1 ILRLR 3860 Professor Salvatore 18 November, 2011 African-Americans and the New Deal Coalition The identification

of the Republican Party as the Party of Abraham Lincoln—and, by extension, of the Emancipation Proclamation—persisted for decades after Lincoln‘s death. Over the course of only two decades, however, this perception was shattered. Throughout the 1920‘s, the Republican Party began to take the black vote increasingly for granted. This callous disregard for decades of support allowed many African–Americans to consider breaking with the Republicans and during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and later Harry Truman, they did just that. After 1936, blacks voted for the Democratic Party in record numbers. While the transition was not instantaneous, it was the inevitable result of two major features of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations as well as Republican neglect. First, the New Deal, though imperfect, provided economic opportunities and services desperately needed during the depths of the Depression. More importantly, however, was the willingness of both presidents to break with Southern Democrats to cooperate with African–American leaders and take concrete action on specific civil rights issues. Despite the legacy of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the Emancipation Proclamation, by the 1920‘s, many in the Republican Party paid only fleeting attention to the concerns of African–Americans. The Harding and Coolidge administrations both dedicated significant effort towards cultivating a ―lily–white‖ Southern Republican Party in order to crack the Democrat‘s ―Solid South.‖1 To avoid alienating potential Southern voters, Harding, and later Coolidge, avoided taking any significant civil rights action. For example, while both men publicly abhorred the practice of lynching, neither seriously pushed for a federal anti–lynching law—even after 1922 when the Dyer bill passed the house.2

2 Given the Harding–Coolidge record, it is hardly surprising that some African–Americans were beginning to distrust the Republican Party. Northern Democrats, like New York Governor Al Smith, sensed an opportunity to break part of the Republican coalition. After being nominated for the presidency in 1928, Smith contacted Walter White, then assistant executive secretary of the NAACP, about managing a campaign among blacks. 3 White saw the arrangement as an opportunity to ―[wrest] domination of the Democratic Party from the southern bourbons and [vest] it in the hands of the North and East.‖4 Smith‘s running mate, however, Sen. Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, convinced Smith to drop the idea.5 Nevertheless, Smith‘s campaign attracted significant support among urban blacks compared to previous years. In Chicago, for example, not only did the Defender endorse Smith, but the Democratic ticket received 27 percent of the vote in black precincts—compared to 11 percent in 1920 and 10 percent in 1924.6 In Harlem, 28 percent of blacks voted for Smith; 28 percent also voted Democratic in 1924, but only 3 percent had in 1920.7 Ultimately, Smith was reluctant to seriously risk the support of white voters to court African–Americans. Since neither Smith nor his opponent, Herbert Hoover, were willing to speak substantially about civil rights or other key issues, black voting patterns remained essentially unchanged.8 Unfortunately for African–Americans, Hoover proved to be no better than his predecessors. Not only did he continue to build a lily–white Southern Republican Party, he relied on those white Southerners to shape his response to racial issues, introducing new offenses as well. In 1930, Congress appropriated money for women who had lost sons and husbands in World War I to travel to Europe to visit the graves; the War Department ordered these ―Gold Star Mothers‖ to be segregated on the voyage overseas.9 The NAACP bitterly protested this decision, but Hoover declined to intervene. Many black women chose not to go rather than endure the insult.10

