The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations Author(s): Michael N.

Barnett and Martha Finnemore Source: International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 699-732 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: . Accessed: 18/10/2011 15:26
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The Politics, Power,and Pathologies ofInternational Organizations
MichaelN. Barnett Martha and Finnemore

Do international organizations really what do their creators intend them do? In the to the of pastcentury number international organizations (1Os) has increased exponenand of to tially, we have a variety vigorous theories explainwhytheyhave been created. Most of thesetheories explainIO creation a response problems as to of transaction and barriers Pareto to incomplete information, costs, other efficiency and welfare improvement their for members. Research flowing from these theories, howhas attention howIOs actually to behaveafter arecreated. ever, paidlittle they Closer wouldrevealthat from efficiency the scrutiny manyIOs stray goals thesetheories and in and impute thatmanyIOs exercise powerautonomously waysunintended creation. how a unanticipated statesat their by Understanding thisis so requires reconsiderationIOs andwhat of do. they In thisarticle developa constructivist we rooted sociological in instituapproach tionalism explainboththepowerof IOs and their to for propensity dysfunctional, evenpathological, on behavior. Weberian about Drawing long-standing arguments and institutionalist to bureaucracy sociological approaches organizational behavior, we argue the that rational-legal that authority IOs embody givesthem power independent thestates created of that them channels powerin particular and directions. that make rules,but in so doingtheyalso createsocial Bureaucracies, definition, by international (like "development"), tasks create and shared knowledge. Theydefine define categories actors new of create newinterests actors for (like "refugee"), (like and of the "promoting human rights"), transfer models political organization around world(like markets democracy.) and the valuation on However, same normative rules that defines and them in impersonal, generalized bureaucracies makes powerful
We aregrateful John to Keith Boli,Raymond Duvall,Ernst Haas,Peter Haas,Robert Keohane, Krause, M. MarkPollack,Andrew Thomas Jeffrey Legro,John Malley,CraigMurphy, J.Peterson, Moravcsik, ThomasWeiss,andtwoanonymous referees their for comments. We Risse,DuncanSnidal,SteveWeber, are especially of verfor attention theeditors International of Earlier grateful thecareful Organization. sionsofthis article werepresented the1997APSA meeting, 1997ISA meeting, atvarious at the and fora. We also acknowledge financial assistance from Smith the Richardson Foundation theUnited and States of Institute Peace. International Organization 4, Autumn 53, 1999,pp. 699-732 ? 1999byThe 10 Foundation theMassachusetts of and Institute Technology

700 International Organization life to modern can also makethem unresponsive their environments, obsessedwith their ownrulesattheexpense primary of missions, ultimately toinefficient, and lead behavior. are notthefirst suggest We to thatIOs are morethanthe self-defeating reflection state of preferences that and they be autonomous powerful can and actors in globalpolitics.1 arewe thefirst notethat Nor to 1Os,likeall organizations, be can dysfunctional inefficient.2 and However, emphasis thewaythat our on characteristics ofbureaucracy a generic as cultural form shapeIO behavior provides different a and very broad basisfor thinking about howIOs influence world politics.3 an to aboutIOs is onlyworthwhile it Developing alternative approach thinking if produces significant insights newopportunities research major and for on debates in Our on thefield. approach allowsus to weigh with in newperspectives at leastthree suchdebates. it a view of or First, offers differ'ent ofthepower IOs andwhether how in This issue has been at the core of the neoliberaltheymatter worldpolitics. We howneoinstitutionalists' with debate neorealists years.4 showin thisarticle for liberal-institutionalists disadvantage actually themselves their in argument realwith at of do than istsbylooking onlyonefacet IO power. Globalorganizations more just states overcome to market collective action facilitate cooperation helping by failures, and dilemmas, problems associatedwithinterdependent social choice.They also and the create actors, specify responsibilities authority among them, define work and these actors should giving meaning normative it and value.Evenwhen lack do, they the material resources, exercise IOs poweras theyconstitute construct social and world.5 a Secondandrelated, perspective our basis treating as provides theoretical for IOs a challenge thestatist to autonomous actors world in andthus ontolpolitics presents in relations theories. attention interto ogyprevailing international Despiteall their of orientation neoliberal of institutionnational institutions, result thetheoretical one treat alistsandregimes theorists that is treat thewaypluralists thestate. they IOs IOs are mechanisms whichothers through (usuallystates)act; theyare notpurposive The regimes is clear are actors. literature particularly on thispoint. Regimes "prinWeber's and ciples, norms, rules, decision-making procedures;" arenotactors.6 they that aboutthenormative insights poweroftherational-legal authority bureaucracies for and and social embody itsimplications thewaysbureaucracies produce control a this not knowledge provide basisforchallenging viewandtreating as agents, IOs justas structure.
1995.ForSociety States of 1. ForGramscian approaches, Cox 1980,1992,and 1996;andMurphy see see and communities see literature, Haas 1992.ForIO approaches, Hurrell Woods1995.Fortheepistemic 1977;Cox 1996;andNess andBrechin decision-making literature, Cox etal. 1974;Cox andJacobson see 1988.Fora rational choiceperspective, Snidal1996. see 2. Haas 1990. 3. Because theneorealist neoliberal and arguments engagehave focusedon intergovernmental we rather nongovernmental andbecauseWeberian from we arguments which draw organizations than ones, in with we organizations this article and dealprimarily public bureaucracy, toofocus intergovernmental on international use theterm organizations inthat way. 4. Baldwin1993. 5. See Finnemore 1993and 1996b;andMcNeely1995. 6. Krasner 1983b.

thenY must Rather. as theorists. biological processes. must becauseitis more useful other alternatives since.7 ofthisoptimism Part change waytomanage rapid technological which longviewedIOs as a peaceful has andglobalization. theseapproaches nomeans sources dysfunction. we.8 contributing far to Also judgment aboutIOs thatis builtintothe to thisuncritical stanceis thenormative theoretical and scholars theeconomic and assumptions mostneoliberal regimes of on in theories which draw.Whilerealists somepolicymakers taken thisissue. understanding disease. . 1979. theoretical by willpull theplugon any10 that We thisassumption states does notperform. examine suchsource of We one approaches by exhaust that characteristics makeIOs authoritative that flowsfrom same rational-legal the and we andpowerful.1. showhow in Drawing can thevery features makebureaucracies that weakness.andother of about behavior the allowsus tohypothesize bureaucracies constituted are socially Thistype constiof might havein world IO exists. thisview."howarethings hangtogether as Alexander our intheworld together that so havetheproperties do. if improving solveproblems states. find outcomes repeatundesirable evenself-defeating and unsatisfying. as understanding inghowthosethings makes causalarguthedouble-helix DNA molecule constituted is materially possible how so ments aboutgenetics.without punishment scholarsare familiar withprincipal-agent understand why.Pathologies International of Organizations701 vantage pointfrom whichto assess the Third." a understanding by pens. of and or of performance surprisingly other few students IOs have been critical their of stems from central tenets classicalliberalism. these but have rarely effectiveness. Further. evenprobable. See Commission GlobalGovernance on 1998.onlybecausethey IOs organization they it arePareto and for Consequently. 1995. of desirability. 10 and cratic behavior possible. powerful also be their The claimswe makein thisarticle of flowfrom analysis the"social stuff" an of about which is a constructivist question bureaucracy made.andWendt 10. why. and edly. from research sociology anthropology.Jacobson 8. IOs andtheeffects socialform this law-like statements as "ifX hapsuch tutive does notallowus to offer explanation of follow. Wendt 1998. 9. putsit. See Mearsheimer 1994. exist. be than axiom. See Ruggie1998. perspective our offers different a have up desirability 1Os. providing morecomplete kindsof bureauof whatbureaucracy we can provide explanations how certain is."sinceunderstanding constitution things how Just behaveand whatcausesoutcomes. are or of the different branches organiWe beginbyexamining assumptions underlying of their for zationtheory exploring and implications thestudy 1Os.We are asking standard what the Wendt makes world or. in of does essential work explainthe tion."9In thissense. We arguethat treatand drawn economics that neoliberal neorealist from undergird assumptions 7.andHelms1996. often IOs produce wantto muchless dismantlement. preferable theobviousalternative-war.International relations politics compromise can organizational problems thewaysinwhich and bureaucratic been appliedto 1Os. andDoyle 1997. they they put and from mostother international of is explanation IO behavior constitutive differs "meredescripThis approach does notmakeourexplanation relations approaches.

andCoase 1937. bodyoftheory is The developed explain existence as focuseson organizations efficient solutions contracting to powerof firms probmarket and lems. andGrandori 12. of and One is economistic rooted assumptions instrumental and in rationality effithe is and focused issuesof legitimacy on and ciencyconcerns. Within to standard microeconomic logic. consequently look and only a limited of effects for. fact by (busito the and nessfirms) an anomaly. and to We provide illustrations theUN system showhowIOs do. incomplete information. interests. dysfunction outside organization. the others locateitinside.702 International Organization ments IOs do notalwaysreflect empirical of the situation mostIOs commonly of studied political by scientists. other imperfections.notsurprisingly. provide they research hypotheses aboutonly someaspectsofIOs (likewhythey created) notothers are and (likewhatthey do). Liberalandrealist theories makepredictions only about. . outfirst by RonaldCoase and morerecently OliverWilliamson. Some theories locatethesourceof factors. See PowellandDiMaggio1991. We IO how perspective towiden research for conclude discussing our the by helps agenda 1Os. We a thesetheories to and mapping according thesourceof dysfunction emphasize. the tional of we that the behavior 1Os. Theoretical Approachesto Organizations Within socialsciencethere twobroadstrands theorizing are of aboutorganizations. expect explain much and a broader range impacts of organizations haveand can their specifically highlight rolein constructing shouldbe muchmoreefficient or conduct transactions markets rather than"hierarchies" organizations. whywe have business is by firms. 11. material others focuson cultural factors. however.12 1993. of The economistic out approach comes. In thesecondsection develop constructivist we a approach from these sociological the of arguments examine powerwielded IOs andthesources their to by influence. ofeconomics departments andbusiness whom fundamental the theoretical laid schoolsfor problem. from havesuch in In third the world section explore dysfuncwe powerful effectscontemporary politics. they showthat sameinternally cultural forces giveIOs their the that and generated power can of behavior. Further. all through the that life economic is dominated hugeorganizations Consequently. constructtypology. socialpurpose. See Williamson 1975and 1985. We then introduce sociological arguments helpremedy that these problems.Sociological by theories.chap. usethe We term to autonomy alsobe a source dysfunctional pathologies describe instances when dysfunction be traced bureaucratic can such to culture. very range welfare-improving caused 1Os.infact. International theorists familiar are withseveraltypes of relations Some locatethesourceof dysfunction theories might that in explainsuchbehavior.11 different assumptions tionon different ofquestions kinds and on aboutorganizations provide insights different kinds problems. other sociological focusattenThe embedded within eachtype theory of power.which define behavior undermines stated as goals of theorganization.1.

