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Kargil Whit Paper te
WHITE PA APER KARGIL: A ADVENTURE OR TRAPE! O By M.Siddi ique-Ul-Farooq que PREFACE ects of Kargil defeat have rais so much du that the act sed ust tual facts have become almos obscure from the st m The archite public eye with the openin of the Kargil front, bitter fa ng acts began to unfold through n national and int ternational med dia owledgeable sources of the c country, raising two serious question: g and the kno 1) Had the generals soug the permiss ght sion of the chief executive? 2) Why Pakistan opened this fr f ) n ront after the si igning Declaration? of Lahore D When Paki istan decided to pull out the N troops and Mujahideen fro Kargil after Prime Minister Muhammad NLI om Nawaz Sha arif’s meeting with President B Clinton on J w Bill July 4, 1999, it raised another question: t Who had s suggested the pullout? p Though bit facts about Kargil operatio started beco tter on oming a public knowledge soo after its laun on nching up to th he toppling of the PML-N government, the coup-makers c continued brushing them unde the carpet because the buc for er ck defeat had stop pped right at the door and they were feeling the nose tightening its grip a eir g around their ne eck. this huge d While Pakistan was losing the battle, the military estab g e blishment continued to portray this sure defe as a victory y eat y. when news abo human casualties and the resultant defe began to ex out e eat xpose the gene erals to the nation, However, w they, true t their past tra to adition, laid the blame at some ebody else’s do In this case, it was Prime Minister oor. e Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. When the i inquiry committ ordered by Muhammad N tee y Nawaz Sharif ex xposed the peo ople responsible for the Kargil defeat, the generals toppled the elected government to save their sk and continue to portray th d o kin ed hem as heroes and the prime m minister as villa ain. Though, I w well aware of the bitter fa was e acts in this rega I could not pass them on to the nation b ard, t because the planners of the October 12, 1999 coup h detained m for almost tw years. Soon after my relea in September f 1 had me wo n ase 2001, I tried to defuse the propaganda o the military r e of rulers through s statements and facts-sheets r d released off an on. nd However, It needed to ma a gigantic e ake effort to clear this turbid situa ation. After a thre ee-month toil, I released a wh paper on th Kargil defeat at a news con hite he t nference in Isla amabad on Aug gust 5, 2006 that a flashed by th national and international media on 5th a 6th of Augu as he d and ust. I was snow under with phone calls, w every caller demanding a copy of the wh paper. In th meantime, s wed with r hite he some publishers also expressed their keennes in its publica d ss ation. Feeling e encouraged and buoyant, I de ecided o shape this e er a he se is turbid situation with n white pape into a book and now it is in your hands. Th sole purpos of this book i to clear this t the brush o media report authentic do of ts, ocuments and t statements of comparativ the s vely impartial fig gures. Dear rea aders, while writin this book, I have taken spe ng h ecial care of the health of facts. However, I d not go into t formality of e did the f describing the events in a chronological order rather I adopted the na l arrative style of writing. It rem f mains to be ed n had ia investigate whether or not Musharraf h caught Indi unawares. Praise be t Allah that for the first time in seven years I, in the light o authentic Indian knew abou the operation long to r of ut n before it wa put into a pr as ractical shape a had made all necessary preparation to make Kargil a death cage for the and r Pakistani tr roops and Muja ahideen. I take this opportunity to point out t e that while writin this book I s ng strictly remaine ed objective a about facts and figures and su ubjective about the national in t nterest. The book also mentio the 1965 ons Pakistan-In ndia war, fall of Dhaka, Shimla Agreement a Lahore and Islamabad De f and d eclarations. The book also co ontains the content of the militar oath sworn b the officers o Pakistan Arm at military a ts ry by of my academies. Ref ferences from t the Kargil committee Report (released by In ndian governme and an art ent) ticle written by Bruce Reidel, Special Assista for ant Near Easte and South Asia Affairs at the National Security Council to the former US President B Clinton, hav ern A Bill ve also mentio oned the marty yrdom of our va aliant NLI office and Jawans (May Allah sh ers s hower His bless sings on them! and !) appended an incomplete list of their nam at the end of the book. D mes Dear readers, a according to my information, th y his e hensive docum ment published so far in Pakistan on Kargil m misadventure. H How far I have book is the most compreh succeeded in my endeavor in this regar I leave this d d rd, decision up to y you. I am indeb bted to my teac cher Prof Jamil Azar, Peer Amin-ul-Hasnat Sha Emmint scholar, writer and Journalist Irfa Ghazi, my daughter Maria Farooque, Isht ah d an tiaq Aasi and m former perso my onal staff office Ch Muhamm Ishaq for th help and gu er mad heir uidance during the writing of this g book. I am highly obliged to Peerzada M Muhammad Ibrahim Shah who took special interest to deco o orate beautiful title and attract tive layout. M. Siddique-ul- Farooque e INTRODUC CTION
It has been almost seven years since the humiliating Kargil defeat. Though the actual causes of this military defeat and defects in the operation plan are no secret to a dominant majority of the armed forces, the politicians and the intelligentsia, the nation has been deliberately kept in dark about the bitter facts in this regard. Throughout this limited war, General Pervez Musharraf- the architect of Kargil adventure- and this coterie moved heaven and earth to portray this military defeat as a victory. The Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) too did not lag behind and issued statements on different occasions claiming achievements and contradicting the federal government’s position on Kargil operation that had brought Pakistan and India to the brink of a nuclear war. But its statements carried no weight and no substance. A naïve General Musharraf thought in his heart of hearts that the Indian Leadership did not know about his brainchild (Kargil Operation), but he was living in a fool’s paradise, as they knew about the plan long before it was put into practice and had made all necessary preparations to trap Pakistan and the Kashmiri Mujahideen and extract maximum political, diplomatic and economic benefits. Hardly had general Musharraf launched the Kargil operation then the entire world started tightening the screw on Pakistan asking it to call back its troops from Kargil. The brotherly state of