Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems Giovanni Sartori The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Jun.

, 1969), pp. 398-411.
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hereinafter. See also successor. esp. 1961). wisdom and ignorance.edge and ideology in politics is not necessarily ings. whereas in the second sense All in all. .U. Knowledge (Springfield: Thomas. ' Marx and Mannheim are the obvious references. of "ideology" which constitute a necessary neat. generation. I .g.mans Green. ideologism) . belongs to the concepts in the second case we are not concerned with that bracket a variety of complex phenomena the truth-value but with the functional value. within a by analytical philosophy."l Likewise. Sociologie de la Connaissance Chatillon.^ And my specific question will be The distinction between ideology in knowlwhether there is a technical meaning. however. ideology in knowledge and/or ideology in politics. be followed by a movement in the other Ideologie und Warheit: Eine Soziologische Kritik direction. an entirely different matter. ~ (and equivalents). if one asks whether the Discussions about ideology generally fall into various "isms" of politics-e. L. one is entitled to wonder whether we ultimately point to an ideological mentality there is any point in using "ideology" for schol. pp. p. its Free Press. and Oxford: hand. 1961). Merthat while the 1930-1935 Encyclopaediu of the So. Philosophy. rev. hy. ideology "signifies a t the whether ideology is a n essential feature of polisame time truth and error. and the literature is extensive. namely. 141cally conditioned or distortede4With respect to 198. mains. "Biblio. whereas a cluster concept. Blackwell.Ideologie und Wissenschaft (Neuwied: Luchtertroversy (Oslo: Oslo University Presa. How mental und Wissensoziologie (Neuwied: Luchterhand. Horo(*) This is an abridged draft of a paper prepared for the meeting on "Ideology and Politics" of the witz. universality and par. arly purpose^. if so. With respect to the first area of inquiry the question is whether. what does it explain. Ideologiekritik success.F.sumer's end of the problem. La Sociologie Allemande Contemthe Social Sciences. 171. ed. so about which one tries to generalize. E. For instance. for case "ideology" is contrasted with ((truth. 1957) chaps 12 and 13. New York: "The Sociological Study of Ideology 1940-1960: A Praeger. 1962) . A.e. 103. Sorokin (Louvain: Nauwelaerts. 1967). for a number of issues draw from both dotool of enquiry for a science of politics. 455-4601 is that the Mannheim Trend Report and Bibliography. IDEOLOGY. I n the first sense b y saying growing popularity of the term has been ideology we actually mean ideological doctrine matched. but scarcely in Gustav Bergmann. ' Remo Cantoni. See esp.(also called. and Jacques J . My own position (Democratic Theory. des Denkens (Stuttgart: Humboldt Verlag. products are produced is. of ideology. 1965. Science and the Sociology of Institut International de Philosophie Politique. Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: cial Sciences did not include the item ideology. sotwo broad domains. Mondadori. if anything." now in The Metastatements intended to express .tics and. Illusione e Pregiudizio (Milano : -Etude Critique des Systkmes de K. "Ideology. As the second area of enquiry the question is a philosopher puts it. See Theodore Geiger." Current Sociology type of sociology of knowledge attacks the con(Oxford : Blackwell. 1949). . Topitsch. b y its growing o b s c ~ r i t y . I t will continue to be used in headlines. and the to speak. Mannheim et de P. 2nd ed. and Kurt Link. "Begriff und Funkracy.tion der Ideologie.POLITICS. thereby explaining the graphische Einfiirung. The theme has been especially pursued social psychology and political science will.poraine (Paris: P. For the bibliography see Norman Birnbaum. liberalism. 19561.physics of Logical Positivism (New York: Longpotheses or classifications of obse~ations. pp. controversy. AND B E L I E F S.." scithe political scientist the term ideology points to ence and valid knowledge in general5. 1961). i. I n the first ticularity. ogy. Ideology and Objectivity-Studies in the Se.many current definitions of ideology. the spread of mental products. 'Concerning the popularity it is symptomatic A particularly brilliant criticism is Robert K .. June 1967. the 1968 International Encyclopedia of Raymond Aron.. man's knowledge is ideologi. 'This is actually the major and more persistent 'See the conjecture of Arne Naess that "the movement of the term 'ideology' into social science. 1950) pp.." Democ.'' in Sozialphilosophie zwischen mantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Con. . Maquet. 1954) ." in Ideologie.ton.YS'TEMS" GIOVANNI SARTORI University of Florence T h e word ideology points to a black box. 1953) . 74-94. The book also reviews and to what extent. in summaries and popularieations. theories. p. or mean. contains two articles on ideol.

