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1

1.1

1.1.1

**Cournot Duopoly Model
**

The case of Monopoly

Linear Demand Curve:

A linear demand function, written in "slope-intercept" form (i.e. Y = mX + b) is expressed as p = a − bQ where a is the vertical intercept and b is the slope and Q is the market (total) output. This type of demand function suggests that market price p is determined by the total amount of output available. Therefore, this would be a commodity market; one where the product is considered "generic" (i.e. oil, pulp, wheat, lumber, water). 1.1.2 Marginal Revenue

If the demand curve is linear, then the marginal revenue function is always twice as steep as the demand curve1 p = a − bQ M R = a − 2bQ If the the market is supplied by a single ﬁrm, or monopolist, then the market marginal revenue curve is also the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue. Cost function Every ﬁrm faces the same cost function of the form T C = K + cq where K is the ﬁrm’s capital cost (ﬁxed cost or setup cost) and c is the per-unit cost of production. Note that is q = 0 then total cost still equals K. This type of ﬁrm has a constant marginal cost equal to c (M C = c). Remembering from economics that the proﬁt maximization rule for all ﬁrms is to set MR = MC to determine the optimal output. By subsituting the parameter of our model MR = MC a − 2bQ = c 2bQ = a − c a−c Q∗ = 2b

1 This relationship is well explained in any microeconomics text in the chapter on Monopoly. It is also a result of the quadratic total revenue function. Students with a bit of calculus should understand the following:

TR TR

= = =

aQ − bQ2

(a − bQ) × Q

P ×Q

Marginal revenue, by deﬁnition, is the derivative of total revenue: dT R = a − 2bQ = MR dQ from the power-function rule that says if y = axn , then dy/dx = anxn−1 .

1

100 900 profit 70 MC = 40 40 MR D 60 100 30 50 quantity 100 TC = 40q 70 900 profit 40 TR = pxq = (100-q)q 30 50 60 100 quantity Figure 1: 1. is now the sum of the output of each ﬁrm (Q = q1 +q2 ) P P where qi is ﬁrm i’s output (i = 1. 1. (and let K = 0 for now) Applying the proﬁt maximization rule MR 100 − 2Q 2Q Q = = = = MC 40 60 30 Subsituting Q into the demand function. Further. let our marginal cost (c) be equal to 40. 2). we get the monopoly price P P Finally. then the marginal revenue is M R = 100 − 2Q.3 Numerical Example: Suppose our demand function is P = 100 − Q.2 Duopoly Now suppose we have two ﬁrms. the ﬁrm’s proﬁt (π) is found by π = (P − c) × Q − K = (70 − 40)30 − 0 = 900 = 100 − Q = 100 − 30 = 70 This example is illustrated graphically in ﬁgure 1. = a − b(q1 + q2 ) = a − bq1 − bq2 2 .1. Q. The market output.

The solution to this system of equations is the equilibrium to the ”Cournot Duopoly Game. When ﬁrm 1 produces zero output. ﬁrm 2’s marginal revenue is given by M R2 = [a − bq1 ] − 2bq2 Each ﬁrm faces the same cost function T C = K + cqi (i = 1. in the case of more than one ﬁrm.1 Finding each ﬁrm’s marginal revenue (M Ri ) Just like the case of monopoly. Lets suppose ﬁrm 2’s output is q2 . The residual demand is that part of the market that is left over after the other ﬁrms have supplied their output into the market. 2) and. Firm 1’s marginal revenue will be twice as steep. each will derive its marginal revenue from the "residual" demand. q1 = a−c 3b ∗ 2. treating q2 as constant M R1 = M C1 a − bq2 − 2bq1 = c solve for q1 2bq1 = a − c − bq2 q1 = a−c − 1 q2 ⇒ ”Best Response Function” 2b 2 Best Response Function tells Firm 1 the proﬁt maximizing q1 for any level of q2 . as in the case of monopoly. However.” ∗ 1. For Firm 2 M R2 = M C2 a − bq1 − 2bq2 = c 1 q2 = a−c − q2 Firm 2’s ”Best Response Function” 2b The two ”Best Response Functions” Firm 1 q1 = Firm 2 q2 = a−c 2b a−c 2b − − q2 2 q1 2 gives us two equations and two unknowns. the price would then be P = [a − bq2 ] − bq1 This is ﬁrm 1’s residual demand. q2 = a−c 3b ∗ ∗ Market Output q1 + q2 = 2(a−c) 3b The two best response functions and the nash equilibrium can be seen in ﬁgure 2 3 . or M R1 = [a − bq2 ] − 2bq1 Similarly.1. M Ci = c Each ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is πi = P qi − cqi − K = (p − c)qi − K Max π 1. a ﬁrm’s marginal revenue is twice as steep as the demand curve.2. the market price would be P = a − bq2 as ﬁrm 1 adds output to the market.

ﬁrm 2’s marginal revenue is given by M R2 = 100 − q1 − 2q2 Each ﬁrm faces the same cost function T C = 40qi (i = 1. Finding each ﬁrm’s marginal revenue (M Ri ) Firm 1’s marginal revenue will be twice as steep.q2 (a-c)/b Firm 1's Best Response (a-c)/2b Cournot (a-c)/3b Firm 1's Best Response (a-c)/3b (a-c)/2b (a-c)/b q1 Figure 2: 1.3 Numerical Example P P = 100 − (q1 + q2 ) = 100 − q1 − q2 Using the example from the monopoly case. as in the case of monopoly. 2) and. M Ci = 40. treating q2 as constant M R1 = M C1 100 − q2 − 2q1 = 40 solve for q1 2q1 = 60 − q2 q1 = 30 − 1 q2 ⇒ ”Best Response Function” 2 For Firm 2 M R2 = M C2 100 − q1 − 2q2 = 40 1 q2 = 30 − q2 Firm 2’s ”Best Response Function” 4 . or M R1 = 100 − q2 − 2bq1 Similarly. In this case ﬁxed costs are zero (K = 0) Max π 1.

The two ﬁrm’s best response functions and the nash equilibrium are illustrated in ﬁgure 3 5 . we get ∗ 1. by substituting the solution to q1 into ﬁrm 2’s best response. q2 = 20 ∗ ∗ Market Output q1 + q2 = 40 Price P = 60 Finally. By substituting one equation into the other q1 q1 q1 1 q1 − q1 4 3 q1 4 ∗ q1 1 = 30 − q2 2 1³ q1 ´ = 30 − 30 − 2 2 1 = 30 − 15 + q1 4 = 15 = 15 µ ¶ 4 = 15 = 20 3 then. q1 = 20 ∗ 2.The two ”Best Response Functions” Firm 1 q1 = 30 − Firm 2 q2 = 30 − q2 2 q1 2 gives us two equations and two unknowns. each ﬁrm’s proﬁts are π 1 = π2 = 400.

q2 60 Firm 1's Best Response 30 Cournot 20 Firm 1's Best Response 20 30 60 Figure 3: q1 6 .

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