Waltz1979. Krasner 17. example.Ilgen. they and provide basisforunderstanding a organizational autonomy. in organizations arenotefficient effective that or servants ofmember In interests might exist.Weber 1994. they maybe created forwhat they butfor they 17 what and they represent symbolically thevaluesthey embody. Sociologists.The environment by approaches and or to organizations socially is thin devoidof socialrules. of an in interest relative versus absolute gains. assumed economic IOs and theirenvironment. Scott1992.13 liketheeconomists.Pathologies International of Organizations703 This bodyof organization theory informs neoliberal neorealist and debatesover international institutions. Following Kenneth Waltz.16 all.andWillett 15. See DiMaggioand Powell 1983. and for are environmental charchange. 1991. a theoretical assumption theseapproaches. to They provide reasons why. See Vaubel1991. 14. approaches within sociology treat in organizations different ways. the exCompetition. on theParetofrontier. Meyerand Scott1992. fact. lead us to lookfor kinds power of they and sourcesof autonomy organizations economists in that Different overlook. andDillon. Organizations respond in but notonlyto other material interests theenvironment also to actors pursuing and normative cultural and forces shapehoworganizations theworld concepthat see for tualizetheir own missions. 1991. study organizations a wider situations. neoliberals neorealists and understand worldpolitics be analogousto a market to filled withutility-maximizing competitors. so doing. whether do whatthey claimor do itefficientlyan empirical they not of question. and. Baldwin1993. 13. 16.14 and Neoliberals realists disagree about degree which the to constraints anarchy. they as ing solutions problems incomplete to of information hightransaction and costs. Powell andDiMaggio 1996a.why After else wouldstates up these and to set organizations continue them they notservestate if did support interests? from Approaches sociologyprovideone set of answers thisquestion. conby in world nonmarket of trast.27. even otheractorsbeyondthoseconstructing organization. Organizations treated "social facts"to is be investigated. Environments "select" or favororganizations can or behavior. consequent pressures efficiency thedominant the and of acteristics driving formation behavior organizations. both but agree. are as no they beginwith suchassumptions. 1-5.butthenotion created servestateinterests notmuchquestioned neorealist neoliberal to is by or scholars. For reasons other than efficient responsive organizations may fit than be created and supported reasonsof legitimacy normative rather for and not what are-for efficient do output. political thatIOs are instruments bargains fall. consequently. 1991.butas a group they in stand sharp contrast theeconomists' to in approaches at leasttwoimportant respects: a they offer different of between and conception therelationship organizations their environments.and fears cheating scuttle of will international institutional arrangementshobble or their effectiveness. cultural very content.andFinnemore . implicor itly explicitly.15 in battles insideIOs overwhere. see organizations welfare-improvThus. IOs helpstates that further interests their where they allowedto are Statepowermaybe exercised political work.

bargains shapethemachinery itscreation. are."20 Thesetheories treat as empty thus IOs shellsorimpersonal to policy machinery be at Political manipulated other by actors. Waltz1979.then.andRittberger 21. Krasner 1983a. and 20. organizational environments takemanyforms. shouldchooseone whoseassumptions we approximate empirical the conditions theIO we areanalyzing. 1996b.355-68. than consistent itstreatment IOs as structure in of remarkably the literature been devoted exploring waysin to theneoliberal institutionalist has between states' which regimes (and1Os) can actas intervening variables.18 IO autonomy.1Os. Economistic make by approaches certain abouttheenvironment whichIOs are embedded thatdrive assumptions in researchers use them lookfor who to certain kinds effects notothers. many not.they by structures these of theories. point simply when of is Our that we choosea theoretical they of "understood knowing attributes the and quoteWaltz'sdefinition reductionism.704 International Organization Empirically. hard the in of states within machinery pursuit their maypolitick policy goals. mediating of outcomes changing structure opportunithe of and pursuit self-interest political by control overinformation. simply of of are epiphenomena state interaction. doesnotgrant autonomy purpose havebecomeincreasingly awareof themisapproaches 18.22 this Although line of scholarship (sincethey and it them indedemonstrably change outcomes). mostIOs now are created other this Jacobson. that should of and we be awareof thebiases created thoseassumptions.particuin tiesand constraints states their facing through accordsIOs some causal status lar. theextent IOs do.See Snidal1996.andthe whatstates do. the breach "limits realism" wellas ofneoliberalism violating the of as own. can Some organizationsexistin competitive environments createstrong that pressures efficient for or responsive behavior.regime theory thebroadrange and of to scholars within generally IOs as creations states it treat of working designed further stateinterests. See Keohane1984. See Shanks.andBaldwin1993. by theinteractions [their] of parts. . Note that empirically is notthecase.Someorganizations but do operate with clearcriteria for"success" (like firms have balancesheets). by 19.21 ontological a on that The regimes concept spawned hugeliterature interstate cooperation is Muchof rather agents. Following economistic logic. butsee Finnemore 22. of and Specifyor ingdifferentmore varied enviro'nments IOs wouldlead us to lookfor for different varied andmore effects world in politics. for successorfailure no serious and threat elimination. and of match the of between assumptions their 1Os. 1993.19 Analysis subsequent behavior of IO of focuseson processes member within structhe aggregating state preferences through interaction strategic ture theJO.18. that whereas others (like political with sciencedepartments) operate much vaguer with clearcriteria few missions. Kaplan1996. Researchers applying theseeconomistic models theempirics 1Os.IOs arenotpurposive is actors their ownright haveno political To that takeon a lifeof their ontological independence. in fact. butthemachinery norms rulesmayconstrain and can machinery's in and itself passive.

Another branch liberalism recently of has divorced itself from statist the ontology focusesinstead thepreferences and on of social groupsas thecausal engineof worldpolitics. Moravcsik 1997.butsee Moravcsik 1999. but. Ourreading detailed of of empirical studies IO activity case of suggests Yes. Wade 1996. 25. Joint Evaluation Emergency of Assistance Rwanda1996. The problem withapplying it to of principal-agent analysis thestudy IOs is that a theoretical requires priori specification what want. we Field studiesof the EuropeanUnion provideevidenceof independent roles for "eurocrats. employed students of by international relations examine to organizational couldpotentially dynamics. See Ascher1983. . Willett and 1991. of multiple we whichhas been increasingly Principal-agent analysis. See Pollack1997. Nelson 1995. of IOs Principal-agent dynamics arefueled thedisjuncture between what want what and want. doesnotoffer fundamentally for It a differentconception IOs. Ayres1983. To by agents principals thosetwosetsof interests In produce insights. they but mayembody multiple agendas andcontain sources agency-a problem takeup later.andZabusky 1995. See Pratt Zeckhauser and 1985. economics be this of is and type analysis usually appliedto preexisting agents principals (clients 23.Pathologies International of Organizations705 pendent thestates comprise of that them. to 27. analysis concerned whether agents responsible of whether in delegates their principals. and Finnemore 1996a.23 of Therelevant question ask aboutthis to conceptualizationwhether is a reasonis it able approximation theempirical of condition most1Os. analysts these understand as "agents"of IOs states The is with are ("principals"). 24.28 framework This a provides meansof treating as actorsin their own IOs with right independent interests capabilities.andKiewit McCubbins and 1991.Vaubel1991. their ownpreferagents smuggle andpursue ences.Not onlyare IOs with independent actors their ownagendas.Ilgen. 28.and how principals construct can variousmechanisms keep their to agents honest. not. provide JO a sophisticated to approach understanding autonomy. Escobar 1995.andDillon.27 on of Building theories rational choiceand of representation. by butthenotion they passivemechanisms no independent that are with agendas their of ownis notborne by anydetailed out of empirical study an JOthat have found.Ross 1995.Lake 1996.25 and for of Studies recent peacekeeping reconstruction UN and efforts similarly document UN agendathat a with leads frequently to conflict memberstates."24 Studiesof theWorld culBankconsistently an identify independent ture agendas action. 26. See Pollack1997. and action IOs is tobe Autonomous by in It of expected thisperspective. Ferguson1990.26 of Accounts theUN HighCommission Refugees on (UNHCR) routinely notehow its autonomy authority grown and has overtheyears.IOs areconstrained states.thisview simply argues attention a different for to group agents of involved theconstruction IOs in of andcompeting accesstoIO mechanisms. wouldalso explaina number thenonresponsive andpathological behaviors concern becausewe knowthat that us and monitoring in these are and shirking problems pervasive these principal-agent relationships that can at relationships often stuck suboptimal get equilibria.again. any cannot identical.

