .t«.||a|«ays me:ee:|essaa.ve|ysaççesetaeçess.|.|.ty
aacaeeess.tyeitae.ate:eeaaeet.eascese:.|ec|yuasæ:| .uacea|i·
ec|y taese .ate:eeaaeet.eas a:e a|«ays ma:sec |y a ]a:.c.ea| aac
t:aaseeaceata| s.,a.ieat.ea, |attaey :eie: teconcrete aetslived .a a
unique systemei. ast. tat.a,.mç|.eat.eas , . e ,.aasystemtaaiaas|eea
e:.,.aa||yç:ecaeecea|yo»:e-taat:ema.asce iaeie ¬c ce]a:e,ir­
reversible. 1aesetaeaa:e taeinterconnections-of «aat.s, . ataen||est
seaseeitae«e:c,histor itsel. 1aas, eeai:eat.a,«aat.sta:eaµaac
ta:ea,a aa.ste:.ea|acveata:e ,tae iaetei«a.ea.s .neç|aeea||ei , a
60
Cf. in particular Tran-Duc-Thao, Phenomenoiogie, p. 221 . Following this interpreter,
"the subjectivist point of view" in The Origin ofGeometr would have prohibited Hus­
serl from "going beyond the level of common sense remarks. "
66
Jacques Derrid
aç:.e:. aac e.cet.e:eac.a,aac c.seea:se saea|c |e çess.|| e uasse:|
c.caet.aveatsaeaaçess.|.| .ty. .t«ass.mç|yc. se|esecas«aat.m·
ç| .e.t|yaasa| «ayseeac.t.eaectaees.steaeeeitae.cea|e|]eetseia
ça:ese.eaeeaactaaseiaça:e t:ac.t.ea. aaceease¡aeat| yeiaça:e
a. ste:.e.ty.taemece|eia.ste:y.a,eae:a|
Pure-interconnections-of a.ste:y.apriori-thought-of a. ste:y. ceesta. s
aetmeaataattaeseçess.|. | .t. esa:eaet.ataemse| vesa. ste:.ea| :Netat
a|.ie:taeya:enothing but taeçes s.|.|.t.esoftaeaççea:aaeeofa.ste:y
as such, eats.ce «a.eatae:e .s aeta.a, u.ste:y.tse|iesta||. saes tae
çess.|.| .tyei.tse«aaççea:.a,
v
1a.sçess.|.|.ty.s| :stea||ec"language. " ii«eas|ea:se| vesa|eat
taemaaae:.a«a.eataesa|]eet.veev. ceaeeei,eemet:.ea|sease,a.as
.ts .cea|O|]eet.v.ty.«emasti:staete taat.cea|O|]eet.v.tyaetea| y
eaa:aete:.zes,eemet:.ea|aacse.eat.iet:atas . .t.staee|emeatei| aa·
,aa,e. a,eae:a| it. sç:eçe:tea«ae|ee| asseisç.:.taa|ç:ecaetsei
taeea|ta:a|«e:| c. te «a.ea aetea| ya| | se.eat.ie ie:mat.eas aactae
se.eaeestaemse| ves |e|ea, |at a| se. ie: esamç|e. tae ie:mat.eas ei
|. te:a:ya:t , | -º¸mec.iec} ,
1a.smevemeat. saaa|e,easte«aat«eaaa|yzecea:| .e:. tae.cea|
O|]eet.v.tyei,eemet:y. s| :stç:eseatecasaeaa:aete:.st.eeemmeate
a|ie:msei|aa,aa,eaacea|ta:e.|eie:e. ts esemç|a:y ç:.v. |e,e.s
ceiaec ia aa . mçe:taat aete . uasse:| sçee.ies taat tae |:eacest
eeaeeçt ei| . te:ata:e , i -º, eemç:. sesa| | . cea| ie:mat. eas . s. aee. . a
e:ce:te|esaea.taeymasta|«ays|eeaça||eei|e.a,esç:ess.||e. a
c.seea:se aac t:aas|ata||e . c.:eet|y e:aet. i:em eae| aa,aa,e .ate
aaetae:.iaetae:«e:cs. .cea|ie:mat.easa:e:eetecea| y.a|aa,aa,e.a
,eae:a| .aet. ataeiaetaa| .tyei|aa,aa,esaactae.:ça:t.ea|a:| .a,a. st.e
.aea:aat.eas
i t . s ta:ea,ataesetaemes. a|:eacyç:eseat. ataeLogical Investiga­
tions aactaei:stseet.easeiFormal and Transcendental Logic, taattae
ve:ysa|t|eaacsçee.ie eaa:aete:eitaeuasse:|.aa¡aest.eaaççea:s
1ae.cea|e|]eet. staea|se| atemece|ie:aaye|]eet«aateve: .ie:
e|]eets .a ,eae:a| . ' it. sa|«aysme:ee|]eet.vetaaa tae :ea| e|]eet.
6 I
This ideality of the object, i . e . , here, of the mathematical thing itself, i s not the
non-reality of the noema described i n Ideas I (especially § §88, 97f. ) . The l atter charac­
terizes the type of intentional i ncl usion of every noema i n conscious l i ved experience,
whatever the intended type of exi stent may be and however i t may be intended (even if
67
Introuctin to the Origin of Geometry
taaataeaata:a|es.steat re:.itae|atte::es.stse:eççesesaayta.a,..t
«ea|ca|«ays|eaceiaeteemç.:.ea|sa|]eet.v.ty1ae:eie:e .tae:ea|
e|]eeteaaaeve:atta.ataata|se| ateO|]eet.v.ty«a.eaeaa|eç:eçesec
ie:a||sa|]eet.v.ty.a,eae:a|.atae.ataa,.||e.ceat.tyei.tssease 1ae
¡aest.ea"how is any object in general possible? " assames.tssaa:çest
aacmestace¡aateie:m. taea. .ataeOrigin, «aea uas se:| «eace:s
"How is ideal Objectivity possible? " ue:e tae ¡aest.ea a| seatta.as.|s
,:eatestc.mea| ty.s.aee:eeea:setetaeaata:a|O|]eet.v.tyeia«e:|c|y
es.steat.sae|ea,e:çess.|| enes.ces .eaeeaav.a,:eaeaectae| eve|ei
.cea|O|]eet.v.ty.«est.||eaeeaate:seve:a|me:ece,:ees
Necea|t|aa,aa,e. s tae:ea,a|ymaceaçei.cea|e|]eet.v.t.es . ie:
esamç|e. tae «e:cLowe ,|.ea} eeea:s ea| yeaee .a tae Ce:maa | aa·
,aa,e ..t. s.ceat.ea|ta:ea,aeat.ts.aaame:a|| eatte:aaees|yaay,. vea
çe:seas, | - | ¸mec.iec} ,
1aas. tae«e:c¸¬o· } aasaa.cea|O|]eet.v.tyaac. ceat.ty.s. aee.t. s
aet .ceat.ea| «.ta aay ei. ts emç. :.ea| . çaeaet.e . e: ,:aça.e mate·
:.a|.zat.eas it.sa|«aystaesame «e:c«a.ea.smeaataac:eee,a.zec
ta:ea,aa||çess.||e| .a,a.st.e,esta:es i aseia:asta.s.cea|e|]eeteea·
i:eats|aa,aa,eas saea.tae|atte:saççesesasçeataaeeasaeat:a|.za·
t.eaeitaeiaetaa|es.steaeeeitaesçea|.a,sa|]eet. ei«e:cs. aacei
taeta.a,ces.,aatecsçeeea[La parole], taea.. sea|ytaeç:aet.eeeiaa
. mmec.ate e.cet.e � ~ac:- ce Ha:a|t aetes ve:y ç:ee.se| y taat tae
we are deal i ng wi th perception of a real thing) . However, there is no doubt that thi s
non-reality of the noema (a very difcult and deci si ve notion) may be what, in the last
anal ysi s, permits the repetition of sense as the "same" and makes the idealization of
identity i n general possible. Undoubtedl y, we coul d show this in a precise way on the
basi s of §62 of FTL, devoted to ' ' The I deali ty of All Species of Objectivities Over Against
the Constituti ng Consciousness" and the "universal ideality of all intentional unities"
(pp. 1 65-66).
tI2
The l i nguistic neutralization of exi stence is an original idea only in the technical and
thematic signifcation that phenomenology gives it. Is not this idea the favorite of Mal­
larme and Valery? Hegel above al l had ampl y expl ored it. In the Encyclopedia ( one of the
few Hegel i an works that Husserl seems to have read) , the l i on already testifes to thi s
neutralization as an exemplary martyr: "Confronting the nae-Lion-we no longer
have any need ei ther of an intuition of such an animal or even an image, but the nae
(when we understand i t) i s i ts simple and imageless representation; in the name we thi nk"
(§462) . (Thi s passage i s ci ted by Jean Hyppolite i n hi s Logique et existence: Essai sur La
logique de Hegel [Pari s: Presses Uni versitaires de France , 1 953] , p. 39, a work which , on
a great many points, lets the profound convergence of Hegelian and Husserlian thought
appear. )
Hegel also writes: "The frst act , by which Adam i s made master of the animal s, was to
i mpose on them a name, i . e . , he anni hi l ated them i n thei r existence ( as exi stents)"
( "System of 1 803- 1 804") . Cited by Maurice Blanchot i n La Part dufeu (Pari s: Gallimard,
1 949) , p. 325.
68
Jacques Derrida
"reduction is implicitly carried o.·-s. mç|yçe:ie:mecaac aetyetmace
esç|.e.t-asseeaas|aa,aa,e. seeas.ce:ecea.tse«aaeeeaat
"|i'\
ue:e «e a:e eeaee¬ec «.ta tae e.cet.e :ecaet.ea. nat. ça:aces.·
ea||y.ie:ta.s:easea.tseemsme:ec.mea|ttesaytaatataea,at«a.ea
mevesse|e|yeatae|eve|ei |aa,aa,e. saeeessa:. |y.ataeatt.taceeitae
phenomenological reduction ¸ea: emçaas. s} . .t . s set s¡aa:e|y . a tae
e.cet.e«e:|ceis.,a.aeat.ease:ça:e| .vecesçe:.eaees
"|¡·1
re:.itae çaeaemeae|e,.ea|:ecaet.ea.s ta|ea .a.tsia||estsease. .t
masta| seeata.|tae:ecaet.eaeieeast.tatece. cet.esaactaeaei.tse«a
|aa,aa,e 1aeç:eeaat.eaei¡aetat.eama:|sea| ysat.s| esta.s.m·
çe:at.ve.aaae¡a. veea|iasa.ea1a.st:aaseeaceata|:ecaet.eaeie.ce·
t.es. «a.ea.a.tsmest:ac.ea|memeatmastst.||ta:a as|ae|te«a:ca
ae« aac .::ecae.||y aeeessa:y e.cet.e . taat ei ça:e eease.easaess.
e:eates .a eaeet seme eeas.ce:a||e c.mea|t.es uasse:| . s ve:y eea·
se.easeita.saacaeesçesestaesec.mea|t.es«.tatae,:eateste|a:.ty
. aIdeas i.
1ae:eie:e . te tae ve:y esteat taat |aa,aa,e .s aet aata:a| . .t
ça:aces.ea||y eae:s tae mest caa,e:eas :es.staaee te tae çae·
aemeae|e,.ea| :ecaet.ea. aac t:aaseeaceata| c.seea:se «.|| :ema.a
B:l The Idea of Phenomenology: Husser/ian Exemplarism, tr. Garry L. Breckon
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1 974) , p. 1 28.
´`Ibid. [modifed] .
"Meanwhile we cannot disconnect transcendents indefnitel y, transcendental purif­
cation cannot mean the disconnection of all transcendents, since otherwise a pure con­
sciousness might i ndeed remain over, but no possbi lity [sic 1 of a science of pure con­
sciousness" (Ideas I, § 59, p. 1 59) . I n thi s section, devoted to the necessary but difcult
reduction of formal ontology and fonal logic once all the transcendents of the material
ei detics have been excluded, Husserl concludes in favor of the possibility of such a
reduction, provided the "logical axioms " are maintained, axioms (li ke the principle of
contradiction) " whose uni versal and absolute val idity" the description of pure con­
sciousness could "make transparent by the help of examples taken from the data of its
own domain" ( p. 1 60) . But he says nothing about the language of this ultimate science of
pure consciousness, about the language which at least seems to suppose the sphere of
fonal logic that we j ust excluded. For Husserl, the univocity of expression and certain
precautions taken within and with the help of language itself (di stinctions, quotation
marks, neologi sms, revaluation and reactivation of old words, and so on) wil l always be
sufcient guarantees of rigor and nonworl dliness.
That is why, despi te the remarkable analyses which are devoted to it , despite the
constant interest i t bears (from the Logical Investigations to the Origin) , the specific
problem of language-its origin and i ts usage i n a transcendental phenomenology-has
always been excl uded or deferred. Thi s is explicitly so in FTL (§2, p. 2 1 , and §5, p. 27)
and i n the Origin, where he has written: "we shall not go i nto the general problem which
also arises here of the origin of language i n i ts ideal existence and its exi stence in the real
world" ( 1 61 ) .
69
Introuctin to the Origin of Geometry
. ::ecae.||ye||.te:atec|yaee:ta.aam|.,aeas«e:|c|.aess ny. ma,·
.a.a,taattaeOrigin «.|| | :st.ac.eatetaeçess.|.| .tyeia. ste:yastae
çess.|.|.tyei|aa,aa,e.«ea:eea|ea| at.a,ae«c.mea| t. seve:yattemçt
te :ecaee ,.a seme a|t. mate aac :ac.ea| t:aaseeaceata| :e,:ess.ea· a
çaeaemeae|e,yeia. ste:.e.ty ~acseeaeeme:e«e seeaee:ta.aaea·
ceçeaceaeeeeaa:mec.ataat çaeaemeae|e,y
¯ Thi s is a di fculty that Fink has frequently underscored (particularly in hi s famous
article i n Kantstudien of 1 933 [ "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl
and Contemporary Cri ti ci sm"] ) . For hi m, the phenomenological reduction "cannot b
presented by means of simpl e sentences of the natural attitude. It can be spoken of only
by transforming the natural function of language" ( Letter of May 1 1 , 1 936, cited by
Gaston Berger, The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy, tr. Kathleen McLaughl in [ Evanston:
Northwestern Uni versity Press. 1 972] , p. 49).
And i n his admirable lecture on " Les concepts operatoires dans la phenomenologie de
Husserl , " he attributes a certain equi vocation in the usage of operative concepts (that of
"constitution, " for exampl e) to the fact that "Husserl does not pose the problem of a
'transcendental language. ' " He wonders if, after the reduction, one can sti l l "have at hi s
di sposal a Logos i n the same sense as before" (i n Husserl, Cahiers de Royaumont, p.
229) .
Si mi larl y, concerning the expression "intentional life, " S. Bachelard evokes the
danger of " a surreptitious return to psychologi sm. " for " language does not know the
phenomenological reduction and so holds us in the natural attitude" (A Study of HusserI' s
Logi c, p. xxxi ) .
On the basis of the problems i n t he Origin, we can thus go on t o ask oursel ves, for
example , what i s the hi dden sense, the nonthematic and dogmatically received sense of
the word "hi story" or of the word "origin"-a sense which. as the common fous of
these signifi cations, permits us to di sti nguish between factual "hi story" and intentional
"hi story, " between "origin" i n the ordinary sense and phenomenological "origin, " and
so on. What i s the uni tary ground starting from whi ch this difraction of sense is permitted
and i ntelligible? What i s history, what i s the origin, about which we can say that we must
understand them sometimes in one sense, sometimes in another? So long as the notion of
origin in general i s not criticized as such, the radical vocation i s always threatened by thi s
mythology of the absolute beginning, so remarkably denounced by Feuerbach in hi s
"Contribution to the Critique of Hegel ' s Phi losophy" ( 1 839) ( cf. Maniestes
philosophiques, tr. L. AIthusser [Pari s: Presses Uni versitaires de France . 1 960] , pp.
1 8-2 1 ) .
These questions can show the need for a certain renewed and rigorous phi lological or
"etymological" thematic, which would precede the discourse of phenomenology. A
fonidable task, because it supposes that all the problems which it would have to precede
are resolved, in particular, as a matter of fact : the i nterloutory problem of history and
that of the possibility of a hi storical philology. I n any c
a
se, this task never seems to have
appeared urgent to Husserl , even when the i dea of l i ngui stic "reactivation" takes on so
much importance for him. Unlike Heidegger, he almost never indulges in etymological
variations, and when he does so (cf. FTL, § 1 , pp. 1 8-1 9) , it does not detenine but
fol l ows the orientation of the i nvestigation. For Husserl , it would be absurd for sense not
to precede--e jure (and here the de jure i s difcult to make clear rune evidence
difcile D-the act of language whose own value wi l l always b that of expression .
It is rather signifcant that every critical enterpri se, juri di cal or transcendental, is made
70
Jacques Derrid
na||ae «e:c s ce,:ee ei. cea| O|]ee|.v.|y .s ea| y. «e eea|c say.
primar. Oa|y«.|a.aa iae|e·a.s|e:.ea| |aa,aa,e . s|ae aeaa"Lowe"
i:ee. aac |ae:eie:e . cea| . eemça:ec «. |a . |s seas. ||e. çaeae|.e . e:
,:aça.e.aea:aa|.eas . na|.|:ema. asessea|.a||y|.ec.asaCe:maa«e:c.
|e a :ea| sça|.e|emçe:a| .|y� .| :ema.as . a|e::e|a|ec .a . |s ve:y .cea|
O|]ee|.v.|y «.|a |ae ce iae|e es.s|eaeeeia,.vea |aa,aa,e aac |aas
«.|a|aeiae|aa|sa|]ee|.v.|yeiaee:|a.asçea|.a,eemmaa. |y i|s. cea|
O|]ee|.v.|y.s|aea:e|a|.veaacc.s|. a,a. saa||eea|yasaaemç. :.ea|iae|
i:em|aa|ei|ae r:eaeae:Ða,| .sa«e:c lion. "
1ae:eie:e«ee:ess. a|eaa.,ae:ce,:eeei. cea|O|]ee|.v.|y-|e|as
ea||. | secondar-as seeaas«eçassi:em|ae«e:c| e|aeaa.|yei|ae
sease "lion, " i:em "the expression" |e «aa| uasse:| ea| | s .a |ae
Logical Investigations |ae "intentional content" e: |ae aa. |y ei . |s
s.,a.iea|.ea. 1aesame eea|ea|eaa|e. a|eacecs|a:|.a,i:emseve:a|
vulnerable by the irreducible factuality and the natural naivete of its language. We be­
come conscious of this vulnerability or of this vocation to silence in a second reflection on
the possibility of the jur�dico-transcendental regression itself. Despite its necessarily
speCUlative style, this refection is always focused, without having to succumb to empiri­
cism, on the world of culture and history. Attentiveness to the "fact" of language in
which ajuridical thought lets itself be transcribed, in which juridicalness would like to be
completely transparent, is a retur to factuality as the de j ure character of the de jure
itself. It is a reduction of the reduction and opens the way to an infnite di scursiveness.
This explains why the retur on itself of thought which has never wanted to prescribe
anything but a turning back [rep/i]
t
oward its own proper conditions remains more dif­
fcult for the "master" than for the "disciple. " Did not Herder. in his Verstand und
Erfahrung: Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der rein en Verunft [Leipzig, 1 799; rpt. Bruxelles:
Culture et Civilisation, 1 969, 2 vols. ] . already reproach Kant for not taking into consid­
eration the intrinsic necessity of language and its immanence in the most apriori act of
thought? Did not the author of the Essay on the Origin of Language [tr. Alexander Gode
in On the Origin of Language (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1 966)] also conclude that
language, rooted in cultural experience and in history, made all aprioriness of s ynthetic
judgments impossible or illusory? The inability of received language to be treated themat­
ically, an inability which precedes every critical regression as its shadow-is not the
unavowed dogmatism he thus denounces that geschichtlose "Naivitit" about which
Fink wonders whether it i s not the basis for "phenomenology' s methodological revolu­
tion" (cf. "L' Analyse intentionnelle et Ie probleme de la pen see speculative" [French tr.
Walter Biemel and Jean Ladriere] , in Problemes actuels de La phenomenologie, ed. H. L.
Van Breda [Pari s: Desclee de Brouwer, 1 952], pp. 64-65)? That i s only one of the
numerous analogies which could be taken up between the diferent futures of Kantian and
Husserlian transcendental idealisms, such as they are already outlined. Thus, in any
case, an irreducible proximity of language to primordial thought is signified in a zone
which eludes by nature every phenomenal or thematic actuality. Is this immediacy the
nearess of thought to itself? We would have to show why that cannot be decided.
´´Vol . I , Introd. to Vol. I I of the German ed. , §5, and 1 , § 1 1 , particularly pp. 259 and
284-85. Like those of FTL, the analyses concering linguistic ideality in the Origin
71
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
|aa,aa,es. aac. |s .cea| .cea|.|y assa:es . |s|:aas|a|a|.|.|y 1a. s. cea|
.cea|.|yeiseaseesç:essec|y| .ea.leo, Lowe, aacseie:|a ..s|aeai:eec
i:ema||iae|aa| linguistic sa|]ee|.v. |y.
na| |ae "object" itsel . s ae.|ae: |ae esç:ess.ea ae: |ae sease·
eea|ea| 1ae resa aac ||eec |.ea. . a|eacec |a:ea,a |«e s|:a|a ei
. cea|.|.es. . saaa|a:a| .aac|ae:eie:eeea|.a,ea| .:ea| .|y.as|aeçe:eeç·
|.eaei|ae. mmec.a|e| yç:esea|seas.||e|a. a,,:eaacs.cea|.|.esaace:
|aesee.:eamsiaaees. se|aeeea|.a,eaeyei|ae| .ea. s,e.a,|e:eve:|e:·
a|e . a |ae . cea|.|y ei|ae esç:ess. ea aac .a | aa| ei . |s sease. 1ae
|:aas|a|a|.|.|yei|ae«e:clion, |aea. «. ||ae|. aç:.ae.ç|e|ea|se|a|e
aacaa.ve:sa| i|«.|||eemç. :.ea|| yeeac.|.eaec|y|aeeea|.a,ea|ea·
eeaa|e:. aa:eeeç|.ve. a|a. | .eaeiseme|a. a,| .|e|ae| .ea.1ae|a||e:. s
ae|aae|]ee|. v. |yei|aeaace:s|aac.a,. ¯ |a|aa e|]ee|ei:eeeç|.v·
.|y 1ae .cea| . |y ei . |s sease aac ei«aa| .| eve|es .::ecae.||y
acae:es|eaaemç.:.ea|sa|]ee|.v.|y.1a. s«ea|c|e|:aeevea.ia||mea
aac|eea a|| e|e aaceea|cin fact eaeeaa|e:aacces.,aa|e |ae |.ea.
uace:|aese e.:eams|aaees|ae | .e |eaceiae|eaa|a:eçe|e,.ea| ,ea·
e:a|.|y«ea|cae||e:ecaeecaayia:|ae:1a.s. s|eeaase|ae.cea|.|yei
sease.eeas.ce:ec. a. |se|iaac| .|e|aa|ei| aa,aa,e. .sae:ea"bound"
directly suppose the subtle as well as indispensable distinctions found in the LI (nos. 1-5) ,
especially in the first and fourth Investigations.
In the First Investigation, the notion of " intentional content" or "unity of its significa­
tion" announces in the linguistic sphere the notion of "noematic sense, " or the " nuclea­
tic layer" (Kernschicht) of the noema, a notion the former implies and which is fully
elaborated only in Ideas I (in particular, cf. §90, pp. 241 f. ). Just as the core unity of
noematic sense (which is not the reality of the object itself) can be intended according to
various intentional modes (the sense "tree" can be attained in a perception, a memory,
an imagining, and so on) in order fnally to constitute a "complete" noema with all its
characteristics, so the ideal identity of signifi cation is made accessible to several lan­
guages and allows itself to be "translated. " In the Foreword to the 2nd edition of LI
( 1 91 3 ; p. 48 of Vol. I of ET) , Husserl recognizes that the notion of noema and of the
noetic-noematic correlation lacks completion in the First Investigation.
´¨ Husserl used a great number of examples when analyzing this distinction for the fi rst
time i n the LI (I, 1 , particularly § 1 2, pp. 286-87).
´´The diference between these two types of Objectivity, which comes back to the
diference between ideal objectivity and real object, is amply described in E (§63 , pp.
250t. ) . The objectivities of the understanding are on a "higher level" than those of
receptivity. They are not preconstituted, like the latter, in the pure passivity of sensible
receptivity, but in predicative spontaneity. "The mode of their original pregivenness is
their production in the predicative activity of the Ego . . . " [po 25 1 ] . Another diference:
that of their temporality (§64). Whereas the real object has its individual place in the
objective time of the world, the irreal object i s, with respect to this latter, tot

.
lly free,
i . e. , "timeless. " But i ts timelessness (ZeitLosigkeit) or i ts supratemporality ( Uberzeit­
lichkeit) is only a "mode" of temporality: omnitemporality (Allzeitlichkeit).
7
Jacques Derrid
.cea|.|yaacae|a"free" eae 1a. sc. ssee.at.ea|e|«eea"free idealities"
aac"bound idealities, " «a.ea.sea|y. mç|.ec.ataeOrigin70 ,|a|. ac.s·
çeasa||e ie: .ts aace:staac.a,· . eaa||esas |eeemç:eaeac «aa| tae
a|se| a|e .cea|O|]eet.v.tyei. ie:esamç|e. tae,eemet:.ea|e|]eet eaa
|eaac«aatc.s|.a,a.saes.|i:em|aatei|aa,aa,eas such aaci:em|aat
ei|ae sease·eeateatas such.
1ae.cea|O|]eet.v.|yei,eemet:y.sa|se|a|eaac«. |aeataay|.acei
|. m.|its.cea| . ty¯tertia¸¯. sae|ea,e:ea| y|aa|ei|aeesç:ess.eae:.a·
teat.eaa|eea|eat ..|. s|aa|ei|aeobject itself. ~| |acae:eaee|eaay:ea|
eea|.a,eaey.s:emevec1aeçess. |. | .tyeit:aas|a|.ea. «a.ea.s.ceat.·
ea| «.|a taateit:ac.t.ea. . seçeaecad infnitum: 1ae ry|aa,e:eaa
taee:em..aceeca||ei,eeme|:y.es.s|sea|yeaee. aema||e:ae«euea
e:evea.a«aa||aa,aa,e.|may|eesç:esseci | .s. cea|.ea||ytaesame
.atae e:.,.aa||aa,aa,e eiÐae| . caac.aa|| |:aas|at.eas .aac«. ta.a
eaea|aa,aa,e.t.sa,a.a|aesame. aemat|e:ae«maay|. mes. | aas
|eeaseas.||yatte:ec.i:emtaee:.,.aa|esç:ess.eaaac«:.t.a,·ce«ate
|ae .aaame:a||ee:a|a|te:aaeese:«:. ||eaaac etae:ceeameata|.eas
(Dokumentierungen) " , | -º·
1ae sease eiea|yeaee e:eieaee aac ie: a| | . wa.ea .s |ae
esseat.a|meceeitaee|]eet s. cea|es. s|eaeeaactaas|aat«a.eac.s·
| .a,a.saes |ae e|]eeti:em taema| t. ç|.e.ty ei:e|atec aetsaac|. vec
esçe:.eaees. seemsteaave|eeae|ea:|yceaaec.ataeseve:yte:ms|y
ue:|a:|(Pschologie als Wissenschaft, i i . § i :º. ç 1 75) aacta|eaaç
a,a.a|yuasse:| .1ae|atte:.:eee,a.z.a,taataee«esmaea|eue:|a:t
aacç:a.s.a,a.mie:aav.a,c.st. a,a. saec|e|te:taaakaat|e|«eea|ae
`´ From the perspective of our text, this dissociation fi nds its most direct and illuminat­
ing explication in E (§65, p. 267). In particular, we can read there: "Thus it appears that
even cultural systems are not always completely free idealities, and this reveals the
diference between free idealities (such as logicomathematical systems and pure essential
structures of every kind) and bound idealities, which in their being-sense carry reality
with them and hence belong to the real world. All reality is here led back to spatiotempo­
rality as the form of the individual . But originally, reality belongs to nature : the world as
the world of realities receives its individuality from nature as its lowest stratum. When
we speak of truths, true states of afairs in the sense of theoretical science, and of the fact
that validity 'once and for all' and 'for everyone' belongs to their sense as the telos of
j udicative stipulation, then these are free idealities. They are bound to no territory, or
rather, they have their territory in the totality of the [mundane] universe and in every
possible universe. In what concers their possible reactivation, they are omnispatial and
omnitemporal. Bound realities [the German and Derrida' s translation thereof reads:
Bound idealities] are bound to Earth, to Mars, to particular territories, etc. " (Husserl ' s
emphasis) . Husserl immediately specifes, however, that by their "occurrence, " by their
coming on the scene and their " 'being discovered' " in a historically determined territory,
free idealities are also factual and worldly. Thus he states the crucial difculty of all his phi­
losophy of history: what is the sense of this last factuality?
73
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
|e,.ea|aac|aeçsyeae|e,.ea| . :eç:eaeaesa. m. aeaetae| ess. ie:aav.a,
eeaiasec.cea|.tyaacae:ma|.v.|y(LI, i . r:e| . §59, çç : | --i s·
1a.s :eç:eaea . s ve:y ea|.,atea.a,. s.aee a|se|a|e|y e|]ee| .ve.
|:aas|ata||e. aac t:ac.|.eaa| .cea| .ceat.|y .s ae|]as|aay,eemet:.ea|
e|]ee|.v.|y. |a|genuine e|]ee|.v.ty Oaee «e ,et |eyeac |ae |eaac
.cea|.t. es aac :eaea .cea| e|]eet.v.ty .tse|i. «e eaa st.|| eaeeaate: a
iae|aa| :es|:.et.ea . |aa| ei c.sva|ae . ia| seaess. e: catecaess
[eremption] . Necea|t|aee|]eet.veseaseeiaia| se] ac,mea|. sa| se
.cea| re:|a.s:easea.teaa|e.ace| a.|e|y:eçeatecaac|aas|eeemes
ema.temçe:a| 71 nat|ae e:.,.aaac |ae çess.|. |.|yei|a. s.cea|ema.·
|emçe:a|.ty:ema.ama:|ec|yaiaetaa|eea|.a,eaey.taa|eitae:ea|.|y
.a|eacec |y |ae]ac,mea| e: taat ei sa|]ee|.ve ae|s 1aas . .a ce·
se:.çt.ve]ac,mea| s|ea:.a,ea«e:|c| y:ea| .|. es. seaseeaa|ese .|sva·
|.c.ty«.|aea|s.ma|taaeeas|y| es.a,.|sema.temçe:a|.cea| .ty re:.|e
|a|eaçuasse:| sesamç|ea,a. a. I eaa.ace| a.|e| y:eçea|.astaesame,
tae ç:eçes.t.ea 1ae aa|eme|.|e .s |ae iastes| meaas ei t:ave| .
«ae:easi|ae«. || e|eia| seaaceat·ei·ca|e 1aeaaaea:eayeiva|. c. ty
.aae«ayaaee|stae.atemçe:a|.|y[uchronie] e:çaa|emçe:a| .|y[an­
chronie] ei .cea|.ty i.|e«.se. .a tae .a|e:eeaaee|.eas ei a aea·
cese:.ç|.vese.eaee saeaas,eemet:y. e::e:a| se aas a eeateat «a.ea
eaa |eeeme .cea| aac ema. |emçe:a| ,e::e: :esa||s e.tae: i:em tae
´ ' Once again it is in Experience and Judgment that the omnitemporality of simple
ideality is scrupulously distinguished from the omnitemporality of validity : " Furthermore,
it should be noted that this omnitemporality does not simply include within itself the
omnitemporality of validity. We do not speak here of validity, of truth, but merely of
objectivities of the understanding as suppositions [Vermeinheiten] and as possible, ideal­
identical, intentional poles, which can be ' realized' anew at any time in individual acts of
judgment-precisely as suppositions; whether they are realized in the self-evidence of
truth is another question. A judgment which was once true can cease to be true, like the
proposition 'The automobile is the fastest means of travel , ' which lost its validity in the
age of the airplane. Nevertheless, it can be constituted anew at any time as one and
identical by any individual in the self-evidence of distinctness: and, as a supposition, it
has its supratemporal. irreal identity" (§64 C , p. 26 1 [modifed)) . Also cf. LI. I. I , § I I , p .
285.
In the Origin Husserl also alludes to the ideal identity of judgments which not only
would be anachronistic in their validity but also contradictory and absurd in their sense­
content. These analyses, at the same time that they announce and orient a phenomenol­
ogy of the specific ideality of negative validities (of the fal se , the absurd, the evi l , the
ugly, etc. ) , assign limits to the "freedom" of those idealities which will always be, as we
wiII soon try to show, idealities "bound" to an empirical, determined temporality or to
some factuality. For what absolutely frees and completes the ideality of sense (alrady
endowed in itself with a certain degree of "freedom") is the ideality of positive validity
(by which evidence is not only distinct but clear when it reaches judgment) . It alone
causes sense to attain infi nite universality and infinite omnitemporality.
74
Jacques Derrid
|e,.ee·cecaet.veaaac|.a,eisym|e|s«a.eaa:eve.ceitae.:seaseaac
. ate «a.ea. aa|ae«ate as. a seas.||e iaetaa|.ty . s :e.at:ecaeec. e:
i:em semeçsyeae|e,.ea|eeat.a,eaeyaav.a,ae sease . aeemça:.sea
«.ta,eemet:.ea|t:ata, 1aeeeateateie::e:eaa |eeeme saea evea
«aea ,. a e::e: e: assamçt.ea, . eaee tae st:ata ei a|:eacy ceiaec
. cea|.t.es . st:ave:sec. «e aave aet:eaeaectaet:ataei,eemet:.ea|
Sachverhalt, 72 aacevea«aeataeve:ytaemeeitaestatemeat:ema.as
|eaacteiaetaa| .ty1ae.cea| .tyeiseasesym|e|.ea||yçatsaç«.taa
ce| acec e: . aaataeat.ea||y sat. siec t:ata·. ateat.ea7:; it ie||e«s.
taea.taat. itaeema.temçe:a|.tyeic.sva|ae. sçess.||e.. t. sa|«ays. a
taeseaseeiemç.:.ea| çess. |. |.ty. . e . eieeat.a,eateveataa| .ty ne·
s.ces. ema.temçe:a|.ty. sma.ata.aec. a. tseventualit ea|y|yasease
«a.eaa|«ays |eeçs açaee:ta.aesseat.a|:e|at.ea«.tataea|seate:
eseeecect:ata.1a.s.s|eeaasei|ae«taatsaeaaaeatcatecç:eçes.·
t.eahad been true aacst.||:ema.asaa.iecaacaa. matec|yaa. ateat.ea
eit:ata. aataeat.e.ty. e:e|a:.tyk|.·|e··, taesete:msa:e .aee:·
ta.a:esçeetssyaeaymsie:uasse:|taatieaama.ata.aaac:eçeattae
.cea| aa.tyei.ts sease ~aeveataa||yabsurd intention, a|sa:c .atae
seaseeiaeaseasee:eeaate:sease . ¯te|e«aat.t. s. masteeat.aa·
a||yçe.at,.asç.teei. tse|nte«a:ctaetelos eiaataeat.e.tyaac|et.tse|i
|e,a.cecsym|e|.ea||y|y.t. ataeve:y,esta:e.a«a.eatae.ateat.ea
ç:eteacste|ec.se:.eatec.1a.s.ateat.eamast,. ataeÐa:ye|e.aa| aa·
,aa,e«a.eataeStranger eitaeSophist sçea|s, e«aaçte [dire] tae
telos . ae:ce:tec.se«a[de dire ] .t
1a.s t:aas,:ess.ea ei |.a,a. st.e . cea|.ty. taea. :ea||y cese:.|es a
mevemeataaa|e,easte«aat«eea:|.e:cese:.|ec se. eaee«asaea|·
to:a|ie:m. |at.ts ça:eçess.|.|.tyaççea:ecastaeça:eçess.|.|.tyei
`¯ A notion difcult to translate other than by the clumsy, strange, and l ess exact (but
for so long accepted) expression "state-of-afairs. "
``´ I n the LI, I . 1 , § 1 1 , pp. 285-86, these themes are already greatly explicated. For
example, Husserl writes: "What my assertion asserts, the content that the three perpen­
diculars of a triangle intersect in a point, neither arises nor passes away. (The frst
German edition and the French translation continue: " Each time I (or whoever else it
may b) pronounce with the same sense this same assertion, there i s a new judgment .
. . . But what they judge, what the assertion says, is all the same thing. "] It is an identity
in the strict sense, one and the sae geometrical truth.
" It i s the same in the case of aB assertions, even if what they assert is false and absurd.
Even in such cases we distinguish their ideal content from the transient acts (of] afrming
or asserting it: it i s the sigifcation of the assertion, a unity in pluraity. . . .
"If ' possibility' or ' truth' is lacking, an assertion' s intention can only be carried out
symbolically: it cannot derive any 'fulness' from intuition or frm the categorial functions
performed on the latter, in which 'fulness' its value for knowledge consists. It then lacks,
as one says, a ' true' , a 'genuine' signifcation. Later we shall look more closely into this
distinction between intending and fulflling signifcation" (modifed] .
75
I ntroductin to the Origin ofGeometry
ea|ta:e ea| y aue: a :ecaet. ea ei eve:y ce iaete ea|ta:e se ae:e
se. �aee. s. |.|e |aa,aa,es aac |aa,aa,e .a,eae:a| . eae eitae ie:ms
ei . cea|

O|]eet. v.ty. |at . ts ça:e çess.|.|.ty aççea:s ea|y ta:ea,a
a:ecaet.eaeia|||aa,aa,e-aetea|yeieve:yceiaete|aa,aa,e|atei
tae

i�etei|aa,aa,e.a,eae:a| . 1aasuasse:|sçee.aes.aaaa|se|ate|y
ce..s.veseateaee nattae. cea|.t. esei,eemet:.ea|«e:cs seateaees
taee:. es·eeas. ce:ec ça:e|y as |.a,a.st.e ie:mat.eas-a;e aet ta�
.cea|.t

. es taat ma|e aç «aat .s esç:essec aac |:ea,atte va|.c.ty as
t:at? M ,eemet:y. tae |atte: a:e .cea| ,eemet:.ea| e|]eets. states ei
aaa.:s.

ete.wae:eve:semeta.a,.sasse:tec.eaeeaac.st.a,a.sa«aat. s
taemat.e . taat a|eat «a.ea .t . s sa. c ,.ts sease, . i:em tae asse:t.ea
«a.ea .tse|i.ca:.a,taeasse:t.a,.. saeve:aaceaaaeve:|etaemat.e�
~ac tae taemeae:e .s ç:ee.se|y.cea|e|]eet.v.t.es. aac ¡a.tec.ae:eat
eaes i:em taese eem.a, aace: tae eeaeeçt ei |aa,aa,e ,| - |
,mec.iec} , ··
iet as i:staete taat .a ta. sseateaeetaeseaseeitaeasse:t.ea tae
: tae�e¯a|eat«a.ea , semeta.a,}.ssa.c. aactaee|]eet. tse|f a:e
.ceat.ea| .aiaet«a.eaeea|caeve::esa|t.ataeeaseei:ea|e|]eetse:ei
: |e�ac .cea| e|]eet.v.t.es re: tae i:st t.me. «. ta tae a|se|ate
. cea|.ty ei aa e|]eet-tae ,eemet:.ea| e|]eet «a.ea . s ta:ea,a aac
ta:ea,aea|ytaeaa.ty ei.ts t:ae sease-«e çass |eyeace::.cea:·
se|veseitae. cea| .|atst.|||eaac. O|] eet.v.tyei|aa,aa,ewes.ma|·
taaeeas|y�eae? �aO|]ee�. v.tytaat. sa|se|ate|yi:ee«.ta:esçeettea||
iae�aa|

s�|,eet.v.ty1aat.s«aytaeesemç|a:y¡aest.eaeitaee:.,.aei
O|,eet.v.tyee�|c

aet|eas|ecaç:eçes| .a,a. st.e.cea|.tyassaea.|at
aç:eçes«aat . smteacec ae:ess[d travers ] aac eataeetae:s. ce ei
[�u-�eld de] ta.s.cea|.ty.natastaea|se|ate. cea|e|]eet.v.tyceesaet
|.veM atapas ouranios, .tie||e«staat.
1 . �tsi:e�?em«.ta:esçeette a|| iaetaa|sa|]eet.v.ty aas ea|y|a.c
|a:e.ts|e,. t. mate[de droit ] t.es«.taat:aaseeaceata|sa|]eet.v.ty.
2. . ts a.ste:.e.ty.s .at:.as.eaacesseat.a| .
Taas�aesçaeeie:atranscendental historicit .sç:ese:.|ec.a a||. ts
�m,�at.ec�çta. ~i:e:aav.a,cete:m.aecaacç:ev. cecaeeess,«. taa||
.ts c.uea|t.es, te ta.s sçaee . uasse:| eaa taea as| tae a. ste:.ee·
`` By the distinction they propose, these sentence.s give the greatest and most
exemplary sharpness to the central question of the Origin. Husserl added them after the
fact
.
to Fink' s typed version of the manuscript. They do not appear in the published
verSIon of 1 939.
At the end of a similar analysis, Husserl writes in FL: loutions "are not thematic
ends but theme-indicators" (§5 , p. 27).
76
Jacques Derrid
t:aaseeaceata|¡aest.ea«a.eaieeasesa|| tae c.s¡a.etace eia.s text
Oa:ç:e||emae«eeaee:asç:ee. se|ytae. cea|e|]eet.v.t.es«a.eaa:e
taemat.e.a,eemet:yae«cees,eemet:.ea|. cea| .ty¸ast|.|etaateia||
se.eaees,ç:eeeeci:em .ts ç:. ma:y .at:açe:seaa|e:. ,. a. «ae:e .t . sa
ie:mat.eaç:ecaeec«. ta. atae eease.eas sçaeeeitae i:st.aveate: s
sea| . te.ts . cea|O|]eet.v.ty:( 1 6 1 ¸mec.iec} ,
VI
uasse:| s :esçease.sc.:eetaaceemesve:y¡a.e||y. itaastaesty|e
eiaturnabout «a.eaeaa|esa:ç:.s.a,. icea|.tyeemeste.tsO|]eet. v. ty
|y meaas ei |aa,aa,e. ta:ea,a «a.ea .t :eee. ves. se te sçea|. .ts
|.a,a. st.eresa( 1 6 1 ,mec.iec} , .uasse:|aetestaat«eseeta.s. a
acvaaee 1aeea|y ¡aest.ea. taea. . s ae« (Quomodo): ae« cees
| .a,a.st.e. aea:aat.eama|eeateitaeme:e|y.at:asa|]eet.veie:mat.ea
taeObjective, taat«a.ea. ie:examç|e.as,eemet:.ea|eeaeeçte:state
eiaaa. :s..s. aaetaa|iaetç:eseat. .ate||.,.||eie:a|| .ae«aaca|«ays.
a|:eacy|e.a,va|.c. a. t s| .a,a.st.eexç:ess.eaas,eemet:.ea|c.seea:se.
as ,eemet:.ea| ç:eçes.t.ea .a .ts ,eemet:.ea| .cea| sease: ( 1 6 1
,mec.iec} , .
we m.,at|esa:ç:. sec. ~rte:aav.a,seçat.eat|yext:aetectaetae·
mat.et:ataeiSachverhalt i:em| .a,a.st.e. cea|.tyaaci:ema|||eaac
.cea|. t. es. uasse:|taeaseemsteredescend te«a:c|aa,aa,eastae .a·
c.sçeasa||emec. amaaceeac.t.eaeiçess.|.| .tyie:a|se|ate.cea|O|·
]eet.v.ty. ie:truth .tse|i. «a.ea«ea|c |e «aat .t.s ea| y ta:ea,a .ts
a.ste:.ea|aac.ate:sa|]eet.vee.:ea|at.ea.1aas. ceesuasse:|aetcome
back te|aa,aa,e.ea|ta:e. aaca.ste:y.a||ei«a.eaae:ecaeec.ae:ce:
teaavetaeça:eçess.|.| .tyeit:ataeme:,e:isaeaet|eaaca,a.ate
|eac. atea.ste:ytaat«aesea|se|atei:eecemae]astcese:. |ec:r:em
taeaea. «.||aeaet|eeemçe||ecte:emevea||tae:ecaet.eassteç|y
steç. .ae:ce:te:eeeve:iaa||ytaereal texteia. ste:.ea|exçe:.eaee�
i a:ea| .ty-aac «e ta.a| .t tae mest . ate:est.a, c.mea|ty ei ta.s
text-uasse:|ceesexaet|ytaeeççes.te. 1a.sreturn te|aa,aa,e. asa
return home teea|ta:eaaca.ste:y.a,eae:a| .|:. a,ste.tsiaa|eemç|e·
t.eataeça:çeseeitae:ecaet.ea. tse|i. Ce.a,|eyeac |eaac.cea|.·
t.este«a:ctaetaemeeit:ata. s.tse|ia:ecaet.ea«a.eama|estae
.aceçeaceaeeeit:ataaççea:«.ta:esçeettea||ceiaete ea|ta:eaac
|aa,aa,e. a,eae:a| .nateaeeme:e.t. sea|ya¡aest.eaei�. se|es.a,

a
]a:. c.ea|aact:aaseeaceata|ceçeaceaee. Necea|t,eemetnea|t:ata. s
|eyeac eve:y ça:t.ea|a: aac iaetaa| | . a,a.st. e ae|cassaea. eae ie:
«a.eaeve:ysa|]eetsçea|.a,acete:m.aec|aa,aa,eaac|e|ea,.a,tea
77
I ntroduction to the Origin of Geometry
cete:m.aecea|ta:a|eemmaa.ty.s. araet:esçeas.||e.nattaeO|]eet.v·
.tyeita. st:ataeea|cnot |eeeast.tatecwithout taepure possibility eiaa
.a¡a.:y.ateaça:e|aa,aa,e.a,eae:a| w.taeatta. sça:eaacesseat.a|
çess.|.|.ty. tae,eemet:. ea|ie:mat.ea«ea|c:ema.a.aera||eaacse| .·
ta:y. 1aea.t «ea|c |eabsolutely bound to the psychological lie of a
factual individual, tetaateiaiaetaa|eemmaa.ty..aceecteaça:t.ea|a:
memeateitaat|.ie. it«ea|c|eeemeae.tae:ema.temçe:a| .ae:.ate|·
|.,.||e ie:a| | . .t«ea|c aet|e«aat.t. s. · waetae:,eemet:y eaa|e
sçe�eaa|eat.saet . taea. taeext:.as.eaacaee.ceata|çess.|. |.tyeia
ia|| . ate tae |ecy eisçeeea e:eia s| .ç .ate a a. ste:.ea| mevemeat.
sçeeea. sae|ea,e:s. mç|ytaeexç:ess.ea(Aiisserung) ei«aat.w.taeat
.t. «ea|calready |eaa e|]eet eaa,ata,a.a.a. tsç:.me:c.a|ça:.ty.
sçeeeaconstitutes tae e|]eetaac .s a eeae:ete]a:.c.ea| eeac.t.ea ei
t:ata.1aeça:acex.staat.«.taeattaeaçça:eatia|||ae|.ate|aa,aa,e
aactae:e|y. atea. ste:y.aia||«a.ea«ea|ca|.eaatetae.cea|ça:.tyei
sease.sease«ea|c:ema.aaaemç. :.ea|ie:mat.ea.mç:.seaecasiaet.a
açsyeae|e,.ea|sa|]eet.v.ty»the inventor' s head. u.ste:.ea|.aea:aa·
t.easetsi:eetaet:aaseeaceata| ..asteacei|.ac.a,. t 1a. s|astaet.ea.
taet:aaseeaceata| . masttaea|e :etaea,at
Deesta.sa|t.mate:ecaet.ea.«a.eaeçeaseateat:aaseeaceata||aa·
,aa,e.:eve|at.ea.zeuasse:| staea,at:·Dees ta. s:eta:atetaesçea|·
. a,sa|]eetas«aateeast.tatestae.cea|e|]eet.aactaeaa|se|ateO|·
]eet. v.ty. ç:eeeec te eeat:ac.et a ç:ev.eas ça. |eseçay ei|aa,aa,e:
He:|eaa·reatysçea|seia st:.|.a,eeat:ast.ata.s:esçeet|et«eea
taeOrigin eataeeaeaaacaactaeLogical Investigations eataeetae: ·¯
73 According to the same movement, omnitemporality and universal intelligibility (al­
though they may be concrete and experienced as such) are only the reduction of
f

�tual historical temporality and factual geographical spatial ity. "Supratemporality"
( Uberzeitlichkeit) and "timelessness" (Zeit/osigkeit) are defined i n their transcendence or
their negativity only in relation to worldly and factual temporality. Once the latter is
reduced, they appear as omnitemporality (Allzeitlichkeit). the concrete mode of temporal­
ity in general.
´´ The expression "transcendental language" that we use here does not have the sense
o� "t�anscendental discourse. " This latter notion, invoked earlier, has been utilized by
�lOk 10 the sense of discourse adapted to transcendental description. Here we are speak-
1 09 of transcendental language insofar as, on the one hand, the l atter is "constituting"
compared with ideal Objectivity, and, on the other hand, insofar as it i s not confused in
its pure possibility with any de facto empirical language.
´´ Cf. "On the Phenomenology of Language, " in Merleau-Ponty' s Signs. tr. Richard C.
McCleary (Evanston: Northwester University Press, 1 964) , p. 84, or even
"Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man, " tr. John Wild in Merleau-Ponty' s The Pri­
macy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwester University Press,
1 964) , pp. 83-84.
78
Jacques Derrid
uacea|tec| ytaeLogical Investigations «�s

me:e .ate:e�t�c ea| y . a
«aatee::esçeacst eai:stçaaseeiceseoçt.ea�ataeOrzgln: taea�·
teaemyeieeast.tatec.cea| e|]eetseemça:ec�. t� � | aa,aa,eta�t.·
.tse|ieeast.tatec nat. a:eaet.eaa,a.astasa|,eet.».stçsyeae|e,.sm.
tae ¡aest.ea .s a|e»e a|| te c.ssee.ate tae .cea|

e|]eet i:em a| �

sa|·
,eet. ».ty aaca|| emç.:.ea| |aa,aa,e. |e�a e

i«a

.ea

eea�c ea|y eea·
iase taet:aasça:eat . aa. »eea| . aace|,eet.»es.,aie

at.eas?ia

ça:e
| e,.e nattae:eta:atetaeç:. me:c.a|.tyeitaesçeasm,sa|,eet.·ae
me:e . a eeat:ast «.ta ta.s i:st açç:e�ea te |aa,aa,e

ta�a

ta


. cea| . smeiIdeas I . s. as«astaea,at. «.tataeaçça

:eat

|�,.e. sm
e: :ea| . sm eitaeLogical Investigations. 1ae¡aest.ea .··. �ç|yte
ça:eataes.zeeeast.tatec|aa,aa,e.«a.ea.s«�atuasse�|

eea�maeste
ce .a Formal and Transcendental Logic and m tae Orzgl n, m e:ce:.
sa|se¡aeat| y. te |et tae e:.,.aa| .ty eieeast.tat.»e |aa,aa,e eemete
|.,at

i 1econstitute aa.cea|e|]eet.steçat.tattaeçe:maaeatc. ·çe·.t.ea ?
aça:e ,aze Ne«. |eie:e |e.a, tae eeast.tatec aac eseeec�c a�s.

| ·
.a:y eiaaaet «a.ea ç:eeeecs te«a:c tae t:�ta ei sease. | m,a. st.

.
.cea|.ty .s tae m.|.ea .a «a.ea tae .cea| e|,eet sett|es as «�at .·
sec.meatece:ceçes.tecnatae:etaeaeteiç:. me:c.a|depositing .� aet
tae:eee:c.a,eiaç:.»ateta.a,.|attaeç:ecaet.eaeiacommon e|,eet .
. e .eiaaobject «aesee:. ,. aa|e«ae:.staasc. sçesses�ec1aas|aa·
,aa,e ç:ese:»es t:ata. se taat t:at

a ea� |e:e,a:cec .a tae a

eaee·
ie:ta aeaeçaeme:a|. | |am. aat.eaei.t· se,ea:a. |at�| se setaat.teaa
|ea,taea taat stay. re: tae:e «ea|c |e ae t:ata «.tae�t taat «e:c·
aea:c. a, [thesaurisation] , «a.ea . s aet ea

| y«aat
.
deposlts aac seeçs
ae|ceitaet:ata.|ata|setaat«.taeatwa..aaproJect eit:ataaact�e
.ceaeiaa. aia.tetass«ea|c|eaa. ma,.aa||e 1aat.s«ay|aa,a

a,e.·
taee|emeateitae ea| yt:ac.t.ea.a«a.ea,|eyeac. ac.».caa|imtace·
sease·:eteat.eaaacsease·ç:esçeet.a,a:eçess.||e
ia ta. s :esçeet tae:e .s se | .tt|e c.seeat.aa.ty e:eeat:ast |et«eea
uasse:| sea:| .estaac|atesttaea,attaat«eiacça,es.

at�eLogic�l
Investigations «a.eaeea|c|e. ase:.|ec«.taeat�ec.ieat.ea.

ta�
.
Orz­
gin ' ça,eseataeesseat.a|iaaet.eaeiDokumentlerung, eatae spmtual
cor�oreality" ei|aa,aa,e. aaceataestate�eatasta� ia|i||.a,eitae
t:ata·.ateat.ea 1a.s . s a|| tae me:e se .i«e eeas.ce:Formal and
´` Thus, for example, Husserl writes: "All theoretical research, though by no mea�s
solely conducted in acts of verbal expression or complete
,
state�ent, none the less termi­
nates i n such statement. Only in this form can truth, and 10 particular t
.
he truth of theory,
become an abiding possession of science, a documented, ever available tr�asure for
knowledge and advancing research. Whatever the connection of thought with speech
may be , whether or not the appearance of our fnal judgements in the form of verbal
79
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
Transcendental Logic ,ça:t.ea|a:| y§§ 1 -5, çç 1 8-29) aactaeCartesian
Meditations (§4, ç. I I ) . Ðaeat.me .uasse:||e,. as|yaç:eet.a,taea,at
i:em«aat. t«ea|c|e se|e|y. . ataeaetei»e:|a|esç:ess.ea. .a
e:ce:te sçee.iy taea taat .teea|c aet |eeeme t:ata «.taeattaat
"stating" aac"communicating . . . to others, " ei«a.eaaea| sesçese
. ataeInvestigations (LI, i. i at:e ve| II eiCe:maaÐc . §3, ç255) .
re:..stae:eee,a.t.ea.a|aa,aa,eei«aatconstitutes a|se| ate.cea|
O|]eet.».ty.asia:as. tstates ta.sO|]eet.».ty. aet]astaaetae:«ayei
aaaeaae.a, e: :eçeat.a, taat t:aaseeaceata| .ate:sa|]eet.».ty .s tae
eeac.t.eaeiO|]eet.».ty:~t|ettem. taeç:e||emei,eemet:y s e:.,.a
çats tae ç:e||em eitae eeast.tat.ea ei. ate:sa|]eet.».ty ea ça:«.ta
taat eitaeçaeaemeae|e,.ea|e:.,.aei|aa,aa,e. uasse:| . s»e:yeea·
se.easeita. s natae«.||aetattemçtta.sc.mea|t:e,:ess.ea. atae
Origin, a|taea,a ae says .t a:.ses ae:e ( 1 6 1 ) . re: tae memeat .t
sameestesae«..iaethow, at|eastthat |aa,aa,eaaceease.easaessei
ie||e« aamaa.ty a:e . ate::e|atec çess.|. |.t.es aac a|:eacy ,.»ea tae
memeattaeçess. |.|.tyeise.eaee. sesta|| .saec1aeae:.zeaeiie||e«
maas.acsaççesestaeae:.zeaeitae«e:|c..tstaacseataaca:t.ea|ates
. tsaa.ty a,a. ast[se detache et articule son unite sur] tae aa.ty eitae
«e:| c. Oieea:se. tae «e:|c aac ie||e« maas.ac ae:e ces.,aate tae
a||·.ae|as.»e .|at. a| a.te|yeçea. aa. tyeiçess.||eesçe:.eaeesaacaet
ta. s«e:|c :.,atae:e . taeseie||e«mea :.,atae:e.«aeseiaetaa| .tyie:
uasse:| .s ae»e:aayta.a, |at a »a:.a||e esamç|e. Cease.easaessei
|e. a,·.aeemmaa.ty.aeaeaactaesame«e:|cesta||.saestaeçess.|.|·
.tyeiaaa.»e:sa||aa,aa,e Haas.ac. s| :steease.easei.tse|t asaa
. mmec.ateaac mec.ate|.a,a.st.eeemmaa.ty ( 1 62) .
iaeeaaeet.ea «.ta ta. s«eaeecteaeteta:ee. mçe:taatçe. ats
i w.ta.ataeae:.zeaeita. seease.easaesseiie||e«maas.ac. .t. s
mata:e .ae:ma| maas. actaat. sç:. ».|e,ec

|etaastaeae:.zea
eie. ».| . zat.ea aacas tae|. a,a. st.eeemmaa.ty ( 1 62) . 1aetaeme ei
pronouncements has a necessary grounding i n essence, i t is at least plain that judgements
stemming from higher intellectual regions, and in particular from the regions of science,
could barely arise without verbal expression" (LI, I , Introd. to Vol . II of German ed. , §2,
p. 250) .
7! Already in FTL, on the subject of the "idealizing presuppositions of logic" and tying
the problem of constitution with that of expression, Husserl concluded: " The problem of
constitution is again broadened when we recall that verbal expression, which we excluded
from our considerations of logic, i s an essential presupposition for intersubjective think­
ing and for an intersubjectivity of the theory accepted as ideally existing; and that accord­
i ngly an ideal identifability of the expression, as expression, must likewise raise a prob­
lem of constitution" (§73, p. 1 88) .
80
Jacques Derrida
aca| t ae:ma|.ty, «a.ea tee| aç me:e aac me:e :eem .a uasse:| s
aaa|yses, . s ae:et:eatecas amatte:ei eea:se.we«.||aetst:essta. s,·
cesç.te tae se:.eas ç:e||ems taat .t seems te aave �e ç?se �e: a
t:aaseeaceata|ça.|eseçay.ae«eaamata:.tyaacae:maaty,.ve:.sete
a:.,e:east:aaseeaceata|·e.cet.ecete:m.aat.ea:Cea|caca|tae:ma|.ty
eve:|eeeas.ce:ecetae:taaaasaaemç.:.ea|aaciaetaa|modifcation
eiaa.ve:sa|t:aaseeaceata|ae:ms.ataee|ass.esease,i:em«a.eaeea·
t.aaa||ystemtaeseetae:emç.:.ea|eases, macaessaacea.|caeec:
nat ae:e tee uasse:| aas eve:ta:e«a ta.s e| ass.e aet.ea ei
t:aaseeaceata| , te tae çe.at ei ,.v.a, a sease te tae .cea ei
t:aaseeaceata| çatae|e,y. · 1ae aet.ea ei ,aca|t ae:ma|.ty s,
• ç:.v. |e,e ceaetesae:eatelos' mecc|.a,|eie:eaaac.ataeeidos. 1e
aaveaeeesstetaeeidos eimaa|.acaacei|aa,aa,e, ee:ta.ameaaac
ee:ta.asçea|.a,sa|]eets-macmeaaacea.|c:ea-a:eaetgood esam·
ç|es .~aca:st,aecea|t, |eeaasetaeyceaetçessess.atae.:e«a:.,at
a ça:eaac:.,e:eas|ycete:m.aa||eesseaee. nat.ita.s. sse,ceesaca| t
ae:ma|.ty,«a.ea|e,.as«ae:eea.|caeeceacsaacsteçs«aeamaca�ss
sta:ts,aaveaaesseaee:neeaaseae:etaeesç:ess.eaeiaca| t ae:ma|.ty
.saeta,.veae.cet.ecete:m.aat.ea,|attae.aceseiaa. cea|ae�at.v·
.ty«a.ea.son the horizon eiceiaeteae:ma|aca|ts. iaç:eçe:t.eate
ea:acvaaeemeat. atae sç.:.taa|«e:|caactaea.aa.ste:y, taeeidos
eeaseste|eaaesseaee. ae:ce:te|eeemeaae:m,aactaeeeaeeçtei
ae:.zea.sç:e,:ess.ve|ysa|st.tatecie:taateist:aeta:eaacesseaee.
2. 1ae çess.|.| .ty eia mec.ate e: .mmec.ate ae:.zea eiaa.ve:sa|
|aa,aa,e:.s|s:aaa.a,.ate esseat.a|c.mea|t.esaac|. m.t s. 1a. sçess.·
|.|.tya:stsaççesestaattaeaaza:ceasç:e||emeeaee:a.a,taeçess.|.|·
.tyeiaça:e,:amma:aac"a priori ae:ms ei|aa,aa,e. s:ese| vec,
açess.|.|.ty uasse:|aeve:eeasecteta|eie: ,:aatec. ·

i t saççe�� ,
aest, taateve:yta.a, .saama||e.atae|:eacestsease, . . e. ,aa,mst.·
80
We propose to come back to this elsewhere. [Cf. Derrida' s Speech and Phenomena:
And Other Essays on Husserl' s Theor of Signs, tf. David B. Allison (Evanston: North-
wester University Press, 1973), pp. 97-99. ]
8I
In "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity" (i C), the
.
phenomen�n �f
crisis is presented as a "sickness" of European society and culture, a SIckness whIch � s
not "natural" and gets no relief from "something like natur dotos" (p. 270). ThiS
"pathology, " moreover, has the profound ethical sense of a fall into "passivity, " of �
inability to be rendered "responsible" for sense in an authentic activity or authent1�
"reactivation. " Technical activity (that of science als) as such is a passivity in compan­
son to sense; it is the agitation of the sick and, already, the tremors of delirium.
82
Cf. LI, J, 4. On Husserl ' s faithfulness to this theme and the philosophical option that
orients i t, cf. in particular S. Bachelard, A Study of Hussert' s Logic [part J, Ch. 1 ] , pp.
8-1 1 .
81
Introductin to the Orgin ofGeometr
ea||yesç:ess.||e . eve:yeae eaa ta||a|eat«aat .s «. ta.a tae sa:·
:eaac. a, «e:|c ei a.s e. v. | . zat. ea as O|] eet. ve| y es. st. a, ( 1 62
, mec.aec} ,. iaetae:«e:cs, asaete:e,eaeeasastaeesseat.a|st:aeta:es
eiseve:a|eeast.tatec|aa,aa,ese:ea|ta:esmay|e,t:aas|at.ea.aç:.a·
e.ç|e .saaa|«ays çess.||etas|. t«enormal mea«.||a|«ays aavea
prioriH3 eease.easaesseitae.:|e|ea,.a,te,etae:teeae aactae same
aamaa.ty, |.v.a,.aeaeaactaesame «e:|c. i.a,a. st.e c.ae:eaees-
aac«aattaey .mç|y-«.||aççea:tetaemattae|ettemeiaaaç:.e:.
ae:.zeae:st:aeta:e.tae|.a,a. st.eeemmaa.ty,. . e. ,tae.mmec.ateee:·
ta�atyei|eta |e.a, sçea|.a,sa|]eets«aeeaaaeve:ces.,aate aay·
tam,|at«aat|e|ea,stetaeae:.zeaeitae.:«e:|castae .::ecae.||y
eemmeaae:.zeaeitae.:esçe:.eaee.1a. s.mç|.estaattaeyeaaa|«ays,
. mmea.ate|ye:aet , staacte,etae:|eie:etaesameaata:a|es. steat-
«a.ea «e eaa a|«ays st:.ç ei tae ea|ta:a| saçe:st:aeta:es aac
eate,e:.esieaacec(fundiert) ea.t ,aac«aeseaa.ty«ea|ca|«aysia:·
a.sataea| t.matea:|.t:at.eaie:eve:ymisunderstanding. Cease.easaess
eieeai:eat.a,taesame ta.a,, aae|]eetçe:ee.vecas saea,· .seea·
se.easaesseiaça:eaacç:eea|ta:a|we. ue:etae:etaoteç:eea|ta:e. s
aet:e,:ess.eate«a:cea|ta:a|primitiveness |attae:ecaet.eaeiace·
te:m.aecea|ta:e, ataee:et.ea|eçe:at.ea «a.ea . seae eitaea.,aest
ie:mseiea|ta:e.a,eae:a| .1a. sça:e|yaata:a|e|]eet.vees. steat. stae
es.st.a,seas.||e«e:|c,«a.ea|eeemestaea:st,:eaaceieemmaa.ea·
t.ea,taeçe:maaeateaaaeeie:tae:e.aveat.eaei|aa,aa,e~staemest
aa.ve:sa| ,taemeste|]eet.ve|yesa.|.tece|emeat,.veateas, taeea:ta
.tse|i.s«aatia:a.saestaea:stmatte:eieve:y seas.||ee|]eet iaseia:
as .t .s taeexemplar e|emeat ,|e.a, me:e aata:a||y e|]eet.ve, me:e
çe:maaeat,me:ese|.c,me:e:.,.c,aacseie:ta ,taaaa||etae:elements;
aac.aa|:eace:sease, .teemç:. sestaem, , .t.sae:ma|taattaeea:ta
aasia:a. saectae,:eaacie:taea:st.cea| .t.es, taeaie:taea:sta|se·
|ate|y aa. ve:sa| aac e|]eet.ve identities, taese ei ea|ea| as aac
,eemet:y.
natç:eea|ta:a||ypure Nature .s a|«ays|a:.ec. se, as tae a|t.mate
`� But both still have to meet. The question here, then, is only that of a material ,
therefore in a certain sense contingent, a priori (cf. above) .
H4 Jt i s the "as such" of the object' s substantial and objective unity which i s deci sive
here. In paricular i t di stinguishes human intersubjectivity from that which i s created
between animal s, men and animals, children, etc. All those finite communities al so rest
on the feel i ng of a presence to the same world whereby they confront the same things , and so
on, but in a nonobjecti ve, nontheoretical consciousness-which does not posit the object
"as such" in its independence and as the pole of infi nite determination. Those lower commu­
nities can also gi ve rise to a specifc phenomenology, and Husserl devoted i mportant
unpublished fragments to them.
82
Jacques Derrida
çess.|.|.iy ie:eemmaa.eai.ea. . i. sa|.ac ei.aaeeess.||e. ai:a·. cea| .
Caa«eaeisay. iaea.]asiiae eççes.ieei«aaiuasse:|sa.c:~:eaei
aea·eemmaa.eai.eaaacm.saace:siaac.a,iaeve:yae:.zeaeiea|ia:e
aac|aa,aa,e:uacea|iec|ym.saace:siaac.a,.sa|«aysaiaeiaa|ae:.·
zeaaaciaeia.ie.aceseiiae.aia.ieçe|eeiaseaac.aie||.,eaee.nai
a|iaea,aiae|aiie:. sa|«aysaaaeaaeecseiaai|aa,aa,eeaa|e,.a. .s
aeiia.iaceiaeesseai.a|«a.ea«eeaaaeve::ac.ea||y,e|eyeac:
1ae a|eve seems a|| iae me:e i:ae. esçee. a||y s.aee a|se|aie
i:aas|aia|.|.iy«ea|c |e sasçeacec sia:i.a, iae memeai iae s.,a.iec
eea|cae|ea,e:|e|ec|ae|. e. iae:c.:eei|ye:.ac.:eei| y.:eiaemece|ei
aa e|]eei.ve aac seas.||e es. sieai. Ðve:y | .a,a.si.e c±eas.ea iaai
«ea|ceseaçeia. sa|se|aiei:aas|aia|.|.iy«ea|c:ema.ama:|ec|yiae
emç.:.ea| sa|]eei.v.iy eiaa . ac.v.caa| e: see.eiy. re: uasse:| . iae
mece| ei|aa,aa,e.siaee|]eei.ve|aa,aa,e eise.eaee. ~ çeei.e |aa·
,aa,e. «aese s.,a.ieai.eas«ea|caei|eobjects, «. ||aeve:aaveaay
i:aaseeaceaia| va| aeie: a. m 1aaiiaei «ea|c aave ae eease¡aeaee
within uasse:| .aaiaea,ai. .ia.s iaea,ai«e:e aei a| seiae iae:ea,a
. avesi.,ai.ea [approfondissement ] eisa|]eei.v.iy. Ne« sa|]eei.v. iy .a
,eae:a| . as maea emç.:.ea|asi:aaseeaceaia| . aççea:ecve:yea:| yie
uasse:| as. aaeeess.||e ie ac.:eei. aa.veea| . aac :.,e:eas |aa,aa,e.
sa|]eei.v.iy.siaaca¬eaia||y. aeaa||e ~|:eacy.aThe Phenomenology
ofInteral Time-Consciousness, uasse:|:eie::ecieiaea| i.maie.ceai.iy
eiiaeeeasi.iai.verasei. mmaaeaii. meaaca|se|aiesa|]eei.v.iyaac
eeae|acecre:a||ia. s. aamesa:e|ae|.a,( §36, ç. 100).85 ~ac. aiae
aaça||.saec¬aaase:.çiseiC:eaçCeaç:eieiemçe:a| .iy.ae«eace:s
.iç:e·e|]eei.veie¬çe:a| .iy.ç:eiemçe:a|.iy(Vorzeit) , .saei|eyeaca||
c.seea:se(unsagbar) ie:iae çaeaemeae|e,.z.a,Ð,e,HsC1 31 1 5 i i .
i º·1. ç 9). 1ae:eie:e . |aa,aa,e. i:ac.i.ea. aaca. sie:y es.siea|y.a·
seia:ase|]eeis|:ea|iaesa:iaee
3 . ~siae.aia.ieae:.zeaeieve:yçess.||eesçe:.eaee. iae«e:|c.s
eease¡aeai|y iae aa.ve:se ei O|]eeis «a.ea .s | .a,a. si.ea| | y es·
ç:ess.||e.a.is|e.a,aac.is|e.a,·saea( 1 62) . 1aas. iaes. ,a.ieai.ea
eiiae«e:|casae:.zea. se|ea:| yesç| .eaiec. . . e. .asiae. aia.ie|yeçea
ee¬mea ç|aee ie: eve:yia.a, «e eaa eaeeaaie: . ai:eai eiaac ie:
"
� In the same sense, cf. al l �he subtle analyses in the LI devoted to expressions
" lack[ing] an objective sense, " such as personal pronouns which " indicate" mediatel y
bl lt can never gi ve anythi ng to be seen. "The word T has not i tself di rectl y the power to
arouse the specifc I -presentation; thi s becomes fxed i n the actual pi ece of tal k. I t does
not work like the word ' l ion' which can arouse the idea of a l ion i n and by i tself. I n i ts
case, rather, an i ndicati ve function mediates, cryi ng as it were, to the hearer ' Your
vis-a-vis i ntends himself' " (I, 1 , § 26, p. 3 1 6) .
83
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
ea:se| ves . i ai:eaieiaac ie:ea:se|ves.mç|.es. iaea.,. veaas aae|·
]eei .1ae«e:|c. iae:eie:e .. sesseai.a||yceie:m.aec|yiaecai.veaac
ae:.zeaiæc. meas. eaei|e.a,çe:ee.vec[l' etre-perqu] .aa,aze«aese
e|]eeimasia|«ays|ea||eie|eatheorem. Ceemei:.ea|esemç|a:.aess
aacea|iec|y:esa|isi:emiaeiaeiiaai. asaaa|si:aeimaie:.a|se. ·
eaee .ia. sesemç|a:.aessi:eaisiaesçai.a| .iyei|ec. es,«a.ea. sea| y
eae eiiae|ecy s e.cei.eeemçeaeais, . . . e . i:eais«aaieeaie:s sease
eaiaeaei.eaeiae:.zeaaace|]eei. Desç.iea||iaeaaia,ea.si.emei.is
«a.eaaa.maieçaeaemeae|e,y. sçaee s ç:. v. |e,eiae:e.a .s .a ee:ia.a
:esçeeis:ema:|a||e. iiiesi.iesieiaai e|]eei.v.si ieaceaey «a.ea
uasse:|s.ma|iaaeeas| yeççesessev. ,e:eas| y. aacyei«a.ea. sea|ya
period, aa esseai.a| . aac iae:eie:e .::ecae.|| e. mevemeaieiiaea,ai.
1ae ç:eieaac :ayiam eiia. s ieas.ea |ei«eea e|]eei.v.sm aac iae
i:aaseeaceaia|mei.i.aieas.ease:ema:|a|| ycese:.|ec.aiaeCrisis, .s
a| se . mça:iec ie çaeaemeae|e,y. ia ia.s :esçeei. iae ç:e||em ei
,eemei:y. s:evea|.a,.
Ceemei:y. .aeaeei. .siaese.eaeeei«aai. sa|se|aie|ye|]eei.ve-
. e. . sçai.a|.iy-.aiaee|]eeisiaaiiaeÐa:ia.our eemmeaç|aee. eaa
. aceaa.ie|,iao. saasea:eemmea,:eaac«.iaeiae:mea
,
·uai.iaa
e|]eei.vese.eaeeeiea:ia| ,ia.a,s.s çess.||e. aae|]eei.vese.eaeeei
iaeta:ia.ise|i.iae,:eaacaacieaacai.eaeiiaesee|]eeis . .sas:ac. ·
ea| | y .¬çess.||e as iaai eii:aaseeaceaia| sa|]eei.v.iy. 1ae i:aas·
eeaceaia| Ða:ia . s aei aa e|]eei aac eaa aeve: |eeeme eae ~ac
iaeçess.|.|.iyeia,ee¬ei:ysi:.ei|yee¬ç|e¬eaisiae.mçess.|.|.iyei
«aaieea|c |e ea||eca"geo-logy, " iaee|]eei.vese.eaeeeiiaeÐa:ia
.ise|i 1a.s .s iae sease eiiae i:a,meai¯ «a.eareduces, :aiae: iaaa

On the theme of "our Earth" as the "l ife-world" "i n the most comprehensive
sense" for a humanity which lives i n community and where one can be "understood" in a
communication whi ch must always say and pass through the thi ngs of our Earth , cf. E,
§38, pp. 1 62-67. Thi s section efecti vely i l l uminates, especially by its degree of elabora­
tion, the si mi l arly i nspired fragment on the Earth cited below. In thi s section, the uni ty of
the Earth i s grounded in the unity and oneness of temporal ity, the " fundamental form"
(Grundform), the "form of all forms" [ibid. , p. 1 6] .

Thi s fragment , whi ch i s entitled "Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum
Phanomenologischen Ursprung der Rauml i chkeit der Natur" [ "Fundamental Investiga­
tions on the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature"] , dated May 1 934, was
publi shed i n 1 940 by Marvi n Farber in Philosophical Essays in Memor of Edmund
Husserl [rpt . Greenwood Press, 1 968] , pp. 307-25 . From the perspective of the science of
space, i t sketches a movement analogous to that of the Origin, but di rected toward
ki nematics . In a certain sense , it completes the Origin, although in the Origin Husserl
clearly specifi es that geometry is onl y a title for all mathematics of pure
spatiotemporali ty.
Thi s text, very spontaneous and not greatly worked out i n its wri ti ng, is presented as a
84
Jacques Derri
preface to a "science ofthe origin of spatiality, " of "corporeality, " of "Nature in the
sense of the natural sciences, " and to a "Transcendental Theor of Cognition in the
Natural Sciences" [po 307] . Husserl first wonders about the sense of the world in the
infnite openness of my surrounding world whose frontiers I can always go beyond. Over
against a determined objectivation [representation] of the world, that of the "Negroes"
or ' ' Greeks, " he sets that of the Coperican world. "We Copericans, we men of moder
time, we say: the earth is not ' the whole of Nature, ' it is one of the planets, in the infnite
space of the world. The earth is a spherical body which certainly is not perceptible as a
whol e, by a single person and all at once, but in a primordial [rimordiale] synthesis as
the unity of singular experiences bound to each other. But nonetheless it is a body!
Although for us it may be the experiential ground for all bodies i n the experiential genesis
of our world-objectivation" (p. 308).
H usserl then " reduces" the Coperican thesis by making the certainty of an Earh-as
the origin of every objective kinetic determination-appear as the transcendental presup­
position of this thesis. The question is to exhume, to unearth, the Earh, to lay bare the
primordial ground buried under the sedimentary deposits of scientifc culture and
objectivism.
For the Earth cannot become a mobile body: "It is on the Earth, toward the Earh,
starting from it, but still on it that motion ocurs. The Earth itself, in confority to the
original idea of it, does not move, nor is it at rest; it is in relation to the Earh that motion
and rest fi rst have sense. But then the Eath does not 'move' nor is at rest-and it is
entirely the same for the heavenly bodies and for the earth as one of them" (p. 309) .
The Earth is the fnal ground of our co-humanity (Mitmenscheit), for it is "the same
Earth for us, on it, in it, above it, there are the same bodies existing on it-'on it, ' etc. ,
the same corporeal (leiblichen) SUbjects, subjects of bodies (Leibern), who, for all, are
bodies (Korper) in a modified sense. But for us all , the Earth is the grund and not a body
in the full sense" (p. 3 1 5) .
But toward the end of the text, the Earth takes on a more formal sense. No longer is it a
question of thi s Earth here (the primordial here whose factuality would fnally b irreduc­
ible), but of a here and a ground in general for the deterination of body-objects in
general. For if I reached another planet by flying, and if, Husserl then said, I could
perceive the earth as a body, I would have "two Earths as ground-bodi es. " "But what
does two Earths signify? Two pieces of a single Earth with one humanity" (pp. 3 1 7-1 8) .
From then on the unity of all humanity determines the unity of the grund as such. This
unity of all humanity is correlative to the unity of the world as the infnite horizon of
experience, and not to the unity of this earth here. The World, which is not the factuality
of this historical world here, as Husserl ofen recalls, is the ground of gounds, the
horizon of horizons, and it is to the World that the transcendental immutability attributed
to the Earth returs, since the Earth then is only its factual index. Likewise
correlatively-humanity would then only be the facto-anthropological index of sub­
jectivity and of intersubjectivity in general , starting fom which every primordial here can
appear on the foundation of the Living Present, the rest and absolute maintenance of the
origin in which, by which, and for which all temporality and all motion appea.
Just as here he reduces the Copernican "relativity" of the earth, Husserl elsewhere
reduces Einstein's "relativity": "Where is that huge piece of method subjeted to
critique and clarification-that method that leads from the intuitively given surrunding
world to the idealization of mathematics and to the interpretation of these idealizations as
Objective being? Einstein's revolutionay innovations concer the foulae thrugh
which the idealized and naively Objectified physis is dealt with. But how formulae in
general , how mathematical Objectivation in general, receive sense on the substrtum of
85
Introuctin to the Origin ofGeometry
:eiaies, iae Ceçe:a.eaa aa.vei- aac sae«siaaiiae Ða:ia .a .is
ç:eieç:.me:c.a|.iy cees aei meve. ¡asi as eae s e«a |ecy, asiae
ç:.me:c.a| here aac zero-point ie: eve:y objective ceie:m.aai.ea ei
sçaee aac sçai.a|mei.ea, . saei.ise|i.amei.ea.a ia.s sçaee as aa
e|]eei, se-aaa|e,eas|,-iaeta:ia,asç:.me:c|a||ec,,asiae,:eaac·
|ec, (Bodenkorper) i:em «a.ea a|eae a Ceçen|eaa ceie:m|aa·
i.eaeiiaeea:iaas|ec,·e|]eei|eeemesçess||| e, | saei|ise|ieae|ec,
amea,eiae:s.aiaemeeaaa.ea|sysiem.r:.me:c.a||y, iaeÐa:iameves
aeme:eiaaaea:|ecymevesaac|eavesiaeçe:maaeaeeei.ishere,
,:eaacec.aaç:eseai.1aeÐa:iaiae:eie:e|ae«siae:esieiaaa|se·
|aiehere; a:esi«a.ea.saeiiae:esieiiaee|]eei,:esias meceei
mei.ea, , |aixesisia:i.a,i:em«a.eamei.eaaac:esieaaaççea:aac
|eiaea,aiassaea,iaexesieiaground aacahorzon .aiae.:eemmea
e:.,.a aac eac. 1ae Ða:ia . s, . a eaeei, |eia sae:i eiaac |eyeac
eve:y|ecy·e|]eei-.aça:i.ea|a:iaeCeçe:a.eaaea:ia-asiae,:eaac,
as iae ae:e ei .is :e|ai.ve aççea:.a,. nai iae Ða:ia eseeecs eve:y
|ecy·e|]eeias.is.aaa.ieae:.zea, ie:.i.saeve:esaaasiec|yiae«e:|
eie|]eei.aeai.eaiaaiç:eeeecs«.ia.a.i. 1aeÐa:ia.sawae|e«aese
ça:is . . . a:e |ec.es, |ai as a wae|e .i .s aei a |ecy
, C:aac|e,eace , ç 3 1 3] . 1ae:e. siaeaase.eaeeof sçaee,.aseia:as
.issia:i.a,çe.ai.saeiin sçaee.
iiiaeçess.|.|.iyei|aa,aa,e. sa|:eacygiven ieiaeç:.ma||y. asi.iai·
.a, ,eemeie:, .i samees iaai iae |aiie:aas ç:ecaeec .a a.mse|iiae
.ceai.iyaaciae.cea|çe:maaeaeeeiaa e|]eei .ae:ce:ie|e a||eie
eemmaa.eaie .i neie:eiae same .s:eee,a.zecaaceemmaa.eaiec
amea,seve:a| .ac.v.caa| s, .i.s:eee,a.zecaaceemmaa.eaiec«.ia.a
iae. ac.v. caa|eease.easaess aiie:¡a.e|aaci:aas.ie:yev.ceaee,arie:
aaa. ieaacçass.ve:eieai.eavaa.saes, .is seaseeaab :e·ç:ecaeecas
iae same .a iaeaeiei:eee||eei.ea� .is seaseaasaei:eia:aec ie
life and the intuitively given surrounding world-of this we lear nothing; and thus
Einstein does not reform the space and time i n wh ich our vi tal life (unser lebendiges
Leben) runs its course" ("Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity," in C, p.
295 [modified]) . In the Crisis (§34b, pp. 1 25f. ), a similarly oriented analysis also ques­
tions the objectivism of Einstein' s relativity.
88
In referring to this fragent, Tr�m-Dlc-Thao (Phenomenologie, p. 222) speaks of an
"undaunted refutation of the Coperican system. " However, it is a matter of course that
Husserl does not at any moment or on its own proper level contest the particular truth of
the objective Copernican science. He only recalls that Copernican science presupposes a
primordial Earth which this science will never be able to integrte into its objective
system.
l '
· v
86
Jacques Derrida
ae| a. a,aess |a ta. scoincidence of identity [recouvrement d' identitf] ,
ideality . s aaaeaaeecas saea aac .a,eae:a| .aaa e,e|e,.ea| sa|]eet
Cease¡aeat| y. «aat¬asesta. s. cea| .tyageometrical .cea|.ty«. ||ea|y
.ate:estas|ate:eawe«.||:esçeetuasse:| se:ce:eicese:.çt.eaaac
. atae¬eaat.¬e«.||ce| aetaeeeac.|.easie:.cea|.ty. aaa. ate:sa|]ee·
t. »eee¬¬aa.ty
1aas. |eie:e|e. a,tae .cea| .tyeiaa .ceat.ea|e|]eetie:etae:sa|·
]eets. sease. sta. s. cea|.tyie:other ¬e¬eatseitaesa¬esa|]eet iaa
ee:ta.a«ay. tae:eie:e. . ate:sa|]eet. ». ty .s i:s| tae aeae¬ç. :. ea| :e|a·
t.eaeiÐ,e|eÐ,e.ei¬yç:eseatç:eseatteetae:ç:eseatsassaea .. e .
as etae:s aac as ç:eseats .as ças| ç:eseats· | ate:sa|]eet. ».|y .s |ae
:e|at.eaeiaaa|se|atee:.,.ateetae:a|se|atee:. ,. as. «a.eaa:ea|«ays
¬y e«a. cesç.te tae.: :ac.ea| a|te:.ty 1aaass te ta. s e. :ea|at.ea ei
ç:.¬e:c.a|a|se|a|es. taesame ta.a,eaa|etaea,atta:ea,aa|se|ate|y
etae:¬e¬eatsaacaets wea|«aysee¬e|aestetaeiaa|.astaaeeei
|a. s. tae aa.¡ae aac esseat.a| ie:¬ ei |e¬çe:a|.zat.ea ny . ts »e:y
c.a|eet.ea|aess. taea|se|ateç:.¬e:c.a|.tyeitaei. ».a,r:eseatçe:¬.ts
tae:ecaet. ea.«.taeatae,at.ea.eia||a|te:.ty1aei. ».a,r:eseateea·
st.tates taeetae:asetae:. a.tse|iaactae sa¬e as tae sa¬e . atae
etae:9
0
��I These processes are abundantly described in The Phenomenology of Internal Time­
Consciousness, Ideas I, and in FTL. The passage from passi ve retention to memory or to
the acti vi ty of recollection, a passage which ' ' produces" ideality and pure Objectivity as
such and makes other absolute origins appear as such, i s always described by Husserl as
an already given essential possibility, as a structural abi l i ty whose source i s not made a
problem. Perhaps thi s source is not questioned by phenomenology because it is confused
wi th the possibility of phenomenology i tself. I n i ts "factual ity, " thi s passage i s also that
of the lower forms of Nature and conscious life. I t can also be the thematic site of what
today is cal led an "overcomi ng. " Here phenomenology would be "overcome" or com­
pleted i n an interpretative philosophy. Thus Tran-Duc-Thiw, after a remarkable interpre­
tation of phenomenology, exposes the " Dialectic of Real Movement, " starting from the
concepts of retention and reproduction and from difculties attached to them in
phenomenology, which alone. however, can give them a rigorous sense.
´`The possibility of constituting, withi n the unique and irreduci bl e form of the Li ving
Present (unchangeable in itself and always other i n its ' ' content") , another now and on its
basi s another here, another absolute origin of my absol utel y absolute origin, this possibil­
ity i s el sewhere presented by Husserl as the root of i ntersubjecti vi ty. I n the Cartesian
Meditations, this di alectic of temporalization is i nvoked as an analogous example of the
dialectic of i ntersubjecti vity. In order to illuminate the extraordinary constitution of
"another monad + « « in mi ne , " Husserl al ludes to temporalization, i n what he cal l s an
"i nstructi ve comparison" C§52, p. 1 1 5) .
But i n some unpubli shed material , he seems to go much further: "Urhyl e, " i . e . ,
temporal hyl e, i s defned there as the " core of the other than the Ego' s own" (Ichfremde
Kern) . Cf. Group C 6 ( August 1 930) , p. 6. On the sense of this notion of "alien to my
87
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
VII
A cee.s. »esteç:e¬a. aste|etaseany. tse|itaesçeas.a,sa|]eet. .a
tae st:.etseaseeitae te:¬. . s. aeaça||e eia|se|ate|y,:eaac.a,|ae
.cea| O|]eet. ».ty ei sease O:a| ee¬¬aa.eat.ea , . e . ç:eseat . . ¬·
¬ec.ate.aacsya.a:ea.eee¬¬aa.eat.ea·a¬ea,taeç:ete,ee¬ete:s. s
aet same.eatt e,. »e .cea|e|]eet.». t. estae.: eeat.aa. a,t e|e aac
"persisting factual existence, " taaasste«a.eataeyçe:ca:ee»eaca:·
.a,çe:.ecs.a«a.eatae. a»eate:aaca.sie||e«sa:eae|ea,e:a«asete
saea aa eseaaa,ee:e»ea. ¬e:e aa.»e:sa||y. ae|ea,e:a|.»e 1e |e
a|se|ate|y .cea|. tae e|]eet ¬ast st.|| |e i:eec eiever t.e «.ta aa
aetaa||y ç:eseat sa|]eet. ».ty .a ,eae:a| 1ae:eie:e. .t ¬ast çe:ca:e
e»ea «aea ae eae aas aetaa|. zec .| .a e».ceaee ( 1 64 ¸¬ec.iec}·
sçeeea[langage oral] aasi:eectaee|]eeteiindividual sa|]eet. ».ty|at
|ea»es.t|eaacte. ts|e,.aa.a,aactetae syaea:eayeiaaeseaaa,e
«.ta.ataeinstitutive communit.
1aeçess.|. |. tyei writing «.||assa:etaea|se|atet:ac. t. eaa| .zat. eaei
taee|]ee| . .tsa|se|ate.cea|O|]eet. ».ty~. e .taeça:.tyei. ts:e|at.ea
teaaa.»e:sa|t:aaseeaceata|sa|]eet. ».tyw:.t.a,«.||ceta. s|ye¬aa·
e.çat. a,seasei:e¬.tsactually present e».ceaeeie:a:ea|sa|]eetaac
i:e¬. tsç:eseate.:ea|at.ea«.ta.aacete:¬. aecee¬¬aa. ty 1aece·
e.s. »eiaaet. eaei«:.tteaesç:ess. ea.eiesç:ess.ea«a.eaceea¬eats..s
taat.t¬asesee¬¬aa.eat.eaçess.||e«. taeat. ¬¬ec.ate e:¬ec.ate
acc:ess. .t . s. se te sçeas. ee¬¬aa. eat.ea |eee¬e ».:taa| ( 1 64
¸¬ec. iec} ·
1aatvirtuality, me:ee»e:. .s aa a¬|.,aeas »a|ae. .t s. ¬a|taaeeas|y
¬asesçass. ».ty.ie:,etia|aess .aaca| |taeçaeae¬eaaeicrisis çess.||e
ra:i:e¬aa».a,teia||a,a.a.atea:ea|reale] a.ste:y.at:atataat«e
aa»e ,a.aec i:e¬ ta. s a.ste:y-se:.çta:a| sçat.ete¬çe:a|.ty ,«aese
e..,. aa|.ty«e «.||seea aeectecete:¬.ae·-saaet.easaacee¬ç|etes
tae es.steaeeeiça:et:aaseeaceata|a. ste:.e. ty w.taeat tae a|t.¬ate
e|]eet. ieat.ea taat«:.t.a,çe:¬.ts . a|||aa,aa,e «ea|c asyet:e¬a.a
Ego, " "the intrinsically frst other, " or of " the frst ' non-Ego' " i n t he constitution of the
alter ego, see notably CM, §§4S-49, pp. 1 05-0S.
Preobjecti ve and preexact temporali ty, which had to become the principal theme of the
transcendental aesthetics projected by Husserl (cf. notably FL, Concl usion, pp. 291 -92:
and CM, §6 1 q p. 1 46), i s then the root of transcendental intersubjecti vity. Al l the egos,
beyond al l possible diferences, can be encountered, recognized, and understood also in
the identity of the concrete and universal form of the Li vi ng Present. I n E, " tie as the
form of sensibility" i s described as the "ground" of the "necessary connection . . .
between the intentional objects of al l perceptions and positional presentifcations of an
Ego and a community of Egos" (§3S, p. 1 62 [modifed)) .
88
Jacques Derrida
eaçi.veeiiaeceiaeieaacaeiaa|. aieai.eaa|.iyeiasçea|.a,sa|]eeie:
eemmaa.iy eisçea|.a,sa|]eei s. ny a|se|aie|yv.:iaa|.z.a,c.a|e,ae,
«:.i.a,e:eaiesa|. aceiaaieaemeasi:aaseeaceaia|ie|ci:em«a.ea
eve:yç:eseaisa|]eeieaa|ea|seai
i aeeaaeei.ea«.iaiae,eae:a|s.,a.ieai.eaeiiaeepoche, ¡eaauyç·
çe|.ie .ave|es iae çess.|.| .iyeia sa|]eei|essi:aaseeaceaia|ie|c,
eae. a«a.eaiaeeeac.i.easeisa|]eei.v.iy«ea|caççea:aac«ae:e
iae sa|]eei «ea|c |e eeasi.iaiec sia:i.a, i:em iae i:aaseeaceaia|
ie|c w:.i.a,, as iae ç|aee eia|se|aie|y çe:maaeai .cea| e|]ee·
i. v.i.esaaciae:eie:eeia|se|aieO|]eei.v. iy,ee:ia.a|yeeasi.iaiessaea
ai:aaseeaceaia|ie| c. ~ac| .|e«.se, ie|e sa:e, i:aaseeaceaia|sa|·
]eei. v.iyeaa|eia||yaaaeaaeecaacaççea:eaiae|as. seiia.sie|ce:
. is çess.|. |.iy. 1aas a sa|]eei|essi:aaseeaceaia| ie|c .s eae ei iae
eeac.i.eas eii:aaseeaceaia|sa|]eei.v.iy
naia|| ia. seaa |e sa.c ea|yea iae |as.seiaa .aieai.eaa|aaa|ys. s
«a.ea :eia.as i:em «:. i.a, aeia.a, |ai «:.i.a, s ça:e :e|ai.ea ie a
eease.easaess«a.ea,:eaacs.i as saea, aacaei. isiaeiaa|.iy«a.ea,
|euie. ise|i,.sieia||y«.iaeais.,a.ieai.ea[insignifante] . re:ia.s a|·
seaeeeisa|]eei. v.iyi:em iae i:aaseeaceaia| ie| c, aaa|seaee«aese
çess.|.|.iy i:ees a|se|aieO|]eei.v.iy, eaa |eea|yaiaeiaa| a|seaee,
evea.i.i:emevecie:a||i.meiaeieia|.iyeiaeiaa|sa|]eeis. 1aee:.,.·
aa|.iyeiiaeie|cei«:.i.a, . s. isa|. | .iyiec. sçease «.ia,due to its
sense, eve.y ç:eseai :eac. a, .a ,eae:a| . nai .iiae iesi cees aei aa·
aeaaee.is e«aça:eceçeaceaeeeaa«:. ie:e::eace:.a,eae:a|,. e ,
.i.i.s aeiaaaaiec|yav. :iaa|. aieai.eaa|.iy, ,aac.iiae:e.saeça:e|y
]a:.c.ea|çess. |.|.iyei.i|e.a,. aie| |.,.||eie:ai:aaseeaceaia|sa|]e

i
.a,eae:a| ,iaeaiae:e.saeme:e.aiaevaea.iyei.issea|iaaaaeaaei.e
|.ie:a|aesse:iaeseas.||eeçae.iyeiaceiaaeices.,aai.ea,aces.,aai.ea
ceç:.vecei.isi:aaseeaceaia|iaaei. ea.1aes.|eaeeeiç:ea.sie:.ea:eaaa
aac|a:.ece.v. |.zai.eas, iaeeaiem|meaiei|esi. aieai.easaac,aa:cec
see:eis, aac iae . | |e,.|.|.iy ei iae |aç.ca:y .ase:.çi.ea c.se|ese iae
i:aaseeaeeaia|seaseeiceaiaas«aaiaa.iesiaeseia.a,sieiaea|se·
|aie ç:.v.|e,e ei . aieai.eaa|.iy . a iae ve:y . asiaaee ei .is esseai.a|
]a:.c.ea|ia.|a:e [en ce qui l' unit a l' absolu du droit intentionnel dans
l ' instance meme de son echecl .
waeaeeas.ce:.a,iaece]a:eça:.iyei.aieai.eaa|aa. mai.ea, uas-
se:|a|«ayssaysiaaitae| .a,a.si.ee:,:aça.e|ecy. saresa,aç:eçe:
|ecy ·¡e·/,.e:asç. :.iaa|ee:çe:ea|.iy(geitige Leiblichkeit) (FTL, §2, ç.
21 ) . r:em iaea ea, «:. i.a, . s ae |ea,e: ea|y iae «e:|c|y aac
´` We refer here to a comment by Jean Hyppolite during the discussion which followed
the lecture of Fr. Van Breda on "La Reduction phenomimologique, " in H usserl, Cahiers
de Royaumont, p. 323.
89
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
maemeieeaa.ea|a.cieai:aia«aesee«a|e. a,·sease«ea|cc.sçease
«.iaa||«:.i.a,·ce«a 1aeçess.|.| .iye:aeeess.iyei|e.a,.aea:aaiec
. aa,:aça.es.,a.sae| ea,e:s.mç|yesi:.as.eaaciaeiaa|.aeemça:.sea
«.ia.cea|O|]eei.v.iy. .i.siaesine qua non eeac.i.eaeiO|]eei.v.iy s
.aie:aa|eemç|ei.ea ~s|ea,as .cea|O|]eei.v.iy. saei ,e: :aiae:,can
aei |eea,:avec.aiae «e:|c-as |ea, as . cea|O|]eei.v.iy.s aei .aa
çes.i.eaie|eça:iyieaa.aea:aai.ea,«a.ea, .aiaeça:.iyei. issease .
.s me:e iaaaasysiemeis.,aa|s[signalisation] e:aaeaie:,a:meai,-
iaea .cea| O|]eei.v.iy . s aei ia||y eeasi.iaiec 1ae:eie:e, iae aei ei
«:.i. a, .s iae a.,aesi çess.|.| .iy eia| | "constitution, " a iaei a,a.asi
«a.ea iae i:aaseeaceaia| ceçia ei .cea| O|] eei.v.iy s a. sie:.e.iy .s
measa:ec.
waai r. a| «:.ies a|eai sçeeea .a a. s esee| |eai i:aase:.çi eiiae
Origin . sa fortiori i:aeie: «:.i. a,. i a seas.||e em|ec.meai eeea:s
iae |eea|. zai.eaaaciae iemçe:a|.zai.ea (Temporalisation) ei«aai. s.
|y.is|e.a,·sease, aa|eeaiecaacaaiemçe:a| , D. er:a,e, ç 2 1 0) .
saeaaie:ma|ai.ea:ema:|a||y saa:çeasiaeç:e|| emaaca«a|eas
iaeçeea|.a:v.:iaeei|aa,aa,e .iie|ea:|yi:aas|aiesuasse:|sesaei.a,
eae:iieeaieaiae. cea| .iyeiiaemai.eseaseaacei«e:cs[mots] .aiae. :
:e|ai.eas«.iaiae| .a,a.si.eeveai naiceesaeiia. s ie:ma|ai.eaçe:·
´¯ This sensible embodiment has the peculiar qualities [l'errngete] of both sense' s
inhabitation of the word [mot] and the here and now use of the word' s ideality. In the first
case, embodiment is at its l i mit the inscription of an absolutely "free" and objective
ideality (that of geometrical truth, for example) within the ' 'bound" ideality of the word,
or i n general of a more free ideality within a less free ideality. In the second case,
embodiment is that of a necessarily bound ideality, that of the word' s identity within
language, in a real-sensible event. But this last embodiment is still done through another
step of mediate ideality whi(h Husserl does not directly describe, but which we think can
be located on the basi s of strictly Husserlian concepts. It is a question of ideal forms or
vague morphological types (a notion that we will have ocasion to specify farther on) ,
which are proper to the corporeality of graphic and vocal signs. The forms of graphic and
vocal signs must have a certain identity which is imposed and recognized each time in the
empirical fact of language. Without this always intended and approximate ideal identity
(that of letters and phonemes, for example), no sensible language would be possible or
intelligible as language, nor could it intend higher idealities. Naturally, this morphological
ideality is still more "bound" than the word' s ideality. The precise place of the properly
termed realizing [realisante] embodiment is ultimately therefore the union of the sensible
form with sensible material, a union traversed by the linguistic intention which always
intends, explicitly or not, the highest ideality. Linguistic incaration and the constitution
of written or scriptural space suppose, then, a closer and closer "interconnection" of ideality
and reality through a series of less and less ideal mediations and in the synthetic unity of an
intention. Thi s intentional synthesis is an unceasing movement of going and returing that
works to bind the ideality of sense and to free the reality of the sign. Each of the two opera­
tions is always haunted by the sense of the other: each operation is already announced in the
other or still retained i n it . Language frees the ideality of sense, then, in the very work of its
"binding" ("interconnecting" [enchainement] ).
90
Jacques Derrida
¬.t| .a,a.st.eem|ec.meatte|eaace:steecasta|.a,ç|aeeeats.cetae
|e.a,·sease ei .cea| e|]eet.v.ty: ~s eeea::.a, e: aaesçeetec|y
aaççea.a, .aacc.t.eatetae|e. a,·sease:Deesaetta.sie:¬a|at.ea
,.ve tae . mç:ess.eataat.cea| e|]eet. v. ty . sia||yeeast.tatec as saea
before aacindependently of .tsem|ec.¬eat.e::atae:.|eie:eaac.ace·
çeaceat|yei.tsability to be embodied?
natuasse:|.as. ststaatt:ata.saetia||ye|]eet. ve .. e ..cea| ..ate||.·
,.||eie:eve:yeaeaac.aceia.te|yçe:ca:a||e. as|ea,as.teaaaet|e
sa.cand «:.ttea s.aee ta. s çe:ca:a|.|.ty . st:ata s ve:y sease. tae
eeac.t.easie:.tssa:v. va|a:e. ae|acec. ataeseei. ts|.ie uacea|tec|y.
t:ataaeve:|eeçstae.cea|O|]eet.v.tye:.ceat.tyeiaayei.tsça:t.ea·
|a:ceiaete| .a,a.st.e.aea:aat.eas .aacee¬ça:ect ea|||.a,a. st.eiaeta·
a|.ty.t:ema.asi:ee. natta.si:eecem.sea|yçess. ||eç:ee.se|yi:e¬
taemoment t:atacan .a,eae:a||esa.ce:«:.ttea.. e. .on condition taat
ta.scan |eceae.ra:aces.ea||y.taeçess.|. | .tyei|e.a,«:.tteafossibi­
lite graphique] çe:m.ts tae a| t.matei:ee.a,ei.cea| .ty. 1ae:eie:e . «e
eea|ca|||at:eve:setaete:mseir.a| s ie:¬a|a taeability eiseasete
|e| .a,a.st.ea||ye¬|ec.ec.s tae ea|y ¬eaas|y«a.easease|eee¬es
aeasçat. etemçe:a|
neeaase.cea|O|]eet.v.tyeaaesseat.a||y.aie:¬e:saaçetae|ecyei
sçeeeaaac«:.t.a,.aacs. aee.tceçeacseaaça:e|.a,a. st.e. ateat.ea.
.t .s :ac.ea||y .aceçeaceateiseas.||e sçat.ete¬çe:a|. ty. 1a. s ¬eaas
taatasçee.iesçat.etemçe:a|.ty. sç:ese:. |ecie:ee¬¬aa.eat.ea. aac
tae:eie:e ie: ça:e t:ac.t.ea aaca. ste:y. a sçat.etemçe:a|.ty taat es·
eaçestaea|te:aat.veeitaeseas.||eaactae.ate||.,.||e.e:taeemç.:.ea|
aactae¬ete¬ç.:.ea| .Cease¡aeat| y. t:ata.sae|ea,e:simply es.|ec.a
taeç:.¬e:c.a|eveatei. ts|aa,aa,e.itsa.ste:.ea|aa|.tataataeat.eates
ta.s eveat .]astas tae ç:eteceeameatauthenticates «aetae: . t. stae
ceçes.ta:yeiaa.ateat.ea.«aetae:.t:eie:s«.taeatia|s.ieat.eateaa
e:.,. aa|aacç:. ¬e:c.a|aet iaetae:«e:cs. «aetae:tae|. a,a. st. eeveat
:eie:steaaauthentic aet,.ataeuasse:|.aaseaseeitae«e:c· .|eeaase
.testa|| . saesat:ata·va| ae. . smace:esçeas.||eie:. t. aaceaaaççea|
tetae aa.ve:sa| .tyei.ts test.¬eay
uasse:|taas.ac.eatestaec.:eet.eaie:açaeae¬eae|e,yeitae«:.t·
tea ta.a,. sçee.iea||y. cese:.|.a,tae |ee| .a .ts aa.ty asaeaa.aei
s.,a. r eat.eas 1a.saa.tyeaa|e¬e:ee:| ess. cea|aacaeeessa:y.aac
tae:eie:e aa. ve:sa| . aeee:c.a,te tae|ee| s sease·eeateat
,