In a similar vein Z. Fourth. 'Daniel Bell. I take it. 332-341."^ i. Second.e. for the present enquiry ideological doctrines are givens-they exist in their distinctiveness. But the distinction is neat when one is exclusively concerned with the question: what does ideology explain about the nature of politics? For the sake of brevity a number of preliminary points will have to be laid down axiomatically. or we do not dispose of an empirically usable term. that if no such opposition is justified. I shall not be content with implying that the aforementioned concepts are largely interchangeable and tend to overlap. 430-433. conceptual thinking) bears on the genesis of ideological doctrines." i. To be sure. that requires demonstration. By saying structure I refer to how one believes. 400. and by speaking of function I shall be concerned with the eficacy. ed.1969 POLITICS.e. 19631.e. J." as against the "deductive model of explanation": The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler. unless it can be demonstrated that "ideology is nothing other than x. First. that the word ideology has been increasingly adopted in response to. p. i. creed. . to qualify the notion a contrario. myth. 1965). then. Given the fact that we are confronted with a black box. the relation between ideology and "idea" (i. nationalism." I propose. 89. The more a set of concepts is closely interlinked. Ideologies are action-related systems of ideas . AND BELIEF SYSTEMS 399 cialism. or may not. esp. The End of Ideology.. it can be readily conceded that our treatment of the "isms" of politics will be more perceptive if it presupposes a stand vis i vis the sociology of knowledge.": Man and hb Government (New York: McGraw-Hill. then the notion of ideology loses much of its interest and has little explanatory value. not their difference. 'See C. This way of handling conceptual problems I call "superfluous coextensiveness. and is eventually conducive to an epistemological discussion. there is no object in adopting new terms unless they are employed to cover new phenomena or new sets of observations. (awaiting contrary proof) clause. namely. IDEOLOGY. in the sense that ideological doctrines no longer fall under the jurisdiction of logic and verification. My argument is. . cit. whatever their genesis in relation to "idea." and represents an intolerable waste for the economy of language and clarity of thought. 1964). but . under the assumption that this is the pertinent focus for discussing the structure and function of ideologism. 2nd rev. We are logically required. pp. utopia. the relation of ideology to "belief" and belief systems.e. to call any system of ideas an ideology ."6 I shall aim a t using ideology to signify something that no other neighboring concept signifies. the development of politics-if not the development of an unprecedented aspect of politics.. 5-6.p. to clarify the various meanings of the term ideology as they stand in actual usage. I take the methodological view that awaiting contrary proof (subsequently called the a. However.-are only ideologies (there is no quarrel that in some sense of the word they also are ideologies). it will be necessary to begin with a pure and simple semantic explanation? My first assignment IS.. pp. be found to apply to the real world. to declare what ideology is not. Brzezinski qualifies ideology as "essentially an action-program suitable for mass consumption" : Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger. 327.. with a persuasive treatment (not a logical treatment) of ideas leading to action-oriented ideals. Abraham Kaplan. A final clarification is in order. and as a pointer of.p.c. but not without loss of conceptual substance. and yet explain nothing.e. Friedrich: "It is confusing .. B. 1962. and similar or derivative concepts. 1962). In Kaplan contrasts notational and substantive terms as follows: "Substantive terms cannot be eliminated without loss of conceptual content. p. it is the equivalence between two concepts. therefore. to investigate a different relationship. either we dispose of a notion of ideology that lends itself to falsification.c. it may be a useful shorthand. of belief systems. I am not saying that we must oppose ideological to non-ideological politics. When we pass on to consider ideologies we are confronted with "the conversion of ideas into social lever^. I t will suffice to note here that ideologies are no longer ideas.. pp. op. then. ethos. . pragmatism will be used as a designation for non-ideology.. Third. p. . clause) no concept should be used as a synonym for any other concept." i. the more their meanings need to be specified and distinguished. A term may have a "notational use. opinion. an economizing device. For this purpose "ideological politics" will be opposed here to "pragmatic politics. And the point is that under the a. or effectiveness. Sew York: Collier Books. etc. rather. . I n other terms. therefore.8 However. . To be sure. one may choose to apply "ideology" to any time and place. The pattern model of explanation does not necessarily coincide with Hempel's "reduction to the familiar": Aspects of Scientific Ezplanation (New York: Free Press. belief. Therefore.lo This is notably 'This is called by Abraham Kaplan the ('pattern model of explanation. on how they originate and are born. we are required to conceive ideology as a dimension or an aspect of politics which may. Ideology is generally qualified by how it relates to idea.

not a discriminating element. a political belief system consists of the set of beliefs according to which individuals navigate and orient themselves in the sea of politics. Ideology is. 1961). an ambitious term. but we equally need "explanation stoppers."12 i. not merely because it abridges and/or provides a regression stopper. We are forcefully reminded of thi . Hempel. to qualify ideologj (vis B vis scientific truth) as any value judgemen mistaken for. Therefore. For an introductory overview see Ernest Nagel. If the term ideology were not employed. or that everybody has political beliefs which amount to everyman's ideology. that both ideologism and pragmatism are possible states of belief. The Open and Closed Mind (Xew York : Basic Books. R. ology indicates only the political part of a belief system." it is readily f apparent that the general class is "belief systems" and that ideology is the narrower conceptualization. and could be replaced": op. Properly speaking. terms defined in such a way as to avoid endless regression of enquiry. as the discussion proceeds the focus will be progressively shifted to the explamtory value of the various meanings of ideology. lief system serves the purpose of integrating (axiologically or otherwise) the belief collectivity. "a person's belief-disbelief system is really a political-religious-philosophic-scientific-etcetera system. Thi view makes ideology far too broad. if the eminence attributed to the notion of ideology is justified.p. it must be justified because the term explains. Under the a.e. "This applies also to the attempt. 1952). p. which is oriented to the evaluative integratior of the c0llectivity. a common. 119-121. it does belong to the concepts that are supposed to have broad and farreaching causative significance. of having recourse to the value dimension.400 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 49.. the ideological nature of such beliefs: the pragmatic actor also is belief-oriented." l2 Milton Rokeach. of a belief system." i. Brace. 1959). but we are simply left to describe what people believe or have to say in political matters. for the present discussion it can be simply defined as the system of symbolic orientations to be found in each individual. While not every polity need contain ideological publics no polity can exist without publics that have beliefs. Indeed to contrast ideologism and pragmatism as representing. held ir common by the members of a collectivity . For the sake of simplicity I equally neglect the more sophisticated test suggested by K. Second. or structure. Moreover."~3 But the discriminating power of the notion of evaluative integration and. then. 349 (My italics). The Structure of Science (New York : Harcourt. the presence of beliefs does not suffice to qualify. pp. 11-12. 1962 ed. statement of fact. Whatever the psychological functions of a belief system. that do have explanatory-causative potency. 2 : "Patterns of Scientific Explanation.e. Correlatively. pragmatism is also a state of belief systems.15 It is not without reason. for my ultimate purpose is to probe and single out the conceptualizations that are cognitive instruments. in general. 19601. Popper with regard to the "informati>-econtent" of scientific statements: The Logic of Sczentific Discovery (London: Hutchinson. respectively. that beliefs are. whereas idenotational terms are fundamentally abbreviations. and conversely. The second corollary is.. nothing) is ideology. chap. a total and diffuse framework. p. This is not to say that the notational use of the term ideology is necessarily trivial. 35. The first corollary is. of political belief systems. By definition. a belief versus a belief-less orientation toward politics is to preempt the issue from the outset. but they founder on the reefs of definition by failing to provide a discriminating element. Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.c.ll I. It is not sufficient to say. no loss of conceptual content would follow. the foregoing definitions are not falsifiable: they simply lead to the conclusion that everything (or.p. I purposely avoid saying "explication" on account of the technical meaning attributed to the term by Carnap followed by Carl K. A number of authors seemingly agree to the effect that not all political belief systems are ideological. as such. therefore. cit.). that ideology is the political slice. or part. per se. I assume that ideology indicates a particular state. 63 the case with the authors that are satisfied with saying that ideology amounts to the views of any and all social groups. therefore l 3 The Social System (New York: Free Press. Two corollaries follow. First. ideology is "a system of beliefs.. (awaiting contrary proof) clause.14 Beliefs are inextricably value-laden-they precede the analytica distinction between value and fact-and any be. According to Talcott Parsons. "Let alone the fact that the "integration" of r belief group may well be a "disintegration" vis i vis other groups. . Hence. is almost nil. pp. for instance. To abridge "social views" or "political beliefs" into "ideology" is perhaps convenient. Not only do we need notations. conversely. or disguised as. however. T H E IDEOLOGICAL MENTALITY I ideology is linked to "belief. however. notably pur sued by Bergmann and Geiger. not all political belief systems are ideological. then.