See Ascher1983. lawyer the The or doctor wouldprobably inbusiness be evenifyouandI didnottakeourproblems to them. Beginning with thepioneering work William of scholars theorized bureaucracies Niskanen.Zabusky . socialcontrol waysthat eclipseefficiency and 29.S. and Sigelman 1986. out interacdebated. therelationship theseto a larger to ment. bureaucratic agencies want. Indeed.are often created theprincipals by (states)and given written theprincipals. legitimacy concerns.andWade 1996.Barnett 1997b. See Niskanen 1971. first At theseinterests wereimputed. with Beginning Weber. there no but is reason presume suchmatters to that exhaust evendominate or their interests. however. that had interests defined theabsolute relative oftheir by or size budget theexpansion and or protection their of turf. of a in studies IOs describe world which ethnographic organizational arestrongly goals the of that interand shaped norms theprofession dominate bureaucracy inwhich by in and eststhemselves varied. later and they became and more or altoclosely investigated. thatorganizations are boundup withpowerand also theseapproaches recognize in can concerns.Weingast Moran1983. provide basisforasserting independent utilfor these aboutstates. the battered Niskanen seemslessthan Simply adopting rather hypothesis promisinggiventheglaring anomalies-for example. mission statements by How. insomecases modified rejected no Realismandliberalism. patients visiting doctors) whoseongoing independent existence makes of interests specification independent relatively straightforward. 30. are good reasonsto assumethatorganizations abouttheir care resource base and turf.29 of can the Various strands sociological theory helpus investigate goalsandbehava orientation theone used by than ior of IOs by offering verydifferent analytical have the that economists. of normative cultural environand and interests. we impute can independent preferences a priori? in Scholars American of havemadesomeprogress producing politics substantive theoretical propositions about what U. aretheories Theyprovide to the basis forimputing interests IOs beyond goals states (that principals) is.Ontologically.30 gether. 1995. substantiated.then. give them. through of manysociologicalapproaches explorethesocial content theorganization-its norms thatgovern its dominant behavior and shape culture.on theother hand. organizawhichother tionsas merearenasor mechanisms actorspursueinterests. 1Os. Rather thanassuming behavior that criteria corresponds efficiency alone. sociologists explored notion bureaucertain modern cultural form embodies that valuesandcanhave is cracy a peculiarly Rather thantreating itsown distinct agendaand behavioral dispositions. MillerandMoe 1983. opposition many the of NATO and in for and OSCE (Organization Security Cooperation Europe)bureaucrats those to recent and There organizations' expansion institutionalization. Moe 1984. worked through between staff thebureaucracy theworldin whichthey embedthe of and are tions ded. no ityfunctions 1Os. are often flux.706 International Organization hiring lawyers.

consider We eachinturn. See Schaar1984. authority "rational" that deploys it relevant to rulesthat determine socially recognized knowledge create The howgoalswillbe pursued. becauseofpower flowing atleasttwosources: from (1) thelegitimacy therational-legal of authority embody.973. Sincerational-legal and authority control overexpertise part what are of defines and constitutes bureaucracy bureaucracy any (a would be a bureaucracy not without them). thought. rulesand thus impersonal. sites independent thestate"princifrom pals"whomay havecreated them. of Weber was deeplyambivalent aboutthe bureaucratic world which livedandwas well-attuned thevices in he to increasingly as wellas thevirtues this of newsocialform authority. is in makespossible(and in which.Weber1947. twofeatures these provide theoretical a basis fortreating as autonomous IOs actors contemporary politics identifying in world by of for sources support them. knowledge. thesecond. nonviolent way. that rational-legal authority. In contrast earlier that wereinvested a leader.69. See Weber 1978. leadingscholars overlook to some of themostbasic and consequential of forms IO influence. that sensecauses)other and in processes effects globalpolitics.Pathologies International of Organizations707 The Power of IOs IOs can becomeautonomous of authority. Theyprovide framework social a for interaction canrespond theincreasingly that to technical demands modern ina of life and and stable. to the societies becauseofboth normative they appealofrationalin life control overtechnical legalauthority modern andthebureaucracy's expertise andinformation. Bureaucracies a of embody form authority. predictable. Takentogether.3" of Bureaucracies rightly are a considered grand he achievement. beenconceived very and we has of narrowly. theautonomy flowsfrom that them bestunderstood a constitutive as an is effect. (2) control they and over technical The expertise information. modernity viewsas particularly and to forms authority of legitimate good. powerful makespeoplewilling submit this 31. SourcesofIO Autonomy Authority and To understand IOs can becomeautonomous ofauthority turn Weber how we sites to and his classicstudy bureaucratization. turn. andBeetham 1985. very that fact is makes they embody rationalitywhat bureaucracies and to to kindofauthority. and to But and continuity increasingly complexsocial tasks.they exemplify rationality are technito forms rulebecausethey of callysuperior previous bring precision. argue.120.Weber 1978.Mouzelis1967. independent states.196-97. price.32 suchtechnical rational to are comeata steep Bureaucracies political achievements. in modern is legitimate in authority invested legalities.andBeetham 1985and 1996. 32. of effect thewaybureaucracy constituted. . and rendered in This is procedures. creatures can be autonomous that from their and the creators can cometo dominate werecreated serve. thelarger of in socialenvironment. first these almost and of is entirely neglected by thepolitical scienceliterature. according Weber.

experience is notimand that mediately availableto other actors. andSchaar1984. and 1985. themselves saying' thoseare therules"or "just doingmy they defend by "Sorry. hisdescriptions bureaucracy an "iron him of cage" andbureauan of without are cratsas "specialists spirit" hardly endorsement thebureaucratic in 33. 1990. thecelebration knowledge expertise. by decrees. to in legalauthority. regulations sucha manner and in that of thelegitimacy theauthority becomesthelegality thegeneral of which is rule. Others like these.ShoreandWright Also see Fisher1997. to and intimately connected thefirst. neutral-asnotexercising and power instead serving as others.35 to the charsaw these claims. and as cerned greatly.74-75. course. Some of from rationality legitimates the that them a cultural as valuesflowing conof and Weber admired. through According him. that they present but the cratic. that tionally established are A secondbasis of autonomy authority. depoliticized that "Behindthefunctional acterof bureaucracy legitimates could be a myth: it Bustand." official The duty-likethecorresponding to right the exercise authority: "jurisdictional competency"-isfixed rationally by established norms.708 International Organization According Weber. Wethank and 1993. justimplement to requires The irony bothof thesefeatures authority that in of is makebureaucracies they of The of the powerful precisely creating appearance depoliticization. Weber. andBurley Mattli 36. training.Rather submission under legal bondto thegenerally authoritybaseduponan impersonal is defined and of functional "duty office. with purposely thought enacted. of It in job. is A control overinformation expertise. power 1Os. Gerth Mills 1978. Beetham and 1997. presento and tation acceptance theseclaimsis critical their and of legitimacy authority. Weberstressed it that also givesbureaucracies It and poweroverpoliticians (and other actors). invites at not it. and ."36 of 'ideas ofculture-values' purposes bureaucracy].. announced out. is in becausebureaucrats IOs areperforming "duties office" implementing of and "ranorms" they powerful." "Therules"and "the job" arethesource great power modem society. however. Whilesuchknowledge might helpthebureaucracycarry thedirectives politicians out of moreefficiently.. to was. enactments."as Weber was reason assumethis.233.. submission notrest does uponthebelief devotion and to charismatically persons. bureaucracy's debureaucratic and autonomy rivesfrom specialized technical knowledge. this John 35.120. oruponpiety gifted toward personal a lordand master whois defined an ordered by tradition. and formal correctness.299 (italics original).Thatpurpose reaucracies alwaysservesomesocialpurpose setofcultural the nationalism around him believed Prussian maybe normatively "good.34 times bureaucracies shapepolicy. technois as generally. Gerth Mills 1978.Ferguson Boli for insight.bureaucracies carry or also behavioral dispositions form.199...butthere no a priori In addition embodying the environment might that to cultural valuesfrom larger with them and be desirable not. by andbureaucracies themselves impersonal. [of usually or values. See Gerth Mills 1978.33 Whenbureaucrats something do contrary yourinterests that to or you do notlike. 34.

officials routinely this use language describe UN that this influence. rule-bound ways. andBarnett 1997b. 299. hands in that is has theforefront realists claiming informationpower. eredhowcontrol overinformation IOs a basisofautonomy. a percentage North/South flows. to mation a highly technocratic depoliticized failing see howinformation among and asymmetries transparencies levelinformation is power. becauseof their Examplesof thewaysin whichIOs have becomeautonomous are to and over rationality control information nothard find.50. of critique thewaysin whichinternational Weber'sinsights provide powerful a of authority sughave treated 1Os.39 IOs create As states(a common of theycreatenew information policyprescription neoliberals) that Giventheneoliberal assumption IOs have IOs asymmetries between andstates. See David Rieff.andKeohane1984."TheNewRepublic."738 Following bureaucracy. inventivenally-people who are "lackingin heroism.Whilecompeting it sitesof expertise in suggest in for its have proliferated recent the years. haverealists neoliberals and of at SusanStrange.andClegg 1994a. then may predispositions. See Strange 1997. thanassumethe "goodness"of Weber.37 Bureaucracy undermine it. secure careers internarrowed seeking selectandreward professionals bureaucracies and humanspontaneity. 12 1996. embodiment technical of are they The UN's peacekeepers derive authority theclaimthat from partof their neutral whosimply Councilresoimplement Security actors independent. possibility by states obscured thetechnical apolitical considNor and ment IOs byboth realists neoliberals. a consequence. if IOs have no goals independent states. investigate we rather ness. that in and way. See Weber [1930] 1978. February that 40.40 The World Bank is widelyrecognized have exercised to poweroverdevelopment as of aid would than policiesfargreater itsbudget.of Organizations709 Pathologies International in freedom important ways. but are of suchasymmetries unimportant. objective. Arendt see 1977. The legitimacy rational-legal relations scholars of of independent thepoliciesand interests geststhatIOs mayhave an authority a and treatthat createthem. As UN understand to be thebasis of their they the attempting maintain imagethat to timeandenergy officials spendconsiderable are be of and of power must seenas representatives they nottheinstrumentanygreat as in and of "theinternational community" embodied therules resolutions theUN.216. their andareexplicit to role lutions. Fortheextreme and istic.The very can personal thenameofgeneral exercise their powerin repressive Bureaucracies often Thistendency exacerbated theway is by rulesbecauserulesaretheir raison d'etre.152-55. 39. emphatically among havetended treat inforthe of Neoliberals to stated IOs aresimply agents states.19-24. "The Institution Saw No Evil. of charactermanifestationthisbureaucratic 38.181-83. Gerth Mills 1978. . also bureaucracy dehumanizes character empowers that impersonal. decades after founding development exWorldBank was a magnet the "bestand brightest" for among"development Its had to from prescredentials themost perts. suchasymmetries be autonomous valuesand behavioral highly consequential.?" staff andcontinues haveimpressive 37. becauseof theexpertise houses.

