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The Role of Organizational and Intelligence Discipline Bias in Intelligence Analysis, and Structured Analytic Methods to Overcome This

Jeremy Levin; Student ID #3049427
INTL 506: Analytics II 7/30/2011

Most pundits assert this stovepiping was a result of either security concerns--that those outside the originating organization would leak or spill the intelligence--or born of the desire to use the withheld reporting make their organizations' analysis more valuable to national decision makers. leadership of the intelligence community was taken away from the Director of Central Intelligence--the position that headed the community since 1946. every aspect of the intelligence cycle has been picked apart. A common thread among much of this criticism is the intelligence stovepiping. intelligence organizations were not sharing information. This paper proposes the stovepiping blamed for much of the intelligence community's dysfunction and several intelligence failures results from a more fundamental problem--bias. resulting in several failures to piece together complete intelligence pictures for national leaders. Whatever the reason. suggesting the root of the problem lies deeper than habit or neglect. Despite this mandate and the subsequent creation of numerous joint intelligence groups to facilitate intelligence sharing. In 2005. stovepiping continues to plague the intelligence community. and failure attributed to every aspect. predating the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) creation--and given to the newly-created Director of National Intelligence (DNI). From online blogs devoted to exposing intelligence dysfunction to the 9/11 Commission Report.In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon--commonly referred to as 9/11--and the faulty intelligence that sent the United States (US) to war in Iraq. in large part in an attempt to eradicate the stovepiping that had plagued the US' intelligence efforts for decades. intelligence failure has become one of the most discussed national security topics in both academia and national security circles. This bias primarily takes . or maintenance of intelligence within an organization rather than disseminating it to the intelligence community (IC).

underlying bias that contributes to stovepiping within the intelligence community. Literature Review: While not specifically detailing intelligence stovepiping. "Bureaucracy. in part. and bias for or against a particular type of intelligence. Wilson asserts agencies and organizations attach high priority to their decision making autonomy. "Getting Agencies to Work Together. Assuming the bulk of authors and experts correctly state stovepiping was largely responsible for previous flawed intelligence that left the US vulnerable to terrorist attack. and strongly resist and resent attempts to infringe on this turf. (Wilson 1989) In his book. Bardach further states agencies may fear obsolescence. or against the reporting of other organizations.one of two forms: bias within an organization in favor of that organization's reporting. in his book. and that stovepiping is an ongoing issue." Eugene Bardach asserts agencies often resist collaboration for fear it will blur agency missions and political accountabilities. and toward reporting from different types of intelligence collectors. it logically follows that the US continues to be vulnerable to attack due. this sentiment is applicable to intelligence stakeholders as well. potentially resulting in a "ecosystem ." James Q. This paper will explore the manifestations of this bias toward reporting from different intelligence collection organizations. and consumers." While Wilson was referring specifically to the armed forces. Wilson further states "struggles over autonomy are especially visible when the organizations involved have similar tasks. or turf. Wilson described organizational turf protectionism as a key factor in bureaucratic operations. managers. usually due to its method of collection. It will then explore whether and which structured analytic techniques could effectively mitigate the identified biases among intelligence analysts. to ongoing.

the IC. (Bardach 1998) In August 2007. "Overhauling Intelligence. conducted by the Office of the Inspector General. and there were few mechanisms in place to facilitate. Among his recommendations for intelligence reform. McConnell asserts that in addition to a divide between foreign intelligence and law enforcement that remained in place as intelligence sharing otherwise expanded post-9/11. The study found that most analysts relied on personal relationships with counterparts for information sharing. (McConnell 2007) A 2008 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) study into IC management challenges. the study claimed turf battles and agency protectionism continued to be a problem. former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell wrote his recommendations for intelligence reform in his piece. stovepiping intelligence was one of these areas. individual agencies and organizations--rather than the ecosystem writ large--in this case. according to the study. was that information technology systems were largely disconnected and incompatible. Bardach identifies the same issues regarding autonomy Wilson put forth. and interoperability between networks was lacking. he identified several problem areas within the intelligence community. as agencies responsible for intelligence collection continued to limit access to data and products to the wider community. the IC component organizations' unique mandates and narrowly focused missions inhibited IC unity. let alone ensure collaboration and analytic exchange.effect" in which policy aims to protect individual species--in this case. identified IC information sharing as a key challenge. Part of the problem." published in Foreign Affairs. McConnell specified that few analysts knew their counterparts in other agencies. stating agencies may reject collaboration to preserve their decision making autonomy and minimize potential threats from necessary relationships. despite efforts to improve and . However.