then. ?O ?' Ibid." "consistency. no harm follows if one decomposes belief systems in a number of ways. 1951). This belief-linkage is presumably what a number of authors have in mind when they define ideology as a more or less coherent set of ideas. 432: "Belief refers primarily to the categories. pp. Beliefs are believed-not explored. the mentality (forma mentis) that qualifies an ideological structure of belief in its difference from a pragmatic structure of belief. Under the awaiting-contrary-proof clause a belief is neither an opinion nor an idea." This intellectualistic conceptualization overlooks the difference between idea and belief." those on whom we rely for information. 2) intermediate. "Sur le Concept d'Ideologie.).1969 POLITICS. with reference to belief systems. Following Rokeach again. '' Op."l6 to signify that beliefs are idea-clusters that routinize the cost of decisions precisely because they are taken for granted.' 'correct' and 'incorrect'. they typically belong to the more self-conscious dimension of discourse. If we are reminded that the pertinent yardstick is "efficacy" the evaluation could be reversed. and passim pp 54-67. logical (or rational) attributes such as "coherence. to the fact that beliefs hang together." and the like.: Harvard University Press. though not in rationally congruent and organized systems.JJ21The closed mind is defined. . Converse. Opinions include and characterize the more ephemeral and superficial level of discourse. 44.20 More concretely one may say that the crucial factor is "the authorities. "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action. Ideology and Discontent (Yew York: The Free Press of Glencoe. Mass. [to] the extent to which the person can receive. on its own intrinsic merits. and is hardly in a position to select and to check its authorities. The first problem is to pinpoint the discriminating element. Parsons and E. Toward a General Theory of Actwn (Cambridge.. 1964). ideological closedness is bad and pragmatic openness is good only according to an intellectual yardstick-and one could well say an intellectualistic prejudice. " Contra. Ibid. . that Rokeach draws the distinction between the closed and open mind." in History and Theory. 136. His initial basic definition is as follows: "A person's [belief] system is open or closed . Speaking of belief systems. Doubtless the association of the ideological mentality with the closed mind can be accused of representing an anti-ideological bias. . to segregate and consolidate competing groups around rival ideas": "Myth and Ideology in Modern Usage. p. tested and held under the searchlight of cons~iousness.). However. as a cognitive state in which a person does not discriminate substantive information from information about the source. indeed yields to. cit. 57. Since nobody can avoid reliance on cognitive authorities. (March 1959). to reasoning and theorizing. Shils (eds. the difference must reside in how authorities are chosen and how the instructions emanating from these authorities are assessed. But there is no question that beliefs are "bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence. p. a first obvious caution is that the system may have properties which are not exhibited by its parts. in the strict sense ideas are thought of." in T. It is on this basis. among others. the more he is unable to evaluate relevant information on its own intrinsic merits. On the other hand. and 3) peripheral regions of belief. accordingly. 'true' and 'false. both the notions of "belief" and "system" must be taken seriously. 1 (1967). Having issued the caveat that the system should be taken seriously.~~ As for the notion of system. it appears that the crucial single factor resides in so-called "authority beliefs." Le Contrat Social. If the sentence is understood cum grano salis. IS Philip E. Indeed the single beliefelements can be logically contradictory. I n substance.. p. tems. 39-51. the closed mind relies on. Clyde Kluckhohn.p. esp. . But it is more important to underlie that a "belief system" points to a state of boundedness. ." and more precisely in the beliefs concerning cognitive authority: the beliefs that tip us off to what is true or false about the world and its events." in D. . Now. 77. are hardly applicable to a belief-linkage. IDEOLOGY. in effect. evaluate and act on relevant information . Apter (ed. . p. therefore. Following Rokeach. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. "I paraphrase from Wladimir Weidlk.. absolute authority. one may distinguish between 1) primitive beliefs. for reliance on absolute authorities does obtain the kind of efficacy praised by the man of action and is surely in keeping ~viththe purpose served by id~ologies. A X D BELIEF SYSTEMS 40 1 that I propose to search for structural elements of differentiation bearing on how one believes.lS I propose to dwell briefly on the intermediate region."ls Beliefs. Hence the more closed one's belief system. and then to decompose the more peripheral regions of belief into single belief-elements. and can be safely set aside. . but the sentence applies more directly to beliefs. The author speaks of ideology. . cluster in sysother side of the coin by Ben Halpern: "The function of ideologies . beliefs can be defined as "ideas that are no longer thought. is . 207. p.

hardly a rationalistic realism. 19631." and the assumption will be that these cultural matrixes help explain why only certain polities characteristically display." ibid. Hegel's sentence had a dialectical circular formulation. rationalism looks down at technical knowledge as an inferior knowledge. means the sovereignty of technique. or the matrixes. however sweepingly. in his positive identification of rationalism with technical knowledge.402 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. On the other hand. not ~vith practice. over time. the ideologies drawn from rationalistic philosophies and nurtured in a rationalistic soil-travel easily throughout the world. therefore. Rationalism and empiricism are generally associated. of socialism. ~Iz find it equally striking that only the "rational ideologies"-I mean. that technical knowledge represents the point at which rationalism and empiricism converge. of the third world have been hardly nurtured and taught in London and Oxford.).. though no longer to the "authority-beliefs" but to the "processing-coding-beliefs.2j for the rationalistic attitude is to argue that if the practice goes astray. "In this connection it should be noted that the ideologies of the developing nations and. not with the theory. ii) doctrine prevails over practice." Consequently the empirical attitude is to argue that if the practice goes astray. Perhaps we may say that we are referred once again to the intermediate regions of belief. and symmetrically. in spite of nebulous and bizarre melanges. "Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books. iv) ends prevail over means. respectively. an ideological patterning. The rationalistic processing-coding tends to approach problems as follows: i) deductive argumentation prevails over evidence and testing. it should be noted that a cognitive closed structure fails to justify the other characteristic generally imputed to the ideological mentality. Hegel's famous sentence "the rational is real" goes to the very heart of the rationalistic mind. hardly in other cultural contexts. On ite own premises. "To be sure. however. When we speak of ideology as a "culture"-or a cultural pattern-we are more or less implicitly referred to the anthropological notion of culture. thereby shifting the focus to the notion of ideological culture. to the "cultural matrixes" rationalism and empiricism. 63 In short. 1962). and. The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Praeger. let us attempt to qualify rationalism and empiricism in more detail. rather. something is likely to be wrong with the theory. its typically doctrinaire bent. there must be something wrong with the practice.e. . with and within which our mind stores and orders whatever it apprehends. iii) principle prevails over precedent. typically indirect. and v ) perceptions tend to be "covered up. the mund (ed. A perusal of Paul E. p. and even less in the United States. ("The sovereignty of 'reason. communism. Conversely. ii) practice prevails over doctrine. practical knowledge is not knowledge a t all. . . For our purposes these processing-coding Gestalten will be labelled "rationalism" and "empiricism. approach to politics. Sig- that ideology and pragmatism qua "political cultures" are related. I suggest that it represents the ideological apex attained by the empirical mind.' for the rationalist. the ideologist cannot have it both ways. v) its perceptions tend to be more "direct. Oakeshott equally makes a good point when he writes that "Rationalism is the assertion that ." The simplest and closest analogy appears to be. so that the full enumeration is required to appreciate the meaning of the separate assertions. iv) means prevail over ends.23 Hence my hypothesis is =If "liberalism" is conceived as an ideology."24 But. the empirical processing-coding can be described as follows: i) evidence and testing prevail over deductive argumentation." doctrine-loaded. 11. not the reverse. But "the rational" is the subject: it is rationality that qualifies reality. their unmistakably rationalistic Western source. the Gestalt analogy: a cultural pattern is characterized by the forms. iii) precedent prevails over principle. with the understanding that the following characterizations represent a syndrome. with a "coherence" theory of truth as against a "correspondence" theory of truth. Should this characterization be dropped? Or does i t draw from another source? I shall abide by the latter suggestion. Hegel's philosophy was a realistic rationalism. and surely liberalism has been a poor competitor. equalitarianism and the like. ideologically speaking. The foregoing underpins nicely the common opinion according to which the ideological mentality represents a typically dogmatic. What strikes me in this connection is the extent to which the typically ideological isms of politics-marxism being the outstanding current examplewere born and have developed (before being exported) in the cultural area qualified by the notion of rationalism. and surely not in the cultural area of e m p i r i ~ i s m .) I t seems to me. suffices to confirm. rigid and impermeable. I cannot follow Oakeshott. namely. however. he cannot claim a t the same time an intellectual and a practical primacy. i. in general. respectively.