3 Hoover‘s record on appointments was also dismal, specifically his nomination of John J. Parker to the Supreme Court. Parker‘s views on race were questionable at best. While running for governor of North Carolina in 1920, Parker was quoted as saying, ―The Negro as a class does not desire to enter politics. The Republican party of North Carolina does not desire him to do so. We recognize that he has not yet reached the stage in his development when he can share the burdens and responsibilities of government.‖11 In response to these comments, the NAACP launched a vigorous lobbying effort to block Parker‘s confirmation12 Moreover, after Parker‘s confirmation was defeated, the Association organized a campaign against four pro–Parker senators in the elections of 1930 which helped two to lose their seats.13 These political campaigns galvanized African–American voters in the lead up to the 1932 presidential elections. Many African–Americans, however, still distrusted the Democratic Party. In 1932, the Democrats nominated another New York governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt. In contrast to the Catholic, immigrant background of Al Smith, Roosevelt was an American patrician with little personal experience in the problems of race relations.14 Moreover, Roosevelt‘s running mate, Speaker of the House John Nance Garner of Texas, inspired little confidence of a renewed Democratic attitude towards African–Americans; the Democratic equal rights plank did not even mention race.15 Nevertheless, Roosevelt displayed a remarkably progressive attitude towards racial issues and his comments foreshadowed his later action. In Detroit, for example, Roosevelt stated that, ―I believe in equal economic and legal opportunity for all groups, regardless of race, color or creed.‖16 Meanwhile, Hoover continued to mismanage the issue of race. The Republican equal rights platform was no more than a vague appeal to history and, according to the Chicago Defender, ―a worthless political sop to members of our Race.‖17 Additionally, his lackluster response to the Depression was compared to his maladministration of the 1927 Mississippi flood relief as Secretary

4 of Commerce, both of which disproportionately affected blacks.18 Later in the campaign, an editorial in the Kansas City American exclaimed that while Roosevelt may be unknown, nothing could be worse than Hoover.19 Yet on Election Day, though Roosevelt won an overwhelming victory, most blacks chose to remain with the Republican Party. Only in New York City, with the help of Tammany patronage, were the Democrats able to obtain greater than 50 percent of the black vote.20 In fact, in Chicago, Cleveland and Knoxville, the Republicans surpassed their 1928 percentages.21 Given the slights of the Hoover administration and the depth of the Depression, Roosevelt was presented with an opportunity to permanently alter black voting patterns. It certainly helped that expectations were low for a Democrat; Walter White commented that while Democrats may not do much nationally for blacks, they would also likely not do much active harm which, he said, ―will be a vast improvement over the past four years.‖22 Roosevelt‘s programs to help the ―forgotten man‖ therefore greatly exceeded expectations. African–Americans, already on the economic margins of society were devastated by the Depression. By 1931, unemployment rates had reached 60.2 percent among black men in Detroit, compared to 32.4 percent among white men; in Chicago, the rate was 43.5 percent to 29.7 percent and in New York it was 26.8 percent to 21 percent.23 As New Deal relief programs began operation, African–Americans began to see a new Democratic Party. Prominent members of the Roosevelt administration were well known to be friendly to black advancement. Harold Ickes, for example, was Roosevelt‘s Secretary of the Interior and responsible for running the Public Works Administration; he had also been president of the Chicago branch of the NAACP during the early 1920‘s.24 The P.W.A. was an absolutely massive program—its $3.3 billion appropriation was worth 5.9 percent of 1933 GDP—and Ickes made sure that blacks could find employment on its projects.25 The P.W.A. issued a prima facie definition of discrimination which established minimum payroll quotas for both skilled and unskilled black

5 workers.26 In 1977, one Sterling Tucker recalled that, ―when I was a kid, P.W.A. meant, ‗Poppa‘s working again.‘‖27 Other programs of the New Deal had similar, immediate effects on African–American families. The Civilian Conservation Corps not only paid a wage but taught skills as well. By 1936, there were CCC camps run entirely by black officers and the program itself was 10 percent black.28 According to one observer, young blacks who joined the CCC gained significant prestige, ―[it] was as important as going to Princeton University—they had status.‖29 Along with the CCC, the National Youth Administration performed a similar task; additionally, NYA administrator Aubrey Williams was equally if not more concerned with racial equality than Harold Ickes.30 The NYA also had a Division of Negro Affairs which provided part time employment for black high school and college students as well as tuition assistance. Through the influence Williams and the Division, the NYA became one of the most forward thinking agencies in the government.31 No program, however, rivaled the size and influence of the Works Progress Administration. The W.P.A. was funded by a $4.88 billion emergency appropriation worth 6.7 percent of 1935 GDP.32 While W.P.A. administrator Harry Hopkins was not as vigilant in preventing discrimination as Harold Ickes, the W.P.A. nevertheless provided life altering jobs and relief. One former W.P.A. worker remembered that while discrimination existed, ―before [the W.P.A.] blacks had no bread. Black folk have never been so crazy as to wait for things to be perfect.‖33 Other W.P.A. workers directly correlated their votes with their work as the 1936 presidential election approached. A worker in Springfield, Ohio wrote to President Roosevelt saying, ―I was suffering when you took your seat, but now I eat and live so much better I am insisting everybody I can to vote for you. I don‘t think it‘s fair to eat Roosevelt bread and meat and vote for Gov. Landon.‖34 The success of these New Deal programs in reaching African–Americans should not be misconstrued to say that there were no problems of racial discrimination. Indeed, many New Deal

