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The sixty or so pages that follow are filled with digests I’ve made, compiled, and/or edited (for Persons and Family Relations under Prof. Avila) in the span of months that have made up my first semester of freshman year in the University of the Philippines, College of Law. This isn’t, take note, a product from the bar-review school or, in the words of the Family Code, the school of arts and trade… but from a normal, struggling, oftentimes harassed student of the College of Law. Read with caution. And if, by chance, it helps you through a session of recitation, read with stark, brazen admiration.1 Although far from being the definitive guide to the cases, professors being prone to asking inconsequential details (not to mention the glaring fact that these were mostly authored by an amateur), I think these summarized digests offer enough a starting point to tackle the issues based on a student’s perspective as opposed to the oftentimes confusing ponencias written primarily, in my opinion, to thwart a law student’s understanding of the case and consequently aggravate his/her tenure in law school. This is a summative compilation made by freshmen for freshmen. It’s not exactly the most encouraging of lines but it’ll do for now.2 For the Sigma Rho! For the Grand Archon! Fight!
I just had to put that in. Don’t worry. It’s still going to be revised in the future. Really.

I plan to publish this thing one way or another for future freshmen and as a personal reference material. If I get kicked out of law school, this’ll be my mark on the place. Imagine a dog taking a piss in Malcolm Hall, marking his spot as he passes through the corridors that have marked the advent of legal history, and you will have some vague idea of what this compilation is all about. Foreword to be completed and compilation to be distributed when the future 1Cs start scratching their heads wondering why they paid money to subject themselves to this enlightened version of torment.

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Joaquin v. Navarro
May 29, 1953 (257 Phil. 93), Tuason, J. Nature: Three proceedings instituted in CFI Manila were heard jointly and were given a single decision. This was appealed to the CA, whose decision modified the former. A subsequent appeal to the SC ensued. Facts: Feb. 6, 1946 – While the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses of JN, Sr. and AJ (mother of petitioner), together with their three daughters P, C, and N, and their son JN, Jr. and the latter’s wife, AC, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of the city. Building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, the Club was set on fire, and the Japanese were shooting those who tried to escape. Three daughters were shot and died. JN, Sr. and son decided to abandon the premises to seek safer haven. AJ remained. Upon attempting to escape, JN, Jr. was shot and died. Minutes later, the Club, already on fire, collapsed. JN, Sr. and daughter-in-law died three days later. Friend and former neighbor FL who escaped with JN, Sr. from the building, survived to narrate the story. The RTC claims that the mother, natural child of petitioner Joaquin, survived the son; the son dying first before the mother. CA claimed the reverse. If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession. If the mother died first, the respondent Antonio, son of JN, Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit. Decision was reviewed by the SC. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the discussion of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court having repealed Art. 43 of the CC or not is relevant to the case at bar.

No. Neither of the two provisions is applicable. Both provisions, as their language implies, are intended as a substitute for facts, and so are not to be available when there are facts.3 (2) WON the mother died before the son or vice versa. No. The son died first. The facts are adequate to solve the problem of survivorship without the need for statutory presumptions. The presumption that AJ, the mother, died first is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory is deduced from established facts which, weighed with common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability.

Carrillo v. Jaojoco & Jaojoco
March 24, 1925 (956 Phil. 46), Avancena, J. Nature: Miguela Carrillo, as sister of deceased Adriana Carrillo and current administratrix of the latter’s estate, brought action to the CFI Cavite for the annulment of the document of because her sister was declared mentally incapacitated nine days after the transaction. The defendants were

Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court reads: “When two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes according to the following rules… Article 43 of the CC is of the following tenor: “Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.”

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absolved from the complaint and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed. Facts: Nov. 13, 1918 – Adriana is confined in Hospital de San Juan de Dios for cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia. Marcos Jaojoco and his father Justiniano, defendant-appellees, nephew and brother-in-law, respectively to the deceased, were the ones who took her to the hospital and cared for her. Dec. 18, 1918 – Adriana left the hospital and called a notary public to execute the sale of land (11 parcels of land in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig, municipality of Carmona, province of Cavite at the price of P4000) to Marcos Jaojoco. Nine days later, she dies and Miguela is appointed judicial administratrix of said estate. (It is interesting to note that Miguela was the surety of her sister when the latter acquired it from her husband in January 1917.) Issue: WON Adrian Carrillo was mentally incapacitated in executing the document of sale. Held/Ratio: No. The plaintiff’s attempt to prove that Adriana was mentally deranged was insufficient. Being confined in a hospital does not prove insanity. Her doctor testified that her sickness did not affect her head but only ½ of her body. Documents produced before the Court before the execution of the document of sale, shows complex tasks done by Adriana which couldn’t be done by a mentally incapacitated person.

Evaristo Vaquilar was charged for parricide for killing his wife and daughter (separate cases). He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to the payments of costs in each case. The two cases, combined together, have been submitted to the SC for appeal. Facts: Appellant killed his wife and daughter while wounding others with a bolo. Witnesses testify that he seemed insane during and after the commission of the crimes: (1) There was no known disagreement between the family members of the appellant prior to the event. (2) Appellant looked like a mad man; crazy because he would cut everybody at random without paying attention to who it was. (3) He was quiet during his time in prison and cried out every other night, “What kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts.” The health officer’s slight examination of the appellant did not yield implications of mental derangement. Issues: WON Evaristo Vaquilar, during the commission of the crimes, was mentally deranged and thus not criminally liable for the murder of his wife and daughter. Held/Ratio: No. There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Being crazy is a state wherein a person is merely acting out of the ordinary whereas being insane means acting with an unsound, perhaps diseased, mind. Not applying restraint to anger or passion makes the appellant criminally liable. The testimonies do

United States v. Vaquilar
March 13, 1914 (88 Phil. 27), Trent, J. Nature:

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not prove insanity, they merely point to hysteric acts.4

Sale” sold eight of the claims to Big Wedge Mining Co. June 4, 1940 – After re-amending his original complaint on Nov. 5 1934 (without the “under guardianship” plea), he asked the court to nullify the deeds of transfer/sale and be declared owner of the mining claims. He also sought any profit made by the endbuyer, Big Wedge Mining. Co, while in possession of the plaintiff’s alleged property. Feb. 5, 1940 – The reply from the defendants, Reynolds and Harrison (after the re-amended complaint), entailed that the brothers Dumaguin were expressly employed to locate mineral claims with the understanding that these be transferred to the defendants; that they were not aware of any alleged mental incapacities and bought the claims in good faith. The case was heard by CFI Baguio on July 31, 1940 and was dismissed on Jan. 16 the following year in favor of the defendants. Two appeals were made on Nov. 3, 1941 and December 31, 1941 against Reynolds and Harrison and Big Wedge Mining Co., respectively. The CA found that the amount involved was beyond its jurisdiction and so certified the case to the SC. It was assumed that Reynolds and Harrison had died after/during Japanese occupation since they never answered the appeals leaving Big Wedge Mining Co., the only defendant. Issue Held/Ratio: (1) WON the plaintiff and his brother were working as employees and agents of the defendants when the mining locations were claimed. Yes. All profits made, and advantages gained, by agent in the execution of the agency belongs to the principal5. The fact that the plaintiffs found the claims merely means that that they

Dumaguin v. Reynolds
Sept. 30, 1952 G.R. No. L-3572 Montemayor, J. Nature: Paulino Dumaguin, plaintiff-appellee, invokes insanity to declare transfer of mining claims to his employers invalid. Facts: May 21, 1929 - Dumaguin was admitted to the Insular Psychopathic Hospital at San Felipe, Neri, Mandaluyong, Rizal due to paranoia but was discharged a few months later (Nov. 11, 1929). Sept. 16, 1930 - His wife, in order to withdraw his retirement gratuity from the government, filed for and was appointed guardianship of her husband. During 1930-1931, Fructuoso, Paulino’s brother, helped the plaintiff get a job with Reynolds and Harrison to relocate mining claims and locate new ones. Plaintiff, however, claimed that he was only employed to relocate. From May to July of 1931, the brothers staked and located ten new mining claims and registered Paulino as the locator. Sept. 10, 1931 – Paulino transferred the claims via “Deeds of Transfer” to Reynolds and Harrison in two separate actions (the first contained the first nine deeds, while the second, the last one). On Nov. 2, Reynolds via “Deed of

In People v. Mortimer, the SC distinguished passion and insanity as follows: “Passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend to person under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal responsibility.” In People v. Foy, the court said “the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity.”

Mechem on Agency, Sec. 1224.

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were fulfilling an obligation and complying with a trust. (2) WON the plaintiff’s alleged insanity nullifies the deeds of transfer originally made to his employers and subsequently, the end-buyers. No. The presumption of insanity is only juris tantum, subject to rebuttal. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the presumption of mental incapacity (and insanity) is only prima facie and may be rebutted by evidence; and that a person under guardianship for insanity may still enter into a valid contract and even convey property, provided it is proven that at the time if entering into said contract, he was not insane or that his mental defect did not interfere with his capacity to appreciate the meaning and significance of the transaction entered by him.

how she was raped. A doctor testified that Rufina did suffer injuries and that her hymen was broken. He was tried, found guilty, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of 18 years of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offender party (P1000), acknowledge offspring, if there be any, and pay the costs of the action, including those of the preliminary investigation. Defendant appealed with a question of fact. Issue: WON testimony of a deaf & dumb person is to be accepted at full value? Held/Ratio: Yes. The fact that a person is deaf and dumb is not sufficient to justify the finding that he is incompetent as a witness. Although formerly presumed that persons deaf and dumb from birth were idiots and therefore incompetent to testify within the meaning of the rule, no such presumption now exists. A child of tender age may be permitted to testify when the judge is satisfied that he/she is intelligent and capable of understanding the nature of the oath.6

People of the Philippines v. Sasota
Oct. 25, 1928 (280 Phil. 52), Johnson, J. Nature: Fidel Sasota, defendant was charged and found guilty of the crime of rape upon the testimony of the offended person, who was deaf and dumb. He appealed saying that such testimony should not be taken at its full value. Facts: At around noon, Rufina and her sister, Severa, were visited by the defendant who brought them presents which the sisters refused to accept. Sasota forced Rufina to have sex with him while Severa watched her sister struggle. Nine days later, a complaint was filed with the Court of Justice of the Peace (Dasmarinas, Cavite) wherein the justice found probably cause and had him tried in the CFI. A translator was invited to explain the signs made by Rufina, who made gestures and body language to show

Director of Lands v. Abelardo
Feb. 5, 1930 (386 Phil. 54), Romualdez, J. Nature: Appeal from two judgments of the CFI Bulacan by Magdalena Dino, et al. who pray that the estates in question be adjudicated to them by virtue of said estates not having been partitioned and that the trial court erred in holding that the failure of the appellants or their predecessors to present their claims early on was evident proof that

United States v. Buncad – “The question of the capacity or incapacity of a child to testify rests primarily with the trial judge, and it will not be disturbed on review unless it appears that it was erroneous.

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they had no right to the lands in question. Facts: The case revolves around proving the ownership of 2 parcels of lands, which were properties subject in a successional litigation. Siblings Fulgencia and Jose Dino are contesting the ownership of subject properties in Manuel Libunao’s possession. They further claim that as deaf-mutes, they should not be barred by prescription in filing the case. Issue/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the trial court erred in holding that the failure of the appellants or their predecessors to present their claims early was evident proof of having no right to the lands in question. No. Based on the evidences cited, Ciriaco Libunao and his children have possessed and still possess, and are making use of these lands, as the true owners since the time of the Spanish government. The fact that the witness for the appellants asserts that the appellants themselves were given a support but not a share in the crops proves that Libunao’s possession of the lands in litigation was exclusive. (2) WON the prescription period should be relaxed on the appellants (who are deaf-mutes) because of their state of dependence. No. Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized by law, considered included among the exceptions which in matters of prescription, are granted to incapacitated persons, in connection with the running of the prescriptive period.

Nature: Appeal from Gregorio Nuval, plaintiff, against Norberto Guray, who was elected municipal president of Luna. Plaintiff claims that the defendant, Guray, was ineligible for office, and thus, plaintiff is entitled to hold the office in question, him having secured the second highest number of votes. Facts: May 11, 1928 – Nuval filed in CFI La Union, in his dual capacity as a voter and candidate, a petition to remove Guray from the list of candidates on the basis of Guray not having resided in said municipality for six months prior to the elections as required by Sec. 31 of the Administrative Code. The court dismissed the petition holding that Guray was a bona fide resident of Luna since Jan. 1, 1927 and that this ruling was not appealable. Guray won the election on June 5 (with the plaintiff having the second highest number of votes) and was proclaimed municipal president of Luna two days later. June 18, 1928 – Nuval filed a quo warranto7 (provided under Sec. 408 of the AC as amended by Act No. 3387) in the SC asking that Guray be declared ineligible for not having legal residency one year previous to the election as required by Sec. 2174 of the AC in order to be eligible to an elective


Res judicata (from "res iudicata", Latin for "a thing decided") is a common law doctrine meant to bar relitigation of cases between the same parties in court. Once a final judgment has been handed down in a lawsuit, subsequent judges who are confronted with a suit that is identical to or substantially the same as the earlier one will apply res judicata to preserve the effect of the first judgment. This is to prevent injustice to the parties of a case supposedly finished, but perhaps mostly to avoid unnecessary waste of resources in the court system. Res judicata does not merely prevent future judgments from contradicting earlier ones, but also prevents them from multiplying judgments, so a prevailing plaintiff could not recover damages from the defendant twice for the same injury.

Nuval v. Guray
Dec. 29, 1928 (G.R. No. 30241), VillaReal, J.

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municipal office and thus, he should be entitled to said office. Upto June 27, 1922, Guray had resident in Luna, his birthplace, where he had married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. On that date he was appointed municipal treasuer of Balaoan, La Union and thus changed his residence and made use of his right of suffrage (1925) in his new municipality. His wife was still living in Luna with her parents (due to the high cost of living) along with his children who studied there. Guray visited frequently and on January, 1927, he commenced the construction of a house of strong materials (not yet completed) therein. On January 15, 1928, he was issued a cedula declaring him a resident of Balaoan but on February 20 (dated January 15), 1928, he obtained another cedula from Luna as well. On February 23, he applied for the cancellation of his name in the election list of Balaoan. On April 14 of the same year, he registration in Luna. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the previous judgment rendered was res judicata8 so as to prevent current action of quo warranto. No. In order for res judicata to exist the following are necessary: (1) Identity of parties – the first proceeding was submitted by Nuval in his capacity as registered voter and a candidate, the

second was submitted with Nuval as a registered candidate. Identity of parties requires that there must be identity of capacities as well. (2) Identity of things – the first was the exclusion of Guray as a voter, the second was the expulsion or exclusion of Guray to the office that he was elected. There is no identity in the object of litigation. (3) Identity of issues – the first cause of action was that Guray did not have six month’s residency to be considered a voter, thus candidate, of the municipality, the second cause of action was that Guray did not have the required residency of one year in order to be eligible for his elected office. CFI La Union erred in concluding that the issue was res judicata. (2) WON defendant had legal residence one year immediately prior to the elections of June 5, 1928 in order to be eligible for office of the municipal president. No. Where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires on in another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence9. The term ‘residence’ as so used is synonymous with ‘domicile’ which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also a person presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention10. Since Norberto abandoned his first residence and acquired another, he needed to reacquire residence, and for such, he needed not only the intention to do so, but his personal presence in said municipality. The fact that his wife and children lived in Luna, not in his own house but that of his wife’s father since 1926, cannot be looked upon as a change of residence, since a change of such requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the

Quo warranto (pseudo-Latin for "by what warrant?") is one of the prerogative writs, the one that requires the person to whom it is directed to show what authority he has for exercising some right or power (or "franchise") he claims to hold. In its earliest days in England, it might be a court's order (or "writ") to someone acting as the sheriff to prove the king had actually appointed him to that office (literally, "Who made you the sheriff?"). In the U.S.A. today, quo warranto usually arises in a civil case as a plaintiff's claim (and thus a "cause of action" instead of a writ) that some governmental or corporate official was not validly elected to that office or is wrongfully exercising powers beyond (or ultra vires) those authorized by statute or by the corporation's charter.


Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28. People v. Bender.

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former11 and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. (3) WON the plaintiff should be entitled to the said office by virtue of him having secured the second highest number of votes. (At first, the Court decided Yes in that Nuval has the right to take possession of the office but later said No after a motion for reconsideration.) No. Elected offices are by nature different from appointive offices. The occupation of the first depends on the will of the elector, while that of the second, on the will of the authority providing it. The court cannot declared that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has attained a plurality of votes. Villamor, J. (Dissenting): It is evident that bodily presence in a place, accompanied by the intent ion to live therein forever, establishes domicile or residence. But bodily presence in a place is not residence; it is a mere proof, strong proof, if you wish, tending to demonstrate residence. But such a presumption may be rebutted by other acts, conduct, and circumstances of the person, clearly showing his intention to establish his home elsewhere.12 Under the circumstances of the case, Guray had the required legal residency one year prior to the elections.

municipality of Agoo, La Union during the May 10, 2004 elections. Engr. Carlos Boado, et al. sought disqualification of Dumpit-Michelena and the denial or cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation (under sec. 74 and 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). Boado alleged that she only transferred her registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo (from Naguilian) on October 24, 2003. Her presence in her new “domicile” noticed only after the filing of her candidacy. Boado presented, among other things, a joint affidavit of all barangay officials of San Julian West to prove that DumpitMichelena was not a resident of the barangay. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she had acquired a domicile in the vicinity when she purchased, from her father, a residential lot on April 19, 2003. COMELEC Second Division held that Boado, et al. established by convincing evidence that Dumpit-Michelena was not a bona fide resident of San Juan West, Agoo, La Union. She moved for reconsideration of the resolution passed by COMELEC but on May 7, 2004 COMELEC en banc ruled that the motion for reconsideration was filed three days after the last day of the prescribed period for filing the motion. Dumpit Michelena appeals to the SC. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON Dumpit-Michelena’s motion for reconsideration was filed on time. Yes. The COMELEC committed an oversight in declaring that DumpitMichelena had five days within which to file her motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC had overlooked Resolution No. 6252. (2) WON Dumpit-Michelena was denied due process of law when COMELEC summarily resolved the disqualification case against her without giving her fair opportunity to submit additional evidence to support her case.

Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado
Nov. 17, 2005 (290 SCRA 475), Kapunan, J. Facts: Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the
11 12

20 Corpus Juris, p. 71 Ira v. Abano – the question of residence for the purposes of Election Law is largely one of intention.

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No. Instead of presenting her evidence to support her stand, she chose to file a Memorandum which she herself describes as one “done in ‘halfhearted’ compliance with the rules”. She may not claim that she was denied due process. (3) WON Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991. No. Property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be voted for an office. Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements: (a) actual removal or actual change of domicile; (b) bona fide intention of abandoning former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (c) acts which correspond to the purpose. Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues.

misrepresentation” and that she has always “maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.” April 24, 1995 – COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found Montejo’s petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos’ corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled. May 7, 1995 – COMELEC en banc denied Marcos’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted on April 24. May 11, 1995 – COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos’ proclamation to the office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes. However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended even if she did win. May 25, 1995 – In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of the said Congressional election. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first district of Leyte. Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framer’s of the constitution)13. The confusion of the “honest mistake” made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is

Marcos v. COMELEC and Montejo
Sept. 18, 1995 (G.R. No. 119976), Kapunan, J. Facts: March 8, 1995 – Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor. March 23, 1995 – Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency requirement. March 29, 1995 – Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELEC’s head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the result of an “honest

As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.

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immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to change residences and apply for voter’s registration in these cited locations. When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC14 and further contemplated in Article 10915 of the same code. It is the husband’s right to transfer residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to lose the wife’s domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their farm in Olot, Leyte. (2) WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House of Representatives. Yes. The mischief in petitioner’s contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is

evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections. (3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of the petitioner’s qualifications after the elections. No. The HRET’s jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Puno, J. (Concurring): All her life, Marcos’ domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married the former dictator, her domicile became subject to change by law and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. She has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte. Francisco, J. (Concurring): Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte. Romero, J. (Separate): Women’s rights as per choosing her domicile after husband’s death is evident in this case. Marcos’ living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency requirement. Vitug, J. (Separate): It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared disqualified. The Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunal on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. Voted for dismissal.

The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 15 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

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Mendoza, J. (Concurring): The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. It has none and the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in an appropriate forum (not necessarily COMELEC, but the HRET). Padilla, J. (Dissenting): Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy should not be blurred by academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified. And the law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted. Regalado, J. (Dissenting): A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death of her husband does not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original. Such theory is not stated in any of the provisions of law. Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting): A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or agency has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELEC’s resolutions are within the scope and jurisdiction of this particular agency’s powers. In agreement with Regalado, re: woman’s domicile.

Erlinda Matias (16) married Avelino Dagdag (20), Sept. 1, 1975 and had two children. A week after the wedding, husband would oftentimes disappear for months, indulge in drinking sprees, would return home drunk and force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse with him. If she did not comply, she was beaten. The last time Erlinda saw him was on Oct. 1993. She later learned that he was imprisoned but escaped from jail and was now a fugitive. A certificate issued by the Jail Warden on Feb. 14, 1990 declared that he was still at-large. July 3, 1990 – Erlina filed with the RTC Olangapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Dec. 17, 1990 – RTC issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until Jan. 2, 1991 to present controverting evidence. Although he found that there was no collusion, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Dec. 27, 1990 – RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Jan. 29, 1991 – Investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given till January 2, 1991 to present controverting evidence. The OSG likewise filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in Order dated Aug. 21, 1991 stating that “the fact that Avelino failed to support his family is a violation of essential marriage obligation in Art. 68 of the Family Code. “ The OSG then appealed to the CA which consequently affirmed the decision of the RTC (April 22, 1993). OSG petitioned for review to the SC. Issues:

Republic v. Dagdag
Feb. 9, 2001 (G.R. No. 109975), Quisumbing, J. Nature: Petition for a review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Facts:

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WON the husband qualifies as being psychologically incapacitated on the basis of the provision in Art. 36 of the Family Code. Held/Ratio: No. Erlinda failed to comply with the evidentiary requirements16: particularly guideline no. 2 which requires the root cause of psychological incapacity to be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that her husband is a fugitive was not sufficiently proven. Petition by OSG is granted. Assailed decision by the CA is reversed and set aside. Notes: The guidelines governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated – what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.

well. The SC noted that during the proceedings, the State did not participate except for the manifestation issued by the fiscal stating that there was no collusion between the parties. Issue: WON the RTC and CA erred in dismissing the petitions without due participation of the State in the proceedings. Held/Ratio: Yes. It is important for the State to participate in the proceedings as exemplified in Republic v. Dagdag wherein the decision of the trial court was said to be prematurely rendered since the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Factual disputes of the case will not be heard since this falls within the province of the trial court. Remanded to the RTC for proper trial.

Graham v. Graham
July 15, 1940, Tuttle, J. Facts: James Graham is suing his former wife. They once had an agreement that his wife would pay him $300 each month until “parties no longer desire the arrangement” to continue. The agreement was allegedly made because the wife desired the husband’s company and the husband, in complying with her wishes, quit his job in a hotel provided that the wife subsidizes his expenses. Issue: WON the contract was valid. Held/Ratio: No. It is invalid because under Michigan State law, contracts of this nature are void because they go against public policy and thus, are unenforceable. If contract is given

Malacampo-Sin v. Sin
March 26, 2001 (284 SCRA 355), Pardo, J. Facts: Florence and Phillip Sin were married Jan. 4, 1987. Florence filed a complaint in RTC Pasig for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity on Sept. 20., 1994 which consequently dismissed the petition on the basis of insufficiency of evidence. Florence then filed an appeal to the CA which reaffirmed the trial court’s decision. She filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it as

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, interpreting Art. 36 of the Family Code with its set of guidelines.

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merit, it will alter the personal relationship and obligations assumed upon marriage. It is also traditionally the man’s obligation to support his wife.17

Selanova v. Mendoza
May 19, 1975, Aquino, J. Facts: Judge Mendoza prepared and ratified a document liquidating the conjugal partnership of plaintiff and his wife. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery which each had filed against the other and that they waived their right to “prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity” either one would commit against the other. Issue: WON the document was valid. Held/Ratio: No. The document which was an extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership was void because it was made without judicial approval. Art. 221 of the Civil Code expressly provides that such contracts shall be void and have no effect. With regards to the terms of the contract, per se: although adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they still remain crimes. And a contract legalizing their commission is “contrary to law, morals and public order, and as consequence not judicially recognizable.”20 Judge was severely censured.21

In Re: Santiago
June 21, 1940, Laurel, J. Facts: Ernesto Baniquit wanted to be legally separated from his wife in order to remarry. To this exercise, he hired Atty. Roque Santiago to secure the separation. Acting as notary public, he procured a contract signed by husband and wife which stipulated, among other things, that: (a) they would be allowed to remarry; and (b) they would waive whatever right of action one had against the other upon either remarrying. A month later, however, he admitted that it was a mistake and sent for the couple to sign a deed of cancellation18. Issue: WON Santiago should be disbarred for authorizing an invalid contract. Held/Ratio: Yes. But in light of the circumstances, the court decided that the lawyer’s act in rectifying his error did not warrant the full censure of the law. Suspension, and not disbarment, was employed. Marriage is an inviolable social institution that cannot be made inoperative by the stipulations of the party.19

Wassmer v. Velez
December 26, 1964, Bengzon, J.P., J. Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer were set to marry. Two days prior to

“Marriage is not merely a private contract between the parties, but a status in which the state is vitally interested, and under which certain rights and duties incident to the relationship come into being, irrespective of the wises of the parties.” – Tuttle, Graham v. Graham.

This has no effect. One cannot invalidate an already invalid contract.

There was no negligence in this case but a deliberate and conscious exercise. A lawyer must be knowledgeable about these things and is thus, liable to civil action.

If a lawyer must know the law (see In re: Santiago), then a judge must have mastery over it. There was gross negligence in the case at bar. On a side note: Wife cannot file a case of adultery against husband but the husband, unless in really scandalous circumstances, can file suit against the wife.

Means: slap on the wrist, don’t do it again.

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the wedding, Francisco left Beatriz a note stating that he would not show up for the wedding due to his mother’s opposition to it. The next day, her sent her a telegram stating that he would be returning very soon. Thereafter, he wasn’t seen or heard from again. Beatriz sued Velez and CFI Rizal awarded her for damages and cost. Issue: WON the defendant’s breach of promise to marry made him liable for civil action. Held/Ratio: Yes. While mere breach of promise is not an actionable wrong, Article 21 says that when a person willfully causes loss or injury to good custom, he shall compensate the latter for damages. It is the abuse of righ22t which can be a cause for moral and material damages. To formally set a wedding and go through all the preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized constitutes behavior which is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which the defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with the said Article.23

regular sexual intercourse. She resigned from her job due to her becoming pregnant. Plaintiff claims that due to the man’s refusal to marry, she was unable to support herself and her baby. CFI dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action but was appealed to the CA and the latter decided that there was cause of action for damages under Article 21 of the CC. Tanjaco appeals to the SC. Issue: WON the woman can sue for damages on the ground of breach of promise to marry. Held/Ratio: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. There was no seduction involved. The man neither used deceit, enticement or superior power to force the woman to have sex. Sexual intercourse on a regular basis does not constitute seduction but, rather, a voluntary and mutual passion between the parties.

De Jesus v. Syquia
Facts: Cesar Syquia had courted de Jesus and got her pregnant with a promise to marry her. Before leaving for China, Cesar wrote a letter to a priest that a baby that is due in June is to be named after him. Cesar also wrote several letters to Antonia telling her to take care of “junior”. When the baby was born, Cesar provided a home for them. Btu when the woman became pregnant a second time, Cesar left her and married another. Issue: WON de Jesus can claim damages for breach of promise to marry. Held/Ratio: No, she cannot. But acknowledged paternity is granted to the son and thus, maintenance is required of the defendant.

Tanjanco v. Court of Appeals
December 17, 1966, Reyes, JBL, J. Facts: Apolonio Tanjaco and Araceli Santos, both of legal age, had a relation shop from 1957 to 1959. As a result of the man’s promise of marriage, they had

Abuse of right doctrine is covered by Articles 19-21 which have no specific provisions or specific sanctions on acts which are intentionally/negligently done which are not covered by specific laws and damages. However, the damages that can be recovered by using this cause of action is relatively small compared to other forms.

How would the man defend himself? Avoid a female judge, acquire a female lawyer. – Avila.

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her home to her father’s house with a few pesos.

Baker v. Nelson
1971, Peterson, J. Facts: Petitioners, both adult male persons, made application to respondent, Gerald R. Nelson, a clerk of the District Court, for a marriage license. Respondent declined to issue the license on the sole ground that petitioners were of the same sex, it being undisputed that there were otherwise no statutory impediments to a heterosexual marriage by either petitioner. Issue: WON two persons of the same sex may marry. Held/Ratio: No. The institution of marriage as a union man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis. "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." This historic institution manifestly is more deeply founded than the asserted contemporary concept of marriage and societal interests for which petitioners contend. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for restructuring it by judicial legislation.

Issue: WON the marriage was void. Held/Ratio: Yes. It lacked essential consent from the girl. The consent given was made under duress. The marriage was an obvious ruse to escape criminal liability as seen from the actions during and after the rape.

Buccat v. Buccat
October 31, 1927, Street, J. Facts: Couple got married, stayed together for 89 days, but suddenly, respondent gave birth to a baby boy after 9 months of being pregnant. As a result of this, plaintiff abandoned respondent and sued her on the basis of her not being a virgin when they were married and thus the marriage was obtained by fraud. CFI Baguio, however, ruled in favor of the respondent. Issue: WON the marriage was valid. Held/Ratio: The Court upheld the decision of the CFI Baguio in favor of the respondent because they saw no reason to reverse it. They got married when the woman was seven months pregnant. It is an incredible allegation that the wife's advanced pre-natal state was not suspected by the husband. There was no fraud involved.

People v. Santiago
October 31, 1927, Street, J. Facts: Felicita Masilang is Felipe’s niece by marriage. Felipe Santiago is a widower. Santiago asked Felicitate to accompany him and eventually raped her. Afterwards, he brought her to her uncle’s house, called a protestant minister to marry them, and once the solemnization was complete, he sent

Navarro v. Domagtoy
July 19, 1996, Romero, J. Facts: Dapa, Surigao del Norte Municipal Mayor Navarro filed charges against Judge Domagtoy for gross misconduct and inefficiency in office and ignorance

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of the law. He solemnized the wedding of a couple despite knowing that the groom was merely separated from his wife. He presumed that man’s first wife was already dead because the wouldbe groom has not seen her for seven years. Presumption was made without the requisite summary proceeding. Second instance was when he performed another marriage ceremony in Dapa, which is outside his jurisdiction. Issue: WON judge acted with gross misconduct. Held/Ratio: Yes. The first marriage was bigamous. Presumption of death for purposes of marriage requires a summary proceeding (Art. 41 FC). Affidavits claiming that a person has not been heard of for more than seven years are not sufficient proof of the person’s death. The second marriage, on the other hand, is beyond judge’s jurisdiction. Marriage can only be held outside a judge’s chamber or courtroom if: (a) at the point of death (b) in remote places (c) request of both parties in writing & sworn statement (Art. 8 FC). The second couple was not under any of these conditions. Only appellate and SC justices have jurisdiction over entire country. Judges with specific jurisdictions can only officiate within those areas.

the ceremony took place in Arañes’ house because the groom had a difficulty walking & he couldn’t stand traveling. Judge was aware that there was no marriage license but due to the pleas of the couple and everything was prepared already and the visitors were there, he agreed to solemnize the marriage. He reminded them that marriage won’t be valid without the license. They promised to give it within the day but they never did. Arañes desisted and said that she had filed the case in a fit of rage but Court still decided the case. Issue: WON the marriage was valid with regards to the lack of a marriage license and the lack of the judge’s jurisdiction. Held/Ratio: No. Judges can only solemnize marriage within their territorial jurisdiction. Marriage license is a requisite for marriage and without it, marriage is void. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. And since there was no license, Occiano didn’t have the authority to officiate the ceremony.

Arañes Vs. Occiano
April 11, 2002, Puno, J. Facts: Arañes filed charges against Judge Occiano of for Gross Ignorance of Law. Occiano solemnized Arañes’ marriage without the requisite marriage license in latter’s house which is outside judge’s jurisdiction. Arañes was not able to claim her right to inherit his deceased husband’s property and she was deprived of receiving her husband’s pension. Occiano avers that

Republic v. CA
September 2, 1994, Puno, J. Facts: Woman (Castro) seeks judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage (civil) to Cardenas on the ground that no marriage license was issued to them prior to the solemnization of the marriage. Allegedly Cardenas personally attended to the procurement of the license, and in fact, the marriage contract itself has reference to a license number. But

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upon requesting the Civil Registrar’s Office for a copy, said office could not find the license in question. RTC Quezon City, however, ruled against Castro stating “inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued.” She appealed to the CA which consequently declared the marriage null and void. Petitioner RP petitions the SC for review on certiorari. Issue: WON documentary and testimonial evidence presented are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar prior to the marriage. Held/Ratio: Yes. Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that if a diligent search is made and no record is found in the office in question, it can be considered admissible evidence that there exists no record or entry in that office. CA’s decision is affirmed. Marriage of the parties is considered null and void.

an assurance from the couple that the necessary documents were complete. Issue: WON the marriage is valid without a marriage license. Held/Ratio: No. The judge did commit gross ignorance of the law, since the Art. 3(2) Family Code provides the formal requirement of a marriage license. Art. 4 states the absence of which makes the marriage void from the beginning. Respondent now cannot hide behind claim of good faith to exonerate him from his fault. As a judge, it is his duty to avoid the slightest infraction of the law, and to keep abreast with the developments of the law.

