Contemporary Philosophy

Eichmann, the Banality of Evil, and Thinking in Arendt's Thought*
Bethania Assy

ABSTRACT: I analyze the ways in which the faculty of thinking can avoid evil action, taking into account Hannah Arendt's discussion regarding the banality of evil and thoughtlessness in connection with the Eichmann trial. I focus on the following question posed by Arendt: "Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining and reflecting upon whatever happens to come to pass, regardless of specific content and quite independent of results, could this activity be of such a nature that it 'conditions' men against evildoing?" Examples of the connection between evildoing and thinking include the distinction between the commonplace and the banal, and the absence of the depth characteristic of banality and the necessity of thinking as the means for depth. I then focus upon Arendt's model thinker (Socrates) and argue that the faculty of thinking works to avoid evildoing by utilizing the Socratic principle of noncontradiction.

"What is the subject of our thought? Experience! Nothing else!" (1) (Hannah Arendt)

to do a complete report of the Eichmann case in Israel. he portrayed something entirely negative. After the confirmation that Eichamnn was to be judged in Israel. but the doer . and the United Nations finally decided the legality of Jerusalem Trial. and war crimes. Arendt says: "When confronted with situations for which such routine procedures did not exist. a kind of macabre comedy." was — nicht einmal unheimlich — not even sinister.. what Arendt had detected in Eichmann was not even stupidity. crimes against humanity. Israel and Argentina had discussed Eichmann's extradition to Israel. (3) who was acused of crimes against the Jewish people. evidenced in his transparent superficiality and mediocrity left her astonished in measuring the unaccounted evil committed by him. Arendt asked The New Yorker's director. on the trial of Otto Adolf Eichmann. 1960. quite authentic inability to think. Actually. he [Eichmann] was helpless. Eichmann's ordinariness implied in an incapacity for independent critical thought: ". as it had evidently done in his official life. 1961. in her words. The trial began in April 15.Eichmann in Jerusalem (2) was originated when Hannah Arendt went to Jerusalem in order to report. was quite ordinary. and neither demonic nor monstrous. and his cliché-ridden language produced on the stand." (4) She argues that "The deeds were monstrous. in May 24. for The New Yorker. Arendt's first reaction to Eichmann." (6) (emphasis added) Eichmann became the protagonist of a kind of experience apparently so quotidian. the absence of the critical thought.. "the man in the glass booth. The New York Times had announced Eichmann's capture by Israeli agents in Argentina.. organizing the deportation of millions of Jews to the concentration camps. commonplace." (5) Arendt's perception that Eichmann seemed to be a common man. . that is.. the only specific characteristic one could detect in his past as well as in his behavior during the trial and the preceding police examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but a curious. it was thoughtlessness. William Shamn.

bombs. Arendt addressed the question of the banality of evil. . In fact. adherence to conventional. it was not only Eichmann. who was normal. Those attitudes resulted in the clouding between virtues and vices of a blind obedience. who has not reflected on the content of the rules. stock phrases.. One was before a bureaucratic compact mass of men who were perfectly normal. This normality opened up the precedent regarding the possibility that some attitudes commonly repudiated by a society — in this case the Nazi German attitudes — find as a locus of manifestation the common citizen.Clichés. "We may find it almost impossible to image how someone could 'think'(or rather." (7) Eichmann had always acted according to the restrict limits allowed by the laws and ordinances. whereas all other bureaucrats were sadist monsters. Behind such terrible normality of the bureaucratic mass.Richard Bernstein highlights this "normal and ordinary behavior" of the bureaucratic mass in not thinking about the real meaning of the rules themselves. in the sense that they would behave in the same manner in the manufacturing of either food or corpses. whereby manufacturing food. or corpses are 'in essence the same' and where this can become 'normal'. This is the mentality that Arendt believed she was facing in Eichmann. but whose acts were monstrous. 'ordinary' behavior." (9) II . standardized codes of expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality. not think) in this manner. who was able to commit the greatest atrocities that the world has even seen. as an isolated person. that is.." (8) Eichmann has brought up the radical danger of "such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness. against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence.