,
~acaet
!J:l l n the Origin, Husserl di stinguishes between literature i n the broad sense, the realm
of all written di scourse, and literature as l iterary art. The literary work i s often chosen by
Husserl as the cl ue for analyzing the ideality of cultural objecti vi ties. The ideal identity of
the work wi l l never be mistaken for i ts sensible embodi ments. It does not derive i ts i ndi ­
vi dual identity from the latter. The origin of identity , moreover, i s the criterion which
91
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
ea|yeaataat.cea|aa.ty|e¬e:ee:|ess|eaacteiaetaa| .ty.|ata|se
aeee:c.a,teaame:easaac eemç|ete|ye:.,.aa|ie:msaacmeca|.t.es
He:eeve:.tae:e|at.eaeitae ese¬ç|a:s t etae.:a:eaetyça|aa. ty. s
aacea|tec|yaa.¡aeamea,tae:eç:ecaet.easeietae:ea|ta:a|ie:¬a·
t.eas. esçee.a||y taese ei tae aea|.te:a:y a:ts r.aa||y. tae |ee| s
ç:eçe:ve| a¬eaacca:at.eaa:eae.tae:ça:e|yseas.||eçaeaemeaa.ae:
ça:e|y.ate||.,.||eaea¬eaa 1ae.:sçee.ieeaa:aete:see¬s. ::ecae.||e
1a.s |e.a, eitae |ee|. ta.s .astaaee eiprinted taea,at «aese
| aa,aa,e.saetaata:a| . Casteanaeae|a:cea||sa"bibliomenon. ·
permits us to di stinguish between the real and the ideal . Husserl writes in E (§65, pp.
265-66) : "We call real i n a specifc sense all that which, i n real thi ngs i n the broader
sense. is, according to its sense, essentially individualized by its spatiotemporal position;
but we call irreal ever determination which, indeed, is founded with regard to
spatiotemporal appearance in a specifcally real thing but which can appear in dif erent
realities as identical-not merely as simil ar" ( Husserl ' s emphasis) .
Thus the relation between the ideal and the real in all cultural objectivities (and frst in
all the arts) can be expl icated. That is relati vel y easy for the literary work. Thus,
"Goethe' s Faust i s found i n any number of real books (' book' denotes here what i s
produced by men and intended to be read: it i s already a determination which i s itself not
purely material. but a determination of signifcance !) , which are termed exemplars of
Faust. This mental sense which determines the work of art. the mental structure as such,
i s certainly ' embodied' i n the real world. but i t i s not i ndi vidual ized by thi s embodiment.
Or agai n: the same geometrical proposition can be uttered as often as desi red: every real
utterance has . . . identically the same sense" (ibid. , p. 26) .
But how can we determine the ideality of a work whose proto individualization is tied to
the work' s single spatiotemporal embodiment? How can we make i ts i deality appear by
varying factual exemplars. si nce the latter can only imi tate a factuality and not express or
" indicate" an i deal sense? I s i t, i n short. the same for the ideality of the pl astic arts. of
architecture? Or of music. whose case i s even more ambiguous? Although repetition may
be of a di ferent nature here. which in each case requires an appropriate and prdent
anal ysi s. i t i s no less possible in principle and thus makes an incontestable ideality
appear: "To be sure, an ideal object like Raphael ' s Madonna can in fact have only one
mundane state (Weltlichkeit) and i n fact i s not repeatable in an adequate identity (of the com­
plete ideal content). But in principle this ideal is indeed repeatabl e, as is Goethe's Faust"
(ibid. ) .
From the frst perception, then, of a work of plastic art as such (whose i deal value i s
primordially and intri nsically rooted i n an event), there i s a sort of i mmediate reduction of
factuality which permi ts, next, the neutralization of the necessary imperfection of re­
production. Here is not the place to prolong these analyses of aesthetic perception and
ideality. Husserl i s content to si tuate their domain and to defne prel i mi nary, i ndispens­
able distinctions . He proposes some analogous di stinctions in the cultural sphere of pol i­
tics and stri ves to bring to light both the ideality of the constitution of the state (of the
national wil l . for exampl e) and the originality of its "boundness" to the factual ity of a
territory, a nation, etc . , wi thi n which this constitution can be i ndefnitely repeated as i ts
ideal validity (ibid. , pp. 266-67) .
9 L' Activite rationaliste de l a physique contemporaine (Pari s: Presses U ni versi tai res
de France, 1 95 1 ) , pp. 6-7.
92
Jacques Derrid
iataeOrigin, uasse:|.||am.aatesme:ec.:eet|ytaatm. |. eaei«:.

t.a,
«aesec.uea|ts.,a.ieat.eaaac. mçe:taaeeaeaaca|:eacy:eee,mzec
. ataeLogical Investigations . 1aec.mea|tyei. tsces�:.�t.ea.scaete
taeiaettaat«:.t.a,ceiaes aac eemç|etes tae am|.,a.tyeia|||aa·
,aa,e. ~s taeç:eeesseitaatesseat.a|aaceeast.ta�.veeaç

ae.ty

ie:
em|ec.meat. |aa,aa,e.sa|se «ae:eeve:ya|se|ate|y. cea|e|,eet,. . e. .
«ae:et:ata,. s iaetaa||yaaceeat.a,eat|yem|ec.ec.Ceave:se| y.t:ata
aas.tse:.,.a.aaça:eaacs.mç|e:.,attesçeeeaaac«:.t.a,

.?ateaee
eeast.tatec .teeac.t.easesç:ess.ea. . a. ts ta:a. asaaemç.:. ea|iaet .
1:ata ceçe�cseatae ça:e çess.|. | . ty eisçea|.a,aac «:.t.r,.

|at. s
.aceçeaceatei«aat. s sçe|eae:«:.ttea. .aseia:

astaey a:e m tae
«e:|c ii. tae:eie:e. t:atasaae:s.a aac ta:ea,a .ts| aa,aa,e i:em a
ee:ta.aeaaa,ea||eaess. .tsce«aia||«.|||e|essaia||te«a:c|aa,aa,e
taaaace,:acat.ea«.ta.a| aa,aa,e.

r:emtaeaea..aeaeet .as.sç:ese:.|ecie:. t. sease.s,atae:ecmtea
s.,a. aac tae s.,a|eeemestae«e:|c|yaacesçesec:es.ceaee

eia�
aataea,att:ata.weaaveç:ev.eas|yseeataatt:atae�açe:ca:e. � ta.s
«ay«.taeat|e. a,taea,at.aaete:.aiaetaactaat. s«aat:�c.ea||;
emaae.çatest:atai:em a||emç.:.ea|sa|]eet. v. ty. a||iaetaa|| .�e. ��

c
tae «ae|e :ea| «e:|c. ~t tae samet.me. maa s eemmaaa||em, . s
|. uecteaae«|eve| , i -1, ..teaaaççea:..aeaeet . asat:aaseeace�ta|
eemmaa.ty.1aeaataeat.eaetei«:. t.a,. sat:aaseeaceata|:ecaet.e�
çe:ie:mec|yaacte«a:ctaewe. nats.aee. .ae:ce:teeseaçe«e:|

ci·
aess seasemust i:stbe able te|esetce«a. atae«e:|caac|eceçes.tec
.as�as.||e sçat.etemçe:a|. ty. .tmastçat.ts?�:�.ateat

.eaa|. cea|. ty.
. . e . . .ts t:ata· sease. .a caa,e:. 1aas a çess.|.| .ty. «a.ea evea ae:e
¨´ Cf. LI, I, Prol. , §6, p. 60: "Science exists objectively only in its literature, �n,� in
written work has it a rich relational being limited to men and their intellectual a�tlvltIes:
in this form it is propagated down the millennia, and survives individual s, generatIons and
nations. It therefore represents a set of external arrangements, which , ju
.
st as they arose
out of the knowledge-acts of many individuals, can again pass over into Just such a
.
ct� of
countless individual s, in a readily understandable manner, whose exact de
.
scnpt�on
would require much circumlocution" (our emphasis) . On this level of ana!ysl
.
s, which
above all should disengage the objective autonomy of signifcat
.
ion, th� questIo� I S c�early
that of "external arrangements": sensible exemplars on which neither the Ideahty of
sense nor the clear intention of cognition depends. But this fact neither prohibits nor contra­
dicts at all the subsequent theme of writing as the intrinsic possibilit and intr!nsic c

ndition
of acts of objective cognition. The Origin maintains these two themes. That IS the difculty
we are striving to il l uminate here.
¨´ We take this word in the broad sense of sign-signifer or "sign-expression" (graphic
or vocal), the meaning that Husserl gives this term by opposing it to the " ind�cative" sig
(LI, I , 1 , §§ 1 -5, pp. 269-75) . On the basis of this distinc�ion, we �ould Interpret the
phenomenon of crisis (which, for Husserl , alwa�s r�fer
.
s to
.
a dl sord�� or I11?
,
ess of l�ngua�e)
as a degradation of the sign-expression into a Sign-indIcatIOn, of a clear (klar) intentIon
into an empty symbol .
93
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
aeee:asea|y«.taemç.:.e.smaacaeaça. | eseçay.aççea:s. aaça.|ese·
çay«a.ea. s,at|east|eeaaseeiee:ta.amet.n,taeeeat:a:yeiemç.:.·
e.sm tae çess.|.|.ty eit:ata s diappearance. weça:çese| yase tae
am|.,aeas «e:c c. saççea:aaee waatc. saççea:s .s «aat .s aaa. a. ·
| atec.|ata|se«aateeases..ate:m.tteat|ye:ceia.te| y. teaççea:inJact
yet«.taeataaeet.a,.ts|e.a,e:|e.a,· sease.1ecete:m. aetaeseaseei
ta.s c. saççea:aaeeeit:ata. staemestc.mea|tç:e||emçesec|ytae
Origin aaca||eiuasse:| sça.|eseçayeia. ste:y.ra:tae:me:e.«e«e:e
aaa||eteiac.auasse:|aaaae¡a.veea|:esçeasetea¡aest.ea«a.ea
ea|yma|estaateiçaeaemeae|e,y. tse|i:eta:a.«aat. staeseaseei.ts
aççea:.a,:1aate¡a. veeat.ea«.| |ç:eseat|y:evea||etaae«maeatae
aatae:eitae Crisis «as a st:aa,e: te a. ste:y e: ae« iaacameata|| y
. aeaça||eae«aseita|.a,. t se:.eas| y. aacat«aatçe.at, . ataesame
memeat, ae st:. veste :esçeeta.ste:.e.ty s e«a çeea| .a: s.,a. | eat.ea
aacçess.|.i .tyaact:a| yteçeaet:atetaem.
waat taea .sta.sçess. |. |.tyeic.saççea:aaee:
i . iataei:stç|aee.|etas:a|eeattaeayçetaes. seiadeath oj sense
.a,eae:a|«.ta.atae. ac. v. caa|eease.easaess uasse:|e|ea:|ysçee.| es
.ataeOrigin aace|se«ae:e taat. eaee sease aççea:ec .ae,e |e,.ea|
eease.easaess. .tsteta|aaa.a.|at.ea|eeemes. mçess.|| e. ·~seasetaat
.seease:vecasasec.meata:yaa|.taa|.tyaac«aesece:maatçeteat.a|·
.ty eaa ce]a:e |e :eaa.matec . saet :etaoec te aeta. a,aess|ytae
vaa.sa.a,ei:eteat.easei:eteat.eas ra:i:em|e.a,açaeaemeae|e,·
.ea|aeta. a,. taese·ea||ec' unconscious' " e: ' universal substratum"
«ae:e sease.sceçes.tec.s a | .m.t·meceeieease.easaess(FTL, ç.
· i º, C|ea:|y.ata.styçeeiaaa| ys. s. açea«a.eaie:m.ca||ec.mea|·
t.esa|:eacy«e. ,a .uasse:|. sea|y«e::.eca|eattaeçe:maaeaeeaac
v. :taa|ç:eseaeeeisease«.ta. ataemeaac.esa|]eet.aacaeta|eattae
a|se|ate|y.cea|O|]eet.v.tyeisease,a.aecta:ea,asçeeeaaac«:.t.a,
i:emtaatsa|]eet. v.ty.Ne«ta.sO|]eet. v.ty.sieaacta:eateaecast:ata
. atae«e:| c. ProfoundJorgetJulness tae:eie:eesteacs.atetaesçaeesei
.ate:sa|]eet.v.tyaactaec.staaee|et«eeaeemmaa.t.es Forgetfulness
.s aa.ste:.ea|eate,e:y.
`´ I n Ideas I; in E; but above all in FTL ( i n terms which are literally taken up again in
the Origin) , cf. in particular Appendix I I , §2c, pp. 3 1 8-1 9.
08
On the naivete of the classic problems of the Unconscious and on the question of
knowing whether an intentional analysis can open a methodical access to the Uncon­
scious, see " Fink' s Appendix on the Problem of the ' Unbewussten,' " i n C, pp. 385-87 .
�¨ Forgetfulness is a word that Husserl rarely employs in the Crisis; he never uses it i n
the first text of the Origin, perhaps because habit relates it very easil y t o i ndividual
consciousness or to its psychological sense: perhaps also because it can suggest an
annihilation of sense.
94
Jacques Derri
2. 1ae,:aça.es.,a,tae,aa:aateeeiO|]eet.v.ty,eaaa|sein fact |e
cest:eyec. 1a.scaa,e:. s.aae:eat.ataeiaetaa|«e:|c|.aessei. ase:.ç·
t.ea.tse|i,aacaeta.a,eaaceia.t.ve|yç:eteet. ase:.çt.eai:emta. s. i a
saeaacase, |eeaaseuasse:|eeas.ce:sseaseae.tae:aa.a·.tse|iae:a
ça:e sç.:.taa| .ate:.e:.ty |at aa e|]eet ta:ea,a aac ta:ea,a, «e
m.,ati:stta.a|taattaeie:,etia|aess«a.eaie| |e«saçeataecest:ae·
t. eaeiO|]eet.v.ty s eastec.a|s. ,a[signe gardien] «ea| caetaaeet,as
. aa r| atea. sm e: ne:,sea. sm, tae sa:iaee eia sease «.taeat
aace:m.a.a,tae sease.tse|i. saeaaie:,etia|aess«ea|caetea|ysaç·
ç:essta. ssease|at«ea|caaa. a. |ate.t.ataesçee.ie|e.a,·. a·tae·«e:|c
te «a.ea .ts O|]eet.v.ty .s eat:astec. re: uasse:| e|ea:|y sa.c ta. s.
.aseia: as s.,aseaa|e. mmec. ate|yçe:eeçt.||e |yeve:yeae. atae. :
corporeality; .aseia: as tae.:|ec.es aac ee:çe:ea| ie:ms a:e a|«ays
a|:eacy.aaa.ate:sa|]eet.veae:. zea.taeaseaseeaa|eceçes.tectae:e
aaceemmaaa|.zec[mettre en communaUf] . Ce:çe:ea|este:.e:.tyaa·
cea|tec|yceesaetconstitute taes. ,aassaea|at,.aaseasetaat«e
mas|ma|ee|ea:.. sindispensable te.| .
Yet tae ayçetaes. s ei saea aiaetaa| cest:aet.eacees aet . ate:est
uasse:| a| a| | . wa.|e eemç|ete|y :eee,a. z. a, tae te::.iy. a,reality ei
taeea::ea|:. s|. ae«ea|cceay.taayta.a|a|| e. . . e. .aayça. |eseça. ea|
s.,a.| eaaee. Necea|tae«ea|cacm.ttaataaa. ve:sa|eeara,.at. ea.
a «e:|c·«.ce|a:a.a,ei|.|:a:. es. e:aeatast:eçaeeimeaameatse:
ceeameats .a ,eae:a| «ea|c. at:. as.ea| | y:ava,e |eaac ea|ta:a|
. cea|.t. es. «aeseaet.ea«eeve|eca|eve. nytae.:acae:eaeeteseme
iaetaa|.t,,taese. cea| .t.es, in their ver sense, «ea|c|eva|ae:a||ete
taat «e:|c|, aee. ceat Deata .s çess.||eie:taem a|eae aac aas tae
t:aaseeaceata|s.,a. aeat.ea«e]astae«,:aatec.t, |atea|,.aseia:as
tae |eaac¯ . cea| . t, .s aa. matec e: t:ave:sec |, a t:aaseeaceata|
.ateat.ea,ea|,. aseia:as.t.s,a. cec|,tae1e| eseiaaa|se|atei:ee.a,
«a.eaaasaet|eeaia| |,atta. aecuat| .|etaat«a.eae:.eatsuasse:| s
:eueet.ea, sçee.aea||,,taeia||,i:eec.cea|.t,aaca|se|ateO|]eet.v.t,
eisease,ie:«a.eamataemat.es. s taemece| ), taeta:eateiaa.at:. as. e
cest:aet.ea|ytae|ecyeitaes.,aeaa|e:a|eceat ~| |iae·aa|«:.t.a,s.
.a«a.ea|:ataeea|c|esec. meatec. «. | | aeve:|eaayta.a,. ataem·
se| ves|atseas.||eesemç| a:s. . ac.v.caa|eveats. asçaeeaac|.me
,«a.ea. sea|yt:aete+ ee:ta.ace,:eeie:|eaac. cea|. |. es,. s. aee
t:ata ceesnot esseat.a| |y ceçeac eaany of them, taey eea|call |e
cest:eyec «.taeateve:ta|.a,the ver sense of a|se|ate. cea|.ty. ua·
cea|tec|y. a|se|ate. cea|.ty «ea|c|e eaaa,ec. ma|.|atec. +ac eve:·
ta:e«ain fact; çe:aaçs.t«ea|cc. s+ççea:.aiaeti:emtae sa:i+eeei
tae«e:|c. |a| .ts sease·ei·|e.a,ast:ata. «a.ea.s aet.atae«e:|c-
ae.|ae:.aea:«e:|cae:e.ae·aayetae:-«ea|c:e¬a. a.ataet.a.tse|i
95
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
its |e. a,·sease «ea|c ç:ese:ve .ts e«aintrinsic a. ste:. e.ty. . |s e«a
.ate:eeaaeet. eas, aactaeeatast:eçaeei«e:|c|ya. ste:y«ea|c:ema.a
exterior te.t .
1aat .s «aat uasse:| meaas «aea ae eççesesinternal e: .at:.as.e
(innere) a.ste:.e.tyteexternal (aussere) a.ste:y.1a. sc. st.aet.ea, «a.ea
aasea|yaçaeaemeae|e,.ea|sease,. scee.s.ve. · it«ea|c|ei:a. t|ess
ie: a. mte e|]eettaat a.ste:.e.ty e:|e.a,·.a·a. ste:y .s ç:ee.se| y tae
çess.|.|.ty ei|e.a,intrinsically esçesec te taeextrinsic, ie:taeatae
a. ste:.e.tya|se|ate|yç:eçe:teaayt:ata· sease«ea|c|em. ss.a,,aac
uasse:| s c. seea:se«ea|c|eç|aa,ec. ateaeeaias.eaeis.,a.ieat.eas
aac :e,.eas . we «ea|c taea |e eeaeec.a,taat aça:e.cea|.tyeaa |e
eaaa,ec|ya:ea|eaase ,«a.ea.ste|esesease. ii,eemet:y.st:ae, .ts
.ate:aa|a.ste:ymast|e savec.ate,:a||yi:ema| |seas. ||ea,,:ess.ea.
s. aee,eemet:y.st.ecae.tae:teta. smemeatae:e,ae:teta.ste::.te:y
ae:e,ae:teta.s«e:|cae:e,|attea||tae«e:|c( Weltall) , aeta. a,«.| |
eve:staac|et«eeatae«e:|c|yesçe:.eaees«a.ea.aea:aatec,eemet:y
aac«aattaeyaave|e,aaa,a. a. c.seeve:.a,ai:esa,«.taeataayt:aees
aacaue:tae sa:eac.a,eita. s«e:|cae:e,tae çatas eiaaacveata:e
|a:.ec . a aaetae: :ea| a.ste:y. i aeemça:.sea «. ta veritas aeterna,
«aese ç:eçe:a. ste:.e.tyuasse:|«.saeste,:asç aac a|ea|«a.eaae
sçea|sme:eaacme:eeueaasa. staea,at|eeemesa|| a:ec|ya. ste:y.
ae :ea| ceve|eçmeatetae: taaa taat eitae va:.a||eesamç|e.ate:ests
a.m. ~eee:c.a,|y,taeayçetaes.seitae«e:|c·«.ceeatast:eçaeeea|c
evease:veasa:eve|ate:y| et.ea.
1aas, «esaea|c|ea||ete:eçeatanalogously taeiameasaaa|ys.sei
seet.ea 49 eiIdeas i ' 1ae aaa|ys.s eeae| acectaat. ai:e: a ee:ta.a
e.cet.e·t:aaseeaceata| :ecaet.ea, ça:e eease.easaess .s . ataa,. ||e,
evea «aea tae es. st.a, «e:|c .s aaa. a. | atece:iaetaa|esçe:.eaeec.s·
se|vec ta:ea,a.ate:aa|eear.et. . . . ate.||as.ea(Ideas I, §49, ç. 1 37
,mec.iec}, . uasse:|c. caetc. sçatetaataace:taesee.:eamstaaeesa||
eease.easaess«ea|cin fact |ecest:eyecaactaat.ts«e:|c|yes. steaee
«ea|c|eea,a|iec«.tatae«e:|c.iaacc.t.ea,taee|ea:est.ateat.eaei
´´The opposition between intrinsic penetration and extrinsic circumspection is al ­
ready announced in Ideas I, preci sel y concering the hi story of geometry. There Husserl
shows how psychologistic or hi storicist empiricism remains "outside" [ Derrida' s empha­
sis] "geometrical thought and intuition, " whereas "we should enter vital ly into these
acti vi ti es and . . . determine their immanent sense " (§25, p. 85 [modifi ed]). Once exter­
nal hi story i s "reduced, " nothing i s opposed to the fact that thi s immanent sense may
have its own parti cular hi stori ci ty. The opposition between the two hi stories i s an expl i ci t
theme i n the Crisis ( see, for exampl e, §7, pp. 1 7-1 8, and § 1 5, p. 7 1 ) , i n "Philosophy as
Mankind' s Self-Refection" (c, pp. 338-39), and above al l in the Origin.
l 0 l
P. 1 36. The movement i s taken up again i n CM, §7, pp. 1 7-1 8.
96
Jacques Derrd
ta. saaa|ys.saaciet.ea. steesç|.eatea:ecaet.ea«a.eamast:evea|te
tae|r·kegion-t:aaseeaceata| eease.easaess-taeesseat.a|:e|at. v.ty
eitae «e:|c s sease ,tae «e:|c |e.a, tae teta|.tyei:e,.eas, s.aee
t:aaseeaceata|eease.easaesseaaa|«aysaac«.taeemç|etei:eecem
mec.iye:sasçeactaetaes. seieach ,tae:eie:eeiall) eeat.a,eates.s·
teaee aac eieach ,tae:eie:e eiall) t:aaseeaceaee. .ts ve:y sease . s
ce]a:eaaca|se|ate|y. aceçeaceateitae«ae|e«e:|c.1aes.taat.eaei
t:ata. ça:t.ea|a:|y ei ,eemet:.ea| t:ata. . s aaa|e,eas. it tae:eie:e
ç:eve|estaesame¡aest.eas .
i aiaet. ta. se.cet.e. aceçeaceaee. |:ea,atte| .,at. aametaece|e,.·
ea|.cea|.sm|yaiet.ea.eaa|e¡aest.eaecaste. tsva|ae|eyeactae
memeateiIdeas I; . e . |eyeactaememeattaee. cet.e·t:aaseeaceata|
:ecaet.ea aas aet yet atta.aec .ts iaa| :ac.ea|.ty aac. s ç:ev.s.eaa||y
. mme|.|.zec. aeae:e,.ea.i aeaeet. tae:e,.eaeiça:eeease.easaess.s
tae:es. caeeia sasçeas.ea¯ taatst.|| :ema.asme:ee.cet.e taaa
t:aaseeaceata|aac.sea|ytaemestç:eieaaceitaee.cet.e:ecaet.eas
Yetta. ssasçeas.ea.«a.eateacstec|seeve:taeç:ete:e,.easesseat.a|
st:aeta:es aac .s ee:ta.a|yeeast.tat.veeitae«e:|c. .s eeast.tatec.t·
se|i.~ac. asuasse:|«.||say. . t. saettaea|t.mate t:aaseeaceata|
:e,:ess.ea(ibid. , §8 1 , ç.2 1 6) . 1 02 wea|cuasse:|aave]ac,ecta. siet.ea
va|.ctaememeataestac.ec,ie:esamç|e..ataeCartesian Meditations)
tae,eaet.eeeast.tat.eaeitaeego . ataeaa. ty¯ei. ts a. ste:y: ··
i a
aee:ta.asease«eeaa sayyes 1a:ea,atae se| .çs.st.eayçetaes. s. a
«a.eataeCartesian Meditations a:ei:steeaeaec. ça:eeease.easaess
. sst.||eeas.ce:ecastaat«a.eaae«e:|c|yiaetaa|.tyeaaçeaet:ateas
saea. as "a selfcontained nexus of being" (Ideas I, §49, ç 1 39
,mec.iec} ,. uacea|tec|y. tae .at:a·e,e|e,.ea|sec.meatat.ea. tae çe·
teat.a|ev. ceaee.tae :es. caes. aactae:eie:eaees¯

·taatta. s a.s·
te:y¯ ma|es aeeessa:y a:eea|yaaet«e:|eisease . nat|ytae.::e·
ç|aeea|. |.ty. .::eve:s.|.| .ty. aac.ava:. a|.| .tyeitae.:.ate:eeaaeet.eas.
a:etaeyaeta| se iaets¯ e:iaetaa| st:aeta:es«.ta:esçeette«a.ea
ça:eeease.easaess«ea|cae|ea,e:|ei:ee:Cea|ctaesesec.meata:y
st:aeta:es ce]a:e sa:v.vetaeaaa.a. |at.ea. taeeve:ta:e«. .aa«e:c.
tae eemç|ete va:.at.ea eiiaetaa|.ty: ~s sease. «ea|c taey aet|e
ma:|ec|yaee:ta.ae:ce:eitaeiaetaa|«e:|cte«a.eapast eease. eas·
aess. st.ec-aeease.easaesst. ectae:e|y. tse«a.ate:eeaaeet.easaac
st:aeta:a||y. mç| .eatec.aeve:yç:eseateease.easaess:
I 02
These fi rst reductions lead us to "the very threshold of phenomenology" (Ieas I,
§88, p. 237) .
' ``´ Already cited [see note 7 above] . Al so cf. on thi s FTL. Appendi x I I , � 2h .
pp. 3 1 6-1 7 .
` `` Already cited [ see note 7 above] .
97
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
uasse:|«ea|cç:e|a||y:eç|ytaat..asaeaaease.«ea:eeeas. ce:.a,
iaetaa| st:aeta:es . atae |.ie eitaeego-i . e. , st:aeta:es |eaac te
seme :ecae.||e eeat.a,eaey-aac aetesseat.a| eaes :ecaeecte tae.:
ça:e .cea|.ty. 1ae aa.ty eitaeego' s "histor" .staat eitaeeidos
"ego. " uasse:| s cese:. çt.ea meaas taat tae esseat.a| ie:m eieve:y
.ate:eeaaeet.ea. eve:ysec.meatat.ea. aactae:eie:eeve:ya.ste:y ie:
eve:yego .sse|i·saue.eat. w.ta.ata.s)o·¬eia. ste:.e.tytaat«e«.sa
teatta.aasaa.ava:.aat .a||iaete·a.ste:.ea|.ate:eeaaeet.easa:eva:. ·
a||e at«. ||
s. m.|a:|y.s. aeetae.ate:eeaaeet.easaacsec.meatat.easei,eemet·
:.ea|t:ataa:ei:eeeia||iaetaa| .ty.ae«e:|c|yeatast:eçaeeaaçattruth
.tse|i.acaa,e:.~||iaetaa|çe:.| .tae:eie:e.steçsattaeta:esae|cei.ts
.ate:aa|a.ste:.e.ty Ðvea. ia||,eemet:.ea|ceeameats ¯-aacas«e|| .
a||aetaa|,eemete:s-aacteeemete:a.aeaecay.tesçea|eita.sas
aaeveatei¯,eemet:y«ea|c|eteeemm.tave:y se:. easeeaias.ea
eiseaseaactea|c.eate:esçeas.|.| .tyie:a||:.,e:easc.seea:se Oae
eaaaeteeme|ae|tea| |ta.sev.ceaee«.taeatma|.a,taeseas.||etae
,:eaacei,eemet:.ea|t:ata aac. tae:eie:e. «.taeat¡aest.ea. a, eaee
me:etaeseaseei,eemet:yeeast.tatecasaae.cet.ese.eaee Ne«ta.s
sease«asseea:e|ycee.cec«.ta.ataestat.eaaa| ysestaat.as«esa«
a|eve. «e:e tae .ac.sçeasa||e,aa:c :a.| s ie:a|| ,eaet.e e:a. ste:.ea|
çaeaemeae|e,y
3 . we«ea|c|eia||yeeav.aeec..iae:e-as.a a.s stat.eaaa| yses-
uasse:|aaceeas.ce:ec«:.t.a,te|ea seas.||eçaeaemeaea natc.c
«eaet]ast iac eat taat «:.t.a,. .aasmaea as .t«as ,:eaac.a, ,e:
eeat:.|at.a,tetae,:eaac.a,ei·t:ata s a|se|ateO|]eet.v.ty.«asaet
merely aeeast.tatec seas.||e |ecy(Korper), |at «as a|se a ç:eçe:|y
eeast.tat.a,|ecy¡e·/)-tae.ateat.eaa|ç:.me:c.a|.tyeiaue:e·aac·
Ne«eit:ata: ii«:.t.a, .sboth aiaetaa| eveataactaeaçsa:,.a,ei
sease. .i.t .s |etaKorper aaa Leib, ae« «ea|c «:. t.a, ç:ese:ve . ts
Leiblichkeit i:emee:çe:ea|c.saste::uasse:|. saet,e. a,te. mme|. |. ze
a. saaa|ys.s«.ta.ata.sambiguity, «a.eaie: a.m .s ea|yaç:ev.s.eaa|
aaciaetaa| eeaias.eaei:e,.eas 1aeçaeaemeae|e,.stmastc.sse|ve
taeam|.,a.ty. . iaeceesaet«aatte|e:ecaeecte e¡a. veeat.ea. te
eaeese s. |eaee. e:teç:ee.ç.tate¡aeaemeae|e,y.atephilosophy. uas·
se:| .tae:eie:e .ma.ata.asa. sc. ssee. at.veaaa| ys.saacc.sa:t.ea|atestae
am|.,a.ty iae:ce:te,:asçtaeaata:eeitaecaa,e:ta:eatea.a,t:ata
itsel .a.tseeast.tat.vesçeeeae:«:.t.a,. .ae:ce:aette|eave. ate:·
aa| a.ste:.e. ty.ae. s,e.a,tet:ae|ce«atae.ateat.eaei«:.t.a,,e:ei
:eac.a,, .a.tse|iaac .a .ts ça:.ty. .a a ae« :ecaet.ea ae . s,e.a, te
.se|atetae.ateat.eaa|aet«a.eaeeast.tatesKorper as Leib aacma.ata.a
ta.saet.a.tsLeiblichkeit, . a.ts|.v.a,t:ata· sease saeaaaaaa| ys.sae
| ea,e:aasaayaeeceiKorper assaea Oa|y.atae.ateat.eaa|c. mea·
98
Jacques Derrid
s.eaeiaç:eçe:| yaa. mate|ecy, eitaegeistige Leiblichkit, me:eç:e·
e. se| y, .a tae Geistigkeit eitaeLeib ,te taeese|as.ea eia| | iaetaa|
ee:çe:ea| .ty, , . s sease .at:.as.ea||y ta:eateaec ~|taea,a .a a word
[mot], Korper aacLeib, |ecyaacresa ,a:einfact aame:.ea| | yeaeaac
taesamees.steat ,tae.:seasesa:eceia.t.ve|yaete:e,eaeeas, aacae·
ta. a,eaaeemetetae|atte:ta:ea,ataeie:me:Forgetulness eit:ata
.tse|i«.||taas|eaeta.a,|attaeia.|a:eeiaaaetaactaea|c.eat.eaeia
:esçeas.|. | .ty,a|açseme:etaaaaceieat-aacta.sie:,etia|aesseaa|e
maceteaççea:.açe:seaea|y eatae|as. s eiaa.ateat.eaa|a. ste:y
r:emtaea ea,«aetae:.t:ema.asastae c.saççea:aaeeei.ate:sa|·
]eet.vet:atae:,as«esa.ca|eve, aa.ste:.ea|eate,e:y,forgetfulness
eaaaeve:tae|ess|ecese:.|ecasaçaeaemeaeaeitaeego, aseaeei.ts
.ateat.eaa| ¬ec.ieat.eas ~s. ateat.eaa|sease, eve:yta.a,eaaaac
saea|c|ecese:.|ecea| yasamec.ieat.eaeitaeça:eego, ç:ev.cectae
seaseeieaea¬ec.| eat.ea.s ç:aceat| y:esçeetec, asuasse:|t:.este
ce,ie:esamç|e, eeaee:a.a,taec.uea|teeast.tat.eaeitaealter ego.
wea|seseetaat ,ie:taesame:easea,ie:,etia|aess«. ||aeve:|e:ac.·
ea| ,ae«eve:ç:eieaac.tmay|e,aacseaseeaaa|«ays, .aç:.ae.ç|eaac
ce]a:e ,|e:eaet.vatec
iaFormal and Transcendental Logic aactaea .ataeCrisis, | .a,a. st.e
e|]eet.ieat.eaaacmataemat.ea|sym|e| .zat.ea«e:e ç:eseatecastae
eeeas.ea ei tae teeaa.e. st s aac e|]eet. v. st s a|.eaat. ea, «a.ea ce·
,:acecse.eaee. ateas|.||e:,ame'·1a.saeeasat.ea,ta|eaaça,a.a.a
taeOrigin, . sme:eça:t.ea|a:|yc. :eeteca,a. asttaemetaece|e,.ea|aac
eçe:at.ve teaea. a, ei mataemat.es Oae |ea:as te ase s.,as «aese
ç:.me:c.a| sease ,«a.ea . s aet a|«ays |ae |e,.ea| sease taat .s
sec. meatec aac aeeess.||e te aa explication) . s eeaeea|ec e: çetea·
t.a| .zecaace:sec.¬eatat.eas 1ae| atte:, «a.eaa:eea| y.ateat. ease:
.ateat.eaa| seases mace ce:maat, a:e aet ea|ysuperimposed .a tae
.ate:aa||eeem.a,eisease,|ata:eme:ee:| essv. :taa| | yimplicated .a
tae.:teta| .ty.aeaeasta,ee:steç,iataeOrigin, taeaet.eaeiStufe aas
|etaast:aeta:a|aac,eaet.eseaseaaceaa|et:aas|atec|y steç e:
|y sta,e· 1ae ,ee|e,.ea|. ma,e ei sec. meatat.ea t:aas|ates :e·
¬a:|a||y«e||taesty|e eitaat. mç| .eat.ea it|:.a,ste,etae:,ie: a||
.ateats aac ça:çeses, tae ie| |e«. a, . ¬a,es. 1ae .ma,e eilevel e:
stratum-what .s ceçes.tec |y aa .a:eac e: a ç:e,:ess.ea aite: tae
:ac.ea|aeve|ty eiaa .::açt.eae:upsurge: eve:yacvaaee, eve:y ç:e·
çes.t.ea(Satz) eiaae« sease .sat the same time aleap (Satz) aac a
` ``´ Cf. in particular C, §9f On "meaningless signs" [signes depourvus de signifcation]
and "games-meani ng" [signifcation de jeu] , cf. LI. I , 1 , *20. pp. 304-06. On vocables
and real signs as "bearers" of signifed idealities, cf. E, §65, p. 268.
99
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
sedimentar (satzartig) ia|||ae|eisease ~|se , tae .ma,eeitae sa|·
staat.a|çe:maaeaeeei«aat. staea'upposed e:situated under taesa:·
iaee eiaetaa|| yç:eseatev. ceaee ~ac iaa||y, tae . ma,eeitae eea·
eea|ecç:eseaeetaataa aet.v.tyeieseavat.eaeaaa|«ays:e·ç:ecaee
a|eve ,:eaac as tae ieaacat.ea, taat . s .tse|i,:eaacec, ei a. ,ae:
st:at.ieat.eas it|:.a,sa|| ta.s te,etae:. atae st:aeta:a|aacinternal
aa. tyeiasystem,eia:e,. ea. a«a.eaa||ceçes.ts,.ate::e|atec|at
c.st.aet,a:ee:.,.aa||yç:ese:.|ec|yaaarchi-tectonics.
Ceai:eat.a, sec.meatec sease, ea: i:st caa,e: . spassivity. ia tae
Origin, uasse:|c«e|| sme:eeatae:eeeçt.veaeeeçtaaeeeis.,as-i:st
.a:eac.a,-taaaeataeseeeaca:yteeaa.ea|e:|e,.ea|aet.v.tytaat. s
aetea|yaeteeat:ac.ete:y tetaei:stçass.v. ty |at, eataeeeat:a:y,
saççeses. t 1ae syataes.s«a.eaa«a|eas tae s.,a te s.,a.ieat.ea. s
i:st, .aiaet, aeeessa:.|yçass. veaacassee. at.ve ·1aeçess.|. | .tyei
,.v.a,«ayteta.si:stexpectation eisease.sa| ast.a,caa,e: natea|y
freedom eaa|et.tse|i|eta:eateaec. ata.s«ay.«ea:ea|«aysi:eete
:ea«a|eaaayçass. ve| y:eee.vecsease,te:eaa.matea||. tsv.:taa|.t.es,
aacte t:aasie:mtaem|ae| . atetaeee::esçeac.a,aet.v.ty
1a.si:eecem. stae eaçae.tyie::eaet.vat.eataat|e|ea,se:.,.aa||yte
eve:y aamaa|e.a, as a sçea|.a,|e.a, ( 1 6) . nyta. s :eaet.vat.ea,
«a.ea, uasse:|states , .saet.aiaet taeae:maac«.taeat«a.eaa
ee:ta.a eemç:eaeas.ea .s a|«ays çess.|| e, i aet.ve| y :e·ç:ecaee tae
ç:.me:c.a|ev.ceaee .ima|emyse|iia||y:esçeas.|| eie:aaceease. eas
eitaesease taati ta|e aç Reaktivierung . s, .a taecema.a ei.cea|
e|]eet.v.t.es , tae ve:y aeteia||Verntwortung aaceia| |Besinnung, . a
taeseasesceiaecea:|.e:Reaktivierung çe:m.ts|:.a,.a,te|.ie,aace:
tae sec.meata:y sa:iaees ei | .a,a.st.e aac ea|ta:a| ae¡a. s.t.eas, tae
seasea:.s.a,i:em. ast.tat.a,ev.ceaee1a.ssease.s:eaa. matec|ytae
iaettaat i :este:e.tte.ts ceçeaceaeeeamyae|aac :eç:ecaee.t .a
myse|isaea as.taac|eeaç:ecaeecie:taei:stt. me|yaaetae: Oi
eea:se,taeaet. v.tyei:eaet.vat.ea.sseeeacwaat.t,.ves|ae|teme
l 0ö
This theme of passi ve synthesis is copiousl y explicated i n EJ and eM, but once
again it is in FTL that it i s particularly focused (as in the Origin) by the problem of the
sign and of the sedi mentation of ideal objecti vities. Cf. i n parti cular Appendix I I , pp.
3 1 3-29. On the sense of acti vities and passi vities in a phenomenology of reading as
outlined in the Origin, also see FTL, § 1 6, pp. 56-60.
Of course, the themes of passivity and sedimentation, i . e . , of the potentiality of sense ,
deri ve all thei r seriousness from the fact that they are imposed on a philosophy of actually
present evidence whose "pri nciple of all principles" is the immediate and actual [en acte]
presence of sense itself. If reactivation is valuable and urgent, that is because it can bring
back to present and acti ve evi dence a sense which is thus retrieved out of historical
vi rtual i ty. If, on the surface, phenomenology allows itself to be summoned outside of
itself by hi story, i t thus has found i n reactivation the medi um of its fdel i ty.
100
Jacques De"id
|staee:|,.aa||yç:eseat|ve|ata| t|ea,taateitae,eemet:|ea|ie:mat|ea,
ie:esamç|e,«a|ea| s|etaaaaet|v|tyaacaçass|v|ty.i ita| saet|v|ty|s
esçee|a||y|||am|aatecae:e,|t|saecea|t|eeaasetaeev|ceaeeeeas|c·
e:ec |s taateie:eatecaacesta|||saec|cea|ie:mat|eas . ··
xesçeas||| ||t,ie::eaet|vat|ea| saee·:esçeas|||||t,. ttea,a,estae
eae«ae:eee|ves ,|ata|seaaca:steia||taeeae«aee:eatesaactaea
esç:essestaeseaseie:sec| meatat|ease|||te:ateseaseea|,|aseia:as
tae:ea:esa:iaeesava||a||eie:ta| s. 1aeequivocit eiesç:ess|ea|stae
eaeseaae|ceisec|meata:yceçes|ts .1aat.s«aytaeç:|ma||y| ast|tat·
|a,,eemete:aactaese«aeie| |e«aite:a|mmast|eeeaee:aeca|eat
taeaa|vee|tyei| |a,a|st|eesç:ess|eaaaca|eatseea:|a,, |yave:y
ea:eia|ee|a|a,ei«e:cs, ç:eçes|t|eas,aaceemç|eseseiç:eçes|t|eas,
t ae:esa|ts«a|eaa:ete|eaa. veea||yesç:essec( 1 65 ,mec|aec}, .
uasse:| aeve: eeasec te aççea| te tae |mçe:at|ve ei aa|vee|ty
Сa|vee|ty|staeçataeia| | ça||eseça|ea|a|e::at|ea. i t |sa| | taeme:e
c|uea|taette|eaasty ae:e , astae sease eie¡a|vee|ty |a,eae:a| |s
|tse|ie¡a|veea| . 1ae:e |sacontingent ç|a:|vee|ty e:ma|t|s|,a|aeaaee
aacaaessential eae. 1aese a:ea|:eacyc|st|a,a|saec|ataeInvestiga­
tions (LI, i , 1 , § 26, ç 3 1 4) . 1aea:stceçeacseaaae|]eet|veeeavea·
t|ea, taas tae«e:c ce, s|,a|aes |eta atyçeeiaa|ma| aac,|a
Ce:maa,atyçeei«a,ea, asec| am|aes, . 1a|sç|a:|vee|tyceesaet
m|s|eacaayeaeaac«ea:ea|«aysi:eete:ecaee|t. · 1aeseeeac|sei
¡01
To try to illuminate this point, we first would have to approach directly and fo itself
the difcult and decisive problem in phenomenology of activity and passivity in generl
on the basis of texts directly devoted to thi s (EJ, FTL, eM) . Such a study would perhaps
have to conclude that phenomenology has only argued with the arbitrary sense
[exigence du sens] of this couple of concepts, or indefnitely struggled with them, nael y,
wi th the most "irreducible" heritage (and indeed thereby perhaps the most obscuring
heritage) of Wester philosophy. In one of the fnest analyses where he works with the
concepts of passivity, activity, and passivity in activity, Husserl notes that the distinction
between these two notions cannot be "infexible, " and that in each case their sense must
be "recreated" according to "the concrete situation of the analysis, " as "for every
description of intentional phenomena" (E, §23 , p. 1 08) .
I 08
LI, I , 1 , § 26, p. 3 1 4: "The class of ambiguous expressions illustrated by this last
example are what one usually has in mind when one speaks of 'equivoation' . Ambiguity
i n such cases does not tend to shake our faith in the ideality and objectivity of
signifi cations. We are free, in fact, to limit our expression to a single signification. The
ideal unity of each of the difering signifcations will not be afected by their attachment to
a common designation" [modifed] .
The purpose of univocity supposes, then, a decisive rupture with spontaneous lan­
guage, with the "civil language " of which Leibniz used to speak; after that, "philo­
sophical" or "scholarly [savant]" language can freely be given its own particular con­
ventions. Does not the sentence just cited sound like the faithful echo of another sentence
of the Nouveaux Essais sur l' Entendement Humain, well known to Husserl and where
101
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
sa|]eet.vee:|,.a, aac.tceçeacseae:|,.aa||ateat.eas. eaa|«aysae«
esçe:|eaees«a|eaaa.matetae.ceat.tyeie|]eet.veseaseaacmase.t
eate: .ate aaie:eseea||e eeaa,a:at.eas . 1a. s ç|a:. vee. ty . s aa aa·
ave|ca||e:atae:taaaeaaaeeam|.,a.tyflurivocite], eaetaateaaaet|e
:emevec i:em ea: |aa,aa,e |y aa a:t|ae. a| cev.ee e: eeaveat.ea
(LI, ç 3 1 4) .
ue«eve:.ta|s|aste¡a.vee.ty. s«aatse|eaeeaacça. |eseçay mast
eve:eeme. i t . s aaave.ca||e ea|y.a aata:a| |aa,aa,e. | e , |atae
iaete·ea|ta:a|çaeaemeaeaç:eeec|a,tae:ecaet.ea 1aatuasse:|. sse
aas.eas te :ecaee tae e¡a|veea| sease eiea|ta:a| aa.vet- :evea| s a
eeaee:ataateaeeme:eeea|c|e.ate:ç:etec|etaasa:eiasa|eia.ste:y
aacasaceeçice|.tytetaeça:eseaseeia|ste:|e.tyOn the one hand, .a
eaeet . aa|vee.ty :emevest:ata eateia. ste:y s :eaea ua. veea|ex·
ç:ess|ea eemç|ete| y |:ea|s tae sa:iaee aac eae:s ae ta:a.a, |ae|
[rep/i] tetaeme:ee:| essv.:taa|s|,a|ieat|eastaattae.ateat.easeea|c
ceçes.ta||a|ea,taeacvaaeeseia|aa,aa,ee:ea|ta:e. 1aasuasse:| s
eeastaatassee|at|eaeie¡a. veea|ç:eeeec.a,s«. ta ae:.t|e.smei pro-
fundity |saace:staaca||e · neeaase.t|:|a,seve:yta|a,tev.e««|ta.a
aç:eseataeteiev. ceaee, |eeaase aeta|a,. sa|cceae:aaaeaaeec|a
taeçeaam|:aeiçeteat.a||ateat|eas, |eeaase . taas maste:eca| |tae
cyaam|eseisease.aa. veea||aa,aa,e:ema|asthe same. ittaas|eeçs
|ts. cea| . ceat|tyta:ea,aeata| | ea|ta:a| ceve|eçmeat. it.staeeeac.·
t.eataata| |e«seemmaa|eat|eaamea,,eae:at|easei|avest.,ate:sae
matte:ae« c|staat aac assa:estae esaet|tace eit:aas|at.ea aactae
Theophilus says: "i t depends upon us to fix their meanings [signifcations] , at least in any
scholarly language, and to agree to destroy this tower of Babel" (Book I I , Ch . i x, §9 [ET:
New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, tr. Alfred Gideon Langley (Chicago:
Open Court, 1 91 6), p. 373]) 7 This optimism i s only one of the afnities between Leibniz' s
and Husserl's philosophies of language: More broadly speaking, Husserl also very early
felt himself the heir to the Leibnizian conception of logic in general. Cf. notably LI, I ,
Prol . , §60, pp. 21 8f.
I09
On this, cf. above all "PRS, " p. 1 44: "Profundity [Tiefsinn] i s a mark of the chaos
that genuine science wants to transform into a cosmos, into a simple, completely clear,
lucid order. Genuine science, so far as its real doctrine extends, knows no profundity. "
Husserl then proposes t o re-strike (umprigen), as i n the case of a currency rvaluation,
"the conjectures of profundity into unequivocal [German: eindeutige; French: uni­
voques] rational forms" and thus to "constitut[e] anew the rigorous sciences. " Likewise,
Husserl ' s criticisms written in the margins of [Heidegger's] Sein und Zeit attribute to a
Tiefsinnigkeit the responsibility for the Heideggerian "displacement" toward what Hus­
serl defnes as a facto-anthropological plane. Husserl prefers the value of interiority to
that of profundity or depth, interiority being related to the penetration of interal, intrinsic
(inner), i . e. , essential (wesentlich), sense.
102
Jacques Derrida
ça :.|y ei |:a!. |.ea | a et|e: «e:!s» the other hlndt| e ·e:y
¬e¬eataa. ·ee.|y:e¬e»essease-eyeactae:eaeaeia. ste:.ea|¬ec.i·
eat.ea..ta|eae¬asesça:ea. s|e:yçess. -| e.. e .astaet:aas¬. ss. eaaac
:eee||ee|.ea[recueillement] eisease ua. »ee.tyea|y. ac. eatestae|. m·
ç. c. |yei||e |. ste:.ea|etae: Oaeea,a. a. uasse:| s !e¬aa!ie: aa. ·
»ee.ty ,«|.e| |e ie:¬a|atec -eie:e taeç:aet.ee ei|ae:ecaet. ea· . s
|ae:eie:eea|ytae:ecae|. eaeie¬ç.:.ea||. ste:yte«a:caça:ea. ste:y
·ae| a :e!aet.ea ¬as| -e :eee¬¬eaee! .aceia.te| y. ie: |aa,aa,e
ae.t|e:eaaae:saea| !-e¬a. ata.aecaace:taeç:eteet. eaeiaa. ·ee.ty
iia:ac.ea|e¡a. »ee.t,ç:ee|aces|.ste:y..aeaeet . -yç|aa,.a,.t. ate
t|eaeeta:aa|aac . | |·t:aas¬.ss.-|e:.eaesei -eaac .cea| . t. es. a-se·
| ateaa.»ee.ty«ea|c.tse|iaa»eaeetae:eease¡aeaeetaaateste:.| .ze
e: ça:a|yze |.ste:y . at|e .ac.,eaee eiaa .aceia.te .te:at.ea s.aee
e¡a. »ee.|ya|«ayse».ceaeesaee:ta.aceçtaeice»e| eç¬eataaceeaeea| ·
¬eateiaçast. aac«|eaeae«. saest eassa¬eaacinteriorize t|e¬e¬e:y
eiaea|ta:e. aas. aceirecollection (Erinnerung) .at|eue,e| . aasease.
eaeaas. iae. a,t|. se¡a.»ee.ty.|aeeae.eeeit«eeacea»e:s Oae«ea|c
:esem-|etaatei¡ames¡eyee.te:eçeataactase:esçeas. -.| .tyie:a| |
e¡a.»eeat.ea.tse|i.at. | .z.a,a|aa,aa,etaateea|ce¡aa| .zetae,:eatest
çess.-|esyaea:eay«.t|| ae,:eatestçeteat.a|ie:-a:. ec. aeea¬a|atec.
aac .ate:«e»ea .ateat.eas«.ta.a eaea | .a,a.st.e atem. eaea»eea-|e.
eaea «e:c. eaea s.¬ç|eç:eçes.t.ea. .a a|| «e:c| yea|ta:es aac tae. :
¬est .a,ea.easie:¬s ,¬ytae|e,y. :e|.,.ea. se.eaees. a:ts. | . te:ata:e.
çe|.t.es. ça. | eseçay. aac se ie:ta· ~ac. | .se ¡eyee. ta. s eacea»e:
«ea|ct:ytemasetaest:aeta:a|aa.tyeia||e¬ç.:.ea|ea| ta:eaççea:.a
tae,eae:a|.zece¡a. »eeat.eaeia«:. t.a,taat.ae|ea,e:t:aas|at.a,eae
| aa,aa,e . ate aaetae: ea tae -as. s eitae.: eemmea ee:eseisease.
e.:ea| atesta:ea,aeata| ||aa,aa,esateaee.aeeama|atestae. :eae:,. es.
aetaa|.zes tae.: mestsee:et eeaseaaaees. c.se|esestae.:a:tae:mest
ee¬¬ea ae:.zeas , ea|t. »ates tae.: assee.at.»e syataeses . asteac ei
a»e. c. a,taem. aac:ec.see»e:staeçeet.e»a|aeeiçass.».ty i asae:t.
:atae:taaaçat.teateiç| ay «.ta¡aetat.ea¬a:ss. :atae:taaa :e·
caee. t. ta. s«:.t.a,:ese| ate|ysett|es. tse|iwithin taelabyrinthian ie|c
eiea| ta:e-eaac-y.tse«ae¡a.»eeat.eas.. ae:ce:tet:a»e| ta:ea,a
aac esç| e:e tae »astest çess.-|e a.ste:.ea| c.staaee taat .s ae« at a||
çess.-|e
'
I
´ Exactitude and univocity are overlapping notions for Husserl . Moreover, the exac­
titude of expression will have as its condition the exactitude of sense. Geometry, the
model of the sciences whose objects are exact, will therefore more easily attain univocity
than will the other sciences, phenomenology i n particular. We will retur to this l ater.
About the relations between exactitude and univocity in geometry, also cf. Ideas I, § 73,
pp. 1 89-90.
103
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
1aee|ae:eacea»e:. suasse:| s. |e:ecaeee:. ¬çe»e:.s|e¬ç.:.ea|
|aa,aa,emet|ec.ea||ytetaeçe.at«|e:e.|saa. »eea|aact:aas|ata-|e
e|e¬eats a:e aetaa| |y t:aasça:eat. .a e:ce: te :eae| -aesaac ,:asç
a,a.aat .|s ça:esea:ee aa.ste:.e.tye:t:ac.t.eaa|.tytaatae ceiaete
a.ste:.ea|teta|.ty«. | | y.e|cei.tse|i1|. sa.ste:.e.tye:t:ac.t.eaa| .ty.s
a|«aysa|:eacyç:esaççesec-ye»e:yOcysseaa:eçet.t.eaei¡eyee s
tyçe .as -ya||philosophy ofhistor ,.ataeea::eatsease·aac-ye»e:y
phenomenology ofspirit. 1aeesseaeeseiaa.teteta|.t.esaactaet,çe| ·
e,,eia,a:eseitaesç. :.t«. | | a|«a,s-e. cea| .t.estaata:e -eaacte
e¬ç.:.ea|a. ste:,Oa| ,-,meaaseia. ste:.e. sm. s .tçess. -| ete:ema.a
tae:eaaceeaiasetae¬«. tataemevemeateit:ata
l l l
natuasse:| s ç:e]eet . ast|e t:aaseeaceata| ça:a| |e| te ¡eyee s.
sae«staesa¬e:e| at.».ty¡eyee sç:e]eet. «a.eaa|seç:eeeececi:e¬
aee:ta.aaat. ·a.ste:.e.smaaca«. | |tea«asei:emtaea.,|tma:e
ei |.ste:y.
* ! ! 2
a«. | |te¬aste: taata.,atma:e.a ateta|aacç:eseat
:esamçt.ea. eea|c ea|y saeeeec -y a| |ett.a, .ts saa:e te aa.»ee.ty.
«aetae:.t¬.,atc:a«i:e¬a,.»eaaa. »ee.tye:t:yteç:ecaeeaaetae:
Otae:«.se. tae»e:ytestei. ts:eçet.t.ea«ea|caa»e-eeaaa.ate|| .,.·
-| e . at |east .t «ea|c |a»e :e¬a.aec se ie:e»e: aac ie:e»e:yeae
i.se«.se. uasse:| aac teac¬.taa .::ecae.-|e. ea:.ea.a,.aaca|«ays
:eaaseeate¡a. »ee.ty. ateça:e|. ste:.e.tyiaeaeet .a-se|ateaa. »ee. :y
.s. ¬a,.aa-|eea|y. at«e| . m.t.a,eases First: saççesetaeces.,aatec
ta.a,.saetea| yaaa-se|ate|ys.a,a|a:. .mmata-|e.aacaata:a|e-]eet.
-at a| se aa es.steat «aese aa.ty . . ceat.ty. aac O-]eet.».ty «ea|c .a
tae¬se| »es-eç:.e:tea| |ea|ta:eNe«.i«esaççeset|a|saeaat|. a,
e:çe:eeçt.ea es. sts. |.a,a.st.e.cea|.tyaac .ts ç:e]eet eiaa.»ee.ty-
. e . tae aet ei |aa,aa,e .|se|i. ate:»eae aac i:e¬ t|e eatset ç| aee
taat saççes. t. ea .aaea| ta:e. .aa aet«e:sei| .a,a.st.e :e| at.eas aac
eççes|t. eas. «a.ea «ea|c |eac a«e:c «.ta .ateat.ease:«. ta |ate:a|
aac». :taa|:e¬. aseeaees Сa.»ee.ty. stae eea,eat.a| ¬a:seie»e:y
ea|ta:e 1a.s i:st ayçetaes.s eia aa. »eea| aac aata:a| | aa,aa,e .s.
tae:eie:e. a-sa:caaceeat:ac.ete:y
Second: .saettae:esa| ttaesame.i.attaeet|e:çe|eei| aa,aa,e.aa
a-se| ate| y.cea| e-]eetmast-eces.,aatec:1a.st.me. tae eaaaeeie:
'
I I
Husserl has always associated "Hegelianism" with "romantici sm" and wi th "hi s­
tori ci sm, " to which romanticism is led when "belief" in its "metaphysics of history" has
been lost. (Cf. especially " PRS, " pp. 76-77. ) Was not the e xpression Weltanschauung
frst Hegelian? (Cf. on this J. Hyppol ite, Genesis and Structure ofHegel' s "Phenomenology
of Spirit, " tr. Samuel Cheriak and John Heckman [Evanston: Northwester Uni versity
Press, 1 974] , pp. 469-70. )
I I ?
James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Random, 1 961 ) , p. 3 4 [ "Hi story, Stephen sai d, i s
a nightmare from which I am trying t o awake. "] .
104
Jacques Derrida
aa.vee.ty«ea|caet|eeae:ec|yaç:eea|ta:a| ,|at|yat:aasea|ta:a|
e|]eet, ie: esamç|e, tae ,eemet:.ea| e|]eet. ia aay ease, aa. vee.ty
ee::esçeacstetaeve:y veeat.eaeise.eaee. uasse:|«:. tes.ataeOri­
gin: ia aeee:c «.ta tae esseaee ei se.eaee, taea, . ts aaet.eaa:.es
ma.ata.a tae eeastaat e| a. m, tae çe:seaa| ee:ta.aty, taat eve:yta.a,
taeyçat. atese.eat.ieasse:t.easaas|eeasa.c eaeeaacie:a|| , taat. t
staacsiast, ie:eve:.ceat.ea||y:eçeata||e,asa||e.aev.ceaeeaacie:
a:tae:taee:et.ea|e:ç:aet.ea|eacs-as.aca|.ta||ya||ete|e:eaet.·
vatec«.tatae. ceat.tyei.ts,eaa. ae sease ( 1 65-66 ¸mec.iec} , .
natta. s.ceat.tyeisease,tae,:eaaceiaa. vee.tyaactaeeeac.t.ea
ie::eaet.vat.ea,.sa|«ays:e| at. ve, |eeaase.t.sa|«ays.ase:.|ec«.ta.a
ame|.|esystemei:e|at.easaacta|es. tssea:ee.a¬.aia.te|yeçea
ç:e]eeteiae¡a.s.t.ea. Ðvea .itaese :e| at.eas a:e, «. ta. aa se. eaee,
:e|at.easeiça:e. cea|.t.esaact:atas, taeyceaettae:e.a,. ve:. æ
aay|esstesemes.a,a|a:ç|ae.a,s.açe:sçeet.ve[mises en perspectives],
semema|t.ç|e.ate:eeaaeet.easeisease, aactae:eie:esememec.ate
aacçeteat.a|a.ms. i i, .aiaet,e¡a.vee.ty. sa|«ays.::ecae.||e, taat. s
|eeaase«e:csaac| aa,aa,e.a,eae:a|a:eaet¬ceaaaeve:|ea|se·
|ateobjects. ' 1aeyceaetçessessaay:es. staataacçe:maaeat.cea·
t.tytaat.sa|se|ate| ytae.:e«a. 1aey aavetae.:| . a,a.st.e|e.a,i:em
aa.ateat.ea«a.eat:ave:sestaemasmec.at.eas.1ae same «e:c.s
a|«aysetae:aeee:c.a,tetaea|«aysc.ae:eat.ateat.eaa|aets«a.ea
tae:e|yma|ea«e:cs.,a.ieat.ve [signiant] . 1ae:e . sase:teipure
e¡a.vee.ty ae:e, «a.ea ,:e«s .a tae ve:y :aytam ei se.eaee. Cea·
se¡aeat|y, uasse:| sçee.ies . a a aete taat tae se.eat.ie statemeat,
«.taeat |e.a, ¡aest.eaec a,a.a as te .ts t:ata, a|«ays :ema.as
ç:ev.s.eaa| ,aactaatO|]eet.ve,a|se| ate|yi:m|ae«|ec,eeit:ata. s
aa.aia.te.cea( 1 66) . ~|se|ateaa.vee.ty. s.aaeeess.|| e, |atea|yas¸
aaicea.a tae kaat.aaseaseeaa|e. iitae aa. vee. ty .avest.,atec|y
uasse:|aactaee¡a.veeat.ea,eae:a|.zec|y¡eyeea:e.aiaetrelative,
taeya:e, tae:eie:e, aetsesymmetrically. re:tae.:eemmeatelos, tae
çes.t.ve va|ae eiaa.vee.ty, . simmediately :evea|ec ea| y «.ta.a tae
:e|at.v.tytaatuasse:|ceiaec.ua. vee.ty.sa|setaea|se|ateae:.zeaei
e¡a. vee.ty ia,. v. a,.ttaeseaseeiaa. aia.tetas|, uasse:|ceesaet
ma|eaa|vee.ty,aseea|c|eiea:ec, taeva| aeie:a|aa,aa,e. mçeve:·
. saecaac taas:emevec eateia. ste:y s :eaea. xatae:, aa.vee.ty .s
|etataeaç:.e:.aactaete|ee| e,.ea|eeac.t.eaie:a||a. ste:.e.ty..t. staat
I l3
That is why, as we noted above, Husserl could not inquire as to the absoLute ideal
Objectivity concering language itself, whose ideality is always that of a "thematic
index" and not a theme. This irreducible mediacy thus makes illusory all the safety
promised by speech or writing themseLves .
105
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
«.taeat«a.eataeve:ye¡a.veeat.easeiemç.:.ea|ea|ta:eaac a. ste:y
«ea|caet|eçe·s.||e .
1aeç:e||emeiaa.vee.tyeeaees. mmec. ate| yaçeataatei:eaet.va·
t.ea.itsseaema.staesame ,ie:,«.taeatam.a. ma|| .a,a. st.et:aasça:·
eaey, ae :eaet.vat.ea«ea|c|e. ma,.aa|| e. nat.iaa. vee.ty . s.aiaet
a|«ays :e|at.ve, aac .i.ta|eaeçe:m. tstae :ecaet.ea eia| |emç.:.ea|
ea|ta:eaaceia||sec. meatat.ea, .staeçess.|.| .tyeiaça:ea.ste:yei
seasete|ecea|tecce]a:e:He:eça:t.ea|a:|ys. aee, aue:aav.a,ç:e·
seatec tae eaçae.ty ie: :eaet. vat.ea, uasse:| cees aetia.|te as|tae
se:.eas¡aest. eaof itsjnitude. iaase. eaee| . |e,eemet:y,«aeseçetea·
t.a|.tyie:,:e«ta.sest:ae:c.aa:y, .t. s.mçess.||eie:eve:y,eemete:.
at eve:y . astaat aac eve:yt.meae :esames a.s tas| aite: aeeessa:y
.ate::açt.eas, te çe:ie:m a teta| aac . mmec.ate :eaet.vat.ea ei tae
. mmease eaa. a ei ieaac.a,s |ae| te tae e:. ,.aa| ç:em. ses ( 1 66
,mec.iec} , . 1aeaeeess.tyeitaese. ate::açt.eas.saiaetaa|eae, s|eeç,
ç:eiess.eaa||:ea|s, aac seie:ta, ,«a.ea aas aeseaseeemça:ec«.ta
,eemet:.ea|t:ata|at.sae| ess.::ecae.||ete. t.
~total :eaet.vat.ea,evea. itaat«e:eçess.|| e, «ea|c ça:a|yzetae
.ateoa|a.ste:yei,eemet:y]astassa:e| yas«ea|ctae:ac.ea|.mçess.·
|.|.tyeia||:eaet.vat.ea.uasse:|. saet«e::.eca|eattaat.atta. sçe.at
ateta|:eeaçe:at.eaeie:.,.as.s st.||ea|yate|ee| e,.ea|ae:.zea. re:
aace:taeest:.as.eaeeess.tytaat,eemet:.ea|aet. v.ty|e.ate:m.tteat. s
a| sea.cceaaaesseat.a| aac.ate:aa|aeeess.ty. s.aee aeç. eeeeitae
,eemet:.ea|ec.iee.sse|i· same.eat,aeimmediate :eaet.vat.ea.sçess.·
||e, eaaay|eve| . 1aat. s«ay , uasse:|:ema:|s, tae .ac.v.caa| aac
eveataesee.a|eaçae.ty ie::eaet.vat.ea. seiaae|v.easia.tace
( 1 68) . i t «. || a| «ays|ecea.ec.mmec.ateteta|.ty.
1ae e|v.easaess [evidence] ei taat ia.tace aac ei taat aeeessa:y
mec.aeyeea|cstamçuasse:| s «ae|eça:çeseasaeasease. s. aeetaat
ia. tace. s.aiaet.::ecae.|| e, saea|c.taetia:a.sataet:aesta:t.a,çe.at
ie::ereet.a,eaa.ste:y:w.taeattaatesseat.a|eeaeea|meateie:.,.as
aac«.ta.ataeayçetaes. seiaaa| |·çe«e:ia| :eaet.vat.ea,«aat«ea|c
eease. easaesseia. ste:.e.ty |e: ~| se, ae cea|t, taat eease.easaess
«ea|c |e aeta.a,, . i.t «as :ac.ea| |y ç:ea.|.tec aeeess te e:.,. as .
nat, se taat a. ste:y may aave .ts ç:eçe:ceas.ty, mastaet taea tae
ca:|aess«a.eaea,a|is tae e:.,.aa| ç:em. ses,. teaa|e çeaet:atec
|at aeve:c.ss.çatec, aet ea| y a.ce tae iaet |at a|se tae . ast.tat.a,
sease:~acmastaettaee:.t.ea| ie:,etia|aesseie:.,.as|etaeia.ta·
ia| saace«. a t:ata s acvaaee :atae: taaa aa aee.ceata| a|e::at.ea:
1a. sc. st. aet.ea|et«eeaiaetaacsease,e:taeceiaeteaactaece ]a:e·
«ea|c|eeaaeec.ataesease·.avest.,at.eaeiaç:.me:c.a|ia.tace.
natie:uasse:| ,as«e|ae«,taatia.taceeaaappear ç:ee.se|y.a.ts
106
Jacques Derrida
ç:.me:c. a| .|yea|y,.»ea|aeiceaeiaa. aia.|ea.s|e:y1aas . iaeec«.|a
|aeia.|aceei:eae|.»a|.ea.uasse:|ceesae|,.»eaç.as«esasçee| .|ae
i:s|c.:ee|.eaeia. s. a»es|.,a|. ea ueçes|çeaes|aeç:e||emaa|.|| a|e:
aac.a».|esΡ h, «.|aas| .,at|yea.,ma|.e|:e». |y.|eae|.ee|aa||ae:e
es. stsaa.cea| . za|. ea aame| y. |ae:eme»a|ei|.m.tsi:emea:eaçae·
.ty .aaee:ta.a sease.|s .aia.t. za|.ea ( 1 68) . ~ seeeaca:y.cea| . z.a,
eçe:a|.ea |aea eemes|e:e| . e»e|ae:eae|.»a|.»ea|. | .tyei.|s ia.|ace
aac|e|s. t,e||eyeac.|se|i 1a.s me»emea|.saaa|e,eas |e|aeeea·
s|.ta|.ea. ie: esamç|e. ei|ae aa.|yei|ae «e:|c s .aia.|e ae:.zeae:
, |eyeac|aeia.|e.ate:eeaaeet.eaei:e|ea|.easaacç:e|ea|.eas·|e|ie
eeas|.|a|.eaeitaee». ceaeeie:a|e|a|aa.|yei|ae.mmaaeatrasasaa
icea.a|aekaa|.aasease na|a|e»ea|| .ta.sme»emea|.saaa|e,eas
|e|ae ç:ecae|. eaei,eeme|:y s esae|.|ace |aeçassa,e|e|ae .aia.|e
| .m.teiaia. |eaac¡aa| .ta|.»eseas.||e.ata. t.ea st:.e||ysçea|.a,.e»ea
ae:e .|. s,eeme|:.ea| .cea|.za|.ea«a.ea çe:m. |s.aia.|.z.a,|ae :eae·
|. »a|. »e a|. | .|y we:|.a, .ataec.açaaaeasaess eiça:e . cea|.|y. ta. s
a|.|.tyeas. |yaacce]a:e|:aas,:esses.|s| .m.|s.«a.eaa:etaeaaeme:e
taaataeaem.aa|| . m.|seiça:eiae|aa| .|y1a.s. cea|.zat.ea.«a.eaaas
ie: .|s ee::e|a|e aa .aia.te icea. a|«ayscee.s. »e|y .a|e:»eaes .atae
c.uea| | memea|s ei uasse:| s cese:.ç|.ea 1ae çaeaemeae|e,.ea|
sta|asei.tse». ceaee:ema. as:a|ae:mys|e:.eas 1ae.mçess.|.| .|yei
ace¡aate|yce|e:m. a.a,|aeeea|ea|ei|a. si ceaceesae|aace:m.ae.
uasse:|says.aIdeas I, |ae :a|.eaa||:aasça:eaeyei. |s.as.,a|ia|e».·
ceaee(Einsichtigkeit).

ue«e»e:.taeee:|a.atyei«aa|eaaae»e:.m·
mec.ate| yaacassaeaç:esea|. tse|i.aaa. a|a. |.ea saea|cçese seme
se:.eas ç:e||emsie: çaeaemeae|e,y ,ç:e||ems s.m.|a: |e |aese. ie:
esamç|e .ei|aeeeast.tat.eaeitaealter ego |yaa.::ecae.||ymec.ate
.a|ea|.eaa| .|y· we«.||eemec.:eet|y|ae|te|a. s|a|e:.«aea|aeç:ec·
ae|.eaei,eeme|:.ea|esaet.|ace|y.cea| .za|.ea«.|||eea:eeaee:a~t
tae ç:eseat]aae|a:e. uasse:| ç:e».s.eaa| |y a»e:|s ta. s c. mea| ty ue
«:.|es . 1aeçeea| .a:se:|eie».ceaee|e|ea,.a,|esaea. cea| .zat.eas
«. ||eeaee:aas|a|e:( 1 68 ¸mec.iec} ·
1aeeaçae.tyei:eaet. »at.eamas||aea|et:aasm. ||ec.. ae:ce:|aa|
se.eaee ae| ceeay |ate a t:ac.t.ea emçt.ec eisease ~s |ea, as
! t +
Cf. Ideas I, especially §83, pp. 220-22.
I I ö
Ibid. , p. 221 . [ I n hi s translation of the Origin, Derrida translates Einsicht by "evi ­
dence rationnel le . " In this he foll ows, as he says, the j ustifcation and practice of S.
Bachelard (see A Study ofHusserI' s Logi c, p. \ 0). This helps elucidate the phrase "l a
transparence rationnelle de son evidence" as a "translation" of "Einsi chtigkeit . " I n his
Guide for Translating Husserl, Dorion Cairs suggests the fol lowing: i nsi ght, i nsightful­
ness, i ntellectual seenness, apodictic evidentness, evidentness. Note adapted by Tr. ]
107
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
se.eaeeme»esa«ayi:em.ts|e,|aa.a,saac. |s|e,.ea|saçe:s|:ae|a:es
a:eaeeama|a|ec.taeeaaaeesie:saeaat:aasm.ss.eacee:easeaat.||ae
cay«aea|ae a|. |. |y aaççeas|eia. |. uaie:|aaate|y |a. s.s ea:
s. |aa|.ea.aac|aa|ei|ae«ae|emece:aa,e ( 1 69) . 1aeac»aaeemea|s
eise.eaeeeaa|eça:saec. e»ea«aeatae seaseei.tse:.,.aaas|eea
| es| nat|aeatae»e:y|e,.ea| .tyei|aese.eat.ie,esta:es. . mç:.seaec.a
mec.aey. |:ea|sce«a .a|ea se:|eieae.:.eaac.aaamaaa|sa:c.|y
D.cae|r|atecese:.|e|a. ss.taa|.ea:wasae||aee|e:a.|yeiesseaees
ie: a.m çe:aaçs ea|y aaetae: aame ie: a aeaemç.:.ea| a.ste:.e. ty:
Ceemet:yaac|aestac. es[sciences ] |aa|aeeemçaay. |a:ees.iecia:
i:em |ae.: iaacameata| .a|a.t.eas. 1aey a:e .aeaça||e ei ». s.ea
(idein) aac:.»e|ectetaeayçetaesesae|castae. :ç:.ae.ç|es Ceaias. a,
sym|e|«.tat:ata. |aey seemteas|ec:eam(oromen os oneirottousi)
(Republic vi i .···e· · 1ae:e|a:a.a¡a. :y.s|ae:eie:ea:,ea||a:ea,|
asaacie:as.|«.||:ea«a|ease.eaee|e. tsç:.me:c.a|sease.. e .as«e
|ae«. .tsiaa|sease
VIII
1aastaeme|aecaactaeseaseeitae¡aest.eaeeaee:a.a,e:.,.asa:e
.||am.aa|eca|tae same |.meas|aeeeac.t.easie:|ae|:ac.t.eaeise.·
eaee. a,eae:a| ia e|es.a,taeseç:e| .m. aa:y eeas.ce:at.eas. uasse:|
:eea|| stae.:esemç|a:yaacia| | ya.s|e:.ea|eaa:ae|e:,.a|aeseaseei
Historie) : лe:y«ae:e|aeç:e||ems.taee|a:.iy.a,. a»es|.,a|.eas. tae
. as.,a|s .ate ç:.ae.ç|esa:ehistorcal (historsch) . o wes|aac.|aea.
«.ta.ataea.s|e:.ea|ae:.zea. a«a. eae»e:y|a.a,. sa. ste:.ea| .ae«e»e:
|.tt|e«emay |ae« a|ea|ce|e:m.aecta. a,s nat|a. sae:.zeaaas .|s
essea|.a| st:ae|a:e taateaa|ec.se|esec|a:ea,a me|aec.ea|. a¡a.:y
( 1 7 1 -72 ¸mec.iec}·
w.ta:esçeet|eetae:se. eaees. as«.|a:esçee|te|ae«e:|ceiç:ese.·
eat.ieea||a:e. e|ae::eta:astetae.:e:.,. asa:e |ae:eie:eç:ese:.|ec
1aeya:ea|«aysçess.||e .a|taea,aasç:e||ems|aey s|.| | :ema.a aa·
as|ec. 1a.sie|cei.a¡a.:yaasae|.m. ts. s.aeea.ste:.e.|yem|:aees
|ae .aia.|e |eta|.|y ei|e.a,aac sease. Nata:a| |y. ç:e||ems ei|a. s
ça:t.ea|a:se:|. mmec.ate|ya«a|ea|ae|eta|ç:e||emeitaeaa.»e:sa|
a.s|e:.e.ty ei tae ee::e| at. »e maaae:s ei |e.a,eraamaa.|y aac tae
ea||a:a|«e:|caactaeaç:.e:.st:aeta:eeeata.aec. a|a.sa.ste:.e.|y
( 1 72) .
' ' ´ Plato, The Collected Dialogues, ed. Hamilton and Cairs (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, \ 96 \ ) , p. 765. The translation is that of Paul Shorey.
108
Jacques Derrid
~rte: aav.a, eçeaec a.s ¡aest.ea a|eat ,eemet:y te .ts |:eacest
ae:.zea, |at|eie:eeem.a,|ae|tetaecete:m.aece:.,.aeitaatse.·
eaee,uasse:|:esçeacs,asase:teieemç|emeata:ye|a:.aeat.ea,tet«e
c.amet:.ea||yeççesecmetaece|e,.ea|e|] eet.eas.
Ce:ta.a|y, taea:st«ea|cç:eeeeci:em astaaca:ceç.steme|e,.sm
ie:«a.eatae:eta:ateç:.me:c.a|ev.ceaeeaacte.ts.ast.tat.a,eea·
eeçts .s aa .ac.sçeasa||e tas|. nat tae:e. saeta. a,a.ste:.ea|tetaat.
1ae.||as.eaeia.ste:yeaa|e,.veateta. sa:ste|]eet.eaea|y|yve:|a|
e: sym|e|.e a| |as.eas te seme aac.seeve:a|| e [ 1 72] |at aa:c|y
myta.ea| 1aa|es . uasse:| a. mse|iaac aaac|ec ta.s e|ass.e e|]eet.ea
«aea,eeaee:a.a,taee:.,.aeise.eaeeaac,eemet:y i ça:t.ea|a:, ae
attae|ecemç.:.e.smaacestena|a.ste:y. ue ae«:e]eets.t|eeaase
.t m.seeast:aes . tse«a sty|e eia.ste:.ea| .avest.,at.ea, «a.ea .s as
interal aacaeaemç.:.ea|asçess.|| e.is. taseia|te:eea||taataeve:aas
.t|eeaa¡aest.eaei:eta:a.a,te1aa|ese:taeiaetaa||e,.aa.a,sei
,eemet:y:natte:eaeaaeeiaetaa|a.ste:y. saetata||teeateaese|iea
i:em a.ste:y.a,eae:a| . Oataeeeat:a:y, . t . steeçeaeaese|ite tae
seaseeia. ste:.e.ty. ~ac.aaseateaee«aesest:ess, at|east, eeat:asts
«.ta taateia.s ea:|y çaeaemeae|e,y , |at«a.eaea|y eeaa:ms aac
ceeçeas, «. ta aaacm.:a||eace|.ty, tae. a.t.a|c.st:ast«.ta:e,a:cte
eeaveat.eaa|a.ste:y, . uasse:|sçee.aes( 1 72-73) :
The ruling dogma of the separation in prnciple between epistemo­
logical elucidation and historical, even humanistic-psychological
explanation, between epistemological and genetic origin, is funda­
mentally mistaken [is fundamentally turned upside down: Derrida 's
translation], unless one inadmissibly limits, in the usual way, the
concepts of "histor, " "historical explanation, " and "genesis. " Or
rather, what is fundamentally mistaken is the limitation through which
precisely the deepest and most genuine problems of histor are
concealed.
1e.avest.,atetaeseaseeiase.eaeeast:ac|t.eaaacasea|ta:a|ie:m
.ste.avest.,atetae seaseei. tseemç|etea. ste:.e.ty. r:emta. siaet,
eve:y . at:ase.eat.ae esç|.eat.ea, eve:y :eta:a te a:st as. ems, te
ç:.me:c.a|ev.ceaeesaac. ast.tat.a,eeaeeçts, .sattaesamet. me a.s·
te:.ea| c. se|esa:e [ 1 73] . waateve:ea:.,ae:aaee ea tae sa|]eetei
I I 7
I n Ideas I, §25, pp. 84-86, will be found a long pissage i n which Husserl develops
on his own, and in curiously similar terms, the objection that he prtends to addrss here.
The confrontation of this text with that of the Origin can b rmarkably i l luminating as to
the sense and fdelity of Husserl ' s itinerary.
109
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
aetaa|a.ste:y, «e |ae«a prori taateve:yea|ta:a| ç:eseat,tae:eie:e
eve:yse.eat.aeç:eseat ,.mç|.eates.a.tsteta|.tytaeteta|.tyeitaeçast
1aeaa.tyeita. saaeeas. a,teta|.zat.ea«a.ea. sa|«ays|:ea,ata|eat
.ataeie:meitaea.ste:.er:eseat,tae r:. me:c.a|.a.tse|i¯[Primordial
e� soiD |eacs as, .iee::eet|y.a¡a.:ecei, te tae aa.ve:sa| ~ç:. e:. ei
a.ste:,.Ast|eA|se|ateaae|aa,ea||e.a.tse|ieitaeL. v. a,r:eseat. a
«a.e�.t. s,:eaacec, t|ea. ste:.er:eseat. sat a:sts.,atea| ,tae.:·
:eca..||eaacça:eç|aeeaacmevemeateit|atteta|.zat.eaaactaat
t:ac.t.eaa|. zat. ea.
,
1ae |. ste:.er:eseat.s taea. ste:.ea|A|se|ate~
tae v.ta| ¬evemeat ei tae eees. steaee aac tae .ate:«eav.a, (des
Miteinander und Ineinander) ei ç:. me:c.a| ie:mat.eas aac sec.·
meatat.eas ei sease (Sinnbildllllg [lind Sinnsedimentierllng] ) " ( 1 74
,mec.aec}, .
Ðve:yça:t.ea|a:a.ste:.ea|. avest.,at.eamastce]a:eaete.tsme:ee:
|ess . mmec.ate ceçeaceaee ea taat .as.,at . ate açec.et.e ç:. ae.ç|es
[evidence absolument principielle] . ~||aa|.taa|iaetaa|a.ste:y:ema.as
.aeemç:eaeas.|| e( 1 74) as|ea,astaesea ç:. e:.aaveaet|eeaesç| . ·
eatecaacas|ea,asiaetaa|a. ste:yaasaetacaçtec. tsmetaectetae
aet.eaei.at:.as.e a.ste:y, te tae aet.eaeitae .ateat.eaa| a.ste:y ei
sease.
1a.s|eacsastetaeseeeac:.çeste, ta. st.mec.:eeteca,a.asta.ste:.·
e.sm:atae:taaaemç.:.ea|a.ste:y.1aeseaemaeita.se:. t.e. sm. saaa|·
e,eastetaat«a.eaaace:|.esra. |eseçayask.,e:easse.eaee. nat
tae a.ste:.e.smuasse:|ae«attae|s, cesç.teama.t.eseeaaeet.a,.tte
D.|taey s taee:yeitaeWeltanschauung, seemsteaave ame:eetaae·
see.e|e,.ea| , a me:emodern sty|e. ~ac ae:e «aat uasse:| «aats te
«:esti:ema.ste:.ea|:e|at. v. sm.s| esstaet:atae:.cea|ae:mseise.·
eaeeaacça.|eseçaytaaataeaç:.e:.eia.ste:.ea|se. eaee.tse|i.
ia eaeet, etaae|e,. smsetstae a|aacaatma|t.ç| .e.tyeitest.mea.es
attest.a,taateaeaçeeç|e,eaeat:.|e, eaeaaamaa,:eaçaas. ts«e:|c,
.tsaç:.e:. , .ts e:ce:,.ts|e,.e , .tsa.ste:y, eve:a,a.asttaeaa.ve:sa|a
ç:.e:. , tae aaeeac.t.eaecaacaçec.et.est:aeta:es , tae aa.ta:y,:eaac
eia.ste:y, saeaasuasse:|meaastecese:.|etaem.
Ne«, on the one hand, taeseaa.mçeaeaa||etest.mea. esceaet|e·
| .e |at, ea tae eeat:a:y, ç:esaççese tae st:aeta:e eitae aa. ve:sa|
ae:.zeaaactae aç:.e:.eia.ste:y taat uasse:| ces.,aates . taeseç:e·
´ `´ Naturally, it is a question, as Husserl clearly states, of the hi storic Present in
general as the ultimate universal form of every possible historical experience, an experi­
ence which itself is grounded in the Living Present of egological consciousness.
Moreover, Husserl emphasi zes i n a footnote [ 1 74] that all of intrinsic hi story passes
through the intrinsic history of the totality of individual persons.
· +·
� i
!
� ,
110
Jacques Derrid
saççes.t.easea|yeaases.a,a|a:aaccete:m. aecaç:.e:.te |ea:t.ea·
|atec tae:e. a itsauees. taea. te :esçeet taesea:t.ea|at.eas aac tae
eemç|.eateca.e:a:eay«a.easa|m.tsme:ee:|esscete:m.aecmate:.a|
aç:.e:.tetaeaç:.e:|ie:meiaa.ve:sa|a. ste:|e.ty.On the other hand,
taeiaets. «a.eaa:etaas. ave|ectesaççe:tta. s:e|at. v. sm.eaa|e
cete:m.aec asee:ta.aa.ste:.ea|iaetsea|y .isemeta.a,| . |e a. ste:.ea|
t:ata . s cete:m.aa||e . a,eae:a| . · · xaa|e s ae« .t :ea||y «as
, | :-} . tae a|t.mate:eie:eaeeie:a| |iaetaa|a. ste:y.ç:esaççesesas. ts
ae:.zea a a.ste:.ea| cete:m.aa|.| .ty taateve:y emç.:.ea| se.eaee. |y
.tse|ia|eaeaacassaea.. sçe«e:|esste,:eaac. ~eee:c.a,|y. «eaeec
aeti:steate:.ateseme|.aceie:.t.ea|c.seass.eaeitaeiaetsseteat|y
a.ste:.e. sm. .t. seaea,ataattaee|a.meitae. :iaetaa|.tya|:eacyç:e·
saççesestaea. ste:.ea|aç:.e:..ita. se|a.m.steaaveaaysease, | :-
,mec.iec} ,
iae:ce:te|ea||eteesta|| . saiaetsasiaetsof a.ste:y. «emast
a|«ays a|:eacy |ae« «aat a. ste:y . s aac aace: «aat eeac.t.eas-
eeae:eteeeac.t.eas-.t|s çess.|| e. we masta|:eacy|e ea,a,ec .a a
ç:eeemç:eaeas.eaeia. ste:.e.ty. . . e. . eitae .ava:.aatseia.ste:y taat
|aa,aa,e. t:ac.t.ea. eemmaa. ty. aac se ie:ta a:e. ia e:ce: ie: tae
etaae|e,.ea| iaet te aççea:. etaae|e,.ea| eemmaa.eat.ea masta|·
:eacy|esta:tec«.ta.ataeae:.zeaeiaa.ve:sa|aamaa.ty.t«emeae:
t«e,:eaçseimeamastaave|eeaa||ete|eaace:steecsta:t.a,i:em
taeçess.|.|.t. es. ae«eve:çee:.eiaaa.ve:sa|| aa,aa,e.1aeetaae|e,.st
mast|esa:e .açec.et.ea||y. taatother meaa|seaeeessa:.|y| .ve«.ta.aa
eemmaa.tyei|aa,aa,eaact:ac.t.ea.«.ta.ataeae:.zeaeiaa.ste:y.
sa:e.a|se. ei«aata||taatmeaas.a,eae:a| tataea|t. mate:eeea:se..t
. saeeessa:,te|ae«taattaea. ste:.er:eseat.a,eae:a|-tae.::eaae. ·
|| eie:meieve:,a.ste:.ea|esçe:.eaee-. stae,:eaaceia| | a. ste:.e.t,.
aactaatt eea|c a|«a,seemetete:ms .a ta. s r:eseat«. ta tae mest
c.staat.taemestc. ne:eatetae: ¯ ue«eve:st:aa,eteeaeaetae:t«e
mea ma, |e. tae, a| «a,s a:e aaae:staaca||e-at tae | . m.t-.a tae
eemmeaa| . t, eitae. :i. v. a, r:eseat. a«a. eataea. ste:.e r:eseat . s
:eetec 1aat eaea eitae.: iaacameata| r:eseats . s. also, mate:.a||y
cete:m.aec |y .ts .ase:t.ea«.ta.atae iaetaa|eeateateia t:ac.t.ea.
see.a|st:aeta:e. |aa,aa,e. aacseie:ta. taateaeacees aetaavetae
same sease·eeateat. ta. s .a ae «ay aaeets tae eemmeaa|ty eitae.:
ie:m 1a.s aa.ve:sa|ie:m. «a.ea. stae mestprmordial aacconcrete
|.vec esçe:.eaee. .s saççesec |y a|| |e.a,·te,etae:. 1a. s ie:m a| se
seemste|etaeiaa|:et:eaeameat.tae:eie:etaemestresponsible seea·
I I !I
Some analogous developments will be found in the Vienna Lecture, "Phi losophy
and the Crisis of European Humanity, " i n C, p. 296.
1 11
Introductin to the Origin of Geomet
:.ty. eieve:y çaeaemeae|e,.ea| :ecaet.ea ia ta. s a|t. matejurdical
instant [instance] .s aaaeaaeectaemest:ac.ea|aa.tyeitae«e:|c.
1aas eve:yç:e||emeia.ste:.ea|iaets .ave|vesa.ste:.ea|.ava:.aats
tae ve:y memeattae ç:e||emaatae:.zes aee:ta.arelativism. 1 20 1ae
|atte::eta.asa||.tsva|ae.ç:ev.cec.ts|eve|eimateriality aac.tsaç:.e:|
eeac.t.eas a:e açç:eç:.ate|y cete:m. aec. 1ae ça:t cevetec te :e·
| at.v. sm.a tae ee|e|:ateciette:te i-vy·n:aa| eaa|e .ate:ç:etec. a
ta. s«ay r:emtaat|ette:.«:.tteaayea:ea:|.e:taaataeOrigin, · ·«e
m.,att
¡
. a|. ea tae eeat:a:y. taat uasse:| :eaeaaeectae a.ste:.ea| a
ç:.e:.c.seeve:ec|y. ma,.aa:yva:.at.ea¬c:eee,a.zec taattaeça:e
çaeaemeae|e,y eia. ste:yaacteesçeetsemeta.a,etae:taaaesam
ç|esi:emtaeeeateateitaeemç.:.ea|se.eaees. etaae|e,y. aça:t.ea|a: .
1a.s.saeta||ytae:eac.a,taatHe:|eaa·reatyç:eçesec taa|ette:te
i-vy·n:aa|«a.eaaas|eeaç:ese:vec. uasse:|seemsteacm.ttaattae
iaets ,e |eyeac «aat «e . ma,.ae aac taat ta.s çe.at |ea:s a :ea|
s.,a.ieaaee. it .sas|itae. ma,.aat.ea.|eute.tse|i..saaa||ete:eç:e·
seattae çess.|.|.t.eseies.steaee «a.eaa:e:ea|.zec .ac.ae:eat ea|·
ta:es. . . . , uasse:|}sa«taat. t. sçe:aaçsaetçess.||eie:as.«ae|.ve
. aee:ta.aa. ste:.ea|t:ac.t.eas. teeeaee.veeitaea.ste:.ea|çess.|.|.tyei
taeseç:.m.t.vemea|yame:eva:.at.eaeiea:. ma,.aat.ea.·
O:a,a.a
Historical relativism is now no longer dominated at one stroke by a
mode ofthought which would have all the keys ofhistory and would be
in a position to drw up a table ofall historical possibles before any
factual experimental inquir. On the contrar, the thinker who wishes
I 20
Is it necessary to underscore that the question here is not that of a criticism of
historical or socio-ethnological science as such? Husserl simpl y wants to cal l the problem
back to its presuppositions. Phenomenol ogy, whi ch alone can bring them to light as such ,
at times has been, moreover, taken up by the researchers themsel ves wi th various de­
grees of explication.
This precaution had been formulated as an hommage to history as human science i n
"PRS, " p. 1 29.
I � i
Letter of March I I , 1 935. Husserl there speaks notably of the "indubitable legiti­
macy" that "historical relativism" involves "as anthropological fact" (our emphasis)
and of the possible and necessary task of a comprehensi ve Einfiihlung with respect to
pri mi ti ve societies that are "wi thout history" (geschichtlos) . [A great deal of this letter i s
availabl e i n Merleau-Ponty' s articl es cited beiow. See notes 1 22-1 25-tr. ] He insi sts
v igorously on the fact that the rights of relativi sm thus understood are preserved and
"conserved" by "the i ntentional anal ysi s" of transcendental phenomenology.
I22
Cf. "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man, " pp. 90-91 . The sae interpretation
is presented i n Merleau-Ponty' s article, "The Philosopher and Sociology, " i n Signs, pp.
98-1 ] 3.
. �
1 12
Jacques Derid
to dominate history in this way must learnfrom the facts and must
enter into them . . . . The eidetic ofhistor cannot dispense with
factual historical investigation. In the eyes ofHusserl, philosophy, as a
coherent thought which leads to a classication offacts according to
their value and truth, continues to have its fnal imporance. But it
must begin by understanding all lived experences. (Our emphasis) ·
i ssaeaaa.ate:ç:etat.ea]ast. iec:
1aeea|y:e|at. v. smuasse:|ae|ae«|ec,esasva|.c. s taatattaeaecte
a.ste:.ee· aata:eçe|e,.ea| iaets ¯ assaeaaac .atae.:iaetaa| .ty uas·
se:|aeve:eeatestecta.sva|.c.tyevea. a ra.|eseçayasx.,e:easse.·
eaee. ¯ 1aea. ste:.ea| aç:.e:. te «a.eaae aac a|«ays aççea|ec,aac
me:eaacme:e .asamatte:eiiaet·«e:eaeve:ç:eseatec..tseems.as
|eyseia.ste:y¯ e:asata||eeia||a.ste:.ea|çess.||es|eie:eaay
iaetaa|esçe:.meata|.a¡a.:y. ¯~acs. aeea.ste:yaactaea.ste:.ea|çes·
s. ||es a|eat«a.ea He:|eaa·reaty sçea|s:eç:eseat taemate:.a| aac
cete:m.aeceeateateia. ste:.ea|mec.ieat.eas, . . e. .taeiaetaa|çess.||e
:ea| . zec. asaeaaacsaeaa see.ety. ea|ta:e. eçeea. aacseie:ta· . te
.ate:ç:etuasse:|. ataea|evemaaae:. stease:.|etea.mtaeç:etea·
s.eaeicecae.a,iaetaa|.ty.tse|ia priori. weeaaaetsteç«. ta saea a
ayçetaes. s. «a.eaeeat:ac.ets tae ve:y ç:em. ses eiçaeaemeae| e,y.
uasse:|aacea|tec| ytaea,attaata||eia.ste:y scete:m.aecçess.||es
aacteeeaie:mtetaeaç:.e:.esseaeeseia.ste:.e.tyeeaee:a.a,eve:y
çess.||eea| ta:e.eve:yçess.||e|aa,aa,e.eve:yçess. ||et:ac.t.eanat
aeve:c.caec:eamteie:esee .|ysemee .cet.ececaet.ea.a| | taeiaets.
a||tae ça:t.ea|a:çess.|| es «a.ea mast eeaie:m te taese a ç:.e:. ei
aa.ve:sa|a. ste:.e.ty.
nataettececaeeiaetaa|.tya prori, .staatte | ea:ai:emtaeiaets¯ :
Net aay me:e. .i taat s.,a. ies taat e.cet.e .ata.t.ea«. ||aave te |e
a|aaceaec-evea ç:ev.s.eaa||y-aac iaets asec etae:«.se taaa as
esamç|es.aaa. ma,.aa:yva:.at.ea.1aeça:çeseeitaeva:.at.eateea·
a.¡ae. ae.cet.e:eac.a,aacaeve:|eeateesaaasttaema|t.ç| .e.tyei
çess.||eiaets eataeeeat:a:y.taeteeaa.¡aeeveaaastaeç:.v.|e,eei
|e.a,a||e te «e:|ea ea| yeae eitaese çess. ||es .a aa esemç|a:y
eease.easaess[conscience d' exemple] . 1aas. ta. steeaa.¡ae aas aeve:
aac taem.ss.eaeic.sçeas,.a,}«.taiaetaa|a.ste:.ea|. avest.,at.ea¯ .
e:at|east. .i.tceesta. s. .t. saet|yç:eteac.a,te sa|st.tateie:tae
a.ste:.ea|. a¡a.:y,.aaat.e.çat.a,taeiaets·tae se|.ta:y:ereet.eaeia
a. ste:.aa¯. · ·¹.ts.mç|yde jure ç:eeeceseve:ymate:.a|a.ste:.ea|.aves·
t. ,at.eaaacaasaeaeeceiiaetsassaeate:evea|tetaea.ste:.aatae
aç:.e:.seaseeia.saet.v.tyaace|]eet s. 1ecete:m. aeta. ssease.s.ie:
l 33
Ibid. , pp. 9 1 -92 [modifed] .
I ?4
Ibid. , p. 92.
1 13
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometry
uass�:| .se|!tt|ea¡aest.eaei|e,.a,a.a,}|yaace:staac.a,a||| .vec
esç

e:�eaees. eia|aacea.a, e:|.m.t.a,tae teeaa.¡ae ei. ma,.aa:y
va�.�uea. ta

a� tae|atte:.s esç| .e.t|yaaci:e¡aeat|yç:ese:.|ec.atae
O

lgm, a,nta,taa

teaa|eeeas.ce:eceaeeiuasse:| s |ast re:a.m.
ta.

steeam¡ae:emaastaemetaec¯aeee:c.a,te«a.ea«ee|ta.a a
a�. �e:sa|aaca| seisecaç:.e:.eitaea. ste:. ea|«e:|c«a.ea. s a| «ays
en,ma| |y,eaa. ae( 1 77) .
ra:�ae:ea. ae says. «e a|seaave . aac |ae« taat «e aave . tae
eaça..tyeie?mç�etei:�ecemtet:aasie:m. .ataea,ataacçaaatasy.
ea:aa�a� a.stene�|ex.st�aee. . . . ~acç:ee. se|y.ata. saet.v.tyei
i:eevanauea.aaca:aama,ta:ea,ataeeeaee.va||eçess.|.| .t.esie:
tae|.ie·«e:|c.tae:ea:.se�.«.taaçec.et.ese|i·ev.ceaee. aaesseat. a||y
,eae:a|seteie|emeats,ea,ta:ea,aa||taeva:.aats . 1ae:e|y«e
aave :emeveceve:y|eacte taeiaetaa| |y va| .c a. ste:.ea| «e:|c aac
a��� :e,
.
�:cecta. s«e:|c .tse|ime:e|yaseae eitae eeaeeçtaa| çes·
s.|.|.t.es ( 1 77) .
ue:e�,a. a. �ecea?t. .