theseexamplesshow. See also Starr . actors socialworld. expertise. and Thisexpertise.42 in to and and neednotbe "scientific" nature create autonomy knowledge expertise for power 1Os.Finnemore 41. one ofbureaucracy's greatest very treated theobjects that of Thispower frequently is poweras accomplished power.andHarrell-Bond 42. The definition "refugee. An elementary and This classification information knowledge. and Clegg 1994b. power.Ascher1983.156-59.(2) fixmeanings the classify world. by but and to circumstances is legitimated through capriceand without regard their to of with justified bureaucrats reference therulesand regulations thebureauby exercise power of of bureaucratic maybe identity defining. as exercise of constructed of we power virtue their by culturally this three broadtypes IO power. ordering. 1992. See Foucault1977.22. This coupled its quent authorityrefugee refugees). Consequences this orevenlifethreatening. International For see and equation." persons among Theydo this "moving by The and suchcategories."Bureaucracies. the direction.technical as waysin setting refugee up camps.reports. in do do it? and what they with A growing in and anthropology examined has waysin whichIOs bodyof research sociology status sites authority. Haas 1992. has inginternational refugee conventions law ("the rules"regarding and decisions about refugees without consultallowed UNHCR tomakelifeanddeath the the of in ingtherefugees. to compromise authority states various and Note that. examine of We how IOs (1) distill from research in the of and action."44 ability classify to riesorbyinventing applying objects." socialcategoandknowing socialworlds.280. the withwhichit has successfully dictated content.All of thesesourcesof powerflowfrom ability IOs to structure knowledge. scope of global and standing longexperiand development thepastfifty over years. research the overtheyears werewidely influential among "development experts" sponsored inthefield. themselves.Ayres 1989. See Malkki1996. and is sources of to shift their definition identity. the of theglobe.andNelson1995. See Wade 1996.43 is and feature bureaucracies thattheyclassify of Classification. writes Don Handelman.andWright 44. (3) articulate diffuse norms. 1983." category of is Consider evolving the "refugee" notatall be from of who and categories individuals straightforward must distinguished other 1996b. cracy.Hartigan disrerelations theory typically 43. official encewith relief efforts endowed UNHCR with"expert" have the status conseand in with roleinimplementmatters.710 International Organization and groupsit has tigiousuniversities theelaborate and models. creating categories actors new and and and around principles. ThePowerofIOs IfIOs haveautonomy authority theworld. coupled with claimto "neutrality" its"apolitical" its Bankan authoritative voice technocratic decision-making havegiven World style. an example.41 Similarly. gards negative oftheknowledge power the side 1994.27. 1992. processis boundup with organize "are waysof making. Handelman 1995.

Because actors are oriented toward and that objects objectives thebasisofthemeaning they on havefor them. See Williams 1996. classification The matters becauseonlycertain classes of people are recognized theWorldBank's development by as machinery having that in knowledge is relevant solving and development problems. that powerless by be and as actors they nothavetobe do in consulted decisions suchas asylum repatriation willdirectly dramatiand that and them. acceptable action. of created and arbitrated largepartby 1Os. endoftheColdWarencouraged reexamination thedefinition of that security.andMalkki1996. and thoseseeking political asylum. Arturo powerfrom development Escobar how theinstitutionalization concept "development" of the after explores of World WarII spawned hugeinternational a and has apparatus howthis apparatus nowspread in itstentacles domestic international and the of politics through discourse development. Gran1986.50 the a of of Similarly.Walkup 1997.andAnonymous 1997. economic migrants. IOs exercise of power virtue their by of ability fixmeanto which related classification. The debateoverthemeaning "refugee" of has beenwagedin andaround UNHCR. beingable to invest situations a particular with an meaning constitutes important sourceof power. . 46.49 do notact alonein thisregard. 51. The UNHCR's legalandoperational the definitionofthecategory strongly influences decisions aboutwhois a refugee shapes and UNHCR staff in decisions thefield-decisions havea tremendous that effect the on lifecircumstance thousands people. The discourse development. mightily this Thereis strong evidence this of studies.48 is ings.Gran 1986.Goodwin-Gill 1996.47 Categorization classification a ubiquitous are feature bureaucratization haspotentially of that importantimplications thosebeingclassified. is.Bourdieu 1994.Clegg 1994b. exiles.51 havebeenattheforefrontthis IOs debate. The fixing meanings.Carr[1939] 1964. a day and laborer.46 Gransimilarly callyaffect Guy describes the how World Banksetsupcriteria to define someoneas a peasantin orderto distinguish themfrom farmer. in determines onlywhat not constitutes activity the (what development butalso who is) and that (orwhat)is considered powerful privileged.45 of of These categories notonlypolitical are andlegalbutalso discursive. other categories. 49. to or Naming labeling socialcontext the establishestheparameters.andKrauseandWilliams 1996.Cooper Packard 1998. shaping viewamong a that UNHCR officials refugees must. powerless. arguing security pertains notonlyto statesbutalso to individuals thatthethreats security and to may be 45. 50.Pathologies International of Organizations711 are "temporarily" "involuntarily" and livingoutsidetheircountry originof displaced persons. See Harrell-Bond 1989. See WeissandPasic 1997. very the of boundaries. whogetsto do thedevelopthe ing(usually state 1Os) andwhois theobjectofdevelopment or (local groups). 47.Ferguson 1990. and See Gupta 1998. their but IOs organizational resources contribute to end. classify to engagein an act of for is To power.andWade1996. See Matthews 1989. guest workers. Blumer 1969.Escobar 1995. 48.andKeeley1990. definition. diaspora communities.

"and "structural intothemeaning development. environmental. 1990. on Rights World Conference Human Program 1994. for there. politicalas well as military." needs.712 International Organization In these economic. Thisis fairly obviousin therealm The Fund(IMF). human The consequences redefining of security be similar. 54. the who threatshift attention from away states toward individuals arefrequently and owngovernment. an it meant national armies. andother ofdevelopment. human abusesanywhere nowcausefor intervenWidespread rights missions without the out carry peacekeeping protion.54 Similarly. and. on parsecurity.55 rulesandnorms. regulating family reproductive in tween and of governments their citizens a variety ways. theenvironment all now becometiedto international in and their interventionsmember states thesegrounds. United link that is human and there an important between security sustainProgram argues in able development implicitly and for interventionthemanagement argues greater as human ofenvironmenta meanstopromote security. when entsetof actors and legitimating alternative of practices. in allocations states theformer of SovietUnionandwater rights newly independent of theMiddleEast havealso cometobe discussed under rubric "environmental the The for Nations and Development security" arethus grounds IO intervention.andBoutros-Ghali See UN Development 1998. from enedby their military practices toward and other feaaway a tures social lifethat of and to might represent moreimmediate dailydanger the livesofindividuals. 1995. 53. UN Development . UN cannot in human environmental disasters Eastern Europeandthe moting rights.andFeldstein See Escobar1995. World Monetary Bank. areeagerto spread Diffusion norms. "rural As every phaseoftheeconomy polity many "basic human becameincorporated adjustment" opment.conversely. IOs justify in the in states.53 may Democratization. One consequence these meanings development security that of and is of redefined in and increased levelsofIO interventionthedomestic they legitimate. required. example. Councilandprovided Now.Ferguson 1993. privileged state officials and security safety from invading invested These alternative definitions security of powerin military establishments.theInternational have a that institutions established web of interventions affect nearly development in develand Third World states. of officials set Specifically. mediating regions. Program 1994. 55.that linkage Security grounds UN involvement Warenvibetween human and has rights security becomea stapleofthepost-Cold are UN ronment. and have peace and rights. affairs states-particularly World of Third states. Havingestablished of IOs the of thebenefits their and act beltsfor transmission of expertise often as conveyor 52. evenrequire.52 forwarding and from various areempoweringdifferIOs a alternative definitions security. become even to of IOs in of polities posting by inintimately involved thedomestic workings developing reorganizing political the economy enof house"advisors"to runmonetary policy. For during anti-apartheid struggle South ticularly developing threats theUN humanrights abuses came to be classified security as by Africa. and betirerural and practices. werepermitted.

UN andtheEuropean in states believe Western involved policetraining non-Western becausethey in policand will conducive democratization to ingpractices be more processes theestablisha But assumesthat ment civil society.One was to eliminate categories acceptable thatattempted retain their states.andLegro1997.The result a societies non-Western packageofreforms sponsored IOs aimedat transforming by 1996b. inculcate.To be sure. andClaude 1966.Officials IOs often in insist part their that of mission to is and spread. by the of of encouraged acceptance thenorm sovereignty-as-territorial-integrity through and resolutions. namic. enforce globalvaluesandnorms.Pathologies International of Organizations713 norms and modelsof "good" political behavior. has an expansionary too. be sometimes notalways)state by (but power. idea ofhowtocreate better a of an the life.These actionshad severalconseon certain of actionforpowerful quences." Finally. and a professional judiciary.57 disregard fundamental of an The UN Charter announced intent to Consider decolonization an example. See McNeely1995. Theyarethe"missionaries" ofourtime. Those states to colonialprivileges wereincreasingly viewedas illegitimate other by states. UN helpedto ensurethatthroughout of Colonial was coupledwithterritorial sovereignty thesenew states inviolability. the Trained lawyers presuppose code oflaw. diffusion.56 Thereis nothing accidental or unintended aboutthis role.425. dyfor diffusion 1Os.italso established institutional apparatus achieve end(most to that prominently Trusteeship the Council and the Special Committee Colonialism).Developing states continue be popular to targets norm by are The Unionarenow actively evenafter they independent. by articulating. See Alger1963. and transmitting that norms define what constitutes acceptable legitimate behavand state ior.commissions.andJackson .373. manyIO eliteshave as their stated purposea desireto shape statepractices establishing. and and boundaries often divided ethnic tribal groups. with as other powers. their successdepends morethantheir on persuasive capacities. and some understanding theconversion of process. theUN was quiteconcerned thatin theprocessof "self-determination. 1996. for their rhetoric must supported power. Armed with notion progress. monitoring devices. having professional of police establishment can and where criminals be tried and there a professional is judiciary penalsystem that that in are jailed.58 JO norm Notethat. See Katzenstein 57." governments "multhese containing to a territotiple"or "partial" selvesmight attempt create wholepersonality through The UN rialadjustment-a fearshared many thesenewly of decolonized states. one famous peacekeeping episodeinCongoin the1960s. Another consequence was to empower for international bureaucrats theTrusteeship (at Council)to setnorms standards and the the decolonization "stateness. in and Buttooverlook howstate power organizational and missionaries work tandem theways in whichIO officials channeland shape states'exerciseof poweris to a feature valuediffusion. 58. turn.Finnemore 56. as at universalize as of of sovereignty a constitutive principle thesociety states a time an when overhalf globewas under the somekind colonial of rule. presupposes there lawyers a is can comebefore court. 1993.