People v. Borromeo
October 31, 1984, Relova, J. Facts: Elias Borromeo was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide after killing his wife. There were witnesses and police officers who testified against him. He claims that he cannot be charged with parricide (and thus, only homicide) since he was never legally married to the victim because (a) officiating priest testified against it and (b) no marriage contract was executed. Issue: WON Borromeo can be considered married to the victim. Held/Ratio: Yes. Mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the marriage registry does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. People living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the

Moreno v. Moreno
Facts: Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married by Judge Bernabe. The judge assured her that the marriage contract will be released 10 days after. It turned out she could not get the marriage contract because the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She is now suing him for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for conspiring with her husband’s relatives to deceive her. The judge posits that he had no intention to violate the law because he solemnized it in good faith, especially since the complainant is begging and pleading him to marry them. He admitted to performing the marriage without a license because there was

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parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law.

claiming that the marriage was not valid since she signed the document in her own home thinking that it was a paper authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage. Issue: WON the marriage is valid. Held/Ratio: Yes. They were married since there was an expression of mutual consent and both of them appeared before the justice of the peace. Court ruled that General Orders No. 68 Sec. 6 states: “No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence solemnizing the marriage that they take each other as husband and wife.” Letters of Martinez to Tan regarding the marriage and asking for her parents consent are proof that marriage took place and is valid. Parties ratified their petition under oath. They both understood Spanish thus they knew the contents of the document they were signing.

Seguisabal v. Cabrera
August 27, 1981, Melencio-Herrera, J. Facts: Judge Cabrera is charged with gross misconduct in office and gross ignorance of the law for having solemnized a marriage without the prerequisite marriage license as required by Art. 53 of the CC, for having failed to transmit a copy of the marriage conduct to the Civil Registrar within 15 days from date of solemnization as required by Art. 68 of the same code. Issue: WON the marriage can still be considered valid. Held/Ratio: No. The marriage license is a formal requisite of a marriage and the absence of such in this particular case is not excusable despite the judge’s defense of good faith.

Madridejo v. Gonzalo de Leon
February 9, 1909, Ross, J. Facts: Flaviana Perez, a widow from a previous marriage to de Leon, lived with Pedro Madridejo and a son named Melecio was born to them. Three years later, the couple got married under circumstances of articulo mortis. The priest who solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.

Martinez v. Tan
February 9, 1909, Ross, J. Facts: Rosalia Martinez was visiting her brother in Palompon, Leyte. She met Angel Tan there and they were married by a Justice of Peace. Tan and Martinez first submitted a petition requesting the Justice to solemnize their marriage. Upon arriving at the office of the justice, they signed another document to ratify their petition under oath. Then the marriage was solemnized and a marriage certificate was signed by Tan, Martinez, Ballori and witnesses Esmero and Pacita Ballori. The couple did not live together and when Martinez went home to Ormoc, her relatives convinced her to file charges

Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the marriage can be considered valid.

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Yes, the failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not affect the validity of their marriage because it is only an irregularity of a formal requisite. (2) WON the marriage legitimized Melecio Madridejo. No. To be legitimized by a subsequent marriage of one’s parents, a natural child must be acknowledged before or after the celebration of the said marriage. Plaintiff in this case did not meet these requirements and is thus void of legitimacy.

Facts: Petitioner claims to be the surviving spouse in a marriage, respondent claims to be a legally adopted son in the same marriage. The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of the respondent on the basis that no copy of the marriage contract survived, thus implying that the marriage wasn’t valid. Issue: WON the marriage was valid. WON the adoption of the respondent can be considered legal. Held/Ratio: Yes. It has been established (by an affidavit by the petitioner and the deceased husband) that the couple had lived as husband and wife for at least five years. Clearly, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the CC. The CC governs this case because the questioned marriage and assailed adoption took place prior to the effectivity of the FC. “It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses.

Trinidad v. CA
April 20, 1998, Panganiban, J. Facts: Four parcels of land were inherited by the siblings: Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad. Inocentes died but his son, Arturio (plaintiff) survived him. He now seeks that the parcels be divided into three and that he be given 1/3 of the lot as his due as a legitimate child. Defendants (Lourdes and Felix) claim contend that Inocentes was single when he died. Arturio’s marriage certificate in the Civil Registrar was either: lost, burned or destroyed during Japanese occupation. Issue: WON in the absence of proof, marriage is considered invalid. Held/Ratio: No. Absence of a marriage certificate is not proof of absence of marriage. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute as competent evidence: (1) testimony of witnesses to matrimony; (2) couple’s public cohabitation; and (3) birth and baptismal certificate of children born during the union.

People v. Mendoza
September 28, 1954, Paras, C.J. Facts: Arturo Mendoza married his first wife in 1936. During the subsistence of his first marriage, he contracted a second marriage. After the death of his first wife, he contracted a third marriage. It is with the last that he is prosecuted with bigamy. Issue: WON Mendoza is liable for bigamy. Held/Ratio:

Vda. De Jacon v. CA
August 19, 1999, Panganiban, J.

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No. Sec. 29, Marriage Law Act 3613 (in force at the time appellant contracted his second marriage): Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void unless first marriage has been annulled, dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years without news if he/she is still alive. Judicial declaration of nullity is only necessary for third case. Thus, his second marriage is null and void without need for judicial declaration. The third marriage was contracted after the death of the first spouse, thus not bigamous.

public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. Therefore, it should be the petitioner’s name on the death certificate and not the respondent.

Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
August 19, 1986, Paras, J. Facts: Karl Wiegel filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo Maxion. Lilia admitted to the previous marriage but claimed that it was null and void since she was forced to enter the said union. In the pre-trial that ensued, both parties agreed that the issue was whether the previous marriage was void or merely voidable. Lilia asked the court for an opportunity to present more evidence but the respondent judge denied the petition. Lilia appeals to the SC in hopes of modifying the “agreed facts” and to allow her to present evidence in her favor. Issue: WON the prior marriage was void or voidable. Held/Ratio: The petition is devoid of merit. There is no need to prove that her marriage was vitiated by force. Assuming, however that this is so, it would still be irrelevant since the previous marriage wasn’t void but merely voidable (therefore valid, until annulled). Since no annulment was made, her current marriage is therefore void.

Tolentino v. Paras
May 30, 1983, Melencio-Herrera, J. Facts: While marriage was still subsisting with first wife, Amado Tolentino contracted another marriage with Ma. Clemente on Nov. 1, 1948. He was convicted with bigamy. After serving his sentence, he continued living with Clemente until he died. Ma. Clemente was the surviving spouse indicated in his death certificate. Amelita Tolentino, the first wife, claims that she is the rightful surviving spouse and petitions for correction of the death certificate. Lower court dismissed petition for “lack of proper requisites under law”. Issue: WON Tolentino is the rightful surviving spouse. Held/Ratio: Yes. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted of bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of the petitioner and the deceased. The second marriage he contracted was void from the beginning and thus has no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish invalidity of a void marriage. While documents, such as death and birth certificates, are

Terre v. Terre
July 3, 1992, Per Curiam Facts:

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The man, a lawyer, pursued a woman despite knowing that she was already married. He convinced her to marry him and that the first marriage was void because the woman married her first cousin, and was thus void ab initio. Since it was void, according to the lawyer, it was no longer necessary to go to court to declare it as such. She agreed to marry him. After the birth of the first child, the lawyer disappeared and contracted a second marriage while claiming that his marriage to the woman was void from the beginning since she had already married her first cousin. Issue: WON an action for judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage is necessary before entering a subsequent marriage. Held/Ratio: Yes. Even if the first mistake was contracted in good faith, the lawyer would still be liable for bigamy after he contracted his second one. It was deemed that the moral character of the respondent was deeply flawed and thus, should be disbarred and struck out from the Roll of Attorneys.

that year, they still didn’t apply for a marriage license. The woman abandoned the Judge nineteen years ago leaving their children to his care. He claims that Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was thus governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage on 1991, governed by the Family Code. Issue: WON the judge can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity. Held/Ratio: No. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the FC, said Article is given “retroactive effect” since it does not prejudice or impair any vested right. His failure to secure a marriage license on two possible occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith as a lawyer and judge. Dismissed from service.

Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr.
March 29, 1995, Quiason, J. Facts: Atienza, visiting his house in Makati wherein he has two children with De Castro, saw the respondent Judge Brillantes sleeping in his bed. The houseboy claimed that the judge had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza files charges on the judge on the ground that the respondent is already married and has five children. Judge denies the claim of being married stating that the alleged union wasn’t valid because it lacked a marriage license. Although upon the request of the woman’s parents they held another marriage ceremony later

Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez
March 8, 2001, Davide, Jr., J. Facts: Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David, had, prior to the solemnization, issued an affidavit stating that they were both married; however due to incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They lived together as husband & wife

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for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. Issue: WON Payao and David’s marriage is valid. Held/Ratio: No. Although the couple had lived together for seven years (as the affidavit shows and which the Judge relied on in crafting his decision), Article 34 of the FC also requires that there must be no legal impediment to marry each other. Also in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were “separated”. The judge ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage (regardless of the couple being separated) is a diriment impediment which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. And besides, free and voluntary cohabitation with another for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.

Issue: WON the previous marriage of the judge was valid. Held/Ratio: No. Since the second marriage occurred before the promulgation of Wiegel v Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the FC, the doctrine of Odayat v. Amante (will be applied in favor of the respondent. Although there did not exist any grave misconduct (since the acts were committed in relation to the judge’s personal life), he will still be held administratively liable because of his position as a judge of high principles and ethics. Considering that he was remiss in attending to the needs of the children of his first marriage (whose filiations he did not deny), the court would impose a penalty. But since he is dead, the case will merely be dismissed.

Ninal V. Badayog
March 14, 2000 Ynares-Santiago, J. Facts: Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974 and they had five children who are the petitioners in this case. Twelve years later (1985), Pepito shot Teodulfa which resulted in her death. A year and 8 months after the said death (Dec. 1986), Pepito married the respondent Norma Badayog without a marriage license claiming that they were exempt from the requirement because they had already cohabited with each other for five years as husband and wife. Pepito died in a car accident on February 1997 galvanizing petitioners, the children from his first marriage, to file a declaration of nullity of the subsequent marriage claiming that it was void for lack of a marriage license. Issue: WON the five year cohabitation as husband and wife in this case can be

Apiag v. Cantero
February 12, 1997, Panganiban., J. Facts: Defendant Judge, without his consent freely given, married in a drama presentation in 1947 and had two children with the plaintiff. For several years, judge was never heard of till he resurfaced in the plaintiff’s hometown. Plaintiff begged for support but they were ignored. This consequently led to a formal demand of support which still elicited no response. The plaintiffs then learned that the judge had remarried and had another family. They sued on the basis of grave misconduct. He died while the case was being deliberated by the SC but the court nevertheless resolved the case to determine whether there would be a forfeiture of the death and retirement benefits of the respondent.

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considered to have sufficiently met the requirement to be exempt from acquiring a marriage license. Held/Ratio: No. After the first marriage was dissolved, only 20 months had elapsed. The contracting parties cannot claim to have been living together as husband and wife prior to the first marriage’s dissolution because the husband already had a subsisting marriage. Cohabitation can only be invoked if the ‘living together as husband and wife’ is continuous and if the parties do not have legal impediments to marry.

Buccat v. Buccat
October 31, 1927, Street, J. Facts: Couple got married, stayed together for 89 days, but suddenly, respondent gave birth to a baby boy after 9 months of being pregnant. As a result of this, plaintiff abandoned respondent and sued her on the basis of her not being a virgin when they were married and thus the marriage was obtained by fraud. CFI Baguio, however, ruled in favor of the respondent. Issue: WON the marriage was valid.

Katipunan v. Tenorio
Sept. 29, 1937, Panganiban, J. Facts: Katipunan appointed a guardian for his wife Tenorio before he filed for a complaint praying for the annulment of his marriage to her for reasons of her being of unsound mind when they were married 15 years ago. He claims to have noticed her insanity a few days after the marriage but he lived with her anyway hoping that one day it would be cured. He waited patiently until 1926 when the wife had a severe attack of madness after the delivery of their third child. Her ailment was said to be incurable according to the resident physician and specialist. Issue: WON a marriage can still be annulled after one of the spouses becomes insane several years after the marriage. Held/Ratio: No. Unless it can be proven that Tenorio’s condition was existing prior to/during the celebration of the marriage, insanity cannot be a ground for annulment because “every presumption goes in favor of a marriage’s validity.” Held/Ratio: The court upheld the decision of the CFI Baguio in favor of the respondent because they saw no reason to reverse it. They got married when the woman was seven months pregnant. It is an incredible allegation that the wife's advanced pre-natal state was not suspected by the husband. There was no fraud involved.

Aquino v. Delizo
July 27, 1960, Gutierrez-David, J. Facts: Fernando Aquino claimed that his wife deceived him before their marriage by concealing the fact that she was pregnant by another man. The baby was born four months after the marriage. The lower court and the appellate court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the child could’ve been born out of lawful wedlock between the spouses. Aquino brought new evidence to the court, chief among which were affidavits of the plaintiff’s brother and the defendant herself claiming that they were parents of the child born four months after the marriage.

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Issue: WON the concealment of pregnancy by another man prior to marriage can be considered fraud and as such, can it be a ground for annulment. Held/Ratio: Yes. Under Article 85, par. 4, it is explicitly declared as fraud. Using Buccat v. Buccat as a defense in this case is untenable since in the present case, she was only four months pregnant during the marriage and at that stage the court is not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent.

WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage. Held/Ratio: No. Fraud is explicitly defined by Article 86 of the CC. And also states that “no other misrepresentation or deceit…” shall constitute fraud that will give grounds for the annulment of marriage.

Jimenez v. Canizares
Aug. 31, 1960, Padilla, J. Facts: Jimenez wanted to annul his marriage to his wife Canizares upon the grounds that her orifice was too small and that this condition existed at the time of the marriage and is still existing. Court ordered the wife to undertake a physical exam but the order was ignored by the defendant. After the hearing in the RTC with the wife being absent, the court decreed the annulment of the marriage. City attorney filed a motion for reconsideration since he claimed that the impotency of the wife was not satisfactorily established and that since she refused to undergo the physical exam, she should merely be held in contempt of court and be compelled to undertake said orders. Issue: WON the marriage may be annulled on the ground of the lone testimony of the husband. Held/Ratio: No. Although the wife did not have herself examined, suppression of evidence cannot be inferred to be sufficient of proof of impotency and thus should be established clearly before any decision is rendered by the court.

Anaya v. Palaroan
Nov. 26, 1970, Reyes, JBL, J. Facts: After one month of marriage to Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Complaint was dismissed. However, during the negotiation of the amount from Anaya’s counterclaim, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with a close relative. Anaya filed suit to annul on the ground that the marriage solemnized between them constituted fraud in obtained her consent. Fernando denied the allegation and counter claimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit; he did not pray for a dismissal of the complaint but its dismissal “with respect to the alleged moral damages.” Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no intention of performing his marital duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a means for him to escape marrying the close relative that was intimated above. Issue:

People v. Santiago

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October 31, 1927, Street, J. Facts: Felicita Masilang is Felipe’s niece by marriage. Felipe Santiago is a widower. Santiago asked Felicitate to accompany him and eventually raped her. Afterwards, he brought her to her uncle’s house, called a protestant minister to marry them, and once the solemnization was complete, he sent her home to her father’s house with a few pesos. Issue: WON the marriage was void. Held/Ratio: Yes. It lacked essential consent from the girl. The consent given was made under duress. The marriage was an obvious ruse to escape criminal liability as seen from the actions during and after the rape.

WON IACS is a legitimate child of EAS and ICS despite the declaration of the nullity of her parents’ marriage. Held/Ratio: Yes. Although judicially, the annulment of marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered, the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of marriage to be wiped out. The status of children is governed by Art 89 of the CC which states that “children conceived of voidable marriage before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”

Jones v. Hortiguela
March 6, 1937, Concepcion, J. Facts: Jones married Escano in December 1914 and had a child with her named Angelita. Four years later Jones secured a passport to go abroad and was never heard from again. Escano instituted proceedings to have her husband judicially decared an absentee. The court issued an order which would take effect six months after publication (Dec. 1919). Later, Escano married Hortiguela in 1927. Escana died intestate leaving her widower Hortiguela as judicial administratrix and both Hortiguela and Angelita as sole heirs. Property was divided accordingly. However, upon Angelita’s marriage and her reaching the age of majority, she filed a complaint claiming that she was the only heir of her mother since the marriage between Escano and Hortguela was void because only six years and fourteen days have elapsed prior to the solemnization of the second marriage. Issue: WON the subsequent marriage can be considered void. Held/Ratio:

Suntay v. ConjuangoSuntay
Dec. 29, 1998, Martinez, J. Facts: EAS, married to ICS, is the son of FS and CAS. IACS is the daughter of EAS and ICS. After four years of marriage, ICS filed a criminal case against EAS. EAS retaliated by filing a complaint based on wife’s infidelity. Marriage of EAS and ICS was declared null and void. EAS died on 1979. His mother CAS died in 1990 without leaving a will. Five years later, IACS filed before the RTC a petition for issuance of Letters of Administration of Intestate Estate of her late grandmother. FS contended the petition and alleged that IACS could not be legally appointed because she was no longer considered a legitimate child after the marriage of EAS and ICS was declared void ab initio. Issue:

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No. It is not necessary that the former spouse be judicially declared an absentee. The law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage or the former spouse is reputed to be dead and this is the belief of the spouse present. The absence of Jones begins on the date when the latest news about him was received – Jan. 10, 1918. Hence, the more than nine years have elapsed prior to the present spouse contracting the subsequent marriage.

sexual intercourse is considered as one count of adultery. Therefore, the husband may still file for additional complaints. Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, meaning it is completed at the moment of the carnal union. As long as the status remains unchanged, each commission of the act constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional provision which bars the filing of as many complaints of adultery. Reasons why it is not considered as a continuing offense: 1. The male defendant cannot anymore use the defense of not knowing his paramour is married. If it is considered as a continuing offense, but he still continued the illicit relation, it is unjust for him to go unpunished because of double jeopardy. 2. Even if the husband pardoned the adulterous wife, she is still not exempt from criminal liability because the pardon extinguished the previous acts, not the subsequent acts.