was written to identify problem areas within the IC and recommend changes to make the IC more relevant and responsive to policy and decision makers' needs. military.increase collaboration and sharing. Lieberthal also assets a "culture of insularity and secrecy" works to the detriment of both the IC and its products by limiting dissemination of intelligence traffic due to variations in security screenings. and FBI. Office of the Inspector General 2008) Kenneth Lieberthal's "The U." written for the Brookings Institution. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy. The study identifies numerous problem areas.S. and therefore perpetuated inter-agency rivalries and partisan manipulation. most prominently between foreign and domestic intelligence and between civilian. Further. Lieberthal's section on overemphasizing classified reporting and de-emphasizing open source reporting that provides greater context to intelligence products." (as he describes them). because there were few. in which producers of finished intelligence products attempt to maintain separate points of view on intelligence topics." Lowenthal contends many of the developments within the IC since 2001 have actually increased rather than eradicated interagency rivalries. Lowenthal also identified the potential for "footnote wars. Lowenthal describes stovepiping as a result agencies attempting to highlight their individual relevance to ensure . (Lieberthal 2009) Mark Lowenthal details IC interrelationships in his book "Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. and lamented that participants in National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) represented their agencies rather than themselves. from overemphasis on a single intelligence product line to the recruitment of poor quality analysts. and law enforcement intelligence-especially between the CIA. for our purposes. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence. if any consequences for failure to collaborate. DoD.

agency reluctance to reverse or alter corporate judgments. which inhibits interaction with other agencies. and asserts this . Peterson reiterated the 9/11 Commission's determination that intelligence stovepiping and agency parochialism as a matter of policy and practice were key contributors to these failures. details the primary intelligence failures leading to both 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Johnston cites interviews with senior analysts and intelligence managers. and confirmation bias in agency selection and weighing of data according to classification. and many of the problems entailed in this analysis. trust in technical collection over other intelligence collection. and asserts one way intelligence analysts attempt to make their products stand out is to emphasize the unique nature of their sources. Johnston also asserts that even when placed in a joint environment." written for the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence." written for the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. Johnston identifies several factors that contribute to intelligence stovepiping and bias. (Johnston 2005) Steven W. (Lowenthal 2009) Dr. in which common themes include bias in favor of classified reporting over open-source intelligence. Peterson's "US Intelligence Support to Decision Making. Johnston further contends agency managers believe personnel. is a comprehensive look at how the IC conducts analysis. and operational structures. Rob Johnston's "Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community. and readiness should be tailored specifically for their own organizations. and agency preference for intelligence collected by that agency. including the conflict between secrecy and efficacy. Peterson also assigns fault to decision makers' expectation that intelligence can provide certainty.continued funding. principles. analysts will revert to previous isolationist patterns if not given specific joint processes. training.