1969 POLITICS." in The Review of ment. "ideological heating." and vice I shall revert to these characteristics later." from "hot politics" to "cool politics. that rationalism is the argument in the following section. just as an empirical culture fect. Along the forideological mentality identifies par ezcellence mer a belief system can be.ception of politics. Possibly.logical mentality will be reduced to a "closed" tanschauung a comparatively broader "space. and we should speak. deductive arguThus far the analysis has been confined to a ment. from a rationalistic cultural matrix. of course) by openness to conclusion appears reasonably warranted: ideoldeductive axiomatization and deafness to empir. Therefore. the same extent it can be legitimately qualified The difference between cognitive structure as a typically principled and doctrinaire way of and emotive status underpins two different conperceiving political problems and of constructing ceptions of ideology: ideologism. "cultural" characterization of the ideological and cognitive openness will be defined a state of mentality.to mass phenomena-e. it follows 11. its capacity of activaBringing our two threads together. This is also to say that the efwill breed ideological minorities.lief systems vary not only along a cognitive but minded actor. This implies. ence should be made to the emotional compoan ideological culture will contain non-ideologi. passion on saying: given a rationalistic cultural matrix. as a religion or even as a mystique. the ideo. hardly to evidence: the sentence "experi. . as we know.2~It should be clear that I am not ity on the one hand. closed with highly "abstract" and "comprehensive" be. Along the emotive dimension beliefs lief systems.ogism can be legitimately understood to mean ical evidence. in each individual cognition and from its rationalistic matrix is that the central affect are tightly interlinked. But beliefs and beence proves" proves nothing to an ideologically. Needless to say. whenever politics is depicted as a matcality of ideological thinking" forcefully high. i.tion. the mentaltheir solution.be defined as a state of dogmatic impermeability batic leaps-a quality that I shall call compre.tics. I n particular an important feature can be intense or feeble. IDEOLOGY." "The rationalist matrix also explains the "logi. It should be Thus whenever we find a mobilized polity disequally clear that a number of individuals react playing a high degree of political activism. passionately or weakly of the ideological mentality that neatly flows felt. and the following (relatively speaking. to tional intensity. and thereby to the notion of ideological afcal minority groups. Also. and consequently. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS that to the extent that the ideological mentality is "open. Per se the ideological mentality ideological mentality necessarily follows.nent.Likewise." ticularly vulnerable on this score..single dimension-cognition. but with reference elements of an ideological belief system are nec. the two istic mind soars a t a higher level of explicitness characterizations reinforce one another but can and especially of abstraction than the empirical exist disjointly.ter of faith.e.both to evidence and to argument. but also a principled and doctrinaire pering ability.volvement and thereby to "ideological activism. the rational. the ideoable to embrace and to cover in terms of Wel. of ideological passion." it is open to rational. referto the culture to which they belong. and ideological. of emotional involveNovel Form of Government. by low practical problem-solving not only a rigid and dogmatic approach to poliflexibility and by high theoretical problem solv. for the simplicity of mind." cognitive structure. reference is made more often than not to a parlighted-perhaps in an overly speculative veinby Hannah Arendt.or open.. Politics (July 1953) 303-327. of arousing and unleashing energies. or passion. abrupt transitions essarily "ends. I am is not necessarily conducive to an active insimply saying that a rationalistic culture is par. However. versa-cognition and affect seem to vary indeFor the moment let us simply retain that to the pendently." not "means. trait. Conversely the pragmatic mentality will be simplistically hensiveness. AND BELIEF SYSTEMS 403 The ad hoc implications for our subject are logical mentality now results in both a personalthat the rationalistic Gestalt is characterized ity trait and a cultural. Assuming cognition to be constant. The foregoing can be easily translated into a identified with an "open" cognitive structure. in addition. An ulterior implication is that the also along an emotive dimension. extent that the ideological mentality is charac. the the other hand. fectiveness of ideology. and cognitive closedness will either with long deductive chains or with acro. If we assume ideologism to result mental permeability. does not reside in the ideological mentality as such but requires. in turn. therefore.we can still have formidable oscillations of emoterized by the rationalistic cultural matrix. "Ideology and Terror: A ticular intensity of feeling.g.