6 Programs were designed with loopholes that allowed the defecto exclusion of many blacks. Local control of WPA projects allowed hiring and pay discrimination and the Social Security Act and Wagner Act both excluded agricultural and domestic workers.35 These compromises were due to, among other things, lengthy tenure among Southern Democrats. Congressional seniority rules gave long serving Southerners control of powerful committees; for example, the Senate Finance Committee was chaired by Sen. Byron Harrison of Mississippi, the Senate Majority Leader was Sen. Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, and in the House, Rep. Howard W. Smith of Virginia chaired the Rules Committee.36 Simply focusing on the racial compromises of the New Deal, however, misses a fundamental point as to why the relief that was provided to African–Americans was so important. The vast majority of blacks had been all but excluded from public life by every administration since Reconstruction. Under the New Deal, blacks were once again brought into public life. Charles Matthews, the first black Democratic ward chairman in Newark, explained that, ―discrimination or not, we were participating.‖37 Moreover, given the severity of the Depression, even the smallest bit of participation had the potential to save lives. Bishop William J. Walls, a key figure in the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church and a lifelong Republican, explained his party switch in exactly those terms; ―by reaching for the ‗forgotten man‘ with the arm of the government [Roosevelt] kept millions of people from starving.‖38 Not all establishment black Republicans, however, followed Bishop Walls‘ example. Black Republican leadership had ossified during the general neglect of the 1920‘s into a self interested group of men whose only job was to secure the black vote in exchange for patronage jobs for friends and relatives.39 This system further pushed blacks, especially the young and college educated, away from the Republican Party. ―All of us were completely disgusted with and critical of the so– called Republican Negro leaders,‖ recalled Robert C. Weaver, who had a doctorate in economics

7 from Harvard.40 As the New Deal began to make an impact, insurrection against these leaders became practical. In Chicago, Republican congressman Oscar DePriest, the first black congressman elected since reconstruction, lost the 1934 election to Arthur W. Mitchell, who became the first black Democratic congressman ever.41 The Roosevelt administration made its case to African–Americans on more than just the economic grounds men like Harold Ickes and Aubrey Williams controlled. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt in particular provided an example of interracial friendship and cooperation never before seen in the White House. Mrs. Roosevelt maintained close relationships with important black leaders both within and without the administration such as Walter White and Mary McLeod Bethune.42 Ordinary blacks as well admired her for her dedication to service. In a letter to the President, one woman wrote, ―if you can‘t help me, write and let me know, so I can write Mrs. Roosevelt, for I am sure she can help me.‖43 The First Lady was also happy to speak at largely black crowds, such as the Urban League‘s twenty–fifth anniversary conference in 1935 or at a fundraising drive for the Washington branch of the NAACP.44 The Pittsburgh Courier called her, ―a living example of what interracial relations should be‖ and her actions certainly shaped black perceptions of the New Deal and the Democratic Party.45 President Roosevelt was willing to make unprecedented appearances as well, though sometimes to a lesser degree than the First Lady. On a 1933 trip to Nashville, for example, Roosevelt stopped at Fisk University to hear the Jubilee Singers; similarly, on a trip to Atlanta, he stopped at Atlanta University and addressed a crowd of 20,000 blacks assembled on the athletic fields.46 An editorial in the Baltimore Afro–American declared Roosevelt to be setting, ―an example of interracial behavior unprecedented in recent memory.‖47 As president, however, Roosevelt could also do much more than his wife by creating positions for blacks within the government itself. In an effort to combat the loopholes for discrimination Congress created, Roosevelt did exactly that and