committed on a gigantic scale. and ideological conviction of the doer. Arendt for the first time utilizes the term banality of evil : "It was as though in those last minutes he was summing up the lesson that this long course in human wickedness had taught us — the lesson of the fearsome. which could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness. the faculty of judgment. such as pathology.. Almost 10 years after Eichmann in Jerusalem. it seems that the Arendtian portrait of a banal Eichmann has become more than a lesson. and a logical process able (11) "to wrest" his speech and thought was described then by Arendt in the final moment of Eichmann's death.these 'lofty words' should completely becloud the reality of his own death. With the following question Arendt substantially circumscribes the main delineation in which the banality of evil . and their moral implications.. The apex of detachment of Eichmann's mind between the reality of such events. in such a way that ".. or ideological conviction in the doer. Eichmann was incapable of articulating anything other than what he had heard all his life. pathology. in which Eichmann became the factual example. word-and-thought-denying banality of evil." (14) Arendt stressed a kind of phenomenon in which the doer exposes an impressive superficiality." (12) With such description." (13) (emphasis added) Such a "lesson. tasks that have been extremely significant in Arendt's work since her first writtings in the late 1940s about the phenomenon of the Totalitarianism. Arendt reaffirms in Thinking and Moral Considerations this same dimension of evil: ". (10) The banality of evil has accentuated the whole relationship among the faculty of thinking. and so one." whose potentiality denys word and thought.Subsequently.. self-interest. the phenomenon of evil deeds. the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. whose only personal distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness. did not seem to frame the usual standards of evil. as Arendt maintained against those who had affirmed that the banality of evil implied a theorization about the phenomenon of evil.

religious traditional standards. in its intrinsic nature and attributes. the habit of examining and reflecting upon whatever happens to come to pass. in other words. moral. did not seem to frame the usual standards of evil. or philosophic — about the phenomenon of Evil. In this sense. Such notion was mentioned by Arendt in the first pages of The Life of the Mind's introduction: "Behind that phrase [banality of evil]. regardless of specific content and quite independent of results. Arendt had already mentioned the deep meaning of experiences through which the reality became an urgent element for the philosophical task in modernity. or even an obstinate set of ideas that had impelled him to evil and so one. whose roots were not anchored in the philosophical. such as pathology of evil. whose potentiality denys word and thought. Arendt raises the question about whether such traditional dimentions of evil are a necessary condition of evil-doing. at least will open a new perspective on the understanding of evil. The banality of evil. has the imperative condition to the evil-doing been the evil based on traditional foundations? It was undeniable that this new whole of questions about the phenomenon of evil.will be the result: "Could the activity of thinking as such. ideological conviction of the doer. self-interest. although I was dimly aware of the fact that it went counter to our tradition of thought — literary." (16) Evil as a demoniac portion like . could this activity be of such a nature that it 'conditions' men against evil-doing?" (15) (emphasis added) In other words. Arendt takes Jasper's expression "border situations" to describe such incalculable and unforeseable situations in which the man is forced to think. Has the phenomenon of evil necessarily a volitive root? Or. theological. does the faculty of thinking. I held no thesis or doctrine. involve the possibility of avoiding evil-doing? At least in "border situations"? In 1946. Eichmann portrayed the factual example of a kind of evil manifestation that was not found in the traditional dimensions. intentional evil.

. for Arendt. and the clear relationship between the problem of evil and the faculty of thinking. commonly happens.Lucifer.. there is a very important difference: 'commonplace' is what frequently. in which Arendt affirms that the notion that "there is an Eichmann in each one of us" is a complete misunderstanding.Thus. Arendt distinguishes between banal and commonplace with regard to the banality of evil. or even the hate that evil feels by Good.. the falling angel." (19) Arendt emphasizes that the absence of critical thinking was common among "Eichmanns. that Eichmann is in nobody. banality of evil does not mean that the evil itself is trivial and common to everybody." Such absence could directly affect the evil-doing that became banal by the fact that this block of Eichmanns did not exercise their capacity of thinking. I always hated this notion of 'Eichmann in each one of us'.. Thus. for Arendt all of them cannot explain what had happened in Nazi Germany. in 1972. but something can be banal even if it is not common. brought into light by Eichmann. This would be as untrue as the opposite. in 1963. it is not true that "there is an Eichmann in each one of us. In a correspondence with Grafton. This is simply not true." (18) Banal does not presuppose that the evil has a commonplace in everyone. mentioned by the religious tradition.. I felt was shocking because it contradicts our theories about evil. envy.." (17) The perplexity before a phenomenon that contradicted the known theories about evil. were what Arendt have pointed out by the expression the banality of evil. Arendt says: ". But they look really quite different.. Oh no! There is none in you and none in me! This doesn't mean that there are not quite a number of Eichmanns. Arendt says: ". the evil mobilized by weakness. This distinction between commonplace and banal is clear in a conference organized on her work in Toronto. Arendt says: "For say that I said there is an Eichmann in each one of us. Evil can become banal even if evil itself is not trivial to anyone. exemplifyed in the literary tradition in Shakespeare." .