" as the authors quote a clandestine service officer--further ensured HUMINT collection would not adequately address US intelligence needs. Treverton implies decision makers discount non-technical intelligence on intent and mindset when addressing tactical situations. such as SIGINT. Intelligence" published in the Washington Quarterly's Winter 2002 edition attributed many of the US' HUMINT collection difficulties to a long-running political shift away from HUMINT collection in the US intelligence community. intelligence managers. and intelligence analysts alike. and against collection and reporting against adversary intent. Treverton details several facets of politicization.S. (Cilluffo. The authors argue US political structures degraded HUMINT collection due to the perception HUMINT was more "dirty" than technological collection methods. and suggests this stovepiping results at least in part from bias on the part of policy and decision makers. (George and Bruce 2008) Frank Cilluffo. and George Salmoiraghi's study titled "The Use and Limits of U. Ronald Marks. Marks and Salmoiraghi 2002) The existing literature on the subject clearly indicates stovepiping is an ongoing issue within the intelligence community. and attempts to make HUMINT "cleaner"-such as directives to ensure HUMINT assets were "boy scouts. Treverton describes the same desire for certainty Peterson detailed. (Peterson 2009) Gregory Treverton's essay "Intelligence Analysis: Between 'Politicization' and Irrelevance" addresses both decision maker and agency bias in intelligence analysis.expectation causes bias in favor of technical intelligence collection and reporting against adversary actions. . including senior policy officials' direct pressure and agency "house line" assessment. but asserts the less technically fact-driven analysis on intent and adversary mindset is still sought after and of value in shaping policy makers' strategic goals.

Johnston and Treverton directly attribute this to the desire for certainty. and the belief that technical collection and analysis based on technical collection can provide more certain assessments. Treverton. Preference for Classified Reporting Lieberthal and Johnston identify the preference to use classified reporting rather than open source information in intelligence analysis. We must further specify how different types of bias affect participants in the intelligence production process. and are read by their customers.Discussion: In discussing bias that results in intelligence stovepiping. we must differentiate between unconscious bias--that which affects the perception of intelligence reporting or analysis writ large. Unconscious Bias: Desire for Certainty Johnston. or agenda. and Peterson all describe a preference for technical collection over non-technical collection. and often results in increased funding for organizations and agencies supporting technical intelligence collection at the expense of those supporting non-technical collection. in that analysts will use a disproportionate amount of technically collected intelligence in finished intelligence products to ensure these product appeal to. In deemphasizing openly available information--especially adversary or target-nations leaders' public statements and concerns--intelligence analysts lose sight of the context and social drivers . This leadership expectation does impact analysis. without a specific goal or aim--and deliberate bias--selecting reporting for use in analysis and assessment to support specific goals. aims. and anecdotal evidence from more than fifteen years in the IC suggests this bias is prevalent among intelligence analysts and managers. however. This appears to be driven by policy makers and intelligence managers more than analysts.

and so forth--is capable of providing such fullspectrum assessment. it can prompt these leaders to discount assessment based on HUMINT or affect budget and resource allocation which subsequently impact both collection and analysis. and contributes to intelligence failure. and over-reliance on this classified but incomplete reporting will invariably lead to intelligence failure. While this bias appears primarily with policy and decision makers. misleading to national decision makers. Additionally. . MASINT.impacting their analysis and assessments. Preference for One's Own Agency's Reporting Lowenthal and Johnston both identify analyst preference to use unique sources of information or reporting originating from their own agencies. and being focused on targets that ensure all relevant information is collected. but pandemic among intelligence analysts and managers. Classified collection platforms that are not perfectly placed and targeted will result in incomplete or incorrect intelligence collection. anecdotal evidence suggests this bias is not only prevalent. Ostensibly "all-source" analysis that emphasizes one discipline or collection agency over others is disingenuous. National decision makers require full-spectrum assessments to identify what adversaries intend. Once again. the state of their preparation. etc. classified intelligence collection depends on collection assets being available and placed where they are able to collect information. Perception of "Clean" and "Dirty" Intelligence Cilluffo et al identify the perception among decision makers that technical collection is "cleaner" or more gentlemanly than clandestine HUMINT collection via spies. and no one intelligence discipline-such as HUMINT. IMINT. SIGINT. of what they are capable.