8 began appointing ―racial advisers‖ to both New Deal agencies and regular government departments.48 While the position of racial adviser was created to enforce the official policy against discrimination in relief programs, the advisers themselves coalesced into an unofficial ―Black Cabinet.‖ By creating the position of racial adviser, Roosevelt also created by default a prominent coterie of highly educated black civil servants which greatly aided in bringing blacks into the public life of the New Deal. Whereas black Republican leadership stifled opportunity for young blacks interested in civil service, Roosevelt created brand new positions.49 Many members of the cabinet also developed close working relationships with the President himself, which simply had not happened under previous administrations. Connections between the White House and the Black Cabinet, however, often extended beyond simple working relationships. Mary McLeod Bethune, Director of Negro Affairs for the NYA, recalled a dinner party where she was seated next to her friend Eleanor Roosevelt, ―I can remember, too,‖ she said, ―how the faces of the Negro servants lit up with pride when they saw me seated at the center of that imposing gathering.‖50 Prior to her involvement in the Roosevelt administration, Bethune had also been a Republican. Describing the reasons for her switching allegiance, Bethune described the potential Roosevelt represented, ―We have seen the path of our opportunities broadened into a wide thoroughfare. He believes truly that all men should have equality of opportunity regardless of race, creed, or color.‖51 Between the economic relief of the New Deal, the prominence of the Black Cabinet, and the inability of the Republican Party to adjust its racial politics, the election of 1936 proved to be a decisive turning point in black voting patterns. At the Republican Convention, credentials fights erupted between lily–white and black–and–tan delegations, while the Democratic Convention not only seated accredited black delegates for the first time, but allowed a black clergyman, Marshall L.

9 Sheppard, to deliver the invocation for one session as well.52 The invocation did prompt a walk out by Sen. ―Cotton Ed‖ Smith of South Carolina, but his protests only served to highlight the changing direction of the Democratic Party. On the campaign trail, the disparities between the two parties continued to accumulate. Republican nominee Alf Landon refused to answer an Afro–American reporter‘s questions on lynching and equal opportunity hiring in the civil service. Landon also provided segregated meals and accommodations at a Topeka rally.53 Moreover, while black members of the White House staff cheerfully campaigned for Roosevelt, Landon‘s black employees confided to a Pittsburgh Courier reporter that they were underpaid and supported Roosevelt since Roosevelt would actually do something for the race.54 On Election Day, Franklin D. Roosevelt won the largest percentage of the popular vote popular vote in history, 60.8 percent.55 Equally impressive were the gains the Democratic Party made among black voters. Nationally, 71 percent of blacks voted for the Democrats.56 In areas like Harlem, the totals rose as high as 81 percent.57 Yet despite the record breaking electoral performance of 1936, the majority of African– Americans still did not identify themselves as members of the Democratic Party.58 The unwillingness of blacks to self–identify as Democrats is unsurprising when one considers that men like Sen. ―Cotton Ed‖ Smith were still powerful members of the party. Roosevelt and liberal Democratic strategists, however, had a different idea. Just as the Roosevelt administration stood up for economic rights, so too would it attempt to stand against the conservatism of Southern Democrats—especially on civil rights. In order to further the New Deal and protect it from congressional conservatives, Roosevelt and his advisors singled out Democratic primaries where conservatives would be vulnerable in 1938. Among those targeted were Sen. Walter George of Georgia, Sen. ―Cotton Ed‖ Smith of South Carolina, and Rep. Howard W. Smith of Virginia, all of whom opposed parts of the New Deal.59