. Even in Eichmann in Jerusalem Arendt says: ". such evil has no-roots in the sense that it has not-roots in any kind of manifestation of evil presented by our tradition as a whole. and instead of being . if this is 'banal' and even funny. for Arendt. Evil be thou my good! No Radical Evil. by definition. not rooted in 'evil motives' or 'urges' or strength of 'temptation' (human nature) or 'Evil be thou my good: Richard III' etc. there was a deep inclination of a whole society to not exercise the faculty of thinking. Evil is a surface phenomenon. I was struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the incontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives. Root-less. if with the best will in the world one cannot extract any diabolical or demonic profundity from Eichmann." (23) That means." (21) In another undated draft she says: "Banality of Evil — . Arendt accentuated that banality means: " 'No roots'. and that for this very reason it is so terribly difficult to think about it." (24) Secondly. a notion of evil that has no roots in "evil motives. no demonic forces. In fact. that is still far from calling it commonplace" (20) (emphasis added) Let us take another penetrating aspect related to the banality of evil: the absence of roots. and consequently reach the roots.. wants to reach the roots. what I was confronted with was utterly different and still undeniably factual. Firstly. the banality of evil has. since thinking.. going to the roots (radix). The notion that the banality of evil has "no-roots" is inherently connected with Arendt's understanding that only the faculty of thinking can reach the profundity. In a draft written for a debate about Eichmann in Jerusalem in Hofstra College in 1964.. as a deep understanding. I would like to discuss two implications concerning the meaning of "no-roots" in the banality of evil. that is has no depth." (22) In The Life of the Mind Arendt writes: "However. In one of the clearest moments about this Arendt says: "I mean that evil is not radical.and that the banality of evil has a commonplace in each of us.

Such aspects are mentioned by Arendt in one of the most controversial statements in her correspondence with Gershom Scholem. by definition. by reaching another dimension than the horizon of everyday life. as I said. by stopping ourselves and beginning to think. because thought tries to reach some depth. Only the good has depth and can be radical.. Eichmann. that it is only extreme. Arendt emphasizes: "It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never 'radical'. the more superficial someone is. to go to roots. it is frustrated because there is nothing.. could not find any profundity with regard to his deeds. and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. can reach the depth. That is its 'banality'. We resist evil by not being swept away by the surface of things. it is merely extreme. Arendt found an absence of evil motives." (25) (emphasis added) Looking for some profundity in Eichmann that could explain the roots of evil. and that solely stopping . It is 'thought-defying'. such evil without roots. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. An indication of such superficiality is the use of clichés. In other words. can be understood essentially by the resulting movement from thoughtlessness. and Eichmann.radical...was a perfect example." the banality of evil.and starting to think. that is. Arendt emphasizes that evil could spread "like a fungus on the surface" mainly because there is no depth." (26) (emphasis added) III . in which we necessarily reach profundity. wants to reach the roots. thinking. . and the moment it concerns itself with evil. Since ". by the fact that he was not able to exercise the faculty of thinking. as if the evil was a superficial phenomenon in opposition to the faculty of thinking. the more likely will he be to yield to evil.

because their conscience did not function in this. as a set of mores. according to Arendt. highly civilized nation. Arendt claims the bridge between morality and the faculty of thinking.In Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship. automatic way. ." (29) (emphasis added) Arendt clearly attributes to the faculty of thinking the presupposition for this kind of judging extremely necessary in times of moral collapse.question is relatively simple. but because only on this condition could they go on living with themselves. at the very moment of its collapse within an old.. then.. that is to say. In this same article quoted above she asks how is was possible that few persons resisted the moral collapse and had not adhered to the regime." (28) Thenceforth. and they were capable of doing so not because they disposed of a better system of values or because the old standards of right and wrong were still firmly planted in their mind and conscience but. the moral and ethic standards based on habits and customs have shown that they can just be changed by a new set of rules of behavior dictated by the current society. does the faculty of thinking work in order to avoid evil? First of all. and they decided that it would be better to do nothing.. Arendt herself answers: "The answer to the . which could be exchanged for another set with no more trouble than it would take to change the table manners of a whole people. Arendt emphasizes: "It was as though morality. The nonparticipants. not because the world would then be charged for the better. were the only ones who dared judge by themselves."Thinking is the only activity that needs nothing but itself for its exercise.. "when the chips are down. despite any coercion." (27) (emphasis added) (Hannah Arendt) Let us raise the question that comes naturally from sthe two former topic: How. called irresponsible by the majority... they asked themselves to what an extent they would still be able to live in peace with themselves after having committed certain deeds. stood revealed in its original meaning." . . as were. of customs and manners.