ma,.aa:yva:.at.eaaactae:ecaet.eade facto
ta|e

tae.:sta:ta,çeataiaetaa| .ty nata,a.a taey :eta.ai:emiaet
?a|y.tses�mç|a:.tyaac.tsesseat.a|st:aeta:e..tsçess.|.| .ty¯aacaet
.tsiaetaa| .ty.
iit�e c�s�ev�:yeitaeaç:.e:.st:aeta:esaactae.ava:.aatseiaa.ve:·
sa|a.ste:...ty .s

metae�e!e,.ea||y aac]a:.c.ea||yi:st. ta. sc.seeve:y
teaeaes

as aetaa,-ta.s . sev.ceat . aaci:stte uasse:|-a|eateaea
:ea| see.ety s e:eaea:ea|a.ste:.ea|memeat s e«asçee.ie eaa:aete:
ç:eçesecie:taes�e.e|e,. st se:a. ste:.aa s aet.v.ty 1ae:eie:e. . taas
aeve:|eeaa�aest.eaeitaat.ae:eieeast:aet,.a,}«aatma|essease
eietae:esçeneaeesaace.v. |.zat.eas|yaça:e|y. ma,. aa:yva:.at.eaei
, eae s} e«aesçe:.eaees ¯·

Neve:tae|ess. .ii«e:ea||eteeeast:aettae seaseeietae:esçe·
neaeesaace. v.| .za�.eas ¯. ataatmaaae: .i«ea|cc.seeve:.a«aat«ay
taeya:ealso esçe:�eae�saace. v.|.zat.eas. aacaetae«taeya:ed(jef·
ent. i ae:ce:teattaata.sseaseeiever e. v. |.zat.eae:ever esçe:.eaee.
1 25 Mer�eau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and Soci ology, " p . 1 07 [modifed] . Always
commentlfl� on the same letter, Merleau-Ponty wri tes: "Here he [ Husserl] seems to admit
t�at the philosopher �ou
.
ld not pos
.
s�bly have immediate access to the universal by refec­
tIon alone-that he � s H no posItIon to do without anthropological experience or to
�ons�ruct wha� c?nstItut�s the meaning of other experiences and ci vilizations by a purel y
Imagmary varIatIon of hI S own experiences" (p. 1 07) .
I n �e
.
rleau-Ponty' s Phenomenology of Perception [ t r. Col i n Smith ( New York:
Humafltle�
.
Pre
.
ss, 1 962)] .
.
the w�ol e l ast period of HusserI' s thought was already i nter­
preted as t
,
�Cl tly [ break� n�] Wlt� the phi losophy of essences, " a rupture by which
Huss�rl �as merely explICItly laYIIg down analytic procedures which he had long been
appl ymg' ( p. 49) .
1 14
Jacques Derrid
i«. | | a:staavete:ecaee«aattae:e. s eimy own ,.ataeiaetaa|sease,
eieea:se,.ataeexçe:.eaeeaace. v. | .zat.eai:em«a.eai .aiaetsta:t .
Oaeetaatseaseeitae exçe:.eaeee: e.v. |.zat.ea.a ,eae:a|aas |eea
macee|ea:, ieea|c|e,.t.mate|yt:ytecete:m.aetaediference |et«eea
taeva:.easiaetseie.v. |.zat.eaaacexçe:.eaee.1a.sceesaetmeaataat
isaea|ca|aaceaeve:ye.cet.eatt.tacei:emtaatmemeatea. w.ta. aa
maea,:eate:iaetaa|cete:m.aat.ea, etae::ecaet.easa:est.||çess.|| e
aacaeeessa:y,:ecaet.eastaatmast|eç:aceat| ya:t.ea|atecaeee:c.a,
te tae.: ce,:ee ei,eae:a| .ty, ceçeaceaee, aac se ie:ta, yet a|«ays
:esçeet.a,, as uasse:| sçee.| es .a tae Origin, tae :a|e eitae st:.et
sa|samçt.ea¸ | ·º}eitaes.a,a|a:aace:taeaa.ve:sa| .iaç:eçe:t.ea
te tae .ae:ease ei mate:.a| cete:m. aat.ea, :e|at.v. sm¯ exteacs . ts
:.,ats, |at,s. aee.t. sceçeaceattetaea.,aestce,:ee,.t«.||aeve:|e,
as uasse:| aetes .a tae same |ette:, tae |ast «e:c ei se. eat.ae
|ae«|ec,e.¯
Ce:ta.a|ytae «e:|eitae a.ste:.aa, see.e|e,.st, etaae|e,.st, aac se
ie:taeeast.tatesa|.acei:ea|.zec. ma,.aæyva:.at.ea.ataeeaeeaate:
«.taiaetaa| c.ae:eaee. ta. s|.aceiva:.at.eaeaa|easecc.:eet|yie:
aeeesstetaeeeae:eteaacaa.ve:sa|eemçeaeatseisee. a|.tye:a. ste:.e·
.ty s.aee taese . ava:.aats «.| | teaea as aeta.a, a|eat tae sçee.ae
eaa:aete:eiaça:t.ea|a:see.etye:eçeea,i«.||-esçee.a||y-aavete
emçata.ze (einzufuhlen), as uasse:| sa.cte i-vy·n:aa| . natta. s
emçata.z.a,(Einfuh lung) , astaeiaetaa| cete:m.aat.ea eic.ae:eaee,
eaaaetexaet|y. ast.tatese.eaeece]a:e. Einfuhlung .tse|i. s çess.||eea|y
within aacby virtue eitaeaç:.e:.aa.ve:sa|st:aeta:eseisee.a| .tyaac
a.ste:.e.ty. itsaççesesaa.mmec.atet:aaseeaceata|eemmaa.tyeia||
a. ste:.ea| e. v. | . zat.easaactaeçess. |.| .tyeiaaEinfuhlung . a,eae:a| .
ia tae mate:.a| cete:m. aat.ea ei a. ste:. e.t. es, Einfuhlung, me:eeve:,
st:.et|y eeaie:ms «.ta tae metaec ei a|| a.ste:.ea| çaeaemeae|e,y,
s.aee.tçeaet:atesa. ste:.ea| s.,a.| eat.easi:em «. ta.a aac ma|estae
external .a¡a.:yceçeaceainternal . ata. t.ea.
nat, taea, ae« ce«e:eeeae.|etae am:mat.eaaeee:c.a,te«a.ea
a.ste:.e.ty .s aaesseat.a|st:aeta:eeitae ae:.zeaie:a||aamaa.ty ,as
«e||asie:eve:yeemmaa. ty,aactaea|| as. eatetae aeaa. ste:.e.ty¯
(Geschichtlosigkeit) eiee:ta.aa:eaa.e see.et.es :· · 1a. saeaa.ste:.e.ty
seemsaette aaveaay ça:eaaca|se|ate s.,a.aeat.eaie:uasse:|. i t
«ea|cea|ymodiy taeaç:.e:.st:aeta:eeimaa|.ac saa.ve:sa|a. ste:.e·
.tyemç. :.ea||ye:mate:.a| | y. it«ea|cb taeie:meia.ste:.e.tytaat. s
ea|y ç:eçe:t eaa. te see.et.eseae|esec. atae.: | ee|ecae:.zeas-
see. et.esasyet:emeveci:emtae.::açt.eaeitae Ða:eçeaa¯i ceaei
I ?6
Letter already cited.
1 15
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
tae . a| a.tetas|aac t:ac.t.ea 1ae. : sta,aat.ea «ea|c aet |e tae
me:e a|seaeeeia. ste:.e.ty |at a|.ac eiaa.tace .ataeç:e]eetaac
:eee||eet.eaeisease 1ae:eie:e ,aacea| y.aeemça:.sea«.tatae.a| ·
».teaacça:ea. ste:. e.tyeitaeEuropeaneidos, cea:eaa.esee.et.esseem
«.taeata.ste:y. iataeCrisis, me:eeve:,uasse:|ea| y:eee,a.zesaa
empirical tyçe .ataesesee.et.es«a.eaceaetça:t.e.çate.ataeÐa:e·
çeaaicea. Neaa.ste:.e.ty,taea,«ea|cea| y|etae|e«e:|. m.t·meceei
emç.:.ea|a.ste:.e.ty 1aeam|.,a.tyeiaaexample «a.ea. sateaeeaa
aac.st.a,a.saecsample aacate|ee|e,.ea|model . sst. ||ieaacae:e ia
taea:stsease,. aiaet, «eeea|csay«.tauasse:|taateve:yeemmaa.ty
. s.aa.ste:y,taata. ste:.e.ty. staeesseat.a|ae:.zeaeiaamaa.ty,.aseia:
as tae:e .s ae aamaa.ty«.taeatsee.a| .ty aac ea|ta:e. r:emta.sçe:·
sçeet.ve , aay see.ety at a| | , Ða:eçeaa, a:eaa.e , e: seme etae:, eaa
se:veasaaexamç|e. aaae.cet.e:eee,a.t.ea nateataeetae:aaac,
Ða:eçeaastaeç:. v.|e,eei|e.a,taegood example, ie:.t.aea:aates. a
.ts ça:.ty tae 1e|es eia| | a.ste:.e.ty. aa.ve:sa|.ty, ema.temçe:a| .ty,
.aaa.te t:ac.t.eaa| .ty, aac se ie:ta. |y .avest.,at.a,tae sease eitae
ça:eaac. aaa.teçess.|.| .tyeia. ste:.e.ty ,Ða:eçeaasa«a|eaeca.ste:y
te.tse«aç:eçe:eac.1ae:eie:e,.ata. sseeeacsease,ça:ea.ste:.e.ty
.s :ese:vec ie: tae Ða:eçeaa eidos. 1ae emç. :.ea| tyçes ei aea
Ða:eçeaasee.et.es, taea,a:eea|ymore or less a.ste:.ea| . attae|e«e:
|. m. t, taeytend toward aeaa. ste:.e.ty.
1aasuasse:| .s |ec te c.st. a,a.sa tae e:. ,.aa| .ty eiva:. eas |eve|s
within taemestaa.ve:sa|eidos eia. ste:.e.ty. iaave:y|:.eii:a,meat .
«aese .asç.:at.ea .s ve:y s. m.|a:te taat eitaeOrigin, uasse:|cete:·
m.aes ta:ee sta,es e: steçs eia.ste:.e.ty ia ç:eçe:t.ea te tae ac·
vaaeemeat.ataata.e:a:eaye:tetaeç:e,:ess.ea.ataatceve|eçmeat,
a.ste:.e.tyassames,:eate:çessess.eaei. tse«aesseaee . r.:st .tae:e
«ea|c |e a.ste:.e.ty .a tae mest ,eae:a| sease, astae esseaee eia||
aamaaex.steaee , .aasmaeaasaamaaex.steaeeaeeessa:.| ymeves. a
taesç.:.taa| sçaee eia ea|ta:e e:t:ac.t.ea. 1ae.mmec.ate|y a. ,ae:
|eve|«ea|c |e taat eiÐa:eçeaaea|ta:e , taetaee:et.ea|ç:e]eet,aac
ça.|eseçay 1ae ta.:c |eve| , aaa| | y, «ea|c |e eaa:aete:.zec |y tae
eeave:s.ea ei ça. |eseçay .ate çaeaemeae|e,y"1 27 1aas, at eaea
' �` "Stufen der Geschichtl i chkeit . Erste Geschichtlichkeit . " 1 934. Bei lage XXVI . in K,
pp. 502-03. El sewhere Husserl writes i n t he same vei n: ' " Human l i fe i s necessari l y, i n the
main and as cul tural life, hi storical i n the strictest sense. But scientifc l i fe , life as the l ife
of a man of sci ence in a horizon of a communi ty of men of science, si gifi es a new kind of
hi storici ty" (Beilage XXVI I , 1 935 , in K, p. 507) . Al so see "Philosophy and the Cri si s of
European Humanity, " in C, p. 279. Husserl speaks there of a "revolutionization of
historici ty. " [ I n the versi on that Paul Ri coeur translates (see note 1 49 below) , the li ne i s
rendered: " ' revoluti on i n the heart of hi storicity, " the emphasis by Derrida. ]
� I
116
Jacques Drrid
sta,e,tae:eve|at. ea«a.eaeve:ta:e«staeç:ev. easç:e]eet|yaa.aaa·
.t.zat.ea .s ea|y tae sease·.avest.,at.ea ei a a. ccea .ateat.ea.
,He:eeve:,taee¡a.va|eaeeeieve:ysease·.avest.,at.eateaa. aaa.t.za·
t.eaeaa|eçes.tecasaçaeaemeae|e,.ea|:a|e. , Oatae etae:aaac,
s.aeetaeseta:eememeatsa:est:at.iy.a,st:aeta:eseic.ae:eatae.,ats,
taeya:eaet. aiaetmataa||yexe|as.ve. aetea|ycetaeyeeex.st. atae
«e:| c, |ateaeaactae same see.etyeaama|e taemeeaa|it«.ta.a
.tse|i,.ataecm e:eat.atecaa.tyeiaae:,aa.es.ma|taae.ty.
it .s taea st:a.,atte«a:ctae e. cet.e.ava:.aatsaac tae te|ee|e,.ea|
a|se| ateseia.ste:.e.tytaatuasse:| s:ereet.ea.sc.:eetec.1aeinteral
aacdynamic c. ae:eat.at.eaeitaese. ava:.aatsmastaet| ese s.,atei
taatiaet . ta. sc.ae:eat.at.ea.sç:ee.se|ytaes.,ataattae.ava:.aatsof
a.ste:.e.ty, taeesseaeesof |eeem.a,a:e :ea| | y.a¡aest.eaae:e. we
eea|c taea |e temçtec |y aa .ate:ç:etat.eac. amet:.ea| | yeççesec te
taateiHe:|eaa·reatyaacma.ata. ataatuasæ:| ,ia:i:emeçea.a,tae
çaeaemeae|e,.ea| ça:eataeses te a.ste:.ea| iaetaa|.ty aace: a|| . ts
ie:ms, |eavesa. ste:yme:etaaaeve:outside taem. weeea|ca|«ays
say taat , |y ceaa.t.ea aac | .|e a|| eeac.t.eas eiçess. |. |.ty, tae . a·
va:.aatseia.ste:ytaas t:ae|ecce«a|yuasse:|a:eaethistorical . a
taemse| ves . we «ea|c taea eeae| ace, | . |e wa|te: n.eme| . taat
uasse:| s essays «a.ea t:y te ,:asç a. ste:.e.ty taemat.ea||y eaa |e
eeas.ce:ecasia.|a:es .
12R
nat«aat«ea|ca.ste:.e.tyaacc.seea:sea|eata.ste:y|e,i aeaeei
taese .ava:.aats «e:e çess.||e: ia e:ce: te sçea| ei ia.|a:e . a tae
taemat.zat.ea eia.ste:.e.ty , mast«e aet a|:eacyaave aeeesste aa
.ava:.aataacme:ee:|esstaemat.eseaseeia. ste:.e.ty:~ac.saettaat
seaseç:ee.se|y«aat.saaaeaaeec.auasse:| s |astmec.tat.eas,. aeem·
ç|eteastaeya:e:
iitaetaemat.zat.eaeitaeaçec.et.e. ava:.aatsaaceitaea.ste:.ea|a
ç:.e:.«asatiaa|t, «ea|caettaat|e.aeemça:.sea«.tahistor :atae:
taaa «.ta historicity? 1ae ia.|a:e «ea|c taea |e ra,:aat .i, at seme
memeat, uasse:|«aste|eeeme.ate:estec.asemeta.a,| .|ea. ste:y.
I ?8
"Les Phases decisives dans Ie developpement de la philosphie de Husserl" (al­
ready cited [see note 5] , in Husserl, Cahiers de Royaumont, p. 58) . [Thi s comment is only
found i n the French version of this essay. J Walter Biemel very accurately sees the Crisis
as a work of old age too easily interpreted as a turning point in Husserl' s thought, despite
the profound continuity which unites it to his previous i nvestigations. At the end of this
valuable lecture-while underscoring Husserl ' s fi delity-the author recalls the discom­
fort of Husserl who, in "an entire series of manuscripts from group K III , " "asks himself
why philosophy should need history" ( in The Phenomenology ofHusserl, ed. Elveton, p.
1 67) . And in Beilagen XXV and XXVIII of the Krisis, Husserl asks himself in particular:
"Why does philosophy need the hi story of philosophy?" ( in K, p. 495), and: "How is
Hi story Required?" ( in K, p. 508; i n C, Appendix IX, p. 389).
117
Introduction t o the Origin of Geometr
ue aeve:seemstea

veceaetaat . wea|caet,taea,a. se:.,.aa|me:.t
|ete aave cese:.|ec, .aa ç:eçe:|ytranscendental steç ,.a aseaseei
taat«e:c«a.eakaat.aa.smeaaaetesaaast, ,taeeeac.t.easeiçess.|.|·
. tyie:a.ste:y«a.ea«e:eattaesamet.meconcrete? Ceae:ete,|eeaase
taeya:eexçe:.eaeec[vecues] aace:taeie:meihorizon.
1ae aet.ea ei ae:.zea .s cee.s.ve ae:e. ae:.zea·eease.easaess,
ae:.zea·ee:ta.aty, ae:.zea·|ae«|ec,e, saeaa:etae|eyeeaeeçts
eitaeOrigin. ue:.zea. s,. veatealived ev. ceaee,teaconcrete |ae«|·
ec,e«a.ea, uasse:|says, .saeve:|ea:aec[ 1 76] , «a.eaaeemç.:.ea|
memeateaataeaaaaceve:,s.aee.ta|«aysç:esaççesestaeae:.zea.
1ae:eie:e,«ea:ee|ea:|ycea|.a,«. taaç:.me:c.a||ae«|ec,eeeaeeo·
.a, tae teta| .ty ei çess.||e a. ste:.ea| exçe:.eaees. ue:.zea . s tae
a|«ays·a|:eacy·tae:eeiaiata:e«a.ea|eeçstae.acete:m.aat.eaei. ts
. aaa.teeçeaaess. ataet,eveataea,ata.siata:e«asannounced teeea·
se.easaess, . ~staest:aeta:a|cete:m.aat.eaeieve:ymate:.a|.acete:·
m.aaey, aae:.zea. sa|«aysv.:taa| |yç:eseat.aeve:yesçe:.eaee .ie:. t
. sateaeetaeaa.tyaactae.aeemç|et.eaie:taatesçe:. eaee-taeaa·
t.e.çatecaa.ty .aeve:y . aeemç|et.ea. 1ae aet.ea eiae:.zeaeeave:ts
e:.t.ea|ça.|eseçay s stateeia|st:aetçess.|.|.ty.atetaeeeae:ete.aaa·
.teçeteat.a| .tysee:et|yç:esaççesectae:e. a. 1aeaet.eaeiae:.zeataas
ma|estaeaç:.e:.aactaete|ee|e,.ea|ee.ae.ce.
IX
~ite:|:eacea.a,a. s:ereet.eate.ae|acetaeç:e||ems eiaa.ve:sa|
a. ste:.e.ty,uasse:|aa::e«staeae|ceia. saaa|ys. saaceemes|ae|te
taee:.,. aei,eemet:y.i aaie«ça,es, aeçatsie:«a:ctaemesteea·
e:etecese:.çt.easeita.stest. Cemmeatate:saavemesteuea:eta. aec
taese cese:.çt.eas|eeaase, .asae:t, asuasse:|a.mse|iaace:see:es.
taey,e|eyeacie:ma|,eae:a|. t.es [ 1 77] aac, sta:t.a,i:emaamaa
ç:ax.s,c:a«aea:tetae eeast.tat.eaei,eemet:.ea|ç:ete.cea|.t. es. a
taeç:ese.eat.aesçae:eeitaeea|ta:a|«e:|c.
1ae çesta:e [situation] eita. saaa|ys.sseems:.,e:eas|yç:ese:.|ec
|ytae|ea:.a,eitaemec.tat.ea, cesç.te. ts:atae:i:eesty|e .~s«ea:e
,e.a, te see, .ts eeateat .s |essaeve| .a uasse:| s «e:| taaa ata:st
açça:eat . ~ite:aav.a,cete:m. aectaeeeac.t.easie: t:ac. t.eaa|.tyin
generl, «e aave tae :.,at te :eta:a te one ei taese t:ac.t.eas«a.ea
,se:v.a,]astamemeata,e asaaesemç|a:y,a.ce,. sae«stac.ec. a
.tse|i.~ite:aav.a,axectaeseaseaactaemetaecie:all ¡aest.ea.a,ei
e:.,.as, «eas|a ¡aest.eaa|eata s.a,|e e:.,.a. Oataeetae:aaac,
,eemet:y aas|eea :eee,a.zecas at:ac.t.eaa| systemei.cea|e|]ee·
t.v.t. es. Ne«.a.cea|e|]eet.v.ty,|etaO|]eet.v.tyaac. cea|.tymast|e
118
Jacques Derrid
aeeeaatecie:. cesç.tetae.:ceeç·:eetec.ate::e|atecaessaactae.::e·
e.ç:eea|eeac.t.ea.a,. taeyeaa|eseça:atec ~aa| yzecin general aac
aetas,ee¬et:.ea| ,as.ataei:stça:teitaetest· . .cea|.tyeaeet.ve| y
eate:s.atet:ac.t.ea|y. tse|]eet.| eat.eaaactaaseaa|ei:eec.eaa|e
aaaceceve:weea,at .taea.te|e,.a,asuasse:|cees·|yaeeeaat.a,
ie:O|]eet.v.ty. . e . taea. ste:.e.tyei.cea|e|]eet.v.ty.a,eae:a| 1ae
aç:.e:.st:aeta:eseia.ste:.e.tyeea|c|e¡aest.eaecea|y|y:eeea:sete
|aa,aa,e .«:.t.a,. taeeaçae.tyei:eaet.vat.ea. aaciaa| |yte¬etaec
1aaa|steta. s¬etaec. «a.ea a|eae eaa||esee¬ç:eaeas.eaeitae.a·
va:.aatseia.ste:.e.tyin generl «.taaaaçec.et.eee:ta.aty.«eeaaae«
:eta:a,ta. ss.ceeise.eaee·tetae.ava:.aatsof taeç:ese.eat.ie«e:|c
ea tae|as.sei«a.ea,ee¬et:.ea|ç:ete.cea|. t. esaave|eeaç:ecaeec
aacesta||.saec 1aas. aite:aav.a,ceiaectaeeeac. t. easie:tae O|·
]eet. v.ty ei .cea| e|]eets. «e eaa t:y te cese:.|e tae eeac.t.easie:
,ee¬et:.ea|.cea|.ty.tse|i. |y aae«:ecaet.eaeieeast.tatecse. eat.ie
O|]e:t. v.ty aac a||.ts sçee.ie a. ste:.e.ty Ða:|.e:. .t «.|||e:eea||ec.
uasse:| as|ec a.¬se|i. ae«eea|c. cea| sease. already constituted . a
sa|]eet.ve.¬¬aaeaee .|ee|]eet.veaacea,a,ec.aa.ste:yaac. atae
¬eve¬eatei.ate:sa|]eet.v.ty:ueae«as|sa. mse|i.ae«..aaç:ev.·
eas¬e¬eat .eea|c.cea|.ty.tse|i|eeeast.tatec:
1aeaeeess.tyeita.s«ayei,e.a,|ae|[recursion] ta:ea,aase:.esei
z. ,za,s see¬s te ,a.ce uasse:| «aea ae «:.tes . 1a:ea,a ta. s
¬etaec.,e.a,|eyeactaeie:¬a|,eae:a|.t.es«eesa.|.tecea:|.e: .«e
eaaa|se¬a|etae¬at.etaataçec.et.easçeeteitaeç:ese.eat.ie«e:|c
taattae e:.,.aa| ieaace:ei,ee¬et:y aacata. sc.sçesa| . taat«a.ea
¬astaavese:vecastae¬ate:. a|ie:a. s.cea| . zat.eas ( 1 77) .
r.:st . «e ¬ast ce|.¬.ttaese st:aeta:es ei tae ç:ese.eat.|e «e:|c
«a.eaeea|c.ast.tatea,eemet:y 1a.scese:.çt.ea.sa|«aysçess.||e.
s.aee tae st:ata¬ eitae ç:ese.eat.ie «e:|c .s aeve: cest:eyec. ae:
ce| a.t.ve|yeeaeea|ec1a.sst:ata¬:ema.as. ataetaace:tae aa.ve:se
cete:¬.aec |y tae .cea| esaet.taceeise.eaee ~ac. aeee:c.a,teaa
.¬a,e«a.eauasse:|asesat|eastt«.ee..t.saeta.a,¬e:etaaaa,a:|
ei.ceasta:e«aeve:tae«e:|cei.¬mec.ate.ata.t.eaaacesçe:.eaee.
,eve:}tae|.ie·«e:|c.ie:eaeaeitae:esa|tseise. eaeeaas.tsieaacat.ea
eisease.ata.s. mmec.ateesçe:.eaeeaac.tsee::esçeac. a,«e:|caac
:eie:s|ae|te.t it. sta:ea,atae,a:|ei.ceastaat«eta|eie:t:ae
ne.a,«aat. saetaa||ya¬etaec
' \ 29
! ´
|I
EJ
,
pp. 44-45 , in a paragraph which concers precisely geometry' s ideal exactitude.
The same image is used in C (§9h : " The life-world as the forgotten meani ng-fundament of
natural science, " p. 5 1 ) . Husserl ' s ambiguous attitude before science-which he val ued
utmost as project and l east i n i ts superstructural precariousness and ability to conceal
refects the very movement of the "historical" constitution of sense: creation which
discloses and sedimentation whi ch covers over i mpl y each other.
1 19
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
1ae:eie:e ..t. sç:eçe:te:ecaeetae.cea|sec.¬eatat.easeise.eaee
.ae:ce:tec. seeve:tae aa|ecaesseitae ç:e,ee¬et:.ea|«e:|c 1a.�
ae« "epoche" ei tae e|]eet.ve se.eaees. tae ç:e||e¬ ei «a.ea .s
ceve|eçec.a taeCrisis, .s c.mea|tie:seve:a| :easeas.
I ´\
1 . 1ae|:stc.iiea|ty.staateieve:y:ecaet.ea. .t¬ast|e|eçti:em
|e.a,aie:,etia|aessaac aae,at.ea. a sa|t:aet.eae:ceva|aat.eaei
«aat.t¬etaec.ea||yce·sec.¬eatse:aeat:a| .zes
2. ~stae:ecaet.eaeie|]eet.ve· esaetse.eaee.ta.sae«epoche ¬ast
aeteaase aste :eaeaaee a||se.eat.ieaess 1aetae¬at.zat.ea eitae
Lebenswelt mast|ese.eat.ieaacatta.atetaeaç:.e:.«a.eaa:eae
|ea,e:taeaa|.taa|eaesei|e,.eaace|]eet.vese. eaee 1 31 uasse:|ertea
ç:eseatsta. sas aça:aces . taeLebenswelt, taeç:ee|]eet.vesçae:e
ei sa|]eet.ve·:e|at.ve s.,a.ieat.eas. aasaaa.ve:sa| . aaeeac.t.eaec
st:aeta:e .ast:aeta:eç:ese:.|ecie:.tsve:y:e|at. v.ty·
\ `\2
1aeaç:.e:.ei
|e,.eaace|]eet.vese.eaeea:ea|se:eetecaac,:eaacec .ataea
ç:.e:.eitaeLebenswelt (C, §34 e , ç 1 30) . wea:eeeaiaec|yaa. vet-te
taeie:¬e:aac|eçt.,ae:aateitae.: sease·:e|at.ea(Sinnbeziehung)
tetae|.ie·«e:|cw.taeatta.s,:eaac.a,:e|at.ea.taeya:e . a¬. c·a.:
(ibid. , §36, ç 1 4 1 ) .
3 . r.aa||y. .t. s aet saiie.eatte c.sse|ve «aatuasse:|ea|| s. .atae
|aa,aa,eeine| zaae.taet:ataseise.eaee. t:atas.atae¬se|ves
(ibid. , ç 1 30) ; «e¬asteeat.aaa||yma|eç:e||e¬at.etae:e| at.eaeitae
Lebenswelt ' s sa|]eet.ve·:e|at. ve t:atas aac se.eaee s e|]eet.ve·esaet
t:atas 1ae ça:aces eitae.: ¬ataa| . ate::e|at.ea ¬a|es |eta t:atas
ea.,¬at.eateaee(ibid. , ç 1 3 1 ) . iatae. aseea:.tyeita.sea.,ma. . a
tae.asta|. |.tyeitaesçaee|et«eeataeset«et:atas. taeepoche ¬ast
|est:eteaec|et«eeataearche aactaetelos eiaçassa,e 1«etruths,
taateidoxa aactaateiepisteme, «aeseseaseaacaç:.e:.a:eaete:e,e·
aeeas .a taemse| ves . :e¬a.a .ate::e|atec (Aufeinanderbezogenheit)
(ibid. ) . se.eaee s t:ata .a . tse|i .s aet aay |ess t:ata-) tae
sa|]eet.ve·:e|at.ve «e:|c. .a «a.ea .t aas .ts |ases Ne cea|t tae:e
es. sts a aa.ve|y saçe:ie.a| |ase|essaess(Bodenlosigkeit) : taat eitae
:at.eaa|.stsaactaet:ac. t.eaa|se.eat.ie. avest.,ate:s«aemeveaaeea·
st:a.aec.ataeat¬esçae:eeitae|e,.ea| aace|]eet.veaç:.e:.aacce
! ·¹
0
Cf. notably § §33 to 39, pp. 1 2 1 -48, and the related texts appended there.
! ·¹
` Ibid. On the difculty and necessity for a sci entifi c thematization of the Lebenswelt.
cf. (§33] , p. 1 22. On the di stinction between the two U priori, cf. above all ( §36] , pp.
1 37-4 1 . I n the Origin, "logic" always has the sense of the "sedimented. "
´�
´
Ibid. [§37], pp. 1 42-43 . On the structural permanence of the presci entifc l ife-world,
also cf. [§9h] , p. 5 1 .
.-j
120
Jacques Derrid
aet:e|atetaemtetae. :a.ste:.ea|,:eaac.atae|.ie·«e:|c.1aeyae.tae:
«e::ya|eattae. :e«aresponsibility ae:as|taemse|ves . what

m I in the
process of doing? Nor: from where does that come? nattae

eIS, aaetae:
aa.vet-]astasse:.eas, |at«.taame:e mece:asty|e. aa.veteeiç·

iaac.tye: ceçta aac aet eisaçe:ie.a|.ty, .teeas. st s.a :eceseeacm,
te«a:c tae ç:ese.eat.ie çe:eeçt.ea «.taeat ma|.a, ç:e||emat.e tae
t:aas,:ess. ea ( Uberschreitung) (ibid. , §36, ç 1 39 ¸ Ð1. sa:çass·
. a,¯} , eitae|.ie·«e:|c s t:atate«a:ctae «e:|ceit:atas. a taem·
se|ves 1ae:eta:otetaest:aeta:eseiç:ese.eat.ieesçe:.eaee mast
eeat.aaa||y|eeç a|.vetaequestin: How can the a priori of scientic
Objectivity be constituted staring from those of the lie-world? w.taeat
ta. s¡aest.ea,aay:eta:a,ae«eve:çeaet:at.a,,:.s|sa|c.eat.a,a||se. ·
eat. ie ¡aa|.tyin general aaca||ça.|eseça.ea|c. ,a.ty,evea.i.tm. ,at
aavet:.ecç:ee.ç.tat.a,a|e,.t. mate:eaet.eate«aatuasse:|ea|| s .ate|·
|eetaa| . st.e ayçe:t:eçay¯ (ibid. , §34f, ç. 1 33) . ii «e eeas.ce: ta. s
¡aest.eate|eat once a.ste:.ea|aact:aaseeaceata|,«eseete«aat.::e·
sçeas.||eemç.:. e. sma||tae çaeaemeae| e,. es eiç:ese.eat.ieçe:eeç·
t.eaa:eeeacemaec, çaeaemeae|e,.es«a.ea«ea|caet|ettaemse|ves
|e|eset|ytaat¡aest.ea
we mast a|se |e«a:e ei ie:,ett.a, taat tae ç:ese.eat.ie «e:|c-
«a.ea tae ç:ete,eemete: aas at a. s c. sçesa| aac «a.ea «e taas
:eeeve:-cees aet aave tae :ac.ea|.ty ei tae ç:eç:ec.eat.ve «e:|c
te «a.ea uasse:| t:.es te :eta:a, a|evea|| , . aExperience and Judg­
ment. 1 33 1ae ç:ese.eat.ie«e:|c . s aea|ta:a|«e:|c a|:eacy .aie:mec
|y ç:ec.eat.ea, va|aes, emç.:.ea| teeaa. ¡aes, aac tae ç:aet.ee ei
measa:emeat aac .acaet.veaess «a. ea taemse|ves aave tae. : e«a
sty|eeiee:ta.aty
1ae a|eve eaa||es as te çe.at eat a,a.a tae ceçeaceat statas ei
uasse:| stest, taestataseieve:ysta:t.a,çe.ataaceve:ye|ae,a. c. a,
:ereet.eaeaaa.ve:sa|a. ste:.e.ty.Ce:ta. a|y, taeesseat.a|st:aeta:esei
taeç:ese.eat.ie«e:|ca:ec.seeve:ec|yacea||e:ecaet.ea. taateia| |
cete:m.aec iaetaa| ea|ta:e aac taat eitae se. eat.ie saçe:st:aeta:es
«a.eaesteac|eyeacça:t.ea|a:ea|ta:a| a:eas. ae:ce:te |ei:ee ei
taem natta.s saea|caetma|easie:,ettaattaeç:ese.eat.ieea|ta:a|
«e:|ceaa|e:ecaeec,.a. tstan, . aa:ac.ea|"epoche" «a.ea«aatste
eataçatate«a:c«aat . sa|:eacy saççesec. taet:aaseeaceata|eea·
st.tat.eaeitaee|]eet. a,eae:a|,|eie:etae. cea|e|]eet«a.ease:ves,
ae«eve:, as esamç|eaacmece|ie: O|]eet.v.ty, , tae ç:eç:ec.eat.ve
st:atameiesçe:.eaee,taestat.eaac,eaet.eeeast.tat.eaeitaeego aac
´´´ This work does not attain the prepredicative world i n its frst radicality. It supposes,
like Ideas I, an already constituted temporality. Cf. on this Ideas [, notably §81 , p.
2 16-1 7, and EJ, § 14, p. 68.
121
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
alter ego, ç:. me:c.a| temçe:a| .ty, aac se ie:ta 1aese :ecaet.eas.
me:eeve:, a:e ceae .a tests ea:| .e: taaa taeCrisis . i aIdeas I, tae
|:eacea.a,eitaet:aaseeaceata|:ecaet.eaa|:eacyesteacsby anticipa­
tion asia:astaee.cet.eeia.ste:y,«a.eauasse:|taea,atst.||:ema.aec
te|eceae . ~rte:aav.a,]ast.ieca.ssasçeas.eaeia||t:aaseeaceat·
e.cet.ecema.as, aetaa|çays.ea|Nata:e, aactaeemç.:.ea|e:e.ce·
t.e se.eaees eiNata:e ,,eemet:y, |.aemat.es. ça:e çays.es. aac se
ie:ta, , uasse:|«:ete .
Si
:
nilarly, just as we �ave suspended all experiential sciences dealing
With the nature ofammate beings and all empirical human sciences
concer

ing pers

nal beings in personal reltionships, concering men
as subjects ofhistor, as bearers ofculture, and treating also the
cultural formations themselves, and so forth, we also suspend now the
eietic sciences which corespond to these objectivities. We do so in
ovance and
.
in idea; for, as everyone knows, these ontological-:idetic
sCle
n
ces (ratonal psychology, sociology, for instance) have nt as yet
recelv

d � proper grounding, at any rate none that i pure and free from
all obJectIOn. (Ideas I, § 60, p. 162 [modied]; our emphasis)
weeea|ctaeasaytaatuasse:|.aacvaaeesa|]eeteca.ste:y s e. cet.e
te

taeaatae�t.et�aaseeaceata|:ecaet.ea-aae.cet.eae«. ||t:yteeea·
st.tate sta:ta, a tae Crisis. 1aat .s «ay, ae cea|t, tae «e:c
t:aaseeaceata| , «a.eauasse:|aea:|ya|«ays:ese:vesie:taeego ' s
ça:e eeast.tat.a, aet.v.ty, . s aeve:at.|.zec .ataeOrigin. iii myse|i
aavesçe|eaeit:aaseeaceata|a. ste:.e.ty ,icese.ae:ce:tec.st.a,a.sa
ateaeeemç.:.ea|a. ste:yaacas.mç|ee.cet.eeia.ste:yça:a||e|tetae
etae:e. cet.es eiNata:e aac sç.:. t. 1aeeidos eia. ste:.e.ty, as esç|. ·
eatec aue: taeCrisis, seems te eseeec tae | . m. tsass.,aec te .t |e·
ie:eaaac|yIdeas I. itsse.eaee.sae |ea,e:merely eaeaamaase.eaee
amea,etae:s it. staateiaaaet. v.tyeeast.tat.a,tae«ae|esçae:eei
a|se|ate .cea| O|]eet. v.tyaaca||taee.cet.e se.eaees 1aatta. seea·
st.tat.a,a. ste:ymay|eme:eç«ieaac| yeeast.tatec.tse|i.saea.s,ae
cea|t .eaeeitaemestçe:maaeatmet.iseiuasse:| s taea,at . a| se,eae
eitaemestc.mea|t ,ie:. taeee:cs|ac| y«. tataateiaa.ste:.e.ty«a.ea
,asuasse:|sa.cme:eaacme:eertea,t:ave:seseve:yta.a,ta:ea,aaac
ta:ea,a ,aaci:steia||taeego .tse|i ·
I¦I4
AI� these difculties seem concentrated to us in the sense that Husserl gives to the
expresslo� "transcendental histor, " which he utilizes (to our knowledge) only once, in
an unpublIshed manuscript of Group C (C 8 II, October 29, p. 3) : thus, the question
concers the intermonadic relation (always considered in itself, of course , as an inten­
tional modifcation of the monad in general in its primordial temporality) , a relation
thanks to which the constitution of a common world becomes possible. This relation
s�ructurally implies the horizon of the history of the spirit, past and future; the latter
discovers for us what perception cannot give us.
122
Jacques De"ida
x
waat .taea.a:etaeesseat.a|aac,eae:a|ee¬çeaeatseitaeç:ese.ea·
t.ieea|ta:a| «e:|c: O::atae:.«aat a:e. . ataat«e:|c. tae. ava:. aat
st:aeta:es«a.eaaaveeeac.t.eaectaeacveatei,ee¬et:y:ue«eve:
ç:e|eaac ea: . ,ae:aaeeeeaee:a. a,a. ste:.ea|iaets . «e sae« «.ta aa
. ¬¬ec.ateaacaçec.et.esae«|ec,e-taeseaseei«a.eaeaaa|«ays|e
.avest.,a|ec-taeie||e«.a,
i 1aatta. sç:e,ee¬et:.ea|«e:|c «as a«e:|ceithings c. sçesecei
aeee:c.a¸teaaaaesaet sçaee aact.¬e
I . I·¯:
2. 1aattaeseta.a,s¬astaave|eeaee:çe:ea| Ce:çe:ea| .ty. sa
ça:t.ea|a:cete:¬.aat.eaeita.a, aeec(Dinglichkeit) .a,eae:a|.|ats.aee
ea| |a:ea|:eacyaacteaave| eu. ts¬a:seatae«e:|c,|eeaase|aa,aa,e
aac .ate:sa|]eet. v.ty ¬ast aave ç:eeecec ,ee¬et:y, . · ee:çe:ea|.ty
cees aet esaaast. ve|y eve:|aç ta.a,aeec. s. aee tae aeeessa:.| y
eees.st.a, aa¬aa |e.a,s a:e aet ta. asa||e as ¬e:e |ec. es aac. | .se
eveataeea|ta:a|O|]eets«a. ea|e|ea,«.tatae¬st:aeta:a||y.a:eaet
esaaastec. aee:çe:ea||e.a, ( 1 77) .
3. 1aat taese ça:e |ec.es aac te aave sçat.a| saaçes. saaçes ei
¬et.ea. aac a|te:at.easeiceie:¬at.ea [ 1 77] .
4. 1aat ¬ate:.a| ¡aa|.t.es ,ee|e:. «e.,at. aa:caess. aac se ie:ta,
¬astaeeessa:. | y|e:e|atectetaeseç:e,ee¬et:.ea| .sçat.ete¬çe:a|
saaçes|yasaçç|e¬eata:ye.cet..cete:¬.aat.ea
i aIdeas I, «a.|eesç|.eat.a,taeç:.ae. ç|esei:e,.eaa|a:t.ea|at. eaaac
.ate:aa| st:aeta:e. uasse:|t:eatec taesee. cet.e eaa:aete:. st.es as aa
.aces. «ae:eastaeya:eac.:eettae¬e. ataeOrigin: 1aeeeast:aet.ea
eitaea.,aesteeae:ete,eaas,tae:e,.ea,eatei,eae:ataata:eça:t|y
c. s]aaet.ve .ça:t|yieaacec.aeaeaaetae:,aac.ata. s ¬ataa||y. ae|�·
s.ve, . ee::esçeacstetaeeeast:aet.eaeitaeeeae:etataat|e|ea,te

. t
eatei|e«estc.ae:eaeestaata:eça:t|yc.s]aaet.ve.ça:t|yieaacecm
eaeaaetae:.as obtains with temporl, spatial, and material determina­
tions, for instance, in the case ofthe thing " ,;72.ç i s-¸mec.iec} .ea:
e¬çaas.s, . ' ·
ra:e,ee¬et:y aac s.ae¬at.es,aaca| | tae assee. atec se. eaeesie:
!
´` This idea, already developed in §9a of the Crisis, is more directly i nscribed within
an anal ysi s of the Lebenswelt . in §36 , p. 1 39, an analysi s identical to that in the Origin.
´ ´ Thi s j ustifes (at least on a specifc point) the anteriority of the Origin ' s anal yses
concerning language and being-in-community.
! ·l
´
Al so cf. § 149, pp. 382-83 et passim.
123
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometr
«a. eat|e,a:e|aeesa¬ç| e|e:e· .taea.«. | | |ematerial e.cet.es .s.aee
tae. :ça:çese.staeta.a,| y. aactaastaeee:çe:ea|. cete:m. aat. eaei
e|]eets.a,eae:a| .nattaeya:eabstract ¬ate:.a|se.eaees. |eeaasetaey
ea|yt:eat ee:ta.a e. cet.e ee¬çeaeats eiee:çe:ea| ta.a,s .a,eae:a| .
c.s:e,a:c.a,tae. :. aceçeaceataac eeae:eteteta|.ty.«a.eaa|seee¬·
ç:.sestae ¬ate:.a| (stojich), seas.|| e¡aa|.t.es aactaeteta|. ty ei
tae. :ç:ec.eates . sçat.a|saaçes . te¬çe:a|saaçes. aacsaaçesei¬et.ea
a:ea|«ayssingled out from taeteta|.tyeitaeçe:ee.vec|ecy
ny .tse|ia|eae. taea. a stat.eaaa| ys. seea|ca priori aac:.,e:eas|y
:eea||ie:astaattaeç:ete,ee¬ete:a|«aysa|:eacyaacata. sc.sçesa|
aaesaetsçat.ete¬çe:a|saaçesaacesseat.a||yva,ae¬e:çae|e,.ea|
tyçes . «a.eaeaaa|«ays,.ve:.se teaç:e,ee¬et:.ea|descriptive se.·
eaee 1a.seea|c|eea||ecgeogrphy. re:saeaasa|]eet.tae :.,e:ei
e.cet.easse:t.eas,|.setaatie:cete:¬.a.a,va,aeesseaees,.saetata||
aace:¬.aec|ytaeaeeessa:yaaexaet.taceeitaeçe:ee.vece|]eet we
¬ast .aceec |e«a:e ei se.eat.ie aa.vet-. «a.eaeaases ta.s aaexae·
t.taceeitaee|]eete:eeaeeçtte|eeeas.ce:ecasa ceieet . asaa
. aexaet.tace . uasse:|«:.tes,«e a:e st. ||¡aet.a,i:e¬Ideas I) : 1ae
¬est çe:ieet,eemet:y aac .ts ¬est çe:ieet ç:aet.ea|eeat:e| eaaaet
ae|ç tae cese:.çt.ve se.eat.ie . avest.,ate:eiNata:e te exç:ess ç:e·
e.se|y,.aexaet,ee¬et:.ea|eeaeeçts,taat«a.ea. aseç|a.a.seaace:·
staaca||e . aac se eat.:e| y sa.ta||e a«ay ae exç:esses .atae «e:cs
aeteaec..aceatec.|eas· saaçec.a¬|.||.ie:¬.aactae|.se-s.¬ç|eeea·
eeçts«a.eaa:eessentially and not accidentally inexact, aaca:etherefore
a|seaa¬atae¬at.ea| ,;:1. ç. 1 90 ¸mec.iec[ ' ·
5. 1aat . |y a ç:aet.ea| aeeess.ty eica.|y | . ie. ee:ta.a saaçes aac
ee:ta.aç:eeesseseit:aasie:¬at.eaeea|c|eçe:ee. vec. :este:ec.aac
ç:e,:ess.ve|yçe:ieetec.ie:exa¬ç|e.:.,. c|.aes. eveasa:iaees. aacse
ie:ta Ðve:y¬e:çae|e,.ea| . . . e. .ç:e,ee¬et:.ea|.cete:¬.aat.ea«e:ss
aeee:c.a,tetae¡aa|.tat.ve,:acat.easeiseas.||e.ata. t.eamore or less
smooth sa:iaees. s.ces. | . aes. e:more or less rough aa,| es. aac seea
1a.sceesaetç:ea.|.ta:.,e:easaacaa. veea|e.cet.eix.a,eiva,ae
¬e:çae|e,.ea|tyçes. iataeOrigin, uasse:|«:.tes,ça:eataet.ea||yaac
se¬e«aat ea.,¬at.ea|| y,taat|eie:eexaet.tacee¬e:,es. ç:eeeec.a,
i:e¬taeiaetaa| . aa esseat.a| ie:¬ |eee¬es :eee,a.za||e ta:ea,a a
¬etaeceiva:.at.ea , i :s, .1aeseaseeita. s:e¬a:s|eee¬ese|ea:e:
ea tae |as. s eiIdeas I aac taeCrisis. ny . ma,.aa:yva:.at.ea«e eaa
e|ta.a.aexaet|atça:e¬e:çae|e,.ea|tyçes . :eaacaess . ie:exam·
I 38
This whole section, devoted to "Descriptive and Exact Sciences, " i s very impor­
tant for understanding the Origin .
124
Jacques Derrid
ç|e , under «a.ea .s constructed iae ,ee¬ei:.ea| .cea|.iy ei iae e.:·
e|e ·1aeaei.eaeiia.seçe:ai.eaei sa|si:aei.ea .sa|se:eçeaiec
.aiaeCrisis . naiiaeiyçe:eaacaess.sae| essa|:eacyia:a.saec«.ia
aee:ia.a.cea| . iy ..i.saeiie|eeeaiasec«. iaiae¬a|i.ç|.e.iyeiaaia:a|
saaçes «a.ea ¬e:e e: | ess ee::esçeac ie .i .a çe:eeçi.ea. Oa|y aa
. ¬a,.aai. ve.aieac.a,eaaaiia.aiaai.cea| .iy.a.isç:e,ee¬ei:.ea|ça:·
.iy. nai ia. s ça:e .cea| .iy .s eia seas.||e e:ce:aac ¬asi|e c.si.a·
,a.saecea:eia|| yi:e¬ça:e,ee¬ei:.ea|. cea|.iy,«a.ea. a.ise|i. s:e·
|easeci:e¬a||seas.||ee:. ¬a,.aai.ve.aia.i.veaess. 1ae. ¬a,.aai.ea. s
«aai ,.ves ¬e iaeça:e ¬e:çae|e,.ea| iyçe, aac.i eaa i:aasie:¬
seas.||e saaçesea| y .aie eiae:seas.||esaaçes (C, §9a, ç. 25) . ~e·
ee:c.a,ieuasse:| ,iaea,ça:eseas.||e.cea| .iy.ss.iaaieceaaç:e¬aia·
emai.ea| |eve| . Once constituted, ça:e¬aiae¬ai.es«.||iaas |eaeeess.·
||e ea|yie aace:siaac.a, ,«aeseaei.eaaasae ç:ee.se ieeaa.ea|
sease. auasse:|, ..aaayease ,ieaaaei.v.iyeeaee. va||e.aiaeseaseei
Ca:ies.aa.aie||eeiaa| .s¬, s.aeeia.saei.v.iy.saieaeei:eeci:e¬i«e
ae¬e,eaeeasiaea|i. es, i:e¬.¬a,.aai.eaaacseas.|. |.iy.iase¬eve:y
ea| .,aiea.a,| .aeseeaee:a.a,ia. s. aiaeCrisis, iae ç:ee.seeeaieaiei
«a.eaceesaeisee¬ie|eieaac.aaayeiae:eiuasse:| siexis ,aeaas
«:.iiea.
In the intuitively given surrounding world, by abstractively directing
our regard to the mere spatiotemporal shapes, we experience
.
"bodies " -not geometrical-ideal bodies but precisely those bodies that
we actually experience, with the content which is the actual content of
experience. No matter how arbitrarily we may transform these bodies
in phantasy, the/ree and in a certain sense "ideal" possibilities we thus
obtain are anything but geometcal-ideal possibilities: they are not the
geometrically ' 'pure" shapes whih can be inscribed in ideal
space¯"pure" bodies, "pure" straight lines, "pure" planes, other
"pure" fgures, and the movements and deformations which occur
in "pure" fgures. Thus geometrical space does not signiy anything like
imaginar space . . . . (Ibid. , [modied]; our emphasis)
I 4U
´¨¨ Cf. on this Ideas I, §75; and Notes 3 and 4 of Ricoeur in Idees, p. 238. We would fnd
anticipated in the Philosophy of Arithmetic the principle for an analogous distinction
between perceptive plurality and arithmetical plurality. On the other hand, a distinction
of the sae type between a certain " style" of causality or of premathematical i nductivity
and those of pure physics i s invoked i n the Crisis and appended texts, notably i n passages
devoted to Galileo.
I 40
An essential diference remains, even if here he outwardly echoes Kant ("the propo­
sitions of geometry are not the results of a mere creation of our poetic imagination, "
Prologomena t o Any Future Metaphysics, § 1 3 [ET: ed. Lewis White Beck (New York:
The Liberal Arts Press, 1 950) , p. 34] ) . According to Kant, geometry is not imaginary
ffantastique] because it is grounded on the universal forms of pure sensibility, on the
125
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
~|iaea,a,ee¬ei:.ea|.cea|.iy¬ay|e ç:ecaeecstarting i:e¬seas.·
||e¬erçae|e,.ea|. cea|.iy, ia.siaeie·a.sie:.ea|ceça:ia:eçe.ai. saa|·
|. iec as a ,:eaac «.ia.a eeasi.iaiec ,ee¬ei:y. uacea|iec| y, .a . is
ia:a, .¬a,.aai. ve·seas.||e.cea|.zai.ea,«.iaeai«a.ea,ee¬ei:yeea|c
aeiaavea:.sea,çesesse¬ece|.eaieç:e||e¬seie:. ,.a,ei«a.eauas·
se:|. sveryeease.eas . ~|iaea,aia. se:.,.a. siae e:.,.aei«aai ç:e·
eecesaaceeac.i.eas,ee¬ei:y,.i.saeiie|eeeaiasec«.iaiaee:.,.a
ei,ee¬ei:y.ise|iaaca||ei.is:e|aiecçess.|.|.i.es . .iea|yaaiae:.zes
«aai«eea:|.e:ea||eca"geogrphy. " iaeve:yçaeae¬eae|e,.ea|:e·
,:ess.eaie|e,.aa.a,s, iaeaei.eaeia internal e:intrinsic a.sie:yaac
sease |eisas ce|.aeaie se¬e saieiy·eaieaes [crans d' arret], as «e||as
a:i.ea|aie,i aeiave.c,a||"regressus ad infnitum. " 1ae.aie:aa|sease
ei,ee¬ei:y, «a.eaç:ev.cesas«.iaasiai.eaaa|ys.s, ç:ese:.|esiaai
iae¡aesi.eaei,ee¬ei:y se:.,.asieçaiiaeconstituted seaseei«aai
aasimmediately eeac.i.eaec ,ee¬ei:y 1ae sea:eeeiç:e ,ee¬ei:.ea|
.cea|.i. eseaa|e|euç:ev.s.eaa| |y.aiaeca:|. · ¹ ·1aas , uasse:|«:.ies.
si. | | , ¡aesi.eas|.|eiaaieiiaee|a:.ieai.eaeiiaee:.,.aei,ee¬ei:y
aaveae|eseceaa:aeie:, saeaiaaieaeaeecaei.a¡a.:e|eyeaciaese
ç:ese. eai.iemaie:.a| s( 1 72) .
1aeç:e||e¬seie:.,.açeseceais.ceiaaieae|esa:eaaceeaee:a.a,
iaeseaseeiç:eexaeie:ç:ee|]eei.vesçai.eie¬çe:a|.iy«ea|ciaciae. :
ideality of sensible space. But according to Husser!, on the contrary, geometrical ideality
is not imaginary [imaginaire] because i t i s uprooted from all sensible ground in general .
In accordance with Kant, it was sufcient for Husserl to be purifed of empirical and
material sensibility to escape empirical imagination. As for what concers at least the
structure of mathematical truth and cognition, i not their origin . Husserl remains then
nearer to Descares than to Kant. It is true for the latter, as has been sufciently em­
phasized, that the concept of sensibility is no longer derived from a "sensualist" defni­
tion. We could not say this i s always the case for Descartes or Husser! '
I � I
Access to the origin of sensible ideality, a product of the imagination, would also
require, then, a direct thematization of imagination as such. Now the latter, whose
operative role is nevertheless so deci sive, never seems to have been sufciently inquired
into by Husser! ' It retains [ garde] an ambiguous status: a derived and founded reproduc­
tive ability on the one hand, it is, on the other, the manifestation of a radial theoretical
freedom. It especially makes the exemplariness of the fact emerge and hands over the
sense of the fact outside of the factuality of the fact . Presented in the Crisis as a faculty
that is homogeneous with sensibility, it simultaneously uproots morphological ideality
from pure sensible reali ty.
It i s by beginning with the direct thematization of imagination i n i ts si tuation as an
original lived experience (utilizing imagination as the operative instrument of all eideticsL
by freely describing the phenomenological conditions for fction, therefore for the
phenomenological method, that Sartre' s breakthrough [trouee) has so profoundly
unbalanced-and then overthrown-the landscape of Husserl ' s phenomenology and
abandoned its horizon.
, ,
126
Jacques Derid
ç|aee. as. ce taeae«transcendental aesthetics «a.eauasse:|ça:t.ea·
|a:|y eeate|atec . atae Ceae| as. ea eiFormal and Transcendental
Logic ,çç. :ºi º·, · ··

ra:acex.ea||y.|eeaase. cea|,ee¬ei:.ea|sçaee.saei.¬a,.�a:y,aac
iae:eie:eaetseas.||e, ..ts. cea| .iyeaa|e:e|aiectetaeieta|a¬iyei�ae
seas.||e«e:|c ~ac. ie:iaesa¬e :easea. açç|.ec,eemet:y:e¬ams
çess.||e. ,e. a, se ia: as ie |e eeaiasec . aea: eyes «.iaiae t:ae
aaia:etaaiaçç|.ec,ee¬ei:yattaesa¬ei.¬eeeaeea| s ' ·i aeaeet .a
seas.||e . cea|.iy. «a.eaa|«ays sç:.a,si:e¬ . ¬a,.aai.ea. eea|c ea|y
,.ve:.seieaa. ¬a,.aa:yrantastique] sçaeeaacaa. ¬a,.aa:yrant


tique] se.eaeeeisçaee.ieaaaaie:eseea||eaac .ae:,aa.eç:e|.ie:ai.

e�
ei¬e:çae|e,.ea|tyçes iataaiease.«eeea|caeiau:¬.as«e|e,.i.·
¬aie| yaac«. taee¬ç|eteseea:. tyc.c.taai «eaavenot two but
,

nlY
one universalform of the world: aeii«e|aiea| yone geometr . . . (C,
§9 c ,
ç ·1,.
. . ,
1a.s seas.||e aac. te a ee:ta.a ce,:ee. e¬ç.:.ea| aai.e.çai.ea �a| ·
iaea,a .a ee¬ça:.sea «.ta iaeis sa|¬.itec ie va:.at.ea. . ¬a?..at.v

e
.cea|.tyeiiae¬e:çae|e,.ea|iyçeeaaae|ea,e:|e¬e:e|� e¬ç.:..a|,.s
t:ae aetea|yie:,ee¬ei:.ea|forms |ata| seie:,ee¬et:.ea|¬easa:e·
¬eat 1ae|atie:ee¬esietaeie:e. aaacia:ea,aç:ax. s ie:exa¬ç|e .
«ae:e] astc. st:.|at.ea.s .ateacec, | :s, ~aemç.:. ea| teeaa. ¡aeei
¬easa:e¬eat,.asa:vey.a,..aæea.ieeta:e.aacseie:ta,¬astaeees·
sa:. |y|e|ea,ieeve:yç:ese.eai.ieea|ia:e uasse:|

ceesae� �|a|e:aie
eataai.ataeOrigin. iaiaeCrsis aesee¬sieeeas. ce:e¬ç.:.ea|¬ea·
sa:e asa sia,e ia:iae:taaa seas.||e¬e:çae|e,yeatae çatate«a:cs
ça:e,ee¬et:.ea|. cea|.ty.Heasa:e. a.i.atesaa

acv

aaee. ata� se�seei
taeaa. veea| ..aie:sa|]eet.ve .tae:eie:e. cea|·e|,eei.veceie:¬mat.eaei
tae,ee¬ei:.ea|ia.a,(C, §9 c , ç·1, He:eeve:.ea� e| ea:|ya.,ae:e:
sa|se¡aeai|eve| .taea:.ta¬ei.zat.eaei,ee¬ei:y".!||eev?sec

asa
ae« :eve|at.ea«.ta.a,ee¬et:y. ue«eve:. iae en,meiia.s s..eaee
«.|| ea|y|e¬e:eceeç|y|a:.ec.aac.ts sease e¬çt.ec ·
I 42
These few pages are very i mportant, here in parti cular, for determi ni ng
.
the
.
�rchitec­
tonic situation of the Origin . On the sense of thi s "transcendental aesthetICS , al so cf.
CM, § 6 1 . p. 1 46.
! 1'I
"So fami l iar to us i s the shift between a priori theory ad empi rical i nqui ry i n
everyday life that we usual l y tend not to separate the space a�d t�e spatia
.
l shape
.
s
geometry talks about from the space and spatial shapes of expenentIal actualIty, as If
they were one and the same" (C, §9a, p. 24).
´ `` On surveying, see notably §9a, pp. 27-28. On surveying as "pregeometrical
achi evement, " which i s also "a meaning-fundament for geometry, " see §9h, p. 49.
´ Cf. C. §9f. pp. 44-45. Husserl speaks there of an "arithmetizat�on of �eometry: :
which "leads al most automatical l y, i n a certain way, t o the emptymg of Its sense
127
Introductin to the Orgin ofGeometry
wesae«. iaea. a priori taatiaeçays.ea|ta.a,. tae|ecy. taeva,ae
¬e:çae|e,.ea|aacçae:eae¬.etyçes. iaea:iei¬easa:e.iaeçess.|. |.ty
ei.¬a,.aa:yva:.at. ea.aacç:eexaetsçat.eie¬çe:a|.tya|:eacyaacte
|e| eeatec.ataeea|ia:a|ae|ctaat«aseae:ecieiaeça. |eseçae:«ae
c.caeiyetsae«,ee¬et:y|ai«aesaea|c|eeeae-. va||eas.ts. avea·
te: , | :s,
1aastae . asi.tai.eaei,ee±et:yeea|cea|y|eaphilosophical aei
uasse:| . «ae eriea sçeasseir| aiea.z.a,,ee¬ei:y (FTL, Ceae|a·
s. ea. ç :º:, .a|«aysass.,aecteia. s . ast.tat.a,aeiaeeate¬çe:aae.t,
eisense «.tataeseaee|eir|ate(Ideas I, ;º. ç. ·s,. r|atea. s¬(C,
§9, ç :·, . iaeC:eess,a.cec|yiaer|aiea.eceet:.aeeii ceas (ibid. ,
;s. ç. : i , . ' · r|aiea.e. cea|.s¬. · ··aacseie:ia.1aeça.|eseçae:.sa
¬aa «ae .aaa,a:aies iae iaee:ei.ea| aii.iace . iae |atte: .s ea|y tae
sç.:.t s :ac.ea|i:eece¬.«a.eaaatae:.zesa¬eve|eyeacia.taceaac
eçeas tae ae:.zea ei sae«|ec,e as taat ei a ç:eaav.a,. . . e . eiaa
.aaa.ie ç:e]eei e: tass( Vorhaben) . 1ae:e|y. iae iaee:et.ea| att.iace
¬ases.cea| .zat.ea s cee. s. veçassa,etetae| . ¬.tçess.||e.as«e||as
tae eeast.tat.ea eitae ¬atae¬at.ea| ae|c .a ,eae:a| Nata:a| | y. ia.s
çassa,eietae|.¬.t. sea|ytae,e.a,|eyeaceve:yseas. || eaaciaeiaa|
| .¬. i. it eeaee:as iae .cea| | . ¬.i eiaa .aaa.ie t:aas,:ess. ea. aettae
iaetaa||.¬.ieiiaet:aas,:essecia. tace
sta:i.a,i:e¬ta. s. aaa,a:a|.aaa.t.zat.ea.¬atae¬at.esee,a.zesae«
.aaa.i. zat.eas «a.ea a:e se ¬aay .aie:.e: :eve|ai.eas . re:. .i tae
ç:.¬e:c.a|.aaa.t.zai.eaeçeasiae¬atae¬at.ea|ae|cie.aaa.teieeaa·
c.i.es ie: iaeC:eess. .tae| essfrst | .¬.tsiaeaç:.e:. syste¬eitaat
ç:ecaet.v.ty1aeve:yeeaieateiaa.aaa.ieç:ecaet.ea«.|||eeeaiaec
«.ta.aaaaç:.e:.sysie¬«a.ea.ie:taeC:eess. «. | | a|«ays|eclosed.
[modifi ed] . Formal algebrization was already presented as a threat for primordial sense
and the "clari ty" of geometry i n Ideas I. where the " ' pure' geometer" was defned as
the one "who dispenses with the methods of algebra" (§70, p. 1 82) .
1 41; As Husserl often remarked, the al lusion to Greece , to the Greek origin of phi loso­
phy and mathemati cs, has no external hi storico-empirical sense. It i s the factual
[ h' cncmentief] i ndex of an i nteral sense of origi n . Cf. on thi s parti cul arl y "Phi losophy
and the Cri si s of European Humanity" ( in C, pp. 279-80) . Of course, the whole problem
of a phenomenology of hi story supposes that the " indicati ve" character of such language
is resol ved.
´´ "Idealization and the Science of Reali ty-The Mathematization of Nature" ( Before
1 928) , Abhandlung in Krisis, p. 29 1 ; Appendi x I I in Crisis. p. 3 1 3. In addition to thi s text.
one of the most specifc sketches from the h istorical perspective concerning the relation
between Plato' s philosophy and the advent of pure mathematics by ideal ization and
passage to the limit has been publ i shed by R. Boehm in Bei l age VI I of Erste Philosophie
( 1 923124) . Vol . 1 (in Husserliana. Vol . 7 [The Hague: Nijhof, 1 956] , pp. 327-28) .
128
Jacques Derid
1|e ,a.ce|e:e .s Ðae|.ceaa,eemei:y. e: :aiae: i|e " ideal Euclid, "
aeee:c.a, ie uasse:| s exç:ess.ea. «|.e| .s :esi:.eiec ie sease. aei
a.sie:.ea|iaei. iaie:.aii|eca«aeimece:ai.mes. i|eaç:.e:.sysiem
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iaseç|aeewithin .aaa.iyasi|eçess.|.|.iyeiaaai|emai.ea|aç:.e:.. a
,eae:a| . re:|açs . i|ea. «eaeeci ec.si.a,a. s| |ei«eea. eai|e eae
aaac. . aaa.i.zai.ea asi|e. asi.iai.a,aeieimai|emai.es. . e. . asi|e
c.se|esa:e ei mai|emai.ea| aç:.e:.aess .ise|i-i|e çess.|.|.iy ei
mai|emai.zai.ea.a,eae:a|-aac. eaiae ei|e:|aac. . aaa.i.zai.easas
i|eea|a:,emeaiseiaç:.e:.sysiems . 1|ese|aiie:«ea|cea|yaave|ac
ieaccc. meas.easei. aaa.iyieiaeaç:.e:. .|aiiaey«ea|caeieeaee:a
aç:.e:.aess. ise|i.iai|eOrigin, uasse:|. s.aie:esiec.a.aaa.i.zai.ea.a
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|yraa|x.eeea: . |ei«eea iaev.eaaaieeia:e, ra.|eseçayaaciae
C:.s.seiÐa:eçeaa uamaa.iy, aac i|eCrisi .ise|i.«|.e|. x.eeea:
aeies. ,ees |aes ie C:eesiaea,aiaac .a ça:i.ea|a:ie Ðae| .ceaa
,ee¬ei:y.ieass.,ai|e,|e:yeiaav. a,eeaee. veceiaa.aaa.ieiassei
sae«.a,. . .
.
··
He:eeve:. iae c.ae:eaee «e ç:eçeseie e|se:ve|ei«eea iae i«e
s.acsei.aaa.iy«ea|caeiaia||eemç|eie|yeaaee«aai. .ai|e|.ie:a|·
aesseiiae iexis. :ema.asaaa,:aaieççes.i.ea iei as ç|aees.ce|y
s.ceiaei«emesiaçça:eai|y.::eeeae. |a||eçassa,es.
~,
Only Greek philosophy leads, by a specic development, to a science
in the form ofinfnite theory, ofwhich Greek geometry supplied us,
for some millennia, the example and soverei{n model.
Mathematics-the idea ofthe infnite, of infnte tasks-is like a
Babylonian tower: although unfnished, it remains a task full ofsense,
opened onto the infnite. This infnity has for its correlate the new man
ofinfnite ends.
~acia:iae:ea.
Infnity is discovered, frst in the form ofthe idealization of
magnitudes, ofmeasures, ofnumbers, fgures, straight lines, poles,
surfaces, etc . . . . Now without its being advanced explicitly as a
!
"" Paul Ricoeur, "Husserl and the Sense of History, " i n Husserl: An AnaLysis, p. 1 61 ,
n. 1 5.
129
Introductin to the Orgin ofGeometry
hypothesi, intutitively given nature and world are transformed into a
mathematical world, the world ofthe mathematical natural sciences.
A
.
ntiquity led the way: in its mathematics was accomplished the frst
dlscov
.
er ofboth
.
n
f
inite ideals and infnite tasks. Thi becomes for all
later times the gUldmg star ofthe sciences. · ·
n,
Ofcourse the ancients, guided by the Platonic doctrine ofIdeas, had
already idealized empirical numbers, units ofmeasurement, empirical
fgures in space, points, lines, surfaces, bodies; and they had
trnsformed the propositions and proofs ofgeometr into
ideal-geometrical propositions and proofs. What is more, with
Euclid

an geometr had grwn up the highly impressive idea ofa
s

stemlcally

ohe
:
ent deductive theor, aimed at a most broadly and
highly conceived Ideal goal, resting on "axiomatic" fundamental
concepts and prnciples, proceeding according to apodictic
argume
!�
s- totality formed ofpure rationality, a totality whose
uncondltloned truth i available to insight and which consists
exclusively ofunconditioned truths recognized through immediate and
mediate insight. But Euclidean geometr, and ancient mathematics in
general, knows only fnite tasks, a fnitely closed Ü prior. Aristotelian
syl/ogistics belongs here also, as an a prior which takes precedence
over all others. Antiquity goes this far, but never far enough to grsp
the possi

ility ofthe infnite task which, for us, is linked as a matter of
Course wlth the concept ofgeometrical space and with the concept of
geometr as the science belonging to it. (C, § 8, pp. 21 -22; Husserl' s
emphasis)
weeaaaeiei|aiiaea:sieiiaea|eveiexisea|yaii:.|aies.aaa.i.za·
i.ea. aiaea:siseaseie C:eesça. |eseçayaac ,ee¬ei:y. · �· . . e . iae
e:eai.ve .cea|. zai.ea eimaiae¬ai.es .a,eae:a|-aiaei iaey «.|| aei
|e cea.ec .a iae Crisis. 1ae:e ex. sis aa .aaa.iy «a.ea e¡aa| . zes
' "
´ [The fi rst part of thi s passage i s taken from " La Crise de J ' humanite europeenne et
l a philosophie, " translated by Paul Ricoeur. Thi s version (translated from Ms M I I I 5 I I
b) di fers i n places from the version ( Ms M I I I 5 I I a) publ i shed i n the Krisis and translated
i nto Engl i sh ( Lauer' s translation of this text i n the same volume that contains his transla­
tion of " PRS, " Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, also follows the latter
v�rsion). I have always cited the version in C, since here occurs the only signi fi cant
divergence between the two texts i n Derrida's use of them. The second part of the above
quoted passage is found on p. 293 of C. Note adapted by tr. ]
´ ´´ In this respect, it can be said that, by thei r intention, the Vienna Lecture and the
Origin are nearer each other than they both are to the Crisis . Both are interested in a
proto-origin prior to the "Gal ilean" origin of modern times. Cf. what we said above
about the reduction of the Galilean atti tude.
130
Jacques Derrida
tae c. seeve:y ei tae aç:.e:.aess ei mataemat.es .a ,eae:a| aac tae
t:aas,:ess.eaeiseas.||eia.taces. evea.itaei:staç:.e:.system.s.a
.tse|iclosed, astaeseeeacçassa,estates Oatae|as. seiaia.teaç:.e:.
system, aa . aia.te aam|e: ei m+taemat.ea| eçe:at.eas aac
t:aasie:mat.eas. sa|:eacyçess.||e. ataats,stem. evea.itaeya:eaet
. aia.te|ye:eat. ve ~|evea|| .cesç.tetaee|esecaesseitaesystem.«e
a:ewithin mataemat.ea|.aia.ty|eeaase«eaaveceia.t. ve|y.cea|.zec
aac,eae|eyeactaeiaetaa|aacseas.||eia. taces 1ae.aia.te. a| a.ty
eitaemece:a:eve|at.eaeaataea|eaaaeaaeec.ataeia.te. aia.tyei
~at.¡a.ty s e:eat. ea wa.|e . avest.,at.a, tae sease ei «aat taey
e:eatec-mataemat.ea|aç:.e:.aess-taeC:ee|ss.mç|y«ea|caetaave
. avest.,atect|eseaseeia||taeçe«e:sei.a| a.ty«a.ea«e:eeae|esec
.ataataç:.e:.aessaac. tae:eie:e. te |e sa:e . eitae ça:eaac.a| a.te
a.ste:.e.ty eimataemat.es 1aat«. || |e ceaeea|yç:e,:ess.ve|yaac
| ate:ea.|y. ate:eeaaeet.a,:eve|at.eaa:yceve|eçmeatseeaie:m.a,te
taeç�eieaaca. ste:.e.ty eimataemat.es aac teae:eat. v.ty«a.ea a|·
«aysç:eeeecs|yc.se|esa:e '
i itaat «e:e se. tae eeat:ast|et«eeataet«e texts«ea|c|e|ess
a|:açt eae«ea|ctaemat.zemataemat.ea|aprioriness aactaeetae:tae
aç:.e:.systeme:systems. e::atae:mat|emat.ea|systematicity. w.ta.a
tae.a| a.tyeçeaec|ytaeC:ee|s .aae«.a| a. t.zat.ea. sç:ecaeec.eae
«a.ea «.|| ma|e tae ç:ev.eas e|esa:e aççea:. aet as tae e|esa:e
ça:a|yz.a,taeC:ee|son the threshold eimataemat.ea|.aia.ty . tse|i.
|atas tae e|esa:e seeeaca:.|y| .m.t.a, taemwithin tae mataemat.ea|
| e|c.a,eae:a| Ðvea. ataesç.:.teitaeCrsis, taemeceo.aia.t. zat.ea
«. | | ma:| | ess aa aataeat.e açsa:,.a, taaa a |.ac ei:esa::eet.ea ei
,eemet:y He:eeve:. ta.sse|i·:e|.:ta[renaissance a sol] «.|||eattae
sa¬et.¬eea| ,aae«obliteration eitaea:st|. :ta,ee:i. aeate) Aac..t
¬ast|e+ccec.taeç:eeessei.at:a·matae¬at.ea|.aaa.t. zat.eaeaataea
|e,eae:a| . zecad infnitum aacaeee:c.a,teaaaeee|e:

te

c:a,ta¬
I
·
3Z
nat.ieaea. aia.t.zat.ea.saae«|.:ta ei,eemet:y .a. tsaataeat.e
ç:. me:c.a|. ateat.ea,«a.ea«eaet.eest.||:ema.aeca.cceateaee:ta.a
I.¯I
On thi s cf. the Crisis. notably §8, p. 22, and §9h, pp. 5 1 -52, and §71 , pp. 245-46.
I ö2
The text taken from the Crisis, which does not seem to put into question ever again
the "Greek" origin of mathematics as an i nfnite t ask, poses thus the difcult intra­
mathematical problem of closure, a notion which can have mul ti pl e senses according to
the contexts i n which it i s employed. On all these questions, we refer particularly to S.
Bachelard. A Study of Husserf ' s Logic. Part 1 . Ch. 3 . pp. 43-63 . Moreover, there i s al so a
closure of the mathematical domain in general in i ts ideal unity as mathematical sense, a
closure wi thi n which al l i nfnitization will have to be maintained, simpl y because thi s
infnitization sti l l concerns ideal-mathematical objecti vities. About the mathematical sys­
tem in genera\
'
Husserl speaks of "an i nfnite and yet self-enclosed world of ideal objec­
ti vities as a feld for study" (C, §9a. p. 26 [modifed] ) .
131
!ntroductin to the Origin of Geometr
exteat|ytaee|esa:eeitaeç:ev. eassystem, . «emay «eace: .i.t.s
st. | | |e,.t.mate te sçea| eian e:.,.a ei,eemet:y Deesaet,eemet:y
aaveaa. aia.teaam|e:ei|.:tas,e:|.:taee:t. | eates·.a «a.ea.eaea
t.me.aaetae:|.:ta. saaaeaaeec. «a.|est. | ||e.a,eeaeeai ec:Hast«e
aetsaytaat,eemet:y.seatae«ayte«a:c.tse:.,.a.. asteaceiç:e·
eeec.a,i:em. t:
uasse:|aacea|tec|y«ea|ca,:ee1e|e|e,.ea|seaseaactaeseaseei
e:.,.a «e:e a| «aysmataa| | y.mç| .eatecie:a. m ne.a,aaaeaaeec .a
eaeaetae:.taey «.|||e:evea| ecia||yea|yta:ea,aeaeaetae:attae
. a| a.teçe|eeia.ste:ynat. taea.«ayaave,eemet:y|e,. a«.taça:e
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seas.||e .cea|.zat.ea aacme:çae|e,.ea| tyçe|e,y. s.aee exaet.tace . s
already aat.e. çatectae:e: O:. eeave:se|y. «aystill ea| | tae systems
«a.ea«e:eteta|| y:.c eieeae:ete,eemet:y,eemet:.ea| :1a. styçeei
¡aest.ea.a,aacea|tec|yrelativizes taesçee.ie.tyei,eemet:.ea|sease
as saea |atceesaet¡aest.ea.t. a.tse|i 1ae,eemet:.ea|telos . sae
cea|t ea| y tae i:a,meat e: ça:t.ea|a: se,meat eia aa.ve:sa| 1e|es
«a.eat:ave:ses. ç:eeeces. aac,ees|eyeactae,eemet:.ea|eae. |at
,eemet:y s acveata:e. s:.,e:eas|ya:t.ea|atece:ceç|eyec. a[s' articule
en] taat1e|es taeacveata:ec. caet|e,.aas such |eie:etaeeme:,eaee
eia|se|ate|yça:eaacaeaseas.||e.cea|.ty..t:ema.astaeacveata:eo)
,eemet:yas|ea,asça:e.cea|e|]eet.v.t. esa:eeea| aec«.ta.ataeie|c
eiaç:.e:.aesseçeaec|ytaeC:ee|s ¯�1aeauasse:|eaaat one and the
same time sçea|eiaça:eseaseaacaa.ate:aa|a. ste:.e.tyei,eemet:y
aaceaasay.asaeeiteacees. taataaa.ve:sa|te|ee|e,yeixeasea«as
at «e:|.aaamaaa. ste:y|eie:etaeC:eee·Ða:eçeaaeem. a,teeea·
se.easaess [prise de conscience ] , taat ça:e . cea|.ty .s aaaeaaeec .a
|eaac.cea| .ty. aacseea 1aas. attaesamet.meae savestaeabso­
lutely e:.,.aa|seasee:internal a.ste:.e.tyeieaeat:ac.t.eaa|| .aeaac.ts
:e|at. v.ty«.ta.aaa.ve:sa|a.ste:.e.tyi ata.smaaae:ae.sassa:ecei
çeaet:at.a, aa. ve:sa| a.ste:.e.ty ea|y i:em «.ta. a. esçee.a| | y .i. |y
ç:eie:eaee .aeta:asa.s:e,a:cteat:ac.t.eaasexemç|a:yastaatei
mat|emat.es
ra:i:em|e.a,taeaeeesste semeçess.|.| . tytaat. s .tse|iaa. ste:.e
yetc. seeve:ec«. ta.aaa. ste:y,«|.e|«ea|c.ata:a|et:aasi,a:ec|y
.t, .taeeçeaaesseitae. a| a.te.sea|y.eataeeeat:a:y.taeeçeaaessei
a.ste:yitself, .atae atmestceçtas aacça:.tyei.ts esseaee w.t|eat
l .·\
Thi s i s true, of course, onl y i nsofar as these objectivities are related, immediatel y or
not . to spatiality in genera\ , if geometry is considered in i tsel f and in the strict sense ; to
movement i n general . if kinematics i s considered in itself and in the strict sense. (But
Husser! ofen says that "geometry" i s an "abbreviation" for al l the objective and exact
sciences of pure spatiotemporal i ty. ) But i f geometry i s considered in i ts exemplariness.
thi s i s generally true for every absolutel y pure and "free" i deal objecti vity.
132
Jacques Deric
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i.eas, «ea|cea| ye|a.maaemç.:.ea|iyçeeisee.e·¬ia:eçe|e,.ea|aa·
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ça.|eseçay«a.eaaaseeac.i.eaeciaaiei,eemei:y.1a.swasiae|.:ia
eiça:ea.sie:y.1aee:.,.aeia.sie:.e.iy(Geschichtlichkeit) «.||aeve:|e
ceçeaceaieaaa.sie:y(Historie) . ~|iaea,aiaeiaee:ei.ea|aii.iacemay
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meiaece|e,.ea|seea:.iy, aac«.iaeaiy.e|c.a,ieeaasa|.sm,aiem.sm,
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|aia| sesame.eai .~|se,. asemeve:ya| |as.ve|.aes«a. eaaccaeia.a,
ieiaeç:ev.eassiai.ecese:.çi.eas,iaeseaseeiiae.aaa,a:a|eçe:ai.ea
. sesaaasiec. 1aeaa.iaces, «a.eaiaeç:eie,eemeie:ça.|eseçae:aas
aia. sc.sçesa|,amea,iaea.,aesia:e|eaac.cea|.i. es·aac«a.eaae
çe:ee.veseaaa.aaa.ieae:.zea, asie:mai.easceve|eçeceaieiç:as.s
aaciaea,aiei.aie:mseiçe:ieei.ea,e|ea:|yse:veea|yas|asesie:a
ae«se:ieiç:as. seaiei«a.eas.m.|a:|yaamecae«ie¬ai.eas,:e«.
ii. sev.ceai.aacvaaeeiaaiia. sae«se:ieiie:mai.ea«. | | |eaç:ecaei
a:.s.a,eaieiaa.cea|.z.a,,sç. :.iaa|aei, eaeei ça:eia.a|.a,,«a.ea
aas .is maie:.a|s .a iae ces.,aaiecaa.ve:sa|ç:e,.veas eiia.siaeiaa|
aamaa.iyaacaamaasa::eaac.r,«e:|caace:eaies . cea|e|]eei. v.i. es
eaieiiaem , i :º¸mec.aec} · .
!
´` On this cf. notably EJ, § 1 4, p. 65.
133
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
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«aeseaei.v.iyaasaeve:|eeasiac.ecie:.ise| iaac«aeseeeac.i.eas
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e. :e|e , a s.m.|a:| yaamec,|ai}ae«¯ie:mai.ea¨i ae:ce:ie:eaea
|ae|aac,:asça,a.aiaespecies , . e. , iae e:.,.aa| asçeei eiseas.||e
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habits «a.eaieaciee|iaseaie.i. iaThe Poetics of Space, eeaee:a.a,
iae eaaçie: eai.i|ec 1|e raeaemeae|e,y ei xeaacaess, Casiea
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,eemei:.ea|ev.ceaee. ·
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«.iaeaiiaeesseai.a|a.ceiseas.|.|.iye:.ma,.aai.ea,.i|:e|ea«ay|y
a|eaçi:emeve:ycese:.çi. vemee:.a,. uacea|iec| yia.s| eaçc:e«.is
saççe:i e: aççea| i:em seas.||e .cea|.iy. uasæ:| a|«ays sçea|s ei
,eemei:y s seas.||e saççe:i, sa|si:aie, e:|as.s(Ideas I, ;:º.
ç i s·· . ·· naiiaese ieaacai.eas a:e aei iae iaacameaia| s eaes, a|·
' ´`´ The same principle and notion of substructive idealization, but without substantial
supplementary explication, is found again and again from one end to the other of Hus­
sert ' s work. In particular: a) in the LI, I , 1 , § 1 8 , p. 302. There we read among others those
lines devoted to idealization and to which the Origin will add nothing: "The image . . .
provides only a foothold for intellectio. It ofers no genuine instance of our intended
pattern, only an instance of the sort of sensuous form which is the natural starting-point
for geometrical ' idealization' . In these intellectual thought-processes of geometry, the
ideal of a geometrical figure i s constituted, which is then expressed in the fixed meaning
of the defnitory expression. Actually to perform this intellectual process may be presup­
posed by our frst formation of primitive geometrical expressions and by our application
of them in knowledge, but not for their revived understanding and their continued
sigifcant use" ; b) in Ideas I, §74, pp. 1 90-91 ; c) in "Idealization and the Science of
Reality-The Mathematization of Nature" (Before 1 928), Appendix I I , in C, pp. 301 -1 4;
d) i nEl, § to, pp. 41 -46; e) inFTLy §96c, and Conclusion, pp. 243 and 291 -93; f) in C, §9a
naturally, but also in §36, where in summary is said: "These categorical features of the
life-world have the same names but are not concered, M to speak, with the theoretical
idealizations and the hypothetical substructions of the geometrician and the physicist"
(p. 1 40; our emphasis); and g) in Appendix V: "Objectivity and the World of Experi­
ence, " in C, pp. 343-5 1 .
'
õß
The Poetics of Space, tf. Maria Iolas (Boston: Beacon, 1 964) , p. xxxv.
´´` All these formulas are also encountered in the texts we just cited. The sensible type
serves as the foundation for geometry in the process of being constituted. Next, it will
only serve as an illustrative "auxiliary" or "adjunct" to a geometrical activity which
goes through it toward pure ideality.
134
Jacques Derrida
taea,atae|atte:ea,ataette¬asetaeie:¬e:|eie:,ettea| t .s ça:e
ta.as.a,taat. s:esçeas.||eie:tae|eaç.a,acvaaeeei. cea|.zat.eaaac
ie:,ee¬et:.ea|t:ataassaea1ae. aaa,a:a|eaa:aete:eitae.cea| . z.a,
aet.tae:ac.ea|aac. ::açt.vei:eece¬«a.eataataet¬aa.iests. aactae
cee.s.vec. seeat.aa.ty«a..aaç:eetstaeaeti:e¬. tsçasteeac.t. eas. a||
ta.sa.cestae.cea|.z.a,aeti:e¬a,eaea|e,.ea|cese:. çt.ea
,

|itae ea:|.e:testsce aetteaea as aay ¬e:e a|eat taeprocess ei
.cea| .zat.ea. a:e taey ¬e:e ç:ee.se as te taeorgin of the abilit te
.cea| .ze: |tceesaetsee¬se |a. ts¬esteeae:etecete:¬.aat.eas. tae
eçe:at.ea. sa|«aysç:eseatecasaçassa,etetae| .¬.t sta:t.a,i:e¬
aaanticipatory st:aeta:e ei .ateat.eaa|.ty. «e ,e |eyeac ¬e:çae·
| e,.ea| .cea|.ty te«a:c tae . cea| aac .ava:.aat çe|e ei aa . aia.te
açç:es.¬at.ea
natie: tae .ateat.eaa| aat.e.çat.ea te |eaç te tae .aia.te . .t ¬ast
already |e . cea| waat ta.s .cea| . zat.ea eiaat.e.çat.ea ateaee aa·
l �8
I n the same sense Gonseth notes: "The passage from the i ntuitive notion: the
intended line, to the ideal notion: the straight line, i s something completely indescriba­
ble" (Les Mathematiques et la realite: Essai sur la methode axiomatique [Pari s: Lib­
rairie Fel i x Alcan, 1 936] , p. 76).
t �!i
To us the most specifc passages concering thi s seem to be the fol lowing:
A) "Geometrical concepts are 'ideal' concepts, they express something which one
cannot ' see' ; their 'origin, ' and therefore their content also, is essentially other than that
of the descriptive concepts as concepts which express the essential nature of t hings as
drawn di rectly from si mpl e i ntui ti on, and not anything ' ideal . ' Exact concepts have their
correlates i n essences, which have the character of 'Ideas ' in the Kantian sense . Over
against these I deas or ideal essences stand the morphological essences, as correlates of
descri pti ve concepts .
" That ideation . . . gi ves ideal essences as ideal 'limits, ' which cannot on principle be
found in any sensory intuit ion, to which on occasion morphological essences ' approxi­
mate more or l ess, without ever reaching them . . » " (Ideas I, �74, pp. 1 90-9 1 ; Husserl ' s
emphasi s) .
B) The text which follows, taken from the Crisis (§9a, p. 26) , i s of a more genetic style.
Here Husserl also shows himself more sensitive to the difculty of a description which, he
thi nks, sti l l remains to be done: "Without going more deeply into the essential intercon­
nections i nvol ved here (which has never been done systematically and is by no means
easy) , we can understand that, out of the praxis of perfecting, of freel y pressi ng toward
the horizons of conceivable (erdenklicher) perfecting ' again and again' (Immer-wieder),
limit-shapes emerge toward which the particular series of perfectings tend, as toward
i nvariant and never attainable poles. If we are interested in these ideal shapes and are
consistently engaged in determining them and in constructing new ones out of those
already determined, we are ' geometers. ' The same i s true of the broader sphere whi ch
includes the dimension of time: we are mathematicians of the ' pure' shapes whose uni­
versal form is the coideal i zed form of space-time. In place of real praxi s . . . we now
have an ideal praxis of ' pure thinking' which remains excl usi vel y within the realm of
pure limit-shapes . " Husserl ' s emphasi s.
135
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
tae:.zesaacç:ese:.|es. staeç:eseaeeie:eease. easaesseiaaIdea in
the Kantian sense. 1ae|atte:.staee|]eeteiaaideation, aaa¬euasse:|
euea,.veste.cea| .zat.eaaac«a.ea¬ast|ec.st.a,a. saeci:e¬.cea·
t.eaastae.ata.t.eaeiaaesseaee( Wesensschau) .
l h0
1aec.ae:eaee|e·
t«eeataeset«e.ceat.eas. s eaeeaaeeast.tateaae|]eetasae:eat.ea.
taeetae:eaacete:¬.ae.t.aaa. ata.t.ea r:. ¬e:c.a|,ee¬et:.ea|.cea·
t.ea. ie:esa¬ç|e. |:.a,sa|eataaesseaee«a.eac.c aetes. st|eie:e
tae .ceat.ea 1a.s .ceat.ea . s tae:eie:e ¬e:ehistorical. nateaee tae
.cea| e|]eet . s eeast.tatec «.ta.a :eacy·¬ace ,ee¬et:y. tae
Wesensschau :e,a. as.ts:.,ats |t. saet|yeaaaeetaattaesa¬e«e:c
ces.,aatest«ec.ae:eateçe:at.eas .a|etaeases. taee|]eet.saa.::ea|
esseaee. a|taea,a aet at a|| . ¬a,.aa:y [antastique] . | a eeast.tatec
,ee¬et:y.taeWesensschau ea|y:eçeatstaeç:ecaet.ve.cea| .zat.ea |i
t?e,ee¬et:.ea|Wesensschau . sçess.||eea|y|eeaase.cea| .z.a,.cea·
t.�
a aa
� already ç:ecaeec tae ,ee¬et:.ea| e|]eet . eeave:se| y. t|e
çn�e:c.a| çassa,e·te·tae·| .¬.t.sçess.||eea| y.i,a.cec|yaaesseaee
«a.eaeaa a| «ays |e aat.e.çatec aactaea :eee,a. zec. |eeaase a
truth eiça:esçaee.s.a¡aest.ea1aat.s«ayçassa,estetae| . ¬.ta:e
aet te |e ceae a:|.t:a:. | ye:a.¬| ess| y 1aat .s «ay ,ee¬et:y .s ta. s
est:ae:c. aa:y eçe:at.ea tae e:eat.ea eiaa e.cet.e | t ie| |e«s taat
,�e�et:y s .aia.te a.ste:y «.||a|«ays see .ts aa.tyç:ese:. |ec|ytae
e.cet.. st:aeta:e eia :e,. ea. e: ¬e:e ç:ee. se| y. |y tae aa.ty eiaa
a?st:�et
��
¬eat � �sçat.a|.ty,eia:e,.ea 1a.saa.tyee:ta.a|y.saet
�.ste

oea|

..t.

e.nea|| yaaeaaa,ea||e nat.t.sea| ytaeaa. tyof tae
mi¬tea. stenea|ceve|eç¬eateitaee.cet.eea||ec,ee¬et:y |tis no­
thing eats.ce taea.ste:yei,ee¬et:y.tse|i
Ðsseaee·| .¬.ts saççese taeaaa eçea|e:.zeaaactae|:easta:ea,a
te«a:ctae.aia.teeiaa" immer wieder" e:aa" und so weiter, " «a.ea. s
taeve:y¬eve¬eatei¬atae¬at.ea|. cea|.zat.ea.a,eae:a| | itaest:ae·
ta:
� �
itae "again and again" . siaaca¬eata| ae:e. tae ç:. v. | e,ec
çes.t.eaeit|eç:eteat.eaa|c.¬eas.eaei.ateat.eaa|.tyaaceitaateitae
iata:e .ataeeeast.tat.ea eisçaee .a,eae:a| ¬ast|e aesae«|ec,ec
I 60
Cf. Idees, § 74, pp. 235-36, n. 1 of translator.
I 6!
On t he "again and agai n, " t he iterative "over and over again, " or t he "and so
forth" as fundamental forms of idealization, "since de facto no one can always again"
[take all the ideal i zations into consideration] (FTL, p. 1 88) , cf. FTL, §74, pp. 1 88-89; and
�. Bachelard
:
A Study ofHusserl's Logic [Part I I , Ch . 3] , pp. 1 1 9f. The "and so forth, "
masmuc� as I t belon�s t o the evident structure of the noema of the thing i n general, had
been copIOusl y descnbed i n Ideas I (cf. particularly § 1 49, pp. 379-83 , which sketches on
thi s a comparison between ideation, i ntuition of the I dea and of the "and so forth, " and
pure intuition i n the Kantian sense, whose ideation would only be phenomenological
clarifcation) .
136
Jacques Derrid
nai.a eççes.i.eaieiae | .vecsçaee.a «a.eaiae.aceia.ieaesseiiae
acam|:ai.eas .s a i:aaseeaceaee iaai esseai.a||y eaa aeve: |e mas·
ie:ec,iae.cea| .zecsçaeeeimaiaemai.esa||e«sasie,e.mmec.aie| y
ieiae. aia.ie| .m.iei«aai. s. aiaeiaaaaia.saecmevemeai.1aas, iae
i:aaseeaceaeeeieve:y| .veciaia:eeaa|ea|se|aie|yaçç:eç:.aiecaac
:ecaeec.aiaeve:y,esia:e«a.eai:eesiaaiiaia:eie:aa.aia.iece·
ve|eçmeai. Haiaemai.ea| sçaee ae |ea,e: sae«s «aai sa:i:e ea| | s
i:aasçaeaemeaa|.iy. 1aeceve|eçmeaiseimaiaemai.ea|sçaee«. ||
aeve:de jure eseaçe as. iaai . s«ay.im. ,aiseemme:e :eassa:.a,,
me:eour own. nai.siaaiaeia|se|eeaase.iaas|eeememe:eie:e.,a
ieas:
we:e«ei e:esçeeiaaci e:eçeaiiaese aame:eas mec.ai.easeaee
a,a.a,«e«ea|ciaas|e|ec|aeseaeeme:eie«a:cç:.me:c.a|iemçe:·
a|.iy1ae a,a.aaaca,a.a «a.eaaaacseve:exaei.iace.ase:.|esiae
acveaieimaiaemai.es«.ia.aiaeeia.ee·ie|ee|e,.ea|ç:ese:.çi.eaeiiae
.aia.ie iass. ~ac iae |aiie: . s ,:eaacec, iaea, .a iae mevemeai ei
ç:.me:c.a|çaeaemeae|e,.ea|iemçe:a|.zai.ea,i «a.eaiaei.v.a,r:e·
seaieieease.easaessae|cs. ise|iasiaeç:.me:c.a|~|se|aieea|y.aaa
.aceia.ieç:eieai.ea, aa.maiecaacaa.iec|yiaeicea(in the Kantian
sense) eiiae ieia| aax ei|.vecexçe:.eaee. · · ~s «e aave seea, iae
i.v.a,r:eseai.siaeçaeaemeae|e,.ea|a|se|aieeaiei«a.eaieaaaei
,e|eeaase.i. siaai.a«a.ea, ie«a:c«a.ea, aacsia:i.a,i:em«a.ea
eve:y ,e.a, eai. s eaeeiec. 1ae i.v.a, r:eseai aasiae .::ecae.||e
e:.,.aa|.iyeiaNe«, iae,:eaaceiaue:e,ea|y.i.i:eia. as,.ae:ce:ie
|ec.si.a,a.saa||ei:em.i,iaeçasiNe«as such, . . e . , asiaeçasiç:e·
` `'� Cf. the important §83 of Ideas I : "Apprehension of the Uni tary Stream of Experi­
ence as ' Idea, ' ' ' pp. 220-22. Thi s Idea i s the common root of the theoretical and
the ethical. Finite and objective ethical values are undoubtedly constituted and
grounded, according to Husserl, by a theoretical subject. Thi s point has been very accu­
rately brought to light by Emmanuel Levinas (The Theor of Intuition in Husserl' s
Phenomenology, tr. Andre Orianne [Evanston: Northwester University Press, 1 973] ,
pp. 1 33-34) and by Gaston Berger (The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy, pp. 8082). But
on a deeper level , theoretical consciousness i s nothing other, in itself and thoroughly
understood, than a practical consciousness, the consciousness of an infnite task and the
site of absolute value for itself and for humanity as rational subjectivity. Cf. , for example:
"Philosophy as Mankind' s Self-Refection, " Appendix IV in C, pp. 335-4 1 . There we
read: mankind "is rational in seeking to be rational . . . reason allows for no diferentia­
tion into ' theoretical , ' ' practical , ' '
a
esthetic' . . . being human is teleological being and
an ought-to-be . . . " (p. 341 ) . Also cf. CM, §41 , p. 88. The uni ty of Reason in all its
usages would manifest itself fully for Husserl in the theoretical project (rather than in the
practical function, as would be the case for Kant). On this point , a systematic confronta­
tion between Husserl and Kant on the one hand and Husserl and Fichte on the other
would be necessary.
137
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometry
seaieiaa a|se|aiee:.,.a,.asieaceiça:e|yaacs.mç|ysaeeeec.a,.i .a
aa e|]eei.ve i.me nai ia. s :eieai.ea «.|| aei |e çess.||e «.iaeai a
ç:eieai.ea«a.ea.s.is ve:yie:mi:si, |eeaase.i:eia.asaNe««a.ea
«as. ise|iaae:.,.aa|ç:e]eei, .ise|i:eia.a.a,aaeiae:ç:e]eei , aacseea.
aexi, |eeaase iae :eieai.ea .s a|«aysiae esseai.a| mec.ieai.ea eia
Ne« a|«ays .a sasçease , a|«aysieac.a, ie«a:c a aexiNe«. 1ae
~|se|aieeiiaei.v.a,r:eseai ,iaea, .sea|yiae. aceia.ieHa.aieaaaee
,iaeNe«aess} eiia.s cea||eeave|eç.a,. naiia. sHa.aieaaaee. ise|i
aççea:sas such, .i.siaeLiving r:eseai ,aac.iaasiaephenomenological
seaseeiaconsciousness ea|y.iiaeaa.iyeiia.smevemeai.s,.veaas
indefnite aac .i. isseaseei. aceia.ieaess .sannounced .aiae r:eseai
, . . e . , .iiae eçeaaess eiiae .aia.ie iaia:e . s, as saea, a çess.|.|.iy
experienced [vecue ] as sease aac :.,ai, . Deaia «.|| aei |e eem·
ç:eaeacec as sease|aiasa iaei exi:.as.e ieiaemevemeaieiiem·
çe:a|.zai. ea. 1aeaa.iyei.aia.iy, iaeeeac.i.eaie:iaaiiemçe:a|.za·
i.ea,masiiaea|ethought, s.aee.i.saaaeaaeec«.iaeaiaççea:.a,aac
«.iaeai|e.a,eeaia.aec.aar:eseai. 1a. siaea,aiaa.iy,«a.eamases
iaeçaeaemeaa|.zai.eaeii.meassaeaçess.||e,.siae:eie:ea|«aysiae
icea.aiae kaai.aasease«a.eaaeve:çaeaemeaa|.zes. ise|i
1ae aaia. saecaess ei uasse:| s :eaeei.eas ea ç:.me:c.a|
iemçe:a|.iy-iae.::.eaaess, |aia|se,as. ssa. c, iaec.ssai.siaei.eaiaey
|eii iae. :aaiae:-aas |ea, |eea aace:see:ec ti iae maaase:.µis ei
Group C iaas]asi|,iase.aaieHasse:|
·
seemmeaiaie:s , . siaai aei|e
eaase iaese maaase:.µis ieaea ea iae mesi µ:eieaac :e,.ea ei
µaeaemeae|e,.ea|:eaeei.ea,«ae:ecarsaess:. sss|e.a,ae|ea,e:iae
ç:ev. s.eaeiaççea:.a,e:iae| e|c«a.eaeae:s.ise|iieçaeaemeaa||.,ai.
|aiiaeie:eve:aeeia:aa|sea:eeeiiae| .,ai.ise|i:~:eaeiiaeiceaaac
iae. cea|.z.a,a|.|.iy,«a.eaexemç|a:. | yeeeaçyasae:easiaee:.,.aei
maiaemai.es, seçi|aes.aia.sesseai.a|ca:saess:
1aeicea.aiaekaai.aasease,iae:e,a|ai.veçe|eie:eve:y. aia.ie
iass,assamesc.ve:se|aiaaa|e,easiaaei.easiaaia:ecee.s.veaisev·
e:a|çe.aisa|ea,uasse:| s .i.ae:a:y. raa| x.eeea:ve:y ç:ee.se|y:ee·
e,a.zes .a iae icea iae mec.ai.a, :e|e |ei«eea eease.easaess aac
a.sie:y.' Ne«, «a.|e eemç|eie| yma:s.a, .i «.ia iae a.,aesiaac
mesieeasiaaiie|ee|e,.ea|c.,a. iy. «a.|eeemç|eie|y,:aai.a,a|e|.ev.a,
aiieai.eaie«aai.ieeac.i.eas, uasse:|aeve:maceiae iceaitsel iae
theme eiaçaeaemeae|e,.ea|cese:.çi.ea.ueaeve:c.:eei|yceiaec.is
iyçeeiev.ceaee«.ia.açaeaemeae|e,y,«aeæ 'prnciple ofal prnci­
pies" aaca:eaei,µa|ie:m eiev.ceaeea:eiae .mmec.aieµ:eseaeeei
! 6³
"Husserl and the Sense of History, " in Husserl: An Analysis, p. 1 45.
138
Jacques Derrida
taeta.a,. tse|i .açe:sea ¯imç|. e.t|,taat�eaa�.eitaeçaeae