People v. Zapata and Bondoc
May 16, 1951, Rilloraza, J. Facts: A complaint for adultery (inclusive dates: 1946- March 1947) was filed by Andres Bondoc against his wife Guadalupe Zapata and Dalmacio Bondoc. Guadalupe pleaded guilty and was sentenced to arresto mayor. In the same court, he filed again another complaint for adulterous acts (for the period March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948), but this was dismissed due to double jeopardy by the RTC. It was held that the adulterous acts in the first and second complaints must be deemed one continuous offense, since the defendants and the complainants were the same parties as before. Issues: WON adultery is a continuous offense, and therefore the defendant may not be charged of the same offense twice. Held/Ratio: The court held that it is not a continuous offense24, and that each

Munoz v. Barrio
Facts: Married in 1942. Husband (Barrio) and wife (Munoz) had frequent quarrels. During these quarrels, husband maltreated the wife. Unable to stand the maltreatment she suffered, she lived separately from her husband. After they lived separately, two more incidents of maltreatment occurred. She filed for a petition seeking legal separation, custody and child support. Upon the testimonies of witnesses it was established that the maltreatment of the wife consisted of: boxing in the
constitutes a separate cause of action.

The court held that it wasn’t a continuing offense because it lacked identity in cause of action. What determines if there is identity in cause of action is the right of the plaintiff. Since the spouse has the right for his partner to remain loyal, every time this right is violated, it

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face or abdomen, hair-pulling and twisting her neck. Issue: WON the maltreatment in this case is a ground for legal separation. Held/Ratio: No. Prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, maltreatment suffered by the wife does not constitute attempts on her life. Intent to kill must be established with clear and convincing evidence.

separation. This modified the ruling in Francisco v. Tarayo which required that the guilt of the defendant spouse had to be established by a final judgment in a criminal action before it could be used as a ground for legal separation.

US v. McMann
July 1, 1905, Street, J. Facts: McMann and McKay were packers employed by the Quatermaster’s Department of the Army. Both men were drunk. McMann, for no foreseen reason, shot McKay and alleges that it was an accident and meant to shoot a Moro nearby. Witness testimony however debunks this claim stating that the discharge of the revolver was by no means accidental. The lower court held that the defendant was drunk at the time the act was committed. Issue: WON the inebriated condition of the defendant can be factored to lessen the imposed sentence. Held/Ratio: No. Drunkeness was habitual as established by witness testimony and thus, cannot be taken in consideration for the purpose of lessening sentence. In the case of Commonwealth vs. Whitney the court said: "The exact degree of intemperance which constitutes a drunkard it may not be easy to define, but speaking in general terms, and with the accuracy of which the matter is susceptible, he is a drunkard whose habit is to get drunk, 'whose ebriety has become habitual.' To convict a man of the offense of being a common drunkard it is, at the least, necessary to show that he is an habitual drunkard. Indeed the terms 'drunkard' and 'habitual drunkard' mean the same thing."

Gadionco v. Penaranda
Nov. 27, 1987, Padilla J. Facts: Gadionco filed a civil case for legal separation against her husband on the ground of concubinage. A few months later, she filed a criminal case against her husband using the same cause of action. Froilan, her husband, contends that the civil action must be suspended in the light of the more recent criminal case field against him. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the said civil action should be suspended while the criminal case is pending As for the first issue: civil action (a case for may damages) may proceed because it is not one to enforce civil liability arising from or related to the same offense. The wife’s civil action is not to recover civil liability but aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses in relation to each other. (2) WON the conviction for concubinage must first be secured before it can be used as a ground for legal separation. As for the second issue: No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. A preponderance of evidence may suffice as a cause of action for legal

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In the case of Ludwick vs. Commonwealth: "A man may be an habitual drunkard, and yet be sober for days and weeks together. The only rule is, Has he a fixed habit of drunkenness? Was he habituated to intemperance whenever the opportunity offered?"

parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action.” - 1 Corpus Juris, 208 A review of the resulting changes in property relations (which was among the reasons why Carmen filed the original petition) between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.

Lapuz v. Eufemio
Jan. 31, 1972, Reyes, JBL: Facts: Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio on the ground of being abandoned and the latter cohabiting with another woman. Eufemio counterclaimed that his marriage was void ab initio because said marriage was allegedly bigamous. Before trial could be completed, Carmen died in a car accident. Husband moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on the grounds of prescription and a lack of a cause of action due to the death of his wife. Issue: WON the death of the plaintiff before final degree in an action for legal separation abates the action. Held/Ratio: Yes. [Additional Info: Carmen (through her substitute) assumed that her husband’s counterclaim converted the legal separation cause of action to one which voided the marriage. This was deemed untenable since both can stand independent and separate adjudication. ] "Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the

De la Cruz v. De la Cruz
January 30, 1968, Castro, J. Facts: Severino and Estrella have six children. Severino started to live away from his wife but continued to support his family. Estrella files a complaint praying for separation of property, a monthly allowance, and a payment for attorney’s fees on the ground of (a) abandonment and (b) abuse by the husband of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership (for failing to inform the wife of the progress of their various business concerns). The witness of Estrella, the cook of the household, claims that the except for one time, the husband during a period of three years, wasn’t seen in the household. The witness of Severino, a manager of one of his companies, claims that he personally gave the plaintiff a monthly allowance. Issue: WON the respective acts of the husband constitute abandonment.

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Held/Ratio: No. It will be noted that the plaintiff does not ask for legal separation. The evidence presented by her to prove concubinage on the part of the defendant, while pertinent and material in the determination of the merits of a petition for legal separation, must in this case be regarded merely as an attempt to bolster her claim that the defendant had abandoned her, which abandonment, if it constitutes abandonment in law, would justify separation of the conjugal assets under the applicable provisions of article 178 of the new Civil Code. (1) To entitle her to any of these remedies, under article 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. Physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. (2) For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commit acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. It is interesting to note that a denial of the wife's prayer in this case does not imply a condonation of the husband's act but merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a cause of action.

People v. Sensano and Ramos
Facts: Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. After the birth of their only child, the husband left his wife and was gone for three years without writing to her or sending her support. While the husband was away, the wife began to live with Marcelo Ramos. When husband returned, he filed a charge of adultery which resulted in a conviction and a sentencing. When the sentence was completed, wife begged the husband to take her back but he refused. Abandoned a second time, the wife fled back to Ramos. Husband, knowing that his wife reverted to her lover, did not do anything to asserts his rights and left for the states. He returned to the Philippines seven years later and presented a second charge of adultery. Issue: WON the second charge of adultery can be a ground for legal separation. Held/Ratio: No. The husband was only assuming a mere pose of an “offended spouse”. He consented to the adulterous relations of his wife and Ramos and is thus, therefore barred from instituting any criminal proceeding. Even if he was still in a foreign country, he would have still been able to take action against the accused but since he didn’t take this option, it showed a considerable lack of genuine interest as the offended party.

Ocampo v. Florenciano
February 23, 1960, Bengzon, J. Facts: Jose Ocampo was married to Florenciano and had several children together who are living with the

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husband. In March 1951, the husband discovered on several occasions that his wife was having illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff again surprised the wife and found her engaging in other illicit relations with Nestor Orzame. On July 5, 1955, husband filed a petition for legal separation with the wife conforming to the charge provided that she isn’t criminally charged. Because the wife did not answer the charge, the RTC declared her in default. The CA, however, held that the husband’s right to legal separation on the ground of the wife’s relations with Arcalas had already prescribed and it also interpreted the facts to mean that a confession of judgment on the part of the wife agreeing with the husband signified collusion between the parties and thus bars the right to procuring a separation. Issue: WON the CA interpreted Art. 101, which prohibits a decree of legal separation upon a confession of judgment, properly. Held/Ratio: No. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand. This did not occur. Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.

Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement ". . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce." Griffiths v. Griffiths, Sandoz v. Sandoz. In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefore.

Brown v. Yambao
Oct. 18, 1957, Reyes, JBL, J. Facts: Brown alleges that while he was interned by the Japanese from 1942 to 1945, his wife had engaged in adulterous relationships from which she begot a child. He learned of it after his release. From then on they decided to live separately from each other and executed, to this effect, an agreement liquidating conjugal partnership, even giving the erring wife a share. On July, he filed a suit for legal separation praying for confirmation of said agreement, custodial rights and disqualification of wife from succession of plaintiff. Her wife was declared in default for not having answered on time. When cross-examined by the assistant city fiscal, it was revealed however that Brown, after the liberation from the internment, had also lived with another woman with whom he has begotten children. The court refused to grant the petition on the basis of prescription, commission of similar offense by petitioner, and involvement of consent and connivance.

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Issue: WON proceedings for legal separation can still be instituted when both spouses are offenders. Held/Ratio: No. His petition cannot prosper for two reasons: (1) prescriptive period is over since he learned of his wife’s relations in 1945 and only filed a complaint after ten years; and (2) His cohabitation with another woman bars him from claiming legal separation. Failure of the wife to set up a defense may be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between them. Consent and connivance no longer need to be proven there being two established statutory grounds to grant the decree of legal separation.

wife’s alleged infidelities can be considered an act of condonation. Held/Ratio: Yes. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission of one party of a matrimonial offense which the other party committed. According to American jurisprudence, any cohabitation and sexual intercourse with the guilty party after the commission for the offense and with knowledge of the offense will amount to evidence of condonation. Resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation is inferred.

Matubis v. Praxedes
Oct. 25, 1960, Paredes, J. Facts: Matubis and Praxedes got married on 1943. The couple agreed to live separately on 1944. On April, 1948, the spouses entered into an agreement stating that both relinquish their rights over each other as husband and wife, that both are free to marry again, and that wife is no longer entitled to support. In Jan. 1955, the husband cohabited with another woman and had a child with her. On April 1956, wife alleged abandonment and concubinage subsequently filing a petition for legal separation. RTC held that the acts constituted concubinage but dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. Plaintiff appealed. Issue: WON there was consent of the wife to her husband’s concubinage. Held/Ratio: Yes. As seen in the agreement, there was an express condonation and consent granted to the husband. Having consented, the wife cannot claim legal separation and is undeserving of the court’s sympathy. The petition was also filed after the prescriptive period. She came to know

Bugayong v. Ginez
Dec. 28, 1956, Felix, J. Facts: Bugayong was a serviceman of the US Navy. He was married on 1949 to Ginez while on furlough leave. Before he reported back to duty, they made arrangements as to where the wife would stay. In July 1951, the husband received letters informing him of his wife’s infidelities. In Aug. 1952, he sought his wife and after finding her, they lived together as husband and wife for two nights and one day. The night after, they continued to live together but the next day, when he questioned her about her illicit affairs, she deserted him. He took this as confirmation of her infidelities. On November, he filed a complaint for legal separation. The court ordered the dismissal of the action based on wife’s motion to dismiss. He appealed but the CA furthered the case, since it constituted questions of law, to the SC. Issue: WON the copulation which transpired after the husband knew about his

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the situation in Jan. 1955 but only instituted the complaint on April. 1956 – more than a year later.

Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, Jr.
July 29, 1972, Fernando, J. Facts: July 18, 1971 - Somosa-Ramos filed for legal separation on the ground of concubinage and an attempt at her life. She also sought a writ of injunction for the return of her paraphernal and exclusive property. Judge Vamenta, Jr. suspended the hearing for the injunction on the ground of Art. 103 and stressed that it would further dim the prospect of reconciliation of the parties.

Contreras v. Macaraig
May 29, 1970, Dizon, J. Facts: In Sept. 1962, family driver told Elena Contreras that her husband Macaraig was living with another woman. She failed to verify the rumor from her husband. In April 1963, she heard rumors that her husband was seen with another woman who was pregnant. In May of the same year she once more failed to ascertain the veracity of the allegations because she was afraid that it would precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. However she finally found out about her husband’s mistress and the birth of the latter’s child. In December 1963, wife finally met with her husband and pleaded him to give up his mistress and return to the conjugal home, assuring him that all would be forgiven. He declined. In the same month, she filed suit for legal separation but the case was dismissed because prescription had, according to the court, already taken place from Sept. 1962 when she had found out about her husband’s illicit relationship from the family driver. The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription. Issue: WON the period of prescription is counted from Sept. 1962 or from December 1963. Held/Ratio: December 1963. This was the only time when she became truly cognizant of her husband’s infidelity. Hearsay information would not have been legally sufficient as a basis for legal separation.

Issue: WON The court can hear the suit. Held/Ratio: The court should remain passive and let the parties alone in the meanwhile in order for them to cool off. It is precluded from hearing the suit. The management of the spouses’ properties need not be left unresolved even during this cooling off period. An administrator may be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership.

De la Vina v. Villareal
July 31, 1920, Johnson, J. Facts: Geopano, wife, filed a complaint of divorce (Sept. 17, 1917) in RTC Iloilo against her husband de la Vina on the ground of concubinage (which was allegedly occurring since 1913). When she learned of the illicit relationship, she was ejected from the conjugal home. She prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony pendente. After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property.

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Respondent Judge Villareal granted the motion. Husband filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in issuing preliminary injunction. Issue/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON a married woman may ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of a subsisting marriage. Yes. The general rule of law that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband is not an absolute rule. The husband unlawfully ejected the wife from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with another woman. Continued cohabitation would give the impression of the wife’s condonation. A wife may acquire a separate residence where the husband has given cause for divorce. (2) WON in an action for divorce, where conjugal property is concerned, a preliminary injunction may be issued to restrain a spouse from alienating/encumbering conjugal property during the pendency of the action. Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is granted power to alienate and encumber the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. This only holds true as long as a harmonious relationship exists. When such relation ceases, the husband’s powers of administration should be curtailed during the pendency of action to protect the interests of the wife.

filed on June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein she was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her driver’s intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support pendente lite for herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for support on the ground that the wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive such support during the pendency of the case, and that even if she is entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive. The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made the husband appeal to the SC. Issue: WON adultery of the wife was a defense in an action for support. WON support can be administered during the pendency of an action. Held/Ratio: Yes – provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will not bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the pendency of such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. [The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings of the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and because it wasn’t excessive.]

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
February 28, 1979, Fernandez, J. Facts: Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was

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Banez v. Banez
January 23, 2003, Quisumbing, J. Facts: A decision granting legal separation to Aida and Gabriel Banez was subsequently followed by a motion to modify the decision (by Aida) and a notice of appeal by (Gabriel). In the original decision, Aida was granted, among other things, possession of a residential unit and a vehicle. The motion to modify the decision was partly granted (commitment of fees, execution pending appeal granted but moral damages denied) but when it was questioned in the CA, the trial court’s orders were set aside. Aida appealed to the SC. Meanwhile the notice of appeal given by Gabriel was granted by the CA. With this decision, Aida also appealed to the SC. Both appeals were consolidated as one petition in the SC. Though she no longer questions the CA’s decision of the vehicle after Gabriel repossessed it: as to the residential house, Aida claims that it being conjugal in nature, justice requires that she and her children be allowed to occupy it since during the proceedings before the trial court, she was did not have a chance to stay there. She contends that an action for legal separation is one where multiple appeals are allowed and thus Gabriel’s appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record on appeal with the reglementary period. Issue/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON execution of judgment pending appeal is justified. As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression and

In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute respondent’s allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather than the exception. (2) WON an action of legal separation is one where multiple appeals are allowed. In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 186, 194 (1996), this Court held: xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are

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mere incidents of legal separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.

It was the latter himself who gave rise to the necessity.” – People v. Francisco.

Alvarez v. Ramirez
October 14, 2005, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. Facts: Husband Maximo Alvarez went to sister-in-law’s house and set the place on fire knowing that there were people inside (including his wife Esperanza). Esperanza testified against her husband but Alvarez petitioned to disqualify such testimony on the ground of marital disqualification. The RTC issued an order to disqualify the wife’s testimony. Sister-in-law (Susan Ramirez) filed in the CA an application for preliminary injunction and TRO. CA nullified RTC’s orders thereby anticipating husband’s current appeal. Issue: WON the wife’s testimony can be used against her husband. Held/Ratio: Yes. The marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions for both civil and criminal actions. If marital relations are so strained that harmony and tranquility are disturbed, “the identity of interests of both parties disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent”. “In Ordono v. Daquigan, “when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute…” Obviously the offense of arson impairs the conjugal relation. It should be stressed that prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between the petitioner and his was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Evidence thus reveals that the preservation of such a marriage is no longer an interest that the State aims to protect.