Rather. And finally." Second. that is. if only because thoughtlessness as well as stupidity are much more frequent phenomena." (30) (emphasis added) Arendt enumerates three basic propositions that involve the faculty of thinking and the problem of evil." (32) (emphasis added) In fact. Hence. to the avoidance of evil-doing. . only through the functioning of the faculty of thinking. we cannot walk upon the firm soil of established moral standards. then. has an antagonistic result regarding solid axioms.Arendt argues: "The presupposition for this kind of judging is not a highly developed intelligence or sophistication in moral matters. Her answer would be indicative of the trajectory of such a faculty. meaning by that that we are condemned to the continuos examination of the events through our activity of thinking. the exercise of reason as the faculty of thought. it can be found in highly intelligent people.. any moral commandment. since this experience. but merely the habit of living together explicitly with oneself. one cannot expect that such faculty builds any kind of moral foundation. and wickedness is hardly its cause. one must presuppose that the faculty of thinking is accessible to everyone. one would need philosophy. Arendt asks how the faculty of thinking can be relevant not only to the problem of evil.. Arendt has made clear that after the experience of totalitarianism. if the faculty of thinking. or even. She says: "Inability to think is not stupidity. what for Arendt means: looking for the experiences of thought. we have been confined to live in the company of ourselves. that is. First. it consequently takes no place directly in the world of appearances. (31) Taking into account these three presuppositions. but also. of being engaged in that silent dialogue between me and myself which since Socrates and Plato we usually call thinking. to prevent evil. as we will see. if the faculty of thinking concerns the invisible. is necessary to cause great evil. rather than the privilege of "professional thinkers. in Kantian terms.

Verstand. rather than. The faculty of thinking concerns meaning.." (34) Such a form of preventing evil is located in the process of thinking itself.Describing the faculty of thinking. putting the established standards in movement. as a faculty of cognition. whose argumentation does not intend to achieve any concept or definition about the inquired subject. the former. and the necessity of understanding. and thereby pertains to the intellect. In a broad sense. whereas. without right or wrong. As if the faculty of thinking had the potentiality of putting man in front of a blank painting. the latter. Thus. as a faculty of thinking. reflecting by . and intellect. whose evidence is given by the senses. Arendt argues that the faculty of thinking is related to the search for meaning pertaining to reason. objectifying a verifiable knowledge. thinking about them and asking his interlocutors to do the same. Arendt had claimed that "If there is anything in thinking that can prevent men from doing evil.simply for the right to go about examining the opinions of other people. regardless of its objects. without good or evil." (33) Socratic thought follows an aporetic movement. One of Arendt's main concerns about the faculty of thinking was the fact that a whole society can succumb to a total changing of its moral standards without its citizens emitting any judgment about what has happened. the search for truth.. as if the perplexity has the power to dislodge the individuals from their own dogmas and rules of behavior. Arendt chooses Socrates as her model of thinker. This Socratic movement of thinking provokes essentially the perplexity." insofar Socrates thought ". but simply activating in him the condition to establish dialogue with himself. aims at the apprehension through perceptions that are given by senses. Vernunft. Arendt takes the Kantian distinction between reason. "a citizen among citizens. it must be some property inherent in the activity itself. aims at the conception of meaning. and understanding.