¬eaa||,
aeaaeae:aeaaa||eta.a,.tae:eie:etaefnzte tam, ,1ae¬et. i?iaa·
.taaeaasçe:aaçsme:eaua.t,«.tatae
.
|atte� . �ç| .eat.eat?a� .ta���
see¬s te aave «.ta çaeae¬eae|e,y s çnae. ç|e ei çnae. ç| es
raeae¬eae|e,y «ea|a taas |estretched |et«eea taejnitizing eea·
se.easaessei.tsprinciple aaataeinjnitizing eease.easaessei.tsaaa|
institution, taeEndstiftung .aaeaa.te|yaeie::ea[differee] .a .tseeateat
|ata|«aysev.aeat.a.ts:e,a|at.veva|ae. ,
i t . saet|yeaaaeetaattae:e.saeçaeae¬eae|e,yeitaei aea. ��e
|atte:eaaaet|e,.vea.açe:sea.ae:aete:¬.aea.aaaev. aeaee. ie:.tI S
ea|ytaeçess.|.|.tyeiev.aeaeeaaataeeçeaae�sei

� see�a,.tse|i..t. s
ea|ydeterminability as tae ae:.zea ie:eve:y mta.t.ea. a,eae:�| . tae
. av.s.||e¬.|.eaeisee. a,aaa|e,eastetaea. açaaae.tyeitae~nstete·
|. aaD. açaaaeas. aae|e¬eata|ta.:a.|attaeeaesea:eeeitaes��aa�a
taev.s.||e |ya.açaaaeasi¬eaa«aat.sv. s.||e.aaayetaetv. s. ||em
.tse|i.|at:atae:e«.a,.tsv.s.|.| .tytetaeee|ea:eise¬eta.a,e| se. i t
. staaasst eta. sa|eae taattaeee|ea:eiata.a,. sseea(De Anima,
1i s|,. iitae:e. s aeta.a,tesaya|eattaeiaea ··se(. .t.s|eeaasetae
l 64
An essential fni tude can appear i n phenomenology i n another sense: to recogni�e
that the transcendental reduction must remain an eidetic reduction in order to avo� d
empirical ideali sm is to recognize that transcend
.
ental ideali s� does nO
,
t proc
.
eed, e,en 1 0
the Kantian tradition itself, without the afrmatIon of the phI losopher s radIcal fmtude.
This necessi ty for the transcendental reduction to remai n so i s th� necess
.
ity to make �he
absolute and primordial ground of the sense of being appear 10 � regIon (the r�glOn
" consciousness" unifed by an ego and an Idea) , i . e. , i n a region whIch, even were It
.
the
Ur-Region, i s no l ess a domain of determined existents . The uni tary ground of all �egl Ons
can onl y appear i n one region; it can onl y then be concealed und�r a typ� of bemg�ess
[itance] determined the very moment it app�ars
.
as
.
the �round. Wlthout thIs
.
oc�ult�tI?�,
philosophical di scourse woul d renounce all
.
eldetIc r
.
1gor,
.
I . e. , all sense. T�e eIdetIc l
,
l m1ta­
tion i s then indispensable, and the reductIOn receIves 1ts true sen�e ,h1Ch, c�ntrary to
appearances, is that of prudence and critical hum!l i t�. �it
.
hout �hl � d1sappe�nng �f the
ground necessary for appearing itself, wi thout th1S hmltatlon w1thm a
.
cert�m reglonal­
ness, without this reduction that Heidegger impl i citly reproaches h1m w1th, �us
.
serl
thinks that philosophy even more surel y fal l s back i nto regionalness; better st1l1, mto
empirical regionalness-here, for exampl e, under the form of anthropological factu�l ity,
Husserl thi nks, that of Dasein . On thi s poi nt, the dialogue between Husserl and Heldeg­
ger could go on indefnitel y, except considering that the reduction i s alw�ys already
supposed as the essential possibility of Dasein, and that, convers�IY, consc10u
.
sness as
transcendental source i s not a "region" in the strict sense, even If the neceSSI ty of �n
eidetic language has to consider it as such. For both Husserl and Heidegger, the co��hc­
ity of appearing and of concealing seems i n any case primordial, essential , and defmtlve.
I 6^
[ET: On the Soul, t r. J. A. Smith, i n The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1 941 ) , p. 568 (modifed) . ]
139
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometry
i aea. staatsta:t.a,i:e¬«a.ease¬eta.a,.a,eae:a|eaa |e sa.a. i ts
e«a ça:t.ea|a:ç:eseaee . taea. eaaaetaeçeaaeaaçaeae¬eae|e,.ea|
ty,eeiev.aeaee . Desç.tetae¬a|t.ç|.e.tyei:eie:eaeestetae i aea.a
uasse:| s |ast«:.t.a,s. tae ¬est ç:ee. se texteeaee:a.a, .tstyçe ei
ev.aeaee .s ieaaa. .tsee¬s. .atae eaaçte:eiIdeas I aeveteatetae
çaeaemeae|e,yeixeasea,; | 1ª .ççª---:, .Ceaee:a.a,taeaae¡aate
,.veaaesseitaet:aaseeaaeatta.a,.«eaaatae:eaç:e||e¬aaa|e,eas
tetaateitaeteta|aa.tyeitae. ¬¬aaeataax.a«a.ea. ta. st.¬e .eaea
|. veaexçe:.eaee.s aae¡aate|y,. vea. ~|taea,ataet:aaseeaaeatta.a,
|e|ea,.a,teNata:eeaaaet|e,.vea«.taee¬ç|eteaete:¬.aaaeyaaa
«.ta s.¬.|a:|y ee¬ç|ete . ata.ta|.|.ty .a aay |.¬.tea | a.te eease. eas·
aess. "as Idea ,. ataekaat.aasease,. [its] complete givenness is . . .
prescribed . . . " (ibid. , ç. ª--, .
1a. siaeaeitae. aaa.teaete:¬. aa|.|.tyeitaesa¬ex-¬e:eeve:. as
«e| | . taateitae «e:|a .a ,eae:a|-aes. ,aat,es}ta:ea,a. tsesseat.a|
aata:eatpe ofevidence that is its own" (ibid. , çª-:,¬ea.aea} , . '
.
nat
ta. sev.aeaeeeitae iaeaas :e,a|at.veçess.|. |.ty.s a|se|ate|yexeeç·
t.eaa| . açaeae¬eae|e,y. .taasaeç:eçe:eeateat. e::atae:. t. saet
ev.aeaeeeitaei aea seeateat it.sev.aeaeeea|y. aseiaras.ti sjnite,
. . e . . ae:e.formal, s.aeetaeeeateateitae. aaa.tei aea. s a|seataaa. s
aea.eat eeve:y. ata.t.ea.1ae.aeaeiaa. aaa.tyesseat.a||y¬et.vatea
.s aet .tse|i aa . aaa.ty. tae ev.aeaee taatta. s .aaa.ty . s . at:. as.ea||y
.aeaça||e ei|e.a, ,.vea aees aet exe|aae |at :atae: ae¬aaas tae
t:aasça:eat,.veaaesseitaeIdea eita. s. aaa.ty (ibid. ,¬ea.aea}, .
i ataei aeaei.aaa.ty.tae:e .saete:¬. aeaev. aeaeeea|yeitaei aea.
|ataeteitaatei«a.ea.t. staeiaea. 1aeiaea. staeçe|eeiaça:e
.ateat.ea.etyeieve:yaete:m.aeae|]eet ita|eae:evea|s.taea.tae
|e.a,eitae.ateat.eaintentionality .tse|i.
1aas . ie:eaee. aeta.a, aççea:s .aa sçee.ae ev. aeaee. waataees
aççea: . s ea|ytae :e,a|at.ve çess. |.|.ty ei aççea:.a, aaa tae aa.te
ee:ta.atyei. aaa.teçaeae¬eae|e,.ea|aete:¬.aa|.|.ty. . . e. .aee:ta.aty
«.taeataee::esçeaa.a,ev.aeaee. nyaeaa.t.ea.aeta.a,eaa|eaaaea
teta.sie:¬a|aete:¬.aat.eaeitaeiaea 1ae|atte:. astae. aaa.teaete:·
¬.aa|.|.tyeix. . s ea|yrelation with an object. it .s. . atae |:eaaest
sease.Objectivit . tse|i.
ia a.s a:t.e|e ea kaat aaa uasse:| . raa| x.eeea: «:.tes tae
I66
In FTL, Husserl also evokes "thi s phenomenologically cl arifable i nfi nite anticipa­
tion (which, as an i nfnite anticipation, has an evidence of its own) " (§ 1 6c, n. I , p . 62).
But, at that poi nt , Husserl no longer goes beyond the promise or suggestion made i n the
passage. Moreover, at the end of thi s note he refers to Ideas I.
140
Jacques Derrid
c.si.aei.ea,iaacameaia|.a kaai. . . |eiweeaintention ¬cintuition "
.s ieia||yaa|aewa.aHasse:| .
³!ö7
i aiaei,s aeaac.si.aei.ea. saeve:
iaemai.e. auasse:| . Necea|i,aa. aieai.ea.awa.eaaeia.a,. s,.vea
eaaaeiaave, assaea, açaeaemeae|o,.ea|eaa:aeie:,aacuasse:|eaa·
aeieeae:eie|ycese:.|e. i, ai|easiaei.a. iseeaieai, ie:iae. aieai.ea s
ie:m. saeeae:eieaac| .vecev.ceaee, wa.ea. saeiiaeease. akaai.
~eee:a.a,|y,phenomenology eaaaei|e,:eaacecassaea. a. ise|i,ae:
eaa .iitsel .ac.eaie .is ewa ç:eçe: | .m.is . nai . s aei iae ee:ia.aiy
,w.iaeaiamaie:.a||yceie:m.aecev.ceaee,eiiae. aaa.ieceie:m.aa|.|·
.iyeixe:eiiaee|]eei.a,eae:a|aa .aieai.eaw.iaeai.aia. i.ea, aa
emçiy.aieai.eawa.ea|eia,:eaacs aac.s c.si.a,a. saeci:emeve:y
ceie:m.aecçaeaemeae|e,.ea|.aia.i.ea: is aeiiae samei:aeie:aay
eease. easaesseiiae.aaa.ieias|aacie:ie|ee|e,.ea|ee:ia.aiyaace:a||
.isie:ms :~ssa:ec|y, iaea,ia.s.aieai.eaa|ça:esease[sens pur d'inten­
tion], ia.sintentionality, .a. ise|i.siae|asiia.a,iaaiaçaeaemeae|e,y
eaac. :eei|ycese:.|eeiae:w.seiaaa.a.isaa. ieaeis ,.aia.i.eas,:esa|is ,
e:e|]eeis , |ai , w.iaeaiwaai.a,e:|e.a,a||eie cese:.|e.i, Hasse:|
aeve:iae|ess:eee,a.zes, c.si.a,a.saes, aacposits ia. s.aieai.eaa|.iyas
iaea.,aesisea:eeeiva|ae .He|eeaiesiaespace wae:eeease.easaess
aei.aes .ise|i ei iae i cea s ç:ese:. çi.ea aac iaas .s :eee,a.zec as
i:aaseeaceaia|eease.easaessia:ea,aiaes.,aeiiae.aaa.ie.ia. ssçaee
.siaeinteral |eiweeaiaei ceaei. aaa.iy.a.isie:ma|aacaa.ie,yei
eeae:eie,ev. ceaeeaaciae.aaa.iy. ise|ieiwa.eaiae:e. siaeicea.ii.s
eaiae|as.seiia. sae:.zea·ee:ia.aiyiaaiiaea.sie:.e.iyeiseaseaaciae
ceve|eçmeaieixeaseaa:eseii:ee.
I 67
"Kant and Husserl , " in Husserl: An Analysis, pp. 1 75-201 . In this very dense
article, Ricoeur defi nes Husserlianism as the completion of a latent phenomenology and
the reduction of an ontological disquietude, both of which aimate Kantianism; of these
he has said that "Husserl did phenomenology, but Kant limited andfounded it" (p. 201 ) .
I n thi s way the formidable and decisive problems of the Fifth Cartesian Medi tation are
taken up again in a Kantian reading: the practical detenination of the person by respect
must precede and condition a theoretical constitution which, by itself alone, cannot have
access to the alter ego as such. Also cf. on this Fallible Man, tr. Charles Kelbley
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1 965), pp. 1 05-2 1 . As for the relation with an object which
preoccupies us here, Ricoeur writes more particularly: "The key to the problem is the
distinction, fundamental in Kant but totally unknown in Husserl, between intention and
intuition . Kant radically separates from one another the relation to something and the
intuition of something. An object " X is an intention without intition. This distinction
subtends that of thinking and knowing and maintains the ageement as well as the tension
between them" (p. 1 89).
Here we naturally leave aside those various possibilities, so often invoked by Husserl ,
of empty intentions, like the symbolic intentions that are deceived or not fulflled, and so
on. They could not b said to be deprived of intuition in general . Their emptiness is
circumscribed, in that they always bear reference to a determined but absent intuition.
141
Introductin to the Origin ofGeomet
re:aaçs ia. s ae|çs as ieeemç:eaeacwayiae icea.a i~ kaai.aa
seaseaac, ae:e,iaemaiaemai.ea|. cea| .zai.eawa.easaççeses. ieea|c
ea|y|eoperative aacnot thematic eeaeeçis.
!öB
1a. sçaeaemeae|e,.ea|
aeaiaemai.zai.eae|eysaç:eieaacaac.::ecae. ||eaeeess.iy.1aeicea
.siae|as.seawa.eaaçaeaemeae|e,y.sseiaç.ae:ce:ieaea.eveiae
aaa|.aieai.eaeiça.|eseçay.1aaiaçaeaemeae|e,.ea|ceie:m.aai.eaei
iae icea . ise|i may |e :ac.ea||y . mçess.||e i:em iaea ea s.,a.aes
çe:aaçsiaaiçaeaemeae|e,yeaaaei|e:eaeeiec.aaçaeaemeae|e,yei
çaeaemeae|e,y,aaciaai. isLogos eaaaeve:aççea:assaea.eaaaeve:
|e ,.vea.a aça.|eseçayeisee.a,, |ai ,|.|e a|| sçeeea, eaa ea|y |e
aea:c e: aace:sieec ia:ea,a iae v.s.||e. 1ae Endstitung ei
çaeaemeae|e,y ,çaeaemeae|e,y s a|i.maie e:.i.ea| |e,.i. mai.ea. . . e . ,
waai . issease , va|ae , aac:.,aiie||as a|eai.i, , iaea, aeve:c.:eei|y
measa:es açie açaeaemeae|e,y. ~i|easi ia.sEndstitung eaa,.ve
aeeessie.ise|i.aaça.|eseçay,.aseia:as.i.sannounced .aaeeae:eie
çaeaemeae| e,.ea|ev.ceaee..aaeeae:eieconsciousness wa.ea. smace
responsible ie:.icesç.ieiaeaa.iaceeiiaaieease.easaess,aac. aseia:
as .i ,:eaacs i:aaseeaceaia| a. sie:. e.iy aac i:aaseeaceaia| .aie:sa|·
]eei.v.iy. Hasse:| s çaeaemeae|e,ysia:isi:em ia. slived anticipation
asa:ac.ea|:esçeas.|.|.iy,semeia.a,wa. ea, waeaeeas.ce:ec|.ie:a| |y.
ceesaeiseemie|eiaeeasew.iaiaekaai.aae:.i.¡ae,
X

1a�ç:eseaeeeiiaeiceaa|eae, iae:eie:e,aaiae:.zesiae|eaçieça:e
.cea| |iy|yiaea,a:e·|.m.iaaciaeacveaieimaiaemai.es , aiaeiiaai
eea|c,.ve:.seiecea|isa|eaiiaaie:.,.a s sçee.aea.sie:.e.iy. ~:ewe
aeieeai:eaiecw.iaaaaa.sie:.ea|iceaeaiaeeaeaaacaac.is.ase:i.ea
.aiaeeveaie:a.sie:.ea|iaeieaiaeeiae:: ia wa.ea ease, wewea|c
si:.|eiae saa,siaai Hasse:|ç:ee.se|ywaaisieave.caacwea|cm.ss
ea:ia:,ei-çaeaemeae|e,.ea|a.sie:y.waaiwei:a|yaeec.sie.aves·
i.,aieiaeseaseeiiaeicea sç:eieaaca.sie:.e. iy.
uacea|iec| yiaeiceaaaciaexeaseaa. ccea.aa.sie:yaac.amaaas
: 'animal rationale" a:eeie:aa| .uasse:|eueasaysia. s naiia.seie:a.iy
IS only a a.sie:.e.iy. ii . s iae possibilt of a.sie:y .ise|i. iis
saç:aiemçe:a|.iy-eemça:ec w. ia emç. :.ea| iemçe:a|.iy-.s ea|y aa
ema.iemçe:a|.iy.1aeicea, |.|exeasea, .snothing eais.ceiae a.sie:y
I68
We refer here to the very enlightening distinction proposed by Fink in his lecture,
already cited, on " Les Concepts operatoires dans la phenomenologie de Husser\ . " [See
note 66 above. ]
1 '
Ì
142
Jacques Derrid
.a«a.ea.tdispLays .tse|i.. e. . .a«a.ea,.aeaeaactaesa¬emeve¬eat,
.tc.se|esesaac|ets. tse|i|eta:eateaec
s. aeetaetcea. saeta.a,eats.cea. ste:,|attaesense ofa||a.ste:,.
ea|,aa. ste:.ee·t:aaseeaceata|sa|] eet.v.t,eaa|emace:esçeas.||eie:
.t 1aas. .ataeCartesian Meditations , i .;1, , uasse:|sçeasseic.se|es·
.a,taeiaa|sease(Zwecksinn) eise.eaeeasa"noematic phenomenon. "
i at:aaseeaceata|sa|]eet. v.ty s c.se|esa:eei taei cea. progressiveness
.saetaaext:.as.eeeat.a,eaeytaataaeetstaeicea|attae. e:at.ve
ç:ese:.çt.ea ei .ts esseaee. · 1ae icea .s aet aa ~|se|ate taatfrst
ex. sts.ataeç|ea.taceei.tsesseaeeaactaeaceseeacs.atea.ste:ye:
|eee¬esc. se|esec.aa sa|]eet.v. ty «aese aets «ea|c aet|e.at:. as. ·
ea||y.ac.sçeasa||ete.t · ·iitaat«e:et:ae. a||t:aaseeaceata|a.ste:.e·
.tyeea|c|esa.cte|eea|yaae¬ç.:.ea|a. ste:y. . . at.|. zecas«aat
:evea|sesseat.a|.ate:eeaaeet.eas · ·· nattaeseesæat. a|.ate:eeaaee·
t.eas «ea|c |e . ¬çess.||e . taey «ea|c |e aeta.a, «.taeat a
t:aaseeaceata|sa|]eet. v.tyaac.tst:aaseeaceata|a.ste:.e.ty. 1ae ~|·
se|ate ei tae icea as tae 1e|es ei aa .aia.te cete:¬.aa|.|.ty . s tae
~|se|ateof .ateat.eaa|a.ste:.e.ty 1aeof ces.,aates ae.tae:a¬e:e| y
e|]eet.veae:a¬e:e|ysa|]eet.ve,ea. t.ve tae eieeaee:asae.tae:
aa .aceçeaceat . e|]eet.ve ~|se|ate taat .sc.se|esec .a aa .ateat.ea
«a.ea.s:e|at. vetetaat~|se|ate. «a.tsie:.t.aaceeaie:¬ste. t. ae:
ceestaeeieeaee:aasa|]eet. ve~|se|ate«a.eae:eatesaacass. ¬.·
|ates sease . ate .ts e«a .ate:.e:.ty. xatae:. ta. s ei eeaee:as tae
.ateat.eaa|~|se|ateeiObjectivity, taeça:e:e|at.ea«. taaae|]eeta
:e|at.ea .a «a.easa|]eet aace|]eet a:e :ee.ç:eea||yea,eace:ec aac
,eve:aec iitae of aaaeaaees ae. tae: aa e|]eet.ve ae:a sa|]eet.ve
,ea.t.ve.taat.s|eeaase.teeaee:astae~|se|ateofgenitivity .tse|ias
ì i·!i
That the Idea may not be i mmediately graspable in its evidence i s, i n any case, the
sign of its profound hi storicity. The expanded title of "Philosophy as Mankind' s Self­
Refl ection" i s: "Phil osophy as Manki nd' s Self-Refl ection: the Self-Realization of Reason
through Stages of Development Requires as its Own Function the Stages of Development
of this Self- Refection" ( see ' ' La Philosophie comme prise de conscience de I ' humanite, "
tr. Paul Ri coeur, i nDeucafion, 3 : Verite e t Liberte [Cahiers de Phi l osophi e] , ed. Jean Wahl
[Neuchatel : Edition de la Baconniere, October 1 950] , p. 1 1 6) .
t ¯º
Husserl rigorously distingui shes Idea from eidos (cf. Ideas I, Introd. , p. 42) . The
I dea, then, is not essence. From which the difculty, already indicated, of an intuitive
grasp or evidence of what is neither an existent nor an essence. But it is als necessary to
say of the Idea that it has no essence, for it is only the openness of the horizon for the
emergence and determination of every essence. As the i nvi sible condition of nidence, by
preserving the seen, it loses any reference to seeing indicated i n eidos, a notion from
which it nevertheless results in its mysterious Platonic fous. The I dea can only be
understood [or heard: entendre J .
t ¯ !
Jean Cavail l es, Sur fa Logique, p. 77.
143
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
taeça:eçess.|.| .tyeia,eaet.e:e|at.ea taeof eaa¬a:staesa|]eet s.
as well as taee|]eet s. ,eaea|e,.ea||yseeeaca:yaacceçeaceatstatas .
taea.ta:ea,ataeve:yeçeaaessei . ts.acete:¬.aat.ea.. t eaa¬a:stae.:
ç:.¬e:c.a|.ate:ceçeaceaee iitaat. se|ea:|ytaeease. «aysaea|c«e
eaeese. as Cava.||es taea,at. |et«eea aa a|se|ate |e,.e aac a
t:aaseeaceata| |e,.e (Sur La Logique, ç ::, . e: |et«eea aeea·
se.easaesseiç:e,:ess aaca ç:e,:esseieease.easaess (ibid. , ç
:s, :~| |tae¬e:ese.s.aeetaedialectical ,eaes. staatCava. |i-seççeses
te tae aet.v.ty eiuasse:|.aa eease. easaess .s cese:.|ec ç:ee.æ|y
aaceeç.eas|y|yuasse:|eava:.eas|eve| s. a|taea,atae«e:c.saeve:
meat.eaec weaave seeaae«¬aeata.saet.v.tyeieease.easaess
«as|eta aate:.e:aacçeste:.e:te çass.v.ty. taattae¬eve¬eat ei
ç:.me:c. aitemçe:a| .zat.ea,taea|t.mate,:eaaceia| | eeast.tat.ea,«as
c. a|eet.ea|ta:ea,aaacta:ea,a,aactaat,aseve:,aataeat.ec.a|eet. e.t,
«aats,ta. smevemeat«asea|,taec. a|eet.e|et«eeataec. a|eet.ea|,tae
.aceaa.temataa|aac.::ecae.||e.mç|.eat. eaeiç:eteat.easaac:etea
t.eas,aactaeaeac. a|eet.ea|,taea|se|ateaaceeae:ete. ceat.t,eitae
i. v.a,r:eseat.taeaa. ve:sa|ie:meia| |eease.easaess, titaeA|se|ate
eit:aaseeaceata|a.ste:, .s .aceec. asuasse:| sa,s .ataeOrigin, tae
v. ta|mevemeateitaeeeex.steaeeaactae.ate:«eav.a,(des Mitein­
ander und Ineinander) ei ç:.me:c. a| ie:mat.eas aac sec. meatat.eas
eisease(Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung) " ,e.tec.ç 1 09 a|eve,.
taeatae e:eat. ve aet. v.ty eisease . ¬ç|.es . a .tse|ia çass.v.ty :e·
,a:c.a, eeast.tatec aac sec.¬eatec seasea sease «a. ea aççea:s
aacaetsassaeaea|y«.ta.ataeç:e]eet eia ae«e:eat. v. ty. aacse
ie:ta waat Cava.||es ]ac,es . ¬çess.||e e: c.mea|t te ac¬.t ie:
çaeae¬eae|e,y-«ae:etae¬et.veie::esea:eaaactae,:eaaceie|·
]eet.v.t.esa:e:.,at|ytaeeeaaeet.eateae:eat.vesa|]eet.v.ty(Sur La
Logique, ç. -·, ·. s ç:ee. se|y«aat uasse:|cese:.|es .a taeOrigin,
eaeat.¬etaetae¬eeisec.¬eatat.ea.staeieeaseia.s:eaeet.ea.1e
a,a.a tase aç Cava.||es te:¬s. uasse:| sae«s exaet| y taat a sa|·
]eet.v.ty ae:¬ec .a .ts r:eseat |y a eeast.tatec e|]eet.ve sease
,«a.ea .s tae:eie:e .ts a|se|ate|e,.e · iasteas . ts ae:¬s te a
a.,ae:sa|]eet.v. ty. . e .teitsel .ataee:eat.ve¬eve¬eat|y«a.ea
.t,ees|eyeac.tse|iaac ç:ecaeesaae«sease. aac seea 1a.sae«
sease«.||a|se|etae¬e¬eateiahigher sease·. avest.,at.ea.a«a.ea
tae çast sease. sec. ¬eatec aac :eta. aec i:st . a a se:: eie|]eet.v.st
att.tace. «.|| |e :ea«aseaec .a .ts ceçeaceat :e|at.ea te |.v.a, sa|·
¯ Cavai l l es, who then referred above al l to Ideas I and to FTL, moreover added: "Per­
haps the later phenomenological investigations at least permit such a bluntly posed di lemma
to be contested" (p. 65) .
144
Jacques Derrid
]eei. v.iy. uasse:|aeve:seemsieaaveiaea,aiiaaiia.s«asiea|ase
iae s.a,a|a:.iy eiiae a|se|aie-ie :ese:ve ie: .i iae ee.ae.ceaee|e·
i«eeaiaeeeasi.iai.a,aaciaeeeasi.iaiecmemeais(ibid. ) . re:a.m
ia.s ee.ae.ceaee . s s.mç|y aeia.a, |ai iae a|se|aie aa.iy eisease s
movement, . . e. , iaeaa.iyei iaeaeaee.ae.ceaeeaacei iae .aceaa.ie
ee.mç|.eai.eaeiiaeeeasi.iaiecaaceeasi.iai.a,memeaisin the abso­
lute identit eiai.v.a,r:eseaiiaaic.a| eei.ea||yç:e]eeisaacma.aia.as
itsel·
Oieea:se,a| |ia.s:ema.asça:acex.ea|aaceeai:ac.eie:yas| ea,as
«eeeai.aaeieeeas.ce:-. mç|.e.i|ye:aei-iaeiceaassome thing aac
xeaseaasaaabilit. wemasieeasiaai|y:eia:a, iaea.
1 . 1euas.e:| s eeae:eiecese:.çi.easeeaee:a.a,iaeaeema s|e.a,
aea·:ea||y.ae|acec. aeease.easaess, eeaee:a.a,iae.cea|.iyeiaeema·
i.esease,aa.ae|acecaess«a.ea. sae.iae:asa|]eeiae:aae|]eei,aac
iae:eie:eis nothing but iaee|]eei sO|]eei.v. iy,iaeaççea:.a,ei. is as
saeafor aeease.easaess: ,aaceeaee:a.a,iaeaea.ma,.aa:y[nonfan­
tastique] .::ea|.iyeiiaeeidos , aa.::ea|.iy«a.ea. snothing other than
iaeseaseaacçess.|.|.tyofiaeiaa|:ea|.iyie«a.ea.i. sa|«ays:e|aiec,
.mmec.aie| ye:aei, asiae:.,e:easç:ese:. çi.eaeiiaeeidos' esseai.a|
meceeiaççea:.a,, . ii«eacm.iie:]asieae. asiaai, evea«e:e. iaa
.::ecae.||e ç:esamçi.ea, iaaiiae:e .s .a uasse:|«aai çe:aaçsiae:e
«as aei evea .a r|aie ,exeeçi .a iae |.ie:a|aess ei a.s myias aac
çeca,e,y)-aame|y,a r|aiea. sm eiiaeeidos e:iaeicea-iaeaiae
«ae|e çaeaemeae|e,.ea| eaie:ç:.se, esçee.a| | y «aea .ieeaee:as a.s·
ie:y,|eeemesanovel. 1aeicea. ssi.|||essaaex. sieaiiaaaiaeeidos, .i
iaai . s çess.||e , ie: iaeeidos . s aa e|]eei iaai. sceie:m.aa||e aac
aeeess.||eiea ia.ie .aia.i.ea 1ae | cea.saei . |i.sa| «ays|eyeac
|e.a, (epekeina tes ousias) . ~s iae 1e|es eiiae .aaa.ie ceie:m.aa·
|.|.iy ei|e.a,, .i.s |ai|e.a, seçeaaessieiae|. ,aiei.ise«açae·
aemeaa|.iy, .i . s iae | . ,ai ei |.,ai, iae saa ei iae v.s.|| e saa. a
a.cceasaa«a. easae«s«.iaeai|e.a,sae«a. ~ac.i.saecea|i«aai
ar|aiemaiec|yr|aiea. s¬ie| | sas a|eai.
:. 1e uasse:| s aei.ea ei xeasea. Ðvea .i ee:ia.a exç:ess.eas ai
i|mesm.,aisa,,esiia.s,a.cceaxeasea.saeiaaa|.|.iyeeaeea|ec.a
iae saace«s eia a. sie:.ea| sa|]eei.v.iy e: .aiae sa|«e:|c [arrere­
monde] ei|eeem.a, xeasea.saeisemeeie:a.iyai«e:s.aa. sie:y.
` ´ Li kewi se, the transcendental Ego in the phenomenological sense has no other con­
tent but the empirical ego and, further, no real content of its own, although i t is not the
abstractform of a content either, as indeed might some falsel y psed problems about thi s
suggest. I n its most radical moment, every transcendental reduction gi ves access to a
145
Introuctin to the Origin ofGeometr
a:si|eeaaseiae:e.saea.sie:y«.iaeaixeasea, . . e. ,aeça:ei:aasm.s·
s.eaeiseaseasiaei:ac.i.eaeii:aia,iaea|eeaase,:ee.ç:eea||y,iae:e
.saexeasea«.iaeaia. sie:y, . . e. ,«.iaeaiiaeeeae:eieaac.asi.iai.a,
aeis ei i:aaseeaceaia| sa|]eei.v.iy, «.iaeai .is e|] eei.aeai.eas aac
sec.meaiai.eas . Ne««aea«e sçea|eixeaseaa.ccea.aaamaas.ac,
.i.sc.mea|iie,ei:. ceiiaeçsyeae|e,.ea|çaaaiemeiiaea|iye:a|.|.iy,
«aea«esçea|eixeaseaa.ccea.aa.sie:y,iae. ma,|aai.veseaemaei
aeameaa|sa|siaaee.s aa:cieeaaee. ii«eeeaaaeea:se|vesieiaese
sçeca|ai.veç:e]ac.ees , e. iae:a. sie:y«ea|cea|yaaveaaemç.:.ea|aac
exi:.as.es.,a.aeai.ea,e:e| sexeasea«ea|cea|y|eamyia.Oaeeme:e
«e «ea|c aave ie eaeese |ei«eea xeasea aac u. sie:y. Yei ve:y
ea:| y, .aa.se:.i.e. smeiçsyeae|e,.smaac.aiae :eia:aieiaeia.a,s
iaemse|vesasiaeacveaieii:aeçes.i.v. sm, uasse:|a:,ec,eii. a,
:.ceiiaesçeei:ameiiaesea| siaea|i. esaaca| |iaevesi.,eseie|ass..
sa|siaai.a|.sms .
i i xeasea. s|aiiaeesseai.a|si:aeia:eei iaei:aaseeaceata|ego aac
iaei:aaseeaceaia|we, .i is ,|.seiaem, a. sie:.ea|ia:ea,aaacia:ea,a
Ceave:se| y, a.sie:.e.iy, as saea,is :ai.eaa|ia:ea,a aacia:ea,a. nai
being, «a.eaa:i.ea|aiesxeaseaaacu. siecy.a:e|ai.eaieeaeaeiae:,.s
a"sense, " aie|ee|e,.ea|ea,ai· ie·|e«a.eaeeasi.iaies|e.a,asmeve·
meai .1ae|asiça,eseiiaeOrigin a:eea,a,ec.aia.sç:e||em De«e
aeisiaacae:e|eie:eiae,:eaiaacç:eieaacç:e||em·ae:.zeaeixea·
sea,iaesamexeaseaiaaiiaaei.eas.aeve:ymaa,iaeanimal rationale,
aemaiie:ae«ç:.m.i.veae. s:, i sº,¬ec.iec}, .
Ðaeaiyçeeiiaeiaa|aamaa.iy aasia.sesseaeeeianimal rationale.
Ðaeaiyçe, uasse:|eeai.aaes, aas a :eei.aiaeesseai.a|si:aeta:eei
«aai .s aa.ve:sa||yaamaa, ia:ea,a«a.eaaie|ee|e,.ea|xeasea :aa·
a.a,ia:ea,aeaia||a.sie:.e.iyaaaeaaees.ise|i.w.iaia. s.s:evea|eca
seieiç:e||ems.a.is e«a:.,ai:e|aiecieiaeieia|.iyeia. sie:yaacie
iae ieia| sease «a.ea a|i. maie|y ,.ves .i .is aa.iy , | sº ,mec.iec}·
thoroughly historical SUbjecti vi ty. In a letter of November 1 6, 1 930, Husserl writes:
" For, with the transcendental reduction, I attained, I am convinced, concrete and real
subjectivity in the ultimate sense in al l the fullness of i ts being and life, and in thi s
subjecti vity, uni versal constituting life (and not si mpl y theoretical constituting life) :
absolute subjecti vi ty i n its hi storicity" (letter published by A. Diemer, French tf.
Al exandre Lowit and Henri Colombie, i n "La Phenomenologie de Husserl comme
metaphysique, " Les Etudes Philosophiques, NS 9 [ 1 954] , p. 3�hereafter cited as
Diemer) .
` ´� "Reason is not an accidental de facto ability, not a title for possible accidental
matters of fact, but rather a title for an all-embracing essentially necessar structural
form belonging to all transcendental subjectivity" (eM, §23, p. 57) .
·� |
146
Jacques Derrid
i. |eiaei:si,ee¬ei:.ea|aei«a.easaççeses.i.iaei:siphilosophical
aei.s ea|yiae sease·. a»esi.,ai.eaeiia. sa.sie:.ea|:ai.eaa|.iy 'in the
constant movement of selelucidation. " · ·1e|ee|e,.ea| xeaseaa|:eacy
eeeaç.ec e. v.| . zai.eas [l'humanite dans ses tpes empirques] |eie:e
iae ça. |eseça.ea| sease·.avesi.,ai.ea ,a sease·.avesi.,ai.ea «a.ea
awa|eaecxeaseaie.ise|i,aacaaaeaaeeciaeça:eæaseeia. sie:.e.iy.
. e . iae ve:y seaseof xeasea. ie a.sie:y 1ae sease·. avesi.,ai.eaei
«aai«asa|:eacy iae:e ¬a:|sa:açia:eaac. eease¡aeai|y. a:ac.ea|
aac e:eai.ve e:.,. a
·
Ðve:, se/f·a«a|ea.a, [naissance a se. } ei a
|aieai.aieai.ea.sa:e|. :iauav.a,a::.vecai.ise|i.ça. | eseça. ea|kea
seaeaaiaasese:e. se ea|,iae a:eaeai.e¯ iaaei.eaei|e,.aa.a,aac
ç:ese:.çi.ea, ra. |eseça,aaciaeC:. s. seiÐa:eçeaaua¬aa.i,. ¯.aC,
ç :sº, i aseia:asiae:ac.ea|ça.|eseçae:ee¬ç| .es«.iaiaedemand ei
iaeie,es. |emustprescribe [commander] ; . aseia:asae:esçeacsieaac
.s:esçeas.||eie:. i. aeassa¬esiae:esçeas.|. |.iyie:amandate. Oa|y
.aia. sseaseceesuasse:|ceiaea. ¬asa"functionar of mankind" [C,
;:. ç | :}
nai«aai. s iaeself (selbst) eiia. sse|i·e|ae. cai.ea(Selbsterhellung) ?
i s aa¬aai:aaseeaceaia|eease.easaessea|yiaeç|aeeei:eres. vea:i.e·
a|ai.ea. . e . iaemediation ei a ie,es :eia|.a, çessess. ea eiitself
ia:ea,a ia.s eease.easaess: Ce:ia.a ¬aaase:.çis ei iae | asi çe:. ec
¬.,ai sa,,esi ia.s. eaes aeee:c.a, ie «a.ea iae a|se|aie ie,es
«ea|c |e |eyeac i:aaseeaceaia| sa|]eei. v.iy ··· nai . iia.s "b-
1 7: "Thus philosophy is nothing other than rational i sm, through and through, but it i s
rati onali sm diferentiated wi thi n i tself according t o the diferent stages of t he movement
of intention and fulfllment: i t is ratio in the constant movement of self-elucidation
[Scl bsterhel lung] , begun with the first breakthrough of phi losophy into mankind. whose i n­
nate reason wa� previously in a state of concealment, of noctural obscurity" ( " Phi losophy
as Mankind's Self-Reflection, " i n C, p. 338) .
1 7
n
"Just as man and even t he Papuan represent a new stage of animal nature, i . e . , as
opposed to the beast, so philosophical reason represents a new stage of human nature and
its reason" ( "Phi losophy and the Cri si s of European Humanity, " in C, p. 290; also cf.
pp. 298-99) .
1 7 7 Cf. E I I I , 4, p. 60: "The absolute polar ideal I dea. that of an absolute in a new
sense, of an absolute whi ch is situated beyond the worl d, beyond man, beyond
transcendental subjecti vi ty: i t i s the absolute Logos, the absolute truth . . . as unum,
verum, bonum . o . " (Diemer, p. 39) .
If the I dea is thought here to have a transcendental sense and. as we wi l l see in a
moment, is "beyond" only compared wi th the constituted moment of transcendental
subjecti vi ty, we can observe that Husserl profoundly recuperates the original scholastic
sense of the transcendental (unum, verum, bonum, etc . , as the transcategorial of Aristote­
lian logic) over and above its Kantian meani ng. but also in a development of the Kantian
enterprise .
147
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
yeac ces.,aaies ea|y a ie| ee|e,.ea| i:aaseeaceaee. .i ve:y e|ea:|y
eaaaeiceç:.vehistorical i:aaseeaceaia|sa|]eei.v.iyeiiaea|se|aieei
iaeSel; |eeaase. s.aeeiaeie,esa|«aysaasiaeie:¬eia1e|es . .is
i:aaseeaceaee«ea|caei|e:ea|i:aaseeaceaee|aiiae. cea| re|eie:
|:.a,.a, a|eai |:aaseeaceaia| sa|]eei.v.iy itsel. Oiae: çassa,es
sa,,esiia.s.çassa,es«a.ea. «.iaeaiaaycea|i. ¬e:e| .ie:a|| yeeaie:¬
iea||eiuasse:| s ¬esi| asi.a,. aieai. eas ·
1aei:a,¬eais«a.ea¬eai.eaCeca:e¬a:|ec«.iaiaesa¬eaçça:·
eaia¬|.,a.iyCec.sae|ea,e:.ave|ec. asie:esa¬ç|e.aIdeas I ,;11.
ç. i :· . aac;:º. ç : i º, , ea|yas iaeese¬ç|a:y¬ece|aac | . ¬.ieia||
eease.easaessei. ¬çess. |. |.iy.aiaeç:eeieiaae. cei.ei:aia. iae|aiie:
|e.a,i:si «aai Cec a. ¬se|ieea|caeiea| | .aie ¡aesi.ea Cec .s ae
|ea,e:ces.,aaiecasiaei:aaseeaceaiç:.ae.ç|e-aaceease¡aeai|ya|se
:ecaeec .aIdeas I ,;·s. çç | ·:-·s,-eieve:y aa.ve:sa|factual
ie|ee|e,y. e. iae:eiNaia:ee:iae sç.:. i. . e . eia. sie:y D.v.ae eea·
se.easaess. «a.ea:evea|siae.aiaa,.|. |.iyeieeasi.iaiecesæaees .sa
iei.eaa|eeaieaiaaciaec.:eei.a,1e|esie:iae :ea|aa.ve:se ~s s�ea
.i. sa iaeiaa|.iy 1ae :ecaei.ea eiCec asiaeiaa| |e.a, aac iaeiaal
eease.easaessseisi:eeiaes.,a.ieai.eaeii:aaseeaceaia|c.v. a.iy.saea
as.iaççea:s.aiae|asi«:.i.a,s 1aea¬|.,a.iy«eaaaeaaeeca¬e·
¬eaia,eeeaee:asç:ee.se|yiae:e|ai.eaeiiaei:aaseeaceaia|~|se|aie
�sc. v.a.iyaaciaei:aaseeaceaia|~|se|aieasa. sie:.ea|sa|]eei. v. iy ia
.isi:aaseeaceaia| sease. Cec . sse¬ei.¬esces.,aaiecasiaeeaeie·
«a:c«a.ea ia¬eaiae«ayaac«aesçea|s.aas . aieiae:i.¬es
as «aai .s aeia.a, eiae:iaaaiaere|e' · ~ii.¬esiaeie,eses·
ç:essesitself through ai:aaseeaceaia|a. sie:y.aieiae:i.¬es.i.sea|y
iaea|se|aieçe|a:aaiaeai.e.iyof i:aaseeaceaia|a.sie:.e.iyitself iaiae
i:siease .i:aaseeaceaia|çaeae¬eae|e,y«ea|c|eea| yiae¬esi:.,e:·
easlanguage eiasçeea| ai.ve¬eiaçays.ese:aaa|se| aie.cea|. s¬ i a
iaeseeeacease.iaeeeaeeçis|e::e«eci:e¬¬eiaçays.es«ea|caave
ea| yametaphorical aac.ac.eai.ve sease. «a.ea«ea|caeiesseai.a| |y
aaeeiiaee:.,.aa|ça:.iyeiçaeae¬eae|e,yasi:aaseeaceaia|. cea|.s¬
iaiaei:siease.iaeesseai.a|aacç:eseaiç|ea.iaceeiaa.aia.iy«ea|c
i ¯8
I n the same fragment (Diemer, p. 40) . the transcendence of the Logos i s defned as a
transcendental norm, "the i nfnitely di stant Pole. the I dea of an absol utely perfect
transcendental omni-communi ty. · ·
1 7� K I I I , p. 1 06 (Diemer. p. 47) . [Derrida translates hi s frst cited phrase from the
German found i n Diemer on p. 48 rather than quoting the French given on p. 47. 1 In thi s
sense. the Pole as "beyond" i s always beyond for the Self of transcendental conscious­
ness. It i s its own beyond. It will never be a real transcendence: "the path which starts
from the Ego . . . is its own path [our emphasi s] , but all these paths lead to the same
pole, situated beyond the world and man: God" (ibid. ) .
148
Jacques Derri
|eunfolded ea| y.aaa.sie:.ea|c. sea:s.veaessi:em«a.ea. i«ea|c|ei
. ise|i|ederived. iaiaeseeeacease,.aaa.iy«ea|c|eea|yiae.aceaa.ie
openness iei:aiaaacieçaeaemeaa|.iyie:asa|]eei.v.iyiaai.sa|«ays
aa.ie.a.isiaeiaa||e.a,.
weeea|c|eaeme:eaaia.iaia|ieuasse:|iaaa|ysee.a,ac.|emma
ae:e . 1ecese «ea|c sa:e|y|e ie si:aacea:se|ves . aa sçeea| ai.ve
aii.iace, .aiaeçe]e:ai.veseaseiaaiuasse:|a|«aysass.,aecieia.s, .
1aeçaeaemeae|e,.ea|aii.iace. sa:siaaava.|a|.|.iyeiaiieai.eaie:iae
iaia:eeiai:aia«a.ea. sa|«aysa|:eacyaaaeaaeec. i asieaceii:aai.·
ea||y.avesi.,ai.a,iaeeçi.eas, «emasisi:.veie«a:ciaeaeeessa:.|y
single :eeieieve:yc. |emma.Deesiaeseaseeii:aaseeaceaia|a.sie:.e·
.iyma|eitsel aaae:sieec ,e:aea:c}thrugh iaaia.sie:.e.iy, | .|eiae
ie,es«a.ea.saiiae|e,.aa.a,:i s Cec,eaiaeeeai:a:y,ea|yiaeãaa|
a|a||meais.iaaiecaiiae.aaa.ie,iaeaameie:iaeae:.zeaeiae:.zeas,
aaaiaeEntelechy eii:aaseeaceaia| a.sie:.e.iy . ise|i:· 1aei«eai
eaee, ea iae|as.s eia si. | | ceeçe: aa.iy, saea çe:aaçs . siae ea|y
çess.||e:esçeaseieiae¡aesi.eaeia.sie:.e.iy.Ceasçea|saacçasses
through constituted a.sie:y,ae. sbeyond . a:e|ai.eaieeeasi.iaieca.s·
ie:yaaca||iaeeeasi.iaiecmemeaiseii:aaseeaceaia|| .ie. naiae.s
only iaere|efor itself eiconstituting a.sie:.e.iyaacconstituting a.sie:.·
ea| i:aaseeaceaia| sa|]eei.v.iy. 1ae c.a·a.sie:.e.iy e: iae meia·
a.sie:.e.iyeiiaec. v. aeie,esea|yi:ave:sesaac,ees|eyeac raei
asiae:eacy·mace eia.sie:y, yeiiaeie,es .sbut iaeça:emeve·
meaiei.ise«aa.sie:.e.iy.
1a.s s.iaai.ea ei iae ie,es .s ç:eieaac|y aaa|e,eas-aac aei |y
eaaaee-ieiaaieieve:y.cea| .iy,saeaasea:aaa|ys.seilanguage aas
eaa||eaasiesçee.iy ia. seeaeeçi, icea|.iy. sat once saç:aiemçe:a|
aaaema.iemçe:a| , aacuasse:|¡aa|. aes.isemei.¬esi eaeiasa.ea.
semei.mes .a iae eiae:, aeee:c.a,ie «aeiae:e:aei ae :e|aies .iie
iaeiaa|iemçe:a|.iy.Oa|yiaea eaa«esaytaaiça:esease, iae.aea| .iy
ei. cea|.iy,«a.ea.snothing other than iaeaççea:.a,ei|e.a,,.sat once
saç:aiemçe:a|,uasse:|a|seeriea saysi.me| ess[in-temporel] ) aacem·
a.iemçe:a| , e:a,a.aiaai"supratemporality implies omnitemporlit, "
iae|aiie:.ise|i|e.a,ea|y" a mode of temporality" (E, ;-1c , ç :-|
,mec.aec} , . ~:e aei saç:aiemçe:a|.iy aaa ema.iemçe:a|.iy a|se iae
eaa:aeie:.si.es eiTime itsel? ~:eiaey aei iae eaa:aeie:. si.es eiiae
i.v|a,r:eseai.«a.ea.siaea|se|aieeeae:eiere:mei çaeaemeae|e,.·
ea|iemçe:a|.iyaaciaeç:.me:c.a|~|se|aieeia||i:aaseeaceaia| |.ie:· ·
t 80
F I , 24, p . 6 8 (Diemer, p . 47: "God i s the Entelechy . . . )

t 8 |
"Die urzeitliche, iiberzeitliche ' Zeitlichkei t, ' " Husserl says, speaking of "my Liv­
ing Present" (C 2 I I I , 1 932, pp. 8-9) .
149
Introductn to the Origin of Geometry
1aea.cceaiemçe:a|aa.iyeic.a· , saç:a· , e:.a ·iemçe:a|.iyea
iaeeaeaaacaaceiomniiemçe:a|.iyeaiaeeiae:.siaeaa.ia:y,:eaac
eia||iaes.,a.aeai.easUnstances] c. ssee.aiec|yiaeva:.eas:ecaei.eas.
�aeia

a|.iyaacesseai.a|.iy,«e:|a|.aessaacaea«e:|a|. aess, :ea|.iyaac
.aeaaiy, empeiria aaci:aaseeaceaia|.iy. 1a. s aa.iy, asiemçe:a|.iy s
iemçe:a|aa.iyie:eve:yGeschehen, ie:eve:ya. sie:yas iaeassem||a,e
ei«aaiaaççeas.a,eae:a| ,.sa.sie:.e.iy.ise|i
I there is any histor, iaea a.sie:.e. iy eaa b ea|y iae çassa,e ei
sçeeea [Parole] , iae ça:e i:ac.i.ea eia ç:.me:c.a| ie,es ie«a:c a
çe|a:1e|es nais.aeeiae:eeaab aeia.a,eais. ceiaeça:ea.sie:.e.iy
eiiaaiçassa,e,s.aeeiae:e.saene.a,«a.eaaasseaseeais.ceeiia.s
a.sie:.e.iye:eseaçes.is.aaa.ieae:.zea. s.aeeiaeie,esaaciae1e|es
are
.
aeia. �,�at

.ceiaeinterplay ( Wechselspiel) eiiae.::ee. ç:eea|.asç.·
:ai.ea,ia.ss.,maesiaeaiaaiiaeAbsolute is Passage. 1:ac.i.eaa|.iy. s
«aaie. :ea|aiesi:emeaeieiaeeiae:,. ||am.aai.a,eae|yiaeeiae:.aa
mevemeai «ae:e.aeease. easaessa.seeve:s .is çaia .a aa . aaeã a.ie
:ecaei.ea, a|«ays a|:eacy|e,aa, aac «ae:e.a eve:y acveaia:e .s a
eaa?,eeic. :eei.ea [conversion] aaceve:y:eia:aieiaee:.,.aaaaa·
aae. easmeveie«a:ciaeae:. zea1a.smevemeai.sa|seDanger(ous)
as the Absolute [I'Absolu d' un Danger] . re:.iiae|. ,aieisease. sea| y
ia

:ea,arassa�e,iaai.s|eeaaseiae| .,aieaaa| se|e| esieaiae«ay
i.|esçeeea,a,aieaa|e|esiea|y.aiae.aaaiaeai.e.iyeialanguage
aaa|yiaea|c.eai.eaeia sçea|. a,|e. a,. iaiaai :esçeei . çaeaeme-
ae|e,y as Heiaea ei D. seea:se .s | :si ei a|| Selbstbesinnung aaa
Verantwortung, iae i:ee :ese|ai.eaie ia|e aç eae s e«a sease ,e:
:e,a.aeease. easaess [reprendre son sens ]) . .a e:ae: ie ma|e eaese|i
aeeeaaia||e.ia:ea,asçeeea. ie:aa.mçe:.|ecçaia«ay ¯ 1a.ssçeeea
. s a. sie:.ea| , |eeaase .i . s a|«ays a|:eaay aresponse. xesçeas.|.|.iy
ae:emeaas saea|ae:.a, a«e:ceae aea:s sçe|ea[une parole enten­
due] , as«e||asia|.a,eaeaese|iiaei:aasie:eisease..ae:ce:ie|ee|
arte:.isaavaaee. ia.ismesi:aa.ea|.mç|.eai.eas. iaea. Heiaea.saei
iaeaeai:a|ç:eiaeee:preambulator exe:e. seeiiaea,ai. xaiae:,.i. s
iaea,ai.ise|i.aiaeeease.easaessei.iseemç|eiea.sie:.e.iy
´`¯ Since The Idea of Phenomenology [tr. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikain
(The Hague: Nijhof, 1 973)] (cf. [Lecture 1] , pp. 1 8-1 9) , Husserl' s entire itinerary con­
firms the essence of phenomenology in its fundamental discovery, that of the
transcendental; reduction as the essence of Method, in the richest and perhaps most
enigatic sense of this word. Husserl says the transcendental reduction i s "the Prto­
Method of all philosophical methods" (C 2 I I ; S, 7; Diemer, p. 36) . On the sense of
phenomenology as Method, see particularly Beilage XI I I : "Foreword to the Continuation
of the Cri si s, " in K, pp. 435-5. [A French translation is presented by H. Dussort in
Revue Philosophique de France et de l' Etranger, 1 49 ( 1 959) , pp. 447-2. Some passages
are translated in C, p. 1 02 , and pp. xxviii ff. ]
150
Jacques Derid
~||ta.s:.,e:eas|yceve|eçstaec.seeve:yei.ateat.eaa| .ty.1ae| atte:
.s a|se aeta.a,|attae~|se|ateeia|.v.a,Meve¬eat«.taeat«a.ea
ae.tae: .ts eac ae: .ts e:.,.a «ea|c aave aay eaaaee eiaççea:.a,.
i ateat.eaa|.ty .s t:ac.t.eaa| .ty. ~t.ts ,:eatestceçta~. . e . . .ataeça:e
¬eve¬eateiçaeae¬eae|e,.ea|te¬çe:a|.zat.eaastae,e.a,eati:e¬
se|ite se|ieitae~|se|ateeitaei.v.a,r:eseat-.ateat.eaa|.ty .stae
:eeteia. ste:. e.tyiitaat.sse. «eceaetaaveteassea:se| veswhat .s
taeseaseeia.ste:.e.ty.i aa||taes.,a.ieat.easeita. ste:¬.a.ste:.e.ty.s
sense.
r:ev.cec«e :esçeet.tsphenomenological va|ae. saea aa asse:t.ea
ceesaett:aas,:esssease.tse|i.. . e. .a. ste:y sappearing aactaepossi­
bility ei.ts aççea:.a,. saeaaaasse:t.eaceesaet ¬.s t:aaseeaceata|
.cea| . s¬aac sçeea|at. ve¬etaçays.es i asteac. .t ¬a:ss tae ¬e¬eat
çaeae¬eae|e,yeaa|ea:t.ea|atec.«.taeateeaias.ea.«. taaça. |ese·
çayçes.a,tae¡aest.eaeine.a,e:u.ste:y.1a. seate|e,.ea| ¡aes·
t. ea , eate|e,.ea| .a tae aea·uasse:|.aa sease eitae te:¬. «a.ea
a|eaeeaa|e .aactecayertea.s.eççesecteuasse:| s çaeae¬eae|e,.·
ea|eate|e,y,eaaaetste¬i:e¬açaeae¬eae|e,yassaea. nat«ece
aet|e|.evee.tae:taatta.s¡aest.eaeaaeve:.in philosophical discourse,
simply ç:eeecet:aaseeaceata|çaeae¬eae|e,yas .ts ç:esaççes.t.eae:
|ateat,:eaac. Oa taeeeat:a:y.ta.s¡aest.ea«ea|c ¬a:s «.ta.aça.·
|eseçay.a,eae:a|tae¬e¬eat«ae:e.açaeae¬eae|e,yte:¬.aatesas
taeça.|eseça.ea|ç:eçaeceat.eie:eve:yça.|eseça.ea|decision-a ¬e·
¬eateeaee.vec¬e:eeve:|yuasse:| .s. aeeta.sç:eçaeceat.e.sa| «ays
aaaeaaeecas.aia.te.taatmoment . saetaiaetaa|. ty|ataa.cea|sease.
a:.,at«a.ea«.| |a|«ays:e¬a.aaace:çaeae¬eae|e,.ea|]a:. sc.et.ea.a
:.,at taatçaeae¬eae|e,ya|eae eaa ese:e. se|yesç| .e.t|yaat.e.çat.a,
taeeacei.ts.t.ae:a:y.
weaeecteeeae|aceta.sç:eçaeceat.ece]a:ee:aat.e.çate.tsiaetaa|
eac. se taat «e ¬ay çass i:e¬ tae ¡aest.ea "how" te tae ¡aest.ea
"why" -tesae«ei«aat«esçeas. it.s. ata.s:esçeettaata||ça.|e·
seça.ea|c.seea:se¬astce:.ve.tsaatae:.tyi:e¬çaeae¬eae|e,y we
¬astesaaastce]a:etae¡aest.eaeia.ste:.e.ty s seaseaaceia.ste:.e·
.tyassease. . e. .eitaepossibility of a.ste:.ea|iaetaa| .tyaççea:.a,.se
taat«e eaa¬aseia|| sease eitaeie||e«.a,¡aest.eas .Is there, and
why is there, any historical factuality? 1aese t«e ¡aest.eas a:e .::e
cae.||y.ate::e|atec.1ae «ayeaae¬e:,eea|yi:e¬taepossible ,. a
tae¬etaçays.ea|e:eate| e,.ea|sease .aacaet.ataeçaeae¬eae|e,.ea|
sease, aea|e.a, eia. ste:.ea| iaetaa| .ty. aac aea|e.a,as aeaa. ste:y
ea|y c.se|eses.tseventuality eatae |as. seiaeease.easaesseiça:e
seaseaacça:ea. ste:. e.ty.. . e .eatae|as. seiaeease.easaesseipos­
sibility .atae çaeae¬eae|e,.ea| sease. ~s «e aave saue.eat|y seea.
151
I ntroduction to the Origin ofGeometry
ta.seease.easaess «a.eaçaeae¬eae|e,ya|eaeeaa|:.a,te|.,at·eaa
ea| y|eate|ee|e,.ea|eease.easaess 1a.s.s|eeaasetaeseasete«a.ea
«eaaveaeeess. saetaaeveat s|e.a,.|eeaaseta.sseaseeaaa|«ays
aet|e. aea:aatec..teaac.eeate:aet|e|e:a.|eeaasetae «ay e«es
.tsse:.easaessteaçaeae¬eae|e,.ea|ee:ta.atyaacta:ea,ata. sse:. eas·
aess:eeeve:s tae v.:a|eaee eiaa "in view of what?" 1ae eate|e,.ea|
¡aest.ea.taea.see¬sa||etea:.seea| yeateiate|ee|e,.ea|am:¬at.ea.
. . e. . eat eii:eece¬ 1e|ee|e,y .s tae ta:eateaec aa.ty eisease aac
|e.a,.eiçaeae¬eae|e,yaaceate| e,yue«eve:.ta.ste|ee|e,y.«a.ea
aeve:eeasecte,:eaac aacaa.¬ate uasse:| s taea,at. eaaaet|ede­
termined .aaça.| eseça.ea|| aa,aa,e«.taeatç:ev. s.eaa||y|:eas.a,ta.s
aa.tyie:tae|eaeiteiçaeae¬eae|e,y.
1aas. sae«.a,«aattae seaseeiaaeveat.seatae|as. seiaiaetaa|
[evenementielle] esa¬ç|e.aac«aattaeseaseeisease .a,eae:a|.sea
tae |as.s eiese¬ç|a:.aess .a ,eae:a| . «e eaa taea ass ea:se|ves a
¡aest.ea«a.eaae|ea,e:ç:eeeecsi:e¬çaeae¬eae|e,yassaea Net .
" What is a Fact? " , a¡aest.eate«a.ea açaeae¬eae|e,.ea|eate|e,y
:esçeacsasa:a|e . nat . "Why are a factual starting point in factualit
and a reduction possible in general? " O:. " What is the factuality offact
which supposes the exemplariness offact? " O:yet." What is the primor­
dial unity ofsense andfact, a unit for which, by themselves alone, neither
can account?" i aetae:«e:cs. sae«.a,«aatsease.sasa.ste:.e.ty. i
eaa e|ea:|y ass ¬yse|i«ay tae:e «ea|c |e aay a.ste:y :atae: taaa
aeta.a,.
l i
a
Oataeeeac.t.eataattaetas.a,se:.eas|yeiça:eiaetaa| .ty
ie||e«sarte:taeçess.|.| .tyeiçaeae¬eae|e,yaacassa¬es.ts] a:.c.ea|
ç:.e:.ty. tetaseiaetaa|.ty se:.eas|yas saea .sae|ea,e:te:eta:ate
e¬ç. :.e.s¬e:aeaça.|eseçay. Oataeeeat:a:y. .tee¬ç|etes ça.|ese·
çay. nat|eeaaseeitaat ..t¬aststaac. ataeç:eea:.easeçeaaesseia
¡aest.ea.tae¡aest.eaeitaee:.,.aeine.a,asu.ste:y.Ðve:y:esçease
tesaeaa¡aest.eaeaa:esa:iaee ea|y .aaçaeae¬eae|e,.ea|ç:eeess
Oate|e,yea|yaasa:.,atte tae ¡aest.ea. | ataea|«ayseçea|:eaea
[breche] eita.s¡aest.ea.ne.a,.tse|i.ssilently sae«aaace:taeae,at.v·
.tyeitaeapeiron.
l i
4 uacea|tec| y. ne.a, .tse|i¬asta|«aysa|:eacy|e
| 8¦!
Such a question can be repeated about every si ngle factuality and about al l the
particular forms of i nfnite historicity as the horizon of every phenomenon, about all the
determined forms of the world in general as the horizon of every possible experience,
singularly of this hi storical world right here.
! S4
We have already cited the passage in which Husserl, gathering together the entire
signifcance of his enterpri se, afrms that , for phenomenology, pure exi stential [existen­
tielle] factuality as wild si ngularity (always outside the reach of every ei detic subsump­
tion) i s "eternally the apeiron" ( "PRS, " p. 1 1 6). We pass from phenomenology to ontol­
ogy ( in the non-Husserlian sense) when we si lently question the upsurge of stark fact and
152
Jacques Derrida
,.veateta.a|.a,,.ataeç:e·sa¬çt.ea-wa.ea. sa|sea:esa¬çt.eai
Hetaec'�·~acaacea|tec|yaeeesstene.a,and ne.a, sa::.va|¬ast
a|waysa|:eacy|econtracted e:drawn together, waeaçaeae¬eae|e,y
|e,. as|ye|a. ¬.a,tae:.,attesçea|[droit a parole] . ~ac.ine.a,c. c
aethave te|e u.ste:yta:ea,aaacta:ea,a,taedelay e:lateness ei
D. seea:seafter taesaew.a,eine.a,wea|c|e|atas. ¬ç|e¬. sie:taae
[fautive misere] eitaea,atasçaeae¬eae|e,y. 1aatta. seaaaet|ese.
|eeaasea.ste:.e.ty. sç:ese:.|ecie:ne.a,.taatce|ay. staecest. ayei
1aea,at.tse|iasD.seea:se-ea|y açaeae¬eae|e,yeaasay ta· saac
¬a|eça.|eseçaye¡aa|te. t. re:çaeae¬eae|e,ya|eaeeaa¬a|e.aaa·
. tea.ste:.e.tyaççea:. . e ,.aaa.tec.seea:seaac. aaa. tec.a|eet.ea|aess
astaeça:eçess.|. | .tyaactaeve:yesseaeeeine.a,.a¬aa.iestat.eait
a|eaeeaaeçeataea|se|atesa|]eet.v.tyeiseasetene.a,·u.ste:y|y
¬a|.a,a|se|atet:aaseeaceata|sa|]eet.v.tyaççea:,attaeeaceitae
¬est :ac.ea| :ecaet.ea, as ça:e çass.ve·aet.ve te¬çe:a|. ty, as ça:e
aate·te¬çe:a|.zat.eaeitaei.v.a,r:eseat-. . e. ,aswealready saw, as
. ate:sa|]eet.v.ty 1ae c.sea:s.ve aac c.a|eet.ea| .ate:sa|]eet.v.ty ei
1.¬ew.ta.tse|i.atae. aaa.te¬a|t.ç|.e.tyaac. aaa.te. ¬ç|.eat.eaei.ts
a|se|atee:.,.aseat.t|eseve:yetae:. ate:sa|]eet.v.ty. a,eae:a|teex.st
aac¬a|estaeçe|e¬.ea|aa.tyeiaççea:.a,aacc.saççea:.a,.::ecae.·
||eue:ece|ay.staeça. |eseça.ea|a|se|ate,|eeaasetae|e,.aa.a,ei
¬etaec.e:eaeet.eaeaaea|yeeas.st.ataeeease.easaesseitae.¬ç|.ea·
t.eaeianother ç:ev. eas, çess.||e,aaca|se|atee:.,.a.a,eae:a| . s.aee
cease to consider the Fact in its phenomenological "function. " Then the l atter can no
longer be exhausted and reduced to its sense by a phenomenological operation, even were
it pursued ad infnitum. The Fact is always more or always less, always other, in any
case, than what Husserl defines it as when he writes, for example, in a formula which
marks the highest ambition of his project: fact' , with its ' irrationality' , is itself a
structural concept within the system ofthe concrete Apiori" (eM, § 39, p. 8 1 ; HusserJ ' s
emphasis) . But phenomenology alone, by going t o the end of eidetic determination, by
exhausting itself, can strip pure materiality from the Fact. It alone can avoid the confu­
sion of pure factuality with such and such of its determinations. Naturally, having
reached this point, in order not to fall back into the philosophical nonsense of ir­
rationalism or empiricism, the Fact then must not function: its sense must not b deter­
mined outside or independently of all phenomenology. Also, once we have become
conscious of phenomenology' s juridical priority in all philosophical discourse, perhaps it
is permissible to regret again that Husserl had not also asked this ontological question
about which there is nothing to say concerning the question itself. But how can we lament
that phenomenology is not an ontology?
¯¨´ [Derrida says of the neologism presumption: "} wanted to escape the current mean­
ing of the word presomption (conjecture or hypothesis), in order to be nearer the
metaphorical schema of anticipation and in order to set it more visibly over against the
very rare French word resumption ( I' m not even sure it exists}-which can only be
written with a u . " Therefore, this word is translated as "pre-sumption" to emphasize its
diference from ' ' presumption. ' ' ]
153
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometry
ta. s a|te:.ty ei tae a|se|ate e:.,.a st:aeta:a| |y aççea:s .amy Living
Present aacs.aee.teaaaççea:aac|e:eee,a. zecea| y.ataeç:. ¬e:
c.a|.tyeise¬eta.a,|.|emy Living Present, ta. sve:yiaets.,a.aestae
aataeat.e.tyeiçaeae¬eae|e,.ea|ce|ayaac|.¬. tat.eaiatae| ae|| aste:
,a.seeiateeaa.¡ae,taexecaet.ea. sea|yça:etaea,atastaatce|ay,
ça:e taea,at.avest.,at.a,tae seaseei| tse|iasce|ayw.ta.aça.|ese·
çayCea|ctae:e|eaaaataeat.etaea,ateine.a,as u.s te:y,as«e| |as
aaaataeat.ea. ste:.e.tyeitaea,at , .itaeeease.easaesseice|ayeea|c
|e:ecaeec:nateea|ctae:e|eaayça.|eseçay,.ita. seease. easaessei
ce|aywasaetç:.¬e:c.a|aacça:e:Newaç:.¬e:c.a|eease.easaessei
ce|ayeaaea|yaavetaeça:eie:¬eiaat.e.çat.ea. ~ttaesa¬et.¬e,
ça:e eease. easaess eice|ay eaa ea|y |e a ça:e aac |e,.t.¬ate, aac
tae:eie:e aç:.e:. , ç:esa¬çt.ea, w.taeatwa.ea ,eaee a,a.a, c.seea:se
aaca. ste:ywea|caet|eçess.||e.
1ae. ¬çess.|.| .tyei:est.a,.ataes.¬ç|e¬a.ateaaaee,aewaess} eia
i. v.a,r:eseat ,tae se|e aaca|se|ate|ya|se|atee:.,.aeitaeDeraete
and tae De ¡a:e, ei ne. a,and sease, |at a|ways etae: .a .ts se|i·
.ceat.ty. tae . aa|.|.ty te |.veeae|esec .a tae .aaeeeat aac.v.cecaess
[indiviSion] eitaeç:.¬e:c.a|~|se|ate,|eeaasetae~|se|ate. spresent
ea|y.a|e.a,defered-delayed [dierant] w.taeat:esç.te ,ta.s. ¬çeteaee
aacta. s. ¬çess.|.| .tya:e,.vea.aaç:.¬e:c. a|aacça:eeease.easaess
eiD.ae:eaee .saeaaconsciousness, w. ta. tsst:aa,esty|eeiaa.ty,¬ast
|ea||ete|e:este:ecte. tsewa|.,at .w.taeatsaeaaeease.easaess,
w.taeat. tsewaç:eçe:cea. seeaee, aeta.a,wea|caççea:.
1aeç:. ¬e:c.a|D.ae:eaeeeitaea|se|ateO:. ,. a, wa.eaeaaaac. a·
ceaa.te|y¬ast |eta :eta.aaacaaaeaaee. ts ça:e eeae:eteie:¬w. ta
aç:.e:.seea:. ty . . e. ,tae|eyeace:taeta. s· s.cewa.ea,.vesseasetea| |
e¬ç.:.ea| ,ea. as aac a| iaetaa| ç:eias.ea, taat .s çe:aaçs waat aas
a|wa,s|eeasa.caace:taeeeaeeçtei"transcendental, " ta:ea,atae
ea.,mat.e a.ste:, ei .ts c. sç|aeemeats D. ne:eaee wea|c |e t:aa
seeaceata| . 1ae ça:e aac .ate:m. aa||e c. s¡a. etace ei taea,at st:.v
. a,te:ecaee¨D. ne:eaee|,,e.a,|e,eaciaetaa|. aaa.t,tewa:ctae
.aaa.tyei.tsseaseaacva|ae,. . e. ,wa.|e¬a.ata.a.a,D.ae:eaee-taat
c. s¡a. etace wea|c |e t:aaseeaceata| ~ac 1aea,at s ça:e ee:ta.aty
wea|c |et:aaseeaceata| , s. aee.teaa|ee|ie:wa:ctetaea|:eacyaa·
aeaaeec1e|esea| y|yacvaae.a,ea,e:|e.a,.aacvaaeeei[en avan­
cant sur] ) taeO:.,.ataat. aceaa.te|y:ese:ves .tse| i. saeaaee:ta.aty
aeve:aacte|ea:ataat1aea,atwea|aa|ways|eteee¬e.
1a. sst:aa,eç:eeess. eaeia"Rickrage" . stae¬eve¬eats|eteaec
.aThe Origin ofGeometr, wae:e|yti.sç.eeeeiw:.t.a,a| seae| cs, as
uasse:| says, aaexe|a:ys.,a.aeaaee[ 1 57] .
July 1961
Appendix
The Origin of Geometr 1
THE INTEREST THAT ç:eçe| sas .a ia. s«e:| ma|es.iaeeessa:yie
ea,a,ea:sieia||.a:eaeei.eas«a.easa:e|yaeve:eeea::ecieCa|.|ee
we masiieeas ea: ,aze aei me:e|y açea iae :eacy·mace, aaacec·
ce«a,eemei:yaacaçeaiaemaaae:ei|e.a,«a.ea.ismeaa.a,aac. a
a. si|.a|.a,,.i«asaec.ae:eai. aa. si|.a|.a¡i:em«aai.i«as. aiaai
eia||iae|aie. aae:.ie:seiiaee|ce:,eemei:.e«. scem,«aeaeve:iaey
«e:eai «e:|,e.iae:asça:e,eemeie:se:asma|.a,ç:aei.ea|açç|.ea·
i.easei,eemei:y.xaiae:,.aceeca|evea||,«emasia| se.a¡a.:e|ae|
.aieiae e:.,.aa|meaa.a, eiiae aaacec·ce«a,eemei:y, «a.eaeea·
i.aaecie|eva| .c«.iaia.s ve:ysamemeaa.a,-eeai.aaecaacaiiae
samei. me«asceve|eçecia:iae:,:ema.a.a,s.mç|y ,eemei:y .aa||
.isae«ie:ms . Oa:eeas.ce:ai.eas«.||aeeessa:.| y| eacieiaeceeçesi
ç:e||emseimeaa.a,, ç:e||emseise.eaeeaaceiiaea. sie:yeise.eaee
. a,eae:a| ,aac.aceec.aiaeeaci eç:e||emseiaaa.ve:sa|a.sie:y. a
,eae:a| , se iaai ea: ç:e|| ems aac exçes.i.eas eeaee:a.a, Ca|.|eaa
,eemei:yia|eeaaaexemç|a:ys.,a.aeaaee.
iei. i|eaeiec. aacvaaeeiaai,.aiaem.csieiea:a. sie:.ea|mec.ia·
i.eas eamecemça. |eseçay,i|e:eaççea:s ae:eie:iaeã :sii.me«.ia
Ca|.|ee,ia:ea,aiaec.se|esa:eeiiaeceçia·ç:e||emseiiaemeaa.a,·
e:.,.aei,eemei:yaac,ieaaceceaia. s, eii|emeaa.a,·e:.,.aeia. s
ae«çays.es, ae|a:.iy.a,| .,aiie:ea:«ae|eaace:ia|.a,.aame| y, ,iae
.cea ei} see|.a, ie ea::y eai, .a iae ie:m eia.sie:.ea| mec.iai.eas,
se|i·:eaeei.eas a|eaiea:e«aç:eseai ça.|eseçaiea| s.iaai.ea . aiae
aeçe iaai.a ia. s«ay «e eaaaaa||yia|e çessess.eaeiiaemeaa.a,.
meiaec,aac|e,.aa.a,eiça. | eseçay, iaeone ça.|eseçayie«a.eaea:
| .iesee|sie|eaacea,aiie|eceveiec. re:,as«.|||eeemeev.ceai
ae:e, ai a:si. aeeaaeei.ea «.ia eaeexamç| e, ea:.avesi.,ai.easa:e
a. sie:.ea|.aaaaaasaa|sease,aame|y,.av. :iaeeiaiaemai.ec.:eei.ea
«a.ea eçeas aç ceçia·ç:e||ems ¡a.ie aa|ae«aiee:c.aa:ya. sie:y.
ç:e||ems«a.ea,,ae«eve:,] .aiae.:e«a«ay, æeaacea|iec|ya.sie:.·
` This manuscript was written in 1 936 and was edited and published (beginning with the
third paragraph) by Eugen Fink i n the Revue internationale de philosophie , Vol . I , No. 2
( 1 939) under the title "Der Ursprung der Geometrie als i ntentional- historisches Prob­
l em. " It appears in Biemel ' s edi tion of the Crisis as "Beilage I I I , " pp. 365-6. The first
paragaphs suggest i t was meant for i nclusi on i n the Crisis.
157
.
158
Edmund Husserl
ea|ç:e||e¬s wae:eaeeas. sieaiça:sa. ieiiaeseceçia·ç:e||e¬s| eacs
eaaaaia:a||yaeiyei|eseeaaiiae |e,. aa.a,.
1ae¡aesi.eaeiiaee:.,.aei,ee¬ei:y,aace:«a.eai.i|eae:e ,ie:iae
sa|eei|:ev.iy,«e. ae|acea||c.se.ç|.aesiaaicea|«. iasaaçesex.si.a,
¬aiae¬ai.ea||y.aça:esçaee·i.¬e,saa| | aei|eeeas. ce:ecae:easiae
ça.|e|e,.ea|·a.sie:.ea|¡aesi.ea,. e ,asiaesea:eaie:iaei:si,ee¬ei·
e:s «ae aeiaa|| y aiie:ec ça:e ,ee¬ei:.ea| ç:eçes.i.eas, ç:eeis,
iaee:. es, e:ie:iaeça:i.ea|a:ç:eçes.i.easiaeyc. seeve:ec, e:iae|. |e.
xaiae:iaaa ia. s, ea: .aie:esi saa|||e iae .a¡a.:y |ae| .aieiae ¬esi
e:.,.aa|sease.a«a.ea,ee¬ei:yeaeea:ese, «asç:eseaiasiaei:ac.·
i.eaei¬.| | eaa. a, .ssi.||ç:eseaiie:as, aac.ssi.|||e.a,«e:|ecea. aa
| .ve|yie:«a:c ceve|eç¬eai . · «e .a¡a.:e .aie iaai sease .a «a.ea .i
aççea:ec.a a.sie:yie:iaei:sii.¬e-.a«a.ea.iaacieaççea:,evea
iaea,a«e|ae«aeia. a,eiiaei:sie:eaie:saaca:eaeieveaas|.a,
aue:iae¬. sia:i.a,i:e¬«aai«e|ae«, i:e¬ea:,ee¬ei:y,e::atae:
i:e¬iaee|ce:aaacec·ce«aie:¬s, saeaasÐae|.ceaa,ee¬ei:y, ,iae:e
.saa.a¡a.:y|ae|.aieiaesa|¬e:,ece:.,. aa||e,.aa|a,sei,ee¬ei:y
asiaey aeeessa:. |y ¬asiaave |eea .a iae.: ç:. ¬a||y esia||.sa.a,
iaaei.ea. 1a.s :e,:ess.ve .a¡a.:y aaave.ca||y :e¬a.as «.ia.a iae
sçae:eei,eae:a|.i.es , |ai, as«esaa||seeasee, iaesea:e,eae:a|.i.es
«a.eaeaa|e:.ea|yexç| .eaiec,«.iaç:ese:.|ecçess.|.|.i.eseia::.v.a,
ai ça:i.ea|a: ¡aesi.eas aac se|i·ev. ceai e|a. ¬s as aas«e:s 1ae
,ee¬ei:y«a.ea.s:eacy·¬ace,seiesçea|,i:e¬«a.eaiae:e,:ess.ve
.a¡a. :y |e,.as, . sai:ac. i.ea Oa:aa¬aaex. sieaee ¬eves«.ia.a.a·
aa¬e:a||ei:ac.i.eas .1ae«ae|eea|ia:a|«e:|c, .aa||.isie:¬s, ex.sis
ia:ea,ai:ac.i.ea1aeseie:¬saavea:.seaassaeaaei¬e:e|yeaasa| | y.
«ea|se|ae«a|:eaayiaaii:ac.i.ea. sç:ee.se| yi:ac.i.ea,aav.a,a:.sea
«.ia. aea:aa¬aasçaeeia:ea,aaa¬aaaei.v.iy,. e. ,sç. :. iaa|| y, evea
iaea,a«e,eae:a||y|ae«aeia.a,,e:as,eecasaeia.a,,eiiaeça:·
i.ea|a: ç:eveaaaee aac eiiae sç.:.iaa| sea:ee iaai |:ea,ai .i a|eai .
~ac yei iae:e |.es .a ia.s|ae|ei|ae«|ec,e, eve:y«ae:e aac essea·
i.a||y, aa.¬ç|.e.i|ae«|ec,e, «a.eaeaaiaasa| se|e¬aceexç|.e. i, a
|ae«|ec,e ei aaassa.|a||e se|i·ev.ceaee ii |e,. as «. ia saçe:ie. a|
ee¬¬eaç|aees, saea as. iaai eve:yia.a,i:ac.i.eaa| aasa:.seaeaiei
aa¬aa aei.v.iy, iaai aeee:c.a,|y çasi ¬ea aac aa¬aa e. v. | .zai.eas
ex.siec,aaca¬ea,iae¬iae.:i:si. aveaie:s, «aesaaçeciaeae«eai
ei¬aie:.a| saiaaac,«aeiae::a«e:a| :eacysç.:.iaa||ysaaçec r:e¬
iaesaçe:ie.a| ,ae«eve:,eae. s|ec. aieiaeceçias 1:ac.i.ea.seçea.a
ia.s,eae:a|«ayieeeai.aaec.a¡a.:y.aac, . ieaeeeas. sieai|y¬a.aia.as
¯ So also for Gal i l eo and al l the periods followi ng the Renaissance, continual l y being
worked on in a l i vely forward development, and yet at the same time a traiti on.
159
The Origin of Geometry
iae c. :eei.ea ei . a¡a.:y, aa .aia.iy ei¡aesi.easeçeasaç, ¡aesi. eas
«a.ea|eaci eceia.ieaas«e:s.aaeee:c«.iaiae. :sease 1ae. :ie:¬
ei ,eae:a|.iy-. aceec, as eae eaa see . ei aaeeac.i.eaec ,eae:a|
va| . c.iy-aaia:a||y a||ews ie: açç|.eai.ea ie . ac. v. caa||y ceie:¬. aec
ça:i.ea|a:eases, iaea,a .iceie:¬.aesea|yiaai.aiae. ac. v.caa|iaai
eaa|e,:asçecia:ea,asa|sa¬çi.ea
ieias|e,.a,iaea,.aeeaaeei.ea«.ia,ee¬ei:y.«. iaiae¬esie|v.·
easee¬¬eaç|aeesiaai«eaavea|:eacyexç:esseca|eve. ae:ce:ie
.ac.eaie iae sease ei ea: :e,:ess.ve .a¡a. :y. we aace:siaac ea:
,ee¬ei:y,ava.|a||eieasia:ea,ai:ac. i. ea,«eaave|ea:aec.i,aacse
aave ea:ieaeae:s, , ie|e aieia|ae¡a.s.i.ea eisç. :.iaa|aeee¬ç| .sa·
¬eais«a.ea,:e«sia:ea,a iae eeai.aaec«e:| eiae« sç.:.iaa|aeis
. aieae« ae¡a. s.i.eas. we |ae« ei.is aaacec·ce«a, ea:| . e:ie:¬s. as
iaesei:e¬«a.ea.iaasa:.sea.|ai«.iaeve:yie:¬iae :eie:eaeeieaa
ea:| . e:eae.s:eçeaiec.C|ea:| y, iaea, ,ee¬ei:y¬asiaavea:.seaeaiei
afrst ae¡a.s.i.ea, eai eii:si e:eai. ve aei.v.i.es we aace:siaac . is
çe:s.si.a,¬aaae:ei|e.a,. .i. saeiea| ya¬e|. | eie:«a:cç:eeessi:e¬
eaeseieiae¡a.s.i.easieaaeiae:|aiaeeai.aaeassyaiaes. s.a«a.eaa||
ae¡a.s.i.eas¬a.aia.aiae.:va| .c.iy,a||¬a|eaçaieia| .iysaeaiaai,ai
eve:yç:eseaisia,e,iaeieia|ae¡a. s.i.ea. s, seie sçea|,iaeieia|ç:e·
¬. seie:iaeae¡a. s.i.easei iaeae«|eve| Cee¬ei:yaeeessa:.|yaasia.s
¬e|.| .iyaacaasaae:.zeaei,ee¬ei:.ea|iaia:e. aç:ee.se| yia. ssiy| e.
ia.s. s .is¬eaa.a,ie:eve:y,ee¬eie:«aeaasiaeeease.easaess,iae
eeasiaai. ¬ç|.e.i|ae«| ec,e,eiex. si.a,«.ia.aaie:«a:cceve|eç¬eai
aace:sieecasiaeç:e,:essei|ae«|ec,e|e.a,|a.|i.aieiaeae:.zea
1aesa¬eia.a,.si:aeeieve:yse.eaee.~|se,eve:yse. eaee.s:e|aiecie
aaeçeaeaa.aeiiae ,eae:ai.easeiiaese«ae «e:|ie: aac «.iaeae
aaeiae:,:esea:eae:se.iae:|ae«ae:aa|ae«aieeaeaaeiae:«aea:e
iaeaeee¬ç|.sa.a,se|]eei.v.iyeiiae«ae|e|.v.a,se.eaee. se.eaee,aac
.aça:i.ea| a:,ee¬ei:y,«.iaia. seai.e¬eaa.a,,¬asiaaveaacaa.sie:·
.ea| |e,.aa.a,. ia. s ¬eaa.a, .ise|i ¬asi aave aa e:.,.a .a aa ae·
ee¬ç|.sa¬eai . i:siasaç:e]eeiaaciaea .asaeeessia|exeeai.ea
O|v.eas|y.i.s iae sa¬eae:e as«.iaeve:yeiae:. aveai.ea. Ðve:y
sç.:.iaa|aeee¬ç|.sa¬eaiç:eeeec.a,i:e¬.isi:siç:e]eeiie.isexeea·
i.ea. sç:eseaiie:iaei:sii. ¬e.aiaese|i· ev.ceaeeeiaeiaa|saeeess
nai«aea«eaeieiaai¬aiae¬ai.esaasiae¬aaae:ei|e. a,eia|.ve|y
ie:«a:c¬eve¬eaii:e¬ae¡a.s.i.easasç:e¬.sesieae«ae¡a.s.i.eas,
.a«aeseeai.e¬eaa.a, iaaieiiaeç:e¬. ses. s .ae|acec ,iae ç:eeess
eeai.aa.a, .a ia. s¬aaae:,, iaea . i. se| ea: iaaiiaetotal ¬eaa. a,ei
,ee¬ei:y,asaceve|eçecse.eaee, as.aiaeeaseeieve:yse. eaee· eea|c
aeiaave|eeaç:eseaiasaç:e]eeiaaciaeaas¬e|. |eia|i| |¬eaiaiiae
|e,.aa.a, ~ ¬e:e ç:. ¬.i.veie:¬ai.ea ei¬eaa.a,aeeessa:. | y«eai
160
Edmund Husserl
|eie:e .i as a ç:e|.m.aa:y sia,e, aacea|iec|y.a saea a «ay iaai .i
aççea:ecie:iaea:sii.me. aiaese|i·ev.ceaeeeisaeeessia|:ea|.zai.ea.
nai ia.s «ay ei exç:ess.a, .i .s aeiaa||y eve:||e«a. se|i·ev.ceaee
meaasaeia.a,me:eiaaa,:asç.a,aaeai.iy«.iaiaeeeose.easaessei
.is e:.,.aa| |e.a,·.ise|i·iae:e [Selbst-dal saeeessia| :ea|.zai.ea ei a
ç:e]eei. s, ie: iae aei.a, sa|]eei, se|i·ev.ceaee, .aia.sse|i·ev. ceaee,
«aaiaas |eea:ea|.zec.siae:e,originaliter, as .ise|r.
naiae«¡aesi.easa:. se. 1a. sç:eeesseiç:e]eei.a,aacsaeeessia||y
:ea|.z.a,eeea:s,aiie:a|| ,ça:e| y«.ia.aiaesubject eiiae. aveaie:,aac
iaas iaemeaa.a,, as ç:eseaioriginaliter «.ia . is«ae|eeeaieai , |.es
exe|as.ve|y, seiesçea|,«.ia.aa.smeaia|sçaee. nai,eemei:.ea|ex.s·
ieaee. saeiçsyea.eex.sieaee,.iceesaeiex.siassemeia.a,çe:seaa|
«.ia.aiaeçe:seaa|sçae:eeieease.easaess. .i.siaeex. sieaeeei«aai
.se|]eei. ve|yiae:eie:eve:yeae,ie:aeiaa|aacçss.||e,eemeie:s,
e: iaese «ae aace:siaac ,eemei:y, . iaceec, .i aas, i:em .is ç:.ma|
esia||.sameai , aa ex.sieaee «a.ea . s çeea|.a:|y saçe:iemçe:a| aac
«a.ea-eiia.s«ea:eee:ia.a-.saeeess.||eiea||mea,a:sieia||ieiae
aeiaa|aacçess. ||emaiaemai.e.aaseia||çeeç| es, a||a,es, aacia. s.s
i:aeeia||.isça:i.ea|a:ie:ms . ~aca||ie:msae«|yç:ecaeec|yseme·
eaeeaiae|as.seiç:e,.veaie:ms.mmec.aie|yia|eeaiaesamee|]ee·
i.v.iy.1a.s. s, «eaeie,aa.cea|e|]eei.v.iy. it.sç:eçe:iea«ae|e
e|asseisç.:.iaa|ç:ecaeiseiiaeea|ia:a|«e:|c, ie«a.eaaeiea|ya||
se.eai.aeeeasi:aei. eas aaciaese.eaeesiaemse|ves|e|ea,|aia| se, ie:
examç|e, iaeeeasi:aei.eas eiaae |.ie:aia:e.· we:|seiia.se|assce
aei, |.|e iee|s ,aamme:s, ç|.e:s,e:|.|e a:ea.ieeia:a|aaceiae:saea
ç:ecaeis, aavea:eçeaia|. |.iy.amaay|.|eexemç|a:s. 1aeryiaa,e·
:eaaiaee:em, ,.aceec}a||ei,eemei:y,ex.sisea|yeaee ,aemaiie:ae«
eiieae:evea.a«aai|aa,aa,e.imay|eexç:essec.ii.s.ceai.ea||yiae
same.aiaee:.,.aa||aa,aa,eeiÐae|.caac.aa| |i:aas|ai.eas .aac
«.ia.aeaea|aa,aa,e.i. sa,a.aiaesame ,aemaiie:ae«maayi.mes.i
aas |eea seas.||yaiie:ec, i:emiaee:.,.aa|exç:ess.ea aac «:.i.a,·
ce«aieiae.aaame:a||ee:a|aiie:aaeese:«:.iieaaaceiae:ceeamea·
iai.eas. 1ae seas.||e aiie:aaees aave sçai.eiemçe:a| .ac.v.caai.ea
.aiae«e:|c|.|ea||ee:çe:ea|eeea::eaees, |.|eeve:yia.a,em|ec.ec
.a |ec.es as saea, |ai ia.s .s aei i:ae eiiae sç.:.iaa| ie:m .ise|i,
¯ But the broadest concept of l iterature encompasses them all : that is, it belongs to
thei r objective bei ng that they be li ngui stical l y expressed and can be expressed again and
again; or, more preci sely, they have their objecti vi ty, their existence-for-everyone, only
as signifi cation, as the meaning of speech. This is true i n a peculi ar fashi on i n the case of
the objecti ve sci ences : for them the di ference between the original l anguage of the work
and its translation i nto other languages does not remove i ts identical accessibil i ty or
change it i nto an i nauthentic, indirect accessi bi l i ty.
161
The Origin of Geometr
«a.ea.sea|| ecaa .cea|e|]eei[ideale Gegenstindlichkit] . iaaee:·
ia.a«ay.cea|e|]eeisceex.sie|]eei.ve|y.aiae«e:|c,|ai.i. sea|y. a
v. :iaeeiiaesei«e·|eve|ec:eçei.i. easaaca|i.maie|y.av.:iaeeiseas.·
||yem|ecy.a,:eçei.i.eas . re:|aa,aa,e. ise|i, .aæ|. isça:i.ea|a:.za·
i. eas,«e:cs, seaieaees, sçeeeaes, , .s, aseaaeas.|y|eseeai:emiae
,:ammai.ea|çe. ai eiv.e«, iae:ea,a| ymace açei.cea| e|]eeis ,ie:
examç| e,iae«e:cLowe eeea:sea|yeaee. aiaeCe:maa|aa,aa,e,.i. s
. ceai.ea|ia:ea,aeai.is. aaame:a||eaiie:aaees|yaay,.veaçe:seas .
nai iae .cea| .i. es ei ,eemei:.ea| «e:cs, seaieaees, iaee:.es-
eeas.ce:ec ça:e|y as | .a,a.si.e si:aeia:es-a:e aei iae . cea|.i.es iaai
ma|eaç«aai. sexç:essecaac|:ea,aiieva|.c.iyasi:aia.a,eemei:y.
iae|aiie:a:e.cea|,eemei:.ea|e|]eeis,siaieseiæ a.:s,eie.wae:eve:
semeia.a,.sasse:iec, eaeeaac.si.a,a. sa«aai. siaemai.e ,iaaia|eai
«a.ea.i. ssa.c,.ismeaa.a,, ,i:emiaeasse:i.ea,«a.ea.ise|i,ca:.a,iae
asse:i.a,, .s aeve: aaceaaaeve: |e iaemai.e. ~ac «aai .siaemai.e
ae:e.sç:ee.se|y.cea|e|]eeis,aac¡a.iec.ae:eaieaesi:emiaeseeem·
.a,aace:iaeeeaeeçiei| aa,aa,e.Oa:ç:e||emae«eeaee:asç:ee. se|y
iae.cea|e|]eeis«a.eaa:eiaemai.e.a,eemei:y.ae«cees,eemei:.ea|
.cea|.iy¸asi|.|eiaaieia||se.eaees,ç:eeeeci:em.isç:.ma:y.ai:açe:·
seaa|e:.,.a,«ae:e.i.sasi:aeia:e«. ia. aiaeeease.eassçaeeeiiae
ã :si.aveaie: ssea| , ie.is.cea|e|]eei.v.iy :iaacvaaee«eseeiaai.i
eeea:s|ymeaasei | aa,aa,e,ia:ea,a«a.ea.i:eee.ves,seiesçea|,.is
| . a,a. si.e|.v.a,|ecy[Sprachleib] . naiae«cees| .a,a.si.eem|ec.meai
ma|eeaieiiaeme:e|y.ai:asa|]eei.vesi:aeia:eiaeobjective si:aeia:e
«a.ea,e. ,. ,as,eemei:.ea|eeaeeçie:siaieeiaaa.:s,. s. aiaeiç:eseai
asaace:siaaca||e|ya||aac. sva|.c,a|:eacy.a.is| .a,a. si.eexç:ess.ea
as,eemei:.ea|sçeeea,as,eemei:.ea|ç:eçes.i.ea,ie:a||iaeiaia:e.a
.is,eemei:.ea|sease:
Naia:a||y, «esaa| | aei,e.aieiae,eae:a|ç:e||em«a.eaa|sea:.ses
ae:eeiiaee:.,. aei|aa,aa,e. a.is.cea|ex.sieaeeaac.isex. sieaee.a
iae:ea|«e:|c,:eaacec.aaiie:aaeeaacceeameaiai.ea.|ai«emas|
sayaie««e:csae:ea|eaiiae:e|ai.ea|ei«eea|aa,aa,e,asaiaaei.ea
eimaa «.ia.a aamaa e. v. |.zai.ea, aac iae «e:|c as iae ae:.zea ei
aamaaex.sieaee.
i.v.a, «a|eia|| y. aiae«e:|c «e a:e eeasiaai|y eease.eas eiiae
«e:|c, «aeiae:«e çay aiieai.eaie .ie: aei, eease.eas ei.i asiae
ae:.zeaeiea:| .ie , asaae:.zeaeiia.a,s,:ea|e|]eeis, .eiea:aeiaa|
aacçess.||e.aie:esisaacaei.v.i.es. ~|«ays siaac.a,eaia,a.asiiae
«e:|c·ae:.zea.siaeae:.zeaeiea:ie||e«mea,«aeiae:iae:ea:eaayei
iaem ç:eseai e:aei. neie:e evea ia|.a, aei.ee ei.i ai a|| , «e a:e
eease. easeiiaeeçeaae:.zeaeiea:ie||e«mea«. ia.is|.m.iecaae|eas
eiea:ae.,a|e:s, iaese|ae«aieas . wea:eiae:e|yeeeease.easeiiae
¡
!
1 62
Edmund H usserl
¬eaeaea:exiena|ae:.zea.aeaeaeaseaseiae:s ..aeaeaeasei
a¬eease.easeiiae¬as ¬yeiae:s. as iaese«.ia«ae¬ieaaeaie:
.aieaeiaa|aacçeieai.a|.. ¬¬ec.aieaac¬ec.aie:e|ai.easeie¬çaiay.
,ia. s .ave|ves} a :ee.ç:eea| ,eii.a, a|ea, «.ia eiae:s . aaceaiae
|as.seiiaese:e|ai.easieaacea|«.iaiae¬.eaie:.aieça:i.ea|a:¬eces
eiee¬¬aa.iy«. iaiae¬. aaciaea |ae«. .a a aa|.iaa| «ay. ei¬y
|e.a,se:e|aiec i. |e¬e. eve:yaa¬aa|e.a,-aacta.s. sae«ae. s
aace:sieec|y¬eaaceve:yeaee|se-aasa.sie||e«¬eaaac. a| «ays
eeaai.a,a.¬se|i.e.v. |.zai.ea.a,eae:a| ..a«a.eaae|ae«sa. ¬se|iie
|e|.v.a,.
ii. sç:ee.se|yie ia.sae:.zeaeie.v.|.zai.eaiaaiee¬¬ea|aa,aa,e
|e|ea,s Oae.seease.easeie.v.|.zai.eai:e¬iaesia:iasaa.¬¬ec.aie
aac ¬ec.aie| .a,a.si.eee¬¬aa.iy. C|ea:| y.i.sea|yia:ea,a|aa,aa,e
aac.isia:·:eaea.a,ceea¬eaiai.eas. asçess.||eee¬¬aa.eai.eas.iaai
�aeae:.zeaeie.v.| .zai.eaeaa|eaaeçeaaaceac|esseae .as.ia|«ays
.sie:¬ea. waai.sç:.v.|e,ec.aeease.easaessasiaeae:.zeaeie.v.|.·
zai.ea aac as iae |.a,a. si.e ee¬¬aa.iy .s ¬aia:e ae:¬a| e.v.| .zai.ea
,ia|.a,a«ay iaea|ae:¬a| aac iae «e:|c eiea.|c:ea, . ia ia.s sease
e.v.| .zai.ea. s. ie:eve:y¬aa«aese«e·ae:.zea.i.s. aee¬¬aa.iyei
iaese «ae eaa :ee.ç:eea||y exç:ess iae¬se|ves. ae:¬a||y. .a a ia||y
aace:siaaca||eiasa.ea.aac«.ia.aia.see¬¬aa.iyeve:yeaeeaaia|s
a|eai«aai.s«.ia.aiaesa::eaac.a,«e:|ceia.se.v.|.zai.eaase|]ee·
i.ve|yex.si.a,Ðve:yia.a,aas.isaa¬e.e:.saa¬a||e.aiae|:eacesi
sease. . e. . | .a,a.si.ea||yexç:ess.||e.1aee|]eei.ve«e:|c. si:e¬iae
sia:i iae «e:|c ie: a|| . iae «e:|c «a.ea eve:yeae aas as «e:|c·
ae:.zeai ise|]eei.ve|e.a,ç:esaççeses¬ea.aace:steecas¬ea«.ia
aee¬¬ea|aa,aa,e . iaa,aa,e.ie:.isça:i.asiaaei.eaaacexe:e.sec
eaçae.iy. .s:e|aiecee::e|ai.ve|yieiae«e:|c. iaeaa.ve:seeie|]eeis
«a.ea. s|.a,a. si.ea||yexç:ess.||e.a.is|e.a,aac.is|e.a,· saea1aas
¬eaas¬ea.ie||e«¬ea.«e:|c-iae«e:|cei«a.ea¬ea.ei«a.ea«e.
a| «ays ia|| aac eaa ia||-aac. ea iae eiae: aaac. |aa,aa,e. a:e .a·
seça:a||y.aie:i«.aec. aac eae.sa|«ays ee:ia.a eiiae.: .aseça:a||e
:e|ai.eaa| aa.iy. iaea,a asaa||y ea| y . ¬ç| .e.i| y. .a iae ¬aaae: eia
ae:.zea
1a.s|e.a,ç:esaççesec. iaeç:.¬a||yesia||.sa.a,,ee¬eie:eaae|·
v.eas| y a|se exç:ess a.s .aie:aa| si:aeia:e nai iae ¡aesi.ea a:.ses
�,a.a. ue«cees iae |aiie:. .a .is.cea|.iy. iae:e|y |eee¬ee|]ee·
i.ve:1e|esa:e.se¬eia.a,çsyea.e«a.eaeaa|eaace:sieec|yeiae:s
[nachverstehbar] aac.see¬¬aa.ea||e.asse¬eia.a,çsyea.e|e|ea,.a,
ieia. s¬aa.. seo ipso e|]eei. ve. ]asiasaea.¬se|i.aseeae:eie¬aa..s
exçe:.eaeea||eaacaa¬a||e|yeve:yeaeasa:ea|ia.a,.aiae«e:|cei
163
The Origin of Geometry
ia. a,s.a ,eae:a| reeç|eeaaa,:eea|eaisaeaia.a,s. eaa¬a|eee¬·
¬ea ve:.aa||easse:i.easeaiae|as.seiee¬¬eaexçe:.eaee.eie nat
ae«ceestae.ai:açsyea.ea||yeeasi.iaiecsi:aeia:ea::. veataa.aie:·
sa|]eei.ve|e.a,ei.ise«aasaa.cea|e|]eei«a.ea.as,ee¬ei:.ea| .
. s aayia.a,|aia:ea|çsyea.e e|]eei. evea iaea,a. i aas a:.sea çsy·
ea.ea||y:ieias:eaeei 1aee:.,.aa||e.a,·.ise|i·iae:e. .aiae. ¬¬ec.
aey[Aktualitit ] ei.isi:siç:ecaei.ea.. e ..ae:.,.aa|se|i·ev.ceaee.
:esa|is . a ae çe:s. si.a, ae¡a. s.i.ea ai a|| iaai eea|c aave e|]eei. ve
ex. sieaee v. v. cse|i· ev.ceaeeçasses-iaea,a. asaeaa«ayiaaiiae
aei.v.iy.¬¬ec.aie|yians.aieiaeçass.v.iyeiiaeae«.a,|yiac.a,eea·
se.easaessei«aai·aas·]asi·ae«·|eea. r. aa||yia. s:eieai.ea c.sa,·
çea:s. |aiiae c.saççea:ec çass.a,aac|e.a,çastaasaei|eee¬e
aeia.a,ie:iaesa|]eei.a¡aesi.ea..ieaa|e:ea«a|eaec 1eiaeçass.v·
.iyei«aai .sai| :sie|sea:e| ya«a|eaecaac«aai çe:aaçse¬e:,es
«.ia,:eaie:aac,:eaie:e|a:.iyiae:e|e|ea,siaeçess.||eaei.v.iyeia
:eee||eei.ea.a«a.eaiaeçasiexçe:.eae.a,[Erleben] .s|.vecia:ea,a.a
a ¡aas.·ae« aac ¡aas.·aei.ve«ay. Ne« .iiae e:.,. aa||yse|i·ev. ceai
ç:ecaei.ea. asiae ça:eia| i|| ¬eaiei. is .aieai.ea. . s«aai.s:eae«ec
,:eee||eeiec, .iae:eaeeessa:. |yeeea:s. aeee¬çaay.a,taeaei. ve:eee|·
|eei.eaei«aai. sçasi.aaaei.v.iyeieeaea::eaiaeiaa|ç:ecaet.ea.aac
iae:e a:.ses iae:e|y. .a e:.,.aa| ee.ae. ceaee. iae se|i·ev.ceaee ei
.ceai.iy «aaiaasae«|eea:ea|.zec.ae:.,.aa|iasa.ea.siaesa¬eas
«aai «as ç:ev.eas|yse|i·ev.ceai ~|seeeesia||. saec.s iae eaçae.iy
ie::eçei.i.eaai«.||«.iaiaese|i·ev.ceaeeeiiae.ceai.iy,ee.ae.ceaee
ei.ceai.iy, eiiae si:aeia:e ia:ea,aeaiiae eaa.a ei:eçei.i.eas Yei
evea«.iaia.s.«eaavesi.||aei,eae|eyeaciaesa|]eeiaaca.s sa|·
]eei.ve.ev. ceaieaçae.i.es. iaai.s.«esi.||aaveae e|]eei. v.iy,.vea
itceesa:.se.ae«eve:-.aaç:e|. ¬.aa:ysia,e-.aaace:siaaca||eiasa·
.eaasseeaas«eia|e.aieeeas.ce:ai.eaiaeiaaei.eaeie¬çaiayaac
ie| |e« ¬aa|.acas a ee¬¬aa.tyeie¬çaiay aacei| aa,aa,e. ia iae
eeaiaei ei:ee.ç:eea|| .a,a.si.e aace:siaac.a,. tae e:.,.aa| ç:ecaei.ea
aaciaeç:ecaeieieaesa|]eeieaa|eactively aace:sieec|yiaeeiae:s
ia ia. sia||aace:siaac.a,ei«aai .s ç:ecaeec|yiae eiae:. as .a iae
easeei:eee||eei. ea. aç:eseaieeaeee¬ç|.sa¬eaieaeae se«aça:iei
iaeç:eseai.iecaei.v.iyaeeessa:.|yia|esç|aee.|aiaiiae sa¬ei.¬e
iae:e.sa|seiaese|i·ev.ceaieease.easaesseiiae.ceai.tyeiiae¬eaia|
si:aeia:e.aiaeç:ecaei.easei|eiatae:eee.ve:eiiaeee¬¬aa.eai.ea
aaciaeee¬¬aa.eaie:. aac ia.s eeea:s :ee.ç:eea||y 1ae ç:ecaet.eas
eaa:eç:ecaeeiae.:|.|eaessesi:e¬çe:seaieçe:sea.aac.aiaeeaa.a
eiiaeaace:siaac.a,eiiaese:eçei.i.eas«aai.sse|i·ev.ceaiia:asaças
iaesa¬e.aiaeeease.easaesseiiaeeiae: |ataeaa.iyeiiaeee¬¬a·
164
Edmund Husserl
a.iyeieemmaa.eai.eaamea,seve:a|çe:seasiae:eçeaiec|yç:ecaeec
si:aeia:e|eeemesaae|]eeieieease.easaess, aeiasa|.|eaess, |aias
iaeeaesi:aeia:eeemmeaiea|| .
Ne««emasiaeieiaaiiaee|]eei.v.iyei iae.cea|si:aeia:eaas aei
yei|eeaia| | yeeasi.iaiecia:ea,asaeaaeiaa|i:aasie::.a,ei«aaiaas
|eeae:.,.aa||yç:ecaeec.aeaeieeiae:s«aee:.,.aa||y:eç:ecaee.i
waai .s | ae|.a,. siaepersisting existence eiiae .cea|e|]eeis evea
ca:.a, çe:.ecs .a «a.ea iae .aveaie: aac a.s ie||e«sa:e ae |ea,e:
«a|eia||yse:e|aiece:eveaa:eae|ea,e:a|.ve.waai.s|ae|.a,.siae.:
eeai.aa.a,·ie·|eevea«aeaaeeaeaas,eease.eas| y}:ea|.zeciaem.a
se|i·ev.ceaee.
1ae.mçe:iaaiiaaei.eaei«:.iiea,ceeameai.a,|.a,a.si.eexç:ess.ea
. siaai.ima|eseemmaa.eai.easçess.||e«.iaeai.mmec.aiee:mec.aie
çe:seaa| acc:ess , .i .s, se ie sçea|, eemmaa.eai.ea|eeeme v.:iaa| .
1a:ea,a ia.s , iae eemmaaa| .zai.ea ei maa .s |.uec ie a ae« |eve| .
w:.iiea s.,asa:e , «aea eeas.ce:eci:em aça:e|yee:çe:ea|çe.aiei
v. e«, si:a.,aiie:«a:c|y,seas.||yexçe:.eaeea||e,aac.i. sa|«aysçes·
s.||eiaaiiaey|e.aie:sa|]eei.ve|yexçe:.eaeea||e. aeemmea. naias
| .a,a.si.e s.,as iaey a«a|ea, as ce | .a,a. si.e seaacs, iae.: iam.|.a·
s.,a.aeai.eas . 1ae a«a|ea.a, .s semeia.a, çass.ve. iae a«a|eaec
s.,a.aeai.ea. siaas ,.veaçass.ve|y,s.m. |a:|yieiae«ay.a«a.eaaay
eiae: aei.v.iy «a.ea aas saa| .aie e|sea:. iy, eaee assee.ai.ve|y
a«a|eaec,eme:,esaia:sipassively asame:ee:|esse|ea:meme:y.i a
iaeçass.v.iy. a¡aesi.eaae:e,as. aiaeeaseeimeme:y, «aai. sças·
s.ve|ya«a|eaeceaa|ei:aasie:mec|ae|,·seiesçea|,.aieiaeee::e·
sçeac.a,aei.v.iy.ia. s.siaeeaçae.iyie::eaei.vai.eaiaai|e|ea,se:.,·
.aa||yieeve:yaamaa|e. a,asasçea|.a,|e.a,.~eee:c. a,| y, iaea.iae
«:.i.a,·ce«aeaeeisai:aasie:mai.eaeiiaee:.,.aa|meceei|e.a,ei
iae meaa.a,· si:aeia:e, ,e. ,. ,] «.ia.a iae ,eemei:.ea| sçae:e ei se|i·
ev.ceaee, eiiae,eemei:.ea|si:aeia:e«a.ea .s çai. aie«e:cs . ii |e·
eemessec.meaiec, seiesçea|.naiiae:eace:eaama|e.ise|i·ev.ceai
a,a. a, eaa:eaei.vaieiaese|i·ev.ceaee.t
1ae:e .s a c.si.aei.ea, iaea, |ei«eea çass.ve|y aace:siaac.a, iae
exç:ess.eaaacma|.a,.ise|i·ev.ceai|y:eaei.vai.a,.ismeaa.a,.nai
iae:ea|seex.siçess.|.|.i.eseia|.aceiaei.v.iy,aia.a|.a,.aie:msei
¯ This is a transformation of which one is consci ous a being i n i tself patterned afer
[what is passi vel y awakened].
t But this is by no means necessary or even factuall y normal . Even without this he can
understand; he can concur " as a matter of course" in the validity of what is understood
wi thout any acti vity of his own. In this case he comports hi msl f purel y passivel y and
recepti vel y.
165
The Orgin of Geometry
ia.a,siaaiaave |eeaia|ea açme:e|y :eeeçi.ve|y, çass.ve|y, «a.ea
cea|s «.ia s.,a.aeai.eas ea|y çass.ve|y aace:sieec aac ia|ea eve:,
«.iaeaiaayeiiaese|i·ev.ceaeeeie:.,.aa|aei.v.iy.rass.v.iy.a,eae:a|
.siae:ea|meiia.a,siaaia:e|eaacie,eiae:aacme|i.aieeaeaaeiae:
assee.ai.ve|y, «ae:e a||meaa.a,iaaia:.ses .s çaiie,eiae:çass. ve|y.
waaieiieaaaççeasae:e .siaaiameaa.a,a:. ses«a.ea.saçça:eai|y
çess.||easaaa. iy-. . e. ,eaaaçça:eai|y|emacese|i·ev.ceaeeia:ea,a
açess.||e:eaei.vai.ea-«ae:easiaeaiiemçiaiaeiaa|:eaei.vai.eaeaa
:eaei.vaieea|yiae.ac.v.caa|mem|e:seiiaeeem|.aai.ea, «a.|eiae
.aieai.eaieaa.iyiaem.aiea«ae| e, .asieacei|e.a,a|a||ec, eemesie
aeia.a,. iaai . s, iae eai.e va|.c.iy .s cesi:eyec ia:ea,a iae e:.,.aa|
eease.easaesseiaa||.iy.
ii.seasyiesee iaai evea .a ,e:c.aa:y}aamaa|.ie, aac a:sieia||.a
eve:y.ac.v.caa||.iei:emea.|caeecaçiemaia:.iy,iaee:.,.aa||y.aia.·
i.ve| .ie«a.eae:eaies.ise:.,.aa||yse|i·ev.ceaisi:aeia:esia:ea,aae·
i.v.i.eseaiae|as.seisease·exçe:.eaeeve:y¡a.e|| yaac.a.ae:eas.a,
measa:eia||sv.ei.mieiaeseduction oflanguage. C:eaie:aac,:eaie:
se,meais eiia.s|.ie |açse .aie a |.ac eiia||.a,aac :eac.a, iaai . s
cem.aaiecça:e|y|y assee.ai.ea,aaceriea eaea,a, .a:esçeeiieiae
va|.c.i. es a::.vec ai .a ia.s «ay, .i .s c.saççe.aiec |y sa|se¡aeai
exçe:.eaee .
Ne«eae «.|| say iaai .aiae sçae:eiaai.aie:esis as ae:e-iaaiei
se.eaee, eiia.a|.a,c.:eeiecie«a:ciae aiia.ameaieii:aias aac iae
ave.caaeeeiia|seaeec-eae .s e|v.eas|y,:eai|yeeaee:aeci:emiae
sia:iieçaiasieçieiaei:eeç|ayeiassee.ai.veeeasi:aei.eas . iav.e«
eiiaeaaave.ca||e sec.meaiai.ea eimeaia|ç:ecaeis .aiaeie:m ei
çe:s.si.a,| .a,a.si.eae¡a.s.i.eas,«a.eaeaa|eia|eaaça,a.aaia:si
me:e|yçass.ve|yaac|eia|eaeve:|yaayeaee|se,saeaeeas::aei.eas
:ema.a a eeasiaaicaa,e:. 1a.scaa,e:. s ave.cec .ieae aeime:e|y
eeav.aeeseaese|iexçesiiaeieiaaiiaeça:i.ea|a:eeasi:aei.eaeaa|e
:eaei.vaiec |ai assa:eseaese|ii:emiae sia:i , arie: iae sea·ev.ceai
ç:.ma|esia|| .sameai, ei.iseaçae.iyie|e:eaei.vaiecaaceaca:.a,|y
ma.aia.aec. 1a. seeea:s«aeaeaeaasav.e«ieiaeaa.vee.iyei| .a·
,a.si.eexç:ess.eaaacieseea:.a,, |ymeaaseiiaemesiça.asia|.a,
ie:mai.eaeiiae:e|evaai«e:cs, ç:eçes.i.eas, aaceemç|exeseiç:eçe·
s.i.eas , iae:esa|is«a.eaa:eie|eaa.veea||yexç:essec1a. smasi|e
ceae|yiae .ac.v.caa|se.eai.si , aacaeiea|y|yiae .aveaie:|ai|y
eve:y se.eai.siasamem|e:eiiae se.eai.aeeemmaa.iyaue:aeaas
ia|eaeve:i:emiaeeiae:s«aai.sie|eia|eaeve:.1a. s|e|ea,s, iaea,
ie iae ça:i.ea|a:s eiiae se.eai.ae i:ac.i.ea «.ia.a iae eeaesçeac.a,
eemmaa. iy eise.eai.sis as a eemmaa.iy ei|ae«|ec,e | . v.a, .a iae
aa.iyeiaeemmea:esçeas.|.|.iy.iaaeee:c«.iaiaeesseaeeeise.eaee,
166
Edmund Husserl
iaea. .is iaaei.eaa:.es ¬a.aia.a iae eeasiaaie|a. ¬. iae çe:seaa| ee�·
ia.aiy.iaaieve:yia.a,iaeyçai.aie se.eai.ieasse:i.e?saas |eea sa.c
eaeeaacie:a| | . iaai.i siaacsiasi . ie:eve:.ceai.ea||y:eçeaia||e
«.ia se|i·ev.ceaee aac asa||e ie: ia:iae: iaee:ei.ea| e: ç:aei.ea|
eacs-as .aca|.ia||y :eaei.vaia||e «.ia iae .ceai.iy ei .is aeiaa|
¬eaa. a, ·
ue«eve:.i«e¬e:eia. a,sa:e.¬çe:iaaiae:er.:si «eaaveaeiyei
iasea.aieaeeeaaiiaeiaeiiaaise.eai.ieia. as.a,aiia.asae«:esa|isea
iae |as.s eiiaese a|:eacy aiia.aec. iaai iae ae« eaes se:ve as iae
ieaacai.eaie:si. | | eiae:s. eie-.aiaeaa.iyeiaç:eça,ai.veç:eee·sei
i:aasie::ec¬eaa.a,
| aiaeiaa||y. ¬¬easeç:e|.te:ai.eaeiase.eaee|.se,ee¬ei:y.«aai
aas|eee¬eeiiaee|a.¬aaciaeeaçae.iyie::eaei.vai.ea:waeaeve:y
:esea:eae:«e:ss ea a.s ça:i eiiae |a.|c.a,. «aai eiiae veeai.eaa|
.aie::açi.easaaci.¬eeaiie::esi .«a.eaeaaaei|eeve:|eesecae:e:
waea ae:eia:asieiae aeiaa|eeai.aaai.eaei«e:s. ¬asiaei:si:aa
ia:ea,a iae «ae|e . ¬¬ease eaa.a ei,:eaac.�,s |aes ie ia� e:.,.�a|
ç:e¬.sesaacaeiaa||y:eaei.vaieiae«ae|eiam,:

|ise. as..eaeeis�
ea:¬ece:a,ee¬ei:y«ea|ce|v.eas|yaei|eçess.||eaia|| ~acyei.i
.s eiiae esseaeeeiiae :esa|iseieaea sia,e aeiea|yiaai iae.:.cea|
eai.e¬eaa.a,.aiaeiee¬es|aie:¸iaaaiaaieiea:|.e::esa|is}

|aii?ai .
s.aee ¬eaa.a, .s ,:eaacec açea ¬eaa.a,. iae ea:|.e: ¬eaam,

,.ves
se¬eia.a,ei. isva| .c.iyieiae|aie:eae..aceec|eee¬esça:iei. iie

a
ee:ia.a esieai 1aasae |a. |c.a,||ees«. ia. aiae ¬eaia| si:aeia:e . s
se|i· same.eai . aac aeae. iaea. eaa |e .¬¬ec.aie| y :eaei.vaiec ¸|y
.ise|i}

1a.s .s esçee.a||yi:ae eise.eaees «a.ea . | .se,ee¬ei:y. aaveiae.:
iae¬ai.esçae:e. a. cea|ç:ecaeis. .a . cea|.i.es!:e¬

«a.

ea¬e:� aac
¬e:e. cea| .i.esaia. ,ae:|eve|sa:eç:ecaeec |i.s¡a.iec.ae:eai.aiae
se·ea||eccese:.çi.ve se.eaees. «ae:eiaeiaee:ei.ea|.aie:esi. e|ass.iy·
.a,aaccese:.|. a,.:e¬a.as«.ia.aiaesçae:eeisease· .aia.i.ea.«a.ea
ie: .i :eç:eseais se|i·ev.ceaee ue:e. ai |easi. a,eae:a| . eve:y ae«
ç:eçes.i.eaeaa|y. ise|i|eeasaec.a ie:se|i·ev. ceaee
ue«. |y eeai:asi . .s a se.eaee| .se,ee¬ei:yçess�||e: Je«. as �
sysie¬ai.e. eac|ess|y,:e«.a, si:ai.iec si:aeia:eei.�eaai.e

s

e�a

.i
¬a.aia.a. ise:.,.aa|¬eaa.a,ia| aessia:ea,a|. v. a,:eaei.vaia|.|iy.i.is
¯ At frst, of course, i t is a matter of a frm direction of the wi l l , which the scientist
establishes i n hi mself, aimed at the certain capacity for reactivation. If the goal of reac­
tivatability can be onl y relatively fulflled, then the cla
.
i m whi�h
.
stems fro� the ��n­
sciousness of being able to acquire something also has Its relat�vlt� ; and thI S relatIVIty
also makes itself noticeable and is driven out. Ultimatel y, obJectIve, absolutely frm
knowledge of truth is an infnite idea.
167
The Origin of Geometr
ee,a.i.veia.as.a,.ssaççesecieç:ecaeese¬eia.a,ae««.iaeai|e.a,
ae|e ie :eaei.vaieiaeç:ev.eas|eve|s eisae«| ec,e |aesie iaei:si:
Ðvea . i ia. s eea|c aave saeeeecec ai a ¬e:e ç:. ¬.i.ve sia,e ei
,ee¬ei:y..iseae:,y«ea|ca|i. ¬aie| yaave|eeaiee¬aeasçeai.aiae
eae:ieiç:eea:.a,se|i·ev.ceaeeaac«ea|caeiaave|eeaava.|a||eie:
aa.,ae:ç:ecaei.v.iy
ue:e «e¬asiiase.aieeeas.ce:ai.eaiaeçeea|.a: |e,.ea| aei.v.iy
«a.ea. si.ecsçee.iea||yie|aa,aa,e. as«e||asieiae.cea|ee,a.i.ve
si:aeia:esiaaia:.se sçee.iea||y«.ia.a. i 1e aayseaieaee si:aeia:es
iaaie¬e:,e«. ia.aa¬e:e| yçass.veaace:siaac.a,iae:e|e|ea,sessea·
i.a||ya çeea| .a:se:ieiaei.v.iy|esicese:. |ec |yiae«e:c esç| .ea·
i.ea~çass.ve|ye¬e:,.a,seaieaee,e , ..a¬e¬e:y· .e:eaeaea:c
aac çass.ve|y aace:sieec. . s ai i:si ¬e:e|y :eee.vec «.ia a çass.ve
e,e·ça:i.e.çai.ea.iaseaaçasva|.c.aac.aia.sie:¬ .i. sa|:eacyea:
¬eaa.a, r:e¬ia.s«ec.si.a,a. saiaeçeea| . a:aac.¬çe:iaaiaei.v.iy
ei esç|.eai.a, ea: ¬eaa.a, wae:eas .a .is i:si ie:¬ .i «as a
si:a.,aiie:«a:c|y va|.c ¬eaa.a,. iasea aç as aa.ia:y aac aac.i·
ie:eai.aiec-eeae:eie|y sçeas. a,. a si:a.,aiie:«a:c|y va| . c cee| a:a·
i.ve seaieaee~ae« «aai .a .ise|i .s va,ae aac aac.ae:eai.aiec . s
aei. ve| yesç|.eaiecCeas.ce:.ie:esa¬ç| e. i|e«ay. a«a.ea«eaace:·
siaac. «aea saçe:ie.a||y:eac.a,iae ae«sçaçe:. aac s.¬ç|y :eee.ve
iaeae«s . ae:eiae:e .saçass.veias.a,·eve:eieai.eva|.c.iysaea
iaai«aai.s:eacsi:a.,ai«ay|eee¬esea:eç.a.ea
nai.i.sse¬eia.a,sçee.a|.as«eaave sa. c. ieaave iae. aieai.eaie
esç|.eaie .ieea,a,e.aiaeaei.v.iy«a.eaa:i.ea|aies«aaiaas|eea:eac
,e:aa.aie:esi.a,seaieaeei:e¬.i· .esi:aei.a,eae|yeae..aseça:ai.ea
i:e¬ «aai aas |eea va,ae| y. çass.ve|y :eee.vecas a aa.iy. iae e|e·
¬eaisei¬eaa. a,. iaas|:.a,.a,iaeieia|va|.c.iyieaei.veçe:ie:¬aaee
.a a ae« «ay ea iae |as.s eiiae .ac.v.caa| va|. c.i.es waai «as a
çass.ve¬eaa.a,·çaiie:aaasae«|eee¬eeaeeeasi:aeiecia:ea,aae·
i.veç:ecaei.ea 1a. saei.v.iy. iaea. .saçeea|.a:se:ieise|i·ev.ceaee .
iae si:aeia:ea:.s. a,eaiei.i.s.aiae ¬eceeiaav.a,|eea e:.,.aa||y
ç:ecaeec ~ac .a eeaaeei.ea «.ia ia. s se|i·ev.ceaee . iee. iae:e .s
ee¬¬aaa|.zai.ea 1ae esç|.eaiec]ac,¬eai |eee¬es aa . cea| e|]eei
eaça||eei|e.a,çassecea|i.sia. se|]eeiese|as.ve|yiaai.s¬eaai|y
|e,.e«aea.isçeasseiseaieaeese:]ac,¬eais ~aciaasiaedomain of
logic . saa.ve:sa||yces.,aaiec.ia. s. saa. ve:sa||yiaesçae:eei|e.a,ie
«a.ea |e,.e çe:ia.as .aseia: as .i .s iae iaee:y ei iae seaieaees ¸e:
ç:eçes.i.eas}.a,eae:a|
1a:ea,aia. saei. v. iy. ae«.ia:iae:aei. v.i.es|eee¬eçess. ||e-se|i·
¯ Verdeutlichung, i . e. , maki ng explicit.
168
Edmund H usserl
ev.ceaieeasi:aei.easeiae«]ac,meaisea iae |as.seiiaesea|:eacy
va|.cie:as . 1a.s . siaeçeea||a:ieaia:eei|e,.ea|ia.a|. a,aacei.is
ça:e|y|e,.ea|se|i· ev.ceaees . ~|| ia.s :ema.as. aiaeievea«aea] ac,·
meaisa:e i:aasie:mec .aie assamçi.eas, «ae:e, . asieac eiea:se|ves
asse:i.a,e:]ac,.a,,«eia.a|ea:se|ves.aieiaeçes.i.eaeiasse:i.a,e:
]ac,.a,.
ue:e«esaa||eeaeeai:aieeaiaeseaieaeesei| aa,aa,easiaeyeeme
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1 69
The Origin of Geometr
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170
Edmund Husser
|eeeme v. s.||e ia:iae:ea .a iae i:eaimeaieia. sie:.ea| maiaemai.es.
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iaaieaa |e mace e:.,.aa||y se|i·ev.ceai. «ae:eas .i .s |y ae meaas
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se.eaee,iaeieia|sysiemeiç:eçes.i.eas.aiaeaa.iyeiiae.:va| .c.i.es.
.si:siea|yae| a. m«a.eaeaa|e]asi.aecasaaexç:ess.eaeiiaea||e,ec
i:aia·meaa.a,ea| yia:ea,aiaeaeiaa|eaçae.iyie::eaei.vai.ea
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iae cemaac.«a.eaaassç:eacia:ea,aeaiiaemece:açe:. ec aac aas
aaa||y |eea ,eae:a||y aceeçiec. ie: a se·ea||ec eç.sieme|e,.ea|
¯ These work to the beneft of logical method, but they remove one further and further
from the origins and make one i nsensitive to the problem of origi n and thus to the actual
ontic and truth-meaning of all these sciences.
171
The Orgin ofGeomety
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1 09: Oaiaeeiae:

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¯ What �oes Hume
.
do but endeavor to i nquire back into the primal impressions of
developed Ideas and, I n genera, scientifc ideas?
1 72
Edmund Husserl
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«ay, iae eeaeeçis ei a. sie:y, a. sie:.ea| exç|aaai.ea, aac
1 73
The Origin ofGeomet
,eaes.s . O::aiae:, «aai.siaac±eaia||ym.sia|ea.stae| . m. iai.ea
ia:ea,a «a.ea ç:ee.se|y iae ceeçesiaac mesi,eaa. aeç:e||emsei
a. sie:ya:eeeaeea|ec.iieaeia.a|seve:ea:exçes.i.eas,«a.eaa:eei
eea:sesi.||:ea,a aac«. |||aie:eiaeeess.iy| eac as .aie ae« ceçia·
c.meas.easi , «aai iaey ma|e e|v. eas . s ç:ee.se|y iaai «aai «e
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ei:y .s a i:ac.t.ea aac . s si. || ee.a, aaacec ce«a-. s aei |ae«|·
ec,e eeaee:a.a,aaexie:aa|eaasa| . iy «a.eaeaeeisiaesaeeess.eaei
a. sie:.ea|eeaa,a:ai.eas, as.i.i«e:e|ae«|ec,e|asecea.acaei.ea,
iaeç:esaççes.i.eaeiwa.ea«ea|cameaaiieaaa|sa:c.iyae:e ,:aiae:,
i eaace:siaac,eemei:ye:aay,.veaea|ta:a|iaei. sieb eease.easei
.is a. sie:.e.iy, a||e.i .mç|.e.i|y. 1a. s, ae«eve: , .s aei aa emçiy
e|a. m,ie:¡a.ie,eae:a||y.i.si:aeie:eve:yiaei,.veaaace:iaeaeac·
.a,eiea|ia:e, «aeiae:.i. samaiie:eiiae|e«|.esiea|ia:eeiaeees·
s.i.ese:iaea.,aestea|ia:e, se. eaee, siaie. eaa:ea , eeeaem.ee:,aa. ·
zai.ea, eie. i , iaai eve:y si:a.,atie:«a:c aace:siaac.a, ei .t as aa
exçe:.eai. a|iaei.ave|vesiae eeeease. easaess taai. t. ssemeta. a,
eeasi:aeiecia:ea,aaamaaaei. v.iy.Nemaiie:ae«a. ccea,aemaiie:
ae«me:e|y .mç|.e.i|y ee.mç|.ecta. s meaa.a,. s. tae:e|e|ea,sie.t
taese|i·ev. ceatçess.|.|.tyeiexç|.eai.ea, ei ma|.a,.texç|.e.t aac
e|a:.iy.a, .i. Ðve:y exç| .eai.ea aac eve:y i:aas.i.ea i:em ma|.a,
exç|.e.iiema|.a,se|i·ev. ceai,eveaçe:aaçs.aeases«ae:eeaesieçs
maeaieeseeai . s aeia.a,eiae:iaaaa. sie:.ea| c.se|esa:e, . a.ise|i,
esseai.a|| y,.i. ssemeia.a,a.sie:.ea|, aacassaea.i|ea:s, «.iaesseai.a|
aeeess.iy,taeae:.zeaei. isa. sie:y«.ia. a. ise|i1a.s. seieea:sea|se
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t.ea eç ie iae ç:eseai, «a.ea .s ea: ç:eseai Óò ,a ç:eeess ei}
i:ac.i.eaa|. z.a,.ise|i. are«.a,·siai.ev.ia| .iy.1a. s . s, asaas|eeasa.c,
aaaaceie:m.aec,eae:a|.iy, |ai.iaas.aç:.ae.ç|east:aeia:e«a.eaeaa
|emaeame:e«.ce|yexç|.eaiec|yç:eeeec.a,i:emiaese.ac.eat.eas ,
a si:aeta:e«a.eaa|se,:eaacs, .mç| .es, iaeçess.|.|.i.esie:eve:y
sea:eaie:aacceie:m.aai.eaeieeae:eie,iaeiaa|siaieseiaaa.:s

Ha|.a,,eemei:yse|i·e».ceai,iaea,«aeiae:eae.se|ea:a|eaiia. s
e:aei ,.siaec.se|esa:eei. isa.sie:.ea|i:ac.t.ea.natta. s|ae«|ec,e. . i
.t. saeite:ema.aemçiyia||e:aac.ae:eat.aiec,eae:a| . ty. :e¡a.:estae
metaec.ea|ç:ecaei.ea,ç:eeeec.a,i:emiaeç:eseaiaacea::.eceatas
:esea:ea.aiaeç:eseai. eic.ae:eai.aiecse|i·ev. ceaeeseitaeiyçec. s·
eeve:eca|eve,. aseve:a|i:a,meata:y. avest.,ai.easei«aai|e|ea,s
iesaea|ae«|ec,esaçe:ae. a||y, as.i«e:e, .Ca::.eceaisysiemai.ea||y.
1 74
Edmund Husserl
saea se|i·ev.ceaees :esa|i .a aeia.a,eiae: aac aeia.a,| ess iaaa iae
aa.ve:sa| a ç:.e:. eia.sie:y «.ia a|| .is a.,a|y a|aacaaieemçeaeai
e|emeais.
weeaaa|sesayae«iaaia.sie:y.si:emiaesia:iaeia.a,eiae:iaaa
iaev.ia|mevemeaieiiaeeeex.sieaeeaaciae. aie:«eav.a,eie:.,.aa|
ie:mai.easaacsec.meaiai.easeimeaa.a,
~ayia.a,iaai.ssae«aie|eaa.sie:.ea|iaei , e.iae:.aiaeç:eseai
ia:ea,aexçe:.eaeee:|yaa. sie:.aaasaiaei.aiaeçasi, aeeessa:.|y
aas.isinner structure ofmeaning; |aiesçee.a||yiaemei.vai.eaa|.aie:·
eeaaeei.eas esia||. saec a|eai.i.aie:ms eieve:ycay aace:siaac.a,
aave ceeç, ia:iae: aac ia:iae:·:eaea.a, . mç|.eai.eas «a.ea masi |e
.aie::e,aiec, c. se|esec ~|| ¸me:e|y} iaeiaa| a. sie:y :ema. as .aeem·
ç:eaeas.||e |eeaase, a|«ays me:e|y c:a«.a, .is eeae|as.eas aaive|y
aacsi:a.,aiieoa:c|yi:emiaeis, .iaeve:
_
a|esiaemai.eiae ,eae:a|
,:eaac eimeaa.a, açea «a.ea a|| saea eeae|as.eas :esi, aas aeve:
.avesi.,aieciae. mmeasesi:aeia:a|aç:.e:.«a.ea.sç:eçe:ie. i Oa| y
iaec.se|esa:eeiiaeesseai.a||y,eae:a|si:aeia:e·| y. a,.aea:ç:eseai
aac iaea .a eve:y çasi e:iaia:e a.sie:.ea| ç:eseai as saea , aac, .a
ieia| .iy,ea| yiaec.se|esa:eeiiaeeeae:eie,a.sie:.ea|i.me.a«a.ea«e
| . ve ,.a«a.eaea:ieia|aamaa.iy|.ves.a:esçeeiie.isieia| ,esseai.a||y
,eae:a|si:aeia:e-ea|yia. sc.se|esa:eeaama|eçess.||ea. sie:.ea|.a·
¡a.:y [Historie] «a.ea . s i:a|y aace:siaac.a,, .as.,aiia| , aac .a iae
,eaa.aeseasese.eai.ae 1a.s.siaeeeae:eie, a.sie:.ea|aç:.e:.«a.ea
eaeemçasseseve:yia.a,iaaiex. sisasa.sie:.ea||eeem.a,aacaav. a,·
|eeemee:ex.sis.a.isesseai.a||e.a,asi:ac.i.eaaacaaac.a,·ce«a.
waaiaas|eeasa.c«as:e|aiecieiaeieia|ie:m a.sie:.ea|ç:eseai.a
,eae:a| , a.sie:.ea|i.me,eae:a||y.naiiaeça:i.ea|a:eeaa,a:ai.easei
ea|ia:e, «a.ea aac iae.:ç|aee«.ia.a .is eeae:eai a.sie:.ea||e.a,as
i:ac.i.ea aac as v.ia||y aaac.a, iaemse|ves ce«a, aave «.ia.a ia.s
ieia|.iy ea|y :e|ai. ve|y se|i· same. eai |e.a, .a i:ac.i.eaa|.iy, ea|y iae
|e.a, ei aease|i· same.eai eemçeaeais Ce::e| ai. ve|y, ae«. aeeeaai
«ea|caaveie|eia|eaeiiaesae] eeiseia.sie:.e.iy,iaeçe:seas«ae
e:eaie ea|ia:a| ie:mai.eas, iaaei.ea.a, .a ieia|.iy e:eai.ve çe:seaa|
e. v.|.zai.ea ·
¯ The superfcial structure of the exteral l y " " ready-made" men wi thi n the social­
hi storical , essential structure of humanity, but also the deeper [structures] which disclose the
inner hi storicities of the persons taking part . [ "Structures" is Biemel 's interpolation. ]
t The hi storical world i s, t o be sure, frst pregiven as a social-hi storical world . But i t is
historical only through the i nner historici ty of the i ndi vidual s, who are i ndi vi dual s in thei r
i nner historicity, together wi th that of other communal i zed persons . Recall what was said
i n a few meager begi nni ng exposi ti ons about memories and the constant historicity to be
found i n them [pp. 1 62[ above] .
1 75
The Origin ofGeometry
i a:esçeeiie,eemei:yeae:eee,a.zes, ae«iaai«eaaveçe.aieceai
iae a.cceaaessei. isiaacameaia|eeaeeçis, «a.eaaave|eeeme.aae·
eess.||e, aac aave mace iaem aace:siaaca||e as saea .a a:si|as.e
eai|.aes, iaaiea| yiaeeease.eas| yseiias|ei,c.seeve:.a,}iaea. sie:.·
ea|e:.,.aei,eemei:y,«.ia.aiaeieia|ç:e||emeiiaeaç:.e:.eia.s·
ie:.e.iy. a,eae:a|,eaaç:ev.ceiaemeiaecie:a,eemei:y«a.ea.si:ae
ie.ise:.,.asaacaiiaesamei.me.sie|eaace:sieec.aaaa.ve:sa|·
a. sie:.ea|«ay.aaciaesame.si:aeie:a| |se.eaees, ie:ça. |eseçay. ia
ç:.ae.ç| e, iaea,aa.sie:yeiça.|eseçay,aa.sie:yeiiaeça:i.ea|a:se.·
eaees.aiaesiy|eeiiaeasaa|iaeiaa|a. sie:y,eaaaeiaa||y:eace:aeia·
.a,eiiae.:sa|]eeimaiie:eemç:eaeas.||e re:a ,eaa.aea. sie:y ei
ça.|eseçay,a,eaa.aea. sie:yeiiaeça:i.ea|a:se.eaees, .saeia. a,eiae:
iaaaiaei:ae.a,eiiaea. sie:.ea|meaa.a,·si:aeia:es ,.vea.aiae ç:e·
seai ,e:iae.:se|i·ev.ceaees, a|ea,iaeceeameaieceaa.aeia. sie:.ea|
|ae|·:eie:eaees.aieiaea.cceac.¬eas.eaeiiaeç:. ¬a|se|i·ev.ceaees
«a.eaaace:|.eiaem ·Ðveaiaeve:yç:e||emae:eeaa|emaceaace:·
siaaca||eea|yia:ea,a:eeea:seieiaea. sie:.ea|aç:.e:.asiaeaa.ve:·
sa|sea:eeeia||eeaee.va||eç:e||emseiaace:siaac.a,. 1aeç:e||em
ei,eaa.ae a.sie:.ea| exç|aaai.ea eemes ie,eiae: , .a iae ease eiiae
se.eaees , «.iaeç. sieme|e,.ea|,:eaac.a,e:e|a:.| eai.ea
we masiexçeeiyeiaseeeacaacve:y«e.,aiye|]eei.ear:emiae
a.sie:.e. sm«a.eaç:eva.|sexieas.ve|y .ac.ae:eaiie:ms ,iecay} i ex·
çeei| .ii|e:eeeçi.v.iyie:aceçia·.a¡a.:y«a.ea,ees|eyeaciaeasaa|
iaeiaa|a.sie:y,asceesiaeeaeeai| .aec.aia. s«e:|,esçee.a| | ys.aee .
asiaeexç:ess.eaaç:.e:. ¯.ac.eaies, .i|ayse|a.mieasi:.ei|yaaeea·
c.i.eaecaaci:a|yaçec.ei.ese|i·ev. ceaeeexieac.a,|eyeaca||a. sie:.·
ea|iaei.e.i.es . Oae«. | | e|]eei «aaiaaivei-,iesee|iec.sç|ay, aacie
e|a. m ie aave c. sç|ayec, a a.sie:.ea| aç:.e:. , aa a|se|aie, saçe:iem·
çe:a|va|.c.iy,aue:«eaavee|ia.aecsaeaa|aacaaiiesi.meayie:iae
:e|ai.v.iyeieve:yia.a,a.sie:.ea|,eia| |a. sie:.ea||yceve|eçec«e:|c·
aççe:eeçi.eas, :.,ai|ae| ie iaese eiiae ç:. m.i.ve i:.|es Ðve:y
çeeç|e, |a:,e e:sma|| , aas.is «e:|c.a«a.ea ,ie:iaai çeeç|e ,eve:y·
ia.a, ais «e||ie,eiae:, «aeiae:.amyia.ea|·ma,.ea|e:.a Ða:eçeaa·
:ai.eaa| ie:ms , aac .a «a.ea eve:yia.a, eaa |e exç| a.aec çe:ieei| y.
Ðve:yçeeç|eaas. is| e,.eaac,aeee:c.a,| y, .iia.s|e,.e. sexç|.eaiec
.aç:eçes.i.eas, .isaç:.e:. .
ue«eve:, |ei as eeas.ce:iaemeiaece|e,yeiesia||. sa.a,a. sie:.ea|
¯ But what counts as primal self-evidence for the sciences is determined by an edu­
cated person or a sphere of such persons who pose new questions, new historical ques­
tions, questi ons concerni ng the i nner depth-dimension as well as those concering an
external hi storicity in the social-hi storical worl d.
1 76
Edmund Husserl
iaeis.a,eae:a|. iaas .ae|ac.a,iaai eiiae iaeis saççe:i.a,iaee|]ee·
i.ea, aac|eiasceia. s.a:e,a:cie«aaisaeameiaece|e,yç:esaç·
çeses Deesaeiiae aace:ia|.a, eia aamaa. si.e se.eaeeeiae« . i
:ea||y «as eeaia.a a ç:esaççes. i.ea ia|ea ie: ,:aaiec. a va|.c.iy·
,:eaacaeve:e|se:vec. aeve:maceiaemai.e.eiasi:.ei|yaaassa.|a||e
,iyçeen se|i·ev. ceaee. «.iaeai«a.ea a.sie:.ea| .a¡a.:y «ea|c |e a
meaa.a,|esseaie:ç:. se:~||¡aesi.ea.a,aaccemeasi:ai.a,«a.ea. s . a
iaeasaa|seasea.sie:.ea|ç:esaççesesa. sie:y [Geschichte] asiaeaa.·
ve:sa|ae:.zeaei¡aesi.ea.a,. aetexç|.e.i|y. |aisi.||as a ae:.zeaei
.mç|.e.i ee:ta|a|y. «a.ea. .a sç.te ei a|| va,ae |ae|µeaac·. aceie:·
m.aaey. .siaeç:esaççes.t. eaeia||ceie:m. aa|.|.ty.e:eia||. aieai.ea
iesee|aacieesia|| . sacete:m. aeciaeis.
waai. sa. sie:.ea||yç:.ma:y. a.ise|t. sea:ç:eseai. we a|«aysa|·
:eacy |ae«eiea:ç:eseai«e:|c aac iaai«e|. ve.a .i. a|«ays sa:·
:eaacec |y aa eçea|y eac|ess ae:.zea eiaa|ae«a aeiaa|.i. es . 1a. s
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«a.ea«aseaeeaeiaa|aacaasme:e| ysaa||ae|ie|eeemeça:ieiiae
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eaça||e ei|e.a, | a.c eaiiaemai.ea| | y, .i . s a|:eacy ç:esaççesec .a
e:ce:iaai«eeaasee|ie|ae««aai«eceaei|ae«. ~||aei·|ae«.a,
eeaee:astae aa|ae«a «e:| c. «a.ea yeiex.sis . aacvaaeeie:asas
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eeex.sieaee. aiae«e:|caaci:aasie:miaeeeasiaaiea|ia:a|iaeeeiiae
«e:|c. De «e aei |ae« ia:iae:-«e aave a|:eacy aac eeeas.ea ie
sçea|eiia.s-iaaiia. sa.sie:.ea|ç:eseaiaas.isa. sie:.ea|çasis|ea.ac
. i. iaai. iaasceve|eçeceaieiiaem.iaaia.sie:.ea|çasi. saeeai.aa.iy
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ai:ac.i.eaç:ecae.a,i:ac.i.eaeaiei. ise|i:De«eaei|ae«iaaiiae
ç:eseaiaaciae«ae|eeia. sie:.ea|i.me. mç|.ec. a. i. siaaieiaa. sie:.·
ea||yeeae:eaiaacaa.ãece.v.| .zai.ea. eeae:eaiia:ea,a. is,eae:ai.ve
|eacaaceeasiaai eemmaaa| .zai.ea . aea|i.vai.a, «aai aasa|:eacy
|eeaea|i.vaiec |eie:e. «aeiae:.a eeeçe:at.ve «e:| e: .a :ee.ç:eea|
. aie:aei.ea.eie. :Deesa||ia.saeiaaaeaaeeaaa.ve:sa||ae«.a,ei
taeae:.zea. aa . mç|.e.i |ae«.a,taaieaa|e maceexç|.e.isysiemai·
.ea|| y.a. isesseai.a|si:aeia:e:i s aeiiae:esa|t.a,,:eaiç:e||emae:e
taeae:.zeaie«a:c«a.eaa||¡aesi.easteac.aactaas taeae:.zea«a.ea
.sç:esaççesec.aa||eiiaem:~eee:c.a,|y. «eaeecaeiã:sieaie:.aie
seme|.aceie:.i.ea|c. seass. eaeiiaeiaeis seieai|ya.sie:.e.sm, .t. s
eaea,ataateveataee|a. meiiae.:iaetaa|aessç:esaççesestaea. ste:. ·
ea|aç:.e:..iia. se|a.m.sieaaveameaa.a,
1 77
The Origin of Geomety
naiacea|ia:.sesa||iaesame. 1aeae:.zea·exçes.i.eaie«a.ea«e
:eea::ec masiaei|e,ce«a . ava,ae. saçe:ãe.a|ia| |, . imasi.tse|t
a::. veai.tse«ase:ieise.eai.ãec.se.ç|.ae.1aeseaieaees. a«a.ea.i. s
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aaca,a.a. 1a:ea,a «aai meiaecce «ee|ta.a a aa.ve:sa| aaca|se
ãxecaç:.e:.eiiaea. sie:.ea|«e:|c«a.ea. sa|«ayse:.,.aa||y,eaa. ae:
waeaeve:«eeeas.ce:. i. weãacea:se|ves«. ia iaese|i· ev.ceaiea·
çae. iyie:ereet-ieia:aieiaeae:.zeaaacieçeaet:aie.i. aaaexçe·
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eemç|eiei:eecemiei:aasie:m. .aiaea,aiaacçaaaiasy. ea:aamaa
a.sie:.ea| ex. sieaee aac «aai .s iae:e exçesec as .is |.ie·«e:|c. ~ac
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.cea|.zai.eas.
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sçaee·i. meaaciaesaaçes. ã,a:es. a|sesaaçeseimet.ea. a|te:ai.easei
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aeia.a,a|eatiaea.sie:.ea| sa::eaac.a,«e:|ceitaeã:si,eemete:s.
ta.smaea. see:ia.aasaa.ava:.aat. e sseai.a|si:aeia:e. taat. s«asa
«e:|ceiia.a,s ,.ae|ac. a,iaeaamaa|e.a,staemse|vesassa|]eets
ei ia.s «e:|c, , taai a|| ia.a,s aeeessa:.|; aac ie aave a |ec.|y
eaa:aeie:-a|taea,a aei a|| ia.a,s eea|c |e me:e |ec.es. s.aee tae
aeeessa:.|yeeex. si.a,aamaa|e.a,sa:eaeiia.a|a||easme:e|ec. es
aac. | .|eeveaiaeea|ta:a|e|]eets«a.ea|e|ea,«. tataemsi:aeta:a||y.
a:eaeiexaaasiec . aee:çe:ea| |e.a,. waat. sa|see|ea:. aaceaa|e
seea:ecai|east.a. tsesseai.a|aae|easia:ea,aea:eia|aç:.e:.exç|.ea·
t.ea. . staattaeseça:e |ec. esaacsçai.etemçe:a| saaçesaac mate·
1 78
Edmund H usserl
:.a| [stoiiche] ¡aa|.t.es,ee|e:.«a:mta.«e.,at.aa:caess.ete. · :e|atec
tetaem. ra:tae:. . t.se|ea:taat.a tae|.ieeiç:aet.ea|aeecsee:ta.a
ça:t.ea|a:.zat.easeisaaçesteeceataactaatateeaa.ea|ç:ax.sa|«ays
¸a.mec at} taeç:ecaet.eaeiça:t.ea|a:ç:eie::ec saaçes aactae . m·
ç:evemeateitaemaeee:c.a,teee:ta.ac.:eet.easei,:acaa|aess.
r.:stte|es.a,|eceati:emtaeta.a,·saaçesa:esa:iaees-me:ee:
|esssmeeta. me:ee:|essçe:ieetsa:iaees .ec,es. me:ee:|ess:ea,a
e:ia.:|yevea .. aetae:«e:cs. me:ee:|essça:e|. aes. aa,|es. me:e
e: | ess çeneet çe.ats . taea. a,a.a. amea, tae |. aes. ie: examç|e.
st:a.,at| .aesa:eesçee.a||yç:eie::ec.aacamea,taesa:iaeestaeevea
sa:iaees . ie:examç| e. ie: ç:aet.ea| ça:çeses |ea:cs| .m.tec|y evea
sa:iaees. st:a.,at |.aes. aac çe. ats a:e ç:eie::ec. «ae:easteta||y e:
ça:t.a||yea:vec sa:iaeesa:e aaces.:a||eie:maay |.acseiç:aet.ea|
.ate:ests. 1aas tae ç:ecaet.ea eieveasa:iaeesaac tae.:çe:ieet.ea
,çe| .sa.a,·a|«aysç|ays.ts:e|e. aç:ax. s. sea|se. aeases«ae:e]ast
c.st:.|at.ea .s .ateacec. ue:e tae :ea,a est.mate ei ma,a. taces .s
t:aasiemec. atetaemeasa:emeateima,a. taces|yeeaat.a,taee¡aa|
ça:ts . ,ue:e. tee. ç:eeeec.a,i:em taeiaetaa| . aaesseat.a|ie:m|e·
eemes:eee,a.za||eta:ea,aametaeceiva:.at.ea. · Heasa:.a,|e|ea,s
te eve:y ea|ta:e. va:y.a,ea|y aeee:c.a, te sta,esi:emç:.m.t.vete
a.,ae:çe:ieet.eas. weeaa a|«aysç:esaççese sememeasa:.a,teea·
a.¡ae. «aetae: ei a |e«e: e: a.,ae: tyçe. .a tae esseat.a| ie:«a:c
ceve|eçmeateiea|ta:e. ,as «e|| as} tae,:e«taeisaeaateeaa.¡ae.
taasa|se .ae|ac.a,tae a:teices.µie:|a. |c.a,s.eisa:vey.a,ae|cs.
çata«ays. ete . · saea a teeaa.¡ae .s a|«ays a|:eacy tae:e. a|:eacy
a|aacaat| yceve|eçecaacç:e,.veatetaeça.|eseçae:«aec.caetyet
|ae«,eemet:y|at«aesaea| c|e eeaee. va||e as .ts.aveate:. ~sa
ça.|eseçae:ç:eeeec.a,i:emtaeç:aet.ea| .ã a.tesa::eaac.a,«e:|c,ei
tae:eem. tae e.ty. tae|aacseaçe. ete . aac temçe:a||y tae «e:|c ei
çe:.ec.ea|eeea::eaees . cay.meata.ete · tetaetaee:et.ea|«e:|c·v.e«
aac«e:|c·|ae«|ec,e . aeaastaeã a.te|y|ae«aaacaa|ae«asçaees
aact.mesasia. tee|emeats«.ta.ataeae:.zeaeiaaeçea.aaa.ty nat
«.tata.saeceesaetyetaave,eemet:.ea|sçaee. mataemat.ea|t.me.
aac«aateve:e|se.s te |eeemeaaeve| sç.:.taa|ç:ecaeteateitaese
ã a.te e|emeats «a.ea se:ve as mate:.a| . aac «.ta a.s maa.ie|c ia.te
saaçes.atae.:sçaee·t.meaeceesaetyetaave,eemet:.ea|saaçes . tae
çae:eaem.esaaçes. ,a.ssaaçes. as}ie:mat.easceve|eçeceateiç:ax. s
aactaea,atei.a te:msei¸,:acaa|},e:ieet.ea. e|ea:|y se:ve ea|y as
`' Bi emei ' s interpolation.
� "I have reverted to the original version of this sentence as given in the critica ap­
paratus; I can make no sense of the emended version given in the text . "-D. Carr.
1 79
The Origin ofGeomety
|ases

ie:aae« se:teiç:ax.seatei«a.eas.m.|a:|yaamecae«eea·
st:aet|eas,:e«.
it .sev.ceat .aacvaaee taat ta.sae« se:teieeast:aet.ea«.|||ea
�:ecaet

a:.s.a,

eateia� .cea|.z.a,. sç.:.taa|aet . eaeeiça:eta.a|·
a,. «a.eaaas

.tsmatena|s.ataeces.,aatec,eae:a|ç:e,.veaseita. s
�aeta
.
�|aamaa.tyaacaamaasa::eaac.a,«e:|caace:eates.cea|e|·
,eets eateitaem.
Ne«taeç:e||em«ea|c|etec.seeve:.ta:ea,a:eeea:sete«aat. s
esseat.a|

te a.ste:y [Historie], tae a. ste:.ea| e:.,.aa| meaa.a, «a.ea
aeeessan| � «as�||� te ,.ve aac c.c ,.ve te tae «ae|e |eeem.a, ei
,eemet:y.tsçe:s.sta,t:ata·meaa.a,
it.s

eiç�:t�ea|a:. mçe:taaeeae«te|:.a,.ateieeasaacesta||.satae
ie||e«a,as.,at. Oa|y .itae açec.et.ea||y ,eae:a| eeateat. .ava:.aat
ta:ea,a

eata||e

eaee. va||eva:.at.ea. eitae sçat.etemçe:a| sçae:e ei
s

aaçes

.sta|

eaate aeeeaat.atae.cea| .zat.eaeaaaa .cea|eeast:ae·
t. eaan�e«a.eaeaa|eaace:steecie:a| |iata:et. meaac|ya||eem.a,
,eae:at.eas ei mea aac taas|e eaça||e ei|e.a, aaacec ce«a aac
:eç

:ecaeec«.tatae. ceat.ea|.ate:sa|] eet.vemeaa.a,1a.seeac.t.ea.s
va|.cia:|eyeac,eemet:yie:a||sç. :.taa|st:aeta:es«a.eaa:ete|e
aaeeac.t.eaa||yaac,eae:a||yeaça||eei|e.a,aaacecce«awe:etae
t�.a|.

a,�et.v

.tyeiase.eat.stte.at:ecaeesemeta.a,t.me·|eaac.a
a. staa|a,.. . e. . semeta.a,|eaacte«aat.sme:e|yiaetaa|a|eata.s
ç:eseat 0: semeta.a,va|.cie: a. mas ame:e|yiaetaa| t:ac.t.ea. a.s
ee

ast:aet.�a«ea|c| . |e«.seaavea¬e:e|yt.me·|eaaceat.emeaa.a,.
ta.smeaaa,«ea|c|eaace:staaca||eea|y|ytaese¬ea «aesaa:ec
taes�meme:e|yiaetaa|ç:esaççes.t.easeiaace:staac.a,

it.s a,ea

e:a|eeav.et.ea taat ,eemet:y. «.ta a|| .ts t:atas. .sva|.c
w.taaaeeac.t.e

aec�eae:a|.tyie:a||mea.a||t.mes. a||çeeç| es. aacaet
me:e| yie:

�||a. stene�||y

iaetaa|eaes|atie:a||eeaee.va||eeaes 1ae
ç:esaççes.t.eas eiçnae. ç|e ie:ta.s eeav.et.ea aave aeve: |eea ex·
ç|e:ec|eeaasetaeyaaveaeve:|eease:.eas| ymaceaç:e||e¬ nat.t
aas

a|se|eee�ee|ea:teastaateve:yesta|| .sameateiaa. ste:.ea|iaet
�a.e� |ayse|a.mteaaeeac.t.eaece|]eet. v. ty|. |e«.seç:esa,,esesta.s
. avanaate:a|se|ateaç:.e:.
?a| y,ta:ea,? taec.se|esa:eeita.saç:.e:. } eaatae:e|eaaaç:.e:.
s.. eae

e exteac¬, |eyeac a|| a.ste:.ea| iaet.e.t.es. a|| a.ste:.ea| sa:·
:e�aca, «e:|cs. çeeç|es. t.¬es. e.v.| .zat.eas . ea| y.a ta.s«ay eaaa
s..eaeeasaetera veritas aç,ea:Oa| yeata.siaacameat.s|asectae
se�a:eceaçae.t� ei.a¡a.:.a,|aesi:emtaetemçe:a:. | yce,| etecse| i·
e».ceaeeeias..eaeetetae ,:.¬a| se|i·ev.ceaees

-; Bi emel ' s interpolation.
180
Edmund Husserl
De«eaetstaacae:e|eie:etae,:eataacç:eieaacç:e||em·ae:.zea
ei:easea, tae same :easea taatiaaet. eas . aeve:y maa, taeanimal
rationale, aematte:ae«ç:.m.t.veae. s:
1a. s. saettaeç|aeeteçeaet:ate.atetaeseceçtastaemse|ves .
i aaay ease, «eeaaae«:eee,a.ze i:ema||ta.staata. ste:.e. sm,
«a.ea «.saes te e|a:.iy tae a.ste:.ea| e: eç. steme|e,.ea| esseaee ei
mataemat.esi:emtaestaacçe.ateitaema,.ea|e. :eamstaaeese:etae:
maaae:seiaççe:eeçt.eaeiat.me·|eaace. v. |. zat.ea, .s m. sta|ea.a
ç:.ae.ç|e. re: :emaat.e sç.:.ts tae myta.ea|·ma,.ea| e|emeats eitae
a.ste:.ea|aacç:ea.ste:.ea|asçeetseimataemat.esmay|eça:t.ea|a:|y
att:aet. ve. |at te e| .a, te ta. s me:e| y a. ste:.ea|| y iaetaa| asçeet ei
mataemat.es. sç:ee.se|yte|eseeaese|itease:tei:emaat.e. smaacte
eve:|ee|tae,eaa. aeç:e||em,tae.ate:aa|·a.ste:.ea|ç:e||em,taeeç.s·
teme|e,.ea|ç:e||em. ~|se, eae s ,azee|v.eas|yeaaaettaea|eeeme
i:eete:eee,a.zetaatiaet.e.t. eseieve:ytyçe,. ae|ac.a,taese.ave|vec
.a tae ¸a.ste:.e.st}e|]eet.ea, aavea :eet .atae esseat.a| st:aeta:eei
«aat. s,eae:a||yaamaa,ta:ea,a«a.eaate|ee|e,.ea|:easea:aaa.a,
ta:ea,aeata||a. ste:.e.tyaaaeaaees.tse|i.w.tata. s.s:evea|ecasetei
ç:e||ems. a.tse«a:.,at:e|atectetaeteta|.tyeia.ste:yaactetaeia||
meaa.a,«a.eaa|t.mate|y,. ves.t. tsaa.ty.
iitae asaa|iaetaa|stacyeia. ste:y.a,eae:a|,aac.aça:t.ea|a:tae
a.ste:y«a.ea. amest:eeeatt.mes aasaea.evect:aeaa.ve:sa|extea·
s.eaeve:a||aamaa.ty, .steaaveaaymeaa.a,ata|| , saeaameaa.a,
eaaea|y|e,:eaacecaçea«aat«eeaaae:eea||.ate:aa|a.ste:y,aac
assaeaaçeataeieaacat.easeitaeaa.ve:sa|a. ste:.ea|aç:.e:. .saeaa
meaa. a,aeeessa:.|y|eacsia:tae:tetae. ac.eateca.,aestçaest.eaeia
aa.ve:sa|te|ee|e,yei:easea.
ii, arte:taeseexçes.t.eas, «a.eaaave.||am.aatecve:y ,eae:a|aac
maay·s.cecç:e||em·ae:.zeas , «e| ayce«ataeie||e«.a,assemeta. a,
eemç|ete|yseea:ec,aame| y, taat taeaamaasa::eaac.a,«e:|c.stae
sametecayaaca|«ays, aactaas a| se. a:esçeette«aat.s:e|evaatte
ç:.ma|esta||. sameataac| ast.a,t:ac.t.ea,taea«eeaasae«.aseve:a|
steçs, ea|y. a aa exç|e:ate:y «ay, .a eeaaeet.ea «. ta ea:e«a sa:·
:eaac.a,«e:|c,«aatsaea|c|eeeas.ce:ec.ame:eceta.|ie:taeç:e|·
|em ei tae .cea| .z.a, ç:. ma| esta||ísameat ei tae meaa.a,·st:aeta:e
,eemet:y
Coda
contrapunctus and translation
[ ¯ ¯ ¯ ]
In the Erste Untersuchung of The Trial Joseph K. "thought he re­
marked that the si lent Exami ning Magi strate, wi th a look to someone in
the crowd, just gave a sign rein Zeichen] . " K. cal l s it .. 'a secret si gn' "
( "ein geheimes Zeichen" ) , but because he has interrupted the si gn be­
fore any response , because he has intervened "prematurel y, " punctu­
ated the scene vorzeitig, untimel y, wi th his suspicion and wi th his "be­
trayal " before the si lent Examining Magistrate , the "meani ng of the
si gn, " its Bedeutung, cannot be known. Joseph K. "abandons quite de­
liberately" learni ng the secret si gn' s signifcance with hi s betrayal and
punctuation. Yet the punctuation begi ns with accepting responsi bi l ity
for the sign. In the interrupti on, K. " 'empowers' " ( "ermachtige" ) the
Exami ni ng Magi strate to speak with words , not wi th secret signs (Franz
Kafka, Der Prozej [Frankfurt am Mai n: Fi scher, 1 979] : 42; The Trial,
trans . Wi l l a and Edwi n Muir [New York: Schocken, 1 974] : 44).
Accepting the responsibi l i ty of the secret sign , wi thout response , in
order to empower with words-the rhythm of the interruption.
How am I to punctuate my reading of thi s text I transl ated over el even
years ago? Wi l l any punctuation be timely or in rhythm? Or is punctua­
tion always vorzeitig? Can the responsibi l i ty for such a punctuation be
intentional ly assumed and the meaning abandoned in favor of another
meani ng?
My responsibil ity i s the responsibi l ity of the transl ator.
[ ¯ ¯ ¯ ]
Thi s frst extended publication of Derrida ( 1 962) i ncl udes hi s transla­
tion of Husserl ' s Origin of Geometr. In one sense, I would say Derrida
has del iberatel y abandoned any other transl ations . Yet in another sense,
I would say Derrida has never fni shed transl ating; he continues to trans­
late, cl ai mi ng that "the question of deconstruction is also through and
through the question of transl ati on" (Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese
Friend, " trans . Davi d Wood and Andrew Benjami n, i n Derrida and
184
John P. Leavey
"Dijerance, " ed. David Wood and Robert Berasconi [Evanston:
Northwester University Press , 1 988] : 1 ) or frequently using transl ation
as the lever for intervening in a textual fel d, as he states, for exampl e,
concering his use of transl ation in reading Heidegger on the hand:
I am doing so for two reasons. On the one hand, in order not to eface the
constraints or the chances of the idiom in which I myselwork, teach, read,
or write . . . . On the other hand, I thought that Heidegger' s text could be
still more accessible, could gain some supplementar readability by reach­
ing us through a third ear; the explication (Auseinandersetzung) with one
tongue extra can refne our translation C
U
bersetzung) of the text that is
called " original. " . . . one can write on the typewriter, as I have done,
with three hands among three tongues. ( "Geschlecht I: Heidegger's
Hand, " trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. , in Deconstruction and Philosophy: The
Texts of Jacques Derrida, ed. John Sallis [Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1 987J: 1 96n)
In Derrida's translation of Husserl ' s text, L' origine de la geometrie
(2nd ed. [Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1 974]), there is a note
concering the transl ator' s task. It reads: "We have strived to preserve in
our transl ation the very spontaneous rhythm of Husserl ' s phrasing, even
when it is greatly marked by the incompletion of the sketch. For reasons
of cl arity, however, we have had to modify on two or three occasions the
original text' s punctuation . . . " (p. 1 73n). This note, which occurs i n
that strange space between the title and the body of the text, that strange
space of the transl ator, states an almost traditional desire of the transla­
tor, the desire for fdel ity, for matching the original and the transl ation
not simply in sense, but also in rhythm. The rhythm of the phrasing i s
connected with punctuation, which required some infdelity in favor of
clarity, in favor of, then, the fdelity of sense. This transl ator' s dilemma
i s also the reader' s.
How is one to punctuate a text? a corpus? here, now, Derrida's text?
his corpus? Have I intercepted too early, in an untimely way, a secret
sign? Am I l ike Joseph K. then to accept responsibility for this untimely
designation and empower another signifcance-for example, that this
"frst" piece is to be read as the germ of al l the rest of Derrida's work? or
that it is to be read as a youthful work without much interest for reading
the mature Derrida, for reading the true signifcance of the text? or that it
is to be read as more philosophical than the later, more l iterary texts? or
that this is a preambul atory text, preambulatory to deconstruction?
The punctuation of a corpus raises many difculties . First, the desig­
nation "corpus" i s often understood as an attempt to unify a group of
texts signed by an author, movement, or time period. As of 1 988 the
185
Coda
corpus of Derrida is de facto incomplete, which would disrupt any move
to unity. Second, unl ike certain readers (for example, phenomenol ogi­
cal , hermeneutic , dialogic, or new critical) that claim just the opposite
and close the corpus in any act of reading, a transl ator argues that a
corpus remains incomplete, marked by transl ation as in need of transla­
tion, even upon the death of the author, the more common closure of a
corpus . In other words , transl ation marks the incompletion of any
corpus and concentrates the problems of reading. The transl ator wants to
punctuate for clarity, for reasons of cl arity, and wants to take respon­
sibility, deliberately, for the punctuation that punctuates too early or too
late, because the del ay of cl arity to itself is precisely rhythm, punctua­
tion, counterpoint.
Derrida himself has punctuated this text and his corpus at least three
times . The frst is the 1 967 punctuation of Positions ( see pp. 7-9 above).
A second is the 1 982 punctuation of Joyce, of "Joyce' s ghost . . . al­
ways coming on board" in the corpus . In this punctuation, Derrida says,
"at the very centre" of the Introduction t o The Origin ojGeometr, there
is the comparison of Husserl and Joyce, "two great model s" or "para­
digms" on the "rel ationship between l anguage and history" that "try to
recapture a pure historicity. "
To do this, Husserl proposes to render language [langageJ as transparent
as possible, univocal, limited to what, by being transmittable or able to be
placed in tradition, thereby constitutes the only condition of a possible his­
toricity. From this point of view it is necessar that some minimal read­
ability, an element of univocity, an analyzable equivocit resist the Joycean
overload and condensationfor a reading to begin to take place, and the
work's legacy . . . . The other great paradigm would be the Joyce of Fin­
negans Wake. He repeats and mobilizes and babelizes the asymptotic total­
ity of the equivocal. He makes this both his theme and his operation. He
tries to make outcrop, with the greatest possible synchrony, at great speed,
the greatest power of the meanings buried in each syllabic fragment, sub­
jecting each atom of writing to fssion in order to overload the unconscious
with the whole memory of man . . . . This generalized equivocality of writ­
ing does not translate one language into another on the basis of common
cores of sense . . . ; it talks several languages at once, parasitizing
them . . . , (Ulysse gramophone: deux mots pour Joyce [Paris: Galilee,
1 987J: 27-28; "Two Words for Joyce, " trans. Geof Bennington, in Post­
structuralist Joyce: Essays from the French, ed. Derek Attridge and Daniel
Ferrer [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 984J: 149 [modiedJ)
The third punctuation is Derrida's 1 980 thesis "defense" : "The Time
of a Thesi s: Punctuations" (in Philosophy in France Today, ed. Al an
186
John P. Leavey
Montefore [Cambridge: Cambridge Universi ty Press, 1 983] ) . In rela­
tion to the thesi s sur travaux, Derrida punctuates into three periods: ( 1 )
from 1 968 to 1 974 the thesi s was neglected as other works were pub­
l i shed; (2) from 1 974 to sometime in 1 979-80, he thought , "rightly or
wrongly, that it was neither consistent nor desirable to be a candidate for
any new academic title or responsibi l ity" (p. 48) ; (3) during 1 980 and af­
ter, the thesis sur travaux i s accepted and the position of Directeur i s
taken at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. Prior to the
punctuation of the thesi s , other punctuations abound. From 1 963 to
1 968 , after the Introduction to The Origin of Geometr, after the frst
thesis on "The ideal i ty of the l iterary object" (Jean Hyppol i te directed),
and after the Memoire on "the problem of genesi s in the phenomenol­
ogy of Husserl " (Maurice de Gandi l l ac "watched over this work" as the
"entire examination committee" [p+ 39]) , there i s the working out of "a
sort of strategic device . . . an unclosed, unenclosable, not whol l y for­
mal i zable ensemble of rules for readi ng, interpretation and writi ng" (p.
40) .
Derrida punctuates the Introduction to The Origin of Geometr du­
al l y. He states in his thesi s defense:
Naturally, all of the problems worked on in the Introduction to The Origin
of Geometry have continued to organize the work I have subsequently at­
tempted in connection with philosophical, literary and even non-discursive
corpora, most notably that of pictorial works: I am thinking, for example,
of the historicity of ideal objects, of tradition, of inheritance, offliation or
of wills and testaments, of archives, libraries, books, of writing and living
speech, of the relationships between semiotics and linguistics, of the ques­
tion of truth and of undecidability, of the irreducible otherness that divides
the sel-identity of the living present, of the necessity for new analyses con­
cerning non-mathematical idealities. (Pp. 39-0)
But this punctuation of the corpus (a punctuation sets up a rhythm of
work and organi zation to the corpus , to the movement of the body of
work) is punctuated again, contrapunctus . In di scussing later texts
(those after 1 974), Derrida says: "I should have liked i n thi s respect to
have been able to shape both my di scourse and my practice, as one says,
t o ft the premises of my earl ier undertakings. In fact , if not i n principle,
this was not al ways easy, not always possibl e, at times indeed very bur­
densome in a number of ways" (p. 49). Whi le the Introduction to The
Origin oJGeometr provided the organization for the subsequent work,
this punctuation marks itself as di srupted in fact if not in principle, with
the burden of its rhythm not always possible: thi s thesis defense, which
187
Coda
as desire "delights in being without defence, " which i s desi gnated as a
captatio, that i s, a quest or the disrupted question, thi s thesi s defense
"has been also as i mpoveri shed as a punctuation mark, rather, I should
say, an apostrophe in an unfni shed text" (p. 50).
How to punctuate now? Should I, as a transl ator, alter just a few occa­
sions for clarity, for the sake of the rhythm? As one way of punctuating
thi s text, of punctuating the transl ation of thi s piece, I want to read the
responsibi l ity of translation for Husserl by reading a note with two sig­
ni fcant punctuati ons of Derrida, those of translation and l i terature, the
frst being, as we have seen, the "question" of thi s corpus and the sec­
ond, as Derrida points out i n his punctuations , being his " most constant
interest" ( "my most constant interest , coming even before my philo­
sophical interest I should say, if thi s i s possible, has been directed to­
wards l iterature , towards that writing which i s called l iterary" [ "Time
of a Thesi s , " p. 37]) . . .
[ ¯ ¯ ¯ ]
In The Origin oJGeometry, in the passage distinguishing geometrical
existence from psychic exi stence, Husserl states that "from i ts primal
establ i shment" geometrical exi stence is "objectively there for 'every­
one' [objektiv Dasezendem Jur 'jedermann' ] ' ' ' is "an existence [Da­
sein] which i s pecul iarly supertemporal [eigenartig uberzeitliches] and
which-of thi s we are certain-is accessible [zugingliches] to all
men. " The objectivity of this exi stence i s "an ' ideal ' objecti vity, " which
i s "proper to a whole class of spiritual products of the cul tural worl d
[geistigen Erzeugnissen der Kulturwelt] , to which not only al l scienti fc
constructions and the sciences themselves belong but also, for example,
the constructions of fine l i terature [die Gebilde der schonen Litera­
fur] . " Husserl goes on to diferentiate thi s objectivity from that of tool s
or architecture, which, whil e they "have repeatabil ity in many l i ke ex­
empl ars [gleichen Exemplaren] , " do not have the identical sameness of
ideal objectivity, whi ch transl ation guarantees: "The Pythagorean theo­
rem, all of geometry, exi sts only once, no matter how often or even in
what language it may be expressed. It is identical l y the same in the ' orig­
inal l anguage' [ ' originalen Sprache' ] of Eucl i d and i n all ' transl ations'
[ ' Ubersetzungen' ] ; and withi n each l anguage i t i s again the same, no
matter how many times i t has been sensibly uttered, from the original
expression and writing-down to the innumerable oral utterances or writ­
ten and other documentations" (p. 1 60 above; Husserl , Die Krisis der
europiischen WissenschaJten und die transzendenfale Phinomeno-
188
John P. Leavey
logie, ed. WaIter Bi emel , vol . 6 of Husserliana: Edmund Husserl: Ges­
ammelte Werke [The Hague: Nijhof, 1 954] : 367-68). D'Amico, in
"Husser! on the Foundational Structures of Natural and Cultural Sci­
ences , " states that the diference i s that between the signifer and the sig­
nifed: "In this context HusserI makes the di stinction between the ' sensi­
ble u�terance' or means of expression (signifer) and the meaning of
what I S asserted or said (signifed). The ideal object i s at the level of the
signifed as a thematic assertion or meaning. The signifer would be the
historically contingent vehicle for the signifed (for example, a certain
written or spoken language or set of signs and symbol s). The signifer
can be replaced with no loss of ideal ity or meaning since that aspect of
the sign i s fundamentally arbitrar. Ideality means, on the contrary, that
the object sufers no l oss of original self-evidence" (Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 42 [ 1 98 1 -82] : 1 0).
But insofar as geometry i s a problem of tradition, there arises the
question of the diference between the repeatabil ity of the same and the
l ike, in D'Amico's terms , "between ideality and the corruption of cul­
tural transmission, " or in more general terms , of the "authenticity" of
the repetition (p. 1 0), which i s the cri si s of the European sciences . In a
note added by Husser! to Fink' s typescript of Husserl 's text, a note with a
number of mi sreadings and appended to the sentence that ends "con­
structions of fne l iterature, " a response is begun by means of transla­
tion, which is responsible for the diference or authenticity of the repeti­
tion. The translation by David Carr reads (p. 1 60n above):
But the broadest concept of literature encompasses them all [the scientifc
constructions, the sciences themselves, and the constructions of literature J;
that is, i t belongs to their objective being that they be linguistically ex­
pressed and can be expressed again and again; or, more precisely, they
have their objectivity, their existence-for-everone, only as signication, as
the meaning of speech. [D'Amico mistakenly modifes this to read: " 'or
more precisely, they only have meaning and signifcance from the speech of
objectivity (Reden die ObjektiviHit), as they have existencejor-everone' "
( '"Husserl, " p. J J ). Husserl writes (Krisis, p. 368n): "nur als Bedeutung,
SInn von Reden die Objektivitat , das Fir-jedermann-Dasein zu haben" :
only as meaning, as the sense of speech does it belong to their objective be­
ing to have objectivity, existencejor-everone. J This is true in a peculiar
fashion in the case of the objective sciences:for them the diierence between
the original language of the work and its translation into other languages
does not remove its identical accessibility or change it into an inauthentic,
indirect accessibilit.
189
Goa
In this translation, the l ast l i ne seems i n l ine with Husserl ' s text. In the
objective sciences, the diference between the original and the transl a­
tion does not remove access to the identical sense of the original expres­
sion, the transl ation does not make the accessibility inauthentic (un­
eigentlichen) or indirect (indirekten). D'Amico notes that the "use of
' inauthentic' in the above quote suggests the problem raised about the
di stortion or l oss that haunts the replication of cultural forms" ( "Hus­
ser! , " p. 1 1 ).
Derrida, however, fol lows Husserl ' s text and transl ates the l ast line in
j ust the opposite sense: "ou plutot la rend seulement indirecte, non ex­
presse" (L' origine, p. 1 79n). That i s, in the objective sciences (die ob­
jektiven Wissenschaften, a narrower category than literature in general),
the transl ation diference does not remove access to the identical sense
of the original expression, rather it renders the access only indirect, in­
di stinct, inauthentic, improper (bzw. nur zu einer uneigentlichen, indi­
rekten macht [Krisis, 368n] ).
Husser! seems of two mi nds here: translatability guarantees the same
sense in geometry (the Pythagorean theorem is "identically the same" in
the original language and al l "translations") and yet the diference be­
tween transl ation and original renders the accessibility to that identical
sameness (ideal object), indirect, inauthentic, improper, indi stinct. The
counterpoint of these two minds i s the double bind of history for Hus­
ser! , as we shal l see.
Derrida highl ights this note in the Introduction:
In an important note, Husserl specifes that "the broadest concept of litera­
ture" ( 1 60) comprises all idealformations, since, in order to be such, they
must always be capable of being expressible in discourse and translatable,
directly or not, from one language into another. In other words, idealfor­
mations are rooted only in language in general, not in the factuality of lan­
guages and their particular linguistic incarnations. (P. 66; my emphasis)
"Directly or not" establi shes the l imits of transl atabil ity of ideal forma­
tions (or constructions, in Carr's transl ation) in "the broadest concept of
l iterature. " Derrida remarks the translatabi lity of ideal formations as
"rooted only in language in general . " What are the l i mits of ideality' s
rootedness in language in general? In distingui shing the ideal formations
of geometrical objectivity (the most ideal of ideal formations, that i s, a
free ideali ty), Derrida argues that geometrical ideal objecti vity is "abso­
lute and without any kind of l imit. Its ideal ity . . . i s no l onger only that
of the expressi on or intentional content; it is that of the object itsel· Al l
190
John P. Leavey
adherence to any real contingency is removed. The possibi lity of trans­
lation, which is identical with that of tradition, is opened ad infnitum
. . - " (p. 72 above). In other words , the ideal ity of ideal formations
opens upon infnite transl ation; its rootedness in language is in no de
facto language, but in language in general ; in language, but not lan­
guages ; in langage, but not langues. Thi s is the double bind of the Babel
scene: "in one stroke" ideality "commands and forbids" transl ation "by
showing and hiding . . . the l i mi t" ( "Des tours de Babel , " trans . Joseph
Graham, in Diference in Translation, ed. Joseph F. Graham [Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1 985] : 204), the l imit between language and
languages . Derrida notes that the factual ity of free ideality is the "cru­
cial difculty of all [Husserl ' s] phi losophy of hi story. " Free ideal ities ,
although free of al l contingency, occur in hi story, and this occurrence
means that " free idealities are also factual and worldl y. " Thus the cru­
cial question i s, "what is the sense of this last factual ity?" (p. 72n
above). In other words , for the transl ator, what i s the sense of l anguages
in Babel ' s double bind?
The double bind of Babel is curiousl y echoed in the two occurrences
ofthe tower of Babel in Derri da' s Introducti on, the frst in the discussion
of the asymmetrical transcendental paral l el s of Joyce and Husserl on
equivocity and univocity, the second concerning the infnities of Hus­
serl o Both occurrences, however, while arguing in opposite directions
on the tower (one for its destruction, the other for its building), do so for
the sake of univocity. In the frst instance, the tower of Babel is to be de­
stroyed in order to fx meaning. Husserl ' s text reminds Derrida of Leib­
niz's statement: " ' i t depends upon us to fx their meanings, at least in
any scholarly language, and to agree to destroy this tower of Babel ' " (p.
l O I n above). In the second, in a citation from Husserl ' s "Cri si s of Euro­
pean Humanity and Phi losophy, " mathematics i s compared to the tower
of Babylon (Babel) as the infnite task to be completed: " ' Math­
ematics-the idea of the infnite, of infnite tasks-is l ike a Babylonian
tower: although unfni shed, it remains a task ful l of sense, opened onto
the infi nite. Thi s infnity has for its correlate the new man of infnite
ends' " (p. 1 28 above). In these two occurrences, uni vocity i s possible
(and so impossible, contrapunctus) only this-side-of or beyond (before
or after the end of) Babel (see pp. 1 03-4 above for a discussi on of the
impossible " l imiting cases" of absol ute univocity); this-side-of or be­
yond the double bind of Babel -transl ate, do not transl ate; thi s-side-of
or beyond languages; this-side-of or beyond, in HusserI 's terms , the
"seduction oj language [Verfiihrung der Sprache] " (p. 1 65 above;
Krisis, p. 372) ; this-side-of or beyond translation, which, in the Ver-
191
Coda
fuhrung of language, i s al so Uberjuhrung,
.
the ev�r transmitte� and
transmissible (tradier and tradierbar) capaCIty to bnng to the cl ant� ?f
reactivation in assuming responsibil ity for sense (p. 1 69 above; Knsl
.
s,
pp. 375-76); this-side-of or beyond hi story; this-s� de-of or
.
beyond wnt­
ing, counterpoint, punctuation, the rhythm of the mterruptIOn.
.
If absolute univocity (the ideal) is the impossible double bmd for
Husserl , how does he work with hi story? D' Amico ends his essay on
HusserI by recalling Marx' s argument against Hegel :
the manner by which we come to know and thus advance fro

imm

diat

and naive knowledge to that ofrefective self-understandmg lS not ldentlcal
to the way in which the object (as real object, rather than object ofkn