Saudi Arabia, China and G-8 countries including Russia, Japan, France, Germany and United States minced no words in saying that Pakistan should withdraw its Northern Light Infantry troops and Mujahideen from Kargil. When casualties being to mount on the Pakistan side and post after post started falling to the Indian army, General Musharraf beseeched the then Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif to find an honourable way out of for the country and its armed forces. Keeping in mind the future complications for Pakistan, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif found a respectable solution to the crises through the intervention of the then US President Bill Clinton and this way he saved the subcontinent from a sure nuclear war. Kargil debacle led to the death of over 3,000 officers and Jawans of the NLI and Mujahideen. This loss was huge then the country had suffered during the 1965 war. On the other hand, according to a report released by the Indian defence ministry on December 1, 1999, India suffered 524 casualties and injuries to 1,363 officers and Jawans till 26th July 1999 during “Operation Vijay”. Kargil war brought an unquestionable military, diplomatic and economic victory to India, while for Pakistan its proved a multi-layered defeat demoralizing the entire nation and their armed forces. Despite winning the battle, the Indian government constituted a four-member committee on Kargil on 29th July, 1999 headed by K. Subramanyam. The executive summary of this report was posted on the internet on 25th February, 2000 thus bringing the entire world in picture about the operation. On the other hand, General Musharraf purposely and willfully avoided constituting a commission to know about the causes of this humiliating military defeat, fix responsibility and take this experience as a guide for future. After the October 12 military takeover, General Musharraf took the stand that he had taken the then Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif into confidence before launching the Kargil Operation and that he (Nawaz Sharif) had changed hi military victory into a defeat by calling back troops. How far he is true in his claim; we will produce documented evidence in this regard to help the readers draw a conclusion. THE FRONT Some words on Kargil Kargil being a part of Azad Kashmir was under the control of Pakistan. Some of its peaks are as high as 17,000 feet. We lost to India during the 1971 war. Under the Simla Agreement, India released our 93,000 troops and civil servants and gave us back 5,000 square kilometer occupied territory. However, both the countries agreed on a status quo vis a vis the State of Jammu and Kashmir meaning that the area where the armed forces of the two countries were pitched against each other in the state of Jammu and Kashmir was declared Line of Control. After this agreement, Kargil, which was located across the border, went under Indian control. What prompted Kargil Operation? Military experts, politicians and intelligentsia are at a loss to understand what prompted General Musharraf to launch the Kargil Operation when Pakistan had become an atomic power and Lahore Declaration had been signed to solve the lingering Kashmir dispute without compromising national honour and prestige? There are four different sets of opinion in this regard. • . One set of opinion says since the west’s overtures to smooth its relations with India were not bearing the fruit; therefore, it planted this operation on General Musharraf, who in view of his poor military record was straining at the leash to become a hero through CIA. • . The second set of opinion says Indian intelligence agency RAW lured General Musharraf into the Kargil trap keeping in mind his mercurial disposition because India wanted to defuse the mounting pressure on it with regard to Kashmir and milk maximum political, diplomatic and economic benefits by portraying it as a victim of Pakistani aggression. • . The third opinion is that since General Musharraf had failed to get some prestigious military award during his 34-year active service and failed to take back Pakistan peak in 1987, he launched the Kargil operation to become a hero. • . The fourth opinion is that after the signing of Lahore Declaration when it became immensely clear to the military establishment that Kashmir issue was nearing its solution and it would close the chapter of their influence, superiority over politicians and their overt and covert interference in policy-making, they decide to launch the Kargil operation to maintain their superiority. Anyhow, we can’t establish one opinion in this regard. We believe that the day Kargil commission was constituted; the nation will find an answer to not only this conundrum but also the other issues. Planning for Kargil Operation When India occupied Siachen during the rule of the late president and chief of army staff General Ziaul Haq, he had made a planning to occupy Kargil to avenge the Siachen loss. However, the plan was
put on hold in view of the indifference exhibited by the west and the United State to the Indian aggression in Siachen sector that was strategically so important to Pakistan. When PPP Chairperson Benazir Bhutto became prime minister for the second time, the general sought her green signal to go ahead with the plan. But she vetoed the plan. In this regard, we are quoting her statement below. Benazir Bhutto’s disclosure Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on Tuesday said that president Pervez Musharraf had brought the Kargil plan to her when she was prime minister and he was Director General of Military Operations. “Kargil was an absolute disaster,” Benazir said in an interview with the Third Eye Television. “I asked Gen Musharraf what would happen after the execution of his plan. He said he would hoist the flag of Pakistan atop the Srinagar Assembly. I vetoed the plan because I knew we have to surrender the territory when it would come to the international community and that’s exactly what happened.” “So, I wish he had listened to me and not got lost in the brilliance of the military strategy,” she said. (Daily Times, July 02, 2003). Military decides to go ahead with plan When General Musharraf took over as Chief of Army staff on 7th October, 1998, he brought the Kargil plan out of the cabinet and made “a fresh planning” in this regard. Keeping Benazir Bhutto’s experience in view, General Musharraf decided to go ahead with the plan without getting approval of the prime minister. He knew that because of economic sanctions on Pakistan in the wake of 28th May, 1999 nuclear detonations and isolation of the country in the international community due to West’s misperception about the Taliban and Islamization, the prime minister will not approve the plan. The plan was a secret between General Musharraf, the then Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen.Muhammad