they are subject only to traumatic change under conditions of great stress. These elements may be called inelastic. therefore. Given the fact that they are emotively participated in. These elements will be called firm. Typology of Belief-Elements 2 ." VII IPSA World Congress. (11) The inelastic elements are still impermeable to argument and to evidence. (11) Closed but weakly held. Bruxelles. 1967." "Bourgeois democracy must be replaced by a dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand. (111) Open but strongly felt. "The scheme is largely inspired by Robert E. AFFECT Weak COGNITIVE STATUS < Strong . without traumatic consequences.27 Let us now enter the peripheral regions of belief and decompose belief systems into distinguishable belief-elements which are generally expressed in a slogan form. ConfEict and Consensus: Notes for a Theory (mimeographed). One may also call them "adamant" elements. Even though they tend to be persistent. (IV) Open and weakly felt. 2. These elements will be called flexible. ( I ) Closed and strongly felt. op. " )With reference to ~~ the four combinations afforded by the scheme of Figure 1. but are open to evidence and/or to argument. beliefs expressed by propositions like "Democracy is the best form of government. the belief-elements can be broken down. or be dismissed. EMOTIVE STATUS Strong Closed / \ W eak - (Neither subjected 1 to evidence nor COGNITIVE STATUS argument) (Subq:~Fedo t evidence and/or argument) L I I1 I11 IV The overall scheme of analysis is thus the one recapitulated in Figure 1. they are not impermeable and are./I . p. " Ibid. The scheme of Figure 1 can thus be filled with the typology of belief-elements represented in Figure 2. they can fade away. changeable.THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW FIG. even though they tend to be persistent over time. Furthermore. (I) The fixed elements are rigid. in substance. As Dahl introduces the argument.L?k&& element. Some additional but in no way exhaustive qualifications are as follows. dogmatic. . activistic potential of the adamant elements is high. 1. as follows. for they are not passionately felt. a paper prepared for the panel on "Consensus and Dissent.. but display a low dynamic potential. As such. September 18-23. Dahl. following the roman numerals of the previous table. "it is convenient to think of the content of a belief system as made up of identifiable elements or components (e." "A capitalist economy is more efficient than a socialist e c o n ~ m y . Ideology. (111) The firmelements are firmly held.g. a t least in principle. These elements will be called fixed. firm ele(*) FIG. cit.^ Closed elements Firm Fixed Open elements elements Flexible (*) This table repeats. Dahl's scheme on page 3. impermeable to argument and evidence. Scheme of Analyeie. the dynamic. This essay is particularly indebted to Dahl's intellectual stimulation.

Ideology and Pragm atism as Polar Opposites. that the logical error is to hold that if ideology and pragmatism are conceived as blends of a same continuum. conversely. this means only that we are also required to define ideology and pragmatism as "concrete" systems.4. are approximated in the real world. their dynamic potential is very low. furthermore. qua ideal types or. p. They are changeable by definition. a belief system based on i) flexible elements characterized by ii) weak affect and iii) open cognitive structure. Conceivably. The individuals imbued with an adamant belief system are impenetrable vis & vis external influence and are strongly motivated toward outward expansion. to convenience. The individuals imbued with a resilient belief system resist change and support the internal status quo. we are also reminded by Converse that "the idea-elements within a belief system vary in a property we shall call ~entrality. qua polar opposites. if ever. whereas a "perfectly pragmatic" belief system falls in quadrant IV-as shown in Figure 4. 7 Strong I a Weak AFFECT Closed COGNITION Ideology Iv Pragmatisnz . . 208. a "perfectly ideological" belief system falls in quadrant I. Hence. characterized by ii) strong affect and iii) closed cognitive structure. can be illustrated with reference to the FIG. Having reference to our initial scheme (Figure I ) . The in29"TheNature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. Be that as it may. but lack dynamism and outward orientation. Granted that pure types seldom. I I1 "fixed-feeble" elements prevail IV Resilient Adamant "fixed-strong" elements prevail I11 "flexible-strong" elements prevail Firm - "flexible-feeble" elements prevall Flexible ments have a stronger dynamic potential than the inelastic elements. Patterns of Belief Systems. A N D BELIEF SI'STE~IS 406 FIG. open to argument and/or to evidence and. I t can be easily seen that the foregoing typology of belief-elements can be turned into a typology of belief-system tentatively labelled as in Figure 3. cit." polar definitions remain the sine qua non condition for having a continuum at all. Definition: Whenever ideology and pragmatism are confronted dichotomously."~9Whenever possible. and thereby conceptualized as polar types. dividuals sharing a firm belief system are both open to change and motivated toward outward expansion. either in the form of proselytism or of overt aggression.3. (IV) The flexible elements are feebly held. ideology is a belief system based on i) fixed elements. therefore. the simplest way of establishing the nature of a pattern is provided by the following criterion: which type of element prevails in terms of intensity. A continuum of what? Unless the ends of a continuum are defined. and to define them accordingly (regardless of what one believes).OCI'. the continuum itself remains undefined. and even less that it is logically superfluous. even if one abides by the "continuum language. I would argue." loc. they should not be defined as opposites. Finally. However. Pragmatism is. one should use centrality as a criterion.. on the contrary. I t does not follow that it is logically erroneous. The usefulness of these mappings. the individuals sharing a flexible belief system easily accept changes but lack outward dynamism. On the other hand. IDEOJ. to define concepts ex adverso. better. we are now in a position to perceive clearly the placement of the ideological and pragmatic varieties of belief systems. and the extent to which crucial distinctions are often bypassed.1969 POLITICS.