wl­
edge) came about historically and materially. History does not recap

tulate
the methodology ofknowledge. Philosophy is, however, pushed to thls ob­
vious error because any contingency or materiality threatens the suprem­
acy ofthe ideal. ( "Husserl, " p. 20)
He goes on to concl ude that Husserl 's "efort to save t�e theor�tica� atti­
tude involves [him] in the perennial oppositions of reahty
.
and Ideal Ity
.
or
necessity and contingency. In each case, while his anal YSI S shows an m­
separable connection, Husserl onl y ' values' ideal ity; and thus the mate­
rial , the diferent , and the contingent are denied or removed from t�e d?­
main of knowledge" (p. 22). D' Amico punctuates Husserl ' s valuat�on m
quotation marks and highl ights the evaluat�on. Yet in c?unterpo
.
mt to
thi s punctuation, there is a counterpunctuatIOn. Husserl I
.
nvokes Ideal­
ity, but that ideality i s al ways caught in Babel ' s double bmd, such that
the material the diferent, and the contingent are removed from the do­
main of kno
'
wledge (ideality) only insofar as they are the conditions of
possibil ity of that ideal ity and thus empower the domain of knowledg�.
In other words , Babel , as the "primordial Diference of the absolut� <n­
gin, " as "the beyond or the this-side which gives sense to al l empincal
genius and al l factual profusion, " punctuates the transcendenta
.
l as the
double bind of thought , the double bind of "the strange processIOn of a
' Ruckrage' " (p. 1 53 above) . Or perhaps , untime
.
ly, t�e t�anscendental
i s the punctuati on, the punctuation of the double bmd, m hI story .
[ ¯ ¯ ¯ ]
Coda: Have I abandoned prematurely meaning in favor of the signa­
ture? As my responsibil ity i s the transl ator' s, i s the signature to be trans­
lated? Can it be? From deja to da to j' accepte, signatures punctuate
1 92
John P. Leavey
Derrida's COrpUS . In the Introduction, one such signature is the signature
of horizon, a "decisive" notion: "Horizon is the always-already-there
[Ie toujours-deja-la] of a future which keeps the indetermination of its
infnite openness intact . . . . a horizon is always virtually present in ev­
ery experience; for it is at once the unity and the incompletion for that
experience-the anticipated unity in every incompletion" (p. 1 1 7
above; L' origine, p. 1 23). Always already there, on the horizon, punctu­
ated, the signature of a corpus incomplete .
John P. Leavey, Jr.
September 1 988
Index ofPassages
Cited from Husserl
[Page numbers refer to the present book. ]
Cartesian Meditations
§3: 3 3 , 39
§4: 79, 1 42
§7: 95
§23 : 1 45
§29: 29
§ 37: 29, 47, 96
§38: 29, 96
§39: 1 52
§4 1 : 1 36
§§48-49: 86-87
§52: 86
§6 1 : 87, 1 26
The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology
§7: 95 , 1 46
§ 8: 1 27, 1 29, 1 30
§9: 1 27
§9a : 35, 1 22 , 1 24, 1 26, 1 30, 1 33 , 1 34
§9b : 34-35, 36-37
§9c : 1 26
§,: 98, 1 26
§9h : 35, 36, 57, 1 1 8, 1 1 9, 1 26 , 1 30
§91 : 3 5 , 5 1
§ 1 5 : 95
§2 1 : 3 3
§§33-39: 1 1 9
§33 : 1 1 9
§34b : 85
§34e : 1 1 9
§34f: 1 20
§36: 1 1 9, 1 20, 1 22, 1 33
§37: 1 1 9
§7 1 : 1 30
Appendi x I : . ' Phi losophy and the Cri si sof
European Humanity" (Abhandlung
C in Krisis, the German edition) : 36,
80, 84-85, 1 1 0, 1 1 5 , 1 27, 1 28-29, 1 46
Appendix I I (Abhandlung A in Krisis) :
1 27, 1 33
Appendix IV (§73-Schl usswort i n
Krisis) : 95, 1 36, 142 , 1 46
Appendix V (Bei lage I I in Krisis) : 1 33
Appendix I X (Bei lage XXVI I I i n Krisis) :
1 1 6
" Fi nk' s Appendi x on the Problem of the
' Unconscious' : 93
Die Krisis der europiischen
Wissenschaften und die
tranzendentale Phinomenologie
Bei lage XI I I : 1 49
Bei lage XXV: 1 1 6
Bei l age XXVI : 1 1 5
Beilage XXVI I : 42 , 1 1 5
Experience and Judgment
§ I : 47
§ I O: 1 1 8, 1 33
§ 1 4: 1 20, 1 32
§23 : 1 00
§38: 83 , 87
§63 : 7 1
§64: 7 1
§64c: 73 , 1 48
§65: 72, 91 , 98
Erste Philosophie ( 1 923124) , Vol . I
Bei lage VI I : 1 27
Formal and Transcendental Logic
I ntroduction: 3 1 , 32, 33, 38-39, 52
§§ 1 -5: 79
§ I : 69
§2: 68, 88
§5: 68 , 75
§6: 4 1
194
Index ofPassages Cited from Husser!
Formal and Transcendental Logic
( continued)
§9: 53
§ 1 6: 55, 99, 1 39
§ 1 7: 55
§3 1 : 53 , 54
§59: 62
§62 : 67
§ 71 : 32
§73 : 79
§74: 1 35
§96c: 1 33
§ 1 00: 63
§ 1 02: 39, 47
Conclusion: 87, 1 26, 1 27 , 1 33
Appendi x I I : 55, 99
§2b : 96
§2c : 93
The Idea ofPhenomenology
Lecture I [po 23 of German] : 1 49
Ideas I
I ntroduction: 1 42
§ I : 43 , 47
§7: 44, 54
§8: 32
§9: 32, 1 27
§ 1 0: 32
§ I I : 48
§ 1 4: 48
§ 1 5 : 48
§ 1 7: 32
§24: 62
§25: 32, 43 , 95, 1 08
§44: 1 47
§49: 95 , 96
§56: 43
§58: 1 47
§59: 68
§60: 1 2 1
§70: 45 , 1 27 , 1 33
§72: 33, 53 , 56, 1 22
§73 : 3 3 , 1 02
§74: 33, 1 23 , 1 33 , 1 34 , 1 35
§75 : 33, 1 24
§76: 64
§79: 1 47
§8 1 : 96, 1 20
§83 : 1 06, 1 36
§88: 66, 96
§90: 7 1
§§97f. : 6
§ 1 43 : 1 39
§ 1 49: 1 22 , 1 35
Logical Investigations
Foreword to 2nd Ed. : 7 1
Prologomena
§6: 92
§59: 73
§60: 1 02
§67: 47
§70: 53
I ntroduction to Vol . II of German Ed.
§2: 78-79
§3: 79
§5: 70
First I nvestigation
§§ 1 -5: 92
§ I I : 70, 73 , 74
§ 1 2 : 7 1
§ 1 8: 44, 1 33
§20: 98
§26: 82, 1 00
§3 1 : 48
§32: 59
Fourth I nvestigation: 80
I nvestigations 1 -5: 7 1
The Origin of Geometry: passim
The Phenomenology of Internal
Time-Consciousne ss
§2: 47
§36: 82
Concering the Concept ofNl mber ( 1 887)
p. 37: 28
"Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der
Geometrie al s intentional-hi stori sches
Probl em. " Ed. E. Fink
p. 207: 48
p. 208: 48
p. 2 1 0: 89
p. 2 1 5 : 55
"Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum
Phanomeno\ogischen Ursprung der
i
I
|
1
195
Index ofPassages Cited from Hussert
Raumli chkei t der Natur" ( May 1 934)
pp. 307, 308, 309, 3 1 5, 3 1 7, 3 1 8: 83-85
"Phi l osophy as Rigorous Science": 33 , 43 ,
47, 48, 58-59, 1 01 , 1 03 , I I I , 1 5 1
Letter of March I I , 1 935, to Levy- Bruhl :
I I I , 1 1 4
Letter of November 1 6, 1 930: 1 45
Unpubl i shed Transcripts
C 2 I I : S, 7: 1 49
C 2 I I I , 1 932, pp. 8-9: 1 48
C 6, August 1 930, p. 5: 87
C 8 I I , October 29, p. 3: 1 2 1
C 1 3/ 1 5 I I , 1 934, p. 9 : 80
E I I I 4, p. 60: . 1 46, 1 47
F 1 24, p. 68: 1 48
K I I I , p. 1 06: 1 47
ì
1
Index
Absolute 1 7, 58, 86, 1 09, 1 1 6, 1 36-37,
1 43-44, 1 46n, 1 47-50. 1 52-53
of intentional hi storicity 1 7, 1 42
Act
primally i nstituting act ( Urstiftung) 45n,
48, 49, 1 27, 1 28, 1 45 , 1 60 (primal
establi shment) , 1 65 , 1 80
Aesthetics
transcendental aestheti cs 87n, 1 26, 1 26n
"again and again" (toujours encore,
Immer-wieder) 1 34n, 1 35-36, 1 35n
Algebrization 1 27n
Al l i son, David B. I n, 3n-4n, 2 1
Alter ego 87n, 98, 1 06, 1 2 1 , 1 40n
Alterity 1 7 , 86, 1 53
"and so forth" (et ainsi de suite, und so
weiter) 1 35 , 1 35n
Anexactitude 1 22-23
Anni hi lation (of sense) 93 , 93n, 95 , 96
apeiron 1 7 , 48, 1 5 1 n
a priori, Apriori 62, 8 1 , 1 09- 1 3 , 1 1 6- 1 20,
1 1 9n, 1 28-3 1 , 1 52n, 1 74-77, 1 79, 1 80
of hi story 1 5, 1 09, 1 74
contingent 4 1 n
arche 6 , 1 1 9
Ari stotle 30, 1 29, 1 38, 1 46n
Arithmetization 1 26, 1 26n-27n
Attitude
eidetic 1 1 4
natural 69n
phenomenological 1 48
theoretical 55n, 1 27, 1 32
Authentici ty 74, 1 47, 1 53
Axi oms: axiomati cs 33n, 52-55 , 56, 68n,
1 08, 1 29, 1 68, 1 7 1
Bachelard, Gaston 60, 9 1 , 1 33
Bachelard, Suzanne 3 1 n, 53n, 55n, 69n,
80n, 1 06n, 1 30n, 1 35 n
Bass, Al an 1 8n
Bei ng 1 7, 46, 48n, 93 , 96, 1 04, 1 07, 1 1 8,
1 22 , 1 36n, 1 38n, 1 45 , 1 45n, 1 47-53 ,
1 7 1
of the book 9 1
of the mathematical object 27
Objecti ve 84n, 1 60n
speaking 1 49, 1 64
Bergsoni sm 94
Biemel , Walter 27n, 1 1 6, 1 1 6n
Berger, Gaston 69n, 1 36n
Body
Korper 84n, 85 , 88, 94, 97-98, 1 22-24,
1 27, 1 60, 1 77
Leib 84n, 88, 97-98
Bol zano 1 1 9
Book 1 -3 , 90-9 1 , 9 1 n
Brunschi vcg 30
Cairns, Dorion 1 3n, 20-2 1 , 33n
Calcul us 8 1
Carr, David I On
Cavai l l es, Jean 53n, 1 42n, 1 43 , 1 43n, 1 44
Clarifi cation; clarity 55n, 74 , 1 25 , 1 27n,
1 35n, 1 63 , 1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 73 , 1 75
cog ito 33n
Communi cation 82, 83n, 87, 90, 1 0 1 , 1 1 0,
1 64
Communi ty 93 , 1 1 0, 1 1 4-1 5 , 1 62 , 1 63-64
i nstitutive 87
transcendental 1 1 4, 1 47n
Consciousness 7, 1 0, 1 1 , 1 8-20, 27, 42 , 57,
63 , 68, 68n, 8 1 , 8 1 n, 93n, 95 , 96, 1 09,
1 35-3 8, 1 36n, 1 38n, 1 40, 1 43-44,
1 49-5 1 , 1 53 , 1 59, 1 6{, 1 62 , 1 63 , 1 64,
1 65 , 1 68
constituting 67
di vine 1 47
exemplary 27, 1 1 2
factual 4 1 , 1 47
i ndi vidual 1 5 , 57, 85 , 93
self-consciousness 9
transcendental 8, 1 9, 96, 1 46, 1 47n
as Or-Region 64, 96, 1 38n
of origin 38
of fel l ow humanity 79
of hi storicity 1 05
198
Index
Consti tution 1 3 , 25 , 27n, 28, 32-33, 46, 62 ,
63 , 64, 7 1 n, 77-79, 77n, 79n, 86, 86n,
87n, 88, 89. 94, 98, 1 06, 1 1 7, 1 1 8,
1 1 8n. 1 20, 1 20n, 1 2 1 , 1 2 1 n. 1 24, 1 25 ,
1 35, 1 40n, 1 4 1 , 1 43-44, 1 4S, 1 45n,
1 46n, 1 47. 1 48
Copernicani sm 84n. 85 , 85n
Corporeality ( corporeite, Leihlichkeit) 84n ,
88. 89n. 94. 97-98. 1 22. 1 23 . 1 77
(bodi l y character)
Cri si s 33. 80n. 87. 92n
textual 5
Cul ture 57-59. 75 . 76, 8 1 . 82. 1 0 1 -03 . 1 05 .
I I I . 1 1 2 . 1 1 5 . 1 2 1 . 1 22 . 1 73 . 1 74
Eu ropean I 1 5
pre scientifc 1 07. 1 26
sci enti fc 84n
Dasein 1 38n
Death 1 37
of sense 93-94
transcendental sense of 88. 94
Deconstruction 1 -3 , 3n-4n. 6. 1 8
Deduct i vity 33n. 53-56
Defni teness (defnitude) 53-54
De lure 37n. 46. 1 05, 1 37, 1 53
Delay (retard) 1 7. 1 52-53
Descartes 33n. 44n. 45n, 1 24. 1 25 n
De-sedi mentation 50. 1 1 9
Dialect i c 4. 6, 1 2. 1 6. 86. 86n. 1 43-44, 1 52
of protention and retenti on 58
Diaphanei ty 50. 1 06, 1 38
Diferance 3 . 4n. 5 , 6. 9. 1 8-20
Diference 2. 4n. 5. 6. 1 7-1 8 . 1 9. 1 1 3-1 4.
1 22 . 1 53
Di lthey. Wi lhelm 57. 63n. 1 09
Di sappearance of truth 93-98
Discourse 97. 1 1 6. 1 49, I S2-53
phenomenological 50n. 69n
phi l osophical 1 38n. 1 50. 1 52n
transcendental 68. 77n
Di ssemi nation 3. 3n. 4. 5
Dokumentierung 72 . 78. 1 60. 1 6 1 . 1 62 . 1 64,
1 68
doxa 1 1 9
Earth 1 4-1 5 . 8 1 . 83 . 83n-85n. 85
Ego 6 1 , 7 1 n. 86, 86n-87n. 1 44n. 1 47. 1 67
phenomenologi zi ng 82
ego 29, 6 1 , 63 . 87n, 96-97. 98. 1 20-2 1 ,
1 38n. 1 45
Eidetic 67-68. 68n. 1 2 1 , 1 23 . 1 25n. 1 35
of hi story 1 1 2. 1 2 1
eidos 29. 4S . 47-49. 58, 80. 1 42n. 1 44
European 29, 57. 1 1 4-1 5
geometrical 44
ego 6 1 . 97
of hi storicity 1 1 5
Ei nstei n. Albert 84n-85n
Embodi ment (incorporation,
Verkorperung) 9 1 n. 92 , 1 60
l i ngui sti c 90n
sensible 89. 89n. 90n. 1 6 1
Embree. Lester E. 2 1
Empathy (Einjihlung) 1 1 I n. 1 1 4. 1 62 , 1 63
empeiria 1 49
Empi ri ci sm 42, 59. 62 . 93 . 95n. 1 08 . 1 20.
l S I . 1 52n
Entelechy 1 48. 1 48n
epekeina tes ousias 1 44
episteme 1 1 9
Epi stemologism 1 08
epoche 88. 1 1 9-20
Equi voci ty 1 00-04. l OOn
Erasure (rature) 1 -2 . I n. 5 . 1 8 . 20
Error 73-74
Essence 47, 48. 80. 1 07, 1 1 5-1 6. 1 23 . 1 3 1 ,
1 34n. 1 35 . 1 42 . 1 42n. 1 47, 1 65 . 1 66.
1 80
irreal 1 35
non-fi cti ve irreali ty of 48
Essence-of-the-frst-time (Erstmaligkeit)
1 1 , 48. 48n. 62
Essentiality 1 49
Ethi cs 1 36n
Eucl i d 54n. 72, 1 28-29. 1 58, 1 60
Evidence 1 3n. 47. 56. 62 , 63n. 64, 73 n, 87,
96, 99. 99n. 1 00. 1 04. 1 06. 1 1 3 , 1 1 7.
1 35n. 1 37-4 1 . 1 42n. 1 58, 1 59. 1 60.
1 64. 1 66. 1 67. 1 68 . 1 70, 1 73 . 1 75. 1 76
primordial (originaire) 54-55 , 62 , 1 08 ,
1 63 (origi nal sel f-evi dence) , 1 68 , 1 69.
1 7 1 , 1 72
Exacti tude 25, 1 0 1 -02 , 1 02n, 1 1 8 , 1 1 8n.
1 23 , 1 3 1 . 1 36
geometrical 33n. 1 06
Exi stence 48, 49. 66. 67n. 87, 95 . I I I . 1 1 3 .
1 1 5 , 1 58, 1 60, 1 62 , 1 64
Exi stent 66n. 67. 67n, 8 1 . 82 , 1 38n, 1 44.
1 60 (enti ty)
Exi stent ial thesi s ( these d' existence,
Daseinsthesis) 44, 96
\
1
Experience. l i ved ( \CI I , Erlehnis ) 29, 33n.
35 . 4 1 . 49, 63n. 65 , 66n. 68 . 72 . 1 1 0.
1 1 2 . 1 1 3 . 1 1 7, 1 25n, 1 36, 1 37. 1 39. 1 40
Expli cation ( elucidation, Verdelltlic/wng)
55n, 61 . 98. 1 67. 1 73 , 1 77
Expression 69n. 70-72 . 77. 79, 79n. 1 00.
l OOn. 1 02 . 1 33n, 1 64
Exteriority 92n
corporeal 94
Fact : Factual i ty (jait, jacticite) 26. 37n.
38. 40, 42-44, 43n. 46-49. 46n. 50n,
56. 59, 63 , 64. 66. 70, 70n. 72n. 74.
84n. 86. 88, 9 1 . 91 n. 92 , 94, 96. 1 05 .
1 06, 1 1 0-1 3 . 1 1 6. 1 22 , 1 23 . 1 25n,
1 27n, 1 28, 1 32 . 1 37. 1 38n, 1 47-5 1 .
1 5 I n-52n. 1 73 , 1 74. 1 75 , 1 76, 1 79 1 80
i nsti tuti ng 46
.
Feuerbach, Ludwig 69n
Fichte, Johann G. 45n, 1 36n
Fiction 3. 5. 45. 64. 95 . 96, 1 25n
Fictional i ze 3
Fi ni tude (fnite, fnitude) 37, 45n. 82.
1 05-06. 1 1 5 , 1 27. 1 30. 1 32, 1 38, 1 38n.
1 4 1 , 1 68
Fi nk. Eugen 25n. 27n. 42n . 55n. 69n-70n
75n. 77n. 89. 90. 1 4 1 n, 1 57n
.
First t i me. eidetic fund of 48-S0
Forgetfulness (oublij 33. 36n. 46n , 52. 87.
93 . 93n, 94. 98. l OS , 1 1 9
Form 5-6. 55n. 83n, 87n . 1 1 0. 1 23 . 1 26.
1 37, 1 43 . 1 44n. 1 45n. 1 48 . 1 53 . 1 58 .
1 74
corporeal 94
cul tural 1 08
ideal 89n
of hi storicity 97
Foucaul t . Michel 7n. 8. 8n
Freud I n
Gadamer. Hans-Georg l I n
Gali leo 35-37. 35n. 36n, 1 24n. 1 29n, 1 57.
1 58n
Gaze (regard) 64. 78. 83 , 1 57. 1 77. 1 80
Genesi s 28 . 47n. 57, 62 . 63 . 65 . 84n, 1 08 .
1 32 . 1 43 . 1 73
psychological 28. 29
transcendental 28
of geometry 46
Geneticism 26
199
Index
Geni ti vity 1 42-43
Geography 1 23 , 1 25
Geology 1 4, 83
Geometry I I , 1 4, 1 5 . 25. 27, 32. 32n. 33n.
34-41 , 35n. 44, 47-53 , 56, 58, 60-62 ,
64-66, 72-73 , 8 1 . 83 , 95 , 97, 1 02n,
1 05-08, 1 1 7- 1 8 , 1 2 1 -23 , 1 24n-25n,
1 25-30. 1 26n, l 27n, 1 30n, 1 32 , 1 33n,
1 35 , 1 46, 1 57, 1 59, 1 60, 1 66 , 1 68, 1 72 ,
1 73 . 1 75 . 1 77, 1 78, 1 80
God 45n. 1 47-8, 1 47n, 1 48n
Godel 53 , 54
Ground, grounding (t"ondement , folld(/ tioll ,
sol) 26, 33n, 37n, 44-46. 45n, 52 ,
54-55 , 58. 61 , 64, 8 1 , 83 , 84n, 85 , 87,
87n , 97, 99, 1 04, 1 09. 1 1 0. 1 1 9, 1 20,
1 2 1 . 1 25n, 1 3 3 , 1 33n, 1 38n , 1 43 , 1 49.
1 50, 1 5 1 . 1 73 , 1 74. 1 75, 1 80
Hal l ucinat ion 44-46, 45n
Hegel , G. W. F. 45n, 57, 67n, 1 02
Heidegger, Mart i n I n, 4n, 5 . 8, I On- l i n,
69n, l O I n, 1 38n
Herbart. J . F. 72
Herder. J . G. 70n
Hi storici sm 26. 44, 46n, 1 03 , 1 03n. 1 09- 1 0.
1 75-76, 1 80
Hi stori ci ty (Geschichtlichkeit) 8, 1 0-1 8 ,
26-29, 28n. 34, 42 . 44, 46. 48, 49. 50n,
59. 6 1 , 63-64, 66, 89, 93 . 97, 1 0 L
1 03-04. 1 07 , 1 08, 1 1 0, 1 1 2-1 8. 1 1 5n,
1 20, 1 30, 1 32 . 1 40, 1 4 1 . 1 42n, 1 45 ,
1 45n, 1 49-53 . 1 72 , 1 73 . 1 74. 1 74n,
1 75n. 1 80
i ntent ional 1 42
i ntrinsic 94-95 , 95n. 97. 1 3 1
transcendental 75. 87, 1 2 1 , 1 4 1 . 1 42, 1 48
Hi story 1 0, 1 4. 27, 29. 29n, 30, 34. 35 , 36n.
38. 39. 42-47. 43n. 49-52 , 50n. 59,
6 1 -66, 63n. 69. 69n. 70. 76, 82 , 90. 93 .
95-97. 95n. 99. 1 01 . 1 02. 1 04. 1 05 ,
1 08-1 2 . 1 1 5- 1 8, 1 1 6n, 1 20, 1 3 1 . 1 32 ,
1 37 , 1 4 1 , 1 42 . 1 44-46. 1 48-53 .
1 72-73 . 1 74. 1 75 . 1 79. 1 80
external 95 . 95n. 1 08
i nfnite 1 06. 1 35
i ntent ional 34. 98. 1 09
i nternal 1 05 . 1 09. 1 25 . 1 80
natural 57
phenomenological 28, 1 4 1
real (reale) 87
200
Index
Hi story (continued)
real (reel/e) 59, 95, 1 09
transcendental 41 n. 1 2 1 n, 1 47
Horizon 1 5 , 1 6, 26, 34, 53 , 55, 55n. 56, 60,
79. 80-83 , 84n, 85, 94, 1 02 , 1 04-1 0,
1 1 4-1 6, 1 25n, 1 27. 1 32, 1 34n, 1 35,
1 38, 1 40, 1 42n, 1 45, 1 48, 1 49, 1 59,
1 6 1 , 1 62 , 1 7 1 -72, 1 73. 1 76, 1 77, 1 78,
1 80
H ors-/ivre 2
Hume, David 1 7 1 n
Hyppolite, Jean 88, 88n, 1 03n
Idea ( i n t he Kantian sense) 1 0, 1 6-1 7 , 1 04,
l OS , 1 34n, 1 35-2, 1 36n, 1 38n, 1 42n,
1 44, 1 46n, 1 47n
European 1 1 4-1 5
I dealism 96, 1 38n, 1 47
transcendental 29, 70n, 78, 1 38n, 1 47,
I SO
Ideality 1 0, 1 3 , 1 4, 27n, 5 1 , 55, 59, 59n, 61 ,
66n-67n, 7 1 , 73 , 75 , 76, 86, 86n, 89,
89n, 90, 90n, 9 I n, 92 , 92n, 95 , 97, 98n,
l OOn, 1 04, 1 04n, 1 06, 1 1 7-1 8, 1 24-26,
1 25n, 1 3 1 , 1 33, 1 33n, 1 34, 1 4 1 ,
1 48-49, 1 6 1 , 1 62 , 1 66, 1 69, 1 70, 1 7 1
bound 7 1 -73 , 72n, 76, 89n, 94, 1 02, 1 3 1 ,
1 32
cultural 42n, 94
free 1 4, 7 1 -72, 72n, 89n, 94
l i ngui stic 70n-7 I n, 74-76, 78, 1 03
sensible 1 24, 1 25, 1 33
I dealization 25 , 36, 44n, 67n, 84n, 1 06, 1 1 8 ,
1 27n, 1 28, 1 3 1 , 1 32-35, 1 33n, 1 35n,
1 37, 1 68, 1 77, 1 79, 1 80
imaginat i ve-sensible 1 25
mathematical 1 6, 1 35, 1 41
substructi ve 1 33, 1 33n
Ideation 1 34n, 1 35, 1 35n
I dentity 47, 67, 67n, 7 1 , 73 , 81 , 85 , 86, 87n,
89n, 90, 90n-9 I n, 1 04, 1 43 , 1 44, 1 5 3 ,
1 63 , 1 66, 1 70
lmaginatio 44n
I magination; i maginary 3n, 1 6, 46, 7 1 n,
I I I , 1 1 3 , 1 24, 1 24n- 1 25n, 1 26, 1 33 ,
1 33n, 1 3 5, 1 45
Incarnation ( Verleiblichung) 6, 76, 89,
89n, 90, 1 1 5 , 1 5 1 , 1 6 1 (embodiment)
hi storical 77
I ndefni teness 1 37
I nducti vity 1 24n
I nexact itude 1 23
Infi nite 45n. 1 28, 1 3 1 , 1 34, 1 39n, 1 40, 1 42 ,
1 48, 1 50
I nfni tization 1 6, 1 1 6, 1 27-30, 1 30n, 1 68
creati ve 1 6, 1 28-30
formali zing 37, 1 28
I nfnity 1 28-30, 1 37, 1 39, 1 40, 1 47-48, 1 53,
1 78
Ingarden, Roman 27n
Intel/ectio 44n, 1 33n
I ntellectuali sm 1 24
I ntemporality see Timel essness
Intention: intentionality 1 3 , 1 5- 1 7, 64, 88,
89n, 97-98, 1 04, 1 06, 1 1 6, 1 24, 1 30,
1 34, 1 35 , 1 39, 1 40, 1 40n, 1 46, 1 46n,
1 50, 1 63
transcendental 94
intentional content 70, 7 1 n, 72
I nterconnection 26, 56, 59, 60, 63n, 65 , 66,
73 , 89n, 95, 96, 97, 1 04, 1 05, 1 30,
1 34n, 1 42, 1 63 (chain) , 1 74
I nteriority l O I n, 1 08, 1 42
I ntersubjective ; intersubjecti vity 1 5 , 25 ,
33, 64-65 , 76, 79, 79n, 8 1 n, 86, 86n,
87n, 93 , 1 1 8, 1 26, 1 4 1 , 1 52 , 1 63 , 1 79
I ntrasubjecti vi ty 1 5 , 76, 1 63
I ntuition 62, 67n, 1 06, 1 07, 1 1 4, 1 1 8 , 1 23 ,
1 34n, 1 35 , 1 35n, 1 38, 1 39, 1 40, 1 40n,
1 42 , 1 44
eidetic 30, 38, 1 1 2
geometrical 43
originally presentive 1 00
recepti ve 40, 7 1
of an essence ( Wesensschau) 1 35
I nvariant , historical I I I , 1 1 3 , 1 1 6, 1 1 8,
1 22 , 1 34, 1 34n, 1 77 , 1 79
I rrationalism 1 52n
I rreality 1 44
I rresponsbi l i ty 52
Joyce, James 1 02-04, 1 03n
Kant : Kanti ani sm 39-42, 45n, 70n, 72 ,
1 1 7 , 1 24n-25n, 1 36n, 1 38n, 1 40, 1 40n,
1 4 1 , 1 46n
Kinematics 1 30n
Kofman, Sarah 5
201
Index
Language (/angage+ langlle) 1 0, 1 2 , 1 4-1 5 .
26. 59, 66-72 , 68n, 70n, 75 , 76, 77n,
78-82 , 85 , 87, 89, 89n, 9 1 , 92 ,
1 00n-0 I n, 1 01 -03 , 1 04, 1 04n, 1 1 0,
1 1 2 , 1 1 8, 1 22 , 1 22n, l 27n, 1 47, 1 48,
1 49, 1 5 1 , 1 60, 1 60n, 1 6 1 -62 , 1 65 .
1 67
transcendental 69n, 77, 77n
Leibni z, G. W. 1 00n-0 I n
Levi nas, Emmanuel 1 36n
Levy-Bruhl , Luci en I I I , 1 1 4
Life 3 1 n. 69n, 77, 86n, 1 1 5n, 1 23 , 1 45n,
1 57, 1 6 1 , 1 65 , 1 70
Life-world (monde de la �· ie. Lebenswelt)
1 6, 25, 3 1 , 60, 1 1 3 , 1 1 8-20, 1 1 8n,
1 1 9n, l 22n, 1 33n, 1 7 1 , 1 77
Li vi ng Present 1 0-1 2 , 1 5-1 7 , 57, 84n, 86,
87n, 1 09. 1 09n, 1 1 0, 1 36-37. 1 43 , 1 44,
1 48, 1 48n, 1 50, 1 52-53
Logic 32, 32n, 33 , 33n, 35n, 38n . 68n, 73 ,
78 , 79n, l OI n, 1 1 9, 1 1 9n, 1 43 , 1 46n,
1 67-68, 1 69, 1 70, 1 7 1 , 1 75
of diferance 5-7, 9, 1 8-20
pure logical grammar 80
Logi ci sm 78
Logocentri ci sm 2
Logos 69n, 1 41 , 1 46-8, 1 47n, 1 49
Mallarme , Stephane 67n
Material i sm, dialectical 46n
Mathemati cs 1 3n, 33n, 37, 39, 53 , 54. 56.
83n, 84n, 94, 98, 1 24, 1 27, l 27n, 1 30n,
1 3 1 , 1 36, 1 4 \ , 1 59. 1 70. 1 7 1 , 1 80
Greek 1 28-30, 1 30n
Meaning (vollioir-dire) 3n, 6. See Sense .
Memory 86n, 1 02 , 1 64. 1 67
rational 60
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 77 , 1 1 1 -1 3 , I I I n ,
1 1 3n, 1 1 6
Metaphysical ; metaphysi cs I , I n. 2 , 4n,
6-8, 20, 6 1 , 1 47, 1 50
of hi story 1 03n
Method 38, 84n, 1 07, 1 09. 1 1 3 , 1 1 4, 1 1 8.
1 25n, 1 49, 1 49n, 1 52 , 1 57 , 1 69, 1 70n,
1 7 1 , 1 75 , 1 77
Mi sunderstanding 8 1 -82
Morphological types 1 26
pure 1 24
vague 89n, 1 23 , 1 27
Mul ti pl i ci ty 53. 54. 54n. 56, 1 1 2 , 1 24. 1 52
de Mural t, Andre 67-68
Myth 59. 1 44. 1 45
Name 67n. 80, 82 . 1 33n. 1 62
Nature 33n. 46n. 72n. 8 1 , 84n . 86n, 1 2 1 .
1 26. 1 47
Neutral i zation 29. 5 1 , 65, 67. 67n. 9 1 n.
1 1 9. 1 29
Ni etzsche. Friedrich I n. 4n
Noema 47. 66n-67n. 7 1 n. 1 35n. 1 42 , 1 44
Nonbei ng I SO
Nonhi stori ci ty (Geschichtlosigkeit) 1 1 4-1 5
Nonhi story 1 32 . 1 50
Nonphi l osophy 93 . 1 5 I
Nonworl dl i ness 1 49
Norm: normat i vity 43n, 44. 49. SOn. 52 . 59.
59n. 63 . 73 . 80. 1 09, 1 43
Normality 80, 80n, 1 62 . 1 64n
Novel 1 44
Object 27n, 64. 66, 67, 7 1 n. 72. 77. 8 1 -83 .
87. 94 , 1 m. 1 04, 1 20. 1 22, 1 23 . 1 35 .
1 39. 1 40, 1 42-45 . 1 62 . 1 77
absolute 63 . 1 04
common 78
geometrical 48. 75 , 1 04 . 1 3 5 , 1 6 1
ideal 1 0-1 2 . 25-26. 29. 40. 44. 45 , 47 .
62-6, 66. 77. 78. 85. 9 1 n. 92 , 1 03 .
1 1 8 . 1 20, 1 35 . 1 64
mathematical 27, 27n
real (real) 66, 67. 7 1 n, 75 . 1 61
of recepti vi ty 7 1 . 7 1 n
Objecti fcation (objectil'ation) 87. 98. 1 1 8 .
1 45
Objecti vati on (representation) 84n
Objecti vi sm 26, 83 . 84n, 85n, 98. 143
Objecti vity (objectivite, Objektivitdt)
1 3-1 4. 1 5 , 2 1 . 32 , 32n-33n, 34, 41 . 63 ,
63n. 64. 66, 67. 70, 7 1 n, 72 , 75 , 76. 79.
86n. 87. 88, 89, 93 , 94, 97. l OOn , 1 04n .
1 1 7- 1 8, 1 20, 1 2 1 , 1 39, 1 44, 1 60, 1 61 ,
1 63 , 1 79
objecti vi ty (objectite. Gegenstiindlichkeit)
I I , 2 1 , 26. 32 . 32n-33n, 40. 6. 67,
7 1 n, 73 , 75 . 76, 87, 88. 90, 94, 99. 99n.
1 1 7-1 8 , 1 2 1 , 1 30n, 1 3 1 , 1 3 l n , 1 32 .
1 43 , 1 61 (i deal object) , 1 63 . 1 67, 1 79
of understanding 7 \ , 7 1 n , 73n
cultural 90n-9 1 n
202
Index
Old names, science of (paleonymy) 1 8-20
Omnitemporality 39, 7 1 n, 73 , 73n, 74 , 77n,
1 4 1 , 1 48-49
Ontology 3 , 6, 1 7, 1 40n, 1 50-5 1 , 1 5 1 n,
1 52n
formal 32n, 68n
material 3 1
Onto-theo-Iogy 2, 4
Origin 3n, 5, 7, 9-1 2 , 1 6, 3 1 , 34, 35n, 37,
39, 46-47, 48, 49, 53 , 55 , 62 , 63 n, 68n,
69n, 75 , 76, 84n, 1 0 1 , 1 05 , 1 07, 1 1 7,
1 25 , 1 25n, 1 28 , 1 32 . 1 34. 1 34n. 1 41 ,
1 46, 1 49. 1 50, 1 5 1 , 1 6 1 , 1 70, 1 75
of geometry 36-37, 48. 79. 1 08, 1 1 7, 1 25 .
1 26, 1 3 1 , 1 58, 1 72 , 1 75
absolute 1 7-1 8, 86, 86n, 1 37. 1 52-53
phenomenological 38, 47n, 69n, 79
sense of 35, 35n, 38, 49, 1 07, 1 27n, 1 3 1 .
1 79 (original meaning)
Ought-to-be 1 36n. 1 45
Ownness 86n-87n
Passage 1 1 9, 1 49
Passage to the l i mit 25 . 1 06. 1 27, 1 27n,
1 34-35
Passi vi ty 87, 99, 99n, 1 00, l OOn, 1 02, 1 43 ,
1 63-65 , 1 67
Perception 9, 27, 44n, 46, 49, 67n, 7 1 n, 83 ,
84n, 87n, 9 1 , 1 2 1 n, 1 24
pre scienti fc 1 20
Phenomenality 27, 1 44, 1 48
Phenomenology 8, 9, 1 7, 20, 27, 29n, 30,
30n, 35, 43n, 4
5
. 45n, 47, 50, 5 1 , 52 ,
67n, 73n, 8 1 n, 83 , 86, 93 , 96n, 97,
l OOn, 1 06, 1 08 , I I I , I l l n, 1 1 2 , 1 1 4,
1 1 5 , 1 20, 1 25n, 1 38-4 1 , 1 38n, 1 40n,
1 43 , 1 49-52 , 1 49n, 1 5 1 n, 1 52n
of hi storicity 5 1 , 69
of hi story 49, 1 27n
of reading 99n
of the spi ri t 1 03
of the written thing 90
transcendental 6, 7, 42 , 48 , 68n, I I I n,
1 47
Phil osophy 9, I I , 1 7, 25 , 26, 29, 3 1 , 33n,
37, 38 , 49, 55n, 57, 86n, 93 , 97, 99,
l OOn. 1 0 1 , 1 02 , 1 09, 1 1 2 , 1 1 3n, 1 1 5 ,
1 1 6n, 1 27, 1 27n, 1 28 , 1 29, 1 32 , 1 38n,
1 4 1 , 1 42n, 1 46, 1 46n, 1 50, 1 52-53 ,
1 57, 1 75
of hi story 65 , 72n, 93 , 1 03
of language 77, 10 I n
cri tical 1 1 7
transcendental 80
physis 84n
Plato; Platonism 42, 45 , 45n, 48n, 59, 62 ,
94, 1 07, 1 27, 1 27n. 1 29, 1 42n, 1 44
Pl urivocity 1 00-0 I
Polysemy 4, 5
"Positi vi sm, true" 1 45
Preface 3 , 1 49
Prepredi cati ve experience 29
Presence 7, 9, 1 35 , 1 37, 1 39
Present 57-58, 60, 86, 86n, 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 37,
1 43 , 1 53 , 1 73, 1 74, 1 76, 1 79
hi storic 1 5 , 58, 1 09, 1 09n, 1 1 0, 1 74, 1 76
Pretemporality ( Vorzeit) 82
Primi ti veness, cul tural 8 1
Primordial in Itself 1 09. 1 76 (what i s
hi storically primary i n i tself)
Primordiality (originarite) 37, 58, 78, 86,
1 06
"Princi ple of all princi pl es" 1 0, 1 4, 1 6, 62 ,
99n, 1 37-38
Production 40, 40n, 46n, 56-57, 58, 6,
7 1 n, 78, 86n, 1 06, 1 63 , 1 78
Profundity 26, 1 0 1 , l O i n, 1 20, 1 58 (depths)
Project 58, 78, 1 04, 1 1 5 , 1 1 6, 1 27, 1 37, 1 43 ,
1 44, 1 59
theoretical 1 36n
Protention 1 2 , 58, 1 06, 1 35-37, 1 43
Protogeometer (primally instituting
geometer) 4 1 , 42 , 85 , 87, 1 00, 1 20,
1 32 , 1 62 , 1 77
Protohi story 42
Protoideality I 1 7 , 1 1 8
Protoprimordiality (archi-originaritej 85
Prototemporality (proto-temporalite) 82
Psychologism 69n, 78, 1 45
Psychology 30n, 73 , 1 2 1
Pythagorean theorem 72 , 1 60
Ranke, L. von 1 1 0, 1 76
Rational i sm 5 1 . 1 46n
Rationality 1 29, 1 45 , 1 46
Reactivation 1 2-1 3 , 26, 28 , 5 1 , 55n, 68n,
69n, 72n, 80n, 98, 99-1 00, 99n, 1 04,
1 05-06, 1 1 8, 1 64-67, 1 69, 1 70
Reali sm 78
203
Index
Reality 46n , 7 1 n, 72n, 73 , 89n, 9 1 n, 94, 1 44,
1 49
natural 48n, 59, 62 , 7 1
Reason 1 6-1 7 , 29, 30, 45n, 1 36n, 1 39, 1 40,
1 4 1 , 1 42n, 1 44-46, 1 45n, 1 80
events of 60
teleol ogy of 29, 36n, 1 3 1 , 1 80
hi storic 29
Recollection 85, 86n, 1 02n, 1 1 5, 1 63
Reduction 1 7, 1 9-20, 26, 37n, 38 , 42, 45n,
46n, 48, 49, 50, 5 1 , 56, 59, 65 , 70n, 75 ,
76-77, 8 1 , 83 , 86, 9 1 n , 95 , 97, 1 02 ,
1 05 , 1 1 3-1 4. 1 1 8-20, 1 28 , 1 29, 1 32 ,
1 38n, 1 40n, 1 47, 1 49, 1 52-53 , 1 52n
eidetic 4 1 , 46, 47, 68, 1 38n
ei detic-transcendental 95 , 96
hi storical 1 2 . 47
iterati ve 47-48
phenomenological 1 6, 68, 69n
reactivati ng 47. 50
transcendental 1 5 , 46, 68, 69, 92, 1 2 1 ,
1 3 2 , 1 38n, 1 49n
Regression 69. 70. 96, 1 25
Relation wi th an object 1 39, 1 40n, 1 42
Relati vi sm 1 1 0, I l l , I l l n , 1 1 2 , 1 1 4
Relati vity 84n-85n, 1 04, 1 3 1 , 1 75
Representation 67n
Responsi bi l i ty ( Verant�t'ortung) I I , 1 2 , 3 1 ,
36n, 52 , 60, 80n, 97- 1 00, 1 20, 1 4 1 ,
1 42 , 1 49, 1 65
co-responsi bi l ity 6 1 , 63n, 1 00
Retenti on 1 2 , 57-58, 78, 85, 86n, 93 , 1 06,
1 37. 1 43 , 1 63
Return I nqui ry (question en retollr,
Riickfrage) 1 2 , 20, 49, 50-52 , 55n,
1 07, 1 53 , 1 57-59 ( i nqu ire back) , 1 7 1
(regressi ve i nqui ry) , 1 72 , 1 79
" Return to the thi ngs themsel ves" 1 45
Ricoeur, Paul 2 . 9n, 1 28, 1 37, 1 39-40, 1 40n
Romanti ci sm 38, 1 03n, 1 80
Sameness 25, 67, 67n, 70, 73 , 8 1 , 85, 86,
1 01 , 1 63
Sartre, Jean-Paul 1 25n, 1 36
Science 7, I I , 25-27, 3 1 -34, 33n, 38-39,
38n-39n, 45n, 49, 52, 53 , 54, 56-58,
60, 66, 68n, 72n, 73 , 74-75 , 78n, 79,
79n, 82 , 83 , 84n, 85 , 92n, 97, 98, 1 01 ,
l O i n, 1 02 , 1 02n, 1 04-1 \ , 1 1 8 , 1 1 8n,
1 1 9, 1 2 1 -23, 1 23n, 1 28, 1 29, 1 3 1 , 1 42,
1 57 , 1 59, 1 60, 1 60n, 1 6 1 , 1 65 , 1 66, 1 70,
1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 75 , 1 77, 1 79
nomological 53 , 54n, 55 , 55n
Sedimentation 1 2 . 36, 36n, 48, 50, 55 , 56,
57, 59, 78, 84n, 96, 97, 98-99, 99n,
1 00, 1 05 , 1 09, 1 1 8n, 1 43 , 1 45 , 1 64,
1 65 , 1 68-69, 1 70, 1 7 I
sense-sedi mentation 59, 1 09, 1 43 , 1 74
( sedi mentations of meaning)
Self 1 46-47, 1 46n, 1 47n
Sense (sens, Sinn) 9, 1 0, I I , 1 3-1 5 , 1 3n,
1 7, 26, 27, 3 1 , 34, 37n, 39n, 43 , 46-47,
46n, 49. 50, 5 1 n, 52 , 53n, 55, 63 , 63n,
6, 69n, 73 , 74, 78 , 83 . 85-86, 87, 88 ,
89, 89n, 9 I n, 92 , 92n, 93 , 93n, 94, 95n,
96, 97-1 00, 99n, l OOn, 1 02, 1 04-07,
1 07-1 0, 1 1 2-1 6, 1 1 8, 1 1 8n, 1 1 9, 1 22 ,
1 25 . 1 25n, 1 26, 1 26n, 1 27n, 1 30-32,
1 30n, 1 37, 1 38n, 1 40, 1 42-53 , 1 46n,
1 52n, 1 57 (meani ng) , 1 58, 1 59, 1 60n,
1 66, 1 67, 1 69, 1 70, 1 7 1 , 1 74, 1 76,
1 80
sense-content 7 1 , 72, 73n, 90, 1 1 0
sense-formation (Sinnbildung) 1 5 , 55 ,
55n, 62 , 1 09, 1 43 , 1 59 (formation of
meani ng) . 1 68 (meani ng-construc­
tion), 1 69, 1 72 , 1 74, 1 80 (meani ng­
structure)
sense-uni ty 52, 54, 56
of being (seils d' etre, Seinssinn,
being-sense) 30, 72n, 89, 90, 94, 1 59
(ontic meani ng), 1 66, 1 70n, 1 79
of geometry 37, 52, 64, 66, 1 25
i nsti tuting 37, 44, 1 05
phenomenal 27
phenomenological 95 , 1 37, 1 44n, 1 50
teleological 1 3 1
Sense-i nvestigation (prise de conscience ,
Besinnung) I I , l i n, 1 2 , 3 1 -33 , 3 1 n,
52 , 99, 1 05 , 1 1 6, 1 4 1 , 1 43 , 1 46, 1 49,
1 57 (sel f-refl ections)
Sensibi l i ty 1 24, 1 25n, 1 33 , 1 33n
Sign 89n, 92 , 92n, 94, 98n, 99, 99n, 1 64
custodial 94
graphic 89, 94, 1 64 ( written signs)
Signi fcation 46, 48, 48n, 57, 59, 63n, 64,
67n, 68, 7 1 n, 74n, 78, 82 , 92 , 92n, 93 ,
94, 95 , 99, l OOn, 1 0 1 , 1 1 4, 1 45 , 1 47,
1 50, 1 60n, 1 64, 1 65 , 1 69
subjecti ve-relati ve 1 1 9
204
Index
Signifcation (continued)
unity of 70, 7 1 n
Soci ality 2n, 1 1 4-1 5
Space; spatiality 6, 77n, 83 , 83n-85n, 85,
1 22-24, 1 26, 1 26n, 1 30n, 1 35-36
scriptural 89n
Space and ti me 1 34n
anexact 1 22
i deal 42
Spatiotemporality 70, 72n, 83n, 90, 92 ,
1 25 , 1 27 , 1 30n, 1 58, 1 77
scriptural 87
Speech (parole) 67, 77, 78n-79n, 87, 9 1 ,
92 , 97. 1 04n, 1 4 1 , 1 49, 1 52
Spirit , objecti ve 63n
State of af airs (Sachverhalt) 74, 74n, 75 ,
76, 1 6 1 , 1 73
Stei ner, George l i n
Structurali sm I , 5 , 8n
Subject 2n, 8, 42 , 88, 1 42 , 1 43, 1 44, 1 60,
1 63 . 1 74, 1 77
of writing 2n
egological 63n
l ogical 63n
monadic 93
psychological 63n
real (reel) 87
speaki ng 67, 76, 77, 78, 80, 87, 88
theoretical 1 36n
Subjecti vi ty 46n, 6 1 . 63 , 67, 7 1 , 78, 82, 87,
88, 92 , 1 36n, 1 43-44, 1 45n, 1 48
communal 60
ego logical 60
factual 70, 75
hi storico-transcendental 1 42 , 1 47 , 1 48
psychological 77
total 6 1
transcendental 1 4, 75 , 82, 83 , 87, 88 ,
1 42 , 1 45 , 1 45n, 1 46, 1 46n, 1 47 , 1 52
Substruct ion 1 24, 1 3 3 , 1 33n
Subsumpti on, phenomenological 48, 1 1 4,
1 59
Supplement ; supplementarity 3 n, 8 , 1 0,
1 8-20
Supratemporality 58, 7 1 n, 77n, 1 4 1 ,
1 48-49, 1 48n, 1 60, 1 75
Suspension (Ausschaltung) 43 , 43n, 96,
96n, 1 2 1
Symbol ; symbolic 74, 74n , 92n, 1 40n
Synthesi s 99, 99n, 1 02 , 1 07, 1 59
Task, i nfi nite 78; 1 1 5 , 1 27, 1 28, 1 29, 1 30n,
1 36 , 1 36n, 1 37, 1 40
Telecommuni cat ion 50
Telos ; teleology 20, 45n , 64, 72n, 74, 80,
94, 1 04, 1 1 7, 1 1 9 , 1 3 1 , 1 37 . 1 40, 1 42 ,
1 44, 1 45 , 1 47, 1 49, 1 5 1 , 1 53
Temporality 60. 7 1 n , 77n, 83 n, 84n, 86n .
87n, 1 20n, 1 41 , 1 48. 1 48n, 1 49
primordial (primordiale) 29, 58, 1 2 1 ,
1 2 1 n, 1 36, 1 37
Temporalization 1 6, 86, 89, 1 37 , 1 43 , 1 50
Text 1 -2 . 65 . 88, 1 03
real (reel) text of hi storic experience 76
Thales 39, 1 08, 1 72
Thing 9, 32n, 4 1 , 1 22-23 , 1 26 , 1 27, 1 35n,
1 38, 1 61 , 1 62 , 1 63 , 1 77
belonging to Nature 32 , 33n, 1 39
designated 67
transcendent 1 39
Thinghood (choseile, Dinglichkeit) 3 2n,
1 22
Thi nki ng, pure 1 6, 1 7, 1 9, 1 32 . 1 34, 1 34n,
1 53 , 1 79
Time 6, 87n, 1 23 , 1 37 , 1 48, 1 52
phenomenalization of 1 37
Time-consci ousness, i nternal 1 2 , 57
Ti melessness 7 1 n, 73 , 77n, 1 48-49
lode Ii 49
topos ouranios 1 2 , 1 4, 48 , 48n, 75
Trace 6, 95
Tradi ti on; tradi tionality 1 0, 1 2 , 1 7 , 36n, 49,
50, 52 , 53n, 55n, 56, 57, 59, 63n, 66,
78 , 82 . 87 , 90, 1 02-03 , 1 06-1 2 , 1 1 5 ,
1 1 7-1 8 , 1 3 1 , 1 49, 1 50, 1 58, 1 59 , 1 65 ,
1 69 , 1 70, 1 7 1 , 1 72 , 1 73 , 1 74 , 1 80
of truth 5 1 , 59, 1 45
Transcendence; transcendental 1 0, 1 4,
1 5- 1 8, 1 9-20 , 29, 37n, 50n, 68n, 76,
77, 77n, 80, 82, 83 , 84n, 88 , 96, 1 1 7 ,
1 20, 1 2 1 , 1 36, 1 46n, 1 47, 1 47n, 1 49,
1 53
Translation; translatabi lity 1 4 , 7 1 , 7 1 n, 72 ,
8 1 , 82 , 1 0 1 -03 , 1 60, 1 60n, 1 69
Transphenomenal i ty 1 36
Tri vial i ty 57
Truth 5 , 1 1 , 38 , 39, 4 1 , 44, 45n , 46, 46n, 5 1 ,
58-60, 6 1 , 63n , 72n, 73n, 78, 79, 85n,
87, 90, 92 , 93 , 94, 96, 97, 98., 1 03 , 1 04,
l OS , 1 07 , 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 1 2 , 1 35 , 1 46n,
1 47, 1 48 , 1 6 1 , 1 65 , 1 66n, 1 79
205
Index
truth-i ntention 74, 78
truth- sense 56, 92 , 95, 97, 1 69
(truth-meani ng) , 1 70, 1 70n, 1 79
truths in themsel ves 1 1 9 , 1 20, 1 25n
geometrical 35, 66, 74, 74n, 75 , 76-77 ,
96, 1 05 , 1 34, 1 69
Unconscious 93 , 93n
Undecidabl es 5-6, 5n, 1 8 , 20, 53 , 53n , 56
Understandi ng 1 6, 5 1 n, 1 24, 1 75
Uni vocity 68n, 1 00, l OOn, 1 02-05 , 1 02n,
1 26, 1 65 , 1 77
Valery , Paul 67n
Val i di ty 59, 59n, 60, 63 , 68n, 72n, 73 , 73n,
75 . 1 59, 1 6 1 , l 64n, 1 65 , 1 66, 1 70,
1 75
Van Breda, H. L. 88n
Variation, imaginary 1 2 , 30, 47, 96,
1 1 1 -1 4, 1 23-24, 1 26, 1 27 , 1 77, 1 78,
1 79
Veritas aeterna 95 , 1 79
Voice (voix) 7
We
precultural 8 1
transcendental 6 1 , 1 45
WeltansclwlIlInR 57-59, 1 03n, 1 09
Wrd (mot) 67, 68n, 75 , 89, 89n, 98, 1 02 ,
1 04, 1 49, 1 6 1 , 1 65
World 26, 3 1 , 52 , 79, 8 1 n, 82 , 83 , 84n. 92 ,
94, 95 , 96, 1 06, I I I , 1 1 3 , 1 1 8, 1 2 1 n,
1 22 , 1 26 , 1 29, 1 39, 1 46n, 1 47n, 1 62
communal 57
cul tural 56, 60. 70, 1 1 7, 1 20. 1 58. 1 60.
1 69, 1 7 1 , I 72
prepredi cati ve 1 20, 1 20n
pre sci enti fc 1 1 8. 1 20. 1 22 , 1 3 2 , 1 77
real (real) 44 , 45 , 46, 68n, 72n, 91 n, 92 ,
1 6 1
all the world ( Weltall) 95
Worl dl i ness 69, 92, 94, 1 49
Wri ti ng I , 2 , 5 , 6, 9, 1 0, 1 2 , 1 5 . 1 9, 87-93 ,
92n, 97, 1 02 , 1 04n, 1 1 8

Copyright © 1962 by the Presses Universitaires de France Translation copyright © 1978 by John P. Leavey, Jr. Afterword copyright © 1989 by the University of Nebraska Press All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First Bison Book printing: 1989 Most recent printing indicated by the first digit below: 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Derrida, Jacques. Edmund Husserl 's Origin of geometry: an introduction / Jacques Derrida; translated, with a preface and afterword , by John P. Leavey, Jr. p. cm. "First Bison Book printing"-T.p. verso. Reprint. Originally published: Stony Brook, N.Y.: N. Hays, 1978. Includes index. ISBN 0-8032-6580-8 (alk. paper) 1 . Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938. Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geo­ metrie als intentional-historisches Problem. 2. Phenomenology. I. T itle. QA447.D4713 1989 142' . 7-dc19 CIP 88-38638

Contents
Acknowledgments Preface: Undecidables and Old Names, by John P. Leav ey
Undecidables and Deconstruction Derrida's Introduction to The Origin oj Geometry Deconstruction and the Science of Old Names Translator's Note

v
1 7 18 20

Introduction to The Origin of Geometry
*1. II.
III. IV. V. V I. VII. The Sense of Sense-Investigation: Responsibility. Consciousness. and Existence The Historical Reduction and the Necessity for Return Inquiry (RiickJrage) in Reactivation The Ego as Fundament and the Reduction of Factuality Objectivity. Historicity. and Intentionality Language, the Possibility of Transcendental Historicity The How of Ideality: the Earth and the Living Present The How of Ideality: Writing and Unil'ocity as . the Telos of Reactivation Horizon: the Absolute of History. and Imaginary Variation The Suspension of Ideality: Scient(fic Study of the Life- World (Lebenswelt)

23
27 34 51 62 66 76 87 107 117 12 2 141

Reprinted by arrangement with Presses Universitaires de France and John P. Leavey, Jr. Translated from the revised edition of Introduction a "L'Origine
de

VIII.

la

geomerrie" de Husserl.

IX. X.
XI.

The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Services-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Geography, Injinitization, and the Idea in the Kantian Sense The Historicity of the Idea: Dif rence, e f Origins. and the Transcendental

Appendix: The Origin of Geometry, by Edmund Husserl,

trans. David Carr Coda: contrapunctus and translation, by John P. Leavey
Index of Passages Cited from Husserl Index

155 181 193 197

* The se headings, added for the convenience of the reader, do not appear in the French edition .

Acknowledgm ents
1 974 second, revised French edition of EDMUND HUSSERL'S L'ORIGINE DE L A GEOMETRIE. traduction et i ntroduction par JAC­
The QUES DERRIDA, in Epimethee, Essais Philosophiques, Collection fondee par Jean Hyppolite, copyright © de France, English translation. We are grateful to the PRESSES UNIVERSITAIRES DE FRANCE for their authorization to present this text in English. HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY is here reprinted from THE CRISIS OF E UROPEAN SCIENCES AND TR ANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY by EDMUND HUSSERL, translated by David Carr. Copyright © 1 970 by Northwestern University Press, Evanston. Pp. 353-78 . We are also grateful to NORTHW ESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS for their authorization to reprint Husserl's text in full.

1 962 by Presses U niversitaires 1 08 , Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris, is the source of this

he follows H eidegger ' s usage in Zur Seinsf rage.1 4. for e x ample. 1 977) . " 1 1 . p. tf. "Programme . 9. 1 969). Freud . p . Marges On the present French intellectual scene. delays. David Allison notes : " Derrida often brackets o r ' crosses o u t ' certain k e y terms taken from metaphysics and logic. " pp. ) ] . � " Like all the notions I am using. as well as any number of works by Roland Barthes or Derrida himself. " Sub-Stance. it belongs to the h istory of metaphysics and we c an o n l y u se it u nder erasu re [so us ra ture (added by tr ." Jacq u e s Derri d a . and different paths at their crossroads . 1 973) . ' ' ' contained in Derrida' s Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl 's Theory of Signs (Evanston: Northwestern U niversity Press . Eugenio Donato . with an e xcellent preface by the translator. Spivak' s Preface . The terms in question no longer have their full meaning. xiii-xx. I n his translation of " La ' differance . His " method" is the " deconstruction" of the very idea of writing .Pref ace Undecidables a nd Old Names UNDECIDABLES AND DECONSTRUCTION Tympaniser-la philosophie. The French philosopher and critic Jacques Derrida is situated at the juncture of the two.:! The book as an I See . xxi-liv . I t forms the backdrop for her lengthy discussion of Derrida' s " acknowledged ' precursors'-Nietzsche . the advent and demise of structuralism have accompanied what has been called the book's super­ sedure by the text. Generated out of the play of difference . Of Grammatology. and in doing this . NO. however . after the decon­ struction of metaphysic s . they no longer have the status of a purely signified content of expression-no longer. nor was I able to comment on Mrs . appeared after the present work was completed . he writes about the origins. 9-26. H er discussion of rature occurs on pp. However . Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns H opkins U niversity Press . but as the place of rature-the always incomplete erasure or scratching out of Western metaphysics. Since this translation . I was unable to compare translations for consis­ tency of terminology (as I did with Allison ' s translation of Speech and Phenomena). a writing understood not in the ordinary sense. Husserl . Heidegger. 7 (Fall 1 973 ) . pp. 1 968). the book and the text. a trace that cannot simply be gotten around (incontourable ) . I have added references in the notes to relevant sections of her preface. Phillippe Sollers. that is . " in his Logiques (Paris : Seu il . Semei6tike: Recherches pour une semanalyse (Paris: Seuil . they still retain a vestigial trace of sense . Texts occur for Derrida only in writing. or Julia Kristeva. 60. 1 4 3 . " Structuralism: The Aftermath .

i ncipits . titles . as "consisting in laying waste to metaphysical discourse by aporia"5-i.e. code-mes sage. of course . 10 deconstruction. all of which could be considered as outside of books. We would be written but nothing would be recorde d . could be seen. f � " If there were only percept ion . of teanng down or Rature and the text of Derrida wherein it occurs are themselves crossed out or somehow suspended in his thought. as marginal comments written in the margins of other books or texts. is not a primum movens. deconstruction. and . plains: "If I distinguish the text from the book. i n Yale French Studies. . Dissemination . La Mythologie Blanche are practical re-stagings of all the false starts. archives of metaphysical inscriptions. The sociality of writin g as drama requires an entirely different discipline" (Jacques Derrida. of Derrida's work. . an action. of the psyche . 247-49. 1 967] . 11 Alli son in his Translator' s Introduction to Speech and Phenomena note s: " The term ' deconstruction' (deconstruction). by producing a non-finite n u mber of semantIc effects. II differance: I:! H " All these texts . pure permeab ility to fraying [facilitat io n ." Diacritics. " Freud et la sd:ne de I ' ecriture. upon the purely simulative kinship between sem e and se men . p . No. p. p. However. . 1 1 3. denudes the surface of the text. " tr. of society . but important.against difference in general. 7 � [imprime] to everything . The ' subj ect' of writing does not exist if we mean by that some sovereign solitude of the author. hors-livre. 48: French Freud [ 1972 ] . no writing would be produce d. exergues. 335. . Bahnun g J.' it is the 'double' of what It exceeds. criticism of Derrida actually strikes at the heart of his enter­ prise. . . They are in no way interconnected by meaning. . 4 (Winter 1 972) . p. deconstruction seems to be the violent misinterpretation of Western thought. is "a fourth text. fictitious pretexts . . 1 975) . " H ere we are playing . agamst Its aphonstic energy. " Taken from �OSI!/Ons. Simulating the postface. produce a sort of semantic mirage: the deviance of the i ntended meant �� . S ee Ray Hart. pp . This common. is "the beyond everything [which] insofar a� It . . deconstructing or demolishing. However. It marks an irreducible and generative multJp!tclty . His method of c riticism. there would be no fraying . Jeffrey Mehlman. .. 2. different text. should present no difficulties �) 5 La Meraphore vive (Paris : Seuil. it is because the force and form of its disru ption break through the semantIc . and the opposition s sender-rec eiver. p. And yet. Unfinished Man and the Imagination (New York: Herder. In order to describe that structure. no doubt are the interminable preface to another text that I would one day like to have the strength to write . etc . it is not enough to recall that one always writes for someone. or again the epigraph to anoth� r [te � t] ?f which I would never have had the audacity to write . ". 6 1 -62: ET: " Positions. p. . " in his L' Ecriture et la difference [Paris: Seuil. Derrida still writes necesSIty. The s lIpple­ . the non-point. 1 4). pp. the seminal differance . But pure perception does not exist [my emphasis ] : we are written only by writing . We would search the 'public ' i n vain for the first reader: i . upon the fortuitious resemblance . the auto-moveme� t of the concept. Derrida ex­ �t the sam: .8 Derridafic­ tionalizes Western tradition. This u nbuilding at times seems close to the negative moment often assigned to the creative imagination . . . what IS the fictIonal motion that his prefaces impress on everything? As the fourth text. by the instance within u s which always already governs perceptio n . " Derrid �' s C � itique of Husserl : The Philosophy of Presence . It Im­ as 'discourse of assistance. 1 972] . by Jacques Derrida. . pp. In fact. in part. With in that scene the punctual simplicity of the classical subject is not to be found . See SPIVak s Preface . in i ts conce �­ tual tenor. . as O Grammatology. etc . does not allow itself to be reduced either to a present of simple origin (La Dissemination. the above criticism also misses the point. remain extremely coarse instrument s . 7 "book �" in the ordinary sense. I shall be saying that the destruction of the book. b e it i nternal o r external. . see David Allison. Derrida says. On marginality . of its signified .14) . horizon . it is an entirely other.2 3 Preface Preface edg � or the complete presence of the signified (transcendental or not). exem pt It fr�m e xhaustive and enclosing formalization or at least proh ibit a saturating taxonomy of Its themes. 365. �he �ccident d oes . fourth text. as Ricoeur says. as a kind of mental gymnastics. 10 "Dissemination ultimately has no meaning and cannot be channeled into a definition. of the world. La Dissemination (Paris : S euil . The subject of writing is a system of relations between strata: of the Mystic Pad. it is di ssemin ation. Its reflectlve­ effect (effet-reflet) in writing sets a process in motion.9 . ." the recapitulation. : decap �ta � i�ns) or to an e �­ chatological presence . l'ecriture . No. . is foreIgn to Derrida's new "concept" of writing. tIme. 1 8 . ET: " Freud and the Scene of Writing." The book's own violence. beginnings . while perhaps u nusual . 37. 65 : my emphasis onfiction. of its i ntended meaning ( vouloir-dire). i n this skidd i ng and this purely external collusion. not erased. . parts The preface. and the recurrent anticipation. 33-35. And the ' sociology of literature' is blind to the war and ruses-wh ose stakes are the origin of the work-be tween the author who reads and the first reader who dictates. How does Derrida fictionalize? In other words. � Ibid.. a movement of fiction. . its "protection of heol ogy and of logocentrism against the disruption of writing. . 1 968) . His continual insistence on the failure of metaphysics as onto­ theo-Iogy seems to support Ricoeur's criticism. " (Positions [Pans : MlnUlt. La Double Seance. . If it is not possible to summarize dissemination . or preferably. . 1 77 . as the encyclopedia of knowl­ prefaces. men! and the turbulence of a certain lack break down the li mit of the text. lxv-lxvi. The Pennsylvania State Umverslty . . in order for "writing" to be understood. 1 97 2) ." Diss . . :l apart. but The . as text. That necessary violence responds to a violence that was no less necessary. retained .e . repeated as readabil ity . as it is now under way in all domains.-t a thought seemingly too abstract. and all the words of his text are. the first author of a work.In Of Grammatology. pp.. ."3 forces the present-day violent distinction of the book and the text. withstands all ontology . 1 974.

or in view of. Or at least it does so more easily by itself than does any other word : here the a comes more immediately from the present participle [diff erant (added by tr. . It signifies a project of critical thought whose task is to locate and ' take apart' those concepts which serve as the axioms or rules for a period of thought.1:l here. Derrida recognizes. And we shall see why what is designated by ' differance' is neither simply active nor simply passive . as Sarah Kofman notes.g. ET: i n The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man (Baltimore: The Johns H opkins Pre ss. of speaking to or be ing spoken to . but it already does so somehow of itself. 8 1 . . a reference that must be " crossed out . Sarah Kofman. one no longer founded on the metaphysics of presence" ( pp . By analogy because. . I n L'Ecriture e t fa difference. as starting from an agent or from a patient. . ' ' ' in Ecarts: Quatre Essais a propos de Jacques Derrida (Paris: Fayard. nonetheless. In other words. p. that the system of Western thought is finite. they destroy the trinitarian horizon. ' false' verbal. 30. In this sense. Differance . by analogy . xxxii-xxxiii ) . . p. IH " It was necessary to analyze. . any of these terms. 17 La Dissemination . 1 48. " " A new writing must weave and intertwine the two motifs. There is no simple ' ov ercoming' of metaphysics or the language of metaphysics.". 36). p. since the crisis of the text is not brought about by polysemy or the overabun­ dance of meaning. " Un philosophe ' unheimlich . 427-28. either Heidegger's deconstruction of onto­ theo-Iogy by means of its own language or the structuralist way-by " affirming absolute rupture and difference. Derrida also speaks of the ' completion' of metaphysic s . . ET p. . 1 972) . or on the basis of. " Freud et la scene de l ' ecriture. Derrida e x plains in " La differance. 1 970). s imulative units. as particular schools or movements of philosophy . ' Deconstruction' is somewhat less negative than the Heideggerian or Nietzschean terms ' destruction' or ' reversal' . Derrida says-cannot be decided. I � The a o f d ifferance inscribes the a t onceness o f differing and deferring i n differance (the French verb differer has both significations: to differ." Derrida says he does not believe "that today there is any question of choosing. 1 . 302. but rather by the very inability to decide meaning. 'differance' with an a neutralizes what the infinitive denotes as simply active. It is the notion of the undecidable-that which. They textually destroy it: they are the marks of dissemination (and not of polysemy) because they do not allow themselves at any point to be pinned down by the concept or content of a signified. etymologi­ cally the English words " differ" and "defer" stem from the same root) . in the text of the history of philosophy as well as in the so-called 'literary' text .must be conceived of in terms other than as a calculus or mechanics of choice. Non-choice runs throughout Derrida' s texts. No. IH " The Ends of Man. it suggests that certain foundational concepts of metaphysics will never be entirely elimi­ nated. that of differance or dissemination. They 'add' there the more or less of a fourth term. e . Here in the usage of our language we must consider that the ending -ance is undecided between active and passiv e . "15 Or again. then. it has a finite number of axioms and a finite number of permutations that will continue to work themselves out in a given period of time as particular moments within this tradition. and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences. and to set forth the possibilities for a new kind of meditation. in breaking down and disassembling the ground of this tradition. p. . a s well a s the figure of the ellipsis. "16 This logic of non-choice is the very foundation." concerning the "two interpretations of interpretation. the terminal point of ' closure ' (cloture) for the system . 1 ( 1 969). 1 62-63. even if their i mportance may seem to be effectively diminished . resist and disorganize it. " 1:1 This textual crisis (a crisis of the line. of the line of writing). undecidability has a reference to decidability . 58 : ET p. But the work of deconstruction does not consist in simply pointing out the structural limits of metaphysics . n. i . In " Structure. " 1 7 The undecidable!H takes into itself this non-choice. Derrida says in " Form and Meaning": " "14 There is. 1 973) . But while bringing us closer to the infinitive and active core of differing. 3 2 . 265-66. those concepts wh ich command the unfolding of an entire epoch of metaphysics. certain marks . in the same way that ' parlance ' does not signify the simple fact of speaking." there is no " simple and unique" choice between two forms of deconstruction. this addition of the fourth term-that of fiction . which escape from inclusion in the philosophical (binary) opposition and which nonetheless inhabit it. . . of Derrida's enterprise. our task is rather to reflect on the circularity which makes the 14 I. The whole essay of Kofman is invaluable for " understanding" Derrida. Rather. . refers to [its] whole com­ plex of meanings not only when it is s upported by a language or interpretive context (like any signification) . to defer or delay . pp. . which cannot be thought of either as a passion or as an action of a subject upon an object. if there is one. within the very axioms themselves.4 5 Pref ace Pref ace Dissemination displaces the three of onto-theo-logy according to an angle o a certain bending-back. a new calculus . " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. " p. is needed. but without ever constituting a third term. its task is both to e xhibit the source of paradox and contradiction within the s yste m . in "The Ends of Man. probably no choice to b e made between two lines of thought. A French version of this article was published in Derrida' s Marges de la phiLosophie (Paris: Minuit. ." translated in Speech and Phenomena." that which "dreams of de­ ciphering" the truth or origin and that which " affirms freeplay and tries to pass beyond man and humanism. It is this loss of sense that the word differance (with an a) will have to schematically compensate for. . )] and brings us closer to the action of ' differing' that is in progress .e . without ever occasioning a solution in the form of speculative dialectics" (Po­ sitions. The above citations occur on pp. which I called by analogy (I emphasize this) undecidables. . nominal or semantic properties. p p . that it speaks of an operation which is not an operation. 1 37 : " the word ' difference ' (with an e) could never refer to differing as temporalizing or to difference as polemos [to difference as division or spacing] . to put to work. that it announces or rather recalls something like the middle voice . Sign. . A crisis of versus: these marks no f longer allow themselves to be resumed or 'decided' in the two of the binary opposition nor sublated [relever] in the three of speculative dialectics . 56.

p p . p.> Positions . becoming history th rough this somewhere interested suppression. hav ing obviously undergone changes by the time of i ts reprinting in L'Ecriture (the use of the concept differance on p . neither more nor less-it is perhaps an entirely different question. by strictly repeating this much a structuralist as not. Derrida has an e ven earlier essay on H u sserl . in Phenomenology i n Perspective. teleology. Neither matter nor form." Even more important for our purposes is the line just before this . And. absence. but a note that has the first place " in a claSSIC philosophic architecture. L e Signe e t Ie poeme (ParIs: Gallimard . he says. cannot be made ! DERRIDA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY "To deconstruct" philosophy would." in his Le Poetique. or is already no longer. a deformed. we allow the production of some elliptical change o site. p. the circle. This mode of writing would exceed everything that the history of metaphysics has conceived in the form of the Aristotelian gramme: the point. Derrida says what can also be said of thi s Introduction: "Here as elsewhere. as "the only quest for time past and time regained that a fundamentalIy atheist [my emphasis] epistemological configuration might offer. to pose the problem in terms of choice." in Ma rges. sees OJ Gramma tology." Also see on this M i kel D ufrenne. but at the same time it would be to determine from a certain outside unqualifiable or unnameable by philosophy itself what this history could dissemble or prohibit. Derrida is as much a phenomenologist as not. one does not make a choice. " tr. Forme et Ie vouloir-dire: note sur la phenomenologie du langage . the early text of Derrida translated here . paths. that is. 243-60. (Paris: Mouton . be to think the structured genealogy of its concepts in the most faithful or interior manner. but first appeared i n 1 965 i n Entretiens sur les notions de genese : t de structure. as an Introduction to Husser1 ' s O �gin of Geometry . " Pour une philosophi e non theologique. question lets itself be depicted in the history of metaphysIcs and III ItS most modern. (Paris: Presses U n iv ersitaires de France . ThIS. C ase y . but with a deficiency that is not yet. The article is very helpful for understanding Derrida's Introduction . In Of Grammatology. It is an ellipsis o f both meaning andform. it is neither plenary speech nor peifectly circular. as a long note . to oblige or to believe oneself obliged to answer it by a yes or no. . Speech and Phe�omena can be considered as "the other side (front or back as you wish) of another essay. arche. Smith (The H ague : N ijhoff.22 as neither. 62. 1 970) . along with Foucault's The Order oj Things . . the disappearance or delaying of the origin. Derrida says: " That is why a thought of the trace [dife f In other words. this logic of the undecidable. published in 1 962. then . " 25 22 E . see Henri M eschonnic . "23 In this work he questions "the privilege of the voice [speech] and phonetic writing in relation to all of Western history. as well as time and space themselves . 2nd rev ised and enlarged ed. 1 975 ). this f one pass into the other indefinitely. Donato in " Structuralism: The Aftermath. Ibid. 19 circle in its own historical possibility. 2:1 H 2. finally. . p . can capture. unhinges the point. �" " Ou sia et gramme: note sur une note de Sein u n d Zeit. is as Speech and Phenomena . p . 1 965) . within the difference involved in repetition. is both before and after the work on the Origin. pp. of differance . presence. 239 is the clearest and simplest example of this change ) . in fact. 40 1 -92. 7-57. Along with the circle. lack. p . Ibid." It was reprinted in L ' Ecriture et La difference i n 1 967 . negativity. 1 3 . Derrida says. 207: ET in Speech and Phenomena . Maurice de Gandillac et aI. . given at a conference in 1 959. line. and styles . to conceive of appurtenance as an allegiance or nonappurtenance as plain speaking. Positions The undecidable' s logic is that of the ellipsis of the circle. 1 28. . 9 3 . however determinate. Choices need not be made here. In the deconstruction of the arche [the proto-] . More and less. J . There the problems concerning writing were already III place as such and connected to the irreducible structure of 'differer' in its relations to consciousness. cause. such a � t�is . nonbeing. the line. is the "essay I value the most. and ontology. and space and time themselves : differance already suggests a mode of writing (ecriture) without presence and absence-without history. Edward S . his Introduction to Husserl ' s Origin ofGeome­ try . it is nothing that any philosopheme. 7 8 . "24 It can be considered . 1 �"La �1 P. history and the history of science." p. e d . is to confuse very different levels. "21 This logic of "differance" is what animates. pp. and so on. science. any dialectic. theology. entitled" 'Genese et structure' et l a phenomenologie. and vigilant form: Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. an atheist as well as thinker of the sacred. 2 5 . 20 no more break with a transcendental phenomenology tha n be reduced to it. to Of Gram mato logy . or telos-which would overturn all dialectic. silence .6 Preface 7 Preface displacement is no doubt deficient." in Marges. Derrida feels. O n Derrida and the sacred . ed . 1 97 � ) . ET: 'Ousia and Gramm e': A N ote to a Footnote in Being and Time . F. critical. decentered circle." Or.

i . . certain half-witted 'commentators' persist in labelling me a 'struc­ turalist' . 1 973) . I want to suggest that Derrida has found in and at the limits precisely where phenomenology fails (i. See. Prior to the metaphysical claims that phenomenology exercises and within the possibility of a deconstructive reversal of the hierarchy of sight and sense. 3 1 2. As he suggests. which becomes the obverse. More perversely. it is "a subjection of sense to seeing. ET in Speech a n d Phenomena. if all these terms were not already inadequate to what we are going to consider-is phenomenology. his Intro­ duction to The Origin of Geometry. as an Appendix to The Crisis of European 2H See Paul Ricoeur. which attributes a constitutent role to an act. the phenomenology in question is not that rejected by Michel Foucault in his Foreword to the English edition of The Order of Things. 2 9 p . Also see the comments of N ewton Garver in his Preface to this work . 22 and 248 . Ibid. 26 philosophical per se (the limits or "margins " of philosophy). or L' Ecriture et la difer­ f ence. As he shows. pp." in his History a nd Truth.8 Preface 9 Pref ace In these comments Derrida presents us with an option. phenomenology must always fail.. as the reverse (or improper) side. That basic framework-and here framework should possibly be changed immediately to set of problems. and the options they present provide further justification for a close reading of Derrida' s first major published essay. since sense in general is in fact the concept of every phenomenological field. or even idealist or existential. the Introduction is both proper (since it was written first. six years before the publication of Speech and Phenomena ) and improper (since it is the reverse of the second essay) . The above comments. 1 02. 1 04. present work. 30 Ibid . Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. " :3:3 Yet "before" this breaking up. tr. . the thing itself always escapes . " Negativ ity and Primary Affirmation . phenomenology breaks upon the rock of presence. as will become clear. p. Based on the "absolute will-to -hear­ oneself-speak. M oreover. p . In light of the comments above. is where Derrida works. of sense to the sense of sight. where it becomes the modern. "Form and M eaning. attacking by its very impropriety the proper side. 1 08-09. xxiii­ xxiv. C harles A. which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity-which . 1 965) .e . p. as well as Note 4 above. The problem of method within these limits is what we will see developed in Derrida ' s Introduction . 27 The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York : Vintage Books. the Introduction would then be the essay Derrida valued the most. taken from Henri Ronse' s interview with Der­ rida in 1967." Speech and Phenomena leads to the conclusion: " There never was any 'percep­ tion. 1 03 . the phenomenology Derrida examines and argues with is the " phenomenology of signification. in short. the improper side . if this is to go too far. self-consciousness . . concepts. since it is the whole which has value. must always delay-defer-differentiate the thing itself. pp. we could take Speech and Phenomena as the reverse of his Introduction. or key terms that characterize structural analysis" ( xiv). pp. Derrida' s Introduction is still to be highly prized (and is so by Derrida26). extensive essay concerned with a short independent fragment included. Rather. Speech and Phenomena." in Marges. exemplary recapitulation of Western meta­ physics) a fertile ground for cultivating questions about the nonDerrida often refers to and summarizes the results obtained in this study in h is later work. contrary to what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into believing. ' "29 Further: "And contrary to what phenomenology-which is always phenomenology of perception-has tried to make us believe. 1 04 and xxviii-xxi x . for example . or that his method is phenomenological.e . since they are undecidable-that is where fruitful Husserlian work can be done. method. " supplements" the value of the second essay. the right or proper (recto) side. origins and history. leads to a transcendental consciousness. xiv. 31 p . In this option. to make our voices resonate throughout the cor­ ridors in order to make up for the breakup of presence. in the midst of it. 1 88 . optic. I cannot resist citing Foucault' s statement to the " English-speaking reader" concerning h is relation to the other half of the phenomenological-structural de­ bate: " In France. about writing. . 80-8 1 . However. "28 Subtitled " Introduction to the Problem of Signs in HusserI' s Phenomenology. according to HusserI's probable intent. What remains is " for us to speak. in order to supplement the impact of one' s presence. a phenomenology " which gives absolute priority to the observing sub­ ject. "ao "31 "a2 The Introduction to The Origin of Geometry is a long. I have been unable to get it i nto their tiny m inds that I hav e used none of the methods. Derrida ' s work to date remains inside this failure and need to speak of phenomenology. and differance. Or. in 1961. "27 What I wish to claim by saying that Derrida' s framework is phenomenological is not that he is Husserlian or Heideggerian. Speech and Phenomena . It is also an introduction to the work of Derrida in general and furnishes a basic part of the framework for his later. 3:1 p. :12 Ibid. . even the absolute foundation for so much of today' s thought. p.

I have follow ed the latter.ard Althou gh the E nglish transla tors of H eidegg cality.m. I wIll not proceed so rigorously. that the concept of historicity has its roots in reflections on various subjects going back as far as 1 9 1 3. an inquiry that can only be a " sense-investigation" (as Husserl used the term) of geometry. the origin of ideal objects. . how can they be recog­ nized or known. tr . serl . the LIVI� g � esent: an d the transcendental. Derrida wants to understand phenomenology as It IS . in 1 932 . I will elucidate the archItectural " concept" of historicity (sense-history) and the r� l� ted areas of ques­ tioning it entails: language. 1 975): "The complete penetrativ e gras p of a text . The major thread guidin� Husserl's reflections in the Origin is the question of beginnings or on­ gins within history and their sense. the always intersubjective consciousness of history" (29). if ideal objects are truly original and primordial.. According to Derrida there are two consequences to this view for Husserl. § §72-77 er' s work. then . H owev er. and humankind in its Living Present-the source of all sense and history. however. First. p. Secondly. John Macqu �ITle �nd Edw. but they are preceded by so many other attempts to formulate his position that it is clear that H usser! had always had in mind the application of his ideas to the problems of the historical sciences . and within this structure Derrida elaborates and elucidates-and final �y " supplements"-what Husserl writes. ton: N orthw est�rn UOl:. Garrett Barden and J oh n Cumming (New York: S eabury Press. Sense-investigation. .. historicity is always a sense-history. ed . " at. Instead.· 'princi� le of all principles" and its final institution: the interp� ay ': Ithm conSCIousness of the definite thing present in person and the mfinIte Idea as an al� a� s deferred Telos. I ncludI� g D. These comments will be pursued wlthm Dernda. ersity �ess. raises for Husserl the problem of their enduring heritage . Historicity and For Husserl. and a study of Derrida's com. ideality. howev � r. It operates on the level of sense and is related to the problems of language. ideality. nitely deferred in its content but always eVIdent III ItS re� ulatIve value. and tradition itself is ss. as it were . writing. a the proce ss of handing down and the endur ance of this proce :H de L'Origine de fa g �omet�ie de H u s­ Jacque s Derrid a. l . althou gh both uction shoul d make clear: . In what follows. their tradition. . 1 975). 2 1 5 : "These statements of the later H usser! [concerning historicity] might be motivated by the debate with Being and Time . Derrida' s Introduction � espects H� s­ serl ' s manner of proceeding therein. 1 974) .slatl? ns will be t �ke. the complete d is­ covery and 'recreative apprehension of its life-forms (prise de conscience). For this quote : ( 1 38) . 66-67 . :1 It should be noted that Geschi orality and Ges �h ichtl!ch kelt. truth.' and put oneself in a position of responsibility for this sense starting from the total sense of our existence" (31). that H usserl ' s conce rn with • . Husserl says.ern� a. for the first tim e . in a acquaintance with Heidegger' s Being and Tim e: " It is hardly to be expected . bring this sense to the clarity of its 'fulfil[ment] . into the origin and transmission of geometrical ideal objectivities or objects. Ideal objects are what alone guarantee "the possibility of historicity.10 Preface 11 Pre face Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. which H usserJ seems to have studied carefu l l y . sense s are different . and that i ts emergence in the Crisis is the effect of an accumulation and confluence of trains of thought which ultimately force H usserI' s new introduction to phenomenology to take on its peculiar form . as origin. Sense-investigation reveals the conditions for and the sense of historicity.e. We intend to show. is an act whose realization can be precise l y felt but is nearly impossible to paraphrase or systematize" ( p . 36 Derrida says about this: " To meditate on or inves­ tigate the sense (besinnen) of origins is at the same time to: make oneself responsible (verantworten) for the sense (Sinn) of science and philoso­ phy. 1 974 ogy and the Problem of History ( Evans m of hIstor y dId not anse from hIS the proble pp. 25) . the E�ds�iftung md� fi­ . What places them in history is their "essence-of-thejirst-time. stretched between the jinitizing consciousness of its priru:iple a� d the injinitizing consciousness of its final institution. to Gadamer' s support of th is position i n his Truth a n d Method. (Paris : Pre sse s U nivers itaires text withm the page references will be CIted 10 the from the text as prese nted below and parenthe sis . have rendered the term as histori usmg h lston� ­ Gesch ichtlic hkeit. In other words. Tran . who transla ted Husse �. most transla tors. Husserl's inquiry back to the origin (in this case) of geometry is an inquiry into the sense-history of geometrical truths. " their Erstmaligkeit. Robins on . but only through personal responsibility and response. they do not occur. as Derrida's Introd rl ' s Crisis . or e ven have entered his thinking from an outside source-such as Heidegger's Being an d Time (with its chapter on Geschich tlich keit). "34 heritage. Introduction et Traduc tion n de Franc e . His commentary-mterpretatIon follows the order of questioning and the problems raised by Husserl. : "Temp Martin Heidegger in Being a nd Time. 2 nd ed." Carr refers. The dialectic of these two. in fact .entary reveals what happens when these implications are made explICIt. i. prise de cons cience -George Steiner e xplains th is notion well in After Babel: Aspects of Language a nd Translation (New York: Oxford U n iversity Press . Besinnung. I n other words. explaI �s In � IS Phenomenol­ In additio n . prefer the term historicity for and Husserl u se the same term. s at­ tempt to understand the interplay of phenomenolog( s. that a problem with which Hu sserl is so preoccupied could have occurred to him over­ night. phenomenon and Id� a. IS w� at Derrida seems to feel implicitly guided Husserl in his reflectIOns on hIS­ toricity. the Ir Heide gger ity throu ghout . b� chtlichkeit is the term used many years e�rlier. David Carr. historicity (Geschichtlichkeit)35 concerns the origin sboth under stood to be traditions of ideal objec ts.

Therefore it must have been a more primitive sense that first was projected and appeared in the evidence of a successful exec ution. ideal objects have accrete d (and continu e to do so) sedimen tations in their tran smission .e. the dialectic of protention and retention within the Living Present. but is bound to those languages in which the word itself makes sense . such · . A finite and mediate capac­ ity. Secondly. All of which is possibl e for Husserl.a7 This means. The sense o f t h e meant object indicates the way to grasp it originaliter. Derrid a points out. there is the level of absolute ideal objectivity. of Ruckfrage is the questioning back through tradition to the origin l ' s term suggest s. 12 Pref ace 13 Pref ace in some heavenly locale. And this necessity is not an external fate. The word "lion. 1 ( 1 940). Lowe. " hidden historical field) as the nature of the field itself (as the possibility of something like reactivation)" (51). First the problem of the former. that the equivo traditional). Thus. histori city becom es possible through return inquiry and reactivation. any historical "re­ duction . Yet. And yet. Rather. there is the level of the word's ideal objectivity. in h is review-abstract of H u sserl' s " D ie Frage nach dem U rsprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem" (" I nquiry Concerning the Origin of Geometry: a Problem of I ntentional H istory " ) Philosophy and Phenomenological Re ­ ' search. Reactivation is the human capacity or ability to reawaken the primordial sense that sedime nted (traditional) sense covers over. Derrida elaborates three degrees of ideal objectivity implicit in Husserl ' s analysis . because there is historic ity. in the reali zing. for example. Derrid a explain s. is recogniz­ able within several languages. we shall see. For Husserl the latter notion . Howev er. Since the origin in question here is a phenomenological one. linguistic meaning--obtains its ideal objectivity. I. They have picked up lateral and latent strata which the historical reducti on must finally reduce in order to reach back and grasp the origins of the idealitie s under discussi on. since the conditions of objectivity are those of historicity? This brings us to the problem of language. be­ cause of language. In other words. such that the ideality sign ified thereby is free 'from all factual linguistic subjectiv­ ity" (71). according to Derrida ." for instance. objectivity . lion. the reawa kening and being respon sible for the cal tradition conceals . p . · " . i . their delivery to the present and future. The historical sedimentation of sense interplays with the creation of new sense within the horizon of present sense. Origins are beginnings of something new . Leo. . as such. " and they possess historic ity as one of their "eideti c components" (48) .e. 1 00. as tradi­ tion. Husserl answers by saying that there must be some objectivity in the origin of an ideality for the ideality to be recognizable.17 Dorion Cairn s . Suc­ cessfully realizing a project is evidence . the effect is there as 'itself. and yet both are possible only because there is an origin and tradition of ideal ob­ jects. . Sense-formations whose nature it is to e xist as subjectivel y produced results are 'grasped ' originaliter in being produced . N o ." and it would have to work through free phantasy (imaginary) variation. This inquiry always starts with an origin ' s tradition . particularly written language (87). . In other words. ' A n d grasping covers other acts besides simply perceptive seeing . a correlate of intentionality. But the phrase is redundant. Husserl continu ed. a plight that Husserl felt gave rise to the crisis in philoso phy which characterized modern times. requires examination of both objectivity and ideality. In his comments. Verantwortung and Besin­ primordial sense nung. Thirdly. Thus any at­ tempt to get at the "origin " of these ideal objects . This circle. that the "sense of the con. It is. Evi­ dence means the grasping of a being in the consciou sness of its original 'itself-therenes s . an origin-al sense. that by which sense itself-or rather. tradition is essential to both the inquiry back to and the reactivation of an origin. stituting act can only be deciphered in the web of the constituted ob­ ject. is whatl concern s Husserl : "what seems to be of utmost importance to Hussera is as much an operation (reactivation itself as the ability to open " topos ouranios. reactivation as a capacity of humankind in general can be infinitiz ed through the idealiz ing power of geometry. e xists a s an age-long advance from acquisition t o acquisi­ tion . as Husser an already receive d message that the tradition hands over. The primordial sense of every intentional act is only its final sense. this questioning respon ds to ideality . its reactivation entails a return inquiry (Ruckfrage). So far we have seen that historicity is concerned with the origin and tradition of ideal objects. but an essential neces­ sity of intentionality. As finite and mediate (i . there is the level of the word's sense. ideal objects are "traditional objects. accurately presents H usserl ' s answer to th is problem (he is abstracting from the German transcription Fink published in the same journal in 1 939) : " Our mathematics . forces intentionality­ the problem of recognizability-to be grasped first through its final product: the constituted object. when we notice that tradition operates analogously to the "dialectic" of internal time-co nsciousness. the constitution of an object" (64). The intended content or signification of the word "lion" is avail­ able to many languages. that of ideal objects." would be "reactivating and noetic. the ability to reactivate sense can be lost. which must in turn be reduce d to the very origin the inquiry is seeking to reactivate.. then the latter. they raise the problem of recognizability. So the question is narrowed: what allows for the objectivity of a primordial sense . Derrida says. First. and then descend to the earth . expressive meaning. reactivation must work through equivocal language to regain a primordial sense. however. The role of tradition in Husserl ' s though t becom es clearer .

for example. p . there is no adherence to any de facto language. . In addi­ tion. Husserl says.' the objective science of the Earth itself" (83) . then. a fact that explains Husse rl's rever sion once more the Living Present in his discus sion about the crucial role of writin to g. " the possibility of a geometry strictly complements the impos­ sibility of what could be called a 'geo-Iogy. . In fact. as the place of all objects. arrive at absolute ideal objectivity from its intrapersonal origin in the inventor's mind? Paradoxically. And geometry is pos­ sible only insofar as the above is true. is humankind ' s essential horizo ing Present found s the historic Present." Derrida says. of primomovement of the rdial forma and sedimentat ions of sense " (109). And Derri argue s that. however. The ideality in question here is that of " the object itself. Derrida concl udes. which in turn reveals. he goes back once again to language. This "how" is achieved becau se humankind is "in one and the same world. sense would remain an empiri­ cal formation imprisoned as fact in a psychological subjectivity-in the inventor's head. the transcenden­ tal. since phenomenology' s basic principle of finitude always interplays with an infinite (and nonobjec:!H However. " On this level of objectivity. intersubjectivity is first ntra subJe ct vlty. indicates that writing is a counterpart to the Living Present In Interpersonal communication. the very thing from which it was trying to escape just a moment ago .. both men revert to the Living Present. Derrida has elucidated these three degrees in order to show that when Husseri. this can only occur within the third region of ideal objectivity. "The paradox. from inter subjectivity. . I will return to this rethinking in a moment. our Earth. e . only adherence to the possibility of language in general. it makes sense-Husserl argues back to writ­ ing's i ntentionality. . " is that. particularly geometrical ideality. to adapt Husse rl s word s tWice quoted by Derri da. Historical incarnation [in language] sets free the transcendental. He says that ideality arrives at its absolute objectivity by means of language. to the ego' s intentional act in the act of writing. and this occurrence is "the crucial difficulty of all [ Husserl' s] philosophy of history : what i s the sense of th is last [type of] factuality?" tive) ideal pole-here . Husserl's question then becomes the " how" of ideality (and not yet that of its origin): how does ideality. Geology is as radically impossible. as Derrida points out in a note . " that objectivity itself is intrinsically historical and must be connected with transcendental sUbjectivity. then. without the ap­ parent fall back into language and thereby into history. the absolutely free ideal objectivity of language.14 ace Pref 15 Preface as the free idealities of geometry. " the vital coexi stenc e and the interweaving . instead of binding it. " and consciousness of this fact "establishes the possibility of a universal language. The Living Present is. Adapt ing Derrid a' s succinct remarks about the Living Present. as is an objective science of transcendental sUbjectivity . in the Origin. must have b�en abl� t� �ecogn ize and comm unicate a geometrical ideality within hiS o. the Living Presen t. Derrida com­ ments. that the transcendental " authentic act of writing is a transcendental reduction performed by and toward the �e . Here again Husserl er re­ t� rns t? the uniqu e form of temporaliza tion. the LIVIng Present which groun ds every intentional act in both its alterity and sameness. Humankind is a comm tions unity . The last notion. The first inventor of geom etry. writin g " sanctions and comp letes the exis­ tence of pure transcendental historicity" (87) . thus pushing human­ kind." (92). a fall which would alienate the ideal purity of sense.wn IndiVidual consc iousness . to the intentional act of the ego. since it does not live in a " topos ouranios. is not an object itself and cannot become one for an objective science. we could say. since the possibility of writing gives sense the ability da to becom e nonspatiotemporal. t l Historicity and the Tran scendental H istoricity. Derrid a' s comment on this result . to intra subjectivity . thi s ideality occurs and i s di s­ covered in a factual language . whose dla�ectIcal character and primordiality permit intrapersonal comm uni­ � atlOn. writin g guarantees for Husserl the possib ility of absol ute ideal objec tivity . Mankind is first conscious of itself [Husserl says] 'as an immediate and mediate linguistic community' " (79). is first encou ntered intra personally. The probl em of language and ideality.�H This means that translation is infinitely open. . and the historic n: the Liv­ Present traditi onalization (the incessant totalization of the Past in the Presenas t) revea ls �he univers�l Aprio ri of history. Sense must be recog nized and com­ mUnIcated as the same sense from one moment of the ego to anoth absol utely different moment of the same ego. As mterpersonal comm unication par excel lence. Thus language is the tool for revealing ideal objectivity . must then be rethought " (77). Since writing is intentional-i . our Earth-the zero-point of all perception the ' " infinite horizon" of every object . does not distinguish between the object itself and its sense . Husserl feels. The ground for transcendental historicity is uncovered. 72 below . acros s a new thresh old-that of comm unity . then. to . � n � � ense . In order not to have truth disappear from the world . that writin g "const itutes the other as other in itself and the same as same in the other " (86) .

However. reveals the limit of historicity (and thereby its own limit): the progressive­ creative-movement of intentionality. Here again we see the " conflict" between the finitizing consciousness of phenomenology's principle and the infinitizing con­ sciousness of its final institution. in a truly transcendental move. The absolute is the act of all tradition (and of histo­ ricity and intentionality): transmission in the act of creation. In the lackluster guise of a technique. e .1 1 ) . nor are its conditions. He wonders if Husserl's merit was not in having described. the unity of this movement is never given. In other words. it must be experienced or thought (thereby making the phenomenalization of time possible). " intentionality is traditionality. . because the beginning of methodic reflection can only consist in the consciousness of the implication of another previous. the " already there" of its dialectics of sense. perhaps. " inten­ tionality is the root of historicity. " . the never present origin of Being and Sense. the Living Present being the "final retrenchment" and " security . both the absolutely original sense of each traditional line (its historicity) and its "relativity" within history in general ( 1 3 1 ) . sensible idealization of the pre scientific world. is never studied in itself. However. the work of the Idea in the Kantian sense. So far the problem of ideality' s origin has been left in abeyance . the idealizing activity o f understanding. Derrida states. Derrida points out that Husserl will leave the question open. theoretical leap is always based on the morphological. Derrida concludes. "the condi­ tions of possibility for history which were at the same time concrete . Being. � ow Derrida also says that sense is "the appearing of being" ( 1 48) . i . Derrida concludes." Derrida says. sense is traditionality and ' 'the Absolute is Passage " ( 1 49) ." Moreover. Once again we are led back to the Living Present. the Idea as au­ thorization of ideality. absolute. Since this alterity o the absolute origin structurally appears in f my Living Present and since it can appear and be recognized only in the primordiality of something like my Living Present. that Husserl leaves each strand undecided: geometry is what has taken place in the Greek creative infinitization. In other words. adding that the " of" designates neither a sUbjective nor objective genetive. is consciousness of Difference : consciousness of the impossibility of remaining in the simple now of the Living Present as well as the " inability to live enclosed in" a simple undivided Absolute. Derrida says. We could say . Derrida says. " is silently shown under the negativity of the apeiron " (ibid) . pure thought investigating the sense of itself as delay within philosophy. pp.39 is never phenome­ nalized in itself. ( 152 -53) See L ' Ecriture. Derrida says. neither the " Absolute" nor "in­ tentional historicity" has fi r st place. . or as Derrida says. a conscious­ ness without which. the Reduction is only pure thought as that delay. which means that being is historical. this very fact signifies the authenticity of phenomenological delay and limitation.39 historical. a passage to the limit whose structure is that of mathematical idealization. that the absoluteness of the Idea " is the Absolute of intentional historicity" ( 1 42). of "pure think­ ing. What then is the historicity of the mathematical (philosophical) ori­ gin." the now needing a past which in turn needs a future toward which the present always already tends. . interplays with the always deferred Absolute within this consciousness. " the phenomenological absolute. Derrida concludes. both must expose "themselves" in order to be. possible. Pure thought is always delay . not just the phenomenological. Derrida says: Here delay is the philosophical absolute. of the nonimaginative and nonsensible. " of every phenomenological reduction" ( 1 1 0. so that the present is the horizon for past and future. and yet this scientific. but only phenomenology can provide the apparatus for an answer. if the I dea is what allows for ideality' s origin? Both the Idea and Reason are historicities. So the question for him becomes : what is " the origin of Being as History" ( l 5 1 ) ? Ontology may ask the question. the infinite Idea that authorizes finitude. " Consequently. Consciousness of this delay. . This unity . yet it is always already a rupture with that sensible­ morphological idealization. They are eternal yet . as the limit toward which ideality passes. This progressive movement is tradition. "nothing would appear. because they are experienced under the form of horizon " ( 1 1 7) ? Hori­ zon is the Living Present' s dialectical form.16 Preface 17 Preface of speaking beings in their Living Presents.e. in a decisive sentence." i. The delay or lateness of speech in this manifestation of Being is finally the philosophical. The Living Present. and absolute origin in general. It is a radical operation. 242 and 250 on the concept of the Idea in the Kantian sense . " historicity is sense " (150). there is no need to inquire about the sense of historicity. the Lebenswelt. since eternity is a mode of historicity. Geometri­ cal ideality is always based on the morphological idealities of imagina­ tion and sense. the how of its temporaliza­ tion. the " again and again" which Derrida feels must have its protentional correlate in intentionality. Thus he saves. although neither are exhau sted in this exposition. since it is the dialectical root of the Living Present.

that without which nothing would ap­ pear. . " ' Literature '(Literature . La Dissemina tion . ch. Richard Macksey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press . More abstractly. differant consciousness . Setting-aside. parenthesized. " So Primordial Difference would be transcendental-as must be. can only be a differ­ ant Reduction. . Positions . obliterated by old senses. " This paleonymic supplementarity is a sec­ ond moment or level of Derrida' s deconstruction. 348-49 . the conceptual structure centered on such and such a predicate. Of Grammatology Prior to elaborating the " structure" of historicity. Co� sciousness of Difference . Primordial Difference is transcendental. the name x being maintained as a tool of intervention (levier d'i�ten:e�tion) in order to maintain a hold on the former organization . second moment or level being understood neither hierarchically nor chronologically. The deconstruction of differance includes then a de-sedimentation and supplementation (or substitution) of an old name for a new "concept. a s well as Note 4 above . according to the process that I have just described. must be a dif­ fera nt Origin-the never-yet-always-already-there as the "beyond" or " before" that makes all sense possible. Derrida asks : What is. i . an old name itself. the Reduction. c h . " pp. the always deferred-differing difference of the origin is differance (with an a ) . not the demolition but the de-sedimentation. . That Difference. 1 80-96 . two major senses (taken from the French verb suppleer) : to fill a deficiency (to complete) and to take the place of (to replace) . p. " Velocities of Change: Critical Essays from MLN. 7. 3 .e . of all the significations that have their source in that of the logos. according to Derrida. IS transcendental consciousness. historicity and reflections thereon. Further. Derrida says: " The pure and interminable disquietude ?f thought striving to ' reduce' Difference by going beyond factual infin­ It� toward the infinity of its sense and value . the " strategic" necessity which sometimes requires that an old name be preserved in order to initiate a new concept? With all the reservations imposed by the traditional distinction between the name and the concept. (2) to the de-limitation. 96. and the controlled extension o this predicate which was set f aside. it inaugurates the destruction . no sense. the grafting. nothing. and Alan Bass. Particularly the signification of truth. -t:! DECONSTRUCTION AND THE SCIENCE OF OLD NAMES The "rationality"-but perhaps that word should be abandoned for reasons that will appear at the end of this sentence-which governs a writing thus enlarged and radicalized. thought' s own disquietude at Difference . " in Speech and Phenomena. However. I described the deconstructive logic of the undecidable. a name sous rature. then. i. the de-construction. . of differance. which is held in reserve and limited within a given conceptual structure (limitedfor some motivations and relations offorce which are to be analyzed) named x. ' " Differance. And transcendental Differ­ ence . while maintaining Dlff�rence-that disquietude would be transcendental" ( 1 53 ) . " is perhaps what always has been said under the concept of 'transcendental' through the enigmatic history of its displacements . Thus transcendental is equivalent to differant (with an a ) . 1 974). something different. to the old name of phenomenology in that text. 147. grafting. This supplementary grafting is noteworthy in Derrida' s Introduction . an absolute Origin. 2 . is transcendental. an Origin.-to involves.18 Preface 19 Preface Without ' 'its own proper dehiscence. " there would be no historicity.e . . 1 (Spring 1 973) . deconstruction as the science of old names: it fills a deficiency in the old concept and replaces it while using its old name. 3 7 .e . The movement of supplementarity . 5 : " S igns and t h e Blink of a n Eye . Of Gram ma to logy Part I I. no longer issues from a logos. 4� 4 1 0n the " concept" of supplementarity . No. ET: Diacritics. Let me now rehearse some of the supplementations that Derrida ad­ vances in the Introduction . finally. The Re­ ductIon. pure thought of its own delay. of non-choice. He says Difference is transcendental­ transcendental being the primordial Difference of a different Origin. i. extension: you know that this is what I called.!!?-aside (prelevement) of a reduced predicative trait. one proceeds: (1) to the setti. differance is also an old name . see: Speech and Phenomena . one ought to be able to begin to describe this 0I? era!i�n: aware of the fact that a name does not name the punctual slmpliClty of a concept but the system o predicates defining the f concept. 60-69. p. So we could say that consciousness is differance (with an a ) . then.-tl This is �o The science of old names is writing. He has added something new. ed . which It IS effectively a question of transf orming. ch.-t:l Similarly. pp. 4:1 S e e Speech a n d Phenomena . p p . p. Derrida con­ jectures. writing. as one of " a certain number of nonsynonymic substitutions" for differance.

John P. Its " is" is that of all metaphysics. I have included certain French and German terms within brackets where necessary in the text. they all partake of its logic. particularly when they bear on a point that Derrida is arguing. Is there a need to choose here between undecidables and old names ? Is one choice more faithful to Derrida' s intent than the other. in a fragile letter that is easily erased. see the Translator's Preface of Lester E . and to my mother. Likewise. following the French tradition. And. In the text itself. and intentionality­ all basic concepts of phenomenology-have been supplemented by dif­ ferance. indicates Gegenstiindlichkeit by the neologism objectite and Objektivitiit by objectivite . To Professors Robert Detweiler. and so on. Embree to Suzanne Bachelard's A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic . an that is hardly readable and definitely undecidable . its metaphysical text deconstructed. as well as his invaluable translation of Derrida' s other major work on Hu sserl. and the old names retained. sous rature: � . I have indi­ cated references to present English translations of works to which Der­ rida refers. Ruckfrage a the French " en fait" and " en droit. I would also like to thank Professor Evans for his patient checking of the complete first draft with the French text. I would like to thank various people for their invaluable aid in the process of this translation. to Walter Russell I want to extend gratitude for persistent good humor and friendship dur­ ing this period . in which undecidables and old names are both present and deferred in the silent tomb of the a . since the French objet comprises both the meaning of Gegenstand and that of Objekt. The same appreciation is extended to Professor James Dagenais for his invaluable suggestions in relation to the first half of the translation. Lea vey TRANSLATOR 'S NOTE Introduction. Professor J. These modifications have been indicated by the word " modified" inserted within brackets in the text. because it is a method for reflecting on historicity. but have modified them where necessary to underscore Derrida' s argumentation. Thus the Reduction. Phenomenology is no longer. " The same is true of apriori (adjec­ tival form) and a priori (adverbial or substantive form). Derrida says: "And Thought's pure certainty would be transcendental. is thereby transcendental: it is a differant process. Finally. Ruckfrage. Texts un­ available in English translation I have translated from the French. The translation offered here is that of the second edition of Derrida's published by Presses Universitaires de France in 1 974. or misprinted. Hillis Miller was also very helpful with his many bibliographical aids and goodwill. all explanatory brackets that occur within quotations are Derrida's additions. ) However. I am most deeply indebted to Professor Derrida himself for his personal help and patient advice during this time. His cordiality and support were greatly appreciated. no differentiation is possible for the word " object. William Beardslee . And I am particularly grateful to Professor David Allison for his personal friendship and editorial aid. Yet they are still named Reduction. crossed out. but still is. since it can look forward to the already announced Telos only by advancing on (or being in advance of) the Origin that indefinitely reserves itself. the translation has been done in light of and in accordance with David Allison' s earlier translation of Derrida's Speech and Phenomena . since they are often translations of Louvain-Leuven December 1 976 . I extend my sincerest thanks for their long-term encouragement.). consciousness. (Der­ rida.20 21 Pref ace Preface And. phenomenology. Phenomenology has been supplemented. Similarly. Such a certainty never had to learn that Thought would always be to come" (ibid. Ron Rembert. who only saw half its completion. Finally. Also. The Husserl texts have been modified in accordance with many of the suggestions of Dorion Cairns' Guide for Translating Husserl. Ruckfrage. I would like to thank the Belgian American Educational Foundation for providing me with time to complete this work. The first edition was published in 1 962. and most particu­ larly Barbara DeConcini and Carla Schissel . All German terms in parentheses are Derrida' s additions ." although in quotations from Husserl it has been retained. For further details on this problem. Such terms as de facto and de jure have been underscored only where Derrida has stressed them himself. I have followed Cairns' suggestion in differentiating between Objektivitiit and Gegenstiindlichkeit by the capital or lower case " 0 " respectively. i s one in fact different from the other? The exemplary case here seems to be difJerance itself. I would also like to thank friends who kindly helped in the prepara­ tion of the final draft: Bernard Matt. finally. and Arthur Evans. I wish to dedicate this work to the memory of my father. finally.

" The Origin of Geometry " Introduction to .

pp. 24-28) . Eugen Fink . whether they be largely prior to or almost contemporary with it. In fact. t It is deeply rooted there and to that extent its originality runs the risk of not being immediately apparent. 1 954). [S ince the ET does not contain all the appendices that the German edition does. 203-25 . ed . it is not because of its descriptive novelty. Also in question are the I Die Krisis der ellropiiischen Wissenschaften und die tranzendentale Phanomenologie: Eine Einleitllng in die phanomenologische Philosophie. English translation [hereafter abbreviated as ET]: The Crisis of European Sciences and Trans cendental Phenomenology: An Introduc­ tion to Phenomenological Philosophy . David Carr ( E vanston: N orthwestern Univer­ sity Press . 1 939) . after stating that he will translate the version presented in K: "The original manu­ script dates from 1 936. th is text has been read and frequently cited under this form . No. The Origin of Geometry still concerns the status of the ideal objects of science (of which geometry is one example) . and prescientific materials." and the constitution of exactitude through idealization and passage to the limit-a process which starts with the life-world' s sensib le . " 25 . as " the same . it will be necessary at times to refer to the German pagination . Nearly all its motifs are already present in other investigations.By its date and themes. Walter B iemel . tr. I . already con­ ferred on it a certain right to independence . then. 6 (The H ague: N ijhoff. 1 970) . 2 (January 1 5. this meditation of Husserl [The Origin of Geometry ] belongs to the last group of writings that surround The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Vol . pp. finite . pp. under the title ' Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie al s intentional-historisches Problem : Since then. ] Hereafter the ET will be cited as C. The Origin of Geometry (C. If The Origin of Geometry is distinguishable from the Crisis. by identifying acts. 3 53-78) is a text appended to §9a on "Pure Geometry " (C. their production. Its typed transcription bears no title . The author of this transcrip­ tion . the German as K. in HlIsser­ liana . In a foreword ing note Derrida says. Its history . has also publ ished an elaboration of it in Rel'lIe Internationa!e de Philosophie . at least .

2 I n effect these pages o f H usserl . against a certain technicist and objectivist irresponsibility in the practice of sci­ ence and philosophy.e . the Cartesian Meditations. even when a certain historicity has become phenomenology's theme. which are neither the factual interconnections of empiri­ cal history. and its being is.26 Jacques Derrida 27 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry interrelated and concrete conditions for the possibility of these ideal objects: language. cf. i t8 phenomenological sense will merge with its teleological sense . The first criticism was the starting point for Forma l and Transcendenta l Logic. 3 ) ( Paris : M inuit. Geschichtlichkeit and Historie . against a historicism blinded by the empiricist cult of fact and causalist presumption . obeys different rules. i. are always utilized.-t : l In our translation [of The Origin of Geometry ] . The Origin of Geometry has both a programmatic and an exemplary value . and on the consequences of such a hy pothesis . first written for himself. even when we get caught up in certain difficulties. · · i n Husser/ ( Cah iers d e Royaumont . the historicity of science and the re­ flection that it invites. But never had the two denunciations of historicism and objectivism been so organically united as in The Origin of Geometry. the techniques of phenomenological de­ scription. Thus. I n other words. it is perhaps not so de jure . the possibility of something like a history of science imposes a rereading and a re­ awakening of the " sense" of history in general: ultimately. 1 959) . of historicist geneticism was always interrelated with that of psycho-geneticism. initially. from the outset. to be an object [etre-objet ] for a pure consciousness. and correlatively. their origin and tradition (in the ambiguous sense of this word which includes both the movement of transmission and the perdurance of heritage). totally rid of empirical subjectivity. Consequently. i . in " Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (in which it was the fundamental preoccupa­ tion). Therefore. pp .e. and on the other hand. 2 Now the singu­ larity of our text rests on the fact that the conjunction of these two standing and tested refusals creates a new scheme: on the one hand . The historicity of ideal objectivities. 3 have certain common apriori conditions. Finally. � On the question of knowing w hether. Less than ever do their validity and fruitfulness appear impaired in Husserl' s eyes. . in the Logical Investigations. and the world as the unity of ground and horizon . But here the apparent discontinuity al so depends on an always regressive method. it is always already reduced to its phenomenal sense . 63 -7 1 . their disclosure is possible in principle and this should lead us to reconsider the problems of universal historicity in their broadest extension. Husserl tries to accomplish a singular proof of these essential pos­ sibilities in connection with geometry and to decipher therein the pre­ scription of a general task. for HusserI . far from it-always the case . and in Ideas I. Though this moment of Husserl ' s radicalness is ultimate according to the facts. Ph ilosoph ie N o . For Husserl. our reading of it must be marked by the exemplary consciousness proper to all eidetic attention and be guided by the pole of this infinite task. . wh ich i s not-i ndeed . it nevertheless is only what it appears to be. notably those of the various reductions. . a method which c hooses its interruptions and multiplies the returns toward its beginning in order to reach back and grasp it again each time in a recurrent l ight . The reduction . intersubjectivity. it brings to light a new type or profundity of historicity. on the other hand . this action cannot possibly be retracted . In their irreducible originality. if not condemnation . it determines the new tools and original direction of historic reflection. Husserl repeatedly seems to agree with this. Therefore. The second had appeared much earlier. Eugen Fink. despite the high cost of its diffi c ulties . on the one hand. In the introduction we now attempt. from which phenomenology alone can make its way. Absolutely objective. t he mathematical obj ect is the mode of every object's constitution. Its being is thoroughly transparent and exhausted by its phenomenality. we will always try to be guided by his own intentions. Nor. I The mathematical object seems to be the privileged example and most permanent thread guiding Husserl's reflection. our sole ambition will be to recognize and situate one stage of Husserl' s thought. like most of Husser!' s texts. The birth and development of science must then be accessible to an unheard-of style of historical intuition in which the intentional reactivation of sense should�e jure-precede and condition the empirical determination of fact. where they proceed from the same impulse and are mutually involved throughout an itinerary whose bearing is sometimes disconcerting. the discussion in which Walter Bieme l . h ave t h e rhythm o f a thought feel ing its way rather than setting itself forth . with its specific presuppositions and its particular unfinished state. and the Crisis. nor an ideal and ahistoric adding on. w e wi l l indicate t h e d i stinc tion be­ tween Historie and Geschichte in parentheses only when t h is distinction corres ponds to H u sserl ' s explicit intention. and Roman I ngarden participated fol low­ i ng B iemel ' s lecture on " Les phase s decisi ves dans Ie developpement de la philosophi e d e H u sser\ . is The O rigin of Geometry distinguishable by its double cluster of critiques that are directed. This is because the mathematical object is ideal.

. Cf. Reference above begins on p. of human community . Neither the structure s of historicity in . At least not directly and as such. however. 1 45-5 1 . H Thus the neutralization of psychological genesis and that of history are still on equal footing in the texts which place the transcendental development in focus. 1 970) . " H usserl and the Sense of H i story . 35ff. Edward G. they also do not include the discussion mentioned in note 4 abo ve . In The Origin o Geometry . Husserl still had not engaged phenomenological description in the problems of historic­ ity. enti­ tled "The Decisive Phases in the Development of H u sseri ' s Ph ilosoph y . the origin of arithmetic was described in terms of psychological genesis . one that will be difficult to maintain in the regional limits which were so long prescribed for it. ibid . H u sserl continually refers to his first book . " N umbers are mental creations insofar as they form the re su lts of activ ities exerc i sed upon concrete contents : what these activities create. In 1887-9 1 . Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. f. § 38 . 1 87-2 1 3 . pp. Ballard and Lester E. " which alone assure the possibility of historicity . it is a question of the unity of traces. to put the whole developm ent of Western philosoph y into perspecti ve. more part ic ularl y pp." in Pau l Ricoeur. All these reduction s hold a fortiori for the descriptio ns of primordial temporality and immanent duration. After that. [A German version of B ieme l ' s lecture. 1 43-74 . as a cultural form and adventure of human­ ity. i . The thematization of transcendental genesis maintained the :ed � c­ tion of history . The Ger­ man and English versions differ from the French version published in Husser!. An ET of this German version. §29 . 78) . however. when Husserl speaks about the unity of a history. pp. Dorion Cairns (The H ague: N ijhoff. i . 63) . Despite a psychologistic inflection whose originality has often and justly been emphasized. pp. " the higher forms of products of reason. of ldealttles whIch no longer will ever belong to the time and space of empirical h i story . . and dependent tasks ( ibid.5 it already concerns. 1 48ff. after fifty years of f meditation. HusserI' s first important work. 1 967) . " of synthetic "residues " within the pure egological sphere . to define the European eidos and the man of infinite tasks. pp. p. i Edmund Hu sser! . And in the Cartesian Meditations. in Experience and Judgment and in Formal and Transcendental Logic . do not belong to the eidos of the concrete ego (CM. p. in the period of the Crisis. It passes first through the reduction of all historical or psychological genesis . 1 50] . of man. when the genetic di­ mension of phenomenology is discovered . of culture . On what obstructs the direct thematization of history in a transcendental phenomenology whic h at the same time calls for this thematization. the reactivation of the primordial sense of arithmetic' s ideal unities by returning to the structure of perception and the acts of a concrete subjectivity. But when. e . " are defined as ulterior. especially in Formal and Tra nscendental Logic. Husserl repeats the same project under the species of a phenomenological history. regional. " is in The Phenomenology of Husser!: Selected Critical Readings. the genesis of arithmetic is not thought of as a history of arithmetic. At the end of the Third Cartesian Meditation . tr. R. The retu rn to prepredicative experience . � On the problem of history in H u sserl ' s philosophy . On the other hand. therefore the primord ial h istoriCIty . § § 3 7 and 3 8 . While constantl y practiced in the Crisis itself. genesis is still not history. ed. " ' appeared in ZeitschriJt fijr phi­ losophische Forsch ung. extended down to a precultural and prehistoric stratum of lived experience . and tr. concealed each time by the very gesture that uncovers it: all this would give credit to a kind of synoptic retrospection that no criticism of historic reason had explicity ju stified from the start. 37 [ ET: p. The passage is translated in Biemel ' s article . this new access to history is never made a problem . On the one hand. " This rem ax:kable � ass��e . all that could be placed under the category of objective :. " Die entscheidenden Phasen in H usserls Philosophie . O. we refer partic ularl y to Paul Ricoeu r' s very fine article . p . tr . Husserl: An A nalysis of His Phenomenology . . the consciou sness of a crisis and the affirmation of a teleology of reason are only new paths or means for legitimizing transcendental idealism once again. and so forth . Busserl himself already proposed to account at once for the normative ideality of number (which is never an empirical fact accessible to a history in precisely this same style) and for its grounding in and through the lived act of its production.28 Jacques Derrida 29 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry The Philosophy of Arithmetic. of "referenc es . and to recount the adven­ tures and misadventures of the transcendental motif. .' Husserl un­ derscores this: the ideal objects. ] Des pite h is severity as regards this psychologi stic tendency . This fidelity is all the more remarkable since the path traversed is immense . wh �ch already designates the prod uction . in Husserl. e " the al­ ways intersubje ctive consciousness of history. is from Con­ cerning the Concept of Number ( 1 887) . 1 3 ( 1 959) .fi In such a case . . a new space of questioni ng is opened. which is taken up again as the first c hapter of Philosophy of Arithmetic ( 1 89 1 ) . the investigat ions that particu larly concern the "theory . 75-80 -hereafter cited as CM . history itself breaks through into phenomenology. spirit and the cultural world was repressed within the sphere of intra­ worldlines s . Elveton (Ch icago: Quadrangle . as does The Origin of Geometry. Embree (Evanston : Northwestern U niversity Press. cf. 1 48-7 3 . 1 970 ) ' Meditation I V. are not new and absolute contents which we could find again in space or in the 'external world' : rather are they uniqu e relation-concepts wh ich can onl y be prod uced again and again and wh ich are in no way c apable of being found somewhere ready-mad e . a s announced i n Ideas I and then accomplished between the years 1 9 1 5 and 1920. could have been entitled The Origin of Arithmetic. pp. I n passing from static t o genetic constitution. in particular Biemel .

Husserl perceives the motif of " radical in­ vestigations of sense" within the "present condition of European sci­ ences . 5-6) . then history in general no longer risks being a distinct and dependent sector of a more radical phenomenology. as empirical science. that. that history-whose own content (contrary to that of the other material and dependent sciences) was. Embree (Evanston: N orth­ western University Press . had always been treated by preterition. The citations are from FTL. val uing. or if they are simply beyond history itself). original questions . 5.e. which could be considered as a criticism of reason in general . B iemel . Vol . to all intents and purposes . and direct manner: 1 . ed . we might be strongly tempted to see The Origin of Geometry (after taking into account the brevity of this sketch) only as the preface to a re-issue of Formal and Transcendental Logic. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff. If this teleological reading of history could not be characterized in Hus­ serl 's eyes by the dogmatic imprudence with which so many philoso­ phers (from Aristotle to Hegel to Brunschvicg) perceive in the past only the labored presentiment of their own thought. 4 (The H ague: N ijhoff. by non­ exemplariness-still lent itself to imaginary variations and to eidetic intuitions . This freeing of science with respect to its bases in the Lebenswelt and its founding subjective acts undoubtedly remains a necessary condition for its conquests. the commentary o f S uzanne Bachelard. which are also difficult ones. tr. it seems. dependent on phenomenology-which alone could reveal to it its fund of eidetic presuppositions (this dependence. th e earlier works . 1 969) . always marked by oneness and irreversibility. But this freeing also involves the threat of an objectivist alienation. frequently affirmed. M ." and put oneself in a position of responsibility for this sense starting from the total sense of our existence. pp. If. pp. A S tudy of Husserl' s Formal and Transcendental Logic . are most immediately assumed . on t he basis of which we can take o ur position toward actualities in j udging.r 30 Jacques Derrida 31 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry general (and we do not yet know whether the historicity of science and that of philosophy are examples or exceptions. Vol . " To meditate on or investigate the sense (besinnen) of origins is at the same time to: make oneself responsible (verantworten) for the sense (Sinn) of science and philosophy . 1 962]) is a very rich testimony to this. whose purpose simply would be adapted to a material ontology . nor the methods of the phenomenology of history were made the objects of specific . in Hllsserlia na . in the Cartesian Meditations. This confidence was supported by the system of apodictic certainties of phenomenology it­ self. . Instead of seeing it as a prolongation of the Crisis. signaled rather than explored) . and 9 . In his Introduction to that work. xxxii i-l i i i . i.9 2 . has simulta­ neously ruined the "great belief" of the sciences and philosophy in themselves : it has made our world "unintelligible. by radical sense . Lester E. But it is in The Origin of Geometry and in the short fragments of the same period that these ambitions. U That. its original techniques and attitudes. The recent publ ication by Walter B i emel of the Lectures of 1 925 and of appended texts devoted to Phiinomenologische Psychologie ( in Husserliana . that history. Vol . But this reading referred to that Idea only mediately. It was still necessary to show in a specific. ani­ mate th e Crisis and. and b) its sense for life and the possibility of being related to our whole world . 9 [The H ague: Nijhoff. whether they are the highest and most revelatory possibilities . Also cf.investigations . The same disquietude and the same will are underscored and ex­ pressed in rigorously identical terms from the first pages of The Origin J J 1 0 Formal and Transcendental Logic. certain eidetic content (for example. notably pp . for e xample . 2 . the history of the geometrical eidetic is exemplary. and acting" (FTL. No doubt these three ambitions. 11 " We m u s t place oursel ves above this whole life and all t h i s cultural tradition and . as Husserl affirms. bring this sense to the clarity of its "fulfil[ment]. which is also a technicization and supposes the "naivete of a higher level" of an investigator become irresponsible. I I . p . We must be careful here: these ambitions are only served by already familiar themes which they orient in a new direction . it is because this reading referred to the very I dea of transcendental phenomenology-which is not itself a philosophical system . history in general no less completely engages phenomenology with all its possibilities and responsibilities. By remaining completely within a deter­ mined relativity. 3. whose relations with phenomenology have been most abundantly defined . in addition to the empirical and non-exemplary content of history. by virtue of its sense of being. . and in the th ird part of the Crisis . was not the case wi th psychology. 1 968) . was. seek for ourselves si ngly and in common the ultimate pos­ sibilities and necessities . 5-hereafter c i ted a s FTL . "10 But we know that for Husserl the critical significance of this situation results less from some epistemological conflict inherent in the internal development of these sciences than from a divorce between a) the theoretical and practical activity of the science in the very renown of its progress and success. that of geometry as the eidetic analysis of spatial nature) had itself been produced or revealed in a history which irreducibly inhabits its being-sense . notably in ldeen II [ldeen Zll einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Ph ilosophie . 1 95 2) ] . tf . like all empirical sciences. which conceals the in­ stituting origins and renders them strange and inaccessible to us. concrete. This occultation.