Aziz, and General Mehmood and what to speak of the Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif even the corps commanders and naval and air chiefs were kept in total dark about it. Scarcely had the ink of the Lahore Declaration (signed between Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee on 21st February 1999) dried off when Pervez Musharaf launched the Kargil Operation on May 8, 1999, opening the floodgates of misfortunes for Pakistan. Biggest flaw in the plan Besides other blunders, the biggest flaw in the Kargil operation plan was that Mujahideen were present in the territory under Indian control and they could not be given full air cover to maintain their position and save themselves from Indian bombing unless Pakistan launched a full-fledged war with India. The international community considered this violation of the Line of Control as aggression due to which it was criticising Pakistan and asking it to withdraw its troops from Kargil. On the other hand, India, with the entire international community firmly on its back, was making the most of its artillery and air power against the Mujahideen. Naming operation after Ghazwa al-Badar General Musharraf named Kargil Operation (al-Badar) after Ghazwa – I-Badar – the first war fought by the Muslims against kufar-i-Makkah under the leadership of Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him). Here, God forbid, our purpose is not to draw a comparison between our Last Prophet Muhammad and a person like general Musharraf. We just want to tell the readers that Musharraf had learnt nothing from the character and military strategies of Prophet Muhammad (peace be Upon him) and his Sahaba (May Allah bless them). Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) had consulted his Sahaba during Ghazwa-i-Badar and had set up an intelligence network that supplied him with up-to- the minute information to help him devise the war strategy. However, an ambitious, aggressive and impatient Musharraf either did not benefit from the reports or he did not trust them at all. During Ghazwa-i-Badar, Prophet (PBUH) changed the position of 313 Muslims with the consultation of his Sahaba and occupied the biggest source of water, closing all others to the discomfort of the enemies. During Ghazwa-i-Badar was being fought under his leadership, the prophet had made the planning with the consultation of his colleagues keeping the chances of defeat in mind. During Ghazawa-i-Badar when Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was arranging the files, the tip of his arrow accidentally slightly hurt the skin of Hazrat Swad bin Ghazia’s belly. Hazrat Sawd said: “Oh the Prophet of Allah, you have hurt me; let me avenge on you.” Hearing this, the Prophet raised his shirt and asked Hazrat Sawd to avenge himself on him. This was the character of the Prophet!!! (Page 283-293, ar-Rahiq al-Makhtoom). On the contrary, General Musharraf failed to emulate Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) and not only dodged the other two services chiefs and the corps commanders but also kept the Kargil Operation plan secret from the chief executive Muhammad Nawaz Sharif to whom he should have been faithful and loyal according to his military oath and the spirit of the constitution. Thinking him a know-all, General Musharraf did not bother to consult his corps commanders. The general based his war plan on sandy foundations in which there was no safe passage for retreat. General Musharraf’s character is no secret from the public. Just to save his hide, he toppled a democratic government and was now saving himself from accountability despite that he was responsible for bringing a humiliating defeat to Pakistan. To be precise, General Musharraf has committed sacrilege by naming Kargil after Ghazwa-i-Badar. Musharraf’s military career Sixty-three-year-old Musharraf (August 11, 1943) completed the 29th PMA Long Course at Kakul and joined the 16th (SP) Field Artillery Regt as 2nd Lieutenant in April 19, 1964. he took part in the 1965 war in Lahore, Khem Kiran and Sialkot sectors as Lieutenant that won him Sanad-i-Imtiaz. Actually, during the 1995 war
in the chawinda (Sialkot) sector in Punjab at night, Musharraf’s battery was bombarded by Indian artillery. Musharraf, however, off-loaded ammunition from the burning gun before it could explode. For this he was “decorated” with Sanad-i-Imtiaz. Military officers know it well that Sanad-i-Imtiaz is nothing but an appreciation letter. After this, he took part in the 1971 was as Company Commander (Major) in the 2nd Battalion of the special services Group (SSG). In 1987, he led the Special Services Group as brigadier in Khiplo near Siachen and in September 1987, he planned to take back Quaid Peak at Bilafond Pass in which he badly failed. In a nutshell, his 23-years active service up to 1987 won him an appreciation letter and military defeat. If Musharraf had done some heroic deed, he would definitely have achieved some prestigious military award and not mere appreciation letter. When he took over as Chief of Army Staff, he launched Kargil Operation to achieve some prestigious military award in order to strengthen his weak profile. Here true to his past record, he suffered another humiliating defeat because of weak planning, brining a bad name to our valiant armed forces. Musharraf’s expectations General Musharraf says he had opened the Kargil front to attract the attention of the international community towards the Kashmir issue and was expecting that after inflicting huge losses on India, the UN will step in to end the war. In an interview to ND TV which was telecast on June 13, 2003 General Pervez Musharaff said, “Let me tell you that before Kargil, Kashmir was dead issue. To avoid Kargil, we need to resolve disputes and much depends on how we proceed on the peace tack”. As a result, the NLI troops and Mujahideen will not only maintain their positions but they would also be able to get reinforcement and arms and ammunition to keep pounding the Indian positions on Siachen, breaking their military supplies. In this way, the general believed, Kashmir issue will rise from its ashes never to die again. General Musharraf and his partners in the plan ignored the fact that during the US and Europe’s proxy war in Afghanistan against the then USSR, General Ziaul Haq had used all resources of Pakistan, including its armed forces, to confine the enemy to the territorial limits of Afghanistan and destroy it there, but when India occupied Siachen, they left Pakistan out on a single limb. Even at that time when the martial law-plagued Pakistan was fighting its war against the former USSR, Europe wanted to make friends with the democratic India despite that it was an ally of its worst enemy. The west just continued patting on back of General Ziaul Haq and did not pressure India to vacate Siachen.