La Rue v. La Rue
May 25, 1983, Miller, J. Facts: Married in 1950, traditional marriage between a husband who handled financial affairs and a wife who was a homemaker. Divorce was granted in 1980. Wife was only awarded alimony and allowance for health insurance and not one-half of the marital assets. Issue: WON the wife was entitled to equitable distribution of properties. Held/Ratio: Yes. A housewife contributes to the economic well-being in the family. In valuing this service, the length of the marriage and quality of service are important considerations. Her contributions must be calculated against the net marital assets. Equitable distribution for a homemaker’s services is not limited to giving of a possessory interest in real estate. The doctrine of equitable distribution permits a spouse who has made a material economic contribution towards the acquisition of property to claim an equitable interest in such property. In determining the appropriate amount for distribution, it is necessary to consider the respective economic contributions made by both parties during the marriage as weighed against the net assets that are available at the time of the divorce.

Ex Parte De Vine
March 27, 1981, Maddox, J: Facts: Divorce – seeking sole custody of two minor children. Given a situation where either husband or wife would be fit to

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take custody of the minor children, the lower court relied solely on the “tender years presumption” to grant custody to the wife/natural mother who has inherent suitability to care and nurture young children (natural rights of the father v. instinctive role the mother). The appellate court held that the presumption was not a classification based on gender but merely a factual presumption based on the historic role of the mother. Issue: WON the “tender years presumption” as applied to child custody proceedings violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Held/Ratio: The “tender years assumption” represents an unconstitutional genderbased classification which discriminates between fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings based solely on basis of sex. It creates a presumption of fitness and suitability of one parent without consideration of the actual capabilities of the parties. There are other factors to consider such as interpersonal relationship between parent and child; emotional, moral, social, educational needs of the child, etc…The court is convinced that in custody determinations, the rule that should be followed is that “best interests of the child” rule. Case is therefore reversed and remanded to the lower court to take into consideration individual facts of the case.

them. While on vacation, they got married in the PI. Upon their return to the US, a son was born to them. The relationship deteriorated and they agreed to get separated. Reynaldo brought the children to the PI but had to leave them with his sister because his assignment in the US was not yet completed. Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against Terestita which she was convicted. Teresita returned to the PI and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children. Trial court dismissed petition, suspending Teresita’s parental authority and declaring Reynaldo as the sole parental authority. The CA reversed the lower court’s decision based on Article 363 of the CC and Article 213 of the FC. Reynaldo filed a petition for review. At the time of the petition, the two children were both over 7 years of age. Prior to the trials, school psychologist and social welfare diagnosed children and they favored Reynaldo due to emotional disturbance emanating from Teresita’s affairs with another man. Issue: WON the custody of a minor child is automatically given to the mother in accordance with Art. 363 of the CC and Art. 213 of the FC. Held/Ratio: The CA blindly based its decision on statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable in common or ordinary situations. The paramount criterion must always be what’s in the child’s best interest. The task of choosing which parent to grant custody to is not a ministerial function based solely on the age of the minor child. Although it is a strong presumption of law to say that the mother is the best custodian if the child is under seven years of age, this is not conclusive. If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but the court is not bound by this choice.

Espiritu v. Court of Appeals
March 15, 1995, Melo, J. Facts: Teresita, a nurse, was already married to another man when she started living with one Reynaldo Espiritu in the US (common law husband and wife relationship). A daughter was born to

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Cervantes v. Fajardo
January 27, 1989,Padilla, J. Facts: Child was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to parents who are common-law husband and wife (Fajardo and Carreon). Parents offered child for adoption to wife’s sister and brother-in-law (the Cervantes), spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely 2 years old. Affidavit of Consent to the adoption was signed by Carreon. On March-April of the same year, adoptive parents received a letter from the natural parents demanding them to pay P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. The Cervantes’ refused to accede to the demand. On September, while the Cervantes spouses were at work, Carreon took the child from the adoptive parent’s residence. Petitioners demanded the return of the child but Carreon refused saying that she had no desire to give up the child and that she signed the affidavit without fully knowing what it meant. However, she sent word to the petitioners stating that she would give back the child if the amount requested was paid. Social worker of the adoption case testified that when she interview Carreon, Carreon manifested her desire to have the child adopted by the Cervantes’. Issue: WON custody of the child should revert back to natural mother. Held/Ratio: No. The paramount interest of the child would not be met if custody were granted to Fajardo (who is legally married to a woman other than Carreon) and the latter. His cohabitation with Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moralminded person. Besides, Carreon has another child through another man. For the child in question to grow up

with a sister whose “father” is not her true father, could affect the moral outlook and values of the child in question. The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses.

Celis v. Caifur
June 12, 1950, Montemayor, J. Facts: Child was born to Celis and an unknown American soldier. Parents of Celis were angered by daughter’s alleged disgrace and objected to the child living in the paternal home. Joel (the child) was given to the custody of Caifur who thereafter took care of him and his needs. Two documents were signed by Celis: the first one entrusted Joel to Caifur and disallowed anybody else to adopt him, and the second one designating Caifur to be the guardian of her natural son. Two years later, Celis married and the new couple decided to get Joel back. Caifur refused, thereby instigating Celis and her husband to sue with a writ of habeas corpus. Trial court found, no basis, upon scrutinizing the two documents, that Celis had renounced the child in favor of respondent. Issue: WON custody of the child should revert back to natural mother. Held/Ratio: Yes. The finding of the trial court is affirmed. Soledad is a stranger to the child; she is not related to him by any degree of consanguinity or affinity. Furthermore, documents entrusting

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the child and providing guardianship do not convey a sense of permanence with regards to renunciation of the mother of her parental rights. Tuason, Dissenting: Although the language of the documents may be in dispute, the parties and the courts should have resorted to the evidence (especially on the parties’ conduct) to discover the meaning and intent of the agreements.

present sufficient basis for denying continued custody of the mother. A divorced person has a right to engage in sexual intercourse with another without affecting his/her right to custody of his/her children. It is within the best interests of the children to stay with the mother since a change of custody this late would be untenable there being no showing that the mother was unfit or that the promiscuous behavior of the mother affected or involved the children.

Feldman v. Feldman
July 15, 1974, Benjamin, J. Facts: Married when woman was 18 and man was 19. Husband, a part-time musician, was involved in extramarital affairs. Divorced was granted based on husband’s cruel and inhuman treatment. Custody of two minor children awarded to the wife because of the parties’ separation agreement. Subsequently after the divorce, wife started seeing somebody who was already married. At one time, exhusband visited the woman’s house and found a copy of a hard-core pornographic magazine on the table and letters (answering an AD which exwife and new partner made in the magazine) with explicit photographs attached. Husband petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus seeking custody on the children on the ground that his exwife was unfit. Petition was granted. Issue: WON acts of the mother made her unfit to retain custody of the children. Held/Ratio: No. Amorality, immorality, sexual deviation and aberrant sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody. The right of a divorced woman to engage in private sexual activities which in no way involve her minor children is within the penumbra of her right to privacy. Even adulterous acts do not ipso facto

Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals
March 16, 1995, Romero, J. Facts: The wife went to the US and left the husband Leoel Santos and the child. The child has been in the care of his maternal grandparents. Father abducted the son and took him to his hometown. Grandparents file for custody of the child. After an ex parte hearing, trial court gave custody to the grandparents. Father appealed to the CA but CA affirmed the lower court’s decision. Issue: WON the father is unfit and thus, substitute parental authority should be granted to grandparents. Held/Ratio: No. Since the father has not been shown to be an unsuitable or unfit parent, there is nothing barring him from custody. His use of deceit in taking the boy away from his grandparents isn’t a ground to wrest custody from him. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced (waiver of parental authority) except in cases authorized by law such as cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to orphan’s home. Only in cases of the parents’ death; absence or unsuitability may substitute

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parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

Laxamana v. Laxamana
Sept. 31, 2002, Ynares-Santiago, Facts: Reymond married Ma. Lourdes and had three children. Reymond became a drug dependent, was confined, and eventually released as “drug-free”. Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even physically assaulted respondent. Thus, on June 17, 1999, respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives. Reymond filed a case to have custody over his children. A month later, his wife filed a petition to annul the marriage. Parties reached an agreement with Reymond being granted visitation rights and both spouses to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination. On Jan. 14, 2000, trial court awarded custody to the wife. Reymond filed an instant petition for review on certiorari. Issue: WON the lower court’s decision erred when it resolved the issue of custody without trial. Held/Ratio: Yes. The paramount interests of the children were not given due consideration. Instead, the court a quo relied on the basis of the psychological report of the spouses’ conditions to render its decision. This is held to be insufficient to justify awarding custody to the mother. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet "completely cured" may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral

David v. Court of Appeals
November 16, 1995, Mendoza, J. Facts: Daisie David worked as a secretary for Ramon Villar, a businessman who was married with four children. A relationship grew resulting in a son and two girls being born to them. The relationship was known by Villar’s wife and the illegitimate children were accepted by the legal family. In a summer trip to Boracay, Villar refused to return the illegitimate son, Christopher J., to Daisie. She filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which the RTC gave to her by virtue of her being a natural mother. The CA reversed the decision saying the question of custody of a minor child does not hold for adulterous relationships. Daisie filed a petition for review of the CA’s decision. Issue: WON mother of an illegitimate child has a right to custody. Held/Ratio: Under the Rules of Court (Rule 102), the use of a writ of habeas corpus is applicable to a mother of an illegitimate child who is deprived of her rightful custody of the child. Under Art. 176 of the FC, since the father of the child was already married to another woman at the time of the child’s conception, the natural mother is granted custody over him. The fact that the father is well-off is not a reason to deprive custody of the mother. Under Art. 213 of the same code, the child’s (now over seven years of age) expressed preference to live with his mother should be respected by the court.

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and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. It is clear that - every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children.

dismissed because the baby had not resided with the Alitzers for the requisite 6 months before filing. The circuit court gave custody to Garska saying that he is the natural father, that he is better educated than the mother, that he is more able to support the child. Issue: WON custody of the child should go to the father or the mother and WON the primary caretaker doctrine can be used in this case. Held/Ratio: The best interests of the child are best served in awarding custody to the primary caretaker parent, regardless of sex. The primary caretaker is a natural or adoptive parent who has been primarily responsible for caring and nurturing the child. However, the absolute presumption in favor of a fit primary caretaker parent applies only to children of tender years. The mother is the primary caretaker parent and there is no finding that she is unfit.

Matute v. Macalado Garska v. McCoy
May 26, 1981, Neely, J. Facts: Gwendolyn McCoy, then 15, left her grandparents to live with her mother. She got pregnant by Michael Garska who was sharing the trailer with her mother. McCoy returned to her grandparents’ home. During pregnancy she did not receive support from Garska. McCoy signed an a consent agreeing to the adoption of her son by her grandparents – Alitzers. Upon learning of the adoption, Garska visited the baby and started to send weekly money orders. The Alitzers filed a petition for adoption while Garska filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to secure custody of his son. Both proceedings were consolidated. The petition for adoption was May 30, 1956, Concepcion, J. Facts: Rosario Matute was found guilty of adultery and a decree of legal separation was granted to Armando Medel, awarding custody of the children to the latter. Medel went to the US leaving children with his sister in whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her offspring. Armando returned late 1954. With his permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila to attend the funeral of her father on the condition that the children would be returned after two weeks. She never returned and instead filed a motion to regain custody on the ground that the children did not want to go back to their father and that the father was living with another woman. Armando opposed this motion and countered with a petition to declare

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and punish Rosario for contempt of court (in view of her failure to return the children). Judge Macadaeg absolved the Rosario from contempt but denied her motion for custody and ordered her to return the children. Rosario then filed an action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Armando and the Judge. Preliminary injunction was granted after filing. Issue: WON mother can regain custody of her children after the issuance of a degree of legal separation. Held/Ratio: No. A decision rendering custody of minor children is never final… but until it is reviewed and modified, such a decision must stand. In the present case, Rosario merely obtained permission from the legal parental authority who is the father. He may therefore demand their return at any time. Judge was well within his jurisdiction whether or not he chose to judge the other way. It is within his power to grant custody or not. No grave abuse of discretion occurred.

Issue: WON a wife can use her maiden name after a decree of legal separation has been granted. Held/Ratio: No. Legal Separation alone is not a ground for wife’s change of name. Art 372 specifically mandates the wife to continue using name and surname employed before the legal separation. Her marriage status is unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for a change of name in general) does not prevail over the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
October 8, 1985, Melencio-Herrera, Facts: Alice Reyes (Van Dorn), a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an American, were married in Hong Kong where they established residence and begot two children. They got divorced in Nevada with Alice eventually marrying Van Dorn. Sometime after, Upton filed suit claiming that Alice’s business in Ermita was conjugal property and thus, he should manage it. He averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that during the divorce proceedings in Nevada, Upton acknowledged that they had no community property and is thereby estopped from laying claim. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss, hence current petition. Issue: WON the divorce in Nevada was valid and binding in the Philippines.

Laperal v. Republic
October 30, 1962, Barrera, J. Facts: Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria. They are now legally separated. Elisea wants to resume the use of her maiden name. Petition was opposed by the City Attorney on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the CC and that is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The lower court originally dismissed the petition but changed its mind and granted it on the ground that it was merely for a change of name. It also reasoned that the use of the married name would give rise to confusion in the woman’s finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

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Held/Ratio: Yes. Philippine jurisprudence follows the nationality principle. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad from their Filipino spouses, and these may be recognized in the Philippines if they are valid according to their national law. Pursuant to this national law, Upton is no longer the husband of Alice Reyes and is thus estopped from asserting his rights over alleged conjugal property.

Held/Ratio: No. Her statement in the facts implied that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Quita v. Court of Appeals
December 22, 1998, Bellosillo, J. Facts: Fe Quita married Arturo Padlan on May 18, 1941 but had no children. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in the US and subsequently remarried. On April 1972, Arturo died without a will. Blandina Dandan, who was married to Arturo on April 1947 and had five legitimate children with the deceased, claimed to be the surviving spouse. The trial court invoked the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escano, which held that a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the Civil Code was not entitled to recognition was valid in this jurisdiction, and discarded the divorce between Fe and Arturo. It expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo. Blandida’s marriage to Arturo was bigamous since it was contracted on April 1947. During the proceedings, when asked by Blandida whether or not Fe was entitled to inherit from decedent considering their divorce, Fe replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. Issue: WON Fe is entitled to inherit in spite of the divorce secured in the United States.

Llorente v. Court of Appeals
Nov. 23, 2000, Pardo, J. Facts: Lorenzo, serviceman of the US Navy, visited his wife in the Philippines and discovered her pregnant and having an adulterous relationship with his brother. Wife, Paula, gave birth to a baby boy whose certificate stated that the child was illegitimate and the line of the father’s name was left blank. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and the couple drew a written agreement wherein: (1) support for Paula would be suspended, (2) marital union would be dissolved in accordance with judicial proceedings, (3) a separate agreement would be made re: conjugal property, and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous acts. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce; wife was represented by counsel. Divorce was granted on 1952. He returned to the Philippines and on 1958 he married Alicia Llorente. Alicia lived in the same town as Lorenzo’s ex-wife but did not know of the latter’s previous relations with her new husband. Regardless, their 25year union produced 3 children. On March of 1981, he wrote a will which was notarized which bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. On January 1984, the court, finding that the will was duly executed, admitted the will to probate. However

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before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula then filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Although Alicia filed a similar petition, RTC issued a joint decision awarding the testamentary dispositions of the will to Paula (because Llorenzo’s divorce to her was void and inapplicable in the Philippines) and the illegitimate children conceived through Alicia. This was later modified to classify only one child by Alicia as qualified to be considered illegitimate and Alicia herself to be declared as co-owner of whatever properties the couple may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation. The latter appealed, was denied by the CA, and thus the existence of current petition. Issue: WON Alicia is entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente. Held/Ratio: Yes. The fact that Lorenzo became an American citizen, procured a divorce from Paula, married Alicia, executed his will, and then died is duly established and undisputed. The trial court and the CA disregarded the will’s dispositions in favor of Alicia because they considered her a mere paramour. But the divorce should be recognized as a matter of comity. Now the effect of such a divorce is best determined by the trial court.

appeal stating: that the questioned provision only applies to valid mixed marriages between Filipinos and aliens; that the remedy is annulment or legal separation; and that there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. Issue: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? Held/Ratio: Taking into consideration legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Par. 2 Art 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce degree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. The reckoning point in the provision is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Republic v. Orbecido III
October 5, 2005, Quisumbing, J. Facts: Orbecido married Villanueva in the Philippines and had two children. Villanueva, wife, left for the US, was naturalized and eventually remarried. Orbecido petitioned for authority to remarry using Par. 2 of Article 26, FC. No opposition. OSG’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this

Garcia v. Recio
October 2, 2001, Panganiban, J.: Facts: A Filipino (Recio) was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen in 1987. In 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian family court. On 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and married a

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Filipina (Garcia) in Cabanatuan City. The application for marriage license showed that Recio was “single” and “Filipino”. Late 1995, couple started living separately. On May 1996, conjugal assets were divided in accordance with Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On 1998, Garcia filed a complaint to nullify the marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that Recio had a subsisting marriage when they were married and that she only became aware of this on November of the preceding year. Recio says otherwise and claims that his first marriage was dissolved by the Australian divorce decree, was legally capacitated to marry, and that Garcia was aware of this as early as 1993. On 1998, five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. RTC declared the marriage dissolved because the Australian divorce had ended the marriage. Garcia filed current petition in the SC. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the divorce between Recio and Samson was proven The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce

decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. (2) WON Recio was legally capacitated to marry Garcia No. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. Since he is an Australian, none of the records he produced do not absolutely prove that he has legal capacity to marry on January 12, 1994. However, Garcia’s prayer to declare the marriage null and void based on bigamy cannot be granted because it may turn out that Recio did, in fact, have capacity to marry. Hence, the SC believes that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’ marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates.