or legal established standards without exciting their capacity of reflect. What Arendt has pointed out in claiming such criterion of noncontradiction. to be consistent with oneself. by its own nature. actually means becoming one's own adversary. these two must be friends. The banality of evil which appeared through Eichmann made evident how superficial the phenomenon of evil could show its face. taking account that the self is also a kind of friend. as a sine qua non condition for the thinking process. Arendt points out the only criterion that Socrates attributes to the faculty of thinking: "agreement. Arendt is trying to avoid adherence by men to any moral. wants to reach the roots. which compels meaning through remembrance. implies the acquisition of an adversary. is to stress how dangerous the deeds can be when the actor does not exercise the inner dialogue with himself in order to examine the events in front of his eyes. in which the only form of interruption is. of thinking. in which we are our own partner. to be in contradiction with oneself. to be in contradiction with yourselves. when one has disagreement with any partner. based on an internal dialogue with themselves about the meaning of such happenings. The criterion of dialogue. The evil could spread out as fungus under the . that means. the harmony of such dialogue is essential to make one's own dialogue possible. the adversary becomes ourselves. Taking the Socratic propositions. its opposite. in disagreement with yourselves. The thinking process. and deliberating by the faculty of judging his own judgment about such events. so that. Because if the modus operandi of the thinking process takes place in the form of a dialogue. to stop provoking the two-in-one dialogue. to stop thinking. by its inner form of working. consequently. In regarding the faculty of thinking. is the harmony that makes possible the dialectical process throughout." (35) Even though the condition to the thinking process is the two-in-one dialogue. the dialogue naturally interrupts. social.himself.

" (37) At first glance." The lesson was how easily individuals can adhere to new standards. In Arendt's proposition. it represents a kind of danger.surface. at least in border situations. the absence of the faculty of thinking can be far more dangerous. such a lesson was the perplexity of how little the habit of reflecting with oneself. the manifestation of the winds of thought able to provoke perplexity. dislodging the prejudices. Although. nor made a dialogue with themselves about their own deeds." insofar as such a new set of code has its proper working logic. If the absence of thinking protects individuals against the "danger" of the winds of thought. in taking Socrates as her model of thinker. Arendt says: The greatest evildoers are those who don't remember because they never given the matter a thought. (36) In other words. Arendt has adverted that as the Socratic model of thinking does not originate any standard. did not ask for significance. I know the agent and am condemned to live together with him. modern society had shown us. in Arendt's view the result of the process of thinking is not nihilism. nothing can keep them back because without remembrance they are without roots. However. of reflection. at least in times when the chips are down. the non-exercise of such a faculty can bring the "banality of evil. it can be infered that such a model will be even helpful in destroying all rules of social behavior. on the contrary. Nevertheless. no matter whether such set of rules comports "thou shalt kill. This . thinking and judging. Arendt argues that the man that exercises his faculty of thinking is always his own witness of his deed: "I am may own witness when I am acting. impels men to exercise the faculty of thinking. in the same sense." instead of "thou shalt not kill. by a mass of citizens that did not reflect on events. making them emit their own judgment. nihilism springs by the wish to find results independently from the necessity of the activity of thinking.

the faculty of thinking in such emergent times "is political by implication." Secondly. Firstly. at least for the self. realizes thinking. a devastating article wrote by Arendt in 1948." defended in the summer of 1996 in Brazil. The manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge. (38) Notes * This paper was presented at the Seminar "Hannah Arendt's The Life of the Mind. . the faculty of thinking has a deliberating effect upon the faculty of judging. beautiful form ugly. making possible The Concentration Camps. Richard Bernstein in the Department of Philosophy at New School For Social Research in the spring/97. And this. at the rare moments when the stakes are on the table." taught by Prof. I conclude this paper pointed out two fundamental implications of the faculty of thinking. keeping in mind that the faculty of thinking and the faculty judging are intrinsically connected. then judging. even though Arendt has left our world without showing exactly how. makes it manifest in the world of appearances. This paper was also a part of my Master Thesis entitled "MIGHT THE PROBLEM OF EVIL BE CONNECTED WITH THE ABSENCE OF THE FACULTY OF THINKING? The relationship between the Banality of Evil and the Faculty of Thinking in Hannah Arendt.lesson was the banality of evil. where I am never alone and always too busy to be able to think. may indeed prevent catastrophes. the by-product of the liberating effect of thinking.This later proposition works as an intentional open door. Arendt writes: "If thinking — the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue — actualizes the difference within our identity as given in consciousness and thereby results in conscience as its by-product. it is the ability to tell right from wrong.

"Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture. no. p. 308." Social Research. 04 (hereafter cited as LM). (hereafter cited as On Hannah Arendt). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report of the Banality of evil. "On Hannah Arendt. He was not an high rank officer. (3) Eichmann was a Gestapo's officer under the Himmler's command." This means that he had the responsibility in organizing the deportations and evacuations of Jews. even though he was responsible by "the Jewish question. The Life of Mind . Martin's Press. (2) Hannah Arendt. unpublished).(1) (emphasis added) Hannah Arendt. (hereafter cited as LW). 1961. edited by Melvy A.. Harvest/HJB Book." In Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World." including "the Final Solution.For Love of the World (New Haven and London: Yale University Press. . Quoted from Elizabeth YoungBruehl. 417.Thinking . (7) LM. 1982). p. 38/3 (Fall 1970). Library of Congress. 329. 1977). p. (5) Hannah Arendt. Hill (New York: St. 1979). including to bring them directly to the camps of extermination. p. (4) Correspondence between Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Blücher. 1978). (hereafter cited as EJ). April 15. (hereafter cited as TMC). revised and enlarged edition (New York: Penguin Books. Hannah Arendt . p. (6) Hannah Arendt. 04. Manuscript Division.Willing (New York-London: Ed. (Hannah Arendt's Papers.

318. 288. 1992) p. (New York. (New York/London: Ed. 417. 1994. 26. (New York.) p." Arendt. p. 1979. edited by Jerome Kohn. and Judging.(8) Richard Bernstein..) p. 356. 418. p. (14) TMC." in Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge: The MIT Press. p. 288. (11) With regard to this logical process see: Hannah Arendt. p.. Margareth Canovan. Imperialism. Thinking. p. it was a lesson. p." In Essays in Understanding 1930-1954. 1994.Harvest-HJB Book. San Diego and London: Harcourt Brace & Company.. 288. Hannah Arendt . (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. "Understanding and Politics" In Essays in Understanding 1930-1954.A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought. San Diego and London: Harcourt Brace & Company. (10) In the postscript Arendt clarifies that the banality of evil does not concern the theorization about the ontological nature of the evil. 1996). p... 170. (9) EJ. "Evil. (12) EJ. Ibib. (15) TMC. 473. (16) LM. "On the Nature of Totalitarianism. Hannah Arendt. She says: ".) p. 03. edited by Jerome Kohn... Hannah Arendt. p. . 252. Totalitarianism. The Origins of Totalitarianism-Anti-semitism. neither an explanation of the phenomenon nor a theory about it [banal]. (13) Ibid.

1964. "From Radical Evil to the Banality of Evil:From . p. (hereafter cited as 'Arendt to Grafton'). container 60. (22) Hannah . Library of Congress. 04. container 60. 023315. (18) Hannah Arendt. (21) Hannah Arendt. Library of Congress. (20) EJ. 24820.Discussion with Enumeration of Topics" Hofstra College. This quotation is in 'Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship I' 023317. (23) LM. (24) For the relationship between radical evil and the banality of evil concerning the meaning of "evil motives" see Richard Bernstein. London. 24842. BBC (August 6 1964). Hannah Arendt's Papers. 288. container 76). undated.(17) The article called Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship was published in The Listener. "Reflections after Eichmann Trial". Library of Congress." p. By the reason that the published material has omitted the fifteenth first pages of the original manuscript. The Manuscript Division. 1963) draft. 06.. Correspondence between Grafton and Arendt. p. (September 19. Hannah Arendt's Papers. The Manuscript Division. whereas the unpublished material will be cited as Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship I ( Hannah Arendt's Papers. 308. "Eichmann . (19) "On Hannah Arendt. The Manuscript Division. Hannah Arendt's Papers. we will adopt the following systematic: the published paper will be quoted as Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship II. Manuscript Division. Library of Congress.

4 (Winter 1994). p.' p. 168. p. 339c.186. (29) Ibid. Vol. (33) LM p. 61. 137-53. Library of Congress. TMC. (34) LM. was published as "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy. (27) LM. The Manuscript Division. Hannah Arendt's Papers. p." In Social Research. No. (30) 'Ibid. Morality Lectures 1965.. 1996) pp. (New York: Grove Press. container 45. (36) The first part of the Morality Lectures 1995. 425.Superflousness toThoughtlessness. p. Arendt. (31) See. 1978). 251. We will take the following systematic: 'Some Questions of Moral . The other three parts remain unpublished as "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy"." in Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge: The MIT Press. pp. (32) TMC. 205. (26) Hannah. 423. 739-64.Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age. 180. p. given by Arendt at New School. (35) (Protagoras. The Jew as Pariah . 162. in this regard. (28) 'Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship II. (25) 'Arendt to Grafton' 07. New School for Social Research.) LM p.

. p. 024636. (38) LM. (37) Ibid.. Paideia logo design by Janet L. This quotation is in 'Some Questions of Moral Philosophy II' 024633. Olson.Philosophy I' for the part published and 'Some Questions of Moral Philosophy II' for the unpublished one. 193. All Rights Reserved .