DEVELOPMENTS I Confrontation and its consequences After taking position at different heights of Kargil, Mujahideen started pounding the Indian position down below on May 8 that initially inflicted heavy losses on India. On 27th May a Mig-27, flown by FL. Lt. Nachiketa, attacked Mujahideen positions in Batalik Sector and was shot down. The pilot bailed out safely and landed in the area under the control of Pakistan. Sqadron Leader Ajay Ahuja flying a mig-21 went out of the way to locate the pilot and was in the process jit by Pakistan. The pilot ejected out succumbed to injuries. Flight lieutenant Nachikita and the body of Squadron Ajay Ahuja were later handed over to India. With the launching of the operation, India sped up its activities both on the military and diplomatic front. The print and electronic media and diplomatic channels highlighted their losses and claimed that Pakistan Army regulars had occupied the Kargil heights under the cover of Mujahideen because the weapons being used against them could never be in possession of Mujahideen. According to Bruce Reidel: “Pakistan denied its troops were involved, claiming that only Kashmiri militants were doing the fighting—a claim not taken seriously anywhere.” According to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, “General Musharraf told me that Mujahideen were fighting in Kargil but it was not true.” The strategy won India the support of the international community due to which pressure started building up on Pakistan to withdraw its troops and Mujahideen unconditionally from Kargil or face complete isolation. On the other hand, according to the Kargil Committee Report, “The Indian Army’s response was very rapid and by May 9, two well-acclimatised battalions returning from Siachen had been concentrated in the Batalik sector to contain the intrusion. In the next few days, three more battalions were moved from the valley into the Kargil sector to counter known and possible intrusions in other sub-sector. By May 24, two additional Brigades had moved into the area and the Indian Air force was committed on May 26. by the end of May and additional divisional headquarters had been inducted to take over command of a portion of the Kargil Sector from 3 Infantry Division. This rapid and strong Indian reaction was obviously not expected by the Pakistanis.” Gen VP Malik in his report titled “Lessons from Kargil” in June 2002 disclosed: “India employed about two divisions (including about 250 artillery guns) on the Kargil front, and mounted 1,200 fighters and 2,500 helicopter sorties.” Lt. Gen. (retired) Y.M Bammi in his book “Artillery? The Kargil war” disclosed that 69,800 Bofors (155 mm) shells, 1, 90,000 Filed Gun (105mm) shells, 16,100 Mortar (120mm) shells, 3,400 Medium Gun (130mm) shells, 9,000 Heavy Mortar (160mm) shells and 5,300 Pinaka Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) shells were fired.” As a result, Mujahideen and the NLI companies started wiping out one after the other, allowing the Indian troops to retake all their lost posts one by one. Besides this, India also ordered its Army to advance towards its border with Pakistan and navy to charge towards Karachi under the cover of exercise “Summerex”.
Indian navy in major exercise Indian’s navy had been put on alert because of the Kashmir crisis, a navy spokesman said on Friday, and added that the navy was separately conducting a “major exercise” in the Arabian Sea. “We are on alert in relation to Kargil,” the spokesman said. “But these are regular exercises. It is a major exercise and all types of ships are taking part.” He said frigates, destroyers, submarines and naval aircraft were in the “three-dimensional exercise”. “There are all the three elements. There is surface-to-air, sub-surface and air,” the spokesman said. He said the exercises began a week ago and would continue for about two months,” he said, -Reuters (June 12, 1999). Musharraf in Bejing When General Musharraf visited China in the last week of May, the Chinese leadership made it clear to him that locking horns with India was no sane decision and ultimately Pakistan will have to call back its troops. R&AW bugs Musharraf-Aziz conversation During his stay in China, LT. Gen. Muhammad Aziz talked to General Musharraf about Kargil front by phone on 29th May. The Indian agency RAW bugged their conversation and fed it to the media that published their conversation to the letter, dealing a deadly blow to Pakistan, especially on the diplomatic front. Text of Musharraf-Aziz conversation published by times of India By Dinesh Kumar New Delhi: The following are excerpts of the taped conversation carried out in Urdu and English between Pakistani Army Chief General Musharraf (while in China) and the Pakistani Chief of General Staff LT. Gen. Mohd. Aziz (from Pakistan). On shooting down of the MI-17 helicopter (29 May 1999): Lt. Gen. Mohd Aziz (MA): This is Pakistan Give me room number 83315. Hello. Gen. Pervez Musharraf (PM): Hello Aziz MA: The situation on ground is OK…One of their Mi-17 was brought down. Further, the position is, we had approached to our position, it was brought down… PM: Has this Mi-17 not fallen in our area? MA: No sir. This has fallen in their area. We have not claimed it. We have got it claim through the Mujahideen. PM: Well done. MA: But top wise side, crashing straight before our eyes. PM: Very good. Now are they facing any greater difficulty in flying them? Are they scared or not? This also you should note. Are they coming any less nearer? MA: yes. There is a lot of pressure on them. They were talking about greater air defense then they had anticipated. They can’t afford to lose any more aircraft. There has been less intensity of air flying after that. PM: Very good. First class… On the line Sartaj Aziz must take and the stand on LoC (29 May): MA: “…. There is a development. How you listened to yesterday’s news regarding Mian Saheb (Nawaz Sharif) speaking to his counterpart. He told him that the spirit of Lahore Declaration and escalation has been done by your people. Specially wanted to speak to me thereafter. he told the India PM that they should have waited instead of upping the ante by using air force and other means. He (Sharif) told him (Indian PM) that he suggested Sartaj Aziz could go to New Delhi to explore the possibility of defusing the tension. PM: OK. MA: Which is likely to take place, most probably tomorrow. PM: OK. MA: Our other friend (Lt. Gen. Ziaudin, director General ISI? Or could it be United States) might have also put pressure on. For that, today they will have a discussion at the foreign office about 9:30 am and Zafar Saheb (Lt. Gen. Saeed Zafar, acting Pakistani army chief and commander 11 Corps) is supposed to attend. PM: OK. MA: Aziz sahib (Sartaj Aziz) has discussed with me and my recommendation is that dialogue option is always open. But in their first meeting. They must give no understanding or no commitment on ground situation. PM: Very correct. You or Mehmood (commander X Corps, Rawalpindi) must go with Zafar because they don’t know about the ground situation. MA: This week we are getting together… Zafar sahib will deliberate it. We want to suggest to Zafar that they have to maintain that they will not be talking about ground situation… PM: Idea on LoC. MA: Yes. Hint is that, given that the LoC has many areas where the