However. and Lowenthal identify intelligence managers' selection and use of intelligence reporting for analysis to ensure decision makers perceive their organizations as relevant and necessary for national security.Deliberate Bias: Ensuring Relevance and Resources Bardach. selecting reporting for ostensibly "all-source" national security analysis and assessment to support an organizational agenda is disingenuous and damaging. This results in incomplete and skewed intelligence pictures provided to senior decision makers. national level decision and policy makers--rely on the products your organization provides. the problem of bias in the . the ODNI's determination that the systems and networks amongst the IC are unable to communicate and lack interoperability likely stems from the protectionism each agency performs: maintaining separate and distinct means of communication translates to less external influence. Lieberthal. As with the unconscious bias in favor of one's own agency's reporting. with the understanding that pressure from or forced collaboration with external stakeholders will degrade that product. Structured Analysis: Advances in message handling systems--such as the Multi-Media Messaging (M3) used by many Department of Defense components--have greatly improved cross-organizational reporting to facilitate its availability to all analysts. One way to do this is to ensure one's customers--in this case. in the manner your organization provides them. Additionally. which increases the likelihood of poor decisions that leave us vulnerable to intelligence failure and attack. Protecting Autonomy Wilson and Bardach identify the overarching desire of any and every bureaucratic organization to seek and protect its decision making autonomy.

Several structured analytic techniques have been developed with the goal of removing bias from intelligence analysis. credibility. While time consuming if there is a large body of reporting on the subject. gathering information. source checks. The top-down approach to eliminating stovepiping and bias in intelligence analysis and assessment undertaken in the wake of 9/11 and the Iraq conflict has so far failed. the quality of information. and increases analyst confidence that all facets of the issue have been thoroughly analyzed. Of . analysts should evaluate the available sources of information to determine reliability. Detailed in this primer are methods to perform relevance checks. This leaves it up to the intelligence analyst to remove bias. using a structured technique to objectively compare reporting to hypotheses further minimized the effect of bias in analysis and assessment. and winnowing available reporting for use in an intelligence product.selection and use of reporting in finished intelligence products continues. In the initial phase of research. not surprising. and quality of information checks--all necessary steps when producing finished intelligence. and intelligence managers are unlikely to cease their deliberately applied bias. relevance checks ensure each piece of data assessed relates to the central issues or alternative possibilities being analyzed. Beyond this. mitigates bias when reviewing information and reporting. and its relevance to the issue at hand. (Defense Intelligence Agency 2009) Relevance Check This check enables analysts to winnow available reporting to that which directly addresses the issue at hand. as policy and decision makers are unlikely to acknowledge their biases as such. In the selection and evaluation stage. the Defense Intelligence Agency's "A Tradecraft Primer: Basic Structured Analytic Techniques" would prove of immense value.

For ELINT or MASINT. The answers to the questions asked while performing a source check will allow the analyst to both objectively weigh reporting from multiple sources. the frequency and duration of collection. and whether the source appears biased or is approaching the information from a particular point of view. and to accurately convey confidence in these sources to intelligence managers and decision makers. signs of deception or intention to influence. when evaluating a HUMINT source. To perform a source check. Quality of Information Check This check enables analysts to evaluate the completeness and validity of available information. etc. Structured Analysis . the analyst should analyze the source information and context. the relevance check should not be used to gather information and data that supports a particular hypothesis or opinion--it should determine reporting related to the central topic. and whether the information is consistent with previous information--and if not. the analyst should ask about the capabilities and limitations of the collection platform compared to the data collected. or signifies a paradigm shift that alters or cancels previous assessments. a series of questions must be asked when reading each report. and therefore likely incorrect. whether the information is anomalous. for example. the platform's coverage. signs of bias. whether the information is corroborated by separate sources or intelligence platforms.note. Analysts should question the reports' actual information for completeness. then ask whether the source's stated placement and access would grant him/her this information. and is designed to mitigate bias for or against a given source. which will then help form hypotheses. Source Check This is conducted as part of the first full review of the relevant reporting.