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Perez v. Court of Appeals
March 29, 1996, Romero, J. Facts: Husband is a doctor in the Philippines. Wife is a nurse in New York, US. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high risk pregnancy, a baby boy was born to the couple in New York. Husband did not want to live in the States, wife wanted to be away from her in-laws and resume her job as a nurse since it was more lucrative. Wife filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking custody of her son. RTC granted custody to the mother based on Article 213 of the FC which provided that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. CA reversed saying that it would be in the child’s best interest to stay with the father. Issue: WON custody should revert to the mother.

year. The mother's role in the life of her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the depth of a mother's love has been immortalized times without number, finding as it does, its justification, not in fantasy but in reality.

Sumbad v. CA
June 21, 1999, Mendoza, J. Facts: When Agata Tait (AT) died in 1936, her husband George Tait Sr. (GT), lived in common-law relationship with Maria Tait to whom he donated land to in 1974. George died in 1977 and Maria died in 1988. The following year, Emilie Sumbad (ES) and Beatrice Tait (BT) sought an action for quieting of title, nullification of the deed of sale, and recovery of possession of damages by virtue of being compulsory heirs of GT’s first marriage to AT. They allege that Maria sold the lots included in the property to Okoren, et. al., despite warning the respondents that Maria was not the real owner of the property. Okoren et. al., private respondents in the case, bought the property anyway on the strength of a Tax Declaration and claim that since the issuance of said Tax Declaration was made thirty years after the death of AT, Maria, GT’s second wife, did not need the consent of her GT or his heirs for the sale. They also claim that the action is barred by laches. RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondents. CA affirmed with modifications, setting aside the attorney’s fees. From this, petitioners, Sumbad, et. al, appealed claiming that the deed of donation issued in 1974 to Maria was void for the following reasons – which the SC debunked as follows: Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) it was a forgery crafted by one Raquel Tait, proof of such was eye-

Held/Ratio: Yes. The CA made its decision on the ground that the mother would not be able to take care of the child since she works on 12-hour shifts three times a week and thus would not be able to properly attend to the child. This is untenable seeing that lot of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are able to raise a family well by applying time management principles judiciously. It is not difficult to imagine how heartrending it is for a mother whose attempts at having a baby were frustrated several times over a period of six years to finally bear one, only for the infant to be snatched from her before he has even reached his first

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witness testimony of one Shirley Eillenger who claims that she saw Raquel and her male board-mates forge the signatures of GT and MT in a span of thirty minutes. -> Aside from the impossibility of accomplishment, such allegations were not proven by handwriting experts which the petitioners failed to make use of. (2) it was not executed as a public instrument because the deputy clerk of court notarized it instead of the duly authorized notary public -> deputy clerk of court was authorized by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Administrative Code of 1917. (3) it contravened Art. 133 of the CC (now Art. 87 of the FC) which states that donations made during the marriage shall be void, which also includes common-law relationships as decided in the earlier case of Matabuena v. Cervantes). -> There is no sufficient evideance on record to prove that GT and MT were in fact married, or if they were, when the marriage took place. There is no evidence as to the time the deed of donation was executed in 1974 that GT and Maria were still continuing their common-law relationship. BT’s testimony merely states that in 1941, Maria became their stepmother… and does not conclusively prove that in 1974, GT and Maria were married. Lacking evidence to prove the contrary, the family code provision cannot apply.

defendants herein. A month after having the car insured, the automobile was completely destroyed by fire. With the time required by the insurance company, Mrs. Harding sought compensation for her loss. Defendant corporation, however, denied the claim stating that the value of the policy and the true ownership of the automobile were fabricated by Mrs. Harding and prayed that the policy be considered null and void. The trial judged ruled that there was no fraud on the part of the plaintiff. On appeal, defendants contested that Mr. Hardings donation to his wife saying that it was void because it contravened Art. 1334 of the CC. Issues: WON donation was void because it was made during the marriage. Held/Ratio: No. In Cook v. Mcmicking, “those who bear no relation to the parties at the time the transfer/donation occurred, cannot question the validity of such transfers. Unless such a relationship appears, the transfer cannot be attacked. Even if it was used as a defense, the gift of an automobile may be considered moderate, and thus fall under the exception – but circumstances that ought to prove otherwise were not presented by the company.

Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.
August 10, 1918, Fisher, J. Facts: Henry Harding bought a car, a Studebaker automobile, and gave it to his wife who had it insured for $3000 in the foreign-owned corporation, Commercial Union Assurance Co.,

Onas v. Javillo
March 20, 1934, Goddard, J. Facts: Crispulo Javillo (CJ) married Ramona Levis and had five children.After the death of his wife, he married one Rosario Onas and had four children with her. He acquired 11 parcels of land during his first marriage and 20

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parcels of land during his second marriage but died intestate on May 1927. A third party administrator submitted two projects of partition; the second of which was approved by the lower court which said that all the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired with the products of the first. This was contested; the second partition was also assailed by Onas, the second wife, because it did not include all the properties of CJ. Issue: WON properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired by the products of the first marriage. Held/Ratio: No. Community property ceases to exist upon dissolution of the marriage. Conjugal property exists as so long as the spouses are legally united; the important thing is the existence in the eyes of the law of the life in common; consequently, when dissolved, the surviving spouse acquires the properties of the dead spouse “and forms part of his/her own capital; the fruits, as an accessory, follow the property.” (Nable Jose v. Nable Jose) There being no liquidation of the first marriage, ½ of the conjugal property of both marriages correspond to CJ and thus, all his children of both marriages. ½ of the community property of the first marriage go to the children of the first marriage while ½ of the community property of the second marriage go to the 2nd wife.

his second marriage which produced 9 children lasted 46 years. After he died, heirs of the first marriage instituted an action for partition of the land but heirs of the second marriage opposed the partition claiming that the said properties were theirs. In the meantime, wife of the second marriage, Dorotea de Ocampo, filed special proceedings. The land in dispute totaled 66 hectares of agricultural land in Caanawan and a 150 sq. m lot in Manila. RTC rendered judgment distributing the properties: ½ to children of 1st marriage ¼ to surviving spouse ¼ to children of both marriages Petitioner appealed but the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modifications. The defendant’s appeal stressed that the Original Cert. of Title covering the 66 hectare land was in the name of: “ND, married to Dorotea de Ocampo” but the CA held that such was not proof that the property was owned by the conjugal partnership and was a mere description of ND’s civil status. It thereby ruled that ½ of the conjugal property of the first marriage constituted the separate property of the husband during the formation of the 2nd conjugal partnership upon remarriage. ½ of property – share of 1st wife ½ of property – ND and all his children Issue: WON the partition was equitable. Held/Ratio: Submitted evidence on appeal claims that the property in dispute were actually homestead grants acquired by ND through different other homesteaders and thus could not belong to the conjugal properties of the first wife because they were lands of the public domain. This was adhered to by the SC because prior to the death of the first wife, it was not

Vda. De Delizo v. Delizo
January 30, 1976, Antonio, J. Facts: Nicolas Delizo’s first marriage which produced 3 children lasted 18 years,

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shown that all the requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the granting of patents to the homesteader was complied with. The decisive factor in determining whether a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage, is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent. Having neither legal nor equitable title, therefore, what was acquired by ND were not rights of ownership but inchoate rights as applicants over portions of the public domain. Hence the CA erred in holding that the entire Caanawan properties belong with the conjugal partnership of ND and his first wife. Considering however that 20 hectares of that land was cultivated from 1905 to 1909, justice and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land lands had been complied with during th existence of each conjugal partnership. Although some properties were not contested owing to the fact that they were acquired during the existence of the 2nd marriage, important considerations preclude the SC from accepting whole-sale the statutory presumption of Art 160 of the new CC (or Art. 1407 of the old one) which states that “All property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife”. There is established fact that the produce of the disputed lands have contributed considerably to the acquisition of these properties in dispute and thus the children of the first marriage, as a matter of equity, should be given a share in such properties. Considering the circumstances and since capital of either marriage and

contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership. Thus, the whole estate should be divided accordingly: 9/64 – Share of 1st wife 23/64 – Share of 2nd wife 32/64 – Share of ND to be divided into 13 equal parts

Lim v. Garcia25
January 11, 1907, Carson, J. (Arianne Reyes) Nature: One claiming that certain property is the separate estate of the husband brought by him to his marriage must establish that fact by evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption established in CC 1407 that all property of the spouses is conjugal partnership property (bienes gananciales). Facts: Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903 leaving widow, Garcia, and nine children, and an interest in an estate valued at P50,000. The trial court found that the entire estate was conjugal property (together with the improvements made) except the following items which were deemed exclusive property of Hilario: 1. House and lot in Zamboanga 2. P10k brought into the marriage 3. P700 purchase price for a lot sold Counsel for the administrator of the property and the children of Hilario Lim (petitioners) claim that the entire estate should not be treated as property of the conjugal partnership because Hilario brought into marriage more than double the amount of the


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intestate estate and Garcia brought nothing into the conjugal partnership. Trial court refused to adhere to petitioner’s contentions on grounds which the SC upheld. (See below) The trial court refused to include three (3) parcels of land as part of the conjugal property. Petitioners claim that these lands were invalid donations/gifts under Arts. 1334 and 1445 of the CC made by husband to the wife during the marriage. The trial court also considered it a dowry (which the SC debunked for a lack of evidence). Issue/Held/Ratio: WON property in question is part of the conjugal partnership property Yes. The finding of the trial court is sustained. It was of the opinion that the evidence presented was not sufficient to overcome presumption in Article 1407 unless and until it is proven that it is a part of the separate estate of the husband or the wife. As to the three parcels of land which petitioners contend should be part of the conjugal property, the SC ruled from the evidence presented that such lands were conveyed to Garcia by third party by way of exchange for certain inherited properties, therefore such is separate and exclusive under Art 1396 (3).

from the defendants (children of Hilarion dela Cruz) Plaintiff alleges that she had acquired said lands during her first marriage from deceased father and that she had permission from Hilarion to commence this action in her own name against Hilarion’s children. She claims that Hilarion had been administering the said lands during the entire period of his marriage to her. However, CFI Albay dismissed the case in favor Hilarion’s children through his first marriage and found as a fact, from evidence during trials, that the lands described in the complaint were acquired by Hilarion during his marriage to his first wife, one Andrea de Leon. And thus, granted the land in question to the children of Hilarion from his first marriage. Rodriguez appealed to the SC. Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) WON Hilarion was the owner of said lands since he had been administering the land in question during the entire period of his marriage to Matea. No. “There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits a husband from administering the property of his wife, as her representative, and certainly it cannot be concluded that the property which he administers for his wife is his for the mere reason that he has administered the same for a long time.” “…the mere fact that she has permitted her husband to administer her property... does not mean that she has thereby lost her property and that the same has become the property of her husband.” (2) Did the CFI Albay err in finding that Hilarion acquired the land in question during his marriage to Andrea de Leon? Yes. SC examined the evidence adduced during the lower court trials

Rodriguez v. de la Cruz26
1907, Johnson, J. (Fred Mayuga) Facts: Plaintiff Matea Rodriguez (married to Hilarion de la Cruz) - both their second marriages - filed in CFI Albay a complaint for the purpose of recovering certain parcels of lands



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and found that the lands in question were acquired by Matea from her deceased father through inheritance.

People’s Bank & Trust v. Reg of Deeds27
(Kaye Concepcion) Facts: October 26, 1933, Dominga Angeles (married to Manuel Sandoval – but they lived separate and apart) executed “Agreement and Declaration of Trust” in favor of People’s Bank and Trust Co. In the agreement, she conveyed in trust her paraphernal property (3 parcels of land w/ 2 buildings in Juna Luna, Manila) that: lands would be subdivided into small lots, lots would be sold, trustee (People’s bank) would redeem mortgage constituted from rent/sale of property, trustee would grant P10,000 loan to redeem mortgage, trustee would collect the rents from property while unsold. Agreement instrument was denied registration by Register of Deeds of Manila. In the Court of First Instance, it was also denied registration (January 5, 1934) because in the instrument, trustee was authorized to collect the fruits of paraphernal property which are considered conjugal property by Arts. 1385 and 1401 (1). It was alleged that management of fruits belong to the husband and thus, without his intervention or consent, instrument is null and void. Issue/Held/Ratio: WON instrument is null and void due to lack of consent No.

Instrument is merely voidable and right of action exclusively belongs to husband or his heirs. Art. 62 declares null and void acts executed by wife w/o consent of husband in cases where such a consent is a necessary requisite – which in this case, consent is not a necessary requisite as per Art. 138428 since the administration of her paraphernal property belongs to the wife, thus it is within her rights to execute such an agreement. Until the property is liquidated by her, the husband cannot claim the fruits in question since they answer for the necessary and indispensable expenses of administrating and preserving the property. Plus, deed of trust doesn’t part or convey rents of the paraphernal property; it only allows the trustee to collect. The agreement merely allows an act of administration. Manresa: Art. 1384 also gives wife power to enter into contracts regarding paraphernal property (1898 case). Acts performed by a married woman without permission of her husband are not null and void but merely voidable, in which exclusive right of action belongs to husband or his heirs, on the ground that the legal prohibition in question was not established in favor of third persons (based on 3 Supreme Court cases in 1866, 1872 and 1862). Reversed. Register of deeds for City of Manila ordered to register instrument upon payment of corresponding legal fees.


Art. 1384. The wife shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the same to her husband before a notary, for the purpose of conferring its management upon him. In such cases it shall be the duty of the husband to execute a mortgage for the value of any personalty which may be so delivered to him or otherwise secure it in the manner prescribed with respect to dowry property.



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Phil. Sugar Estates v. Poizat
December 31, 1925, Johns, J. Nature: Appeal from order of CFI Manila Facts: Juan Poizat (JP), married, was given general power of attorney which authorized him to enter transactions in the name of his wife, Gabriel de Coster. November 1912, he obtained a loan from PSED (plaintiffs) in the sum of ten thousand sterling for his use on the month of January. To secure the loan, however, he mortgaged real property of his wife which consisted of a house and six adjacent warehouses in Binondo (old buildings were torn down and new building constructed is presumed to come from the conjugal funds). Failure to pay the loan, however, led to the foreclosure of the property and subsequent sale of such to PSED. It was assessed at P342,685.00 but sold for P100,000.00. On September, 1924, Gabriel (wife) contested the sale on the ground that the mortgage was executed illegally and that husband was not authorized to execute it. The trial court overruled her allegations which prompted the appeal. Issue/Held/Ratio: WON the mortgage contract is valid and binding. No. The mortgage is valid and binding if it was executed by an attorney in fact and in the person’s name and stead. If not, it is null and void. With the husband’s use of the funds for his own purposes, he was not signing it in behalf of his wife… and there is no showing that such signature

delegating the power of attorney was intended to bind the wife to the agreement. Evidence suggests that he executed the instrument as a personal act and deed. Property was paraphernal before and during the marriage, for it to be validly mortgaged it must be shown that such a mortgage was executed “in her name, place or stead” and as “her act and deed.” Any authority which he had to bind his wife should be confined and limited to his POA. Giving to it the broadest construction, he would not have any authority to mortgage her property unless mortgage was executed for her and as her act and deed. Sec 1093: Deed of agent must purport to b e made and sealed in the name of the principal. The Court in a vote of 5-4 voted to negate the lower court’s ruling. Justice Villa-real dissented. When the case was decided upon rehearing, an additional provision was cited from the CC: (1717) “When an agent acts in his own name, the principal shall have no right of action against the persons with whom the agent has contracted, or such persons against the principal.” “In such case, the agent is directly liable to the person with whom he has contracted as if the transaction were his own. Cases involving things belonging to the principal are excepted.” In the instant case, the court said it must be construed with Art. 1713 which provides that: “In order to compromise, alienate, mortgage, or to execute any other act of strict ownership, an express power is required.” The mortgage in question was upon real property, and it was not a “simple contract”, and where an agency is created by an express power, it must

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be executed with the formalities of an express power. Again, although the wife was party to the body of the mortgage, Poizat himself had an interest in the real property, and was a party to the instrument, and his personal signature was necessary to the mortgage to bind his own personal interest, and the interest of conjugal partnership. The power of attorney from the wife gave her husband the express power defined in Article 1713, and that power should have been exercised, and the mortgage should have been executed “in the name, place and stead” of the wife”. This was not done. Villa-real, Dissenting: Upon signing and conveying power of attorney, such an act was tantamount to giving husband authority to encumber property.