interpretation of either side is not what the other side believes. So comprehensive deliberation is required. So that can be worked out by the DGMOs (directors General military operations). PM: If they are assured that we are here from a long period. We have been sitting here for long. Like in the beginning, the matter is the same—no post was attacked and no post was captured. The situation is that we are along our defensive Line of Control (LoC). If it is not in his (Sartaj Aziz’s) knowledge, then discuss it altogether. Emphasise that for years, we are here only. Yes, this point should be raised. We are sitting on the same LoC since a long period. MA: This is their (Indian’s) weakness. They are not agreed on the demarcation under UN’s verification, whereas we are agreed. We want to exploit it. PM: This is in Shimla Agreement that we cannot go for UN intervention. MA: Our neighbor does not accept their presence or UNMOGIP arrangement for survey for the area. So we can start from the top, from NJ 9842. On this li9ne, we can give them logic but in short, the recommendation for Sartaj Aziz sahib is that he should make no commitment in the first meeting on military situation. And he should not even accept case fire, because if there is
He said when political leadership was told about this adventure. Two important meetings were held to review the situation. said he know too much about the troubling issues between the military and civilian leadership of that time. Nisar opposed his visit to the US saying “Mian sahib let these people face the music who had planned all these things without taking politicians into confidence. Nisar said he received a call from Nawaz who asked him to get ready to got the US. Nisar Ali Khan’s testimony “Kargil was badly conceived. asked Nawaz Sharif for this “let the generals face the music so that in future they dare not take any such step without taking the representative government into confidence”. to ensure our success. who was then Finance Minister. Chief of General Staff Lt. Secretary Defense Lt. Nisar said let the nation ask that question from naval and air chiefs and they should tell the nation what was their exact reaction and what comments they made about possibility of war with India. Ch.” (Urdu Digest. when corps commands were told. Musharraf is summoned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif summoned General Pervez Musharraf in a high level meeting on Wednesday the 2nd June during which many secrets of the Kargil Operation plan came into light. Secretary Defense Lt. That we don’t know but there is no justification about tension on LoC. He told the meeting that their casualties were increasing and all military posts were falling to India one after the other. When General Musharraf was asked why he failed to plan a safe passage in case of retreat. the PM could not reverse or stop it even if he wished to do so because it would have had serious fallout both for the army and government. they have to use their own argument that whatever is interfering with you. Then he said when I came to know seven days back. 1999. Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz. It is my national obligation to inform you about the future dangers. the top priority is to accord confidentially. The entire reason for the success of his operation was this total secrecy. No justification. Raja Zafarul Haq and Mushahid Hussain also participated members of DCC. Nisar said if Nawaz had been aware of Kargil adventure. he was not so foolish to invite Indian Prime Minister to Lahore. Gen. we gave the suggestion that there was no such fear as the scruff of their (militants) neck is in our hands. Our experience was that our earlier efforts failed because of secrecy. Dar said that General Musharraf was . Nisar said the nation should be told about reaction of the then Naval Chief Fasi Bukhari and Air Chief Pervez Mehdi when like the civilian leaders they came to know about the Kargil adventure for the first time during a meeting. then it (Sartaj Aziz’s) visit should be deferred for another day or two…. In this regard. “But Nawaz replied. Musharraf admitted that the Indian carpet bombing had confined the defenseless Mujahideen to their bunkers. (retired) Iftikhar Ali Khan. Gen. So. The member of the cabinet. We want to give them this type so that he does not get into any specifics…If there is more critical situation. Ishaq Dar. The naval and air chiefs told the meeting that they were not taken into confidence before the launching of the operation. Nawaz Sharif steps in Soon after the conclusion of the meeting General Musharraf started imploring Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif to find an honourable way out of this crisis and save army and Mujahideen from an insulting defeat. studies and experience. otherwise all Mujahideen will be eliminated. On this logic. Nisar I could not see my army face humiliation at the hands of India”. General Musharraf conceded Kargil defeat in front of the top civil and military leadership. But. we could regulate it… We told him (Nawaz Sharif) there is no reason of alarm and panic. I can only say that there could only be two results of this military operation: full scale war or an insulting and crushing defeat. he had to fumble for words. Nisar said Nawaz and his team were told by the military leadership only what was needed according to their requirements and perception. Iftikhar Ali said: “On the strength of my military training. Gen. On this occasion. He also stressed the need for finding a diplomatic solution to crises. He was also told that scaling mountain peaks like mountaineers and opening military fronts with the enemy without planning a safe passage for retreat was no wise decision. Nawaz Sharif’s ignorance and Pakistan Army’s control over terrorists in Kashmir (26 May) MA to PM: … But he (unidentified top person) was also saying that any escalation after that should be regulated as there may be the danger of war. (The News. the then nevel and air chiefs and director-general ISI were also present in the meeting. Ishaq’ Dar’s endorsement “On the issue of Kargil operation that had almost brought Pakistan and India at the brink of a full-fledge fourth war. Whenever we want. who were extremely displeased with General Musharraf for his ill-planned military adventure. In this way. Dar said before Nawaz dashed to USA for the July 4 meeting with Clinton. June 09. Dar demanded that a judicial commission should be set up where he would give all the inside information and details that would shock the entire country. Mehmood Ahmed. Nawaz had gone to USA only to bail out of Pakistan army. badly planned and badly executed”. We should respect this and he advantage we have from this would give us a handle…-Times of India. 2003).ceasefire. “No. When asked what was their reaction. August 99 edition page 37). He said that the most important details pertain to the briefing of General Pervez Musharraf to Dar and Sartaj Aziz in the Military operation room of the GHQ towards the end of May 1999 and the meeting of the Defence Cabinet committee (DCC) during May and June 1999 under the chairmanship of PM Nawaz in which Majeed Malik. then vehicles will be moving (on Drass-Kargil highway). He further told the meeting that the Chinese leadership had also counseled hi to withdraw troops from Kargil. June 20.