weapons taboos. Keen 1994. 1995 that organizations IOs can be thelongand 63.62Oncedemocratization for for human rights tiedto international are peace and security. theoretical in cannot exist. end of theCold Warhas openedup a whole The oneself.b.andHendrie of See 64. which turns to meanteaching out them how to "be" market economies. concern that Our is ity. distinctions the between international domestic and governance becomeeffectively erasedand IOs have liin censetointervene almost and manner.and environmental also castdoubton thestatist practices approach by evidence aboutthewaysin which and providing nongovernmental intergovernmen59. The one empirical domain by axiom. however.714 International Organization intoWestern societies. Keen andHendrie. term beneficiaries intervention.Pollack1997. Wade 1996. possibilbut be others. Boutros-Ghali and 1996a.similarly.they for causeorinclination test for nor to waytotest autonomy havethey theoretical any it since. 62.amongtheserespect for striving createa community and This at in democracy human rights.According former task to of one of is Secretary DefenseWilliam Perry. See Perry 1996. was discussed new set of states thiskindof norm to diffusion for1Os. and 1993. linkage also strong theUN as evident The is and and Agenda Democratization TheAgenda Peace.60 IMF's Articles The ofAgreement specifically assignitthistaskofincorporating less-developed economiesintotheworldeconomy.61 European The Bankfor and Reconstruction Development as part has. 60. power attribute IOs is simthey of Thisargument certainly theoretical is one plyepiphenomenal state power. it is nottheonlyone and must tested against becausethesetheories no for have no provide ontological independence 1Os. 61. The WorldBank. norms by states. of its mandate.63 anywhere an authoritative legitimate Realists neoliberals welllookat theseeffects argue and and that classifimay the and associated withIOs are mostly favored catory schemes. a majorrole in arbitrating has the meaning development norm's behavior of and of to appropriate thetaskofdeveloping as earlier. meanings.autonomy whichthestatist is view has been explicitly challenged theEuropean Union.59 Again.andSandholtz .64 empirical studies theareasofhuman rights. OSCE is The to based on sharedvalues.and there havehardly obviousvictory the"intergovernfor studies empirical produced mentalist" Recent in approach. wouldargue.andRuggie1996. See Burley Mattli 1993. international bureaucrats involved these in activities notsee themselves doingthe may as bidding these for states rather expressing interests valuesofthebureaubut as the and cracy. IMF and are The theWorld Bankareexplicit abouttheir as transmittersnorms principles of role and from advanced market economies less-developed to economies. job of spreading the democracy private and enterprise. of thefunctions NATO expansion to inculcate "modern" valuesandnorms theEastern into European countries their and militaries. we the to strong Consequently.whileWestern states involved theseactivities are in andtherefore valuesandinterests part thereasons this their are of for process. suggest nongovernmental 1997. Other examples thiskindof norm of diffusion nothardto find. Call andBamett forthcoming.

more (or.andSagan 1993. the about siderations also presumably applyto 1Os.68 stateuse for fewgrounds expecting they provides haveborcentric frameworks international most relations scholars utility-maximizing to rowedfrom economics assumethat responsive state simply IOs are reasonably than otherwise states wouldwithinterests atleast.morerecently. international in part. folkwisdom is and Bureaucracies infaare bureaucracies that they inefficient unresponsive.69 frameworks. 68. 66.S. discrepancies implementation policy. do to and these and havebeenquicker perceive address to problems areputting however. Twoexceptions Gallaroti are Snidal1996. that in learning foreign in haveinvestigated dynamics produce policy organizational in andinefficient behavior those contexts.Wapner 1996. scholSimilarly.Organizations715 Pathologies International of suptal organizations successfully promote policiesthatare not(or notinitially) strong states drive do IO ported strong by states.5. "suboptimal equilibria" arise organizational may thoseinterested arsresearching foreign policydecision making and. forthcoming. are logic. The Pathologies IOs of Bureaucracies created. though.areprone dysfunctional behaviors.Price1997.Ironically. suspect. responsive alternatives).Which the of on causalmechanisms only effects under which conditions a setofrelationships canbe understood by is that do businessintensive empirical study how theseorganizations of actually their by research wouldtrace origins evolution IO policies. .too.andSnidal1996.67 self-defeating but relations scholars to 1Os.foracting in mousforcreating implementing and policiesthat defy rational stated and forrefusing requests and of ways thatare at odds withtheir mission. axiomofthese them. is theoretical draw from Thisassumption.Haas 1990. suboptimal self-defeating thesescholars notlook forit and have had little say aboutit.theprocesses that the and of which are between and and they implemented. valuedinmodem in and out Thesesameconsupposed rationality effectiveness carrying socialtasks. Policymakers. a necessary it to investigation.Haas andHaas 1995. becausethetheoretical have rarely we apparatus investigated this. 69. there also times but are when other forces atwork eclipseorsignifiare produce which cantly dampen effects states 1Os. overall effects these of policies. 1998.andThomas See KeckandSikkink MarchandOlsen 1989. 67. 1991. are and society becauseoftheir propagated.65 Certainly there occasions are when that behavior. The JO undesirable behavior.chap. their are responsible.66 Scholarsof turning backson thoseto whomthey officially enhave this and considerable rarely treated a hypothesis as subject empirical in or With little theoretical reason expect to behavior 1Os. See Nye 1987. however. 65. bureaucracy recognized problem have devoted a widerange undesirable inefficient behavtounderstanding of and bureaucratic ergy and the under iorscausedbybureaucratic capture slackandto exploring conditions in which structures.

MarchandJohan Powell.we constructtypology Analyzing for locusofcausality suchbehavior. elaborate sociological behavior. (2) locatethecause of JOdysfunction they forces. is pathology) dysfunction later (and point judging for Thusourvantage objectives. creates typology these dimensions familiar to a each cell we have identified representative of theory Within body that of scholars.Paul DiMaggioandWalter we how thesame sourcesof bureauother institutionalists.It is timeforscholars. issuesmore explain dysfuncthat bodiesoftheorizing might In thissection present we several the thatundermines JO's stated as whichwe define behavior tionalIO behavior. KarlDeutsch this Deutsch1963. usingexamples might produce in work 1Os. thepublicly functional certain for members othor overall is. larlyimportant a behavior 1Os.170. organizational in but of ersinvolved the1O's work. organization dysfunction of Theories international these too. on that in to Then.drawing oftheseexplanations locatesthem relation one another. might waythese can in (1) Extant theories about dysfunction be categorized twodimensions: whether the and insideor outside organization.We thank 70. that five We of lar typeof dysfunction pathology. Theremaybe occasionswhen of proclaimed mission theorganization. givenouranalysis thewayclaimsofefficiency in whether authority our culture. dysfunction in fact.each ofwhich emphasizes different by understanding dysfunctional a these causes.Organization 716 International Internal Material Bureaucratic politics External Realism/ neoliberal institutionalism Worldpolity model Cultural Bureaucratic culture FIGURE 1. causedysfunctional power. . them thepolitical agenda. and effectiveness to legitimate act rational-legal their claimandaccomplish missions a particuis do they actually what organizations somebasis for provide Severalbodiesof theory issue to examine. term particuthis can We cratic sketched earlier.70 identify features bureaucracy the the we and from UN system illustrate pathology. for point. on or Mappingtheories whether theytracethecauses to material cultural in the shown Figure1. to beginto explore on fully.and theworkofJames Olsen. relations international most Explanations JOdysfunction emphasize within organization an examine howcominterests of thepursuit material typically leadstheorganization makedecito resources over subunits material among petition Alker Hayward to in of usedtheconcept pathology a waysimilar ourusage.

andCox andJacobson 1977.Haas 1990.. of. Instead wouldstress they howtheorganization permeated that is enviby in defined both material cultural and in it ronment. 1974.Cox etal. andBendor Hammond and 1992.Bureaucratic politics thebest-known is theory here. See Allison1971. which is embedded. See Allison1971. . often IOs engage inpoliciesnotbecausethey strong haveautonomy becausethey weak are and but are 10 andhavenone.Pathologies International of Organizations717 that sionsand engagein behaviors are inefficient undesirable judgedagainst or as someidealpolicythat wouldbetter allowthe10 to achieveitsstated goals. preferences states. budgets. to . 73. Therearetworeasons expect to dysfunctional behavior here. Robert Keohaneobserved.theseargupowerof important in ments differ from previous types their the two clearly on and emphasis ideational cultural factors clearly in motors behavior and differ themselves the of among emphatheories to sized. shouldnotethat We advocates cultural of wouldreject claimthat organization the an many theories can be understood from environment that its or culture separable is from matethe apart rialworld.First. results these be as of bargaining games.In this viewIOs arenottoblamefor outcomes. though and current scholars internaof tional politics havenotwidely adopted perspective explain behavior.71 well in Graham Allison'scentral argument that "nameofthegameis politics: is the bargaining alongregularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within government."72 thisview.Foranalytical we cultural clarity divide according whether see they theprimary causesofthe10's dysfunctional behavior deriving as from culture the of theorganization or (internal) oftheenvironment (external). is this 10 to it relatively developed theolderIO literature. Many are also quitesensitive thewaysin whichresource to constraints thematerial and will shapeorganizational culture. Personal communicationtheauthors. Cultural theories also have internal external and variants. the Realist neoliberal and theories might positthat state 10 preferences constraints responsible understandingdysfunctional and are for behavior. behavior than be connected theefficient to might onlyremotely that ofits to criteria come implementation goalsandmore closely coupled legitimacy 71. a because10 practices reflect searchforsymbolic legitimacy 10 rather efficiency. In decisions notmadeafter rational are a decision but a process rather throughcompetitivebargaining processoverturf. terms. Theworld modelexemplifies theories looktoexternal that culture underto polity stand 10's dysfunctional an behavior. bad states IOs do nothavethe are. actors Thatsaid.73 important ofthese The point theories that is trace dysfuncthey tionalbehavior backto theenvironmental conditions established or theexplicit by. 10 Another bodyofliterature traces dysfunctional behavior thematerial to forces located outside organization. the are luxury choosing optimal of forced chosebeto policybutrather frequently the tween bad andtheawful becausemoredesirable policiesaredeniedto them by states whodo notagreeamong themselves do and/or notwishto see the10 fulfill its in mandate someparticular As instance.144. the Government behaviorcan thus understood . staff maybenefit and that partsof the at organization theexpense overall of goals. 72.