when the overall distribution of the elements gravitates around quadrants' IV and 111. the lesser the elements contained in quadrant IV. returns from box I1 to box I.g. by the passage from box I to box 111. or richness. ~ 3 As for the c) diminishing distance between two or more ideologies.406 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. in this connection. but the feebler the gravitational attraction of each noyeau. with respect to the base 1918-20 the thirties represented a decline of ideology. If "end" is meant seriously. Daniel Bell and S. and it seems to me that the late sixties reveal no decline. What do we mean by decline of ideology. while in the latter the elements are loosely connected and follow. However. a ) With reference to the first property. If belief systems are broken down into elements. Decline of Ideology Hypothesis. cit. 1964). pp. a t best. ~ ~ "Jean Meynaud's book on the Destin. op. b ) their correlative constraining power. a t least in forecasting terms. cit. b ) With regard to the second property. but the 1946-50 period represented an increase of ideology with respect to a pre-war base. On the other hand. A real decline of ideology is safely indicated. . (Cappelli ed. a belief system can be rich (articulate) or poor (inarticulate)?z A rich belief system is necessarily explicit and contains a relatively large number of elements. Lipset are the standard references on the subject. two very different processes. Let us now turn to the problem of defining ideology and pragmatism as concrete belief systems. p. 37-112. in reality. a mere process of growing "affinity" or of t The expression end of ideology pushes the matter further. In the real world. Moreover. If so. But one can hardly be more specific until an additional set of distinctions is brought to bear on the discussion. "Dahl. an ideological pattern can be identsed as such when the overall distribution of the belief-elements gravitates-with reference to the scheme utilized so far-around quadrants I and 11. with respect to the late fifties. Conversely. This is not to deny the possibility of spill-overs in other boxes as well. pp. 210-211 and 241. This is the suggestion perceptively set forth by Dahl (op. "Another possibility is that the decline of ideology amounts--all other conditions remaining equal -to a convergence among different ideologies. cit. The two patterns fall wide apart with reference to their respective centers of gravity. 5-8). it calls for an overall transformation of an ideological belief system into a pragmatic belief system. Destino delle Zdeologie.... are only to be expected and not difficult to obtain. Varieties and variations within each concrete belief system can be very great. they can be classified with respect to the following properties: a ) their relative articulation. Raymond Aron. c) their divisibility in belief strata corresponding to belief publics. then. in this respect the argument largely hinges on the point in time chosen as parameter. by implication.30 If the question is. as suggested by the following rule of thumb: an ideological polity will be less ideological the lesser the elements contained in quadrant I . This is. transl. the hazardous nature of the prediction. i. a belief system may be strongly corntraining or feebly constraining: in the former the elements are tightly related in a "quasi-logical" fashion.e. M. 3. a pragmatic polity will be less pragmatic. Figure 6 underpins how many conditions need to be satisfied and. 63 FIG. However. Figure 5 shows that we are liable to confuse. a poor belief system has a low degree of explicitness and consists of relatively few elements. the greater the diffusion. or in the sense that the distinctive elements which oppose the various belief systems become feebly or more feebly held.. this shift does not necessarily indicate a point of no return. in this case the "decline" would be an optical illusion. See it. for the process described is.5. especially pp. I IDEOLOGY --The I1 fixed elements become weakly held I11 The closed elements become open decline or end of ideology debate. but resurgence. A shift from box I to box I1 merely reflects a decline of emotive intensity and amounts to a relatively easy and easily predictable transformation. E. At least in short run terms (from one to two generations). "As Convene puts it. for it involves a radical change in the mental posture. conversely. a transformation of fixed into firm belief-elements is not an easy transformation. des Zdeologies is actually a review and a discussion of the decline of ideology literature. from cooler to warmer politics. admittedly. loc. either in the sense that the opposed "disbelievers" come to share a greater number of beliefs in common. Conversely.. and therefore the overlaps. an "idiosyncratic" ~ y n t a x . esp. a shift from closedness to o p e n n e s ~ . very vague.. the polity can be identified as being pragmatic.

inner-directed system of orientation. p.. Second. if we deal with one belief public at a time."34 The hypothesis is highly plausible on the ground of its sheer logical force. quasi-logical-and therefore constraining-belief system corresponds to an elite belief system. then you will also believe that." This means that elite rich belief systems tend to be self-constraining. it equally and especially lacks the information and the inductive capability of deciding on his own how a specific event relates to a general principle. Furthermore. 216... 6 IDEOLOGY I Fixed elements become I11 open-and become II - Weakly heldand become IV ENI) I iopellj flexible1 OF IDEOLOGY stratification aspect. the order of investigation suggests that precedence should be given to the rich elite belief systems. IDEOLOGY. First. investigations are rewarding only if the public under investigation is clearly identified. p. The first provide a self-steering. Third. These properties. and specifically to which principle. they are constraining in that they are presented in such terms: "If you believe this. articulate.e. and disappear rather rapidly as one Zbid. the argumentative chain is grasped only by the attentive. aVee Converse. It should be clear. The correspondence between the richness of a belief system and various levels of belief publics is hypothesized by Dahl as follows: "In every country the number of identifiable elements ('richness') in the political belief system of different individuals is most highly related to (1) the amount of political activity an individual engages in. hazardous. then. p. the grasp of what goes with what in the deductive chain of a highflown. op. inarticulate. The implication is that elite publics are largely in a position to manipulate mass publics. the latter require. what "follows in suchand-such ways" is not easy to follow-I mean. political information. a poorly explicated. if the argument of Dahl is combined with the "constraint argument" of Converse. p. recognized by a distinct belief-group. . two conclusions appear reasonably warranted: a ) A rich. without guidance. . belief systems are "diffused in 'packages' which consumers come to see as 'natural' wholes". 248: "Ideological The argument can be recapitulated as in Figconstraints in belief systems decline with decreasing ure 7. The thesis is."S7 On the other hand. appear highly correlated. which is to say that they are I propose to elaborate on the relevance of present among elites at the 'top' of political systems . at least for dynamic purposes. AND BELIEF SYSTEMS FIG. that "elites" also include so-called counter-elites. cit. mass belief publics appear to be de- pendent variables of elite belief publics. but also appears. disconnected-and therefore relatively unconstraining-belief system.. cit. moves 'downward' into their mass clienteles.. a number of consequences follow. loc. End of Ideology Hypothesis. Yet the thesis is largely implied in the basic finding of Converse that at the lower levels individuals "lack the contextual grasp of the [belief] system to recognize how they should respond to it without being told by elites who hold their confiden~e. i. (2) the level or extent of his political interest. and is supported on empirical grounds by the factual evidence reviewed by Converse. . 212. abstract argument. If the foregoing is correct. . in this latter connection."~~ On the one hand.35 b) I n comparison. articulate citizen. in whatever country.POLITICS. the various "belief strata" can be identified by the amount of political information received and absorbed by each belief-public. 4 . The last suggestion is not only crucial. whereas poor and poorly articulated belief systems are basically hetero-constraining. and only if each stratum is measured in accord with its standards. mass publics are likely to display. the term applies to whichever authorities happen to be 34 Dahl. and (3) the amount of formal education he has had. however." " Zbid. or aspects. a t first. The inarticulate public not only lacks. other-direction. that a poorly articulated belief system becomes constraining if and when subjected to "linkage-guidance. for it follows in such-and-such ways.