Quentin Lauer (N ew York : Harper and Row. pp. [At time s Derrida refers to the note s of Paul Ricoeur in his invaluable French translation. tr. h ides true N ature . 84. This statement also refers to the hierarchy of ontologies already elaborated in Ideas I. p p . With­ out being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-j ustification. § 9 . 3 . We should also remember that in Ideas I (§§72-75 . concerning geometrical science and mathematics in general . § 3 . a I /. p.147-hereafter c ited as " PR S " (cf. Part II. they fashioned extremely differentiated method s. . cf. and the . ] H ere formal ontology de sig­ nates formal logic "in the narrower sense " and "all the other disc ipline s whic h constitute the formal ' ma thesis universa lis ' (th u s arithmetic also. as the science of science. FTL. Materially deter­ mined ontologies are subordinated to formal ontology. also C. by a spiraling movement which is the major find of our text. tr. and 93). R. which treats the pure rules of Objectivity in general. On several occasions Husserl notes that he presupposes the constitution of the ideal objectivities1. the displace­ ment of ground. and all related investigations. in particular p p . W. ordine geometrico: " only th is axio � atic fou �dation lies even deeper than that of geometry and is called on to partici­ pate In the ultimate grounding even of geometrical knowledge" (CM. 82. 2: " the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times . Perhaps this is one of the reasons why later on H u sserl will hardly u se-yet without e xplicitl y questioning again-the definiti on of geometry as an eidetic science or as the material ontology of spatially extended . He has done this under at least three form s: 1 . theory of mu lti­ plicities) . 2 . " Our e mphasi s . 3 . are naturally directed first of all to what is essentially common to all possible sciences . Ideas I. was pract ically certai n. 6)? 1 2 The anteriority of Formal and Transcendental Logic in relation to the problems of origin for the other sciences has a systematic and juridical significance. p. Boyce Gibson ( 1 93 1 . Husserl also specifies in Formal and Transcendental Logic that this is only one path among others: "Other paths are possible for sense­ investigations with a radical aim . and the present work attempts to open up. § 25 . one suggested by the historically given relation of the Idea of genuine science to logic as its antecendent norm" (FTL. 56-62 and 70-7 1 -hereafter cited as Ideas I. The phenomenon of "crisis.r 32 Jacques Derrida 33 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry And the question asked there appears at first sight to be only a specification of the general question begun and defined in Formal and Transcendental Logic. pp . con­ cerning the possible sense and possible method of genuine science as such. 84: there geometry and kinematic s (which Hu sserI always associates with geometry in the Crisis and in the Origin) are al so defined as " pure mathematical . FTL . p. Ideas I. 1 950) . natural things . Hu sser! has prin­ cipally and most often defi ned this Umkehrung as the falsification of sense . the model of exact science . p. In a certain sense . a definition often proposed as an e xample up to Ideas I. ET. Husserr s emphasis) .. of logic and language in 1-1 1� 1 :1 o Geometry. it is truly necessary to see that this order of dependence is not reversed. n . p. rpt. Is it not a question here of applying a general project whose program had already been organized to a singular and dependent science? Did not Husserl write: "These investigations. whose fruitfulness.1 O . 58-59 . 1 7 . note 2 . which is always presented as the general theory of science. it is true . and that consequently geometry is an ontological discipline relating to an essential ph ase of sllch thinghood (Dingl ichkeit). Geometry . on account of both geometrical ex­ actitude and deductivity . p . 15 0n the translation of Gegenstiindlichkeit b y objectivity [FT: objectite (and Objektivitiit or objectivite by Objectivity)] . § § 8. . Tome I: Introduction J?enerale a la phenom enologie pu re (Pari s: Gal limard. Idees directrices pOllr line phenomenologie et line philosophie ph e­ nomenologique pures . On the " di rective" character of logic . • � i Cf. �t least in. is responsible for the naturalization of the psychic sphere-a fact that was pointed out in the first part of " Ph ilosophy as Rigorous Science . . main sections. 57 [modified] . Also . the spatial form " ( H u sserI ' s emphasis ) . 3 . has precisely the sense of this type of " rever­ sal" ( Umkehrung) . we will be led to ju stify them in the cou rse of this Introd uction. dogmatically received. tr. al so cf. Of course the notion of objectiv ity here is not in any sense tied to Schopenhauer' s concept of Objektitiit . i s what impelled Descartes t o cover over again the transcendental motif that h e had ingeni­ ou � ly broug�t to l ight . They should be followed secondarily by corre­ sponding sense-investigations for particular groups of sciences and single sciences" (ibid. 1 965) . I ii Cf. the ground for the mathemati­ zation of nature. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. §7 1 . [On matters of translation related to H usser! we have followed in the main the suggestions of Dorion Cairns in Guide f Translating or Hlisser! (The H ague : N ijhoff. 1:3 N ow geometry is a material on­ tology whose object is determined as the spatiality of the thing belong­ ing to Nature. 8) . but whose productivity (Leistung) was not clarified by ultimate insight . This necessary anteriority first derives from the nature of traditional logic. We will refer to th is translation as Idees . " Ideas I. pp. material" disciplines . 1 85-9 3 ) Husser! de­ no�nces the absurdity of geometrizing l i ved experience. " in Phenomenology and the Crisis ofPhilosophy. Also cf. and the forgetting of origins . 1 8. the whole Crisis tends to show how geometry . The sciences made themselve s independent . pp. Final l y . 1 8 1 -82. The geometrical ideal (or that o f mathematical physics). the correlative constitution of intersubjectivity. p. the French translation of FTL. and philosophy IS transformed i nto a deductive system . p. The certitude of the cogito becomes the axiomatic ground . � oreover. f general. The fact that every dimension of The Origin of Geometry accentuates this dependence and this relative superficiality of description will thus be explained. " as forgetfulness of origins. New York: Collier Books. 7 . 7 1 . But while completely justifying the priority of his refl ections on logic . 1� " I t is clearl y realized that it is the essence of a material th ing to be a res extensa. 1 962) . in particular § 2 1 . pure analysis. ] As for translations whic h we have had to do . 1 973) . cf.

p.20 If. a sense­ investigation of its conditions of possibility will reveal to us exemplarily the conditions and sense of the historicity of science in general. and rather intricate methodological precautions in the first pages. diverse . but so is a certain second reflection on constituted geometry. § 9 h .' I' . For Galileo-whose name here is the exemplary index of an attitude and a moment. studied geometry . " 2. pregiven to Galileo as an old tradition" (C. a very important place is reserved for IX Natu rall y . Provided the notion of history is conceived in a new sense. the architectonic relations evoked a moment ago are complicated. ' pure geometry . we are not interested here in " the manner of being which the sense [of geometry] had in [Galileo' s] thinking. or. . 1 7 The attitude taken. 1 57 in Appendi x . Consequently. as done here . only on a psychol­ ogy or history of cognition. " (ibid. in the Crisis. a more exact historical analysi s would have to take account of how much of his thought he owed to his predecessors. § 9b . w as no longer original geome try: in this sort of ' intuitiveness ' it was already empty of its sense" (ibid. §9b. ' ( I shall continue . . It is in the midst of these difficulties and with extreme prudence that Husserl tries to make his purpose understood in The Origin of II Hu sserl takes numerous. The required attitude is no longer that of the classic epistemologist who. The Crisis always echoed this . they would only inform us about the factual rootedness of truth in a historical or psychological milieu of fact. §9 1 . does it command the attention of the author of the Crisis .. I have linked all ou r considerations to h i s name [Gali leo' s] . but it would teach us nothing about the truth of geometry and its sense of origin . and for good reasons. this history and psychology escaped what Husserl always sus­ pected. the latter depends. Besides. H usserl' s emphasis) . further. "There is no need for [the question of the origin] in the attitude of the geometer: one has. . C . Despite the value which would be attached to such an approach. ). however critical . one ' understands' geometrical concepts and propositions. . . " marks the birth of a cri sis in the sc iences and in philoso­ phy . No geometrizing activity as such. 29) . In other words. within a kind of horizontal and ahistoric cut. already broadly applied not only to the earth but also i n astronomy" (ibid . reflection does not work upon or within geometry itself as "ready-made. IX 1 !1 Cf. p . "the relatively advanced geometry known to Galileo . rather than a proper name19-was already an inheritor of geometry. if not inverted. 2 8) . then of universal historicity-the last horizon for all sense and Objectivity in general. the sense of the geometrical tradition ' s origin was already lost: "Galileo was himself an heir in respect to pure geometry . It is a question of repeating an origin. 57: . opening the w a y for objectivism by making mathematized Nature an " in itself. handed-down" ( 1 57) . after all. prov i ng . three confusions again lie in wait for us: A) In the first place. The inherited g eometry. is not that of a geometer: the latter has at his disposal an already given system of truths that he supposes or utilizes in his geometrizing activity. the inherited manner of ' intuitive' conceptual izing . ' the pure mathematics of spatiotemporal shapes in general. 24) . No doubt this rootedness may be accessi­ ble to a descriptive phenomenology which would respect all its original­ ity. notably that of . then . all without disturbing or shaking [sollicitee ] geometry in its buried sense of origin. For Galileo. Hereafter all reference s t o the Origin will be placed in parentheses . Not only are the intelligence and the practice of geometry always possible and ocasionally profound and creative. in the best hypothesis. even if they did not reduce the normativity of ideal objects and geometrical truth to the empirical facts of lived experience. p. But if we leave the actual or virtual givens of the received geo'11etry. incidentally. Both these attitudes would depend on what Husserl had defined in Formal and Transcendental Logic and recalled in the Crisis as a " naivete of a priori self-evidence that keeps every normal geometrical project in motion" (C. the question posed must be understood in its most historic resonance . they indicate the addition of the translator . 1 . Concerning the intentional history of a particular eidetic science. §9a. is 1 7 The Origin of Geometry. . if it were still necessary. i n a similar fashion . [When placed in brackets . p. . can return to a point short of that ' 'familiarity. and if we then come to history ' s vertical dimension . i n a certain sense simplifying and idealizing the matter. here "geometry " serves in an exemp lary way t o de signate mathematics and even l@gic in general . constructing. then. A ll the more . This would demonstrate ." or " in that of all the late inheritors of the older geometric knowledge" ( 1 57 [modified]). 34 Jacques Derrida 35 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry Geometry. would study the systematic structure of geometrical science or of variou s geometries. ) " " 20 What Galileo inaugurated . And even if.. p. p . H usserl already insists a great deal on the secondary character of Galileo' s revoluti on and on the scientific heritage that i t supposed . . ] familiar with methods of operation as ways of dealing with precisely defined structures . bold clearing is brought about within the regional limits of the investiga­ tion and transgresses them toward a new form of radicality . at what point the juridical order of implications is not so linear and how difficult it is to recognize the starting point. . 49 [mod ified] . by virtue of their descriptive style . at his disposal are possibilities of new axiomatizations which (even with their problems and difficul­ ties) already are announced as geometrical possibilities .

which is never questioned for or in itself. assu mes one of the three fol low­ ing significations. 29) .e .) " First" (erste) nearly always designates in H u sserl either an undetermined primacy. as well as i nvestigations like that of the Origin . sensible world and its practical arts) or to occupy himself 21 " It was a fateful omission that Galileo d id not inquire in return as to the original sense-bestowing production which. indeed of fundamental importance. The question of origin will not be a "philological-historical . . We must reduce the very remarkableness of the Galilean naivete to free the question as to the origin of geometry. to make geometrical self-evidence-the ' how' of its origin-into a prob­ lem. p. was already an infinitization. with questions about the origins of apodictic. the first experiences. 5 5 . sometimes devalued as what makes origins and accumulated sense become dor­ mant . 299) . most often. o f the "apparen t " defeat o f reason . the first geometers who were in fact responsible 22 These sentences announce what follows in the Crisis. as idealization practiced on the original ground of all theoretical and practical l ife-the immediately i ntuited world (and here especially the empirically i ntuited world of bodies)-resulted in the geometrical ideal formations)" (C. it would only be a matter for the history of science in the classical sense to take stock of the already constituted contents of geometrical cognitions. " R evu e de Meraphysique et de Morale. 2. Arch-. has the inconsistent negati vity of the " non-essence" (das Unwesen).36 Jacques Derrida r I 37 Introduction t o the Origin of Geometry Galileo and his revolution (which Husserl situates at the origin of the modern spirit's perils). such an investigation can teach us nothing about the geometrical sense of the first geometrical acts. while invoking Galileo's blindness to the traditional space of his own adventure and designating his "fateful omission. an original factuality. too. " Z l Husserl announces very precisely the task that he will undertake a little later on in the Origin: " For Galileo. it will be of considerable interest to see how a shift of focus became urgent and how the 'origin' of knowledge had to become a major prob­ lem" (§9b. But then the possibility of a crisis of reason would disappear. the "fateful ness" o f t h i s "omission" o r negligence ( Versiiumnis ) . search" in the investigation of " particular propositions" ( 1 58) that the first geometers discovered or fonnulated. are conceived by H u sserl on the basis of o ne and the same latent i ntuition. 49 [modified ] ) . here the radicalist demand wants to undo the sedimentations upon which the enterprise of an infinite mathematization was based. then. was already at work. then . ] b) that of a radical ethico-philosophical fau lt : the bankruptcy of philosophical free­ dom and responsibil ity . an im penetrable destiny" (cf. For us.e . i. p. B) But if we return to a point this side of Galileo. is the question now one of studying for itself the heritage which was given to him? Not any more. Despite its incontestable inter­ est. after the reduction of all factuality . and Ur. therefore for all history . I lluminated by the teleology of Reason. And if in the Origin Husserl speaks of engaging himself " in reflec­ tions which surely never occurred to Galileo" ( 1 57) . a de facto chronological priority in constituted cosmic tim e . does not the return to them as an origin tie primordiality to a certain finitude? No simple response is possible to such a question. in particular of the first postulates. how it grew on the underlying basis of the pre­ geometrical. quite understandably. i t c eases to b e "an obscure fate . . the n egativity of which ought to be u nthinkable in itself. if one must return to the instituting sense of first acts. or. as he had said in the Crisis: " It did not enter the mind of a Galileo that it would ever become relevant. " Paul Ricoeur in his French translation of this text points out the literal translation as " non­ essence" : " La Crise de I ' humanite europeenne et la philosophie . it is not at all a question of determining what in fact were the firsf:l acts. " Philoso phy and the Crisis of E uropean H u manity . of the de jure. We will see that the infinite had already broken through . one which is thereby contingent in comparison with the sen se and teleology of reason. of an extrinsic necessity . it is because. 1 950) . i . Proto-. 3 (July-October. each varying according to text and context: a) that of an empirical n ecessity (on the order of individual or social p sychology as well as that of factual history ) . . as a branch of a universal knowledge of what is (philosophy) . It truly is a threatening val u e . C) Finally. § 9 h . devoted to the transcendental motif in post-Galilean philosoph y. e . In the Crisis. and thus. . mathematical self­ evidence" (C. This prescription in turn is sometime s valued as the condition of historicity and the progressive advent of reason. p. L i k e a l l forgetfu l ness i n general . theorems. did not feel the need to go into the manner in which the accomplishment of idealization originally arose (i. it is history itself that would be thought . proceeding beyond Galileo in our historical reflections. [pure geometry as tradition] was given-and of course he. to geometry. see note 1 49 below . c) that of an e idetic necessity: the necessity of sedimentation prescribed for all constitution and all traditionalization of sense . of ground. apparently irreducible t o one another. axioms. . There. §9b. For the relation of Ricoeur's translation and the English one . No. H istory itself is what this intuition announces. 29) .z Z If the Galilean discovery resides especially in a formalizing infinitiza­ tion of ancient mathematics. p. Even if we managed sim ultaneously and without contradiction to think the u nitary ground on the basis of which these three propositions can be received . p." A p­ pendix I in C. 258. and so forth. contents that must be explored and determined as precisely and as completely as possible from archeological documents. [The ET of das Unwesen offered by Carr is "disarray. when the first geometry began-that it.refer to phenomenological primordiality. I t is a matter of course that these three significations. This nece ssity . . to that of sense. It cannot even recognize and isolate those acts as such except by supposing that the primordial sense of geometry is already known .

pp. 268-69 : and eM. it would still leave us blind about the very sense of such a founding: a sense that is necessary and compared to which these facts have at best only an exemplary signification. Preface to 2nd ed. i s the very thing i n quest ion ." as Kant specifies. on the basis of the 'experience ' that gives them to us Kant's intention and that of Husserl. all these various kinds of inquiries we just dismissed have been caught up in the element of a constituted geometry. we do have experience of them as cultural formations given to us beforehand and bearing withi n them selves their mean i ng . which is nothing less than historical. like Husserl. I must already have a naive knowledge of geometry and must not begin at its origin. enjoys a methodological and rightful prior­ ity. pp.38 Jacques Derrida 39 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry I for the advent of geometry. In effect. Their object supposed or was confused with the results of a ready-made geometry that would have to be reduced in order to attain a consciou sness of its origin. 24 A r'u ndamental difference remains.25 Thus. and so forth .] . . Nevertheless. whose birth (or birth certificate) inscribes and prescribes omnitemporality and universality-not only for the opening of its possibility. a consciousness which was at the same time an intuition of its essence . Here the method ' s juridical necessity overlaps history's factual neces­ sity. one that is perhaps less easily distinguishable than would first be imagined. and § 1 02 . "he be called Thales or whatever one desires" (ibid. ' . would flatter our historical curiosity (and everything that Husserl attri­ butes to a certain " romanticism"). Such a determination. [The bracketed expression " of Good Hope " i s added in con­ formity to the Engl i sh translation of Norman Kemp Smith . . But even if. "whether. . 8-9 : " Thus we are presupposing the sciences. even though we know nothing of the first factual experience or the first geometer. Kant' s indifference to the factual origin (as well as to the content of the example-the isosceles triangle-concerning which he develops the implications of its discovery) is more immediately legitimate than Husserl's. x). Despite certain appearances. s ince the genuine sense of all sciences . this " revolution " which gave birth to mathematics out of some empirical " gropings" in the Egyptian tradition (Kritik der reinen Vernunft. We emphasize those Kantian express ions which are also among t h e most frequent i n The Origin of Geometry. In fact. in this case. Cf. Both the necessity to proceed from the fact of constituted science and the regression towards the nonempirical origins are at the same time conditions of possibility : such are . as we know. There must always already have been the fact of a history of geometry . Indeed . in its turn. . although it only has for its content ideal es­ sences. In other words. In a historical retrospection towards origins. At first this "revolution" is only a "revelation for" the first geometer.1 4 . . at its limit. Like Husserl. It is beforehand . ready-made geometry holds here in bulk the status of a fact which must be reduced in its factuality so that its sense can be read. For the inaugural mutation which interests Kant hands over geometry rather than creates it. . as well as logic itself. Nevertheless. But this question can be asked only secondarily and at the end of an itinerary which. p p . between 24 On the necessity of starting from existing sciences that are util ized as the thread guiding the transcendental regression. The sense of the first demonstration can be rigorously grasped. of names. "The history of this revolution. it sets free a possibil­ ity. the imperatives of every transcendental philosophy faced with something like the history of mathematics . xi) . Such empirical knowledge can justifiably pre­ sent itself as historical knowledge of things related to geometry only by supposing a fully developed clarity about the very sense of what is called the geometrical science. 1 3. so that the reduction can be performed . it would enrich our knowledge of empirical circumstances. whether sciences and logic be genu ine or spuriou s. in order to hand it to us. it is of little consequence for him that its " history" has "not reached" u s .). FTL. " was more "decisive" than the empirical discovery " of the path around the famous Cape [of Good Hope]" (ibid. our procedure seems not to be at all radical. p p . dates. . I ntrod . even if possible . Because of this. Kant also evokes this mutation or transformation ( Umiinderung). this means clarity about its sense of origin. . however. And here. philosophers of method are perhaps more profoundly sensitive to historicity. Kant is attentive to the historical dimension of apriori possibilities and to the original genesis of a truth. cf. But this reduction needs as its starting point the constituted result it neutralizes . 8-9 . 2 :. but also for each of its developments and for the totality of its becoming. even though they seem to re­ move digressions from history's path . this determination would embrace all the historical facts that have constituted the empirical milieu for truth's founding. p. The juridical priority of the question of phenomenologi­ cal origin is therefore absolute . their ' sense . the fact has the forgotten sense of the ready-made . " attributed to the "happy thought of a single man" in " an experiment from which the path that had to be taken must no longer be missed and from which the sure way of science was opened and prescribed (eingeschlagen und vorgezeichnet war) for all times and in endless expansion (fur aile Zeiten und in unendlich Weiten). § 3 . . he neutralizes the factual contents of this "revolution in the mode of thinking" with the same indifference. p. also o n thi s FTL.

2!1 Here all history can only be empirical. as a structure of apriori prescription. is abso­ lutely constitutive and creative: the objects or objectivities that it in­ tends did fWt exist before it. except by "formation . l ike all production (Erzeugung) in general . we have translated by "formation" the notion of Gebilde . protogeometer. for example the French translation of A. and not of a founding. it is not only less constricting. To be c lear on this. " to " a light dawns on" : "Dem ersten . It unfolds explicative gestures in the space of a possibility already open to the geometer. he must attribute to things (Sache) nothing but what necessarily followed from what he had put there himself in accordance with his concept" (ibid. Tremesaygues and B .) . as it were. And if there is a birth of geometry for Kant. that is. 27 Among all the translations already proposed for the notion of Leistung . At least it will be ready to be revealed in its initial concept. some­ thing can be said of it. Rather he must beget (hervor­ bringen) (its object) with the help of what he himself put into it and what a priori was represented in it through the concept (through construc­ tion). and this " before" of the ideal objectivity marks more than the chronological eve of a fact: it marks a trans­ cendental prehistory . Do not forget. that the de facto subject of such a "revelation" be " anyone at all. " : lO T h i s 2� The signification. the moment. " and that the geomet­ rical example serving as guide-the demonstration of the isosceles triangle-be indifferent. And to know something a priori with complete security. §6. in particular FTL. thus seems to uproot Kant ' s formalist apriorism from all concrete history and to inh ibit the theme of a transcendental history. 'material a prior i . Thus the spontaneous eidetic reduction which frees the geometrical essence from all empirical reality-that of sensible figuration as well as from the geometer's psychological lived experience-is for Kant always already done. as it concerns the ideal objects of mathematics. Critique de la raison pure (Paris : Presses U niversitaries de France . In the Kantian revelation. to deposits. The "construction" to which he gives himself. produced and grounded by the act of a concrete subject. as in the Origin . The level of geometry as a material ontology is precisely that of such a . And indeed it is an ideal history. I t also agrees with the geological metaphor which runs throughout t h e text.26 or in the bare concept of that same figure . . then geometry already will be on the point of being revealed to the consciousness of the first geometer. the 2H The Erdmann edition notes that hen10rbringen has no "object" in Kant' s text. and to substrata of sense are everywhere. it seems to be only the extrinsic circumstance for the emergence of a truth (which is itself always already constituted for any factual consciousness). dem ging ein Licht auf" (ibid. is only the explication of an already constituted concept that he encounters. that concept whose apriori Objectivity will presently strike any subject whatever with geometrical insight [lumiere ] . But it is the history of an operation. On the notion of the contingent a priori. and the activity of the geometer to which the " happy thought" occurred is only the empirical unfolding of a profound reception. "he discovered that he must not follow the trace of what he saw in the figure 26 Cf. the first geometer merely becomes conscious that it suffices for his mathematical activity to remain within a concept that it already pos­ sesses . Gestalt. namel y . There again. constitutes the "over against us" of Objectivity. Pacaud . as such . What is most often translated by "revelation" is the allusion to " a light that is given . the synthesis of the " construc­ tion" is irreducible. the notion of formation seemed the least foreign to th is virtual X ) . such as Husserl defined it. the word "production" seemed to overlay most properly all the significations that Husserl recognizes in this act that he also designates by some com­ plementary notions: pro-duetion . p . which appears so often in the Origin . then. furthermore. Of course . p. " Each time BiLdung has th is active sense . Contrary to its synthetic explication. . die Bildung . and so on. a creation (Sehopfung) and an act of formation (Bildung. but also de jure necessary. cf. 1 950) . but not about geometry in the act of being instituted. Undoubtedly. and which teaches us about the sense of ready-made geometry as such. to stages. Husserl's production (Leistung) 2 7 also involves a stratum of receptive intuition . we are authorized to pay such attention to these Kantian expressions only by the confirmation that all of Kant' s philosophy seems to give them . And since Kant is in­ terested in the possibility of geometry for a subject in general. from which comes ideal objectivity as Gebilde.:w Strictly speaking. But what matters here is that this Husser­ lian intuition. and which up to now has been very diversely translated . so frequently u tilized in the Origin. pp. " For." as Kant says. . could not be historical . 21' No doubt. to strata. but this bringing to light is also. The very vague character of the word "formation" seemed to us to suit the indetermination of H u sserl ' s notion. which leads to the l ight . o f the whole o f Kant' s transcendental analysis. that in German Bildung also carries the general sense of culture .40 Jacques Derrida 41 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry not produced by him. 29-30. 1 7. seems true. where allusions to sedimentation. It is understood under a dative category. . who is not. in himself-a description which no doubt for Husserl as well would be true of every noncreative geometrical act. Gestaltung). The moment geometry is established as such . The apriori nature of that concept within which we operate precludes all historical investigation whatever about its sub­ ject matter. Erzeugnis. because it is not. the primally instituting (urstiftende) geometer. But we were also unable to designate the act which engenders das Gebilde. once the geometrical concept has revealed its freedom with respect to empirical sensibility. on the contrary . we will insert the German word between parenthese s . finally (an d this i s especially important here). absence of the decisive notion of " material" or " contingent" a prior i . the concept itself.

§25 . . E lveto n. religion . a . sciences of an essentially new type .34 Geometry's truth." before cal co�cep ts before and this side of the Kan pure and exact space and and this side of the con stitu tion of an ideallyed by the act of a concrete time . every ideal objectiv ity has n If we know noth mg of alre ady ann oun ced in that con sciousness. if the levels of explication and the senses of the word "history" had not been clearly distinguished. empo hy of Edm und Huss erl and Cont IS "The Phen omen olog ical Phi losop erl. and p. §56. . our emphasis) . the que stion is " provisionally" left open whether they are " natural sc iences or . works of the tec hn ical and of the fine arts. i t is a s facts and not a s norms that the hi storical gIven s are pa­ renthes ized . n. . its failur e . in particular Ideas I. Natural in the same sense are also realitie s of such kind s of state . who se correlat tory . and all history was "red retat io� pro �� sed gh a different approach . resp ect to emp irica l knowledge is moree diffithe productIon ?f geometn­ In fact . 1 55 [modified]) . Concerning the human sc iences. undergo s uspension as sciences which require for their deve lop­ ment the natural standpoint" (Ideas I. ' which sciences' " can phenomenology " ' draw from ' " insofar as phenomenology is itself "a science of ' origins . ' " and what sciences mu st it .:l:! and his free dom � Ith Bus serl ' s task is thus all the more hazardocult to just �fY at first sIgh� . 7 3. law . whI ch t�e �hole of of a protohis . and through direct analyses determine their immanent sense. ThIs hI �tOry found history has already created nonemp that th� theor� of Idea l . rem ains hidd en for Kant. 45. its normative value. a protogeomet e pos ible a� d nece ss �ry � ing on protogeometry ." p. [The abov e quote ed .:�y wou �d be . 1 26) . with the entire knowledge they have accumulated . Since every ideal obje ctiv ity is product for a tr�ns� endental con scio usne ss (the only starting poin a h �story whIch IS a� way s phenomeno logy ). Therewith all the natural and human sciences. Cf.1 47 . of the sc iences also (so far as we accept them as cultural fa cts and not as validity-system s) [our emphasis]. " O f course . ' not depend on : " H usser! writes: " In the first place it goes without say ing that with the su spending of the natural world . . It may well be that we have inherited dispositions for cognition from the cognitions of past generations. § 1 . this history of geometry had remained in the dark and was judged of doubtful possibil­ ity or mediocre interest for the phenomenologist or mathematician as such . we should enter vi­ tally into these activities. pp . :n This notion ry even whI le mvo kmg Kantian phil osophy seem s to make contrad icto .] . . 46. conc by Fink and appr oved by H usse rl d.geom t�s mdifference to by the nature Kan a " scarcely altered" conventional PlatonIs m. I :\4 Cf. the history of this heritage is as indiff erent as is that of our gold currency to its real value " (Ideas 1. 1 24-26. stituted subj ect. us. Kant had to confine his tran scene was ther fore�Itse lf a con­ � of ideal con stitu ted objects. Thus : " Certainly the mathematician too will not turn to historical science to be taught about the truth of mathematical theories . is radically independent of its history which. m :\. 95. O .. . Thus. e� t that a �or� pro­ the mom emp irical history is only legitimated from irical objects. I . it is always already mad etnc l �bJ �ct. Cf. birth be in �c ribed wi t� in the that the reference to a h istor ical . eve . :u H usser l often stres ses the KnS1 S.42 Jacques Derrida 43 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry himself resp onsi ble for it reduction is not for or by a subj ect who makes er or phil osopher reflect­ in a transcendental adventure. physical and psychological. . Eug�� f tigat ion of the " origin o the worl comp ared with H u sserl ' s inves rary Cntl cl sm . Barnng of geometrical space and the . . the i nterp Here we find. at the end of criticizing an empiricist theory of the origin of geometry: " Instead of philosophizing and psychologizing about geometrical thought and intuition from an outside standpoint. In asking himse lf." in particular pp. the definitions of history as an empirical human science in " PRS . is considered only as a factual history falling under the stroke of the suspension (Ausscha ltu ng) . but for the question concerning the sense and value of what we cognize.we now wonder abo ut the sens of tian " reve lation. at this moment of Busserl' s itinerary . Or again. It will not occur to him to relate the historical development of mathe­ matical representations [the German and French editions add: and judgments] with the question of truth" ("PRS . loca lly and throu e Kan tlan c ntl que ernin g the intraworl dline ss of t . would be in flagrant contradiction with those of the Origin . . all indiv idual objectivi­ ties which are constituted through the functional ac tivities of consc iousness in valuation and in practice are suspended-all varieties of cultural expression. . where both historical origin and history as a human science are excluded . 85-86 [modified] . it ' beco mes Bus serl' s theme . tion ? If space and time were transcendental real a histonc ist emp Inc�1 ed both for an ahistoric metaph ysic s and for always denounced m open Kant science two interrelated poss ibili ties that irici sm from the start and at avo id emp one and the sam e mov e. pp. p. found o n p. 35 HusserI says this (in the period of " Philosophy as Rigorous Science" and Ideas l) in some frank phrases which . aesthetic and practical values of e very shape and form . d its determined content .:l:l method ological or con stitu tive analyse s rem �meor Up to Ideas I the uced" as factualI ty stnictural and static. Can we not say here�e bnn gmg to lIght of an and time both requires and �upp ress es t nces of spac e and mo­ spac e intr insic and nonempirical historicIty of the SCIe itie � . ' ' t'Ion . moral custom . p. can only be mea sure d by vigilance m th IS Kant mn " I Iml't a : \ 2 Perh aps the dept h of its diffic ulty. The Phenomenology of Huss in R. � �m� : . But to dental disc ours to a world any price . espe c ially in Beilage XXV I sense itself of every cultu ral ideal :\1 science of constituted and intraworIdly factuality. I ity. 503-07. pp .

e. 3 0 1 -02 means the first volume. In the Theaetetus ( 1 90b). the s ection number." though not phantasy realities--even if hallucination reveals them as such) : if. factual history must be reduc ed in order � then the normative indep endence of the ideal object in its own right in or logici st confu sion. 30 1 -02) where he recalls the Cartesian dlstmctlon between imaginatio and intellectio concerning the chiliagon and very precisely an­ nounces the theory of geometrical " idealization" that he wil l maintain in the Origin . are f or. pp. H usserl . But his exper s just as little groun dfor his seeing produces. 1 84 [modified]) . no factual [evenemen it with stood stituting sense . with situating geometry esis) was pure essential sciences. as the � arteslan analYSIS before the hypothesis of the Evil Demon in the First Meditation : "At thl s rate we might be justified in concluding that . in them no f positings o actua lfact . qua consciousness over the function of sets up reality or factual existence . by thus avoid ing all histor icist ideal objec t order to respe ct and show the uniqu e historicity of thewill never be factual history itself. Whether or not he thereby hallu s his lines andfigures in a instead of actua lly drawing lines he draw scientific inves tigator of f world o phantasy. that apprehends or experience qua experience . L/. in all their thought-construction s. serl's emphasis) :n :lfi The essential uselessness or the " inadequacy" of sens ible " illustration" i s already u nderscored in the Logical Investigations. 2 vols. KantJan sense . a reductIon which pertains to the sense of these sciences. mstttutmg acts ( Urstiftung) . [ A ll future references w i11 list the volume number. . with respo nding to the kind of histo ricism which reduced on among the in an exemplary fashi and Ideas I. pure There are pure sciences of essen ces . .. can take functions in them . Descartes' God. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach (New York: Bobbs-Merril l . what comes to the same thing. This is becau se " Philosophy as Rigorous Science" was concerned norm to fact. a:OIdmg m plnclsm . whIch treat only of the simplest and most general subject-matter. a fal sification of which Hegel accused Kant and Fichte .re the hypothesis of hallucination takes up the role assigned . and only then. " one simply reduces what is indicated in this sense as what cannot presently be retained by virtue of this ground . to fiction in generaL "the vital element of phe­ nomenology" (Ideas /.' the eidos and the ideal object do not preexist every subjective act. of mathematIcal sense by hallucination. I 970)-hereafter c ited as L/. HusNature beha ves quite differently . p. Since no existential thesis (Daseinsth from all were imme diately freed nece ssary or permitted . . 7 : . For Descartes. tr. and whether production itself. tr. . and so . woul funct on as the necessary reduction of empirical history and the natural world . . pure time-theory. two and three add up to five .he ?ther hand. ot ?nly th moraltty but also the historicity of truth itself would here prevent this . ET: In Descartes: Philosophical Writings. the investigation number or Prologomena. . The p. despite this extraordinary revolution which grounds the absolute a d eternal truth without the aid of God or infinite Reason. g. on t. which is always already at . mathematics. pp. Husserl is less distant from Descartes than it seem s . Whether I am a wake or asle�p . First Investigation . § 1 8 . §70. . . No sensi ble figuration in the real world . § 1 8 . I . � tself. in eIdetIC determination. experience . only after this phenomenology of mathematical evidence and with the hypothesis of the Evil Demon will the critical or juridical question be posed of the ground that guarantees the truth of naive ev idence . level . . it supplying a logical grounding. qua experience .tarting from an analysis of the mathematical " phenomenon: ' or in order to better Isolate ItS " sense . as m a [conventional] Platonism. The geometrical eidos is recognized in that the test of hallu cination: . (Ideas I. He. geometry. That is why these first reductions of remo ved in the Origin -even less so than elsewhere. S. f lslficatton of the actual infinite into an indefinite or an a d infinitum . . p. themsel ves historical. It is true that this infinite. whose mode of appearing is thus c learly recogmzed. Plato had recourse to dream. does not really matter. 1 97 1 ). H usserl measures the eidetic intangib il ity . they must be primordially grounded m � the protoidealizations based on the substrate of an actually per­ � eIve � real world. §7. would only be the name given to a h idden h istory and . see s ImpOSSIble for such obvious truths to fall under a suspicion of being false " [par. moreover. � � � � � � �? � � � � �� � � �� � This autonomy of mathematical truth compared to perception and natural reality (on which mathematical truth could not be based) is described here only in a negative way . space-theory. Non-dependence is what is stressed. IS not a positive and actual infinite . J . and are i ndifferent whether it exists in nature or not. N . But we will see that. does this in a passage (LI. such as pure theory of move ment . 63] . have an element of indubitable certainty . and the page : e . work In the ongms. afford the physical act of and thinking of the geometrica l essence as does cinates.e . arithmetic. The geometer who draws his figure s on the is not as experience are actua lly there on a blackboard produ ces in so doing strokes that f ience o what he thus board that is actua lly there . In this re spect. . i . I f logic . afte an analogous descriptive stage . they must be related to. 1. The de scription itself and the " natural" validity of t is tru th . � � u sserl . I . if then they have a his­ �ory. F indlay . like at of the gre at assic rationalists. and it . as a regulative . and a square has onl y four sides. these sciences a6 ological factu ality. I . Where experience . But if hallucination does not undermine the eidos of the constituted ideal object (because the eidos in general and the ideal object in particular are " irreal . and wh ich seem s thu s to dlsclo se (and e escend toward) a primordially inst ituted finitude while completely . mal hIstOry. This hidden ? Ist ry WIll take its sense from an infinite Telos that H usserl will not hesitate to call God m hiS l ast unp b l ished writings. Huss �r\ ' s devel opment is also situated on the same plane and dons the same style . But they must do this through the element of an orig. 55 [modified ]. i. It is given as an I dea in the . wil l never be put into que stion on their own specific . will investigate th is in primally . no psych any in­ tiel] content have as such .44 Jacques Derrida 45 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry rk­ The conti nuity and coherence of these observations are truly rema to respect and show able: first. (New York : H umanities Press. The positive ground of truth is not investigated for :l i � � � . . The pn ordlal round of these constituted truths. ree throughout from any These . . etc . WIll be delegated to a veracious God who is also the creator of eternal rut s . on. indefinite" whose negativity gives up its rights to history . etc .

this definition of phenomenological origin ( in distinction to genesis in the worldly human and natural sciences) was already clearly specified in the LI. Here . "for the first time" (erstmalig). : I ndiana U niversity Press. §67. the return to the " 'technical and economic forms of production" (namel y . where the de facto IS . 197 1 ). starting from a "first acquisition" (aus einem ersten Erwerben) ( 1 58-59) . Prol. i n FTL. 1 97 1 ) . or not. 1 973)-hereafter cited as EJ­ particularly § 1 . . The indissociability itself has a rigorously determinable phenomenological sense. This d istinction. Even were it unique and buried. t �en. of Landgrebe by James S. � r. not a singular fact-one for which we should not be able to substitute another fact as an example in order to decipher its essence? Is this to say that this inseparability of fact and sense in the oneness of an instituting act precludes access for phenomenology to all history and to the pure eidos of a forever submerged origin? Not at all. in the eM. 220). we must return. he return to real. who thmk H usserl was h imself " obscurely" resigned to this at the tme of The Orzgm ofG� 0m. is strongly oriented t ward thIs kmd f a conclu sion . on the contrary. de jure as well as de facto. and return to a constItu­ tive history.table to that a t or. The historical reduction.mdlssoclable from � he �e jure. for Husserl. The imaginary variation of static phe­ nomenology simply supposed a type of reduction whose style will have to be renewed in a historical phenomenology. Indeed . the irreducibility of a here and now-the total fact marking geometry's establishment would be invariable. is truth' s accomplice only in a st�tic w. in The Phenomenology of Internal Tim e-Consciousness. starting from the real world. I nd . in particular § 1 02. §37. New York: Gordon and Breach . the here and now of the " first time" is institutive and creative. WIth dl lectIcal empiricist historicism to the reductIOn. a history in which the consideration of fac �s thems� lves would become indispensable. fatal . This invariance of the fact (of what can never be re­ peated as such) would de jure c� rry ov er its eidetic � nvariance �� hat . 227-28). To proceed to the ground and pnmordtal con­ stitution of truth. 27-28 . ctually real ature which implies in its development the whole movement of subjectiVity (the author s em:lH � � � � �� � � � the pure phenomenological sense that Husserl so doggedly distinguished : Because. was search109 10 the famous fragment on The Origin of Geometry to ground geo etncal truth on hum n praxis " (p. Thus only at the level and point marked by Ideas I doe� Husserl rejoin Kant' s indifference to a kind of history th� t would sImply be extrinsic and empirical . pp. History as institutive would be the profou �d ar� a w�ere sense IS mdls­ sociable from being. there­ fore invariable . 269. We recognize." p p . as smgu­ lar historical origin. rpt. Churchill and Karl Ameriks ( Evanston : Northwe stern U niversity Press. the instituting fact would be irreplaceable. (and Imagma� l �n in general) is not directly perception. invariance.:lH because here for the first tIme. Instead of repeating the constituted sense of an ideal object. James S . 39 Opening Ideas I (Chapter 1 . § l a. t� at !or the sphere of sense. 1 15. H usserl ' s reduction never had the sense (quite the contrary) of a negatIon-of �n ignorance or a forgetfulnes s that would ' ' leave" the real conditions of sense and factualIty in general in order to " come back" or not. . tf. § 2 . was not its institutor . 45.t e . p. w ill still be u nderscored quite frequently in Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic.1 6 . p p . the materialism "we find ourselves on a plane subsequent {posterieur] latter havin suppressed the abstract conception of nature but ot . and determining its evidence. . pp . Churchill ( B loomington. 2 2 1 ) .s pre­ liminary stage. it has the characteristic which defines fact­ namely. as soon as Husserl s account be � omes concerned with the genesis of geometry and getting beyon� thl. as we have seen. and it would only be a question of clarifying. and of course in the Origin. Phenomenologie et materialisme di� le�tique ( 195 1 . . p. to an Otherwise . creative experience. Also. then. p.real analysis [of what is] (for sense is nothing �ther thQ1� the se�se of realIty o of fa ualIt�). That does not appear to be the case. to th� . 237-3 8 . this i s what Husserl was obscurely presenting when he . and objective inde­ pendence. which H usserl will always j udge a s deci sive. . to a . At the end of Hu sser\ ' s itinerary . isolating. It IS the consciousness of historicity and the reawakemng of ongms . factual. and the r tu . The notion of "origin" or genesis could no longer be recogmzed m The interpretatio n of Trfm-Duc-T hao. But what authorized the essential reading of and within constituted geometry was the possibility of imaginatively varying the natural here and now of the figure or the psychological experience of the geometer who . Husserl says that the upsurge of geometry interests him here insofar as it had taken place " once" (dereinst). in Husserlian langu ge . " The phenomenolo gical explication is thus onented towards determmi ng the actual conditions in which truth is engendered" (p . I . will be reactivating and noetic. . pp. passage already cited). The eidetic aspect of this reduction was the iteration of a noema: since the eidos is constituted and objective. ed. his reduction might seem vam and dIssemblIng . can be repeated voluntarily and mdefimtely) mto a hIstory of �r�gl �s.refer. . one will have to reawaken the dependence of . unique of its kind . the series of acts which intended it could not but in­ definitely restore the ideal identity of a sense which was not obscured by any historical opacity. " Moreover. 75-76. tf. in order to " pass on" . since . w � �� � � � � � � � � phasis. from rev . Is this experience . Martin H eidegger.and extrinsic causality outside of every reduction) seems mevI.orld of constituted significations . this expenence remains. and i n " PRS . singular and empirical existence. etry. which also operates by variation. ed. the true contrary of h �l1ucination. 1 1 .46 Jacques Derrida 47 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry Hallucination. we might expect to see him remove the eIdetIC �nd transcendental reductions purely and simply. but history . If youy. first.

by �em� not�mg other than the fact itself (this is the thesis of the non-fictive Irreahty ?f the essence).). p. Undoubtedly. can be considered in certain respects as the most concrete and most independent. "for [the phenomenological subsumption]. to guide and control the intuition of the ultimate material essence. this is a double necessity : it is that of a Quod and a Quomodo. But inversely. as Ricoeur notes. then their history is the most independent. We saId. is not the factuality of fact but the sense of fact-th �t w�thout which the fact could not appear and give rise to any determm�tIon or discourse . Phenomenology can recognize WIth ? bJectlve validity only essences and essential relations" (p. The problem of dependence or independence. the theme of eidetic singularities is already ticklish enough in Ideas I .-l 1 Their histori� ity. whatever ItS de facto example may be . 330. since the clue there is the immanent lived experience or the sensible thing perceived originaliter. I deal geometncal objects cannot have their original place in some topos ouranios . 40 an inaugural signification that is always reproducible. whose empiricalfact is never imme­ diately present. p. there is an essence-of-the-first-time in general. an Erstmalig�eit. Indeed. I can state this value of necessity independently of all factual cognition . Moreover. �he sin�ula� IS eternally the apeiron . and the first of sciences. Already. " They [the significat�on�] are not for t h a� reas�n objects which. who also italicizes erstmalig (p. t�en. although reduced. e . It marks the possibility of a recurrent structural determination in the absence . i 40 In its substantive form . the tode ti of brute existence . concerning a past is frequently utilized in the Origin . as Husserl says. 62-63 and 66-69) as ultimate material essences WhICh. 1 . § 3 1 . a moment ago. a necessity of having had a historical origin and of having had such an origin. of the abstract or concrete character of these eidetic singularities. pp. It could be said that the eidetic phenomenology of history. There Husserl completely condem�s i n a �latonic manner those who. 1 1 6 [mod!fi �d]).e. and he simultaneously rejects the hypothesis of the intelligible heaven. singular factuality is always present. only 'factual­ ity' " (Idees I. in particular I ." can "understand by 'bemg. was present as the tradition of millennia . . we inquire into that sense in which it appeared in history for the first time-in which it must have appeared [our emphasis]. ' our interest shall be the inquiry back into the most original sense in which geometry once arose. . A doctrine of tradition as the ether of historical perception then becomes necessary: it is at the center of The Origin of Geometry. though existing nowhere in the world. he evidently understood by singularity only the oneness of fact � n ItS pure factuality and not that of the eidetic singularities defined m Ide� s I (§§ 1 1 . such a sense of origin.�h does �ot necessarily implicate in itself the reference to an Er� tmaltgkelf.dtal �ct which created the object whose eidos is determined by the IteratIve reduction . But only If other IS m � ant to qualify essence and not empirical existe�ce as su �h . 239 . (Sem) �nlY · reaI bemg. having to treat only singularities as such . 203-225: Fink. Here again we are going to see that there is no simple re­ sponse to the question of the priority of one reduction over another: The singularity of the invariable first time already has a necessIty whose eidetic fund is indeed rather complex. like the " sons of the earth. had an origin and thus has appeared a first time . However. have bemg m a top �� ouramos or m a divine mind. this notion does not seem to have been employed b� Husserl himself. in particular. where he dIscussed a. is really more difficuH to solve when it concerns historical singularities. exclude " only empirical individuality .IS one of theIr . 41 Cf. " of apriori requisite. "being" in the world of natural reality. that it would be impossible to S ubst tute . the most con­ crete. posed in Ideas I from the notions of the Third Logical I nvestigation . . under secondary passiv ities and infinite sedimentations--a pnmor. But an irreducible historicity is recognized in that this " must" is announced only after the fact of the eventY I could not define the necessary sense and the necessity of the �� Th is notion of " mu st . For � umque fact already has its essence as unique fact WhICh. eidetic components.48 Jacques Derrida 49 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry sense with respect to an inaugural and institutive act con� ealed . Here. 1 of tr. is in one sense the most dependent and the most abstract of sciences. " 1. even though we know nothing of the first creators and are not even asking after them" ( 1 58 [modified]) . the investigation of origins no longer proceeds in this way . . 1 4 . it is apodictically and a priori necessary that geome� ry has. speaks of Erstamaligke �tsmo �us [po 208] and thus gives a thematic value to a signification aimed at by a profound mtentIon of Husserl. and there is no concrete histoncity :vhI. . 207). 1 5 . Hus�erl already emphasized this in the Logical Investigations. . This "must " (have appeared) marks the necessity now recognized and timelessly assigned to a past fact of an eidetic pre-scription and of an apriori norm .anothe� fact for the unique fact of thefirst time . pp. n. when Husserl wrote in " Philosophy as Rigoro� s Science" that. Only under these conditions can Husserl write: . the "in which it must have appeared" clearly reveals Husserl's intention and sums up the sense of every reduction. It is found in place of the adverbial expression erstmalig in the transcnpt of the Origin published by Fink in Revue Internationale de Ph ilosophie ( 1 939). for such metaphysical hypostatization would be absurd . But as soon as historical distance is inter­ posed.ll ideal significations and objects. of the possibilities of science and of philosophy. since the singularities of origins are those of instituting acts of every ideal signification and . Whatever were the empirical content of the origin. i. First. since certain nonempirical singularities.

and Professor Derrida h imself does not remember from what it is taken. a notion no doubt current enough . Absolutely free with respect to what it governs. in their exemplary web. Like Ruckfrage . would be impracticable if geometry were essentially something which continually circulated as common coin in the validity of ideality. For. The latter. If we take for granted the philosophical nonsense of a purely empirical history and the impotence of an ahistorical rationalism . I can restore history to its traditional diaphaneity . confirm at what point is required the "zigzag " way of proceeding-a procedure that the of every material determination . ] H . that they sprang from the soil of pre­ geometrical experience. From a received and already readable document. thi s after i s not the indication of a dependence . Like its German synonym. p. " (§91 . This means-by a necessity which is no less than an accidental and exterior fate-that I must start with ready-made geometry. the reactionary and therefore revolutionary moment of this interplay ( Wechselspiel) . on the con­ trary. Husserl here speaks of Ruckfrage. is then. and second. such that geometry issued from them with the sense as we now know it. It might simply be an adapta­ tion of the last phrase quoted from Ideas I on p. III Crisis All these precautions have made us sensitive to the extreme difficulty of the task. But in the absence of an u nderstanding of the beginnings the development i s mute as a development of sense. Thu s we have no other choice than to proceed forward and backward in a ' zigzag' pattern . the possibility is offered me of asking again. Thus Husser! underscores the preliminary and general character of this meditation in a sentence which appears borrowed word 4:l " Thus we find ourselves in a sort of circle. And if this apriori normativ ity of history is recognized starting from the fact . no more than the history of its transmission grounds the value of gold. Also. of course . in order to go back through it and question the sense of its origin. and whatever in fact the empirical content of their acts was. as would be all phenomenology . as Husserl says. return inquiry (and question en retour as well) is marked by the postal and epistolary reference or resonance of a communication from a distance. It i s due to this qfter s own specific character. after the fact. in the nece ssity of preserving transcendence or reduced factuality as clue . about the primordial and final intention of what has been given me by tradition. return inquiry is asked on the basis of a first posting. it is a priori necessary that they followed from a sort of non-geometry. Return inquiry. can any wordly history give the sense of this circulation as common coin .. Without the Wechselspiel of this double reduction. which yield both the singular essences of institutive acts and. [ Derrida puts the phrase " pas plus que I ' h i storie de sa transmission ne fonde la valeur de I 'or" in quotations . history supposes it. whoever in fact the first geometers were . whatever in fact the first produced or discovered geometrical idealities were . looking back at its development.. These analogies. proposes as a sort of necessary "circle " ":l and which is only the pure form of every historical experience. . to continued inquiry" ( 1 58) . which teaches u s once and for all what the geometrical "phenomenon" is and when its possibility is consti­ tuted. 58 [modified]) . . Neutralization then opens the space for an intentional and intrinsic history of this very circulation and permits the comprehension of how a tradition of truth is possible in general . such as it is now in circulation and which I can always phenomenologically read. . that the particular h istoricity of phenomenological discourse is announced. and finally. We have translated it by return inquiry (question en re­ tour) .50 Jacques Derrida 51 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry origin before geometry was in fact born and before it had in fact been given to me. Undoubtedly. the whole sense of an open history in general. which is only mediacy itself and openness to a telecommunication in general . A phenomenology of the experience is possible thanks to a reduction and to an appropriate de-sedimentation. Third. the maintenance of this circulation permits the neutralization of worldly history. The fact does not teach u s through its factual content but as an example. "open . it is a priori necessary that the establishing gestures had a sense . 43 above . and in return. the reactivating reduction supposes the iterative reduction of the static and structural analysis. both thanks to and despite the sedimentations.. the metaphorical focus of our text. Thus. then we realize the seriousness of what is at stake. I have been unable to locate this phrase . but which now takes on a sharp and precise sense. Rather. since . Thu s only under the cover of static phenomenology's reductions can we make other infinitely more subtle and hazardous reductions. . In short. . what seems to be of utmost importance to Husserl is as much an operation (reactivation itself as the ability to open a hidden historical field) as the nature of that field itself (as the possibility of something like reactivation) . the law­ fulness of sense is nothing in itself. The understanding of the beginnings is to be gained fully only by starting with science as given in its present-day form . the phenomenology of his­ toricity would be an exercise in vanity.

: Tr�m-Duc-Th {lO . Phenomenofogie. is to be thought of as the geometrical science . . geometrical thinking" (p. This whole debate is only understandable within something like the geomet­ rical or mathematical science. . " If science. this unity of geometry's sense. naive style of work. pp . 46 Starting from a system of axioms which " governs" a multiplicity. every proposition is determinable either as analytic conse­ quence or as analytic contradiction. as we know. the notion of the un-decidable-apart from the fact that it only has such a sense by some irreducible reference to the ideal of decidability4S-also retains a mathematical value derived from some unique source of value vaster than the project of definiteness itself. 6): " This return inquiry unavoidably remains within the sphere of gen­ eralities. . On the contrary. besides geomet­ rical shapes.45 This concept (already marked by history) is. its unity is that of a traditional geometrical sense infinitely open to all its own revolutions . as predelineated forms within which the individual deci­ sions ought in any case to confine themselves. however generous the proliferation of its forms and metamorphoses may be . indeed its vulnerability has been well shown. For a rational practice. Thus . " ( 1 58 [modified]) . theory a priori can be only a delimiting form. such as it is announced in the Origin. A Study o Husserl' s Logic [Part I . is not a general concept that is extracted or abstracted from various known geometries.47 That would be an alternative we could not get beyond . But all the questions about the possibility or impossibility of main­ taining Husserl's demands-either as an essentially inaccessible regu­ lative ideal or as a methodological rule and actual technique (which no longer in general seems possible)-are they not asked precisely within this unity of the geometrico-mathematical horizon in general . is not confi n ed to the systematic coherence of a geometry whose axioms are already consti­ tuted. they do not call again into question the unified sense of what. However far its building up progresses. 35 : and especially S . I . 24 1 and 243 . The intention which grasps the new sense is original insofar as the prior project stil l remains and the intention will simply not " gi ve way" to it. . pp. § 3 1 . as we shall soon see. a s apriori determination. has reached decisions. p . in particular Jean Cavailles. 6) . it is the primordial concrete essence of geometry that makes such a generalizing operation possible . pp. 36-38. But this naivete would no longer have the sense it used to have before the sense-investigation of these generalities . Nor is this sense-unity to be confused with the concept that Husserl in fact determined as the ideal orienting geometrical practice in geometry's objective thematic field. that the analyses of the Origin concerning the synthetic style of mathe­ matical tradition serve as an example of tradition in general is thus confirmed. and. or will they be. Con­ tinually calling us back to the unnoticed presuppositions of ever recur­ ring problems. p. these are generalities which can be richly explicated . §9. regional . §72. Doubtless. pp. pp . 36). To pose the question of this traditional unity is to ask oneself: how. I n its very negativity . par­ ticularly when G6del discovered the rich possibility of "undecidable " propositions in 1 93 1 . " Thus the geometer . within the open unity of a science? And it is within the horizon that Husserl here questions that the preoccupation with decidability belongs. The first of these radical generalities is precisely that which au­ thorizes the return inquiry: the unity of geom etry's sense is that of a tradition. Such confidence did not have long to wait before being contradicted . 4 0 On these questions. it can only plant fences. whose unity is still to come on the basis of what is announced in its origin. forget­ fulness. 3 ] . in this development. geometries? Furthermore. 43-63 . cf. 94-97. And they will be " richly explicated" only in a prospective. with radical responsibility. cf. a sense-investigation that Husserl terms a " criticism" and which will have a regulative and normative value for this work. p. S ur f a Logique et f a theorie de fa science (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France . 4H Moreover. pp. sense-investigation will keep us from aberration. will not th ink of exploring. but as the infinite totality of possible experiences in space in general. which is also its oneness. whose indigence is essential . it is itself only if it remains essentially and intrinsically haunted in its sense of origin by the te/os of decidability-whose di sruption it marks. undecidability has a revolutionary and disconcerting sense . before a section in which the relations of the philosopher and the mathematician are defined : in Ideas I. the crossing of which indicates absurdity or aberration" (FTL. The very movement which enriches sense retains a sedimentary reference to the antecedent sense at the bottom of the new sense and cannot dispense w ith it . 1 947). The ground of this unity is the world itself: not as the finite totality of sentient beings. historically. 1 87-88: and in FTL. FTL. and can confine them­ selves so far as those universal decisions have become actually appro­ priated. The unity of the geometrical science . . 47 This ideal is clearly defined by H u sserl . and irresponsibility.52 Jacques Derrida 53 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry I for word from Formal and Transcendental Logic (Introduction. phenomenology will never be able to enrich these generalities. 70ff. Whatever may be the responses con­ tributed by the epistemologist or by the activity of the scientific inves4� On the two ' ' faces" of science ' s thematic and the objective character of the thematic on which the scientific researcher i s exclusively focu sed in his activ ity as researcher. f Ch . notably in the LI. in a certain sense. Bachelard . . have all geometries been. §70. Geometry's development is a history only because it is a history. but. they can impress on life habitual norms as volitional bents. Pro!. that of a "definite" nomology and an exhaus­ tive deductivity.

The axiom-system formally defini ng such a mult iplicity i s distinguished by the circumstance that any proposition (proposition-form . . ter­ tillm non datllr . Fink specifies these distinctions. wh ich H u sserl so often called the ultimate horizon for every theoretical attitude and for all philosophy. e.54 Jacques Derrida 55 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry tigator to these important intra-mathematical questions of definiteness and completeness. when it comes to an end. In fact. as the infinite horizon of a science. for axioms are in principle the results o primordial sense-fashioning (Sinnbildung) and al­ f ways have this behind them )" [modifiedJ. in the "objective" thematic sphere of science where they must exclusively remain. if the origin of mathematics and the unity of its sense were in Husserl' s eyes essentially tied to this ideal of exhaustive de­ ductivity . § § 1 6 and 17. Bachelard comments more rigorously on the sense of this notion by translating it as " process of distinguishing" or " process wh ich renders distinct ." p.'-'o Axiomatics in general (from which alone every ideal of exhaustive and exact deductivity can take its sense . therefore . 96: " the idea of a 'nomolof{ical science ' . it seems he only considered this to be a secondary grounding . I n h is formulation o f the Origin . 2 1 5) .. against the classic affirmations of Hus­ serl. Bachelard . axiomatics supposes a primordial evi­ dence . notably FTL. A S tlldy of Husserl ' s Logic . " Expl i cation" ( Verdeutlichu ng) is not to be confused e ither with clarification (Kliirung) or reactivation: remaining within const ituted sense . and Appendix I I . n aturally) that can be constructed . and above all without reactivating its primordi al intention. and reactivation of propositions in general . In other words. cf. whatever future forms develop. It is for reasons of grammatical construction (the u se of past or present participles. and even if they were identical with this ideal. . they can only be integrated into this unity of the mathematical tradition which is questioned in the Origin. if Husserl (from the Logical Investigations to Ideas I and to Formal and Transcendental Logic ) indeed assigned the narrow sense of decidability to the notion of geometrical determinability. " Then . there i s no truth about space that is not deducibly included in the ' complete' ( vollstiindigen) system of space-axioms . includes the idea that there is no truth about such a province that is not deducibly i nc luded in the 'fundamental laws' of the corre­ sponding nomological science-just as. out of the concepts (concept-forms) occur­ ing [sic] in that system . a radical ground which is already past. a sedimentation of sense: i. no matter what Husserl himself may have thought about this relativity and despite whatever interest it may still hold as such. is e ither ' true'-that is to say: an analytic (purely deducible ) consequence of the axioms-or 'false'-that is to say : an analytic contradiction-. (Primordial evidence must not be confused with the evidence of 'axioms' . Ch . the Origin 's question would be tainted at the outset by a certain historical relativity. that the kinds of primordial evidence he investigates here are for Hu sserl writes in FTL.! When Husser! speaks in the :. 5 6-63 . geometrical determinability seems indeed to have the sense of geometrical determinability in general. Instead o f opposing " reactivation" and " explication . e tc . 1!1 him prior to those of axioms and serve as their ground. we can read in the Origin ( 1 68): "one must also take note of the constructive activities that operate with geometrical idealities which have been 'ex­ plicated' but not brought to primordial evidence. if the primordial act of grounding that Husserl wishes to el icit [solliciter J here was the institution of an axiomatic and deductive field or even the institution of ax iomatics and the ideal of deductivity in general-and if this institution was described as that of mathematics itself-then the Husserlian project would be seriously threatened by the evolution of axiomatiziation toward a total formalization within which one necessar­ ily comes up against the limits stated by Godel's theorem (and related theorems) . in any case.. of substantive or infin i­ tive forms . � 3 1 . a multiplicity) governable by an explanatory nomology. "tertium datur. 1 4-2 3 . pp. . . .O Our emphasis. in accordance with the grammar of pure logic . pp. anything but the determined nature of the axiomatic systems and of the deductive interconnections that they do or do not authorize. clarificat ion . in the ideal Euclid. to its value as present cognition. but by a 'complete' one . t h is formulation confirms and underscores the necessary anteriority of the static analy sis and the s tatic fixing of sense. ) that we have kept the classic translation of Verdeutlichung as e xplica­ tion . p . both of which must control all genetic bearing [demarche ] . only then does reactivation as return i nqu iry concerning the 'primal instituting' begin" ( " Die Frage . . " On all the p roblem s concerning explication. It is then already exiled from the origins to which Husserl now wishes to return.e . not by just any formal axiom-system . 3 1 3-29: also S. in order for the values of consequence and inconsistency to be rendered problematic. problems to which allusion is made in the Origin." he distinguishes between two moments or type s of reactivation in general: reactivation as " logical explication" and reactivation of the " tradition of sense-formation (Sinnbildungstradition ) i nternally present in a t hematic sense-formation. :. S . " 49 Consequently . 1 . And they will never concern. and in order to be able to say. explication makes that sense distinct without restoring it to its ful l clarity . . p . But as soon as the question of origin arises. Consequentl�'. Thu s . But that is not so ! Even if Husserl at one time adopted the conception of grounding axiomatics and even proposed it as the ideal for " all 'exact' eidetic disciplines" (Ideas I. i .1 Geometrical determinability i n the broad sense wou ld only be the regional and abstract form of an infinite determinability of being in general . pp . There is no doubt. § 7 . 56) . But the objective thematic field of mathematics must already be constituted in its mathematical sense . defining the " multiplicity-form in the pregna n t sen se . . or correla­ tively the idea of an infinite province (in mathematico-logical parlance . from which alone every prob­ lem of decidability can then spring) already supposes. " Hu sserl continues: " Such a multiplicity-form is defined." " When reactivation i n the first sense i s completed. this is because he let himself be guided in his nonhistorical investigations by the present state of a ready-made science .

1 0 lectures. . historical interconnections are inter­ connections of sense and value.1 'I ' . but it can pass unnoticed on account of the ideal forma­ tion' s autonomy. he is speaking about the "so-called 'deductive sciences' ' ' . Since the retentional power of living consciousness is finite . but not a necessity. that unity which orients the Origin. it is in the past that the " first inventors" ( 1 58) themselves are found . p.· " 56 Jacques Derrida 57 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry '. And the sciences are only some traditions among others. values. and past acts as habitualities (habitus) and sedimentations . which-by capitalizing ad infinitum and according to an original mode-can never keep their sedimentary de­ posits out of circulation. That is a possibility. which does not permit itself to be bound by the alternative of "true" or "false. we know with "a knowledge of unassailable evidence"-an "implicit knowledge" which inhabits this factual " lack of knowledge. As cultural form. and likewise also the concepts 'false' and 'formally implied as the opposite of a formal impli­ cation of the axioms' (Ideas I." as prescribed by the ideal of a definite multiplicity. and so forth . The analogy will be even greater when we see that. but as the retention of a present past. traditional development.� . In effect they borrow all their characteristics from it. everywhere and essentially" ( I 58)-that cultural forma­ tions always refer to human productions . Sometimes Husser! considers geometry and science in general as cer­ tain forms among others of what he calls the cultural world. the ideal itself of decidability . and although they have instituted new spiritual forms. we have some apriori evidence that no ignorance of factual history can undermine . Traditional sedimentation in the communal world will have the function of going beyond the retentional fi n itude of individual consciousness. does not have a causal style of genesis . from which as yet and always the undecidables or any other future mathematical formation will stem. . since the interest and the difficulty of HusserI's analysis result from what this analysis accrues on both planes at once. The present appears neither as the �upture nor the effect of a past. §9h. This will be the case for all anthropological cultures which do not participate in the European eidos. it should only indicate the pure openness and unity of an infinite horizon.:. On the one hand. as the retention of a retention . is still a mathematical determination? Essentially. is reduced. and for the same reasons. as Husserl immediately concludes in a move which we will con" Origin sider later. then. although they by no means merely deduce" ( 1 68) . The unity of geometrical truth' s primordial sense. In the world of natural reality subject to a causal type of development. for example. I . sedimentation is not that of an acquired sense that is continually and internally recapitu­ lated. concerning exact sciences.� In a similar fashion. 1 88). we know that humanity has a past and that.e. ifnot identicaL to that of internal time-consciousness described from the noematic viewpoint in the 1 904. sedimentary retention is not only the condi�2 This requirement of Trivialitiit is frequently j u stified by Husserl. this style is not that of deductivity. Thus we understand HusserI ' s repeated stipu­ lation in the Origin that. This world exists entirely "through tradition" ( 1 58). notably in C. culture itself in its fi n ite empirical units is not sufficient to constitute the pure unity of a history. spiritually shaped . from this fact. so. This reference to the productive act is inscribed in the formation itself. Of course . There is thus a truth . along with every factual stage of the history of mathematics as such . if the undecidability of a proposition . i. . too. This means that from now on when investigating origins. adding: "so called. this consciousness preserves significations. and the content of science and philosophy is undoubt­ edly transmitted according to the same process as all other forms of culture and tradition in general . §72 . Husser! wishes to extract the idea of science (i. the idea of science is undoubtedly also part of the Weltanschauung. is each determined factual tradition-by disclosing the purely mathematical tradition and pure traditionality in general. from which every culture acquires totality at each moment (in a mediate or immediate synchrony) . p. Hence the necessity to recall the apriori banalities buried by science and culture. " While completely accepting Dilthey' s criticism of the causalist naturalization of spirit and the principle of an original typo-morphology of cultural totalities. but of geometry or mathematics in general. above all .e. There is no natural history for Husser! any more than for Hegel. Here the Origin repeats Husserl ' s critique ofDilthey in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science. or rather a geometrico-mathematical truth-sense in general. philosophy) from the SUbj ective imma­ nence of the Weltanschauung. . could then be posed in a question of this kind: what is mathematical determinabil­ ity in general. Since a fact's opacity could be reduced from the very beginning by the production of ideal objects. The process is analogous. of a " horizon of geometrical future in precisely this style" ( 159) . such a question cannot ex­ pect a determined response. they have been able to do so only by disposing of raw or already traditional . 50. they refer to spiritual acts. for Husserl as for Hegel . materials . On the subject of tradition in general. But on the other hand. e . in which "the concepts ' true ' and 'formal implication of the axioms' are equivalent.

ideality is not always normative . Besides all the characteristics that it has in common with other cultural formations. and on the other hand. In this sense . . 1 35) . As a cultural form which is not proper to any de facto culture. the present is retained and gone beyond as past present. as well as for those who enclose themselves in the ideal ity of validity. I . a reduction which has become possible by an irrup­ tion of the infinite as a revolution within empirical culture.58 Jacques Derrida 59 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry tion for the possibility of protention: it also belongs essentially to the general form of protention. Indeed. since they are not intrinsically affected by the empirical content of real history and by determined cultural inter­ connections . Science is a title standing for absolute. we must now discriminate. is an ' idea' " (" PRS . Husserl describes science as a unique and archetypal form of traditional culture. timeless values . in order to understand pure culture and traditionality in general . in order to constitute another primordial and original Absolute. without this always renewed originality of an absolute primordiality . whose ideality is absolutely normative. At every moment each historic totality is a cultural structure animated by a project which is an " idea. is only the maintenance of what indeed mu st be called the dialectic of protention and retention. . science claims an essential privilege : it does not permit itself to be enclosed in any historically determined culture as such. in which sense-sedimentation does not exclude the fact that validity (which is rooted in a language. for it has the universal validity of truth . . is a supratemporal one. the idea of science is the index of pure culture in general. epoch. 3 3 1 ) . . The latter. §32. the movement of . pp. the cultural form " science" (of which geometry is one example) is itself " exemplary" in the double sense of this word." Thus " Weltanschauung. on the f contrary. the mode of sedimentation is such that no signification ceases to circulate at any moment and can always be reconceived and reawakened in its circulation . Without this extraordinary absolute alteration of what always remains in the concrete and lived form of an absolute Present. the latter would be in fact impossible without the former. and here that means limited by no relatedness to the spirit of one time. which is itself conceived under the abso­ lutely unique and universal form of the Living Present. is an "idea . For those who confine themselves to historical factu­ ality. . eidetic and teleological : it is the particular example which guides the eidetic reduction and intui­ tion.. . without this no authentic history would be thought or projected as such. what is true of the Living Present is true of what supposes it as its ground. . In the movement of pro­ tention. always present and always lived as such . At the same time.53 No doubt. the tradition of truth is the most profound and purest history. Weltanschauung. . In one sense. . We will see this much later: the sense of error has its own particular ideality. beyond every given cultural area. Science is the idea of what. But in another sense. on the one hand. The " idea" o science . the culture of truth is itself only the possibility of a reduction of empirical culture and is manifested to itself only through such a reduction. But at other times. But on the one hand. on the contrary. another Living Present. the latter always refers more or less imme­ diately to the totality of a past which inhabits it and which always appears under the general form of a project . which is the primordial absolute of temporality . p. It is the infinite eidos opposed to the finite ideal which animates the Weltanschauung: Weltanschauung. . once discovered. terrain. the culture of truth is the highest and most irreducible possibility of empirical culture . belongs thereafter to the treasure trove o all succeeding humanity and f obviously determines likewise the material contel1t of the idea of culture. Only the pure unity of such a tradition' s sense is apt to establish this continuity. from the first moment of its production. it designates culture's eidos par excellence. must be true always and for everyone.3 As Husserl had already stressed in the LI (I. the historic present. the narration of the truth can only have the historic originality of myth . in principle to be realized in an individual life by way of constant approach . the culture of truth . between empirical culture and that of truth . wisdom. 135-36) In a non-descriptive pure science . there would only be an empirical aggregate of fi n ite and acci­ dental units. This emancipation can be confused with a breaking from history in general. but it also is the example and model which must orient culture as its ideal. too. Validity is a higher ideality which can or cannot be attached to ideality in general. As soon as phenomenology breaks from both con­ ventional Platonism and historicist empiricism . despite HusserI ' s repugnance for that word. no history would be possible. " but of a goal lying in the finite . The "idea" of Weltanschauung is consequently a different one for each time. between de facto historical culture. on the other hand. they can appear disengaged from all history. and so forth) can become dated [peremption ] . Also . as well as of Weltanschauung philosophy. one that corresponds to Husserl' s intention. (Ibid. In other words." p. too. If it was necessary then to distinguish between natural reality and spiritual culture. . the culture and tradition of the truth are charac­ terized by a paradoxical historicity. Every such value.

in particular Le Rationalisme applique. 56 Then begins the formidable difficulties grappled with in the fifth of the and into which we do not want to enter here. the constituting and pres­ ent source of truth. Egological subjectiv ity cannot be responsi ble for this develop ment. does not correspond. the universa l commun ity also has the unity of a horizon. which is continua lly totalized in an absolute Present. .'. the total premise for the acquisitio ns of the new level. present. In addition to which. so to speak. If the history of geometry were only the development of a purpose wholly present from the beginning. so frequently evoked in the Origin. out of first creative activities . Geometr y is born "out of afirst acquisi­ tion. We understand its persisting manner of being: it is not only a mobile forward process from one set of acquisi­ tions to another but a continuo us synthesis in which all acquisitio ns maintain their validity. whose unity must be absolute and a priori (otherwise even the slightest truth would be un­ imaginable) is but the common place of all egological subjectivities. and in the Origin " in ( 1 66) he emphas izes that a scientific stage is not only a sense which ion of the whole earlier sense in a fact comes later. Husserl already distin­ guished between psychol ogical temporality as successi veness (what Hume describe d) and the temporality of the synthetic interconnections of sense.] . the total acquisition is. ideality and spirituality. " which alone is capable of constitut ing and retaining the "events of reason . Let us understand this as true of every non-desc riptive science . Howeve r. even when they seem mandated by an ideal community. because. For it not . do not cease to be irre­ ducibly those of a monadic "[ think" -to which it suffices to reduce the empirical egological content of the ego in order to discover the d imen­ sion of the " we" as a moment of the eidos "ego. pp. This progress is brought about by the permanent totalization and repetition of its acquisitions . He continue d to explicate this differenc e . but rather in that "rational memory " so profound ly de­ scribed by Gaston Bachelard . 4th ed. the image of the " open chain" does not exhau st the depth of this commun al subjectivity.' 55 Meditations. These synthese s do not occur in a psychological memory . [Derrida wants to suggest by the word uchronie a temporality akin to the spatiality of We should also note Derrida's use of the roots "temporalite " and "chronie" in various words: panchronie and uchronie versus omnitemporalite and intemporalite (as �ell as synchronie. Neither pure diachrony nor pure synchrony make a history. that means without being substituted for him. " Every science is related to an open chain of the generations of those who work for and with one another . it can only be this concrete implication and this reciprocal envelopment of totalities and absolutes . The irreducible historicity of geometrical becoming is characterized by the fact that "the total sense of geometry" (and its necessary noetic correlate . against Husserl ' s most explicit intentions. Since the totality of science is open. diachronie.60 Jacques Derrida 61 1ntroduction to the Origin of Geometry truth that it wishes to describe is really that of a concrete and specific history-the foundations of which are a temporal and creative sub­ jectivity ' s acts based on the sensible world and the life-world as cultural world . they are "founded" in the sense of Fundierung. at every present stage. 2 and 42-46. only has the unity of interrelatedness and co-responsibility-each in­ vestigator not only feels himself tied to all the others by the unity of an object or task-but the investigator' s own subjectivity is constituted by the idea or horizon of this total subjectivity which is made responsible in and through him for each of his acts as a scientific investigator. " if such an hypothesis did not lead. total subjectivity) "could not have been present as a project and then as mobile fulfillment at the beginning" ( ] 59) . We would have on one side a synchronic or timeless [uchronique p6 ground and. The " :'I. The same thing is true of every science" ( 1 59) . as we know. to placing the ego logical monad in abstract relation to the total subjec­ tivity. if there is a history of truth . it IS translated as intemporality. The description of these two characteristics. Phenomenologically. The latter's acts. he remains the absolute origin. at the same time. Only a commun al subjectiv ity can produce the historical system of truth and be wholly responsi ble for it. a purely empirical diach­ rony with its indicative function but without any proper unity of its own. . . When uchronie occurs again on p. 1 970). whether past.4 Cf. Cartesian utopia . In any case." but the integrat new project. whether actually present or possible . the transcendental we is not som ething other than the transcendental Ego . to any metaphysical assertion . on the other side. all make up a totality such that. this total subjectiv ity. and anachronie ) . however collectiv e. a memory based on a "recurrent fruitful­ ness. re­ searchers either known or unknown to one another who are the pro­ ductive subjecti vity of the total living science " ( 1 59 [modified]) . 73 . (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. " 54 In his Philosophy of Arithmetic. In and through him. we would have to deal only with an explication or a quasi-creation. This is possible only because we are dealing with ideal and spiritual implications. Furthermore. One would indeed be tempted to think that it is the we that makes possible the reduction of the empirical ego and the emergence of the eidos " ego. whether known or unknow n. or future.

provisionally abstained before the historical con­ tent of Erstmaligkeit only to ask the question of its objectification [objectivation ]. 1 56-59 . according to H u sserl.l . i . like H usserl. how can it be constituted as such in the historian on the basis of the statements of th i s person o r o f statements made about t h i s matter'? Th is pre suppose s that some logical SUbjects.62 Jacques Derrida 63 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry rejected hypothesis is once more that of a complicity between " Platonism" and empiricism. i . But even though applied to a historical origin in this case. but . with all the characteristics that we know it to have: omnitem­ poraI validity. . . its sense being already evident. a " logical " subject will no more be able to be responsible for such a possibility than could the psychological subject . 263-64. Dilthey writes: " N ow the following que stion arises: how a nexus which is not produced as such in a mind [tete ]. . 7 of Gesammelte Sch riften . Moreover. this question led Dilthey to discover . ed . he tacitly and provisionally considers it to be already done. of its launching into history and its historicity. § 59. Thi s question i s "turned over" in the Origin in formulas which are strangely similar to those of Dilthey. As a matter of fact. This "reverse side" of the question concerns the radical origin and the conditions of possibility for the objective spirit itself.e. we do know a priori that it has had to assume this form. After the interconnections of sense and the evidences of a monadic ego from which we cannot not start . it is one of those formal a priori supposed by every material science. Sketches for a Critique of H istorical Reason" ] . §24 . There. Dilthey. in Dilthey' s Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaf­ ten. pp. 1 958). Having cleared this stage.' 1 . the genesis of the absolute (i . . this sense being already present for any consciousness whatsoever. "grasping an existent in the consciousness of its original being-itself-there" ( 1 60 [modified]). G . For a sense has entered into history only if it has become an absolute object. i Having reached this point. no doubt. En­ twiirfe zur Kritik der historischen Vernunft" [" Plan for the Continuation of the Forma­ tion of the H istorical World in the H uman Studies. co-responsibility . 282. pp. 2nd ed. b ut above all those of FTL: cf. . But this methodological necessity is only legitimate on the basis of a profound philosophical decision. tradition . intelligibility for "everyone. and so forth ? We will see that. inflexion i n FTL. however. Husser! performs a detour which may seem . This recalls the "principle of all principles" defined in Ideas I. the intuition of a natural reality or of an ideal object. we can have a first certainty about it in the absence of any other material knowledge. p. § 1 00. " a more primitive formation of sense (Sinnbildung) necessar­ ily went before it as a preliminary stage. B ernard Groethuysen . It is a question of a methodological limitation and . notably FTL. Since the first geometrical evi­ dence has had to conform to this pattern. Here it is focu sed on the possibility of objective spirit as the condition for h istory and in this respect takes the opposite view to Dilthey' s question. can be constitu ted" (Part I I I : " Plan der Fortsetzung zum Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften . how can an objective spirit i n general be constituted as the place of truth.'H H usserl had posed this question in the same terms but in i ts most inclusive extension and with a more cri tical . Husserl in effect continues his meditation (now protected by that formal legitima­ tion) as if his theme were no longer the origin of geometrical sense. a non­ psychological dimension of the subject. Vol . of the necessity to take one' s starting point in the constituted . I I IV . Husserl re­ peatedly and obstinately returns to a question which is at bottom the following: how can the subjective egological evidence of sense become objective and intersubjective? How can it give rise to an ideal and true object. undoubtedly in such a way that it appeared for the first time in the evidence of successful actualiza­ tion" ( 1 59-60 [modifi e d]). what matters is knowing how the significations and the values of thi s objective milieu can be interiorized and assumed as such by i ndiv idual subjects-first of all in the historian ' s work on the basis of testimonies which are individual in their origin or object .) 7 This i s done i n terms which recall those of Ideas I. but less h istorical.d isconcerting. He is content to recall that we know the general form of this evidence:37 the latter must be-it cannot not be-like all evidence (whether perceptive or eidetic). who are not psychological subjects. this a priori knowledge con­ cerning the form of evidence is nothing less than historical. This abstention before the content of the primordial act and evidence is provisional. Hence the content of geometrical evidence (a content which is historical because created for the first time) is not defined for the moment. here by geometry and history. However little we may know about the first geometrical evidence. it is limited to the egological sphere of Objecti v ity . Defining a "source of au thority" [Ideas I. " up­ rootedness out of all "here and now" factuality. de facto as wel l as de j ure . ideal) Objectivity of sense. 83] for the cognition of any object in general. which consequently i s not directly experienced and c a n no more be l e d back t o t h e lived experience o f a person. i . Husser! consid­ ers it already acquired. once again. and so forth? This is the historical repetition of the question of Objectivity so frequently asked in the five lectures of The Idea of Phenomenology: how can subjectivity go out of itself in order to encounter or constitute the object?·'JH Husserl has. Instead of describing this primitive genesis of sense in itself and in its Erstmaligkeit. even before the possibility of the open project of geometry. e . For him. in effect. (Stuttgart: B . then. . universal normativity . Teubner and Gottingen: Van­ denhoeck and Ruprecht. p. e . starts from the already constituted objective spiri t .

'. Undoubtedly there is not in this account the least grain of history if we understand by that the factual content of development. the de jure implications. would borrow its sense from that attitude. Ideas I.e .e . The latter is such only " after" having been put into intersubjective circulation. " Before" and " after" must then be neutralized in their factuality and used in quotation marks. an ideal object which. "the subjectivist point of view" in The Origin of Geometry would have prohibited Hus­ serl from "going beyond the level of common sense remarks. there is not first a SUbjective geometrical evidence which would then become objective . paradoxically. Thus. But can we simply replace them with the timeless "if" and "provided that" of the condition of possibility? The language of genesis could well seem fictive at this point: the description of any real development (neutralized in principle) would not call for it. a way back toward the beginnings. . The sense of the constituting act can only be deciphered in the web of the constituted object. in the fullest sense of the word. an flO Cf. . The con­ ditions of Objectivity are then the conditions of historicity itself. When Husserl farther on devotes a few lines to the production and evidence of geometrical sense as such and its own proper content. but they refer to concrete acts lived in a unique system of instituting implications . and eidetic stratifications does. This is very much in accord with the initial direction of phenomenology : the object in general is the final category of everything that can appear. But it seems they remain outside Husserl ' s intention. to tell them a story [leur raconte une histoire ]. i. 59 Also. . and normative schema for the conditions of a history rather than history itself? Questions of this kind might seriously impugn the whole originality of this attempt. only retroactively and on the basis of its results can we illuminate the pure sense of the subjective praxis which has engendered geometry. it is the existence of what is Objectively there for . then the sense of sense in general is here determined as object: as some thing that is accessible and available in general and first for a regard or gaze. 1 94-97. or its philosophy. on the contrary." Cf. but an essential necessity of intentionality.9 ' everyone' (for actual and possible geometers. The primordial sense of every in­ tentional act is only its final sense. if geometry is here the exemplary index of being scientific . i . p. Husserl only wished to decipher in advance the text hidden under every empirical story about which we would be curious .e.e. and if history is the highest and most revelatory possibility for a univer­ sal history (the concept of which would not exist without it). but bringing to light the formal conditions of possibility. in a system that has been originally produced only once-that remains de facto and de jure. in particular Tran-Duc-Thao. i. can be sharp and easily imaginable: 60 however. Following this interpreter. the Ur-Region. Factual history can then be given free rein: no matter what its style. the constitution of an object (in the broadest sense of these terms) . at bottom the static. 22 1 . he will do so only after having determined the general conditions of its Objectivity and of the Objectivity of ideal objectivities. in particular § 76. If the sense of geometrical sense is Objectivity or the intention of Objectivity. That is why only a teleology can open up a passage. or those who understand geometry). Thus. structural. it has. its method. pp. These then are the interconnections-of what is. when Husserl affirms that a sense-production must have first presented itself as evidence in the personal consciousness of the inven­ tor. and this is true of all its particular forms " ( 1 60 [modified]). first of all to the actual and possible mathe­ maticians of all peoples. an existence which is peculiarly supratemporal and which-of this we are certain-is accessible to all men. And this necessity is not an external fate. from its primal institution. " Geometrical existence is not psychic exis­ tence � it does not exist as something personal within the personal sphere of consciousness . Geometrical evidence only starts "the moment" there i s evidence of an ideal objectivity. Objects in general join all regions to con­ sciousness. . And the annoyed letdown of those who would expect Husserl to tell them what really happened. Phenomenoiogie. it will always more or less naively suppose the possibility and necessity of the interconnections described by Husserl. history itself. Truly. The worldly image of gaze would not be the unnoticed model of the theoretical attitude of pure consciousness but. ir­ reversible. confronting what is through and through a historical adventure (the fact of which is irreplaceable).64 Jacques Derrida 65 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry 'i i. Are we not then dealing with history? Does this not return us to a classic transcendental regression? And is not the interconnecting of transcendental neces­ sities. . must have broken all the moorings which secured it to the empirical ground of history. even if narrated according to how it develops. Indeed. But the neces­ sity of this reduction has been justified at the outset. and when he asks the question of its subsequent (in a factual chronological order) objectification. that can be for a pure consciousness in general. he elicits a kind of fiction destined to make the characteristics of ideal Objectivity problematic and to show that they are not a matter of course . all ages. this disappointment is illegitimate. Undoubt­ edly these interconnections are always marked by a juridical and transcendental signification.

for they are nothing but the possibilities of the appearance of history as such . but the name (when we u nderstand it) is its simple and imageless representation. and consequently of a pure historicity. 1 949) . ideal formations are rooted only in language in general.e . was to impose on them a name .fi� Andre de Muralt notes very precisely that the we are deali ng with perception of a real thing) . since it is not identical with any of its empirical .1 804" ) . p . . to which not only all scientific formations and the sciences themselves belong but also. we still encounter several more degrees . a work which . in the name we think" (§462) . since recourse to the natural Objectivity of a worldly existent is no longer possible.!i! It is always more objective than the real object. " It is proper to a whole class of spiritual products of the cultural world. is not the non-reality of the noema described in Ideas I (especially § § 88. by which Adam is made master of the animal s. when Husserl wonders: "How is ideal Objectivity possible? " Here the question also attains its greatest difficulty. in the Origin. the l ion already te stifies to this neutralization as an exemplary martyr: " Confronting the name-Lion-we no longer have any need either of an intuition of such an animal or even an image . In other words. then.66 Jacques Derrida 67 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry apriori and eidetic reading and discourse should be possible. In the Encyclopedia ( one of the few Hegelian works that H usserl seems to have read) . (This passage is cited by Jean H yppolite in his Logique et existence: Essai sur La logique de Hegel [Pari s: Presses Universitaires de France . the model of history in general. it would always be a de facto empirical subjectivity. Thus. we could show this in a precise way on the basis of §62 of FTL. we must first note that ideal Objectivity not only characterizes geometrical and scientific truths . the real object can never attain that absolute Objectivity which can be proposed for all subjectivity in general in the intangible identity of its sense. i . there is no doubt that this non-reality of the noema (a very d ifficult and decisive notion) may be what. it is the element of lan­ guage in general. The question "how is any object in general possible? " assumes its sharpest and most adequate form. Is not this idea the favorite of Mal­ larme and Valery? H egel above all had amply explored it. of the mathematical thing itself. and of the thing designated. H owever. . for example. Speech [La parole ]. In an important note . it was simply disclosed as what im­ plicitly has always conditioned the existence of the ideal objects of a pure science and thus of a pure tradition. from one language into another. It is always the same word which is meant and recognized through all possible linguistic gestures. permits the repetition of sense as the "same " and makes the idealization of identity in general possible . the word [mot] has an ideal Objectivity and identity. directly or not. in the last analysis. already present i n the Logical Investiga­ tions and the first sections of Formal and Transcendental Logic. History itself establishes the possibility of its own appearing. in order to be such . U ndoubtedly. lets the profound convergence of Hegelian and H usserlian thought appear. not in the factuality of languages and their particular linguistic incarnations . " If we ask ourselves about the manner in which the subjective evidence of geometrical sense gains its ideal Objectivity. 1 953] . that the very subtle and specific character of the Husserlian question appears. before its ' 'exemplary" privilege is defined. phonetic . v This possibility is first called "language. 1 65-66). 97ff. Husserl specifies that "the broadest concept of literature" ( 1 60) comprises all ideal formations. ) . the latter supposes a spontaneous neutraliza­ tion of the factual existence of the speaking subject. here . for example. they must always be capable of being expressible in discourse and translatable . I t i s through these themes. Husserl did not invent such a possibility . p. i . the formations of literary art" ( 1 60 [modified]). Pure-interconnections-of history. it is identical throughout its innumerable utterances by any given persons" ( 1 6 1 [modified]). Insofar as this ideal object con­ fronts language as such. outside which there is nothing. then. he annihilated them in their existence (as existents)" ( " System of 1 803. The l atter charac­ terizes the type of intentional i nclusion of every noema in conscious lived experience. 61 This ideality of the object. of words. N o doubt language i s "thoroughly made u p of ideal objectivities . For if the latter resists or opposes anything. Therefore . on a great many points. Besides. does this not mean that these possibilities are not in themselves historical? Not at an . the word Lowe [lion] occurs only once in the German lan­ guage . once having reached the level of ideal Objectivity. C ited by Maurice Blanchot in La Part dufeu (Paris: Gallimard. 39. since. or graphic mate­ rializations. The ideal object is the absolute model for any object whatever. li2 The linguistic neutralization of existence is an original idea only in the technical and thematic signification that phenomenology gives it. apriori-thought-of history. is only the practice of an immediate eidetic . . devoted to ' ' The I deality of All Species of Objectiv ities Over Again st the Constituting Consciousness" and the " universal ideality of a ll intentional unities" (pp. 325. This movement is analogous to what we analyzed earlier: the ideal Objectivity of geometry is first presented as a characteristic common to an forms of language and culture.) Hegel also writes : "The first act . whatever the intended type of existent may be and however it may be intended (even if than the natural existent.e . for objects in general.

In th is section. 1 8. neologisms. It can be spoken of only by transforming the natural function of language" ( Letter of May 1 1 ." for exam ple) to the fact that " H usserl does not pose the problem of a 'transcendental language. 1 60). Cah iers de Royaumont. tr. " for " language does not know the phenomenological reduction and so holds us in the natural attitude" (A Study ofHusserI' s Logic." and so on . it is set squarely in the eidetic world of significations or pure lived experiences . about the language which at least seems to suppose the sphere of fonnal logic that we j ust excluded. cited by Gaston Berger. transcendental purifi­ cation cannot mean the disconnection of all transcendents. These questions can show the need for a certain renewed and rigorous philological or " etymological" thematic . " between " origin" in the ordinary sense and phenomenological "orig in . This transcendental reduction of eide­ tics. so remarkably denounced by Feuerbach in his " Contribution to the C ritique of H egel ' s Philosophy" ( 1 839) ( cf. ' " H e wonders if. the univoc ity of expression and certain precautions taken within and with the help of language itself (distinctions. p. " Meanwh ile we cannot disconnect transcendents indefinitely. th is task never seems to have appeared urgent to Husserl . It is rather significant that every critical enterprise. which would precede the discourse of phenomenology. the phenomenological reduction "cannot be presented by means of s imple sentences of the natural attitude. 1 936. p. but no possbility [sic 1 of a science of pure con­ sciousness" (Ideas I. for example . On the basis o f the problems in t h e Origin . is made B:l The Idea of Phenomenology: Husser/ian Exemplarism . And so once more we see a certain non­ dependence confirmed in that phenomenology. provided the " logical axioms " are maintained. [modified] . That is why. HusserI is very con­ scious of this and he exposes these difficulties with the greatest clarity in Ideas 1. 1 28. Thi s is e xplicitly so in FTL (§2. But. 1 960] . Breckon (Evanston: Northwestern U niversity Press. which in its most radical moment must still turn us back toward a new and irreducibly necessary eidetic . AIthusser [Paris : Presses Universitaires de France .'i'i By imag­ ining that the Origin will first indicate the possibility of history as the possibility of language. For Husserl. 1 972] . FTL. 66 This is a difficulty that Fink has frequently underscored (particularly in his famous article in Kan tstudien of 1 933 ["The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism " ] ) . . what is the origin . Similarly . 229) . the nonthematic and dogmatically rece ived sense of the word " hi story" or of the word " origin"-a sense wh ich . In any c ase . 27) and in the Origin. we are calculating how difficult is every attempt to reduce (in some ultimate and radical transcendental regression) a phenomenology of historicity . to the very extent that language is not " natural . p. p. and §5 . U nlike Heidegger. concerning the expression " intentional life . Kathleen McLaughlin [ Evanston: Northwestern U niversity Press. What is the unitary ground starting from which this diffraction of sense is permitted and intelligible? What is history. e ven when the i dea of l i nguistic " reactivation" takes on so much importance for h im . quotation marks." he attributes a certain equivocation in the u sage of operative concepts (that of " constitution . pp. juridical or transcendental. sometimes in another? So long as the notion of origin in general is not criticized as such . and so on) w ill always be sufficient guarantees of rigor and nonworldline ss . 49). And in his admirable lecture on " Les concepts operatoires dans la phenomenologie de Husserl . 6 4 Ibid. we can thu s g o o n t o ask ourselves. the specific problem of language-its origin and i ts usage in a transcendental phenomenology-has always been excl uded or deferred.68 Jacques Derrida 69 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry "reduction is implicitly carried out-simply performed and not yet made explicit-as soon as language is considered on its own account. it would be absurd for sense not to precede---d e jure (and here the de jure is difficult to make clear rune evidence difficile D-the act of language whose own value will always be that of expression . as the common focus of these s ignifications. I. p. creates in effect some considerable difficulties. about wh ich we can say that we must understand them sometimes in one sense." it paradoxically offers the most dangerous resistance to the phe­ nomenological reduction. For him.:. For Husserl. the radical vocation i s always threatened by this mythology of the absolute beginning. because it supposes that all the problems which it would have to precede are resolved . 2 1 . permits us to distinguish between factual " history" and intentional "hi story . devoted to the necessary but difficult reduction of formal ontology and fonnal logic once all the transcendents of the material eidetics have been excluded. § 1 . p. 1 59) . after the reduction. xxxi ) . he almost never indulges in e tymological variations. tr.1 9) . in particular. A fonnidable task. it does not detennine but follows the orientation of the investigation. axioms (like the principle of contradiction) " whose universal and absolute validity" the description of pure con­ sciousness could " make transparent by the help of e xamples taken from the data of its own domain" (p. The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy. what i s the hidden sense . The precaution of "quotation marks" only satisfies this im­ perative in an equivocal fashion. and when he does so (cf. where he h as written: "we shall not go into the general problem which also arises here of the origin of language in its ideal existence and its existence in the real world" ( 1 6 1 ) . despite the constant interest it bears (from the Logical Investigations to the Origin ) . Manifestes philosophiques. paradoxi­ cally. § 59. 65 Therefore . Husserl concludes in favor of the possibility of such a reduction. " S. Bachelard evokes the danger of " a surreptitious return to psychologism. as a matter of fact : the interlocutory problem of h istory and that of the possibility of a historical philology . Here we are concerned with the eidetic reduction. it must also entail the reduction of constituted eidetics and then of its own language. despite the remarkable analyses which are devoted to it . one can still "have at his disposal a Logos in the same sense as before" (in Husserl. revaluation and reactivation of old words. Garry L. that of pure consciousness. tr. For if the phenomenological reduction is taken in its fullest sense. 1 8-2 1 ) . L. But he says nothing about the language of this ultimate science of pure consciousness. pp. and transcendental discourse will remain " Ii:l " Ii·t irreducibly obliterated by a certain ambiguous worldliness. since otherwise a pure con­ sciou sne ss might indeed remain over. for this reason it seems more difficult to say that "a thought which moves solely on the level of language is necessarily in the attitude of the phenomenological reduction [our emphasis] . 1 974) . p.

is here a "bound" directly suppose the subtle as well as indispensable distinctions found in the LI (nos. 24 1ff. Under those circumstances the tie to a de facto anthropological gen­ erality would not be reduced any further. pp. as the percep­ tion of the immediately present sensible thing grounds idealities under those circumstances. 48 of Vol. 68 Husserl used a great number of examples when analyzing this distinction for the fi r st time in the LI (I. 6 7 Vol. "L'Analyse intentionnelle et Ie probleme de la pensee speculative" [French tr. " but an " object of receptiv­ ity. in any case. to a real spatiotemporality � it remains interrelated in its very ideal Objectivity with the de facto existence of a given language and thus with the factual subjectivity of a certain speaking community. the analyses concerning linguistic ideality in the Origin languages. . The flesh and blood lion. phonetic . " Did not Herder. then. and 1 . It will be empirically conditioned by the contingent en­ counter in a receptive intuition of something like the lion. with respect to this latter. 64-65)? That is only one of the numerous analogies which could be taken up between the different futures of Kantian and Husserlian transcendental idealisms. pp. like the latter. already reproach Kant for not taking into consid­ eration the intrinsic necessity of language and its immanence in the most apriori act of thought? Did not the author of the Essay on the Origin of Language [tr. §5. an imagining.9 The ideality of its sense and of what it evokes irreducibly adheres to an empirical subjectivity. " [po 25 1 ] . Just as the core unity of noematic sense (which is not the reality of the object itself) can be intended according to various intentional modes (the sense " tree" can be attained in a perception. " In the Foreword to the 2nd edition of LI ( 1 9 1 3 . 1799. § 1 1 . which comes back to the difference between ideal objectivity and real object.(. especially in the first and fourth Investigations. this reflection is always focused. pp. Alexander Gode in On the Origin of Language (New York: Frederick U ngar. tot�lly free. a memory. §90. I . cf. is then freed from all factual linguistic subjectivity.). 1952]. on the world of culture and history. " But its timelessness (ZeitLosigkeit) or its supratemporality ( Uberzeit­ lichkeit) is only a " mode" of temporality: omnitemporality (Allzeitlichkeit). ed. I I of the German ed. 250tf. 286-87). Is this immediacy the nearness of thought to itself? We would have to show why that cannot be decided.e. . It is a reduction of the reduction and opens the way to an infinite discursiveness. Bruxelles: Culture et Civilisation. Thus.. and therefore contingent. particularly § 12. This would be true even if all men had been able to and could in fact encounter and designate the lion. in the pure passivity of sensible receptivity." or the " nuclea­ tic layer" (Kernschicht) of the noema. " from "the expression " to what Husserl calls in the Logical Investigations the "intentional content" or " the unity of its signification . and so on) in order finally to constitute a "complete" noema with all its characteristics. " Therefore we cross into a higher degree of ideal Objectivity-let us call it secondary-as soon as we pass from the word to the unity of the sense "lion . 1 966)] also conclude that language. made all aprioriness of s ynthetic judgments impossible or illusory? The inability of received language to be treated themat­ ically. as a German word. particularly pp. "(.]. is amply described in EJ (§63 . In the First Investigation. without having to succumb to empiri­ cism . a notion the former implies and which is fully elaborated only in Ideas I (in particular. But it remains essentially tied. in Problemes actuels de La phenomenologie. to Vol. or graphic incarnations. The translatability of the word lion. This explains why the return on itself of thought which has never wanted to prescribe anything but a turning back [rep/i] toward its own proper conditions remains more dif­ ficult for the " master" than for the "disciple . . "timeless. rpt. Only within a facto-historical language is the noun "Lowe" free. an irreducible proximity of language to primordial thought is signified in a zone which eludes by nature every phenomenal or thematic actuality. This is because the ideality of sense. the irreal object is.r. and its ideal identity assures its translatability. in which juridicalness would like to be completely transparent. and so forth . We be­ come conscious of this vulnerability or of this vocation to silence in a second reflection on the possibility of the jur�dico-transcendental regression itself. p. pp. is a natural. Introd. Walter Biemel and Jean Ladriere] . and therefore ideal. so the contingency of the l ion is going to reverber­ ate in the ideality of the expression and in that of its sense. i. .). compared with its sensible. Its ideal Objectivity is then relative and distinguishable only as an empirical fact from that of the French or English word " lion. intended through two strata of idealities. 2 vols. such as they are already outlined. But the word' s degree of ideal Objectivity is only. reality. I of ET). The objectivities of the understanding are on a "higher level" than those of receptivity. the notion of " intentional content" or "unity of its significa­ tion" announces in the linguistic sphere the notion of "noematic sense. "The mode of their original pregivenness is f their production in the predicative activity o the Ego . This ideal identity of sense expressed by lion. will not in principle be absolute and universal. The same content can be intended starting from several " IH vulnerable by the irreducible factuality and the natural naivete of its language. so the ideal identity of signification is made accessible to several lan­ guages and allows itself to be "translated. Like those of FTL. Attentiveness to the "fact" of language in which ajuridical thought lets itself be transcribed. 69 The difference between these two types of Objectivity. Despite its necessarily speCUlative style. .70 Jacques Derrida 71 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry primary. 1 . 1-5). Van Breda [Paris: Descl ee de Brouwer. is a return to factuality as the de jure character of the de jure itself. but in predicative spontaneity. Lowe. Whereas the real object has its individual place in the objective time of the world. 1 969. 259 and 284-85. rooted in cultural experience and in history. L. we could say. in his Verstand und f Er ahrung: Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der rein en Vernunft [Leipzig. an inability which precedes every critical regression as its shadow-is not the unavowed dogmatism he thus denounces that geschichtlose "Naivitiit" about which Fink wonders whether it is not the basis for "phenomenology' s methodological revolu­ tion" (cf. Husserl recognizes that the notion of noema and of the noetic-noematic correlation lacks completion in the First Investigation. Another difference: that of their temporality (§64). H. They are not preconstituted. considered in itself and l ike that of language. But the "object" itself is neither the expression nor the sense­ content. leo. The latter is not an "objectivity of the understanding.