78 is larger a of and Second. standard operating procedures designed trigger stancan dardandpredictable to stimuli. 1996a. ineither they actors a specific or Thiskind routinization after precisely of stimuli. 79. request. canmirror reproduce IOs and those contradictions. including market economics and human that equality. 77. See MarchandOlsen 1989.andLipartito and See MarchandOlsen 1989. often conflicting.bureaucracies specialize compartmentalize. demand. and and See Meyer Rowan1977. which. 78. Finally.718 International Organization from cultural the environment. is oneofthevirtues bureaucracy that provides and the of wayofovercoming limitations individual rationality knowledge embedby in that withindividuals a structure takesadvantage their of dingthose competencies 74. specialization allow theorganization emulate rational in it a this of making process.77 features themodern Two of bureaucratic areparticularly form defeating in The fact that important this regard. behavior we call "pathological.Meyer Zucker1989. is. a decisionwill to expertise. might conflict anyonemoment. the of competent performing complex However. Rulesandroutines cometoobscure may a and behavior"in bureaucrats construct very goals.76 Becausethey embedded that are in cultural environment.21-27. 76.74 instance. Theymaycreate"ritualized within organization the whoseconnection the to normative environment parochial at socialenvironmenttenuous best.Weber1994.environments often are ambiguous aboutmissions contain and varied. .ironically.26-27. knowledge. collective values. 75. disposition toward undesirable ultimately and selfbehavior. instance. all. McNeely1995. andMarch1997. Theserules be formal or response environmental in but tell which case action appropriate response is to informal. andMeyer Rowan1977.75 Second. whatbureaucracies supposedto exhibit-itis whatmakesthemeffective are and in socialtasks. lead in can tocontradictory ultimately and dysfunctional behavior." basic logic that The of thisargument flows our from previous observations aboutthenature of directly are as Bureaucracies established rationalized as meansto bureaucracy a socialform. first thesimple is bureaucracies organized are and a around to rules. normative. create division They haveonlyso much and becauseindividuals laboron thelogicthat time. routines. 1995.andFinnemore Lipson1999. thewaybureaucracies constituted accomplish create cultural a can. legitimacy and imperatives. For manyarms-export control regimes nowhavea multilateral character becauseofanyevidence this not that architecture is themost efficient tomonitor prevent way and arms exports rather but becausemultilateralism attained degree legitimacy is notempirically has a of that connected any to efficiency criteria.theworld polity fullofcontradictions. bureaucracies accomplish goalsandtospread particular create socialknowledge developexpertise they upontheworld(and thus and as act But exercise are to these ends power). See Vaughan 1996. organizations frequently develop distinctive internal cultures canprothat motedysfunctional behavior. presence suchrules drives also compromises extent whichmeans-ends the to rationality organizational overall missions larger and social behavior. is for a liberal world polity several has defining principles. functional. at Thus.To do this. turn.79 Again.

too. neednotbe dysfunctional. cificorganizational cultures maybe valuedand actively promoted a sourceof as "good" behavior.andtheeffects organizational of culture behavior an empirical on are to question be researched.Douglas 1986.mission-defeating 80. through processes describe of it the nature bureaucracy-the of "social stuff" which is made-creates that very that behavioral predispositions makebureaucracy proneto thesekindsof behavand behavior is iors. be present anybureaucracy a limited degree. Just rules eclipsegoals. further this complicating process. which. however.81 organization's rituals. as can can quences.concentrated expertise specialization and within (and perhaps must)limit bureaucrats' of visionand createsubcultures field trainbureaucracy aredistinct those thelarger that from of environment. of organizatheirrationality universalism.andSchien1996. is alike. have own culture cultures) shapetheir (or that The effects bureaucratic Indeed. beand culture. whenconcentrated a subunit an organization. thisview. fact. cultural contestation. and 1966. speof culture. first The we them to flowfrom features bureaucracy of itself.Burrell Morgan1979. 81. See Campbell1998. strong the professionalism havethepotential andto create others. is consistent condiin behavior occursdependson empirical Whether. 83.andBerger Luckman and 82. however. Organizational culture tiedto "good" and "bad" behavior. To further research. defining Consequently.chap. probabilistic. students businessculture as of knowverywell. Wendt .Pathologies International of Organizations719 conseouthaving relyon their to weaknesses. deterministic.are shapedby theorganizational Divisionsand subunits within organization the may developtheir own cognitive with from larger the frameworks are consistent butstilldistinct that organization.It provides interpretive Thisis morethan bounded in itself. may of weak conditions theorganization.14-19.83 theconnection But between thesemechanisms pathological not and withour constitutive analysis. as conseliefsthat embedded theorganization itssubunits).has somenegative it." Such training often worldview and normative perts.Dobbin 1994.82 verymeansand ends thattheyvalue.actors' rationality culture. is cultural we later. Alvesson1996. have of effects behavior. understood therules. See DiMaggioandPowell1983. all to and feedback from environment. normalization deviance. expect in to Theirseverity be increased. Professional ingplaysa particularly strong heresincethis onewidespread we dissemirole is way givesexnatespecialized knowledge credential and "experts.160. However. the just rationality. 1998. two insulation and exacerbate these mechanisms organizational Our claim.80 pronounced on Once in place. drawfrom we studies sociology anthropology in and to such in five bureaucratic culture breed can explore mechanisms which by pathologies 1Os: ofrationalization.therefore. andImmergut 1998. See Starr 1992. specific by empirical Vaguemission. All organizations their behavior. and three thesemechanisms of all tionalinsulation.a distinctive in can commitments.1. contestation.378.indeedis designedto give them. important are in (and has makesense of the who inhabit thatorganization quencesfortheway individuals frames thatindividuals to generate use meaning.

rulebook. professionals) discuss and or additional ones. . SomeUN staff. rules bureaucracies tailor often efficient andprocedures accomplish to their missions. that tions. comfortable and their missions fittheexisting. continued use to ment goals and collectdata necessary pursue and plans data-collection goals existing procedures formulated anddevelopment from instance wheremeans UN-mandated elections maybe another thosedata alone. UN hasdeveloped repertoire instruthat the a of stable.76.andNelson1995. military numbers-peacekeeping Peacekeepers.720 International Organization important (mission.86placeslike by ductive (frequently had the the powers precisely outcome UN andoutside Bosniaelections haveratified elections critiare intervened prevent-ethnic to cleansing-andinplaceslikeAfrica to the ethnic tensions wereostensibly designed quell. Theyfeared peacekeepers to without that theskillsand attitudes hadbeenhonedforone environmentanother to the peacekeeprequired. state and with consent. 85. to that maybecomeso embedded and powerful they means(rulesand procedures) of determine andthewaytheorganization ends defines goals. sitions activate create prorecognized the"rationalization" that Irrationality rationalization. officials. 84. ingnational armies. well-known. fully considering adjustments into carried their interstate conflict and ersdidjustthat: equipment mindset new they minded than and a and situations so created moreaggressive offensively posture 1985. ablein sufficient however.We identify three such conditions are particularly predispoand and howthey intensify inherent these feedback. cizedas exacerbating very they As itself also UN peacekeeping examples. of legedas a measure "success"anda signal an operation's of evenwheneviUN haveconducted elections 10) Consequently.84 Thus. successful conclusion. Rather. government.One observer the its Banknoted World level. Beetham 1990.thebankdidnotdecideon develophow. According someobservers. operating their be for scholars worried peacekeepers that might inappropriate thedepeacekeeping that wouldtransfer of domestic mands handling security. Toward end. (andother officials are or evencounterprodencesuggests suchelections either that premature perhaps and In as acknowledged much state UN officials). See Ferguson 86. theUN begantoinvolve might provide that the and operations" entailed management reconin various"second-generation of conflicts turned theonlyinstrument was readily it to that availciliation domestic are units. Paris1997. Weber of and cesses at whichbureaucracies excelledcould be takento extremes ultimately to if that bureaucracies do their becomeirrational therulesandprocedures enabled and Rather thandesigning mostappropriate the jobs becameends in themselves. two conflict tobe interposed and between contendtrained handle to interstate troops. an operational it to them.85 in becomeendsin themselves. "end" pursued themany The troubled states where in theUN has been involved reconstructionpresumably is somekindof peaceful. just and that intended promote to something to a demoakin ments responses arelargely cratic elections have becomeprivigovernment.