the latter date and title was secured under Moises name as widower. Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the property with their wives and paid its realty taxes and fire insurance premiums. Alexander and his wife, however, left the property in August 1985 for personal reasons. February 1988, Romeo learns from godmother of his wedding that son of godmother, Virgilio Castro (VC, petitioner), who happens to be Romeo’s neighbor, that the Paco property was being sold to VC. A thirty thousand peso downpayment was made by godmother to Moises for her son. April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the Paco property for P42,750.00; a partial payment was made in the sum of P6,000 by Romeo but Alexander did not execute a deed of assignment in favor of his brother because “he had lots of work to do and the title was already in Romeo’s possession.” Downpayment information corroborated by Virgilio Miat (brother of Moises) and Pedro Miranda (who worked with Moises in two hotels: Bayview Hotel and Hotel Filipinas) but Alexander later said that he did not consider the money to be a downpayment but a personal debt due to Romeo. Romeo had possession of the title because he borrowed it from his father when he mortgaged the land to his friend Lorenzo. But when Moises ran into financial difficulties, he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to parents of petitioner VC. December 1, 1988, Romeo and VC met in MTC Manila to discuss status of Paco property. On the 16th, a letter from petitioner’s lawyer informed Romeo that the Paco property had been sold to VC by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated Dec. 5, 1988 for

Castro v. Miat
2003, Puno, J. Facts: Father of two children, Moises, widower (wife died in 1978), originally intended his two properties, one in Paco and the other in Paranaque for his offspring but reverted to keeping the latter for himself while in Dubai, UAE. He modified the original agreement upon return to the Philippines in 1984. Proof of this was given by Moises’ brother, Cerefino Miat, who said testified the original agreement that Paco would go to Moises’ sons. This was reiterated at the death bed of Moises’ wife and affirmed upon Moises’ return to the Philippines. The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was paid for on an installment basis from May 17, 1977 to December 14, 1984. Full payment was made on

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P95,000.00. Buyer, petitioner, VC admitted that the title of the property was with Romeo but bought it anyway on the assurance of Moises that he’d be able to retrieve it from his son. Romeo files in the RTC action to nullify sale and compel Moises and Alexander to execute deed of conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1) Alexander to pay the remaining balance due his brother, (2) Romeo to recognize sale made by Moises, (3) dismissal of defendant’s counterclaim and (4) defendants to pay the costs of suit. Both parties appealed to the CA which modified the decision by saying that: (1) the deed of sale was nullified, (2) Moises and Alexander had to execute a deed of conveyance, and (3) for defendants to pay cost of suit (as applied for by the petitioner). VC subsequently brings the action to the SC.

partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioner’s reliance on Lorenzo v. Nicolas), Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage — Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal. (2) WON valid oral partition between Moises and his sons involving the said property is valid. Yes. The validity of the agreement is apparent in (a) latter of the father to his sons (the one which stated that he didn’t favor any of his sons), (b) the testimony (see above) of Moises’ brother, Ceferino, and the oral agreement between the brothers to divide the property between themselves (attested to by extended Family members). We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco property. Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro Miranda, who testified regarding the sale of Alexander’s share to Romeo, were intensely questioned by petitioners’ counsel. (3) WON Castro spouses were buyers in good faith. Ruling of the CA which was affirmed by the SC: “In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge of the adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant. The most

Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital. Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and at the time it was paid, his wife had long been dead, the SC disagrees on the grounds of the new Civil Code (which was applicable because marriage was celebrated before FC):
Art 153 (1) “The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; x x x.”

Records show that property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property. Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal

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protuberant index that they are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property. xxx “Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the property, they being neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of another person’s possession of the lot he purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent purchaser for value.”

the former’s sister and latter’s daughter, Agustina. Petitioner alleges that documents were null and void, being obtained through fraud and deceit, and that the considerations were merely simulated and fictitious as there was no showing that Agustina paid for properties, that the prices were grossly inadequate and the improbability of sale because parties real intention was to exclude petitioner from estate in parents’ estate. With regardings to the third document, which was made (extrajudicial partition agreement) after MJ’s mother died, MJ says that no real made between father and daughter living in the same roof and that properties were unliquidated conjugal properties and thus cannot be validly sold. He contests the sale but not the partition. Trial Court upheld petitioner’s allegations, further declaring that properties in 1st and 2nd documents were conjugal as they were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.” CA reversed decision based on prescription of claim, that the documents were validly contracted and that the petitioner’s claim on mother’s estate has not been prejudiced. Topic Issue/Held/Ratio: WON properties in 1st and 2nd documents are conjugal properties of the marriage. NO. Art. 160 of Civil Code provides: All properties of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to husband or to the wife. But before petitioner can validly invoke Art. 160, he must first present proof that disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of his parents. In

Jocson v. CA29
February 16, 1989; Medialdea, J. (Chris Fernandez) Facts: Emilio Jocson, father of Moises Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez (married), executed three documents. The 1st document pertains to sale of 6 parcels of land for P10,000; the 2nd one is the sale of 2 rice mills and a camilig for P5,000; and the 3rd one pertains to an extrajudicial partition of the estate of deceased wife, dividing equally to husband, son and daughter. 3rd document also conveys sale of Emilio’s 1/3 share in estate for P8,000. These were registered with TCTs. Petitioner Moises Jocson, son, questions validity of these documents executed by his father, Emilio, which conveyed almost all of his property to


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this case, petitioner has no sufficient proof to his claim and contrary to his position, certificates of title show that Emilio is exclusive owner of registered property. The fact that properties were registered as such is no proof that properties were acquired during marriage. The words, “married to…” are merely descriptive of civil status of owner. Thus he has no claim to said properties. Case Issue/Held/Ratio: WON documents are null and void, and WON claim is barred by prescription. NO and NO. Contracts obtained by fraud are void but has a 4-year prescription period; contracts with no consideration are imprescriptible. Petitioner asks for nullity on the ground of simulated price, thus case is not barred by prescription. However, burden of proof that contracts lack consideration rests on he who alleges it. In this case, petitioner did not sufficiently prove that the contracts lack consideration. His claim that Agustina has no adequate source of income to be able to pay the purchase price of properties was contradicted by his own witness and respondents’ testimony that Agustina is engaged in buying and selling palay and rice. There is also no showing that price is grossly inadequate, in fact purchase price is higher than assessed values of properties. Also, improbability of sale as to father and daughter is purely speculative and has no relevance to essential requirements of a contract. Petition dismissed, CA’s decision affirmed.

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA which affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC Facts: Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his 2nd marriage. Private respondents Conchita, Araceli and Antonio are Eusebio’s kids by his 1st marriage. Eusebio administered the following properties (which petitioner claims were acquired during their marriage): sari-sari store, residential house and lot, apartment house, and another house and lot. He did so until he became invalidated (thus rendering him unfit to administer) by TB, heart disease and cancer. His kids by 1st marriage convinced him to sign a general power of attorney authorizing Conchita to administer the residential house and lot + the apartment house. Petitioner filed a suit for damages and an annulment of the said general power of attorney. RTC and CA both rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents. It was held that petitioner failed to show proof that the properties were acquired during the existence of the 2nd conjugal partnership. Thus, it would seem that the properties belonged exclusively to Eusebio and he has the capacity to administer them. Issue/Held/Ratio: WON the properties are Eusebio’s exclusive capital properties YES. Judgment AFFIRMED. Petitioner failed to refute Eusebio’s testimony that he inherited the property from his parents (even admitted by petitioner!). Property already owned by a spouse prior to marriage, is considered his separate property. (Pursuant to Article 14830 of

Francisco v. CA
1998 (Jackie Espenilla)

Article 148. The following shall exclusive property of each spouse:

be the

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the New Civil Code). Eusebio acquired the land by lucrative title. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or wife. The party who invokes this presumption must prove that the property was acquired during the marriage because the presumption of conjugality is rebuttable with strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. Rebuttals to all petitioner’s property claims: 1) House, apartment and sari-sari store Petitioner: presented building permits and business license Court: do not prove that properties were acquired during the marriage and is not determinative if they are part of conjugal property 2) Other house and lot Petitioner: presented title which is registered under “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco” Court: Inadequare. No proof that it was acquired during their marriage. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are 2 diff things. Registration merely confirms a title that is already exisiting. Finally, Eusebio is not incapacitated and can administer his property as he sees fit.

the Philippines. Rafael Zulueta, along was his wife and daughter, was traveling from Wake island, going back home to Manila. While waiting for the flight, Mr. Zulueta went to relieve himself, but for some weird reason, did not go into one of the 8 restrooms in the terminal, but went to a secluded spot in the beach outside some 400 yards from the terminal. Upon his return, he was late, and the captain of the plane, Capt. Zentner was already being arrogant. As such there was an altercation between Zentner and Zulueta. Consequently, Capt.Zentner had Zulueta’s luggage off loaded, but only 3 of the 4 suitcases were found, and the last piece of luggage remained on the flight to Manila. Originally, Even Mrs. and Ms. Zulueta were supposed to be offloaded, but Mr. Zulueta was able to negotiate a compromise to allow them to stay on the plane back to Manila. Upon reaching Manila, wife tried asking local Pan-Am office to bring her husband home but they refused. When Zulueta sued, trial court awarded them damages which the SC reduced the amount upon appeal by Pan-Am. Upon, motion for reconsideration initiated by both parties (case at hand), Zulueta wants the trial court’s decision to be affirmed in toto while Pan-Am wants the amount of damages reduced.32 While waiting for the results of the appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta, for reasons of their own, separated from

Zulueta v. Pan-Am31
(Kevin San Agustin) Facts: This case is about the off-loading of Rafael Zulueta from his flight back to
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title

The CFI’s jurisdiction is for cases with controversies amounting to more than 10,000 excluding interest. Defendant contends that the action of plaintiff is only for 5,502.85. This however did not consider moral damages. Also, the counterclaim of the plaintiff for and aggregate sum of 12,000 cured this defect, ensuring the jurisdiction of the CFI. damages and attorney’s fees - exemplary damages are covered under CC 2229, 2232, Attorney’s fees under CC 2208. There was an award for 700,000 for damages and 75,000 for attorney’s fees.


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each other. Mrs. Zulueta then entered into a compromise agreement with Pan-Am, settling for P50,000.00. Motion to dismiss, as far as she was concerned anyway, was filed but was subsequently denied by the SC on the ground that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except in case cases provided by law.33 Issues/Held/Ratio: WON the damages involved are part of the conjugal property. Yes. Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta entered into a contract of carriage with defendant, one which was ultimately breached by the offloading of Mr. Zulueta. The award of damages therefore was done collectively. Since Mr. Zulueta, having acted in his capacity as administrator, entered into contract with PanAm and paid for this with funds from the Conjugal funds, damages incurred by breach of contract of carriage naturally would be conjugal.34

Mendoza v. Reyes
1983, Gutierrez (Leo Zulueta) Nature: Efren and Inocencia, Julia de Reyes vs. Ponciano Reyes and CA (1983) Review for certiorari on the decision of CA Facts: Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes were married in 1915. They were able to acquire two parcels of land in QC, plus buildings erected thereon from Araneta Inc. sometime in Feb. 1947 on installment basis. They had to borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) to pay the installments (2 joint loans of P12,000 and P8,000 acquired on 1948 and 1952 respectively). In the deed of sale, the vendee named is JULIA de REYES, with marital consent from Ponciano. The transfer certificates in the Register of Deeds were also in her name. The spouses built a house and camarin on the lots which were eventually leased to Efren and Inocencia Mendoza (appellees) who transformed the camarin into a movie house. November 1958, the Reyes spouses had to ask for an extension of 5 years from the Dev’t Bank of the Phil (successor of the RFC) for the payment of the money they borrowed, as payment for the outstanding balance of the lots. On March 3, 1961, Julia sold the lots to the Mendoza couple while Ponciano was in Pampanga, attending to his farm. The couple ain’t cool with one another anymore. The sale was made without the consent of Ponciano.
the contract was entered into using funds from the conjugal partnership, if the right of redemption pertains to the wife, it may make the property redeemed, in this case the damages, not conjugal. in this case however, since this right of redemption was not proven, there remains a presumption that the damages are part of the conjugal property. In the end, petitions were dismissed.

PAN AM tried using Art. 113 to apply to the case but the Supreme Court said that the husband, and not the wife, was principal/real party in interest. Damages incurred by the wife were merely incidental. Since there was no pronouncement to individual damages, the court ordered that the 50,000 be subtracted from the 700,000 aggregate damages awarded.

the 2 articles in the civil code that are relevant are art 153 the following are conjugal property (1)that which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only 1 spouse; (2)that which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them; (3)the fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.” and Art. 148 the following sha;; be exclusive property of each spouse” (1)that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; (2)that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title; (3)that which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses; (4)that which is purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or husband. Since the contract was entered into using funds from conjugal property, damages are part thereof. The case also mentions something that even if

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Transfer certificates were issued to Mendozas. Ponciano filed a case in the CFI for the annulment of the sale. The Mendozas and Julia allege that the lots were paraphernal properties of Julia, and the purchase was done in good faith. The CFI ruled in favor of Julia and the Mendozas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, declaring the sale null and void with respect to the ½ share of Julia to the lots in question. Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) Are the properties in question conjugal or paraphernal? Court says conjugal. The Court applied Art. 153 of the Civil Code (Art.117 of the FC par.1), declaring that the properties are acquired by onerous title during the marriage. Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the Reyes spouses from the RFC. Although Julia was contending that the money came from her personal funds and from the donations of her mother, various records show otherwise (Income Tax Returns – declaring conjugal partnership), and she did not deny the truth of these statements. (2) Petitioners are not allowed to invoke estoppel, even if a previous case of Ponciano had him declaring in his special defenses that he and his wife never had any kind of conjugal funds, that they acted independently in business. Estoppel can only be invoked between the person making the misrepresentation and the person to whom it was addressed. (3) Did the Mendozas buy the lands in good faith? The Mendozas are aware of the nature of the property. The mortgage contracts issued in the name of Julia Reyes “married to Ponciano” were annotated in the transfer certificates and the Mendozas are unquestionably charged with notice of existence and contents of said mortgages. The property’s nature is still conjugal even

if it was registered in the name of the wife. Petition DENIED. CA affirmed.

Villanueva v. IAC
1990, Narvasa, J. (Patty Miranda) Nature: Petition for review from the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, where judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants [Jesus and Remedios Bernas] and against the plaintiffs [Consolacion Villanueva and Raymunda Aranas]. However in this case, only Consolacion appealed to the Court. Facts: Lot 13 was divided into 2 parts upon the death Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa; the sourthern portion, Lot 13-C, went to one of their sons Modesto Aranas. Modesto died at 81 years, his wife Victoria Comorro predeceased him dying at 70 years— they had no children. Modesto, however, was survived by 2 illegitmate children Dorothea Ado and Teodoro Aranas, to whom he bequeathed “all his interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria.” The 2 kids then used Lot 13-C as security for the Php 18,000.00 they borrowed from Jesus Bernas and, unfortunately, failed to pay their loan which led to Bernas acquiring said land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. A month later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas, the 2 witnesses in the deed of mortgage, filed a case against Bernas, praying that the latter’s title over the land be cancelled, and that Consolacion and Raymundo be declared co-owners, especially since they discovered a 2nd will. If Modesto’s will benefited Dorothea and Teooro, the 2nd will by Victoria apparently bequeathed to the Consolacion and Raymundo all of Victoria’s “interests, rights and properties, real and personal xx as her net share from the

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conjugal partnership property with her husband Modesto Aranas x x.” Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) What right was acquired by Consolacion Villanueva over Lot 13-C and the improvements thereon standing by virtue of Victoria Camorro’s last will and testament giving to her all of said Victoria’s “interests, rights and properties, real and personal xx as her net share from the conjugal partnership property with her husband Modesto Aranas x x.” NONE. Lot 13-C was not a “conjugal partnership property” of Victoria and Modesto. It was the “exclusive property” of Modesto, as decreed by Art. 148 of the CC because it was acquired by him “during the marriage, by lucrative title.” Furthermore, Victoria died 2 years ahead of her husband Modesto, the latter being the “exclusive owner” of Lot 13-C. Hence, Victoria had nothing of the property to bequeath to Consolacion or anyone else. (2) WON the improvements are conjugal property so that Consolacion Villanueva may be said to have acquired a right over them by succession, as voluntary heir of Victoria Comorro. NO. Proof is necessary in order to determine the character of the improvements, such as construction of said improvements and source of funds, to determine whether it belongs to one spouse or the other. Unfortunately no such proof was presented by Consolacion or anyone else. Furthermore, the land was registered in the name of Modesto only, so the presumption is that exclusively belongs him alone. The SC held: “It is therefore impossible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in character.” The judgement of the IAC is AFFIRMED with costs against the petitioner.