" whereas I know it to be false and out-of-date . We do not speak here of validity. No doubt the objective sense of a false judgment is also ideal. nonetheless. The ideal Objectivity of geometry is absolute and without any kind of limit. idealities " bound" to an empirical. ideal­ identical. and within each language it is again the same. Prol. indeed all of geometry. For this reason it can be indefi n itely repeated and thus becomes omnitemporal. reality belongs to nature : the world as the world of realities receives its individuality from nature as its lowest stratum . I. p. falseness. they are omnispatial and omnitemporal. Likewise. however. as a supposition. 71 But the origin and the possibility of this ideal omni­ temporality remain marked by a factual contingency. to take up HusserI' s example again. This reproach i s very enlightening. pp. §59. I . e tc . Also cf. as we wiII soon try to show. free idealities are also factual and worldly. I can indefi n itely repeat. Nevertheless. The latter. 267). All adherence to any real contingency is removed. For. Its ideality tertiary is no longer only that of the expression or in­ tentional content. is opened ad infinitum: "The Pythagorean theorem. true states of affairs in the sense of theoretical science. A judgment wh ich was once true can cease to be true. " which is only implied in the Origin 70 (but indis­ pensable for its understanding). in de­ scriptive judgments bearing on worldly realities. intentional poles. they have their territory in the totality of the [mundane] universe and in every possible universe . then these are free idealities . to Mars. Bound realities [the German and Derrida' s translation thereof reads: Bound idealities] are bound to Earth . sense can lose its va­ lidity without simultaneously losing its omnitemporal ideality ." which is the essential mode of the object's ideal existence and thus that which dis­ tinguishes the object from the multiplicity of related acts and lived experiences. " (Hu sserl ' s emphasis) . and traditional ideal identity is not just any geometrical objectivity . " b y their coming on the scene and their " 'being discovered' " in a historically determined territory. for having confused ideality and normativity (LI. since absolutely objective. 285. assign limits to the "freedom" of those idealities which will always be . the ugly. This dissociation between "free idealities " and "bound idealities. we can read there: " Thus it appears that even cultural systems are not always completely free idealities. They are bound to no territory .72 73 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry Jacques Derrida ideality and not a "free " one . we can still encounter a factual restriction : that of disvalue . § I I . from the original expression and writing-down to the innumerable oral utterances or written and other documentations (Dokumentierungen) " ( 1 60). no matter how many times it has been sensibly uttered . For what absolutely frees and completes the ideality of sense (already endowed in itself with a certain degree of "freedom") is the ideality of positive validity (by which evidence is not only distinct but clear when it reache s j udgment) . seems to have been clearly defined in these very terms by Herbart (Psychologie als Wissenschaft. 2 1 6-18) . irreal identity" (§64 c. but merely of objectivities of the understanding as suppositions [Verm einheiten] and as possible. determined temporality or to some factuality. it has its supratemporal. The sense of "only once" or of "once and for all.' which lost its validity in the age of the airplane . to particular territories . that b y their " occurrence . error also has a content which can become ideal and omnitemporal (error results either from the 71 Once again it is in Experience and Judgment that the omnitemporality of simple ideality is scrupulously distinguished from the omnitemp orality of validity : " Furthermore . or datedness [peremption ] . 70 From the perspective of our text . the absurd. it can be constituted anew at any time as one and identical by any individual in the self-evidence of distinctness: and . I t is identically the same in the 'original language' of Euclid and in all 'translations' . These analyses. which in their being-sense carry reality with them and hence belong to the real world. which can be ' realized' anew at any time in individual acts of judgment-precisely as suppositions. reproaches him. I . Once we get beyond the bound idealities and reach ideal objectivity itself. The possibility of translation. 1 75) and taken up again by Husserl. enables us to comprehend what the absolute ideal Objectivity of. 26 1 [modified)) . exists only once. this dissociation finds its most direct and illum inat­ ing explication in EJ (§ 65 . But originally . In particular. recognizing that he owes much to Herbart and praising him for having distinguished better than Kant between the - logical and the psychological . it is that of the object itself. at the same time that they announce and orient a phenomenol­ ogy of the specific ideality of negative validities (of the fal se . . p . and this reveals the diff erence between free idealities (such as logicomathematical systems and pure essential structures of every kind) and bound idealities. like the proposition 'The automobile is the fastest means of travel. of truth . as the same. In what concerns their possible reactivation. II. translatable. When we speak of truths. for example. ) . it should be noted that this omnitemporality does not simply include within itself the omnitemporality of validity. whether they are realized in the self-evidence of truth is another qu estion. the proposition: " The automobile is the fastest means of travel . which is identi­ cal with that of tradition . § 1 20. . and of the fact that validity 'once and for all' and 'for everyone' belongs to their sense as the telos of j udicative stipulation. The anachrony of validity in no way affects the intemporality [uch ronie ] or pantemporality [pan­ chronie ] of ideality . that of the reality intended by the judgment or that of su bjective acts. p. It alone causes sense to attain infinite universality and infinite omnitemporality . Thus. or rather. no matter how often or even in what language it may be expressed. LI. in the interconnections of a non­ descriptive science such as geometry. etc . In the Origin Husserl also alludes to the ideal identity of judgments which not only would be anachronistic in their validity but also contradictory and absurd in their sense­ content. All reality is here led back to spatiotempo­ rality as the form of the individual . Husserl immediately spec ifies. Thus he states the crucial difficulty of all his phi­ losophy of history: what is the sense of this last factuality? p. but genuine objectivity . the evil. the geometrical object can be and what distinguishes it from that of language as such and from that of the sense-content as such .

Hu sserl added them after the fact to Fink's typed version of the manuscript. not be asked apropos linguistic ideality as such .74 Let us first note that in this sentence the sense of the assertion the : 'the �e" "about which [something] is said. . 285-86. Husser! can then ask the historico74 Thus �he space for a transcendental historicity is prescribed in all its �mg �atIc d �pth . s �bJectivity. . of contingent eventuality. and quite different ones from those coming under the concept of language" ( 1 6 1 [modified]). that if the omnitemporality of disvalue is possible. . Objectivity. even if what they assert is false and absurd. So here sci �nce is. a sensible factuality is reintroduced. the content that the three p erpen­ diculars o a triangle intersect in a point. these themes are already greatly explicate d . then. " to be what it is. . But what they judge . Objectivity of language.f�ct of language in general. states of affaIrs. The ideality of sense symbolically puts up with a deluded or inauthentically satisfied truth-intention. At the end of a similar analysis. unknown to us. We simul­ taneously �eac ? �n Objec �ivity that is absolutely free with respect to all fac �ual . ItS dIfficultIes) to this space . For example. p. For the first time. then. " ] It is an identity in the strict sense . Later we shall look more closely into this distinction between intending and fulfilling signification" (modified] . H usserl writes: "What my assertion asserts. what the assertion says. but its pure possibility appears only through a reduction of all language-not only of every de facto language but of the . is never and can never be thematic � And the theme here is precisely ideal objectivities. " and the object itself are IdentIcal . a unity in plurality . like languages and language in general.e not th� idealities that make up what is expressed and brought to validity as trut? . it is always in the sense of empirical possibility . 1 . really describes a movement analogous to what we earlier described: science was a cul­ tural form. (The first f German edition and the French translation continue: " Each time I (or whoever else it may be ) pronounce with the same sense this same assertion . that about which it is said (its sense). . its histo ricity is intrin sic and essen tial. geometry. This intention must (in the Eurycleian lan­ guage which the Stranger of the Sophist speaks) own up to [dire ] the telos in order to disown [de dire ] it. 1 . is all the same thing . it follows that: III III A notion difficult to translate other than by the clumsy . " If ' possibility' or ' truth ' is lacking. but its pure possibility appeared as the pure possibility of 72 culture only after a reduction of every de facto culture. " It is the same in the case of aB assertions . This transgression of linguistic ideality. . one can distinguish what is thematIc . but still bound. we have not reached the truth of geometrical S a chverh a lt. neither arises nor passes away .etc. 72 and even when the very theme of the statement remains bound to factuality . B ut as the absolute ideal objectivity does not lIve a tapas ouranios. 7:. 2.�eld de ] this ideality . a 'genu ine ' signification. one and the same geometrical truth. . That IS why the exemplary question of the origin of ObjectIVIty co� ld . but apropos what IS mtended across [d travers ] and on the other side of [�u.s give the greatest and most exemplary sharpness to the central question of the Origin. § 1 1 . It then lacks. Be­ sides. one of the forms of Ideal . authenticity . a fact which could never result in the case of real objects or of : 'bo�nd" ideal objectivities . An eventually absurd intention. � ts fre �?om with resp ect to all factu al subje ctivi bare ItS legItImate [de droit ] ties with a transcendental ty has only laid subjectivi ty. This is because I know that such an outdated proposi­ tion had been true and still remains unified and animated by an intention of truth. absurd in the sense of " nonsense" or " countersense . 27). " 7:1 I n the LI. these sentence. once the strata of already defined idealities is traversed. must continu­ ally point (in spite of itself) toward the telos of authenticity and let itself be guided symbolically by it in the very gesture in which the intention pretends to be disoriented. there is a new j udgment . Wherever something is asserted. with the absolute IdealIty of an object-the geometrical object which is through and through only the unity of its true sense-we pass beyond or rid our­ selves of the ideal. and l ess exact (but for so long accepted) expression " s tate-of-affairs . or "clarity" (Klarheit)-these terms are in cer­ tain respects synonyms for Husserl-that I can maintain and repeat the ideal unity of its sense. . Even in such cases we distinguish their ideal content from the transient acts (of] affirming or asserting it: it is the signification of the assertion. the latter are ideal geometrical objects. verSIon of 1 939. It follows. strange . a ' true ' . After having determined and provided access (with all B y the distinction they propose. during the asserting. in which 'fulness' its value for knowledge consists. Husserl writes in FTL: locutions "are not thematic ends but theme-indicators " (§5 . I . pp . e. omnitemporality is maintained in its eventuality only by a sense which always keeps up a certain essential relation with the absent or exceeded truth. i. an assertion' s intention can only be carried out symbolically: it cannot derive any 'fulness' from intuition or from the categorial functions performed on the latter. They do not appear in the published . The content of error can become such even when (in error or assumption).74 Jacques Derrida 75 I ntroduction to the Origin of Geometry logico-deductive handling of symbols which are void of their sense and into which . Thus Husserl specifies in an absolutely deCISIve sentence: " But the idealities of geometrical words sentences theories--considered purely as linguistic formations-a. as one says. or from some psychological contingency having no sense in comparison with geometrical truth) . from the assertion which itself. .

to that of a factual community. The paradox is that. which would be what it is only through its historical and intersubjective circulation. the concrete mode of temporal­ ity in general.76 Jacques Derrida 77 I ntroduction to the Origin of Geometry transcendental question which focuses all the disquietude of his text: " Our problem now concerns precisely the ideal objectivities which are thematic in geometry: how does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin. 84. so to speak. " tr. insofar as it is not confused in its pure possibility with any de facto empirical language. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. "Supratemporality" � � � 70 The expression "transcendental language" that we use here doe s not have the sense " Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man . on the one hand. invoked earlier. the geometrical formation would remain ineffable and soli­ tary. 77 Cf. VI Husserl ' s response is direct and comes very quickly. 1 964) . a fall which would alienate the ideal purity of sense. is in actual fact present. for truth itself. " The only question. Speech is no longer simply the expression (Aiisserung) of what. the transcendental . After having so patiently extracted the thematic truth of Sachverhalt from linguistic ideality and from all "bound" idealities. p. as a return home to culture and history in general. they appear as omnitemporality (Allzeitlichkeit). 1 964) . Historical incarna­ tion sets free the transcendental. tr. all of which he reduced in order to have the pure possibility of truth emerge? Is he not " bound" again to lead into history that whose absolute "freedom" hejustdescribed? From then on. without it. is how (Quomodo): " how does linguistic incarnation make out of the merely intrasubjective formation the Objective. Once the latter is reduced. ed. that which. now and always. in order to recover finally the real text of historical experience � In reality-and we think it the most interesting difficulty of thIS text-Husserl does exactly the opposite. James M . one for which every subject speaking a determined language and belonging to a determined cultural community is in fact responsible. will he not be compelled to remove all the reductions step by step. Here we are speak109 of transcendental language insofar as. the extrinsic and accidental possibility of a fall lOtO the body of speech or of a slip into a historical movement. Richard C . " On the Phenomenology of Language . But once more it is only a question of � isc1osing . which opens onto a transcendental lan­ guage. This return to language. We might be surprised.7i 73 According t o t h e same movement.. revolutionize Husserl's thought?7h Does this return to the speak­ ing subject as what constitutes the ideal object. for example. brings to its final comple­ tion the purpose of the reduction itself. its linguistic flesh" ( 1 6 1 [modified]). speech constitutes the object and is a concrete juridical condition of truth. proceed to contradict a previous philosophy of language? Merleau-Ponty speaks of a " striking" contrast in this respect between the Origin on the one hand and the Logical Investigations on the other. pp . This last notion. as geometrical proposition in its geometrical ideal sense?" ( 1 6 1 [modified]). Thus. omnitemporality a n d universal intelligibility (al­ though they may be concrete and experienced as suc h) are only the reduction of ( Uberzeitlichkeit) and "timelessness" (Zeit/osigkeit) are defined i n the ir transcendence or their negativity only in rela tion to worldly and factual temporality . But the Objectiv­ ity of this truth could not be constituted without the pure possibility of an inquiry into a pure language in general. Without this pure and essential possibility. sense would remain an empirical formation imprisoned as fact in a psychological subjectivity-in the inventor' s head. Whether geometry can be spo�en about is not. and then absolute Ob­ jectivity. then. It would become neither omnitemporal. without the apparent fall back into language and thereby into history. must then be rethought. John Wild in Merleau-Ponty ' s The Pri­ macy of Perception. Husserl then seems to redescend toward language as the in­ dispensable medium and condition of possibility for absolute ideal Ob­ jectivity. Husserl notes that "we see" this "in advance. does Husserl not come back to language. indeed to a particular f moment of that life. as geometrical concept or state of affairs. Ideality comes to its Objectivity " by means of language. instead of binding it. and. or even f��tual historical temporality and factual geographical spatial ity . where it is a formation produced within the conscious space of the first inventor' s soul. already being valid in its linguistic expression as geometrical discourse.a juridical and transcendental dependence. has been utilized by lOk 10 the sense of discourse adapted to transcendental description. nor intel­ ligible for all: it would not be what it is. " in Merleau-Ponty ' s Signs. No doubt geometncal truth IS beyond every particular and factual linguistic hold as such. intelligible for all. 83-84.7. culture. the latter is "constituting" compared with ideal Objectiv ity . " Th is latter notion. Does this ultimate reduction . Then it would be absolutely bound to the psychological life of a actual individual. to its ideal Objectivity?" ( 1 6 1 [modified]). through which it receives. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Going beyond ' 'bound ideali­ ties" toward the theme of truth is itself a reduction which makes the independence of truth appear with respect to all de facto culture and language in general. . and history. then. It has the style of a turnabout which can be surprising. would already be an object: caught again in its primordial purity. on the other hand. o "t anscendental discourse .

78 Jacques Derrida

79

Introduction to the Origin of Geometry

Undoubtedly the Logical Investigations w � s . mo:e intere �t� d only in what corresponds to a first phase of descnptlOn � n the Orzgln: the a� ­ tonomy of constituted ideal objects compared � It� � language th �t IS itself constituted. But in reaction against a subjectivIst psychologIsm , the question is above all to dissociate the ideal . object from al � sub­ jectivity and all empirical language, bo�h o.f wh.Ich. cou �d only , con­ fuse" the transparent, univocal, and ObjectIve sIgmfic. atIons ?f a .pure logic. But the return to the primordiality of the speakmg subject IS no more in contrast with this first appro �ch to language th �n. th� " idealism" of Ideas I is, as was thought, wIth the appa.rent " l�gIcism , . or " realism" of the Logical Investigations. The questIon IS SI �ply to parenthesize constituted language, which is w� at Husse� l con�mues to . do in Formal and Transcendental Logic and m the Orzgln, m order, subsequently, to let the originality of constitutive language come to light . . .. To constitute an ideal object is to put it at the permanent dISpoSItIOn ?f a pure gaze . Now, before being the constituted and exceed�d a� xI.I­ iary of an act which proceeds toward the tr� th of sense, ImgUlstI.C ideality is the milieu in which the ideal object settles as w�at IS sedimented or deposited. But here the act of primordial depositing I � not the recording of a private thing, but the production of a common object, i .e. , of an object whose original owner is thus disposses �ed . Thus lan­ guage preserves truth , so that trut.h ca � be regarded In the h.ence­ forth nonephemeral illumination of ItS sOjourn; but �lso so that It can lengthen that stay. For there would be no truth wItho � t that word­ hoarding [th esaurisation ] , which is not on.ly what .deposlts and keeps hold of the truth, but also that without WhICh a proJect of truth and t �e idea of an infinite task would be unimaginable. That is why langu.age IS the element of the only tradition in which (beyond individual fimtude) sense-retention and sense-prospecting are possible. In this respect there is so little discontinuity or contrast between Husserl's earliest and latest thought that we find pages i.n t�e Logic�l Investigations which could be inscribed without � odificatlOn I � th � Orz­ . gin ' pages on the essential function of Dokumentlerung, on the spmtual cor�oreality" of language, and on the state�ent as th� fulfilling of the truth-intention.7H This is all the more so If we consIder Formal and
Thu s, for example, Husserl write s : "All theoretical research, though by no mea� s solely conducted in acts of verbal expression or complete state ent, none t he less termi­ , nates in such statement. Only in this form can truth , and 10 particular t he truth of theory, . become an abiding possession of science, a documented, ever available tr asure for
7H

Transcendental Logic (particularly §§ 1-5, pp. 1 8-29) and the Cartesian Meditations (§4 , p. I I ) . Each time , Hu sserl begins by uprooting thought

from what it would be " solely . . . in the act of verbal expression ," in order to specify then that it could not become " truth" without that "stating" and " communicating . . . to others, " of which he also spoke in the Investigations (LI, I, Intro. Vol . II of German Ed. , § 3 , p. 2 55 ) . For, is the recognition in language of what constitutes absolute ideal Objectivity, as far as it states this Objectivity, not just another way of announcing or repeating that transcendental intersubjectivity is the condition of Objectivity? At bottom, the problem of geometry' s origin puts the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity on par with that of the phenomenological origin of language. Husserl is very con­ scious of this.7!J But he will not attempt this difficult regression in the Origin , although he says it "arises here" ( 1 6 1 ) . For the moment it suffices to know, if not how, at least that language and consciousness of fellow humanity are interrelated possibilities and already given the moment the possibility of science is established. The horizon of fellow mankind supposes the horizon of the world: it stands out and articulates its unity against [se detache et articule son unite sur] the unity of the world. Of course, the world and fellow mankind here designate the all-inclusive , but infi n itely open, unity of possible experiences and not this world right here , these fellow men right here, whose factuality for Husserl is never anything but a variable example. Consciousness of being-in-community in one and the same world establishes the possibil­ ity of a universal language. Mankind is fi r st conscious of itself ' 'as an immediate and mediate linguistic community" ( 1 62) . In connection with this we need to note three important points : 1 . Within the horizon of this consciousness of fellow mankind, it is "mature , normal " mankind that is "privileged , " both "as the horizon of civilization and as the linguistic community" ( 1 62 ) . The theme of
pronou ncemen ts has a necessa ry grou nding in essence , it is at least plain that judgem ents stemm ing from h igher intellec tual regions , and in particu lar from the regions of science , could barely arise withou t verbal expres sion" (LI, I , Introd. to Vol . II of German ed . , §2, p. 250) .

knowledge and advancing research . Whatever the connection of thought with speech may be , whether or not the appearance of our final judgements in the form of verbal

7!i Already in FTL, on the subject of the " idealizi ng presup position s of logic" and tying the problem of constitution with that of express ion, H u sserl conclu ded: " The problem of constit ution is again broadened when we recall that verbal expression, which we exclud ed from our conside rations of logic , is an essenti al presup position for intersubject ive think­ ing and for an intersu bjectiv ity of the theory accepted as ideally existin g ; and that accord ­ i ngly an ideal identifi ability of the expres sion, as expres sion, must likewise raise a prob­ lem of consti tution " (§73 , p. 188) .

81 80 Jacques Derrida Introduction to the Origin of Geometry

adult normality, which took up more and more room in HusserI's analyses, is here treated as a matter of course. We will not stress this,H O despite the serious problems that it seems to have �o P? se �or a transcendental philosophy: how can maturity and normahty gIVe fIse to a rigorous transcendental-eidetic determination? Could adult normality ever be considered other than as an empirical and factual modification of universal transcendental norms in the classic sense, from which con­ tinually stem those other empirical "cases," madness and childhood? But here too Husserl has overthrown this classic notion of "transcendental, " to the point of giving a sense to the idea of transcendental pathology.HI The notion of (adult normality' s) privilege" denotes here a telos' meddling beforehand in the eidos. To have access to the eidos of mankind and of language, certain men and certain speaking subjects-madmen and children-are not good exam­ ples. And first, no doubt, because they do not possess in their own right a pure and rigorously determinable essence. But if this is so, does adult normality, which begins where childhood ends and stops when madn�ss starts, have an essence? Because here the expression of adult normalIty is not a given eidetic determination , but the index of an ideal no� ativ­ ity which is on the horizon of de facto normal adults. In proportion to our advancement in the spiritual world and then in history, the eidos ceases to be an essence in order to become a norm, and the concept of horizon is progressively substituted for that of structure and essence. 2 . The possibility of a mediate or immediate horizon of universal language risks running into essential difficulties and limits. This possi­ bility first supposes that the hazardous problem concerning the possibil­ ity of a "pure grammar" and "a priori norms" of language is resolved, a possibility Husserl never ceased to take for granted.H2 . It sU'ppo � �, next, that everything " is namable in the broadest sense, I.e. , hngmstI. •

RO

And Other Essay

.] western University Press, 1973), pp . 97-99

mena: here. [Cf. Derrid a' s Speech and Pheno We propose to come back to th is elsew tf. David B . Alliso n (Evan ston: North s on Husserl' s Theory of Signs,

cally expressible" : " everyone can talk about what is within the sur­ rounding world of his civilization as Objectively existing" ( 1 62 [modified]). In other words, as heterogeneous as the essential structures of several constituted languages or cultures may be, translation in prin­ ciple is an always possible task: two normal men will always have a prioriH3 consciousness of their belonging together to one and the same humanity, living in one and the same world . Linguistic differences­ and what they imply-will appear to them at the bottom of an apriori horizon or structure: the linguistic community, i.e. , the immediate cer­ ta�nty of both being speaking subjects who can never designate any­ thmg bu t what belongs to the horizon of their world as the irreducibl y common horizon of their experience. This implies that they can always, immediately or not, stand together before the same natural existent­ which we can always strip of the cultural superstructures and categories founded (fundiert) on it, and whose unity would always fur­ nish the ultimate arbitration for every misunderstanding. Consciousness of confronting the same thing, an object perceived as such,H--l is con­ sciousness of a pure and precultural we. Here the return to preculture is not regression toward cultural primitiveness but the reduction of a de­ termined culture, a theoretical operation which is one of the highest forms of culture in general. This purely natural objective existent is the existing sensible world, which becomes the first ground of communica­ tion, the permanent chance for the reinvention of language . As the most universal , the most objectively exhibited element given to us, the earth itself is what furnishes the first matter of every sensible object. Insofar as it is the exemplary element (being more naturally objective, more permanent, more solid, more rigid, and so forth , than all other elements; and in a broader sense, it comprises them), it is normal that the earth has furnished the ground for the first idealities, then for the first abso­ lutely universal and objective identities, those of calculus and geometry. But preculturally pure Nature is always buried. So, as the ultimate
M�

81 In crisis is presen ted as a " sickne 270). ThiS " something like nature doctor s" (p . not " natural" and gets no relief from a fall into " passiv ity ," of ver, has the profou nd ethica l sense of " pathology , " moreo or authent1 " for sense in an authentic activity inabil ity to be rendered " respo nsible is a passiv ity in compan­ of scienc e also) as such "reac tivatio n ." Technical activity (that m. sick and , alread y, the tremors of deliriu son to sense ; it is the agitation of the the philos ophic al option that to this theme and 82 Cf. LI, J, 4. On Husse rl ' s faithfu lness . 1 ] , pp . A Study of Hussert's Logic [part J, C h orients it, cf. in particular S. Bache lard,

�f Huma nity" (in C), the . phenomen�n " Philos ophy and the Crisis of Europ ean e , a SIckne ss whIch � s ss" of Europ ean society and cultur

But both still have to meet. The question here, then, is only that of a material ,

therefore in a certain sense contingent, a priori (cf. above) .

� �

H4 Jt i s the " as such" of the object' s substantial and objective un ity which i s decisive here . In part ic u lar it distinguishes human intersubjectivity from that wh ich is created between animals, men and animals, c hildren, etc . All those finite c ommunitie s also rest on the feeling of a presence to the same world whereby they confront the same things , and so on , but in a nonobjective, nontheoretical consciousness-which does not posit the object "as such " in its independence and as the pole of infinite determination. Those lower commu­ nities can also g i ve rise to a specific phenomenology, and Husserl devoted important unpublished fragments to them .

8-1 1 .

82 Jacques Derrida

83 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry

possibility for communication, it is a kind of inaccessible infra-ideal. Can we not say , then, just the opposite of what Husserl said? Are not non-communication and misunderstanding the very horizon of culture and language? Undoubtedly misunderstanding is always a factual hori­ zon and the finite index of the infinite pole of a sound intelligence. But although the latter is always announced so that language can begin, is not finitude the essential which we can never radically go beyond? The above seems all the more true, especially since absolute translatability would be suspended starting the moment the signified could no longer be led back, either directly or indirectly, to the model of an objective and sensible existent. Every l inguistic dimension that would escape this absolute translatability would remain marked by the empirical subjectivity of an individual or society . For Husserl, the model of language is the objective language of science. A poetic lan­ guage, whose significations would not be objects, will never have any transcendental value for him. That fact would have no consequence within Husserlian thought, if his thought were not also the thorough investigation [approfondissement ] of subjectivity. Now subjectivity in general , as much empirical as transcendental, appeared very early to Husserl as inaccessible to a direct, univocal, and rigorous language. Subjectivity is fundamentally ineffable. Already in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, Husserl referred to the ultimate identity of the constitutive flux of immanent time and absolute subjectivity and concluded: " For all this, names are lacking" (§36, p . 100).85 And in the unpublished manuscripts of Group C on prototemporality, he wonders if pre-objective temporality , pretemporality (Vorzeit), is not beyond all discourse (unsagbar) for the " phenomenologizing Ego" (Ms C 1 31 1 5 II, 1934, p. 9). Therefore , language, tradition, and history exist only in­ sofar as objects break the surface. 3 . As the infinite horizon of every possible experience, the world is consequently " the universe of Objects which is linguistically ex­ pressible in its being and its being-such" ( 1 62) . Thus, the signification of the world as horizon is clearly explicated, i.e. , as the infinitely open common place for everything we can encounter in front of and for
H � In the same sense , cf. all �he subtle analyses in the LI devoted to expressions " lack[ing] an objective sense, " such as personal pronouns which " indicate " med iately bllt can never give anything to be seen . "The word T has not itself directly the power to arouse the specific I -presentation; this becomes fi xed in the actual piece of tal k . I t does not work like the word ' lion' which can arouse the idea of a l ion in and by itself. I n i ts case , rather, an indicative function mediates, cry ing as it were , to the hearer ' Your vis-a-vis i ntends h imself' " (I, 1 , § 26 , p . 3 1 6) .

ourselves. In front of and for ourselves implies, then, given as an ob­ ject. The world, therefore , is essentially determined by the dative and horizontal dimension of being perceived [l' etre-perqu ] in a gaze whose object must always be able to be a theorem . Geometrical exemplariness undoubtedly results from the fact that, as an "abstract" material sci­ ence , this exemplariness treats the spatiality of bodies (which is only one of the body' s eidetic components), i . e . , treats what confers sense on the notion of horizon and object. Despite all the antagonistic motifs which animate phenomenology, space' s privilege therein is in certain respects remarkable. It testifies to that "objectivist" tendency which Husserl simultaneously opposes so vigorously, and yet which is only a period, an essential, and therefore irreducible, movement of thought. The profound rhythm of this tension between objectivism and the transcendental motif, a tension so remarkably described in the Crisis, is also imparted to phenomenology. In this respect, the problem of geometry is revealing. Geometry, in effect, is the science of what is absolutely objective­ i.e. , spatiality-in the objects that the Earth, our common place, can indefinitely furnish as our common ground with other men . 86 But if an objective science of earthly things is possible, an objective science of the Earth itself, the ground and foundation of these objects , is as radi­ cally impossible as that of transcendental SUbjectivity. The trans­ cendental Earth is not an object and can never become one . And the possibility of a geometry strictly complements the impossibility of what could be called a "geo-logy, " the objective science of the Earth itself. This is the sense of the fragmentK7 which reduces, rather than
Hfi On the theme of "our Earth " as the " life-world" " in the most comprehensive sense " for a h umanity which lives in community and where one can be "understood" in a communication which must always say and pass through the thi ngs of our Earth , cf. EJ, §38, p p . 1 62-67. Thi s section effectively illuminates, especially by its degree of elabora­ tion , the similarly inspired fragment on the Earth c ited below. In this section , the unity of the Earth i s grounded in the unity and oneness of temporality , the " fundamental form" (Grund form), the "form of all forms" [ibid. , p. 1 64] . Hi This fragment , which i s entitled "Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum Phanomenologischen Ursprung der Raumlichkeit der N atur" [" Fundamental Investiga­ tions on the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of N ature " ] , dated May 1 934, was publi shed in 1 940 by Marvin Farber in Philosophical Essays in Memory o Edmund f Husserl [rpt . Greenwood Press, 1 968] , pp . 307-25 . From the perspective of the science of space , it sketches a movement analogous to that of the Origin , but directed toward kinematics . In a certain sense , it completes the Origin , although in the Origin Husserl c learly specifies that geometry is onl y a title for all mathematics of pure spatiotemporality. This text, very spontaneous and not greatly worked out in its writing, is presented as a

who. Just as one's own body. are bodies. to lay bare the primordial ground buried under the sedimentary deposits of scientific culture and objectivism. its sense can be re-produced as the " same" in the act of recollection� its sense has not returned to life and the intuitively given surrounding world-of th is we learn nothing. there are the same bodies existing on it-'on it . But how formulae in general . starting from which every primordial here can appear on the foundation of the Living Present. is not itself one body among others in the mechanical system . both short of and beyond every body-object-in particular the Copernican earth-as the ground. for it is never exhausted by the work of objectification that proceeds within it: " The Earth is a Whole whose parts . and for which all temporality and all motion appear. as the ground­ body (Bodenkorper) from which alone a Copernican determina­ tion of the earth as body-object becomes possible. " of "corporeality. are bodies (Korper) in a modified sense. above it. since the Earth then is only its factual index. p. it suffices that the latter has produced in himself the identity and the ideal permanence of an object in order to be able to communicate it. 295 [modified]) . ' it is one of the planets." p. " of "Nature in the sense of the natural sciences. Husserl first wonders about the sense of the world in the infinite openness of my surrounding world whose frontiers I can always go beyond. the Earth is the ground and not a body in the full sense" (p . For the Earth cannot become a mobile body: " It is on the Earth . Hu sserl then said. in conformity to the original idea of it. He only recalls that Copernican science presupposes a primordial Earth which this science will never be able to integrate into its objective system. 3 1 5) . The Earth is. grounded in a present. H usserl then " reduces" the Copernican thesis by making the certainty of an Earth-as the origin of every objective kinetic determination-appear as the transcendental presup­ position of this thesis. receive sense on the substratum of "refutes. in the infinite space of the world. on it. I could perceive the earth as a body. by which . the Rest of a ground and a horizon in their common origin and end. The question is to exhume. 3 1 3] . 3 1 7."1'!1'! the Copernican naivete and shows that the Earth in its protoprimordiality does not move. " We Copernicans. does not move. and it is to the World that the transcendental immutability attributed to the Earth returns. The Earth therefore knows the rest of an abso­ lute here. a rest which is not the rest of the object (rest as " mode of motion "). it is recognized and communicated within the individual consciousness: after quick and transitory evidence. insofar as its starting point is not in space. we men of modern time . how mathematical Objectivation in general. the Earth takes on a more formal sense. . but as a 'Whole' it is not a body" [" Grundlegende . Just as here he reduces the Copernican "relativity" of the earth. 308). we say: the earth is not ' the whole of Nature . But nonetheless it is a body! Although for us it may be the experiential ground for all bodies in the experiential gene sis of our world-objectivation" (p. 88 In referring to this fragment. ). But for us all . Primordially. but still on it that motion occurs.1 8) . But then the Earth does not 'move' nor is at rest-and it is entirely the same for the heavenly bodies and for the earth as one of them" (p . " " But what does two Earths signify? Two pieces of a single Earth with one humanity" (pp. Over against a determined objectivation [representation] of the world. as primordial body. toward the Earth . If the possibility of language is already given to the primally institut­ ing geometer. but in a primordial [p rim ordia le] synthesis as the unity of singular experiences bound to each other. by a single person and all at once . The earth is a spherical body which certainly is not perceptible as a whol e . it is a matter of course that Husserl does not at any moment or on its own proper level contest the particular truth of the objective Copernican science. " he sets that of the Copernican world. the same corporeal (leiblichen) SUbjects. No longer is it a question of this Earth here (the primordial here whose factuality would finally be irreduc­ ible). the horizon of horizons. 309) . For if I reached another planet by flying. in it. and if. to unearth. it is in relation to the Earth that motion and rest first have sense. the rest and absolute m aintenance of the origin in which. starting from it. There is then a science of space. and not to the unity of this earth here. for it is "the same Earth for us. after a finite and passive retention vanishes. and thus Einstein does not reform the space and t ime in wh ich our vital life (unser lebendiges Leben) runs its course" ( " Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity. In the Crisis (§34b. Likewise­ correlatively-humanity would then only be the facto-anthropological index of sub­ jectivity and of intersubjectivity in general . But toward the end of the text. The Earth is the final ground of our co-humanity (Mitmenscheit). so-analogously-the Earth. but of a here and a ground in general for the determination of body-objects in general. . is not itself in motion in this space as an object. ." in C. Before the " same" is recognized and communicated among several individuals. as the here of its relative appearing.84 Jacques Derrida 85 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry preface to a "science of the origin of spatiality. Husserl elsewhere reduces Einstein's "relativity" : " Where is that huge piece of method subjected to critique and clarification-that method that leads from the intuitively given surrounding world to the idealization of mathematics and to the interpretation of these idealizations as Objective being? Einstein's revolutionary innovations concern the formulae through which the idealized and naively Objectified physis is dealt with . ' etc . 222) speaks of an " undaunted refutation of the Copernican system . that of the "Negroes" or ' ' Greeks. in effect. The World . as Hu sserl often recalls. This unity of all humanity is correlative to the unity of the world as the infinite horizon of experience. pp. which is not the factuality of this historical world here . From then o n the unity o f all humanity determines the unity o f the ground as such . Tr�m-Dlic-Thao (Phenomenologie . is the ground of grounds. a similarly oriented analysis also ques­ tions the objectivism of Einstein ' s relativity. But the Earth exceeds every body-object as its infinite horizon. subjects o f bodies (Leibern). as the primordial here and zero-point for every objective determination of space and spatial motion. p. the Earth moves no more than our body moves and leaves the permanence of its here. but Rest starting from which motion and rest can appear and be thought as such. 1 25ft'. the Earth . . nor is it at rest. " However. The Earth itself. for all. " and to a "Transcendental Theory of Cognition in the Natural Sciences" [p o 307]. I would have "two Earths as ground-bodies.

the object must still be freed of every tie with an actually present subjectivity in general . In E/. That virtuality. Oral communication (i.. all language would as yet remain ideality ��I These processes are abundantly described in The Phenomenology of Internal Tim e­ Consciou sness. see notably CM. h e seems to g o much further: " U rhyl e . what makes this ideality a geometrical ideality will only interest us later on . § § 4S-49. . as a structural ability whose source is not made a problem . . It can also be the thematic site of what today is called an " overcoming . after a remarkable interpre­ tation of phenomenology . I n its " factuality .e . in the strict sense of the term . Far from having to fall again into a real rreale ] history. Without the ultimate objectification that writing permits. I n the Cartesian Meditations. On the sense of this notion of "alien to my . temporal hyl e . exposes the " Dialectic of Real M ovement. w ith in the u nique and irreducible form of the Liv ing Present (unchangeable in itself and always other in its ' ' content" ) . so to speak. Perhaps this source is not questioned by phenomenology because it is confused with the possibility of phenomenology itself. . moreover. i s announced as such and in general in an egological subject. In this coincidence of identity [recouvrement d'identitf? ] . Ideas I. this dialectic of temporalization is i nvoked as an analogous e xample of the dialectic of i ntersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is the relation of an absolute origin to other absolute origins. and in FTL. another absolute origin of my absolutely absolute origin . 1 46). and all the phenomena of crisis possible. §6 1 p .I ' .e. and understood also in the identity of the concrete and u niversal form of the Living Present. it must perdure "even when no one has actualized it in evidence" ( 1 64 [modified]) . is an ambiguous value: it simultaneously makes passivity. which are always my own. " H u sserl alludes to temporalization. can give them a rigorous sense. in what he calls an " instructive comparison" C§52.. . Cf. But in some unpublished material . " starting from the concepts of retention and reproduction and from difficulties attached to them in phenomenology. By its very dialecticalness. of expression which documents. as others and as presents (as past presents) . which had to become the principal theme of the transcendental aesthetics projected by H usserl (cf. " thanks to which they perdure "even dur­ ing periods in which the inventor and his fellows are no longer awake to such an exchange or even. before being the ideality of an identical object for other sub­ jects. We always come back to the final instance of this: the unique and essential form of temporalization . more universally. " To be absolutely ideal. Speech [langage oral] has freed the object of individual subjectivity but leaves it bound to its beginning and to the synchrony of an exchange within the institutive community . Thanks to this circulation of primordial absolutes. . therefore. . !. however . We will respect Husserl's order of description and in the meantime will defi n e the conditions for ideality in an intersubjec­ tive community. no longer alive. which alone. Preobjective and preexact temporality . sense is this ideality for other moments of the same subject. . is then the root of transcendental intersubjectivity . p. p . communication become virtual" ( 1 64 [modified]). a passage which ' 'produces" ideality and pure Objectivity as such and makes other absolute origins appear as such . " this p assage is also that of the lower forms of Nature and consc ious life. 1 62 [modified)) . i s defined there as the " core o f the other than the Ego ' s own " (Ichfremde Kern ) . this possibil­ ity is elsewhere presented by Husserl as the root of i ntersubjectivity. beyond all possible differences. the purity of its relation to a universal transcendental subjectivity. . All the egos. The possibility of writing will assure the absolute traditionalization of the object. pp.e. Consequently. the same thing can be thought through absolutely other moments and acts. of all alterity. " or of " the first ' non-Ego' " in t he constitution of the alter ego. a truth that we have gained from this history-scriptural spatiotemporality (whose originality we will soon need to determine )-sanctions and completes the existence of pure transcendental historicity. and synchronic communication) among the protogeometers is not sufficient to give ideal objectivities their "continuing to be" and "persisting factual existence. By itself the speaking subject. . Conclusion. present. is incapable of absolutely grounding the ideal Objectivity of sense . it is. of my present present to other presents as such . i. . im­ mediate. 6 . " Here phenomenology would be "overcome " or com­ pleted i n an interpretative philosoph y . can be encountered. Thus Tran-Duc-Thiw. 1 15 ) . 1 05-0S. notably FTL. Therefore. p. 291-92: and CM. its absolute ideal Objectivity-i. The passage from passive retention to memory or to the activity of recollection . Writing will do this by eman­ cipating sense from its actually present evidence for a real subject and from its present circulation within a determined community . In order to illuminate the extraordinary constitution of "another monad in mine . between the intentional objects of all perceptions and positional presentifications of an Ego and a community of Egos" (§3S. Ego. forgetfulness.e. 90 The possibility of constituting. without negation. despite their radical alterity . " " the intrinsically first other. is always described by H u sserl as an already given essential possibility . intersubjectivity is first the nonempirical rela­ tion of Ego to Ego . Thus. " time as the form of sensibility" is described as the " ground" of the " necessary connection . pp . Group C 6 (August 1 930) . is that it makes communication possible without immediate or mediate address. The Living Present con­ stitutes the other as other in itself and the same as the same in the other. 86 Jacques Derrida 87 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry nothingness. the absolute primordiality of the Living Present permits the reduction. "The de­ cisive function of written expression. " i . recognize d . another now and on its basis another here. In a certain way. 90 XH VII A decisive step remains to be taken.

Naturally . 2 1 0) . which are proper to the corporeality of graphic and vocal signs. in a real-sensible event. as the place of absolutely permanent ideal objec­ tivities and therefore of absolute Objectivity . a designation deprived of its transcendental function. But this last embodiment is still done through another step of mediate ideality whi(. the entombment of lost intentions and guarded secrets. explicitly or not. in the purity of its sense . § 2 . " in Husserl. writing creates a kind of autonomous transcendental field from which every present subject can be absent. As long a s ideal Objectivity is not. no sensible language would be possible or intelligible as language. . Husserl always says that the linguistic or graphic body is a flesh. that of the word' s identity w ithin language.e. the act of writing is the highest possibility of all "constitution. by its being-sense. embodiment is at its limit the inscription of an absolutely "free " and objective ideality (that of geometrical truth. " p. It clearly translates Hu sserl' s exacting effort to catch the ideality of thematic sense and of words [mots] in their relations with the linguistic event. can be only a factual absence. unlocated and untemporal" ("Die Frage. the highest ideality. p. then. Linguistic incarnation and the constitution of written or scriptural space suppose. nor could it intend higher idealitie s . In the second case . Such a formulation remarkably sharpens the problem and awakens the peculiar virtue of language . left to itself. every present reading in general. transcendental sub­ jectivity can be fully announced and appear on the basis of this field or its possibility. a union traversed by the linguistic intention whic h always intends. but which we think can be located on the basis of strictly Husserlian concepts. From then on. The silence of prehistoric arcana and buried civilizations. For this ab­ sence of sUbjectivity from the transcendental field. But if the text does not an­ nounce its own pure dependence on a writer or reader in general (i . In connection with the general signification of the epoche. in the very work of its "binding" (" interconnecting" [enchainement]). The forms of graphic and vocal signs must have a certain identity which is imposed and recognized each time in the empirical fact of language. certainly constitutes such a transcendental field. if it is not haunted by a virtual intentionality). In the first case . By absolutely virtualizing dialogue.92 But does not this formulation per92 Th is sensible embodiment has the peculiar qualities [l'errangete] of both sense ' s inhabitation o f the word [mot] and the here a n d now u s e o f the word ' s ideality. a proper body (Leib). or in general of a more free ideality within a less free ideality. is totally without signification [insignifiante] . and not its factuality which. o r rather. a closer and closer " interconnection" of ideality and reality through a series of less and less ideal mediations and in the synthetic unity of an intention . then there is no more in the vacuity of its soul than a chaotic literalness or the sensible opacity of a defunct designation. for example). Jean Hyp­ po lite in vokes the possibility of a " subjectless transcendental field . And likewise. writing is no longer only the worldly and 9 1 We refer here to a comment by Jean Hyppolite during the discussion which followed the lecture of Fr. Thus a subjectless transcendental field is one of the " conditions" of transcendental subjectivity. It is a question of ideal forms or vague morphological types (a notion that we will have occasion to spec ify farther on) . Van Breda on " La Reduction phenomimologique . and if there is no purely juridical possibility of it being intelligible for a transcendental subje � t in general. for example) within the ' 'bound" ideality of the word.88 Jacques Derrida 89 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry captive of the de facto and actual intentionality of a speak ing subject or community of speaking subjects. Cahiers de Royaumont. is more than a system of signals [signalisation ] or an outer garment)­ then ideal Objectivity is not fully constituted. "91 Writing. Without this always intended and approximate ideal identity (that of letters and phonemes.h Husserl does not directly describe . What Fink writes about speech in his excellent transcript of the Origin is a f ortiori true for writing: " In sensible embodiment Occurs the 'localization' and the 'temporalization' (Temporalisation) of what is. Language frees the ideality of sense. This intentional synthesis is an unceasing movement of going and returning that works to bind the ideality of sense and to free the reality of the sign . and the illegibility of the lapidary inscription disclose the transcendental sense of death as what unites these things to the abso­ lute privilege of intentionality in the very instance of its essential juridical failure [en ce qui l' unit a l' absolu du droit intentionnel dans l'instance m eme de son echec l . The possibility or necessity of being incarnated in a graphic sign is no longer simply extrinsic and factual in comparison with ideal Objectivity: it is the sine qua non condition of Objectivity ' s internal completion. But all this can be said only on the basis of an intentional analysis which retains from writing nothing but writing's pure relation to a consciousness which grounds it as such. " a fact against which the transcendental depth of ideal Objectivity's historicity is measured. to be sure." one in which "the conditions of subjectivity would appear and where the subject would be constituted starting from the transcendental field. embodiment is that of a necessarily bound ideality. can not be engraved in the world-as long as ideal Objectivity is not in a position to be party to an incarnation (which. an absence whose possibility frees absolute Objectivity. The origi­ nality of the field of writing is its ability to dispense with. then. mnemotechnical aid to a truth whose own being-sense would dispense with all writing-down. 323. . Therefore. even if it removed for all time the totality of actual subjects. due to its sense. p. 2 1 ) . or a spiritual corporeality (geistige Leiblichkeit) (FTL. Each of the two opera­ tions is always haunted by the sense of the other: each operation is already announced in the other or still retained in it . When considering the de jure purity of intentional animation. The precise place of the properly termed realizing [realisante] embodiment is ultimately therefore the union of the sensible form with sensible material. th is morphological ideality is still more " bound" than the word' s ideality.

as is Goethe's Faust" (ibid . but also according to numerous and completely original forms and modalities. This means that a specific spatiotemporality is prescri bed for commu nication . . Undoub tedly. and therefore for pure tradition and history . is certainly 'embodied ' i n the real world. pp . and can appeal to the universality of its testimony . the same for the ideality of the plastic arts. but it i s not individualized by this embodiment. . is made respon sible for it. Or again : the same geometrical proposition can be uttered as often as desired: every real utterance has . i n short. becaus e it establi shes a truth-v alue. on condition that this can be done. the mental structure as such . in real things in the broader sense . truth is no longer simply exiled in the primordial event of its language. wh ich are termed exemplars of Faust. etc . pp. This mental sense which determines the work of art. Here is not the place to prolong these analyses of aesthetic perception and ideality. Since this perdurability is truth ' s very sense. and 93 therefore univers al. it is no less possible in principle and thus makes an incontestable ideality appear: "To be sure . the possibil ity of being written fpossibi­ re . The literary work is often chosen by Husserl as the clue for analyzing the ideality of cultural objectivitie s . but a determination of significance !) . indeed. i ndispens­ able distinctions . is the criterion which only can that ideal unity be more or less "bound" to factuality. truth never keeps the ideal Objecti vity or identity of any of its particu­ lar de facto linguistic incarnations . 94 L ' Activite rationaliste de l a physique contemporaine (Paris: Presses U niversitaire s d e France . as long as it cannot be said and written . and since it depend s on a pure linguistic intentio n. This " being of the book. . That is relatively easy for the literary work. 266) . according to the book's sense-content. a spatiotemporality that es­ capes the alternat ive of the sensible and the intelligible. Therefo formula : the ability of sense to could all but reverse the terms of Fink's be linguistically embodi ed is the only means by which sense become s nons patiote mporal . whether the linguis tic event refers to an authentic act (in the Husserlian sense of the word) . Because ideal Objectivity can essentially inform or shape the body of speech and writing . " this " instance of printed thought" whose "language is not natural.90 Jacques Derrida 91 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry mit linguistic embodiment to be understood as taking place outside the being-sense of ideal objectiv ity? As " occurrin g" or " unexpec tedly happeni ng" in addition to the being-se nse? Does not this formulation give the impression that ideal objectiv ity is fully constitu ted as such before and independently of its embodi ment. Their specific character seems irreducible. Finally. . moreover. and compared to all linguistic factu­ ality it remains "free. there is a sort of immediate reduction of factuality which permits. which in each case requires an appropriate and p rudent analysis. o f a work o f plastic art a s such (whose i deal value is primordially and intrinsically rooted in an event). pp. the neutralization of the necessary imperfection of re­ production. next. " But this freedom is only possible precisel y from the moment truth can in general be said or written . it is radically independent of sensible spatiote mporali ty. the book' s proper volume and duration are neither purely sensible phenomena. is founded with regard to spatiotemporal appearance in a specifically real thing but which can appear in different realities as identical-not merely as sim il ar" (Husserl ' s emphasis) . Moreover. within which this constitution can be i ndefinitely repeated as its ideal validity (ibid. before and inde­ pendently of its ability to be embodied? But Husserl insists that truth is not fully objective . or rather. a ccording to its sense. of architecture? Or of music . 265-66) : " We call real in a specific sense all that which . a n ation. The ideal identity of the work will never be mistaken for its sens ible embodiments. for example) and the originality of its " boundness" to the factuality of a territory. 6-7. and literature as l iterary art. Husserl writes in EJ (§65. identically the same sense" (ibid. is. H usserl distinguishes between literature i n the broad sense. . Thus the relation between the ideal and the real in all cultural objectivities (and first in all the arts) can be expl icated. the realm of all written discourse. : And not !J:l l n the Origin. since the latter can only imitate a factuality and not express or " indicate" an ideal sense? I s it. or the empiric al and the metemp irical. especially those of the nonliterary arts. 1 95 1 ) . just as the protodocument authenticates whether it is the depositary of an intentio n. p. It does not derive i ts i ndi­ vidual identity from the latter. specific ally.e. essentially individualized by its spatiotemporal position. the relation of the " exemplars" to their archetypal unity is undoubtedly unique among the reproductions of other cultural forma­ tions. . an ideal object like Raphael' s Madonna can in fact have only one mundane state (Weltlichkeit) and in fact is not repeatable in an adequate identity (of the com­ plete ideal content) . ideal. whose case is even more ambiguous? Although repetition may be of a different nature here. ) . whether it refers withou t fal sificatio n to an original and primordial act. " Goethe's Faust is found in any number of real books (' book' denotes here what is produced by men and intended to be read: it is already a determination wh ich i s itself not purely material. In other words. But in principle this ideal is indeed repeatable. describ ing the book in its unity as a chain of significations. Husserl thus indicates the direction for a phenomenology of the writ­ ten thing. . we lite graphiq ue ] permits the ultimate freeing of ideality . This unity can be more or less ideal and necessary. the conditions for its survival are included in those of its life. From the first perception. Paradox ically. He proposes some analogous distinctions in the cultural sphere of poli­ tics and strives to bring to light both the ideality of the constitution of the state (of the national will. Husserl is content to situate the ir domain and to define preliminary. Its historical habitat authenticates this event. "9-1 permits us to distinguish between the real and the ideal . Conseq uently. nor purely intelligible noumena. but we call irreal every determination which . " Gaston Bachelard calls a "bibliomenon. But how can we determine the ideality of a work whose proto individualization is tied to the work ' s single spatiotemporal embodiment? How can we make its ideality appear by varying factual exemplars . .e. intelligible for everyone and indefinite ly perdurab le. i. then. The origin of identity . i. Thus. 266-67) .

d the whole real world. " Far from being a phenomenolog­ ical nothing . We have previously seen that truth c �n perdure I. alwa�s r�fer s to a dlsord�� or I11 ? ess of l�ngua�e) . but also what ceases. to appear inJact yet without affecting its being or being-sense.96 and the sign becomes the worldly and exposed residence of a� unthought truth. intermittently or definitely. appears in a philoso­ phy which is (at least because of certain motifs) the contrary of empiri­ cism: the possibility of truth ' s disappearance. . As the process of that essential and constitu � ive cap. we �ould Interpret the phenomenon of crisis (which . insofar. i . and at what point (in the same moment) he strives to respect historicity' s own peculiar signification and possibility and truly to penetrate them . LI. and survives individuals.' " in C.1 9 . as a transcende�tal community. pp. all factual lI�e. for Husserl . Conversely . �n. Furthermore. We purposely use the ambiguous word disappearance. Truth depe�ds on the pure possibility of speaking and writing. truth has its origin in a pure and simple right to speech and writing.9H Clearly in this type of analysis . which . ju st as they arose . Thus a pOSSibility. At the same time. . and not about the absolute ly ideal Objectiv ity of sense gained through speech and writing from that subjectiv ity. whose exact de scnpt�on . I. From then on. 95 The difficulty of its des� ri� tion is due to the fact that writing defines and completes the ambigUIty of all lan­ guage.92 Jacques Derrida 93 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry In the Origin . If. But since. Husserl illuminates more directly that milieu of writing .e . Husserl clearly specifi e s in the Origin and elsewhere that. its downfall will be less a fall toward language than a degradation within language. that of "external arrangements" : sensible exemplars on which neither the Ideahty of sense nor the clear intention of cognition depends.acity. would require much circumlocution" (our emphasis) . Husserl is only worried about the permanence and virtual presence of sense within the monadi c subject . 60: " Science exists objectively only in its literature. . To determine the sense of this " disappearance" of truth is the most difficult problem posed by the Origin and all of Husserl' s philosophy of history. in particular Appendix I I . Prol. 96 We take this word in the broad sense of sign-signifier or " sign-expression" (graphic or vocal). generatIons and nations. In the first place. 1 . see " Fink' s Appendix on the Problem of the ' Unbewussten . ProfoundJorgetJulness therefore extends into the spaces of intersubjectivity and the distance between commu nities. 95 Cf. its total annihilation become s impossi ble. It therefore represents a set of external arrangements. the meaning that Husserl gives this term by opposing it to the " ind�cative" sign (LI. can again pass over into Just such act � of . upon whic-h formida ble difficul­ ties already weigh .. but above all in FTL (in term s which are literally taken up again in the Origin ) . i'. in effect. its truth-sense. let us rule out the hypothe sis of a death oj sense in general within the individu al conscio usness . therefore. I n Ideas I. he never uses it in the first text of the Origin . 385-87 .but is independent of what is spoken or written. §§ 1-5 .dh­ ness sense must first be able to be set down in the world and be depOSited in s�nsible spatiotemporality. 3 19) . which . in order to escape worl. pp. But this fact neither prohibits nor contra­ dicts at all the subsequent theme of writing as the intrinsic possibility and intr!nsic c�ndition of acts of objective cognition. §6. which even here accords only with empiricism and nonphilosophy . 3 1 8. � this way without being thought in act or in fact-and that IS what r�dlcallY emancipates truth from all empirical subjectivity. On this level of ana!ysl s. in danger. cf. perhaps because habit relates it very easil y to individual consciousness or to its psychological sense : perhaps also because it can suggest an annihilation of sense . truth suffers in and through Its language from a certain changeableness. . in El. �9 Forgetfulness is a word that Husserl rarely employs in the Crisis." "the so-called 'unconscious ' " or ' 'universal substratum " where sense is deposited is " a limit-m ode of conscio u sness" (FTL. it must put its ?�r� intent. That IS the difficulty we are striving to illuminate here . for embodiment. (klar) intentIon into an empty symbol. out of the knowledge-acts of many individuals. 269-75) . of a clear . 99 UH On the naivete of the classic problems of the Unconscious and on the question of knowing whether an intentional analysis can open a methodical access to the Uncon­ sciou s. as an empIrIcal fact. in effect. What disappears is what is annihi­ lated. man's communal bemg IS lifted to a new level" ( 1 64): it can appear. p. in its turn. . in a readily understandable manner. whose difficult signification and importance he had already recogmzed in the Logical Investigations . as a degradation of the sign-expression into a Sign-indIcatIOn. Now this Objectiv ity is found threatened as truth in the world. as they are m the world. . The Origin maintains these two themes. pp. where truth) i s factually and contingently embodied. Forgetfulness is a historical category.ional ideality. th� questIo� IS c �early . we were unable to find in Husserl an unequivocal response to a question which only makes that of phenomenology itself return: what is the sense of its appearing? That equivocation will presently reveal both how much the author of the Crisis was a stranger to history or how fundamentally incapable he was of taking it seriously. once sense appeared in ego logical conscio usness. � in written work has it a rich relational being limited to men and their intellectual a�tlvltIes: in this form it is propagated down the millennia. ��.. language is also where every absolutely Ideal object (I. I . ?ut once constituted it conditions expression. On the basis of this distinc�ion. as is prescribed for it. countless individuals. The authentic act of writing is a transcendental reductIo� performed by and toward the we .97 A sense that is conserv ed as a sedimentary habitua lity and whose dormant potential­ ity can de jure be reanimated is not returne d to nothingness by the vanishin g of retentions of retentio ns . above all should disengage the objective autonomy of signification. e . What then is this possibility of disappearance? 1 . § 2 c . sense is gathered mto a sign. . p.

they could all be destroyed without overtaking the very sense of absolute ideality. whose notion we evoked above. Such a forgetfulness would not only sup­ press this sense but would annihilate it in the specific being-in-the-world to which its Objectivity is entrusted. Un­ doubtedly. which has only a phenomenological sense. but only insofar as the "bound" ideality is animated or traversed by a transcendental intention. " individual events in space and time (which is only true to a certain degree for " bound" idealities). " nothing is opposed to the fact that th is immanent sense may have its own particular historicity . a world-wide burning of libraries. nor to this world here. Accordingly. its own interconnections. its internal history must be saved integrally from all sensible aggression. or a catastrophe of monuments or "documents" in general would intrinsically ravage "bound" cultural idealities. This distinction. these idealities. pure consciousness is intangible. because Husserl considers sense neither an in-itself nor a pure spiritual interiority but an "object" through and through. pp. we should be able to repeat analogously the famous analysis of Section 49 of Ideas 1. would be vulnerable to that worldly accident. No doubt he would admit that a universal conflagration. i. absolute ideality would be changed . pp. determine their immanent sense " (§25. and nothing can definitively protect inscription from this. p. will never be anything in them­ selves but sensible "exemplars. for which mathematics is the model). no real development other than that of the variable example interests him . . 338-39). . §49. in " Ph ilosophy as Mankind' s Self-Reflection" (c. The graphic sign. Yet the hypothesis of such a factual destruction does not interest Husserl at all.1 8. In such a case. The movement is taken up again i n CM. for e xample . can also in f act be destroyed. § 7 . Since truth does not essentially depend on any of them . While completely recognizing the terrifying reality of the current risk. Corporeal exteriority un­ doubtedly does not constitute the sign as such but. Husserl did not dispute that under those circumstances all consciousness would in fact be destroyed and that its worldly existence would be engulfed with the world. but its sense-of-being as truth. In addition. even when the existing world is annihilated or factual experience dis­ solved " through internal conflict . Thus. nothing will ever stand between the worldly experiences which incarnated geometry and what they have begun again: discovering afresh (without any traces and after the shrouding of this world here) the paths of an adventure buried in another real history. and Husserl's discourse would be plunged into a confusion of significations and regions. Since geometry is tied neither to this moment here. p p . then sense can be deposited there and communalized [mettre en communaUf(j ] . after a certain eidetic-transcendental reduction. 1 7. . into illusion" (Ideas I. 101 P . If geometry is true. There H usserl shows how psychologistic or historicist empiricism remains " outside" [ Derrida' s empha­ sis] " geometrical thought and intuition . 85 [modified]). for then the historicity absolutely proper to any truth-sense would be missing.e. whose proper historicity Husserl wishes to grasp and about which he speaks more and more often as his thought becomes allured by history . the clearest intention of ]()O The opposition between intrinsic penetration and extrinsic circumspection is al­ ready announced in Ideas I. That is what Husserl means when he opposes internal or intrinsic (innere) historicity to external (aussere) history. . the threat of an intrinsic destruction by the body of the sign can be ruled out. but to all the world ( Weltall).94 Jacques Derrida 95 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry 2 . the guarantee of Objectivity. I n comparison with veritas aeterna. the hypothesis of the world-wide catastrophe could even serve as a revelatory fic tion. 101 The analysis concluded that. . which is not in the world­ neither in our world here. precisely concerning the history of geometry . in which truth could be sedimented. 7 1 ). We would then be conceding that a pure ideality can be changed by a real cause . Death is possible for them alone and has the transcendental signification we just now granted it. we might first think that the forgetfulness which follows upon the destruc­ tion of Objectivity' s custodial sign [signe gardien ] would not affect (as in a "Platonism" or " Bergsonism") the surface of a sense without undermining the sense itself. 1 37 [modified]) . is indispensable to it. mutilated. any philosophical signifi c ance. All factual writings. and § 1 5 . the fully freed ideality and absolute Objectivity of sense. This danger is inherent in the factual worldliness of inscrip­ tion itself. nor any other-would remain intact in itself. By their adherence to some factuality. §7. only insofar as it is guided by the Telos of an absolute freeing which has not been fully attained . and over­ thrown in fact. in their very sense. But l ike that which orients Husserl 's reflection (specifically. 1 36. and the catastrophe of worldly history would remain exterior to it. For Husserl clearly said this: insofar as signs can be immediately perceptible by everyone in their corporeality. perhaps it would disappear in fact from the surface of the world. . 1 7. Once exter­ nal history is "reduced. p. nor to this territory here. insofar as their bodies and corporeal forms are always already in an intersubjective horizon. in a sense that we must make clear. is decisive.1 8 . p. he would deny it any thinkable. Its being-sense would preserve its own intrinsic historicity. and above all in the Origin .loo It would be fruitless for him to object that historicity or being-in-history is precisely the possibility of being intrinsically exposed to the extrinsic. which is to lose sense. The opposition between the two histories is an explicit theme in the Crisis ( se e . " whereas "we should enter v itally into these activities and .

to choose silence. N ow this sense was securely decided within the static analyses that. But did we not just find out that writing. as we saw above. was not merely a constituted sensible body (Korper). this eidetic independence. p. e . The " unity" of the ego' s "history" is that of the eidos "ego.1 7 . structures "bound" to some reducible contingency-and not essential ones reduced to their pure ideality. e. since the interconnections and sedimentations of geomet­ rical truth are free of all factuality. . . if it is both Korper and Leib. in the Cartesian Meditations ) the genetic constitution of the ego in the "unity" of its " history"? lOa In a certain sense we can say yes. 1 0:\ Already c ited [see note 7 above] . 3 1 6. Hus­ serl. All factual peril . without questioning once more the sense of geometry constituted as an eidetic science. The situation of truth . the po­ tential evidence. it is not the "ultimate" transcendental regression (ibid. In effect. if he does not want to be reduced to equivocation. stops at the threshold of its internal historicity . the overthrow. every sedimentation. The phenomenologist must dissolve the ambiguity. all actual geometers-had to come to ruin one day. or to precipitate phenomenology into philosophy. therefore. But by the irre­ placeability. inasmuch as it was grounding (or contributing to the grounding of) truth' s absolute Objectivity. the " residues. beyond the moment the eidetic-transcendental reduction has not yet attained its final radicality and is provisionally immobilized in one region. " Husserl's description means that the essential form of every interconnection. Similarly. Undoubtedly. the intra-egological sedimentation. in order not to leave "inter­ nal" historicity. We would be fully convinced . in such a case. all facto-historical interconnections are vari­ able at will. its very sense is de jure and absolutely independent of the whole world. therefore. in a word. . in a new reduction he is going to isolate the intentional act which constitutes Korper as Leib and maintain this act in its Leiblichkeit. One cannot come back to all this evidence without making the sensible the ground of geometrical truth and. In fact. in its living truth-sense. In order to grasp the nature of the danger threatening truth itself in its constitutive speech or writing. as "a self-contained nexus of being" (Ideas I. therefore . 3 . would they not be marked by a certain order of the factual world to which past conscious­ ness is tied-a consciousness tied there by its own interconnections and structurally implicated in every present consciousness? 1 02 These first reductions lead us to " the very threshold of phenomenology" (Ideas I. § 8 1 . the region of pure consciousness is the " residue" of a " su spension" that still remains more eidetic than transcendental and is only the most profound of the eidetic reductions. and invariability of their interconnections. he is going to track down the intention of writing (or of reading) in itself and in its purity . brought to light in a methodologi­ cal idealism by a fiction. as Husserl will say. p. Since transcendental consciousness can always and with complete freedom modify or suspend the thesis of each (therefore of all) contingent exis­ tence and of each (therefore of all) transcendence. 102 Would Husserl have judged this fiction valid the moment he studied (for example.96 Jacques Derrida 97 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry this analysis and fiction is to explicate a reduction which must reveal to the Ur-Region -transcendental consciousness-the essential relativity of the world' s sense (the world being the totality of regions) . § 88 . 1 04 Already cited [see note 7 above] . no worldly catastrophe can put truth itself in danger. is constituted it­ self. Appendix I I . Such an analysis no longer has any need of Korper as such. can be questioned as to its value beyond the moment of Ideas I. §49. 1 39 [modified]). and therefore every history for every ego is self-sufficient. on this FTL . p. Also cf. how would writing preserve its Leiblichkeit from corporeal disaster? Husserl is not going to immobilize his analysis within this ambiguity. if here-as in his static analyses­ Husserl had considered writing to be a sensible phenomenon . Within thisform of historicity that we wish to attain as an invariant. particularly of geometrical truth." and the " references" l o4 that this " his­ tory" makes necessary are only a network of sense . but was also a properly constituting body (Leib)-the intentional primordiality of a Here-and­ N ow of truth? If writing is both a factual event and the upsurging of sense. are they not also "facts" or factual structures with respect to which pure consciousness would no longer be free? Could these sedimentary structures de jure survive the annihilation. 237) . It therefore provokes the same questions. which for him is only a provisional and factual confusion of regions. we are considering factual structures in the life of the ego-i . 2 1 6) . were the indispensable guard rails for all genetic or historical phenomenology. Through the solipsistic hypothesis in which the Cartesian Meditations are first couched. Yet this suspension. Even if all geometrical "documents"-and as well. pure consciousness is still considered as that which no worldly factuality can penetrate as such. � 2 h . is analogous. i . Husserl would probably reply that. the complete " variation" of factuality? As sense. which tends to discover the protoregion' s essential structures and is certainly constitutive of the world. irreversibility. And. Only in the intentional dimen- . maintains his dissociative analysis and disarticulates the ambiguity. pp . to speak of this as an event "of" geometry would be to commit a very serious confusion of sense and to abdicate responsibility for all rigorous discourse.

Forgetfulness of truth itself will thus be nothing but the failure of an act and the abdication of a responsibil ity .98 Jacques Derrida 99 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry sion of a properly animate body. is sense intrinsicall y threatened . as Husserl tries to do. . for the same reason. I actively re-produce the primordial evidence . a lapse more than a defeat-and this forgetfulne ss can be made to appear in person only on the basis of an intentional history. in the Geistigkeit of the Leib (to the exclusion of all factual corporeality). By this reactivation. If. forgetfulne ss will never be radi­ cal. in particular Appendix I I . of the potentiality of sense . On "meaningless signs" [signes depourvus de signification] and "game s-meaning" [signification de jeu ] . pp. and sense can always. the sense arising from instituting evidence. which. phenomenology allows itself to be s ummoned outside of itself by history. This sense is reanimated by the fact that I restore it to its dependence on my act and reproduce it in myself such as it had been produced for the first time by another. And finally. that is because it can bring back to present and active evidence a sense which is thus retrieved out of h istorical virtuality. also see FTL. interrelated but distinct. are not only superimposed in the internal becoming of sense. which de­ graded science into a skill or game. Korper and Leib . and no­ thing can come to the latter through the former. of higher stratifications. the following images: The image of level or stratum-w hat is deposited by an inroad or a progression after the radical novelty of an irruption or upsurge: every advance. are originally prescribed by an archi-tectonics. for example. 268. sedimentary (satzartig) fall back of sense . the very act of all Verantwortung and of all Besinnung. . supposes it. forgetfulness can nevertheles s be described as a phenomenon of the ego. it thus has found in reactivation the medium of its fidelity. Confronting sedimented sense. It brings all this together in the structural and internal unity of a system. Although in a word [mot]. *20. is not "in fact" the "norm" and without which a certain comprehension is always possible. as one of its intentional " modification s. I . concerning the difficult constitution of the alter ego. that is itself grounded. pp . linguistic objectification and mathematical symbolizat ion were presented as the occasion of the technicist' s and objectivist 's alienation. Also . The latter. body and flesh . Cf. in principle and de jure . 56-60. . But only freedom can let itself be threatened in this way . on the contrary. be reactivated. Cf. the notion of Stufe has both a structural and genetic sense and can be translated by " step" or by " stage. every pro­ position (Satz) of a new sense is at the same time a leap (Satz) and a I (). El. ") The geological image of " sedimentat ion" translates re­ markab ly well the style of that implication. on the surface . §65 . the themes of passivity and sedimentation. In the Origin . If reactivation is valuable and urgent. We also see that. in particular C. as we said above. Reaktivierung is. On vocable s and real signs as " bearers" of signified idealities. On the sense of activ ities and passiv ities in a phenomenology of reading as outlined in the Origin . l on The possibility of giving way to this first expectation of sense is a lasting danger. which are only intentions or intentional senses made dormant. One learns to use signs whose primordial sense (which is not always the logical sense that is sedimented and accessible to an explication ) is concealed or poten­ tialized under sedimentations . derive all their seriousness from the fact that they are imposed on a ph ilosophy of actua lly present evidence whose "principle of all principles" is the immediate and actual [en acte] presence of sense itself. their senses are definitively heterogene ous. are infact numerically one and the same existent. In Formal and Transcendental Logic and then in the Crisis. The synthesis which awakens the sign to signification is first. 1 0. is more particularly directed against the methodological and operative teaching of mathematic s . a historical category. whether it remains as the disappearance of intersub­ jective truth or. necessarily passive and associative. It brings togethe r. Husserl dwells more on the receptive acceptance of signs-first in reading-than on the secondary technical or logical activity that is not only not contradictory to the first passivity but. Of course . but once again it is in FTL that it is particularly focused (as in the Origin ) by the problem of the sign and of the sedimentation of ideal objectivitie s . the activity of reactivation is second. 3 1 3-29. (In the Origin. of the geistige Leiblichkeit. everything can and should be described only as a modification of the pure ego. more pre­ cisely. What it gives back to me I Ofi This theme of passive synthesis is copiously explicated in EJ and eM. I make myself fully responsible for and conscious of the sense that I take up. we are always free to reawaken any passively received sense. for all intents and purposes. taken up again in the Origin. in the senses defined earlier. § 1 6. Husserl states. cf. Reaktivierung permits bringing to life. in fact. Of course. " This freedom is the " capacity for reactivation that belongs originally to every human being as a speaking being" ( 1 64) . p. under the sedimentary surfaces of linguistic and cultural acquisitions. 304-06.. provided the sense of each modification is prudently respected. into the corresponding activity . . §9f. however profound it may be. 1 . cf. From then on. i . " As intentional sense. pp. our first danger is passivity.') This accusation . the image of the con­ cealed presence that an activity of excavation can always re-produce above ground as the foundation. in the domain of ideal objectivities. to reanimate all its virtualities. of a "region" in which all deposits. LI. the image of the sub­ stantial permanence of what is then 'Supposed or situated under the sur­ face of actually present evidence . but are more or less virtually implicated in their totality in each stage or step. and to " transform" them " back .e .

§ 60. propositions. . knows no profundity . 3 1 4: "The class of ambiguous expressions illustrated by this last On this. There is a contingent plurivocity or multisignificance and an essential one. These are already distinguished in the Investiga­ tions (LI. we first would have to approach directly and for itself SUbjective origin. Univocal ex­ pression completely breaks the surface and offers no turning back [rep/i] to the more or less virtual signification s that the intentions could deposit all along the advances of a language or culture.lo7 Responsibility for reactivation is a co-responsibility. by a very careful coining of words. the results which are to be univocally expressed" ( 1 65 [modified]) . "philo­ sophical" or " scholarly [sa vant]" language can freely be given its own particular con­ ventions. eM) . Genuine science. It is the condi­ tion that allows communication among generations of investigators no matter how distant and assures the exactitude of translation and the Theophilus says: " i t depends upon us to fix their meanings [significations ] . That Husserl is so anxious to reduce the equivocal sense of cultural naivete reveals a concern that once more could be interpreted both as a refusal of history and as a deep fidelity to the pure sense of historicity. Husserl ' s criticisms written in the margins of [Heidegger's] Sein und Zeit attribute to a Tie fsinnigkeit the responsibility for the Heideggerian "displacement" toward what Hus­ serl defines as a facto-anthropological plane. Husserl also very early felt himself the heir to the Leibnizian conception of logic in general. The purpose of univocity supposes." and that in each case their sense must be "recreated" according to " the concrete situation of the analysis . essential (wesentlich). Equivocity is the path of all philosophical aberration. . " This plurivocity does not mislead anyone and we are always free to reduce it. then. so far as its real doctrine extends. French : uni­ voques] rational forms " and thus to "constitut[e] anew the rigorous sciences . I . to limit our expression to a single signification. cf. 373]) 7 This optimism is only one of the affinities between Leibniz ' s LI. On the one hand. because it has mastered all the dynamics of sense. and passivity in activity. This plurivocity is an " un­ avoidable rather than chance ambiguity fplurivocite]. Prol . one that cannot be removed from our language by an artificial device or convention" (LI. into a simple . thus the word " dog" signifies both " a type of animal" and (in German) "a type of wagon (used in mines) . It is "unavoidabl e" only in natural language. " the conjectures of profundity into unequivocal [German: eindeutige.e. sense. Husserl never ceased to appeal to the imperative of univocity. activity. § 23 . However. at least in any scholarly language . I . The ideal unity of each of the differing significations will not be affected by their attachment to a common designation" [modified] . univocal language remains the same . " as "for every description of intentional phenomena" (El. it is no doubt because the evidence consid­ ered is that of created and established ideal formations . because nothing is hidden or announced in the penumbra of potential intentions. i . §9 [ET: the difficult and decisive problem in phenomenology of act ivity and passivity in general on the basis of texts directly devoted to th is (EJ. 1 08) . 1 . Husserl notes that the distinction between these two notions cannot be " inflexible . " Likewise . tr. but also and first of all the one who creates and then expresses the sense. 1 08 New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. with the "civil language " of which Leibniz used to speak. If this activity is especially illuminated here. 3 1 4) . p. univocity removes truth out of history ' s reach. and it depends on original intentions. or indefinitely struggled with them. well known to Husserl and where that genuine science wants to transform into a cosmos. in the facto-cultural phenomenon preceding the reduction. a decisive rupture with spontaneous lan­ guage . on always new experiences which animate the identity of objective sense and make it enter into unforeseeabl e configuration s. as the sense of equivocity in general is itself equivocal. after that. p p . Does not the sentence just cited sound like the faithful echo of another sentence of the Nouveaux Essais sur l' Entendement Humain. In one of the finest analyses where he works with the concepts of passivity. Husserl prefers the value of interiority to that of pro fundity or depth . notably LI. FTL. 1 44 : " Profundity [Tie fsinn ] is a mark of the chaos example are what one usually has in m ind when one speaks of 'equivocation' . in effect. . It is all the more difficult not to be hasty here . We are free . " p .100 101 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry Jacques De"ida is the originally presentive intuition (that of the geometrical formation. p . 1 . 109 Open Court. and complexes of propositions. Alfred Gideon Langley (Chicago: and Husserl's philosophies o f language : More broadly speaking. completely clear. with the most " irreducible" heritage (and indeed thereby perhaps the most obscuring heritage) of Western philosophy. Thus Husserl's constant association of equivocal proceedings with a criticism of profundity is understandable . 1 9 1 6). § 26 . e. lucid order. Ch . § 26. It thus keeps its ideal identity throughout all cultural development. interiority being related to the penetration of internal.lo9 Because it brings everything to view within a present act of evidence. in fact. Cf. I . i. p. It engages the one who receives. above all " PRS . ix. . p. The first depends on an objective con ven­ tion. and to agree to destroy this tower of Babel" (Book I I . namely. for example) which is both an activity and a passivity.loS The second is of 107 To try to illuminate this point. 3 14) . 2 1 8ff. Ambiguity in such cases does not tend to shake our faith in the ideality and objectivity of significations. For sedimentations obliterate sense only insofar as there are surfaces available for this. this last equivocity is what science and philosophy must overcome. " Hu sserl then proposes t o re-strike (umpriigen). That is why the primally institut­ ing geometer and those who follow after him must be concerned about " the univocity of linguistic expression and about securing. p . Such a study would perhaps have to conclude that phenomenology has only argued with the arbitrary sense [exigence du sens] of this couple of concepts . The equivocity of expression is the chosen field of sedimentary deposits . intrinsic (inner). a s in the case o f a currency revaluation.

by plunging it into the nocturnal and ill-transmissible riches of " bound" idealities. literature. in a network of linguistic relations and oppositions. Otherwise. and always renascent equivocity into pure historicity. Stephen said. Second: is not the result the same if. The other endeavor is Husserl' s: to reduce or impoverish empirical language methodically to the point where its univocal and translatable elements are actually transparent. i. for language neither can nor should be maintained under the protection of univocity . abso­ lute univocity would itself have no other consequence than to sterilize or paralyze history in the indigence of an indefinite iteration . at least it would have remained so forever and for everyone . Genesis and Structure of Hegel's "Phenomenology o Spirit. accumulates their energies. one has. philosophy. Only by means of historicism is it possible to remain there and confuse them with the movement of truth . e . and when one wishes to assume and interiorize the memory of a culture in a kind of recollection (Erinnerung) in the Hegelian sense. . facing this equivocity. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman [Evanston: Northwestern University f Press. 3 4 [ " H i story . which would load a word with intentions or with lateral and virtual reminscences. Such a reduction must be recommenced indefi nitely. pp . therefore. whether it might draw from a given univocity or try to produce another. knows the same relativity. in order to travel through and explore the vastest possible historical distance that is now at all possible. the e xac­ titude of expression will have as its condition the exactitude of sense . Moreover. also cf. rather than put it out of play with quotation marks. If a radical equivocity precludes history . pp. Ideas I. an absolutely ideal object must be designated? This time. HusserJ had to admit an irreducible. and interwoven intentions within each linguistic atom . ) 1 12 James Joyce .e. But HusserJ ' s project. Hyppolite . Equivocity is the congential mark of every culture . . Now if we suppose that such a thing or perception exists. could only succeed by allotting its share to univocity . as the transmission and recollection [recueillement] of sense." to which romanticism is led when " be lief" in its " metaphysics of h istory" has been lost. 1 974] . And. sciences. the chance for I I I " 1 12 1 1 1 Husserl has always associated " Hegelianism" with "romantic i sm" and with " his­ toricism . " tr. 469-70 . the act of language itself-intervene and from the outset place that supposition in a culture. which also proceeded from a certain anti-historicism and a will "to awake" from the " nightmare" a will to master that nightmare in a total and present of " history. 1 1 1I In other words-on the other h nd -th e very moment univocity removes sense beyond the reach of historical modifi­ cation. circulates throughout all languages at once. i s a nightmare from which I a m trying t o awake. cultivates their associative syntheses instead of avoiding them. in order to reach back and grasp again at its pure source a historicity or traditionality that no de facto historical totality will yield of itself. in all wordly cultures and their most ingenious forms (mythology. no longer translating one language into another on the basis of their common cores of sense. the model of the sciences whose objects are exact. a 1 1 0 Exactitude and univocity are overlapping notions for H u sserl. . phenomenology in particular. (Cf. arts. Geometry . immutable. the very text of its repetition would have been unintelligi­ ble . Since equivocity always evidences a certain depth of development and conceal­ ment ofa past. This first hypothesis of a univocal and natural language is. resumption. and rediscovers the poetic value of passivity. We will return to this l ater. identity . as the transcendental "parallel" to Joyce ' s. 1 96 1 ) . Likewise. In effect. like Joyce. the choice of two endeavors. " pp. One would resemble that of James Joyce: to repeat and take responsibility for all equivocation itself. at the other pole of language. " ] . and natural object. as by all philosophy of history (in the current sense) and by every phenomenology of spirit. This historicity or traditionality is always already presupposed by every Odyssean repetition of Joyce's type . The essences of finite totalities and the typol­ ogy of figures of the spirit will always be idealities that are bound to empirical history. Once again. each simple proposition. utilizing a language that could equalize the greatest possible synchrony with the greatest potential for buried. First: suppose the designated thing is not only an absolutely singular. religion. and Objectivity would in themselves be prior to all culture. § 73 . especially " PRS . politics. actualizes their most secret consonances. will therefore more easily attain u nivocity than will the other sciences. 76-77. 1 89-90. in effect. each word. each vocable. rather than ' 're­ duce" it. but also an existent whose unity . Univocity only indicates the lim­ pidity of the historical ether. it alone makes pure history possible. Ulysses (New York : Random .102 Jacques Derrida 103 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry pu rity of tradition . About the relations between exactitude and univocity in geometry. In short. discloses their furthermost common horizons. p . absolute univocity is imaginable only in two limiting cases. absurd and contradictory. this writing resolutely settles itself within the labyrinthian field of culture "bound" by its own equivocations. accumulated. this endeavor would try to make the structural unity of all empirical culture appear in the generalized equivocation of a writing that. Joyce' s project. on this J. linguistic ideality and its project of univocity­ i . enriching. Husserl' s demand for uni­ vocity (which he formulated before the practice of the reduction) is therefore only the reduction of empirical history toward a pure history.) Was not the e xpression Weltanschauung first Hegelian? (Cf. and so forth).

In a science like geometry . usable in evidence and for further theoretical or practical ends-as indubitably able to be reacti­ vated with the identity of its genuine sense " ( 1 65-66 [modified]). without a minimal linguistic transpar­ ency. should it not furnish the true starting point for reflecting on history? Without that essential concealment of origins and within the hypothesis of an all-powerful reactivation. A total reactivation ." they do not therein give rise any less to some singular placings in perspective [mises en perspectives ]. If. The necessity of those interruptions is a factual one (sleep . The problem of univocity echoes immediately upon that of reactiva­ tion. Husserl could not inquire as to the absoLute ideal Obj ectivity concerning language itself. whose ideality is always that of a " thematic index" and not a theme. In any case. if it was radically prohibited access to origins. In giving it the sense of an infinite task. professional breaks. It will always be denied immediate totality. is always relative.1 04 Jacques Derrida 105 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry univocity would not be offered by a precultural. the value for a language impover­ ished and thus removed out of history' s reach. is the possibility of a pure history of sense to be doubted de jure? More particularly since. no reactivation would be imaginable. what would consciousness of historicity be? Also. the personal certainty. on any level . There is a sort of pure equivocity here. 1 13 They do not possess any resistant and permanent iden­ tity that is absolutely their own. Con­ sequently. absolutely firm knowledge of truth is an infinite idea" ( 1 66) . 1 13 without which the very equivocations of empirical culture and history would not be possible . The " same " word is always "other" according to the always different intentional acts which thereby make a word significative [signijiant] . because it is always inscribed within a mobile system of relations and takes its source in an infinitely open project of acquisition. that is because words and language in general are not and can never be abso­ lute objects. the ground of univocity and the condition for reactivation. that finitude can appear precisely in its . not so symmetrically. Univocity is also the absolute horizon of equivocity. as we know. they are. it is that That is why. is immediately revealed only within the relativity that Husserl defined. always remains provisional. at every instant and every time he resumes his task after necessary interruptions. But if univocity is in fact always relative. as could be feared. Since that finitude is in fact irreducible. Husser! is not worried about that: at this point a total recuperation of origins is still only a teleological horizon. Husser! remarks. Husserl specifies in a note that the scientific statement. Even if those relations are. They have their linguistic being from an intention which traverses them as mediations. therefore. If the univocity investigated by Husserl and the equivocation generalized by Joyce are in fact relative. then. and therefore some mediate and potential aims. That is why . But. but only as_ an Idea in the Kantian sense can be.' that it ' stands fast. the "individual and even the social capacity" for reactivation is of an "obvious finitude" ( 1 68) . but by a transcultural object. ' forever identically repeatable. and that "Objective. it is impossible for every geometer. which grows in the very rhythm of science. its functionaries maintain the constant claim. that everything they put into scientific assertions has been said 'once and for all. For their common telos. within a science. univocity is both the apriori and the teleological condition for all historicity . would paralyze the internal history of geometry just as surely as would the radical impossi­ bility of all reactivation. Its schema is the same . for. the geometrical object. without being questioned again as to its truth. The obviousness [evidence ] of that finitude and of that necessary mediacy could stamp Husserl's whole purpose as nonsense. which has no sense compared with geometrical truth but is no less irreducible to it. the positive value of univocity. no doubt. This irreducible mediacy thus makes illusory all the safety promised by speech or writing themseLves . Rather. Absolute univocity is inaccessible. whose poten­ tiality for growth is extraordinary. relations of pure idealities and "truths. to perform a total and immediate reactivation of the "immense chain of foundings back to the original premises" ( 1 66 [modified]) . For under the extrinsic necessity that geometrical activity be intermittent is also hidden an essential and internal necessity: since no piece of the geometrical edifice is self-sufficient. as we noted above. But this identity of sense. univocity corresponds to the very vocation of science. even if that were possible. for example. in fact. must not then the darkness which engulfs the "original premises" (it can be penetrated but never dissipated) not only hide the fact but also the instituting sense? And must not the "critical" forgetfulness of origins be the faith­ ful shadow in truth's advance rather than an accidental aberration? This distinction between fact and sense (or the de facto and the de jure) would be effaced in the sense-investigation of a primordial finitude. Husser! writes in the Ori­ gin: " In accord with the essence of science. and so forth). Husser! does not make univocity. equivocity is always irreducible. But for Husser!. that consciousness would be nothing. so that history may have its proper density . and if it alone permits the reduction of all empirical culture and of all sedimentation. Husserl does not fail to ask the serious question of itsjinitude. some multiple interconnections of sense. after having pre­ sented the capacity for reactivation. no immediate reactivation is possi­ ble.

the removal of limits from our capac­ ity . 765 . This idealization. At the present juncture. Thus. . however little we may know about determined things. . the rational transparency of its insightful evi­ dence (Einsichtigkeit). ( 1 72) . although as problems they still remain " un­ asked. which are then no more than the nominal limits of pure factuality. the chances for such a transmission decrease until the day when the ability happens to fail. [In his translation of the Origin . as we know . Dorion Cairns suggests the fol lowing : i n sight. the insights into principles are historical (historisch) . \ 96 \) . . Confusing symbol with truth. Husserl provisionally averts this difficulty . the first direction of his investigation. in a certain sense its infinitization'" ( 1 68) . He postpones the problem until later and invites with a slightly enigmatic brevity. Ibid. The translation is that of Paul Shorey . insightful­ ness. With respect to other sciences.106 Jacques Derrida 1 07 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry primordiality only given the Idea of an infinite history . pp . 220-22. . the clarifying investigations. The capacity of reactivation must then be transmitted.e. Strictly speaking. faced with the finitude of reactivation. " I n h is Guide for Translating Husserl. p. 1 14 1 15 science moves away from its beginnings and its logical superstructures are accumulated . They are always possible . The impossibility of adequately determining the content of this Idea does not undermine. then. problems of this particular sort immediately awaken the total problem of the universal historicity of the correlative manners of being of humanity and the cultural world and the a priori structure contained in this historicity" . They are incapable of " vision" (idein) and riveted to the hypotheses held as their principles. \ 06). Ideas I. ed. Husserl does not give up. when the prod­ uction of geometrical exactitude by idealization will be our concern. 1 1 6 Plato. " This field of inquiry has no limits. He writes : "The peculiar sort of evidence belonging to such idealizations will concern u s later" ( 1 68 [modified]). apodictic evidentness. even here it is geometrical idealization which permits infinitizing the reac­ tivative ability. ] Thus the method and the sense of the question concerning origins are illuminated at the same time as the conditions for the tradition of sci­ ence in general . this movement is analogous to the production of geometry' s exactitude : the passage to the infinite limit of a finite and qualitative sensible intuition. this ability easily and de jure transgresses its limits. Note adapted by Tr. within the historical horizon in which everything is historical. especially § 8 3 . p. In closing these preliminary considerations. of the unity of the world' s infinite horizon or (beyond the finite interconnection of retentions and protentions) to the constitution of the evidence for a total unity of the immanent flux as an Idea in the Kantian sense. The advancements of science can be pursued. But this horizon has its essential structure that can be disclosed through methodical inquiry" ( 1 7 1 -72 [modified]). " Unfortunately . 533c) . Did not Plato describe this situation? Was not the eternity of essences for him perhaps only another name for a nonempirical historicity? "Geometry and the studies [sciences ] that accompany if ' are exiled far from their fundamental intuitions. e videntness. its final sense. even when the sense of its origin has been lost. Bachelard (see A Study of HusserI' s Logic. as he says. 1l6 The return inquiry is therefore urgent: through us and for us it will reawaken science to its primordial sense. Derrida translates Einsicht by " evi­ dence rationnelle . 1 1. of the constitution of the alter ego by an irreducibly mediate intentionality). This movement is analogous to the con­ stitution. 22 1 . as we suspect. p . since historicity embraces the infinite totality of being and sense: "Naturally. But then the very logicality of the scientific gestures. 1 15 However. We will come directly back to this later. for example . " As long as lI S . Working in the diaphanousness of pure ideality. intellectual seenness. the certainty of what can never im­ mediately and as such present itself in an intuition should pose some serious problems for phenomenology (problems similar to those. . this is our situation. imprisoned in mediacy. for example. Husserl recalls their exemplary and fully "historical" character (in the sense of Historie ) : " Everywhere the problems. i. A secondary idealizing operation then comes to relieve the reactivative ability of its finitude and lets it get beyond itself. . The phenomenological status of its evidence remains rather mysterious . . VIII Cf. and that of the whole modern age'" ( 1 69) . " In this he follows. always decisively intervenes in the difficult moments of Husserl' s description. This helps e lucidate the phrase "la transparence rationnelle de son evidence" as a " translation" of " E insichtigke it . which has for its correlate an infinite Idea. in order that science not decay into a "tradition emptied of sense. We stand. they seem to us to dream (oromen os oneirottousi) (Republic VII. The Collected Dialogues. to " notice" that there exists "an idealization: namely. breaks down into a sort of oneiric and inhuman absurdity. Hamilton and Cairns (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. other returns to their origins are therefore prescribed.t But above all. as with respect to the world of presci­ entific culture. the j ustification and practice of S . Husserl says in Ideas I.

despite affinities connecting it to Dilthey's theory of the Weltanschauung. " and "genesis. with an admirable fidelity. And here what Husserl wants to wrest from historical relativism is less the truth or ideal norms of sci­ ence and philosophy than the a priori of historical science itself. This leads us to the second riposte. The illusion of history can be given to this first objection only by verbal or symbolic allusions to some " undiscoverable" [ 1 72] but hardly mythical Thales . concerning the origin of science and geometry in particular. each human group has its world. it is a question. even humanistic-psychological unda­ explanation. an experi­ ence which itself is grounded in the Living Present of egological consciou sness. In effect. " "historical explanation. §25. he attacked empiricism and external history He now rejects it because it misconstrues its own style of historical investigation. the unitary ground of history. to the universal Apriori of hIstory. Husserl himself had handled this classic objection when. The schema of this criticism is anal­ ogous to that which underlies "Philosophy as Rigorous Science. 84-86. to primordial evidences and instituting concepts. 1 1 8 The historic Present is the historical Absolute­ " the vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving (des Miteinander und Ineinander) of primordial formations and sedi­ mentations of sense (Sinnbildllllg [lind Sinnsedimentierllng ] ) " ( 1 74 [modified]) . Now . this time directed against histori­ cism rather than empirical history. to the notion of the intentional history of sense. and in curiously similar terms. every return to first axioms. over against the universal a priori. seems to have a more ethno­ sociological. of the historic Present in general as the ultimate universal form of every possible historical ex perience. . between epistemological and genetic origin . Husserl specifies ( 1 72-73) : . " Or rather. the unconditioned and apodictic structures. the initial distrust with regard to conventional history). is at the same time ' ' his­ torical disclosure" [ 1 73] . But there is nothing historical to that. on the contrary. at least. we know a priori that every cultural present. as Husserl clearly states. As the Absolute unchangeable in itself of the Living Present in whic� it is grounded. the historic Present is at first sight only the ir­ redUCIble and pure place and movement of that totalization and that traditionalization . the concepts of "history. implicates in its totality the totality of the past. " But the historicism Husserl now attacks. on the one hand. therefore every scientific present. Moreover. but before coming back to the determined origin of that sci­ ence. which is as internal and nonempirical as possible. Is it useful to recall that never has it been a question of returning to Thales or the factual beginnings of geometry? But to renounce factual history is not at all to cut oneself off from history in general. Certainly. the first would proceed from a standard epistemologism for which the return to primordial evidence and to its instituting con­ cepts is an indispensable task. p p . if correctly inquired of. 117 actual history. what is fundamentally mistaken is the limitation through which precisely the deepest and most genuine problems of history are concealed. a more modern style. The unity of this unceasing totalization which is always brought about in the form of the historic Present (the " Primordial in itself" [Primordial e� soiD leads us. every intrascientific explication. From this fact.117 The ruling dogma of the separation in principle between epistemo­ logical elucidation and historical. is f mentally mistaken [is fundamentally turned upside down: Derrida 's translation ]. contrasts with that of his early phenomenology (but which only confirms and deepens. each tribe. its order. presuppose the structure of the universal horizon and the a priori of history that Husserl designates . these unimpeachable testimonies do not be­ lie but.108 Jacques Derrida 109 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry After having opened his question about geometry to its broadest horizon. it is to open oneself to the sense of historicity. On the contrary. And in a sentence whose stress. The confrontation of this text with that of the Origin can be remarkably illuminating as to the sense and fidelity of Husserl ' s itinerary. in the usual way. H usserl emphasizes in a footnote [ 1 74] that all of intrinsic hi story passe s through the intrinsic history of the totality of individual persons. the objection that he pretends to address here . its a priori . All habitual factual history "remains incomprehensible" ( 1 74) as long as these a priori have not been expli­ cated and as long as factual history has not adapted its method to the notion of intrinsic history. such as Husserl means to describe them. unless one inadmissibly limits. Husserl responds (as a sort of complementary clarification) to two diametrically opposed methodological objections. its logic . its history. To investigate the sense of a science as tradition and as cultural form is to investigate the sense of its complete historicity . these prel IS Naturally. Whatever our ignorance on the subject of I n Ideas I . Every particular historical investigation must de jure note its more or less immediate dependence on that insight into apodictic principles [evidence absolument principielle ] . ethnologism sets the abundant mUltiplicity of testimonies attesting that each people. will b e found a long piissage i n which Husserl develops on his own.

that other men also necessarily live within a community of language and tradition. that each does not have the same sense-content. left to itself. provided its level of materiality and its apriori conditions are appropriately determined. " Philosophy and the Crisis of European H u manity . that Husserl renounced the historical a priori discovered by imaginary variation and recognized that the pure phenomenology of history had to expect something other than exam­ ples from the content of the empirical sciences. is unable to repre­ sent the possibilities of existence which are realized in different cul­ tures . It is as if the imagination. " pp. two men or two groups of men must have been able to be understood starting from the possibilities. " in Signs. e . and so forth. This form also seems to be the final retrenchment. See note s 1 22-1 2 5-tr. The same interpretation is presented in Merleau-Ponty ' s article . 1�1 Letter of March I I . " p. 110 Jacques Derrida 1 11 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry � . From that letter. at times has been. i . i ' � i suppositions only cause singular and determined a priori to be articu­ lated therein. we need not first enter into some kind of critical discussion of the facts set out by historicism. .1 ] 3 .. [A great deal of this letter i s available i n Merleau-Ponty' s articles cited beiow . by itself alone and as such. presupposes as its horizon a historical determinability that every empirical science. pp . of what all that means in general . materially determined by its insertion within the factual content of a tradition. Cf. .. language. On the other hand. This universal form. taken up by the researchers themsel ves with various de­ grees of e xplication. who live in certain historical traditions. That each of their fundamental Presents is. 11 9 Ranke' s " ' how it really was' " [ 1 76]. 1 1 \1 rity. The part devoted to re­ lativism in the celebrated Letter to Levy-Bruhl can be interpreted in this way . In order for the ethnological ' 'fact" to appear. . written a year earlier than the Origin. "The Philosopher and Sociology . On the contrary. the most different "other. 296. . sure. ethnological communication must al­ ready be started within the horizon of universal humanity . H u sserl there speaks notably of the " indubitable legiti­ macy" that " historical relativism" involves "as anthropological fact" (our emphasis) and of the possible and necessary task of a comprehensive Einfiihlung with respect to primitive societies that are " without h istory" (geschichtlos) . This is notably the reading that Merleau-Ponty proposed: "In a letter to Levy-Bruhl which has been preserved. In the ultimate recourse. . can be determined as certain historical facts only if something like historical truth is determinable in general. " Accordingly. therefore the most responsible secuSome analogous developments will be found in the V ienna Lecture. We must already be engaged in a precomprehension of historicity. it is necessary to know that the historic Present in general-the irreduci­ ble form of every historical experience-is the ground of all historicity. of a universal language. Thu s every problem of historical facts involves historical invariants the very moment the problem authorizes a certain relativism. The ethnologist must be sure . [Husserl] saw that it is perhaps not possible for u s. ethnology in particular. also. In order to be able "to establish" facts as facts of history. It suffices.] H e insists v igorously on the fact that the rights of relativ ism thu s understood are preserved and " conserved" by " the i ntentional analysis" of transcendental phenomenology. 1 29. 90-9 1 . on the contrary . which alone can bring them to light as such . which is the most primordial and concrete lived experience. " in C.. they always are understandable-at the limit-in the commonality of their Living Present in which the historic Present is rooted. to conceive of the historical possibility of these primitive men by a mere variation of our imagination. Phenomenology . within the horizon of a history . is powerless to ground. social structure. of every phenomenological reduction. community. moreover. 1 20 The latter retains all its value. and so forth are. tradition. it is enough that the claim of their factuality already pre­ supposes the historical a priori if this claim is to have any sense" ( 1 76 [modified]) .. Husserl seems to admit that the facts go beyond what we imagine and that this point bears a real significance. the "facts. " Phenomenology and the S ciences of Man . the thinker who wishes 1 20 Is it necessary to underscore that the question here is not that of a criticism of h istorical or socio-ethnological science as such ? H usserl simply wants to cal l the problem back to its presupposition s . " 1 22 Or again: instant [instance ] Historical relativism is now no longer dominated at one stroke by a mode of thought which would have all the keys of history and would be in a position to draw up a table of all historical possibles be fore any factual experimental inquiry. 122 . the ultimate reference for all factual history. to respect those articulations and the complicated hierarchy which submits more or less determined material a