theIMF's later by was admission. See Feldstein 1998. After stint Cambodia. manyof thosewho worked peacekeeping operations Cambodia weretransferred topeacekeeping in operations BosniaorSomaliaon theassumption that knowledge the wouldbe applicable others.90 in in Similarly.6.Radelet Sachs 1999.262. Thesegovernments notprofligate were spendto ers. however. Haas 1990. Eknes. calculated however.87 of Bureaucratic universalism. himtofailtouse force defend safehavens from led to the when itwas appropriate likely be effective. and Rieff 1996. to gainedin one location Although sometechnical skillscanbe transferred acrosscontexts. thebureaucratic that Part the for of is view technical knowledge transferable is across circumstances. times.and austerity policiesdid little reassure investors. to which longstanding operationally translates theview into thattheUN shouldavoid theuse of forceand theappearance partiality. whenparticular circumstances not appropriate the are to generalized knowledge beingapplied. .but not always. of This was with somesuccessbyUN envoy Yasushi Akashiin Camknowledge employed bodia.chap. Sometimes is a goodassumpthis tion."88 at Bureaucrats necessarily flatten diversity becausetheyare supposed generate to universal rules and categories are. of justification this.Pathologies International of Organizations721 wouldotherwise havebeenthecase. result.he becametheUN Special Representative his in in As of his to Yugoslavia.3. Vaughan 1996.Chopra. 91. course.combined withhis failure recognize to thatBosnia was substantially different Cambodia. Nordbo1995. The result operations undermined was that the objectives themandate. all knowledge organot and nizational lessonsderived from context appropriate one are elsewhere. manycritics Akashihave argued. commitment theserules.89 the can of of that Manycritics theIMF's ha'ndling theAsianfinancial criseshaveargued theIMF inappropriately of applieda standardized formula budget cutsplus high interest to combat rates rapid without the currency depreciation appreciating unique andlocal causesofthisdepreciation. theIMF prescribed yet that the The roughly sameremedy ithadinLatinAmerica. design. results be disastrous.92 response environmental in stimuli waysthat decisions that lead to accisafeguard against might dents faulty and decisions. that inattentive contextual particularistic to conand cerns.chap. 87. 92. At bureaucracies makesmall. We derivea third fromDiane typeof pathology in the of disaster which chronicles she Vaughan's study thespaceshuttle Challenger to overtime becomeroutinized normal and wayexceptions rules(deviance) of parts Bureaucracies establish to a to rules provide predictable procedures. UN has a The commitmentneutrality.andKapur1998. 90. Heyman 1995. tomakematters worse.91 and to Normalizationof deviance. See Featherston and and 1995.andHirsch Oakley1995. A secondsource pathology IOs derives of in from the fact bureaucracies that "orchestrate numerous local contexts once. 88.

According many at to of safety voluntariness and the the lowered barriers repatriato commentators. Professional knowledge.and 94. is the legal in of law cornerstone international refugee and codified theUNHCR's convention. about Those insulated from feedback from their process cultures worldviews do notpromote and that suchfeedback often developinternal the who it of outside organization created andwhom thegoalsandexpectations those worldviews createtheconditions pathological can for it serves. UNHCR has steadily in protection manutionovertheyears. itsview. Evidence this be found international for can that Committee and resolutions.These distinctive and come to define classification categorization schemes behavior whenparochial inthe bureaucrats understand world-suchthat they routinely ignore reality-how to of formation is essential theaccomplishmenttheir that goals. discourse nowweighs repatriaals. Douglas 1986.soldiers trained sacriWatch1997." TheNew York Crossette. .b. 434. making was or thenow-routine behavior everviewedas risky dangerous. against deviations and as from organizational was a steady incremental development initial of over and The was norms accumulated time led to a normalization deviance.Before1980 theUNHCR viewedrepatriation onlyone of three durable solutions refugee to crises(theothers beingthird-country asylum host-country and In had safeandvoluntary becauseforced integration).chap. 1.Biuner1990.94 to is Two causes of insulation seemparticularly applicable 1Os.447.HumanRights 1993." result this is be and as unacceptable or risk time might weighed t1 seriously debated a potentially at as Indeed.the UNHCRExecutive This tion theprinciple nonrefoulement other and of goalssucha peacebuilding. December and 1967.UNHCR's discussions repatriation to of mustbe safeguarded all costs. comes to though one exampleof deviancenormalization as mind. result in and a lowering thebarriers repatriation an increase thefrequency involunof to of tary repatriation. this We areunaware anystudies haveexamined normalization deviance of that of in IO decisionmaking. Doctorsaretrained valuelifeaboveall else. at can rule-theybecomenormal. in those decisions a later at point time might unaware be that staff turnover. theseexceptions becomethe can create excessiveriskofpolicyfailure. International 1997a. andBarbara 1996. Zieck 1997. 433. however.722 International Organization or dedeviations from established rulesbecauseofnewenvironmentalinstitutional that the does not velopments. 438-39. 22 "The ShieldforExilesIs Lowered. repatriation tobe both the of which repatriation violates international principle nonrefoulement. actraining orientation worldviews thosewho are and of seeks to shapethenormative tively to to are trained.MarchandOlsen 1989.4-1. emphasized theprinciples that Prior 1980. Organizations greatly thedegreeto whichthey vary environment performance.93 in receiveand Insulation. exceptions all: they becomeinstitutionalized not The of process that is what at tothepoint where deviance "normalized.becauseof dangerous procedure comesto be treated normal timetn. See Berger Luckman Starr 1992.The first profestechnical It does morethanimpart sionalism. explicitly calculating bending rulesin thisinstance Overtime. See Chimni Times. Amnesty 93.

"staggeringly scholarship. they valuedforwhatthey are represent rather than whatthey anddo not for from "compete" with other organizations thebasisofoutput-are on protected selectionandperformance willoperate. Ferguson 96. Jarat Chopraobserves could so Somalia werestructurally established after arranged thatno information at wouldblemish UN's record.6. shows to a historians. economists trained value effiand are ciency. "The ChiefBanker for Stevenson. World Bank. is worldview however.This is notsimply bad Ferguson argues. 3. 12-14. 14 Times. 7. 97. is surely ateitsefforts use newinformationcorrect and in "rational" including procedure anysocialtaskbutis onethat many organizations. 1990. Haas 1990. eventhecurrent ofthe Many a distinctive record that World Bank.96 scholars journalists. comeoutthat Chopra will go uncorrected. September of at theNations theBottom theHeap. their by nature. for of by which. Chopra1996. head and and 1Os. leastinpart.chap. Nelson1995. 1. thatthisdifferent in which translates a record development into of failures.In one suchcritique of James Ferguson the of Bank'sactivity Lesotho comparing bank'sintroductory in study theWorld by on he description Lesothoin itsreport that of on country facts theground.5. geoghowthebank"creates" world has little that resemblance what to in suited the to raphers.failtoperform.Pathologies International of Organizations723 to ficelifeforcertain strategic objectives. it is the insulate someIOs to somedegree in so doing and clearly case that thesefactors create tendency a toward The has pathology. concentrate professionals insideorganizatraining tions. andRichard 1997. ond.25-73.Bureaucracies."New York 98.97 sameis true conferences were that that lessons-learned the of other 1Os. the from of and the in havedistincIOs vary greatly thedegree which professionals recruit to the they tiveworldviews thedegreeto whichthey and face competitive but pressures.14-17.sec. demographers on theground Lesothobutis uniquely or see and the the bank'sorganizational abilities presents precisely problems bankknows how to solve. See Wade 1996.forexample. contributed at has openshis many critiques thebank'spolicies.chaps. .organizations whom"successful for performance"difficult measure-that is to do is.98 Sometimes that thesemaladies makeit morelikely cautions. beendomito nated much itshistory economists. well-known feature organizaof Insulation contributes andis causedbyanother to allowtheorganization evaluto feedback tions-theabsenceofeffective loopsthat This a to established routines.havenoticed thebankhas accumulated rather and a with samecriteria has shown marked the but to of "failures" continues operate of The in the lackofinterest evaluating effectiveness itsownprojects. concentrations peoplewith sameexpertise professional and of the or Seccan createan organizational worldview distinct from larger the environment. Ferguson explores detail." from buta wayofmaking world the and perspecintelligible meaningful a particular tive-the WorldBank's. MarchandOlsen 1989. pressures economistic that models simply assume Theabsence a competitive of coupled environment selects inefficient that out practices with already existing tendencies toward institutionalization ofrulesandprocedures insulates organization feedback increases likelihood pathologies.95 The problem. 95. the Suchattempts facesaving.

but Culturalcontestation. lotsofdivisions aredeveloped demands.64. the the missions and thevalue it Consider conflict between UN's humanitarian are and Within organization the there manywho places on impartiality neutrality. Organizational coherence an accomplishment than is rather a given. See Clegg 1994a. a of debaclesin environmental Arguably number themorespectacular as of recent UN peacekeeping be operations might interpreted theproduct these contradictions. of More commonly. principles humanitarianism require UN to giveaid to in of thosein need-values thatare particularly strong a number UN reliefand of Thesetwonorms neutrality humanitarian and humanitarian agencies. itsability persuade rest this principle.butthey may also clashbecauseofdistinct internal cultures growup insidedifferent of that parts theorganization.724 International Organization newevaluative criteria hoisted order demonstrate thefailures are in to that werenot really failures successes. receive different stimuli from mixesof outside. to worldviews are Most tempts reconcile competing hierarchically simply incomplete. IOs that overtime inresponse new and to and stituencies. ofthese All wouldcontributeto thedevelopment different cultures of within organization differthe and local entwaysofperceiving environment theorganization's the and overall mission. ofcompeting perspectives generates pathological The existence cultural contestation be true of might particularly of high-profile conbroadandpoliticized andexpansive liketheUN that havevaguemissions. constituencies representing in viewswillsuggest different andgoalsfor organization. assistance. different and divisions by who are in overbudgets "experts" their assigned tasks. tasks the resulting a clash that tendencies. totheextent hierarchy resolves conflict squelchby inginput from somesubunits favor others. organization thebenefits in of the loses of a division laborthatit was supposedto provide. On of the viewimpartiality a coreconstitutive as principle UN action. .30. local and experience different environments. in of mostdevoted them. 1996. to comeintodirect conflict andtheparts thebureaucracy reliefmight whereproviding humanitarian thosesituations jeopardizethe UN's 1992. authority. Thesedifferent divisions maybattle or material resources so followthebureaucratic and politics model.99 is the This a of partly product thefactthat bureaucracies organized are around principle the of tendto be staffed individuals division-of-labor. andMartin 99.Organizational control within putative a hierarchy alwaysincomplete. atthough. and subsets organizations developoverlapping contradictory ofpreferences among different different normative groups.theymay also be populated different by professions shaped different or by historical experiences. theone hand. Haas 1990. Different segments theorganization developdifferent of may ways of making senseof theworld. of On theother the the hand. and to all on UN's moral its standing.100 Consequently.188. is creating pockets autonomy political of and battles within bureaucracy. Vaughan 100. Organizations try minimize may to complications these from divisions arranging by these demands but that hierarchically.