Indeed I would go as far as to say that this discussion edges on meaninglessness unless the distinction is sought at the elite belief level. the acquisition of a pragmatic mentality: they may simply mean a loss of beliefs and thus increased apathy and indifference. in themselves. that the take-off point of an ideological elite is likely to be situated in quadrant I. I would say that Lane's "latent ideology)' can either become. to the extent that each elite remains as it is-either ideological or pragmatic-the respective areas of variation can be represented as in Figure 8. that the ideologic or pragmatic qualification of mass publics-of the latent beliefs-is largely decided by the forensic beliefs. at the forensic level. p. and always assuming a hypothetical "non-exposure. Assuming "The distinction between "latent" and "forensic" is borrowed from Robert E. an ideological or a pragmatic type of political belief system. at the lower belief stratum there is no reason to assume that in response to a situation of stress shifts from quadrants I1 to I necessarily represent.THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW F I ~ . Mixes and Variations of Mass Publics. in the sense that the ideology-pragmatism bifurcation should be traced back to the original impetus with which a belief system was launched by the founding fathers. in fact. I More ideological elites I11 c - - Less pragmatic elites --- I1 Less ideological elites IV High Intolerance - High conservatism 'or traditionalism I More pragmatic elites High indifference A ." mass belief systems are likely to be largely undifferentiated. My conjecture is. Likewise. 16. in themselves. It should be acknowledged that so far we have been explaining "ideology" more than FIG. This is to suggest. By contrast. 7. IDEOLOGY AND CONFLICT F I ~8.9. whereas a pragmatic elite public is likely to vary across a mix of "open" strong-weak elements (boxes I11 and IV). Meanwhile I only wish to make the point that unless one distinguishes among the various belief strata he is hardly in a position to discuss ideology and pragmatism qua concrete belief systems. the independent area of variation of mass belief publics is more likely to be the one suggested in Figure 9. Breakdowns and Properties of Belief Systems. that under unexposed "rest conditions" any mass public would display at best a latent political belief system. this appears to be a very unlikely pattern. Lase. .the suggestion implicitly conveyed by the table is that an "open-firm" political belief system typically represents an elite achievement. however. Therefore. According to the hypothesis. r Belief Systems - Belief Strata r Elite Publics I Rich I I I I I I i Intermediary publics 0 -1 Properties Self-constraining Quasi-logical I I I I Poor t Mass Publics i Unconstraining (or) Hetero-constraining C these points in the final section. Mixes and Variations of Elite Belief Publics. whereas the take-off point of a pragmatic elite is likely to be in quadrant 111. an increase of ideologism: they are more likely to signify a sheer growth of intolerance. Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press. If so. by the elite belief systems to which mass publics are exposed. For a latent state of belief left to itself. As for the blank of quadrant 111.38 The argument should be placed. In line with my preoccupations. over time an ideological elite public is likely to vary across a mix of "closed" strong-weak elements (boxes I and 11) . largely amorphous with respect to the ideology-pragmatism distinction. 19621. 111. shifts from quadrants I1 to I11 do not necessarily indicate. then. in perspective.

At the other end. With regard to the problem of conflict and consensus the question is: how do two or more belief systems relate to one another? If belief systems are compared among themselves. Conversely. On these premises our earlier distinctions between fixed. Hopefully we have thrown light in a compartment of our black box.e. and the relations between the corresponding belief groups will be consensual: cooperation is likely. In essence. but the chances and the ways of conflict resolution are conspicuously different.. disregarding for the moment the nature of the elements-political conflict reflects the rise of a controversy which taps the distinctive elements of two (or more) belief systems. firm and flexible belief-elements40 immediately outline three typical patterns of interrelation between different belief systems and belief groups. political conflict (in its autonomy vis B. We can also obtain. the less numerous. if the distinctive elements are not only closed but also passionately held we shall have "ideological warfare.39 I t is also convenient to assume that the belief-elements that really matter are the "central" ones. With regard to the pure and simple distribution-i. * Dahl. IDEOLOGY. Of course. for the more numerous the (central) distinctive elements. However. strong and lasting solidarity ties." For the present discussion the "inelastic elements" will be neglected." the controversy will be ideological. a belief group whose common elements are open and feebly held will display "pragmatic consensus. This preliminary argument can be reformulated also along the lines suggested in Figure 10. I shall argue that ideology is an important variable in explaining conflict. a belief group whose common elements are closed and strongly held will display "ideological cohesion.e.e. the sharing of common belief-elements indicates the area in which we obtain political consensus. However the intensity and scope of conflict may vary greatly." that is. ephemeral and feeble solidarity ties. At one end. op. We are thus referred to the question: which is the distribution of which elements? If the central distinctive elements are "closed. the fewer the distinctive elements. the fewer the (central) distinctive elements. however.e.. Of course. Second. In this case the . The same applies to the shared elements. if they are "open" it will be pragmatic. Supra. the more the distinctive elements are open and feebly felt. and the relations between the corresponding belief groups will be of the bargaining type: mutual adjustment is possible.0. discipline and active dedication to the whole.." the relation is incompatibility and conflict is unmanageable.1969 POLITICS. At one end. what does the term explain? I suggest that the question can be squarely met a t least in two respects. that is. vis economic conflict. cit.e. At the other end. the greater the amalgamation and the convergence. between two belief systems which are both ideological or b~th pragmatic. crucial variable: the nature of the distinctive elements. the more we shall obtain "pragmatic transactions" and relations of mutual adjustment. 2. 1 AFFECT jzzGq DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS Many $ High Few 1Low - iii) If the distinctive elements are firm (i. Conflictual versus Consensual Politics. whereas the elements that differentiate one belief system from another are the distinctive elements. then. i. or conflicts of interest) largely depends on which distinctive elements are distributed how within a national community or across nations. some belief-elements may be shared. I n either case controversy is inevitable. the easier the coexistence. and the relations between the corresponding belief groups will definitely be conflictual: conciliation is impossible. First. Figure 10 accounts for two variables-the numerical magnitude and the emotional intensity of the elements-but fails to account for a third. and a tendency to dissolve into multiple loyalties. closed and strongly held) two belief systems are incompatible or mutually exclusive. FIG.. the lesser the occasions of conflict. i) If the distinctive elements are fixed (i. p. and they are the common elements. A N D BELIEF SYSTEMS 409 using "ideology" to explain. open and weakly held) two belief systems are coalescent or fusible. the greater the hostility." which means low cohesion. Yet the question remains: having explained the term. capable of peaceful coexistence. ii) If the distinctive elements are flexible (i. Thus far we have hypothesized relations among homogeneous belief systems. heterogeneous interrelations between pragmatic and ideological belief groups.. consensus and cohesion. Figure 2 : "Typology of belief-elements.. open but strongly held) two belief systems are compatible. I shall argue that ideology is the decisive variable in explaining mass mobilization and manipulation.