” The other services chiefs told the prime minister: “If the war had been confined to Kargil and Batalik. The then political leadership was approached for immediate rescue only when operational problems started to surface at Kargil. the first abrupt question Nawaz asked from his army chief was as to why he was not informed in advance about the operation. Air Force and Naval Chief were also not aware of the operation on day one.” she said. the prime minister started working on the withdrawal plan. Zinni arrives in Islamabad On 24th June. On June 13. When Musharraf briefed Nawaz about this troubling development. Dar said Nawaz had gone to the USA not on his own but on the personal request and insistence of Musharraf who saw Nawaz off at Lahore Airport. Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz visited China on a one-day official visit and discussed this critical situation with the Chinese leadership. Chinese Foreign Ministry’s announcement “China’s Foreign Ministry announced on Thursday that Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh would visit Beijing June 14-16 to discuss “bilateral and international issues of mutual concern”. In these circumstances. (The News. On Nawaz Sharif’s request. the Indian foreign minister gave a cold shoulder to Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz on his arrival in New Delhi. 1999. General Musharraf wanted to take the prime minister into confidence about the fast deteriorating situation across the border. on June 12. General Musharraf said: “The Indian attacks have become more severe and their artillery shelling has created havoc in the entire area. “We hope that both sides will use peaceful means and solve any crisis through negotiations to prevent the escalation of the situation. international newspapers published the Musharraf-Aziz conversation about Kargil on their front pages on June 14. Sartaj Aziz arrives in New Delhi On 12th June. On their advice. He said Kargil was launched without meeting the required formalities and proper approval. . In fact. therefore. finding an honourable way out has become indispensable for Pakistan. The same night Sartaj Aziz reached Islamabad from New Delhi where he had undergone an extremely unpleasant experience. The enemy is tightening the noose. He said he would tell everything to a judicial commission informed on Kargil because he believes that such revelations would not be in the national interest. 2003). The Chinese leader asked Pakistan to find a solution to the crisis through dialogue. PM Nawaz Sharif was in fact informed on May 17. Dar said Nawaz had sincerely tried to save the dignity and honour of Pakistan army and to protect the Mujahideen on Kargil front lines for whom inadequate arrangements were made by Musharraf setup. the Indian intelligence had increased to such an extent that all activities going on at the GHQ could not remain a secret. Musharraf request meeting with Prime Minister “Sensing that the war front was expanding.” Urdu Digest page 39. 1999. On the other hand. June 11. a strategic briefing on different locations including Kargil was held in Skardu which in no way can be termed as an information to or approval from Nawaz for the Kargil operation. Sartaj Aziz also met with the Indian prime minister. Was Nawaz Sharif on board about Kargil operation from day one? Dar says “not at all” Most of the Corps Commanders. Vajpayee’s words were soft but there was no flexibility in his stand. This was the thinking of Nawaz Sharif on the basis of which he decided to save the honour of Pakistan Army. November 24. we could have easily defended the motherland.very keen to involve USA for mediation between India and Pakistan. Rallying the international community firmly behind India and isolating Pakistan at the international level. 1999 he formally requested the prime minister for a meeting. It was also indicated in the taped conversation of Aziz and Musharraf on May 29. Musharraf’s confession Briefing the meeting. increasing the chances of a full scale war with Pakistan. but an all out war with India will pose a big challenge to our defence capability. The then information minister Mushahid Hussain and foreign office spokesman Tariq Altaf while addressing a joint news conference on May 29. Centcom chief General Anthony Zinni came to Pakistan and called on General Musharrf and other Pakistani authorities on 24th and 25th June. 1999 after a strategic briefing at the Foreign Office had also told the media persons that “the Indian response to Sartaj Aziz’s visit to New Delhi believed positive was awaited”. DEVELOPMENTS II Nawaz contacts Vajpayee on hotline On May 25. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee agreed to hold the foreign ministers level talks on June 12. Sartaj Aziz and the services chiefs met with the prime minister in Lahore”. a ministry spokeswoman repeated remarks made earlier this week. with each passing moment unfolding new dangers for Pakistan. –Reuters –Dawn. 1999 the prime minister had already talked to his Indian counterpart on hotline for ending this confrontation. He revealed that many months before the Kargil operation. 40. 1999. Ishaq Dar is not ready to speak more on Kargil though he know too much. Asked about Kashmir fighting.