attentive both interto the shipbetween remaining closely nal organizational and dynamics the10's environment. September 1995. February That 12 1996. including right nonrefoulement. is extremely difficult makewar to 102 andpeacewith samepeopleon thesameterritorythesametime.David Rieff." TheNewRepublic. states be extremely dictions thelarger Demandsfrom can important and determinants 10 behavior mayoverride of internal cultural but dynamics.170. See Kennedy 1986. the UNHCR's regional havebeencharacterized taking less "naras bureaus. QuotedinWeiss1996. 4 101. characteristics. must bearinmind theexternal that environment always presses uponandshapestheinterof in within nal characteristicstheorganization a hostofways. 103. David Rieff.Cultural contestation an organization from remains and linked normative to contrafrequently originates in environment.41-48.166. On the "all necessary means"provision Security of Councilresolutions gave theUN authority deliver to humanitarian andprotect aid civilians thesafehavens. UN to a official in "It intimately involved these decisions.101 According ShashiTharoor. beenparticularly to evident. exercise itmight if repatriation serve broader organizational goals. must the different causalpathways. is it bureaucratic culture nottheonlysourceof 10 dysfunction.theUN abstained from"takingsides" because of thefearthatsuch actions wouldcompromise neutrality future its and effectiveness.85.Pathologies International of Organizations725 vaunted principle neutrality. the in On other hand. however. theUNHCR's Protection Divisionhas articulatedlegalistic a approach toward refuand to gee matters thus tends viewtheUNHCR anditself therefugee's as and lawyer as theprotector refugee of rights underinternational Those thatinhabit law. "We HateYou. . also see Rieff 1996.suchas satisfying theinterests member of and a peace agreestates. See Barnett 1997a. Historically. according many whentheUNHCR contemobservers.suchas facilitating 103 ment." the at UNHCR provides another possibleexample cultural of a Although one that creates broadpatterns behavior should of interest potentially powerful that relations Noneofthesources pathologies international scholars.193. whereastheregional bureausare morewillingto undertake risky a safeguarded. platesa repatriation exercise areasofpolitical in instability conflict: and protection officers demand that refugees' the the of be rights. theone hand. of sketched is here in to domain." New Yorker. interact and likely appearin isolation anyempirical Theseprocesses in feedon each other waysthat willrequire further and Moretheorizing research. they in in canalso setthem placeifconflicting demands state result thecreation organiof zationalstructures missions areproneto pathology. stressing theUNHCR must takeinto account causesofrefugee the flows state and Thesecultural conflicts have pressures. a row"viewof theorganization's that mission.andLawyers Committee Human for Rights 1991. whilewe havehighlighted organization's the internal we over. result these The of was conflicts a string contradictory of policiesthat failedto provide adequately for theUN's expanding humanitarian charges. 102. we beginto explore or that As and we bearinmind complex relationdysfunctional pathological behavior. of Bosniais theclassiccase in point.19-24. regional goals. "The Institution Saw No Evil. andRieff 1996.

theoretically the interesting question ask aboutIOs is whythey to are in created thefirst place. way IOs and Realaction durable collective states overcome to problems achieve cooperation. have suggested on We various actors who can have independent all actorsin globalpolitics. however.engines progress. politics.byprowe that that a viding basisfor autonomy also openup thepossibility IOs arepowerful effects theworld. ineffective.too. Scholars very pay little attention whatgoes on subsequently their to day-toor effects they dayoperations eventhelarger that might haveon theworld. they Ourignorance. to of thisapproach evaluations IOs and also drawsattention normative Third. Economists wantto knowwhywe have firms. for can their desirable bureaucracies also be inefficient. firms states)competing maximize (or to their utilitieswhatis anomalousand therefore theoretically interesting cooperation. about10 behavior. Second. thisapproach First. . agents to niantradition havefocused theimpressive inwhich help on for Neoliberals emancipation. political want scientists toknowwhywe have1Os. in the for internaexploring normative support bureaucratic authority thebroader to the we tionalculture theway IOs use that and authority construct social world.Froman economistic of lens perspective.aresimilarly that impressed. of which abouthow IOs are powerful ways to think of not outcomes but consideration how IOs affect onlydiscrete encourage greater basis also theconstitutive ofglobalpolitics.thequestion flows naturally If from first theoretical principles. you think theworldlookslike a microecothat nomicmarket-anarchy.726 International Organization Conclusion Forall theattention international relations scholars havepaidtointernational institutions overthepastseveral decades. uncritical whatappearsto us to be rather questions optimism relations havebeenquicktorecognize posithe international scholars Contemporary But all and tivecontributions IOs can make. in role forces world on istshavefocused their as stabilizing Constructivists. in we is largeparta product thetheoretical we have applied. we. repressive.Mainstream approaches politicalsciencethatare inhavetended locateagency thestates comprise in that formed economic theories to by 10 membership treat as mere in and arenas which states their By IOs pursue policies. research tends focuson thebargains states strike makeorreshape in 1Os.In both cases. from and reasons state members whyit may provide whyIOs mayhave autonomy to them ontologically as makesenseanalytically treat independent. is Conseour to to quently. ViewingIOs through constructivist sociologicallens. The Wilsoand we suggest revealsfeatures 10 behavior shouldconcern of that international relations scholars becausethey bearon debatescentral ourfield-debatesaboutwhether how to and matter debates and of international institutions abouttheadequacy a statist ontology in an eraofglobalization political Threeimplications thisalternative of and change.we knowvery little abouttheinternal workings ofIOs or abouttheeffects havein theworld. liberal estininvestigating less savory more these distressing and of of tends see IOs as promoters peace. are a approach particularly important. a or here. suspect. little interrelations haveshown andunaccountable. provides basisfor treating in IOs as purposive actors. International scholars. qualities.

PrenticeHall. 1990.: Harvard Press. Peter.163-70.Banking the L. PeaceCall.United Nations Participation a Learning as Process. . Alvesson.Eichmann Jerusalem: Report theBanality Evil.The UNHCR Noteon International ofRefugee Law 9 (2):267-73.: MIT Ayres. 1996.Pathologies International of Organizations727 too.htm>. 1997b. U. York:Columbia and New University Press. Genocide Rwanda. 1966. 1997a. of and at Nations Genocide Rwandaand in Barnett.NewYork:NewYork University and in . 1985.NewYork:Penguin.Boston:Little.1997a. Lonand Gareth and Organizational Burrell. Cambridge. Poverty. York:UN Press. Thomas and Luckmann. and 1992. 37 Robert 1983.Agenda Peace. Cambridge. in Availablefrom<www. Rethinking Allison'sModels. 1971. Lookingfora Few Good Cops: Peacekeeping. David.havetended focuson themorehumane other-regarding to and features 1Os. amnesty. 1994.In ThisTime Knew:Western We Responses Genocide Bosnia. Chuck. the 75:86-98. Baldwin.amnesty. Hannah. for New Mass. PublicOpinion Quarterly 27 (3):411-26. Approaches theAdaptability International Agencies: The Case oftheWorld Bank. 2d ed. ed. York:Cambridge on New University Press.edited Pierre by Bourof dieu. Minneapolis: University Minnesota Bendor.GlobalLeadership After Cold War. Foreign Affairs 1996b. Walter Theory Integration.Max Weber theTheory Modern and of Politics.Europe Burley.In SearchofSafety: Forcibly The DisplacedandHuman Rights Africa. On Symbolic Power.ActsofMeaning.International Organization (3):415-39. 20 AFR Available from < Indifference. of NewYork: Doubleday.J.1983. Jonathan.Chicago:University ChicagoPress. 82 Berger. Anne-Marie. Allison. Al Index. an analytic not assumption. Beetham.The Politics IndifferencetheUnited to in Cushman Bosnia. Brown. Boutros. in A on Arendt.American PoliticalScienceReview (2):301-22.1979. 1997b. . Blumer.ed. Boutros-Ghali. Pierre.TheSocial Construction Reality. Michael. 1969. June. ThomasHammond.edited Thomas by andStjepan Press. Protection Won'tSee. Forthcoming.SociologicalParadigms Analysis. Chadwick. 1995. in Amnesty International. 1993.Neorealism Neoliberalism. 47 International Organization (1):41-76. . NewYork:Polity. University Before Court: Political the A of and Mattli. for 1996a. Civilian Peacekeeping. Morgan. Bruner.1977. David. of William.EssenceofDetision. on Poor: TheWorld Bankand World Mass. Mestrovic. Jerome. We do notmeanto imply thatIOs are "bad".htm>. NewYork:UN Press. and Police. Bourdieu. 2d of Press. 1993. Rwanda: HumanRightsOverlooked Mass Repatriation. Agenda Democratization.The UN Security Council. Cultural Perspectives Organizations.International building. and N. Englewood Cliffs.In Languageand Symbolic Power.Cultural Anthropology 12 (4):551-78.Bureaucracy. Gibson. 01/05/97. we meanonlyto pointout theoretical reasons whyundesirable behavior mayoccurandsuggest normative that evaluation of10 behavior should an empirical ethical be and matter. Mats. References Alger. of butthere nothing is aboutsocialconstruction necessitates that "good" outcomes. 128-62.Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective Method. Press.and MichaelBarnett. 1996. Graham. Herbert. 1963.N. New Development and of Ascher. International You Journal Anonymous. 1997.

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