10 More significantly, however, Roosevelt came out against the poll tax as ―inevitably contrary to the fundamental democracy in which we believe.‖60 Unfortunately for Roosevelt, all three men returned to Congress and the administration was forced to back away from attacking the poll tax.61 While the campaign to completely liberalize the Democratic Party was a failure, it at least indicated that the New Deal administration was no friend of Southern racism. The Southern rebuke did not discourage the Roosevelts, least of all Eleanor. In 1939, Howard University attempted to host a concert for Marian Anderson. Anderson had already sung at the White House, but when Howard approached Constitution Hall, the Daughters of the American Revolution refused to rent the building.62 Eleanor Roosevelt, herself a member of the D.A.R., was incensed. Not only did Mrs. Roosevelt publically resign from the D.A.R., she suggested that Howard and the NAACP contact Harold Ickes and the Department of the Interior about a concert at the Lincoln Memorial.63 The efforts of Mrs. Roosevelt and Harold Ickes once again reaffirmed the administration‘s commitment to racial tolerance. A letter to Secretary Ickes read, ―If we had more leaders of the type that you, Sen. Wagner, and our beloved President and Mrs. Roosevelt are, what a grand and glorious country this really would be for the minority groups.‖64 For the president though, the domestic events of 1939 were largely overshadowed by the beginning of a new European war and preparations for American defense. Roosevelt also won a third term in 1940 with a slightly lower popular percentage among both blacks and whites, though he still won 81 percent of the black vote in New York and 82 percent in Pittsburgh.65 As in 1936, Roosevelt won the national black vote without the majority of blacks identifying as Democrats.66 Blacks were, as Walter White pointed out, ―[still] more Rooseveltian…than Democratic.‖67 The coming of war, however, allowed Roosevelt to accomplish more on race than his abortive Party ―purge‖ in 1938. As the war intensified, so too did defense spending. Lucrative government

11 contracts greatly expanded manufacturing industries and subsequently employment unless, of course, you were black.68 Discrimination in hiring plagued many industries in the United States, but no industry in 1940 received more federal money than defense. A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, saw an opportunity to advance the working lives of blacks by getting the same standard of non–discrimination that was applied to relief to be applied to defense contracts as well.69 Randolph and the NAACP began their campaign through Mrs. Roosevelt, who they invited to speak at the Brotherhood‘s annual convention in Harlem; Mrs. Roosevelt, in turn, organized a meeting with the president.70 While Roosevelt initially resisted Randolph‘s demand for a non–discrimination clause in federal contracts, Randolph and Walter White threatened a 100,000 man march on Washington D.C.71 In order to avoid an embarrassing protest march, and with full knowledge of Southern opposition, Roosevelt, Randolph, and White drafted Executive Order 8802, affirming as, ―the policy of the United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin.‖72 The Order even created a Fair Employment Practices Commission to enforce its provisions. Mary McLeod Bethune spoke for many when she called the Order, ―a refreshing shower in a thirsty land.‖73 As the war progressed, Roosevelt‘s rhetoric returned to the days of the early New Deal. In the 1944 State of the Union Address, Roosevelt described his vision of a second economic Bill of Rights, ―under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all—regardless of station, or race or creed.‖74 Roosevelt further underscored the sincerity of this proposal with his actions at the Democratic Convention. Despite being forced to drop Henry Wallace as his running mate because of Wallace‘s liberal views on race, Roosevelt successfully pushed for the strongest civil rights plank ever put in a Democratic platform.75 Many blacks and liberals, however, were