A blind game results in which misinterpretation. The two mentalities simply do not fit: their very logic. belief systems vary. Third and correlatively: The more a belief "The need. The import of these qualifications is readily apparent in the light of the most crucial aspect of belief systems. and even less to predict. we are easily misled into believing that ideological conflicts can be reduced to underlying economic conflicts which can be cured with economic medicines. IDEOLOGY . 63 additional complication is a serious communication lag. and that the in-group cohesion of an ideological community is a far cry from the ingroup solidarity of a pragmatic community. ii) emotive intensity. each belief group is inevitably prompted to project its own forma mentis on the opposing group. in this case the logic of interest no longer suffices to explain. whereas in pragmatic belief systems the "means" tend to be more central. With regard to accessibility. namely. the more a belief system will elicit normative. unless we are sensitized to the existence of distinctly ideological publics and belief systems we are likely to miss the very nature of "big conflict. attention should be called to the following hypotheses. and "which event goes with which principle" (event-principle linkage) escape the grasp of mass publics and require elite guidance. IV. in general. and finally.42 But now the argument can be pinned down. and much to the bewilderment of the pragmatist. the foregoing equally alerts us to the fact that ideological consensus is not the same as pragmatic consensus. with respect to the following characteristics: i) accessibility either to argumentative demonstration or to factual "Interest is understood here as the utility scale of each individual. I t is unnecessary to elaborate further on the first set of basic characteristics. iii) rich-poor articulation. . of ideological belief systems is far more universal and "totalistic" than the coverage of the pragmatic belief systems. easily hetero-constrained. ideological politics represents a situation in which the utility scale of each actor is altered by an ideological scale. the more abstract a belief system. frustration and a spiral of distrust play the major roles. if not futuristic or even chiliastic responses and behavior. the hypothesis is that in ideological belief systems the "ends" constitute the central elements. political behavior. goal-oriented. ideological belief systems soar on a far more remote. iii) level of abstraction. With respect to their cultural matrixes belief systems vary. Likewise. in the sense that poorly articulated believers need guidance not only for the horizontal inter-belief linkage. ii) centrality of the belief-elements. For instance. if not the inevitability of guidance is also the conclusion implicitly conveyed by the literature on the closed and open mind. In particular Rokeach brings out neatly the extent to which cognitive closedness is exposed to manipulation from the authorities. as we know. misperception. Conversely.410 THE AMERICAN POLIT 'ICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. their constraining power." With regard to the centrality of the beliefelements. As for the additional underpinnings. or the space for expansion. according to the following three points.41 But in the ideological actor the "logic of interest" combines with a "logic of principles." For instance. we are likely to miss the fact that the dialogue of politics may well be a dialogue among deaf men. In conclusion. On the other hand. hardly to empirical proofs. evidence. abstruse and highflown level of discourse than the pragmatic belief systems. the hypothesis is that to the extent that the ideological mentality receives external communications. it is receptive to rational demonstration. with regard to comprehensivenes8. the more "what follows from what" (inter-belief linkage). With regard to the abstraction ladder. Hence. the pragmatic actor tends to assume that interests and conflicts of interestsalong a continuum ranging from total coincidence of interest to zero-sum conflict-suffice to explain and to predict political behavior. Correlatively. Second: The more abstract a belief system.iND MASS MANIPULATION Before turning to the explanatory value of "ideology" vis & vis the unprecedented scale of contemporary mass manipulation-which is also my major and most comprehensive point-it will be necessary to recapitulate. and iv) constraining power. First: The greater the centrality of the belief elements designating ends. are different. as perceived by the interested party according to the culturally accepted standards of economic rationality. the route travelled thus far. Having reference to the more basic features. It was suggested earlier that mass publics are. On the other hand. however sweepingly. along the following dimensions: i) closed and open cognition. but also for the vertical event-principle linkage. the coverage. and iv) comprehensiveness. the more it allows for elite manipulation and maneuvering. their Gestalten. Hence. the pragmatic mentality is open to evidence far more than to the "reasons of reason. in addition." I n fact.

that and varies as it does. the more it obtains still at a loss when we come to macro-phea totalistic comprehensiveness. however. that we tems increases the more the system is ideologi. And this plines leave unexplained. This is. does not follow any statistical logic trol. and to the extent that." than man. that is the same as saying that ideologies are the cru. In short. satisfies the requirement of causal expla.ideology is crucial to an empirical theory of policial lever a t the disposal of elites for obtaining tics because. whereas the second narrows tualizations explain better. Some political systems mobilized and manipulated all along the way display a high extractive capability and succeed that leads to political messianism and fanati. and surely a conclusion that re. ideologies are the hetero-con. as an instrument of mass manipu. If so.sharpen it for the purpose of explaining what matic. cohesiveness. in lar religion.ogy still has an important explanatory role to the condition. at other times the logic of politics is the final analysis. Finally. that is.tain instances we are confronted with monolithic lation." Does political science need the variable ideolquires some justification. and diminishes the more the system is prag. no less "matter of fact. but in other instances we find "this is what the term indicates. with the power of man over no less practical. passionate and trustful cism." we are also equivalent political units characterized by a saying "this is why we have ideological politics. allegiance. At the outset of this exploration I had two ogy to explain. Kevertheless we are temporal boundaries. then.1969 POLITICS. the single major reason that ideology is so important to us. We are concerned times it is a mystique. The foregoing forcibly suggests. AND BELIEF S Y S ~ M S 411 system transcends common sense spatial and in politics the way they do. and provided.ent types of "deafness. then. At this stage we are not merely saying. At seems to me. the diaYet the reader may feel that this is a too nar. with how populations and nations can be the logic of economics. the concept of ideolthe hetero-constraining potentiality of belief sys.political units characterized by extraordinary nation. thereby providing the guideline fore. Politics is not a monotonic phenomenon. therethe problem.logue of politics is confronted with very differrow conclusion. of high or low affect. the more it calls nomena and try to understand why the distribufor elite interpretation and facilitates elite con.in eliciting enthusiastic. I n cermobilization. One was: What should we and variations? My reply has been in the affirseek to explain? The other one was: What is it mative. that the use of "ideology" is restricted to that I have resolved to follow." hopeless lack of solidarity ties.play-under cal.other convergent conceptualizations and discistraining belief systems par excellence. But the first query (worse) that which other disciplines or concepis virtually limitless. a matter of faith. it is condupolitical mobilization and for maximizing the cive to the understanding of variations and varipossibilities of mass manipulation. By now we know the meanings that appear to have a unique exa great deal about why individuals act and react planatory value. provided we do not overload the concept that remains unexplained? Clearly these are the in pursuing ambitious attempts to explain two sides of a same question. My view is. a secuabout ideologies because we are concerned.tion of the "open" and "closed" minds. IDEOLOGY. other political systems display a low The focus on ideology as a lever of political mobilizational and extractive capability. these varieties queries in mind. it eties. a t least in part. .

Stable URL: http://links. 1. No. 1969). 2. 2. Vol. No. If you are trying to access articles from an off-campus location. 3. (1961).CO%3B2-T 26 Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government Hannah Arendt The Review of Politics. pp. Please visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR. 129-149. [Footnotes] 15 "Myth" and "Ideology" in Modern Usage Ben Halpern History and Theory. Stable URL: http://links. 15. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.Page 1 of 1 - You have printed the following article: Politics. (Jun.CO%3B2-P NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list. (Jul. Vol. . 398-411.org LINKED CITATIONS . 303-327. pp. No.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28196906%2963%3A2%3C398%3APIABS%3E2.CO%3B2-Y This article references the following linked citations.jstor. Ideology. 63.jstor. Vol.jstor. you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. and Belief Systems Giovanni Sartori The American Political Science Review.0. 1953)..http://www.0.org/sici?sici=0018-2656%281961%291%3A2%3C129%3A%22A%22IMU%3E2.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28195307%2915%3A3%3C303%3AIATANF%3E2. pp..0.

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