# Three Grades of Modal Involvement by W. V. Quine Review by: A. R. Turquette The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1955), pp.

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as a statementoperator. Three grades of modal involvement are distinguished which depend essentially upon the use of necessity as a semantical predicate. Prior constructs some four-valued tables for a relatively simple quantificational situation which work as well for a similar modal situation. his treatment of the concept of "quantificational value" and "modal value" is little more than suggestive and in basic ideas does not go much beyond the results implied by the first paper listed above. the "modal values" of a proposition are identified with the possible states of affairs which will make the given proposition true. but Prior appears to make a real issue of a verbal one when he decides to restrict the range of "truth-value" to the two elements. The ideas contained in these two papers are interesting. he argues that Aristotle means by "p is possible" not that "p is not impossible" but that "p is neither necessary nor impossible. R. and 1-ditions E. His "extensions" and "possible states of affairs" then become "values" but not "truth-values. In the first of the above listed papers." Why would it not be just as plausible to liberalize the range of "truth-value" so as to include the many elements which Prior A.168 REVIEWS thesis must be rejected in any system of logic which contains modal expressions such as Mp (p is possible). Amsterdam 1953. that there is a sense of "value" in which it is correct to say that modal logics are "many-valued. since it turns out that the contexts produced by the statementoperator 'nec' are referentially opaque in the same legitimate manner as those produced by 'Nec' used as a semantical predicate with quotation." They are many-valued in much the same way that quantification theory is many-valued. In any case. Volume complementaire et comdu Colloque de Logique. Three grades of modal involvement." and concludes that it is not Aristotle's thesis EAMpMNp which must be rejected but rather certain limitations must be placed on the use of Lesniewski's thesis CK p4Npiq. it is concerned largely with the task of making explicit all the major issues. nevertheless. In particular. The basic reason for this is that truth-functional expressions must be substituted for Up in order to preserve the validity of Lesniewski's thesis. It is shown that the first two grades are quite similar. Prior considers some reasons for rejecting Lukasiewicz' conclusion. munications North-Holland Publishing Company. It is argued. Louvain 1953.Actes du XIeme Congres V. QUINE. but aside from this. or as a sentence operator subject to the application of quantifiers. However. In the latter case. Nauwelacrts. "true" and "false". a prospective modal logician would do well to consult the present paper for a clear summary of some of the difficult problems which he must face. This is WV. Consequently. . while in the case of modality. In fact. and model operators are more like quantifiers than they are like truth-functional connectives. This paper is very closely related to XIX 137. TU RQUETTE chooses to call "values"? International de Philosophie. it is not legitimate to substitute modal expressions such as Mlp for Up in Leiniewski's thesis. the "values" of "quantified pre(licates" are identified with their extensions. 65-81. which must be faced in any attempt to deal precisely with logical systems involving strict or a priori modalities such as necessity. the present paper seems to reflect a more tolerant attitude toward alternative formulations of strict modal logic than was suggested in XIX 137. pp). In effect. already implied by the analysis in XIX 137. It is not clear whether this is merely the result of a more temperate style or the consequence of a more explicit analysis of the problems of modal logic. In the second of the above listed papers the argument is such as to suggest that "true" and "false" are the only genuine truth-values. Volume XlV. it is only with the third grade of modal involvement that basic departures are required.