12 disappointed at the loss of Wallace; according to the Chicago Defender, ―it was Wallace who represented more than any platform exactly what the Negro wanted from the Democratic Party.‖76 Sen. Harry S. Truman of Missouri, Roosevelt‘s handpicked successor, would have to prove himself. Unfortunately, Truman‘s opportunity to lead came all too soon. He and Roosevelt won an election with similar results to 1940. Again, the Democrats won the black vote without a majority of blacks considering themselves Democrats.77 Then, on April 12, 1945, Franklin Delano Roosevelt died in Warm Springs, Georgia and Harry S. Truman became the President of the United States.78 For a compromise candidate between the South and Northern liberals, Truman already had a surprisingly good record on race. In the Senate, Truman had stood strongly against the poll tax.79 He was also known for a speech given to black delegates at the Democratic Convention of 1940.80 When the responsibilities of ending World War Two were over, Truman‘s dedication to civil rights would become more apparent. By December, 1946, Truman was anxious to return to a peacetime agenda. While the war had ended in August, 1945, the process of demobilization and the reconversion of the economy from military to civilian production kept the nation in an atmosphere of crisis; then, in a serious blow for the new president, the Republicans won control of Congress for the first time since 1930.81 Truman, however, was fearless, and issued Executive Order 9808, which established a multiracial Presidential Committee on Civil Rights.82 Truman‘s motivation stemmed from a September, 1946 meeting with Walter White and other members of the NAACP. White‘s report on increasing racial violence—particularly against returning veterans—enraged Truman, who right then decided something must be done.83 As the Civil Rights Committee prepared its report, Truman continued his efforts to advance the cause of civil rights. On June 29, 1947, Harry Truman became the first president to address the NAACP since its founding in 1909.84 Truman‘s address, delivered on the steps of the Lincoln

13 Memorial, committed himself, the federal government, and, for as long as he was its standard– bearer, the Democratic Party to the cause of civil rights for all Americans. Truman‘s speech called for federal action against lynching and the poll tax as well as equal opportunity in education and employment, ―we cannot wait another decade or another generation to remedy these evils.‖85 Truman‘s speech galvanized his audience. It reminded Walter White of the Gettysburg address. While White considered Lincoln‘s prose superior, ―[Truman‘s speech] had been a more courageous one in its specific condemnation of evils based upon race prejudice and its call for immediate action against them.‖86 To White, Truman said he meant ―every word of it—and I‘m going to prove that I do mean it.‖87 The speech itself was broadcast live nationwide at prime time on four major radio networks; it set the stage for October when the Civil Rights Committee would release its report.88 To any careful observer of American race relations, the report issued by the committee did not come as a surprise. The committee enumerated four basic rights: the right to safety and security of person, the right to citizenship and its privileges, the right to freedom of conscience and expression, and the right to equality of opportunity.89 That for many Americans, these rights did not exist was the subject that filled the 178–page report.90 Truman, a veteran of WWI, was especially upset by the treatment of black veterans, ―my very stomach turned over when I learned that Negro soldiers, just back from overseas, were being dumped out of army trucks in Mississippi and beaten.‖91 In his 1948 State of the Union, Truman promised to deliver a special message solely on the subject of civil rights so that congress might consider the issue with the urgency it deserved.92 Truman delivered his special message less than a month after the State of the Union. It was nothing short of a bombshell. To African–Americans it offered the chance for full and open citizenship; for Southern Democrats, it threatened to end a way of life. The message contained a ten point program on civil rights which Truman urged Congress to pass immediately.93 Among the ten

14 points were the establishment of a Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice, a federal anti– lynching law, a permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission, and an end to segregation in interstate travel.94 The reaction was immediate. Not even Roosevelt had proposed such an audacious plan. While Southern Democrats talked of a third party and the Republican majority dragged its feet, Mary McLeod Bethune, now a private citizen, wrote to Truman on behalf of the National Council of Negro Women, ―your insistence upon passing the ten points of the Bill of Rights…is the greatest possible sword and ammunition that can be used…to give America its rightful leadership on the affairs of world unity and brotherhood. God bless you, Mr. President.‖95 Bethune‘s optimism was further supported at the 1948 Democratic National Convention. The young mayor of Minneapolis, Hubert H. Humphrey, won a civil rights plank that fully endorsed Truman‘s ten point plan; in front of the entire convention, Humphrey said, ―the time has arrived for the Democratic Party to get out of the shadow of states‘ rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights.‖96 Humphrey‘s convention battle finally established that which even Franklin Roosevelt could not create—a Democratic Party independent of its Southern branch. Following the convention, Truman‘s impatience with Congress inspired him to issue Executive Orders 9980 and 9981, integrating not only the federal workforce, but the military as well.97 No amount of Southern rage would stop him. Harry S. Truman won the election of 1948 in a spectacular four–way upset. Equally impressive, however, was that for the first time in history, the majority of blacks identified themselves as Democrats and 77 percent of them voted for Truman—6 percent more than voted for Roosevelt in 1936.98 The ability of the Democratic Party to turn from its roots in the Old Confederacy into the Party of Civil and Human Rights is one of the most impressive political stories of the 20th century. The economic opportunities provided by the New Deal, flawed as it was, created the opportunity

