Three Grades of Modal Involvement by W. V. Quine Review by: A. R. Turquette The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1955), pp.

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as a statementoperator. Three grades of modal involvement are distinguished which depend essentially upon the use of necessity as a semantical predicate. Prior constructs some four-valued tables for a relatively simple quantificational situation which work as well for a similar modal situation. his treatment of the concept of "quantificational value" and "modal value" is little more than suggestive and in basic ideas does not go much beyond the results implied by the first paper listed above. the "modal values" of a proposition are identified with the possible states of affairs which will make the given proposition true. but Prior appears to make a real issue of a verbal one when he decides to restrict the range of "truth-value" to the two elements. The ideas contained in these two papers are interesting. he argues that Aristotle means by "p is possible" not that "p is not impossible" but that "p is neither necessary nor impossible. R. and 1-ditions E. His "extensions" and "possible states of affairs" then become "values" but not "truth-values. In the first of the above listed papers." Why would it not be just as plausible to liberalize the range of "truth-value" so as to include the many elements which Prior A.168 REVIEWS thesis must be rejected in any system of logic which contains modal expressions such as Mp (p is possible). Amsterdam 1953. that there is a sense of "value" in which it is correct to say that modal logics are "many-valued. since it turns out that the contexts produced by the statementoperator 'nec' are referentially opaque in the same legitimate manner as those produced by 'Nec' used as a semantical predicate with quotation." They are many-valued in much the same way that quantification theory is many-valued. In any case. Volume complementaire et comdu Colloque de Logique. Three grades of modal involvement." and concludes that it is not Aristotle's thesis EAMpMNp which must be rejected but rather certain limitations must be placed on the use of Lesniewski's thesis CK p4Npiq. it is concerned largely with the task of making explicit all the major issues. nevertheless. In particular. The basic reason for this is that truth-functional expressions must be substituted for Up in order to preserve the validity of Lesniewski's thesis. It is shown that the first two grades are quite similar. Prior considers some reasons for rejecting Lukasiewicz' conclusion. munications North-Holland Publishing Company. It is argued. Louvain 1953.Actes du XIeme Congres V. QUINE. but aside from this. or as a sentence operator subject to the application of quantifiers. However. In the latter case. Nauwelacrts. "true" and "false". a prospective modal logician would do well to consult the present paper for a clear summary of some of the difficult problems which he must face. This is WV. Consequently. . while in the case of modality. In fact. and model operators are more like quantifiers than they are like truth-functional connectives. This paper is very closely related to XIX 137. TU RQUETTE chooses to call "values"? International de Philosophie. it is not legitimate to substitute modal expressions such as Mlp for Up in Leiniewski's thesis. the "values" of "quantified pre(licates" are identified with their extensions. 65-81. which must be faced in any attempt to deal precisely with logical systems involving strict or a priori modalities such as necessity. the present paper seems to reflect a more tolerant attitude toward alternative formulations of strict modal logic than was suggested in XIX 137. pp). In effect. already implied by the analysis in XIX 137. It is not clear whether this is merely the result of a more temperate style or the consequence of a more explicit analysis of the problems of modal logic. In the second of the above listed papers the argument is such as to suggest that "true" and "false" are the only genuine truth-values. Volume XlV. it is only with the third grade of modal involvement that basic departures are required.

one seems to be caught in the jungle as soon as any significance is attached to a distinction betweenstatementswhichare truestrictly logical grounds on and thosewhichare truebut not strictly logical grounds. Actually. it is likely to be well worth Ishimoto's paper develops a system employing the two primitive operators I (alternative denial) and 11 (logical incompatibility). to judge by its first issue. pp.REVIEWS 169 immediatelyapparent since 'nec' as sentenceoperator involves the application of quantifiers modal contexts whichare not referentially to opaque. Since the modality involved is strictnecessity and not to physicalnecessity. PRIOR SADEO SHIRAISHI. and the rule of 5-detachment replaced by Nicod's rule that if a and acjl/y are asserted y may be asserted. To those already committed Aristotelianism. P v q for ~'-pI-q. N.there are open sentences Fx and Gx such that (x) (necFx . Therefore." Althoughnot absurd. The science of thought (Tokyo). by pA q for _(plq). and there are the following six axioms (the oblique stroke being used to indicate a weaker bracketing): (pIIq/r) 5 (slq 5 pjs). 1-11. (3) If Fx is x = x. The following further symbols are introduced definition: .otherwise 'nec' is a vacuous operator. is concluded that the third grade of modal involvement is it not prima facie absurd. Ibid.. Ishimoto gives a proof of the axiom PIIP5 PI Iq from the other five listed in his paper. These simplifications are to be discussed in a later article. no.The equivalence of these postulates 5 Iq. 1 (1954). for Quine the third grade of modal involvementdoes entail the undesirable"metaphysicaljungle of Aristotelianessentialism. Quine remains partial to the firstgrade of modal involvement. would be a merereflection to this of certaincomplex realitiesto which we all should adjust.p. Quine's logic demands little more than the ratherneutral philosophicalconclusionto the effectthat third grade modal logic involves subtletiesnot to be found at lower grades. 12-24. and Gx is x=x . The structure of the continuity of psychological experiences and the physical world. The rules of inference are adjunction and 5detachment. TURQUETTE ARATA ISHIMOTO. pp. then we have (x)necFx* (x) Gx* (x)-necGx. This is indeed possible by dispensingwith constant singular terms using Russell's theoryof descriptions.p 5 q forPiIIq." Since the second grade temptsone in thissame direction and is less elegantthan the first.(2) There exists a statement value for'p' whichis truebut not necessarily true. A. to the standard postulates for Lewis's S3 is demonstrated.Quine's preference on forfirstgrade modalityappears to be dictated by extra-logicalconsiderationswhich involve a prior philosophicalcommitment antagonisticto Aristotelianism. In a letter to the reviewer. and by adopting a line of argumentsimilar to Smullyan's in XIII 149. The author states and accepts Zeno's arguments against a Cantorian continuity . (4) Consequently. IIp pI and (PA q) I1(P A q) 5 Ijq. The science of thought is a new annual published in English by the Institute for the Science of Thought. (pIIq/r) 5 (sIIq 5 pIts). p 5 p.In fact.-p forPIP. then 'nec' is not a vacuous operator. and states that if this be not simply deleted but replaced by the weaker PIIP5 pfq. and 22p for -(PIjp). the rule of adjunction may be dispensed with.Gx . P D q forpjI q.then it is a jungle fromwhich it is most difficult escape.The following offered proofthat is as the third grade of modal involvementimplies Aristotelian essentialism: (1) If modal logic is not pointless. Tokyo. R. the attentionof readers of this JOURNAL. It is thus necessary to avoid the conclusionsregarding referential the opacityof 'nec' as statement operator. pIIq5 P1q.mnecGx). A set of axioms of the modal propositionalcalculus equivalent to S3. "if we accept some interference the contextual definition in of singularterms. p A. If this is the jungle of Aristotelianessentialism.