analysts can use any of several techniques to determine mutually exclusive hypotheses on a particular intelligence issue or question. Such a matrix could look like this: . intended to minimize bias and objectively weigh reporting against mutually exclusive hypotheses. The eight-step procedure helps analysts ensure and display thoroughness. and quality of information checks have been completed. ACH compares reporting against these hypotheses in a matrix designed to determine consistency or inconsistency with each hypothesis. and can be used to demonstrate the objective relevance of reporting collected from varying platforms to intelligence managers and decision makers.Possibly one of the most well known and best regarded analytic techniques is Richards Heuer's analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH). source. (Heuer 1999) Once the relevance.

Question: Will Iran retaliate against Israel for Israel's perceived involvement in the 23 July killing of a nuclear scientist in Tehran? Hypotheses: H1: Iran will not retaliate H2: Iran will retaliate only with deniable covert/clandestine/terrorist operations H3: Iran will retaliate with overt military strikes against Israel . N/A = Neither consistent nor inconsistent H1 H2 E1: CIA report of Iranian intent to conduct retaliatory + covert/clandestine attacks against Israel E2: Israeli liaison report of Iranian intent to conduct N/A ballistic missile launches against Israel E3: Iranian public statements vowing + retaliation for the killing E4: NSA report of Iranian military leaders traveling to + + Lebanon for a meeting with Hizballah E5: CIA report stating Iranian military leaders believe they + + are unprepared to repel an Israeli air strike E6: DIA report stating Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel were N/A + photographing the Israeli embassy in Turkey H3 N/A + + + - N/A . + = Consistent.= Inconsistent.

While these techniques will not directly remove or decrease deliberate unconscious bias in decision makers and intelligence managers. the analyst can use the matrix results to support a most likely hypothesis. consistent. . Conclusion: Structured analytic techniques can assist intelligence analysts avoid unconscious bias associated with stovepiping in the creation of finished intelligence products. utilizing all available. For our purposes. as well as assign relative likelihoods to alternate hypotheses. relevant reporting in such a matrix effectively removes unconscious bias in source selection and utilization.Once completed. and can be used to demonstrate each intelligence collection platform and organization's relevance to intelligence managers and decision makers. transparently advertised use of these techniques can make such biases more difficult to justify and maintain. and assist analysts display unbiased relevance of all organizations' reporting to intelligence consumers.

Wilson. Academic Study. Peterson. Johnston. McConnell. Office of the Inspector General. Lowenthal.C.: Georgetown University Press. 2002: 61-74. Washington D. Critical Intelligence Community Management Challenges.C. Bureaucracy.S. Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community. and James B Bruce. Richards J. Basic Books. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Inc. Washington D. Office of the Director of National Intelligence.C. 1989. Lieberthal. "Overhauling Intelligence.C. Mike. Steven W. 2008.: The Brookings Institution. 2005. Defense Intelligence Agency.: Center for the Study of Intelligence. 2009. Salmoiraghi. 4 (2007): 49-58. Ronald A. Cambridge: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Heuer. "The Use and Limits of U.: Center for the Study of Intelligence. 2008.C." Foreign Affairs 86. James Q.Works Cited Bardach. Eugene. 1998. Washington D. Getting Agencies to Work Together.: Brookings Institution Press.. Research Paper.: CQ Press.C. Academic Study. Roger Z. Intelligence. Analyzing Intelligence." The Washington Quarterly. Mark M. Cilluffo. Rob. Washington D. Kenneth. The U. Intelligence Community and Foreign policy. Marks. and George C. US Intelligence Support to Decision Making. Washington D. Frank J.: ODNI. George.S. 2009. Washington D. no. 2009. A Tradecraft Primer: Basic Structured Analytic Techniques. .C. 2009. Defense Intelligence Agency. Washington D. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. 1999.

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