15 for Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats to permanently change the racial composition of political coalitions. Roosevelt, and especially his successor Harry Truman, seized that opportunity by choosing to work with African–American leaders and on their own to fully extend the rights of American citizenship to all Americans, regardless of their color.

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1

Nancy J. Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 6. 2 Ibid, 6; ibid, 99. 3 Ibid, 7. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid, 10-11. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, 11. 9 Ibid, 16. 10 Ibid, 17. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid, 20. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid, 24. 17 Ibid, 22. 18 Ibid, 16. 19 Ibid, 27. 20 Ibid, 30. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid, 33. 23 Ibid, 300. 24 Ibid, 51. 25 Jason Scott Smith, Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works 1933– 1956, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2; Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 51. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid, 53. 28 Ibid, 55; ibid, 200. 29 Ibid, 53. 30 Ibid, 174. 31 Ibid. 32 Smith, Building New Deal Liberalism, 2. 33 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 211. 34 Ibid, 214. 35 Nick Salvatore, ―The New Deal.‖ ILRLR 3860. Cornell University. Ithaca, 26 September 2011. 36 Ibid; Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 106-107. 37 Ibid, 211. 38 Ibid, 213 39 Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 48. 40 Ibid. 41 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 84. 42 Ibid, 126. 43 Ibid, 127. 44 Ibid, 125.

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45 Ibid, 122. 46 Ibid, 41-42. 47 Ibid, 42. 48 Ibid, 136. 49 Sullivan, Days of Hope, 48. 50 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 143. 51 Ibid, 144. 52 Ibid, 185. 53 Ibid, 195. 54 Ibid, 201. 55 Ibid, 205. 56 David A. Bositis, Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, (Washington D.C.: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 2004), 9. 57 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 205. 58 Bositis, Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, 9. 59 H.W. Brands, Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 500. 60 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 250. 61 Ibid. 62 Brands, Traitor to His Class, 517. 63 Ibid. 64 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 265. 65 Ibid, 287. 66 Bositis, Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, 9. 67 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 292. 68 Brands, Traitor to His Class, 711. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid, 712. 72 Ibid. 73 Sullivan, Days of Hope, 136 74 ―1944 State of the Union Address,‖ Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, accessed November 30, 2011, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/011144.html 75 Salvatore, ―The New Deal.‖ 76 Sullivan, Days of Hope, 186. 77 Bositis, Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, 9. 78 Brands, Traitor to His Class, 812. 79 David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 323. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid, 467-524. 82 Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), 15. 83 Ibid, 16. 84 Ibid, 28. 85 McCullough, Truman, 570. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.

18

88 89

Ibid; Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights, 29. Ibid, 51. 90 Ibid. 91 McCullough, Truman, 588. 92 Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights, 68. 93 Ibid, 80. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid, 2-3. 96 McCullough, Truman, 639. 97 Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights, 105. 98 Bositis, Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, 9.

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Bositis, David A. Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, Washington D.C.: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 2004. Brands, H.W. Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, New York: Doubleday, 2008. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library. ―1944 State of the Union Address.‖ Accessed November 30, 2011. http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/011144.html Gardner, Michael R. Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002. McCullough, David. Truman, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Smith, Jason Scott. Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works 1933– 1956, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Sullivan, Patricia. Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Weiss, Nancy J. Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

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