Castillo v. Pasco
1964, JBL Reyes (JV La Chica) Facts: On Oct. 1931, Macaria Pasco, a twotime widow, married a widower Marcelo Castillo. During their marriage, on Dec. 1932, the spouses bought a fishpond from Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales for the sum of P6000. The agreement was that the sum would be paid in three installments: (1) a down payment of P1000, (2) P2000 on Jan. 25, 1933 (w/o interest), and (3) P3000 w/in one year thereafter w/ 11% interest from Feb. 1, 1933. (as the Court of Appeals would later on find) The installments were paid as such: 1. P1000 a. P600 – Gabriel Gonzales apparently owed Macaria P600, so this amount was a done deal b. P400 – paid in cash from proceeds of the sale of one of Macaria’s nipa huts 2. P2000 – a loan from a certain Dr. Jacinto, wherein the pond itself was mortgaged – the loan was later on assigned from Dr. Jacinto to a certain Dr. Pasco 3. P3000 – a loan where 2 parcels of land of Macaria was mortgaged On April 3, 1933, Marcelo died. Macaria later on married her fourth husband. The Court of First Instance of Bulacan declared the pond to be a paraphernal (exclusive?) property of Macaria. The children and grandchildren (representing their deceased parents) of Marcelo from his former marriage appealed in the CA. The CA held the decision of the lower court. The CA declared that Macaria was a woman of means when she married Marcelo, whereas the latter has only his P80 a month salary as a source of income. In fact upon the death of Marcelo, the poor man didn’t

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even have enough asset to pay his debts. Subsequently, after the death of her third husband, Macaria paid their debts to Dr. Pasco, and since the estate of Marcelo didn’t have enough money to pay his debts, then it was logical that the money paid for the loan was that of Macaria – a fact used as another basis of their holding of the lower court’s decision. Issue: WON the pond was an paraphernal (exclusive?) property of Macaria Held: 1/6 of the pond yes, 5/6 of the pond no Ratio: The reason for this decision was based on the Court’s decision that the first installment was paid out of the exclusive property of Macaria while the outstanding amount was paid from the conjugal property. On the first installment: The property regime of the marriage of Marcelo and Macaria was governed by the Spanish Civil Code. Two provisions of that civil code is important in the case at hand: i. Art 1396 (4) stated that properties bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the husband shall be deemed separate property Art 1401 (1) stated that properties acquired at the expense of the common fund shall be deemed exclusive property

There was no contention on the source of the P400 part of the first installment, however, the appellants were disputing that there was no evidence that the P600 debt of Gabriel to Macaria came from her exclusive property, thus Art 1407 of the Spanish Civil Code which provided for the presumption for conjugal property must have been applied. The Court however disagreed – Art 1416 of the same Code stated that the wife may not dispense of any conjugal property w/o first getting the consent of the husband, and until evidence were to be produced showing that a conjugal property (P600) was given by the wife to Gabriel w/ her husband’s consent, then the presumption should be that the amount paid was from her own exclusive property. The first installment was purely from Macaria’s exclusive property. On the second and third installment: Evidence shows that the money used for the payment of the second and third installments were from loans made by the lenders (i.e. Dr. Jacinto, etc.) to both spouses, as joint borrowers. The loans thereby became an obligation of the conjugal partnership, and the money the spouses got from the loan is thus conjugal property. The fact that the property mortgaged was an exclusive property of the wife is not important since a mortgage is a purely accessory obligation that the lenders can waive. In Palanca v. Smith Bell & Co. the Court ruled that the money borrowed by the spouses therein became conjugal property, and the house bought using such money was deemed part of the conjugal property. This Palanca ruling applies in this case. The second and third installments came from the conjugal property of the spouses. Final note:


Simply put, regardless if the property bought were in favor of the spouse (property x sold to spouses A and B), the final determinant of whether a property is deemed separate or not is the source of money.

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Thus the pond was divided by the Court as such: 1/6 – to Macaria as her exclusive property ½ of 5/6 – to Macaria as her half of the conjugal property The remaining parts shall be governed by succession laws applicable when the husband died.

Calimlim-Canullas vs. Fortun
June 22, 1984, Melencio-Herrera, J (Karl Landoy) Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan Facts: Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas (petitioner) and Fernando Canullas were married Dec 19, 1962. They begot 5 kids. They lived in a house on the residential land in question, located at Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After Fernando’s dad died in 1965, he inherited the land. In 1978, Fernando abandoned this family and lived with Corazon Daguines (private Respondent) During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage by the CFI, which judgment had become final. On april 15, 1980, Fernando sold the subject property with the house thereon to Corazon Daguines for the sum of P2000. In the deed of sale, Fernando described the house as “also inherited by me from my deceased parents”. Corazon however was unable to take possession of the house and lot because of Mercedes, so she initiated a complaint against Mercedes for the quieting of title and for damages. Mercedes claims that the house in dispute where she and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; she also claims that the sale of land together with the

house and improvements to Corazon was null and void because they are CONJUGAL PROPERTIES and she had NOT GIVEN CONSENT to the sale. The original judgment declared Corazon as the lawful owner of the land in question as well as the ½ of the house erected on said lands. Upon reconsideration prayed for by Mercedes, respondent court amended the prior decision and resolved that the plaintiff (Corazon) is (still) the true owner of the land in question and the 10 coconut trees, (but) declared the sale of the conjugal house to plaintiff including 3 coconut trees and other crops planted during the conjugal relation between Fernando Canullas and his legitimate wife (Mercedes). Hence this case: Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) WON the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property Yes. A correct interpretation of Art 15835 yields that: Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Fernando could not have alienated the house lot to Corazon since Mercedes had not given her consent to said sale. (2) WON the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction No, the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and

Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.

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public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the family. As provided by Art 1409, contracts such as this shall be void and inexistent. Also, art 1352 states contracts with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from donating or selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. This applies even to couples who are not married but are living “as husband and wife” Wherefore, the decision of respondent judge… and his resolution on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration… are hereby set aside and the sale of the lot, house and improvements in question, is hereby declared null and void.

however, FJ dies as well, allowing Javier to inherit two properties. For purpose of consolidating full ownership of the properties, Javier secured a loan 37 and then purchased38 from FJ’s second wife, PS, the latter’s usufructory rights. In 1913, FC, husband of Javier, was ordered by the court to pay his debt to Osmena39. The sheriff was thereby ordered to auction rights, title, interests, and shares of the property of FC (including the inherited properties of his wife and the usufructory rights purchased in 1911.) Notwithstanding protests from Javier, the two properties were sold to the estate of Osmena for P500 each. This included the usufructory rights. Javier filed a complaint against Osmena alleging that the inherited properties, as well as the usufructory rights were exclusive and not part of conjugal property and thus prayed for the sale to be annulled. Respondent estate of Osmena, admitting that the properties involved were indeed exclusive, still claimed that the usufructory rights, being purchased from the conjungal funds, should be deemed conjugal in nature. He also claimed that the payment due should come from the fruits of the said properties and thus, a receiver should be appointed to manage such revenues due to the respondent. CFI annulled the sale and cancelled the registration of property in the name of respondent Osmena. Osmena then appealed to the SC.40

Javier v. Osmena
March 23, 1916, Arellano, C.J. Facts: In 1890, Petrona Javier (Javier), daughter of FJ and MC, married Florentino Collantes. Before 1892, Florentino, husband, was employed by his father-in-law, FJ, in a commission business. One of their clients was Osmena who consigned tobacco to them from Cebu. Upon retirement of FJ, Florentino took over the commission business as an independent commission merchant (broker). He also assumed the debt owed by FJ to Osmena.36 In 1901, MC, mother of Petrona died. FJ subsequently married one PS. In 1908,

Using as security the property inherited. P3000

38 39

No records could show the origin of the debt but it was admitted that the same was assumed by Florentino upon taking over the business. The original amount was P4000-P5000 but in 1908, FC gave Osmena a statement saying that the debt incurred was now P14,000-P15,000.

Although Osmena never claimed the debt during his lifetime, upon his death, the administrator of his estate sought to collect it in his stead. The amount owed was now P26,000. 40 Then-appellee, Javier, sought to use Art. 1386 against the appellant but the court disproved this by pointing to earlier jurisprudence,

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Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) WON sum owed to Osmena estate can/should be paid from fruits/revenues of the exclusive properties of the wife, PJ. Yes. The court delved into the nature of the debt. It stated that there was a presumption in fact that family expenses come from salaries for services rendered. Since debt was incurred by the husband during the marriage (by virtue of him assuming the debt from his father-in-law) and such a debt was for the support of the family… fruits and revenues of separate properties, being conjugal in nature, should answer the obligation41. These debts are not personal or private debts at all. (2) WON a receiver should be assigned to collect fruits of exclusive properties as prayed for by Osmena estate. No. Art. 1984 of the CC says that the wife has the right to manage her paraphernal property and Art. 1412 says that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property. Appointment of a receiver shall deprive both the husband and the wife of these rights. There is therefore no need for such an appointment.

A debt was contracted when one Damaso Perez bought leather materials from Hormoso for his shoemanufacturing business. On February 1959, Hormoso filed suit against Perez and one Gregorio Sumbong for the recovery of unpaid purchases in t he amount of P17,309.44. On April, 1960, the petition was granted by the presiding judge (Lantin, respondent) and thus ordered Perez and Sumbong to fulfill their pecuniary obligation. They appealed but they were dismissed.42 They brought the action to the SC but it was also dismissed.43 Hormoso moved for the execution of judgment and this was granted on August 15, 1961. The Sheriff levied the shares of common stock of Perez from Republic Bank but Perez urged to stay the execution alleging that the levy was excessive and unjust because he only owed P17,309.44 but the shares levied were worth P357,000. Sheriff was thus stopped from auctioning the shares pending resolution of Perez’s new motion. But after respondent Judge Lantin denied both the appeal and the stay of execution, the sheriff again served a notice for auctioning the shares. This was subsequently cancelled by the CA pending hearing of another petition44 filed by Perez on October 5. CA resolved that the levy was indeed excessive but regardless sustained that such should be paid. Sheriff again published a notice of action but time auctioning only 210 shares of stock. The wife of Perez, Mrs. Cobb-Perez, filed a complaint against Hormoso, Republic Bank and the Sheriff alleging that the levied shares were conjugal property and thus should not be liable for Perez’s
42 43 44

Cobb-Perez v. Lantin
May 22, 1968, Castro, J. Facts:

particularly the decision on June 9, 1887 of the Audiencia of Valencia which did not sustain the argument that “in order for debts to be paid out of the fruits of separate property, it must be shown that such meets the obligations of the conjugal partnership.” It promulgated the doctrine that “debts contracted during the marriage cannot be deemed to be personal nor private debts.”

Filed after reglementary period.

Art. 1409 of the CC: conjugal property should be made liable for debts and obligations (first paragraph) contracted during the marriage and for the support of the family (fifth paragraph).

Lack of merit. On the ground that the levy was unjust and Lantin committed grave abuse of discretion when he denied the right to appeal.

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exclusive debt. CFI once more enjoined the sheriff from executing the auction… but later, upon resolving the case45, it lifted its earlier order. A month before the writ of execution was lifted, however, the wife filed another motion for recall/lifting of writ of execution granted on August 15, 1961 on the same grounds enunciated in italics in this paragraph. Lantin denied the motion46. This paved the way for the sheriff to, once more, give notice of the action and execute the sale. What followed after this was a series of delaying tactics47 which finally ended with Damaso Perez filing an urgent motion for reconsideration using now his wife’s reasons (see italics in paragraph above) and at the same time offered instead of his shares of stocks, the dividends of such amounting to P19,000. Sheriff was then stopped for the fifth time but the motion was still denied. After the sheriff scheduled the auction for the sixth time, the present petition was now filed which alleged that grave abuse of discretion was committed in not recalling the writ of execution (ordering the levy of 210 shares of stock which were deemed conjugal and thus not answerable to personal obligations made by the husband). Issue/Held/Ratio: WON levied shares are conjugal and thus liable for debt of the husband, Perez. No. Perez is estopped from claiming that said shares were conjugal because in the case where he

challenged it as being excessive and unjust, he had given the impression that such stocks were exclusive. This is further confirmed by the fact that the said stocks were registered in his name alone. Wife is also barred by judgment made on husband because she stands in privity with him. She cannot feign ignorance to justify a lapse of seventeen months in questioning the legality of the levy made on the stocks. They claim that Art. 160 of the CC is applicable but no proof was presented that such stocks were acquired during the marriage. No evidence was adduced as to when the shares of stock were acquired. Conceding that they were acquired during the marriage and is conjugal, it must be shown that the partnership is not liable for the judgment debt. No evidence pointing to this was presented.48 Petition dismissed. Treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel.

DBP v. Adil
May 11, 1998, Gancayco, J. Facts: Feb. 10, 1940 – Patricio Confesor & Jovita Villafuerte, spouses, obtained an agricultural loan, in the amount P2000 payable in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations, from Agricultural &

In obeisance of the ruling enunciated in Acosta v. Aluendia. wherein the jurisdiction of one court should not be entered into by another court.

On the ground that the wife was not party to the case and that the motion was not the remedy in any case.

Case against the sheriff, another case initiated by both spouses to vindicate previous claim; sheriff was enjoined two more times from auctioning.

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.

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Industrial Bank (now DBP). A promissory note was executed. After ten years, the debt remained unpaid. Confessor, now a Congressman, executed a second promissory note acknowledging the loan and promising to pay the same before June 15, 1961. Still not having paid on the aforementioned date, DBP instituted a complaint against the spouses which the City Court ruled in their favor. Debtors were asked to pay P5000 plus interest and attorney’s fees. Spouses appealed in the CFI which reversed the decision and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, present petition alleging that CFI judge’s decision was contrary to law and to decisions of the SC. Asserting that the judge refused to recognize that the right to prescription may be renounced or waived and in claiming that the second promissory note, being signed by the husband alone, cannot bind his wife. Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) WON prescription had barred the complaint. No. Prescription was renounced when Confessor signed the second promissory note. In Villaroel v. Estrada: ". . . when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable . . ." (2) WON a husband signing the promissory note alone can bind the wife. Yes. However, the court a quo held that in signing the promissory note alone, respondent Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife, respondent Jovita Villafuerte, citing Article 166 of the New Civil Code which provides:

"Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same."

We disagree. Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.

Luzon Surety Co. v. De Garcia
October 31, 1969, Fernando, J. Facts: Luzon Surety granted a crop loan49 to Chavez based on a surety bond executed in favor of Philippine National Bank. Garcia was one of the guarantors of the indemnity agreement. On April 1957, PNB filed complaint against Luzon Surety. This subsequently prompted Luzon Surety, on August of the same year, to file a complaint against the guarantors (one of which was Garcia). The lower court ruled in favor of PNB in the first case and ordered the guarantors in the second case to pay Luzon Surety. July 30, 1960, CFI issued a writ of execution for Garcia to pay the amount of P3,839. On August, the sheriff levied his sugar quedans, conjugal property of the Garcia spouses.

12% interest per annum, 15% of any amount included in litigation

Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Persons Digests v1.0 Page No. 67

The Garcias filed a suit of injunction which the lower court found in their favor based on Art. 161 of the CC. Luzon Surety appealed to the CA which affirmed the lower court’s decision. Review through SC. Issues/Held/Ratio: WON the signing of the indemnity agreement redounded to the benefit of the family and thus, should fall under the liabilities of the conjugal partnership. No. The administrator’s obligations are only chargeable to the conjugal property if he believes it is done for the benefit of the family. No proof was presented that Vicente Garcia, acting as surety or guarantor, did so for the benefit of the family. Luzon Surety claims that the surety did benefit the family because it added to Garcia’s reputation as being trustworthy and enhanced his standing in the community. This is too remote/fanciful a benefit to be considered in terms of what is provided for in Art. 161. Reyes, Concurring: Actual profit/benefit which must accrue to the conjugal property is not required in Art. 161. It is suffice to say that such transaction should be one to normally produce a benefit for the partnership. 50

included himself jointly/severally liabile to PBM’s indebtedness by virtue of security agreements. PBM failed to pay the loan. AIDC filed a case against PBM and Cheng for the money. Court rendered judgment in favor of AIDC and ordered PBM and Cheng to pay the P50.3M with interests. While decision was being appealed, AIDC moved for a writ of execution. Upon placement of P8M bond, the writ was issued. Sheriff notified and scheduled the sale of 3 conjugal properties of Cheng. This subsequently led Cheng to file a suit of injunction against the Sheriff, enjoining him from enforcing orders against the conjugal property since these were not answerable to the loan. The loan not benefiting the conjugal partnership, payment of such should not come from the conjugal property. The lower court issued the TRO. AIDC filed a petition for certiorari in CA which issued a TRO on the lower court’s initial TRO, paving the way for the scheduled sale of Cheng’s property. The auction took place and AIDC, being the only bidder, was issued the certificate of sale. However, after deciding the issue, the same CA which issued the second TRO, resolved to uphold the lower court’s decision. AIDC then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the issue was now moot and academic since the sale was already consummated. Respondents however averred that a third-party was now questioning the sale and thus a different legal situation was presented. Lower court denied AIDC’s motion to dismiss and after trial declared the sale null and void. The CA affirmed the decision. After a motion of reconsideration was denied, AIDC filed a petition for review in the SC.

Ayala Investment & Development Corp (AIDC) v. Court of Appeals
February 12, 1998, Martinez, J. Facts: Phil. Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50.3M loan from AIDC. VP Cheng, for further security of the credit line,

As held in Javier v. Osmena.

Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Persons Digests v1.0 Page No. 68

Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) WON CA erred in ruling that the obligation incurred by Cheng did not redound to the benefit of the family. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract (he directly received the money and services to be used for his own business/profession), that contract falls under the term “debts and obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no actual benefit may be proven. AIDC claims that the benefits Cheng’s family would reasonably anticipate were the following: (i) employment of Cheng would be prolonged, (ii) shares of stock of members of Cheng’s family would appreciate if PBM could be rehabilitated through the loan obtained, (ii) Cheng’s prestige in PBM would be enhanced and his career would be boosted should PBM survive because of the loan. However these are not benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the CC. It cannot be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. The above-enumerated alleged benefits are not only incidental but also speculative. (2) Is a surety agreement/accommodation contract entered into by the husband within the contemplation of Art. 161 of the CC. No. The money received/services rendered redounded to benefit of PBM and the husband merely acted as a guarantor. The contract by itself cannot be considered as falling within the context of Art. 161.

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