the PM left for a pre-arranged six-day visit of China including Hong Kong. The Pakistani General also uttered the term “withdrawal” for the first times at this press interview. General Zinni reportedly also told Nawaz Sharif that he would get to meet President Clinton as a quid pro quo if he got the Mujahideen to withdraw. He therefore rushed the Centcom chief Anthony Zinni to Islamabad to fine-tune the withdrawal plan and save South Asia from a bloody collision. Niaz Naik was sent on Sunday morning (June 27) on the presidential Falcon for a one-day round trip to New Delhi where he was given an audience by the Indian PM Vajpayee. to talk to President Clinton on telephone. the US Independence Day and also a Sunday. Niaz Naik. The PM was therefore back in Pakistan on Thursday. former foreign secretary who was somewhere in East Asia since June 21. The nest day on June 27. July 12. Following the ‘productive’ talks between Zinni and Pakistani authorities. what took place in the Nawaz-Clinton meeting had already been worked out during the Musharraf-Zinni meeting in Islamabad and President Clinton had just included Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in the approval of the joint statement. COAS General Pervez Musharraf hoped that Clinton-Nawaz meeting would be held soon. . Pakistan might use the nuclear option. The message which Naik brought back from New Delhi discussed threadbare on board the PM’s aircraft flying over the Himalayas. Side by side another drama was unfolding. in accordance with their 1972 Simla Accord. On June 26. Editor-in-Chief of Urdu Digest Altaf Hasan Qureshi in his report “Hidden facts of Kargil – the curtain raises” published on page 40 in the August 1999 edition of the digest said: “Clinton was afraid that facing defeat in the conventional war. Altaf Hasan Qureshi raises the curtain In this context. On the evening of June 28 while briefing the press in Beijing on Nawaz-Zhu meeting. The same message was conveyed to the PM by General Anthony Zinni. Three days later on June 26. using his influence. It is not known whether following this discussion anybody in Islamabad or Washington was contacted from the PM’s aircraft. July 1. M. This indicated that one of the two seemed to be working on a very. very tight schedule to snuff out the perceived signs of a nuclear conflagration in South Asia. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reached Washington on 4th July and during two sessions of almost three-and-a-half-hour spanning two intervals of 75 minutes at the Blair House. could get the Mujahideen to withdraw from the Indian side of LoC on Kargil. meaning that he (the general) was stealthily trying to reach this target through the good offices of the Centcom chief. As a result of these efforts. Disclosure by Dawn’s resident editor Resident Editor Dawn. Niaz Naik came back from his special ‘back channel’ mission before the PM took off for China from Lahore. This talk culminated in the PM getting invited to Washington on July 4.” “On June 27. But what is known is that it was after this discussion that the PM decided to rush back home to be able to be in a position to fly to Washington at the earliest depending up President Clinton’s calendar which. As General Zinni took off for Pakistan on Wednesday June 23. Ziauddin. It was agreed between the president and the Prime Minister that concrete steps will be taken for the restoration of the Line of Control in accordance with the Simla Agreement. General Musharraf in his first ever press talk after the launching of the Kargil Operation expressed the hope that Nawaz-Clinton meeting with regard to “withdrawal” will be held soon. said that the pressure on the PM had started mounding from June when in his letter to Nawaz Sharif President Clinton had offered to meet him somewhere in Europe if the Prime Minister. however. And he waited until Saturday. It was about this time that unconfirmed reports said that the PM has already ordered the withdrawal. a withdrawal plan was worked out. C-in-C of US General Command (CENTCOM) when he traveled to Pakistan on June 24. Pakistan’s foreign office spokesman Tariq Altaf said that the PM has decides to cut short his visit and return home on June 30 via Hong Kong. officially presenting Pakistan’s case on Kargil to the government there was being asked to cut short his visit and return to Pakistan post haste for undertaking a more important mission on behalf of the PM. In fact.” According to Bruce Reidel. in his report captioned “The story behind the story” wrote: “Those who claim to have inside knowledge of how Nawaz Sharif ended up promising the US president what it was not his to promise. Next. Dawn. President Clinton re-arranged his holydays schedule. They also agreed that it was vital for the peace of South Asia that the Line of Control in Kashmir be respected by both parties.Withdrawal agreement A part of the understanding reached between General Musharraf and Zinni was published by Daily Telegraph in its June 27 edition. the message contained in the G-8 resolution issued on June 20 was unusually harsh. 1999. General Musharraf broke this news to the nation that Nawaz-Clinton meeting was about to take place. The presidents urged an immediate cessation of the hostilities once these steps are taken. July 3 the day he was originally scheduled to return from China. It was about this time that the world detected some kind of ‘flexibility’ came reports from India about ‘safe passage’. THE CLIMAX Text of Nawaz-Clinton statement President Clinton and Prime Minister Sharif share the view that the current fighting in the Kargil region of Kashmir is dangerous and contains the seeds of a wider conflict. was full for almost a fortnight after July 4 holidays.
Vajpayee in this regard. On his insistence.” Actually.” Before this. “Thank you Mr. I told him that we would be reaching Washington tomorrow. The president reaffirmed his intent to pay an early visit to South Asia. he said. I told him that I wanted to meet him tomorrow. Pakistan’s ambassador to India Ashraf Jehangir Qazi and director-general Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).30 am and told him that I was with him.e. “How are you Mr. The federal cabinet met on July 10 with prime minster in the chair and formally approved the agreement as well as the contents of the prime minister’s proposed address to the nation. Ok. I was confident that I will bring him round to the solution of Kashmir dispute. Mr. prime minister. Tarar Okayed the withdrawal plan. you know I had no need to meet with President Clinton. including Kashmir. President Clinton told me that we had done a great injustice to the Indians. I think they should have seen their faces in the mirror that day. Nawaz. Then we had a brief interval. In a nutshell. You know Mr. Vajpayee said. Nawaz.” he said and rang off. Clinton outright that Pakistan had imposed war on India and they were least bothered about whether or not they want to stop war. However. racking his brain. Clinton that I wanted to meet with him. Minister for Religious Affairs Raja Zafarul Haq. I told him that I knew that tomorrow was weekend being Sunday and also the US national day (4th July). I am fine. “On the one hand. Mr. What is your army doing? He asked. once the sanctity of the Line of Control has been fully restored. Vajpayee refused to offer any help in this regard. I would address him as Bill and sometimes as Mr. “How are you Nawaz?” Mr. you are holding negotiations. The prime minister then went to Aiwan-i-Sadar to take President Justice (retired) Muhammad Rafiq Tarar into confidence. He also played his role in bringing about a ceasefire between the two countries. “Tomorrow? Mr.” Pages number 149-151 of Sohail Waraich’s book: Who is Traitor? Taking all into confidence The prime minister reached Islamabad on July 8 and convened a high level meeting the same day. I said. Our relations were progressing by leaps and bounds. our demand was rather interesting. Besides. He woke up Mr. (Retd) Majeed Malik. His promise of help to Pakistan in the solution of Kashmir issue held great importance at that time. President. General Musharraf came to the airport to “guide and enlighten” me that I should say this and that to President Bill Clinton so that we could buy some times to pull out our troops and avoid a full-fledged war with India. He would also address me as Nawaz or Mr. Clinton asked.The Prime Minister and president agreed that the bilateral dialogue begun in Lahore in February provides the best forum for resolving all issues dividing India and Pakistan. Whatever Mr Clinton had talked to them was based on facts and reality. Can you meet me tomorrow at 1 pm?” I already knew the departure time of the flight. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif chaired a meeting of the Defence Committee of Cabinet followed by a meeting with the Mujahideen leaders at the Prime Minister’s House. on the other you have imposed war on India. Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed. He said. President Clinton played a very constructive role and assured me that he would take personal interest in the solution of Kashmir dispute. Gen.” I thanked President Clinton. he was virtually on pins and needles and wanted that I settle down the things as soon as possible. But I told Mr. Clinton that I wanted to meet with him tomorrow. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. he is the world’s busiest man. Nawaz sharif’s account of meeting with President Clinton “When I was departing for Washington to meet with President Bill Clinton. He had promised me that he would come to Pakistan and visit such and such place. Clinton that we were not only ready to stop war but also wanted his assistance in the solution of Kashmir dispute. but also desire solution of Kashmir dispute into the bargain?” He told Mr. President Clinton ran me back after an hour and said. on 9th July. “Ok Nawaz. It was attended by Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz. The president said he would take a personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption and intensification of those bilateral efforts. “Are Pakistanis doing us a favor by stopping war? Not only they want to stop war. calling us to stop war because everyone was pointing a finger at us. He told me that his daughter was resuming her classes tomorrow after the end of summer vacations and in this regard he had invited guests at his house. Then there came a torrent of phone calls from Washington. They also assured the prime minister that whatever had been disclosed about the Kargil front would be a “National Secret”. He also wanted to visit Khyber Pass and we had made a planning in this regard. as you know. During our meeting. I thought if we depart tonight. He asked me when I wanted to see him. “Ok. Clinton a day before leaving for Washington. Clinton asked. we would reach the United States tomorrow at 12 noon. but I will have to reschedule my program. I told Mr. I let you know in a few minutes. otherwise. President. I had told Mr. the prime minister took the participants into confidence about his visit to Washington and the withdrawal agreement. Clinton had to come to Pakistan on a three-day state visit. After a marathon discussion. “Ok. Ok. Minister for petroleum Chudhry Nisar Ali Khan. But he came for just three hours and the way he gave a dressing-down to the Pakistani generals. During our meeting. Minister for Kashmir Affairs Lt. there had been contact between us. Secretary Defence Lt. President Clinton asked me if he could talk the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee. Mr. I made a phone call to Mr. The next day i. As I have told you earlier that I had made a phone call to President Bill Clinton. President?” I asked. Prime minister addresses the nation . During the three-hour meeting. Some times. Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf. Clinton said. Gen. Islamabad. The prime minister requested them to leave the Kargil peaks to which they agreed. I had some indirect contacts with him. let me talk to Mr. “Your army shouldn’t have done this. (Retd) Iftikhar Ali khan. President Clinton spent three hours with us. Vajpayee at 1.
Sharif pointed out that there was an imminent threat of war which was no more a secret and that there were “diplomatic complications” which were getting extremely difficult to be handled. “But this situation could have been averted had India avoided to undertake severe bombing of the area. “I ask Prime Minister Vajpayee to start negotiations. He expressed the hope that the US president would continue to take personal interest to resolve the 50-year-old Kashmir issue. “I assure them that time was not very far when they would achieve their independence from India and that their just struggle will meet with great success”. He said the Indian leadership created a war hysteria specially by bringing its huge army near Pakistan borders and by deploying atomic missiles there. LoK Sabha was dissolved while on the other hand the Mujahideen climbed the Kargil hills. THE TRUTH .The prime minister addressed the nation on July 12 after ceasefire and withdrawal of Mujahideen from Kargil on July 4. He said that if today the volcano of Kargil was cooled down.” he said.” he said.” he said.” He thanked Mujahideen for having accepted Pakistan’s appeal to withdraw from Kargil. “But even at that time I refused to be driven by emotions and talked about peace.. July 13. “But I salute our armed forces who were ready to take on the enemy. In his address. and preserve peace and security for them”. He said it was India who had forced Pakistan to explode nuclear went ahead with the plan to becoming a nuclear power. there was any move towards Srinagar. He refused to accept the allegation of the Indian Prime Minister that Pakistan had “stabbed” in the back of India. Moreover. when he and Mr Vajpayee were planning to bury their differences. But. The PM said the crisis had not only created awareness in the international community about the dispute but also proved that Kashmir was a flashpoint. He said that Mujahideen wanted to get the international attention and that was why they captured the hills of Kargil. “Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Monday offered talks to India to ease tension over Kashmir and save the people of both the countries from another war. Giving details of his US visit. Mr Sharif claimed that the nation had rejected those who were trying to play negative politics. the international community must think about Kashmir and force India to stop the killing of the people of occupied Kashmir. “Mr Vajpayee accepted the proposal but the very next day Indian air force and artillery started bombing the Kargil area which was a great surprise for me.” he said. The PM quoted an unknown thinker who said it required real effort and courage to revert the chances of war rather than initiating any conflict Mr. “I am happy that they did not take to streets and supported the government’s efforts to have peace in the region.” he pointed out. it would erupt again and flow somewhere else. –Dawn. 1999. During his 35-minut speech. he stated. he pointed out. “After having appealed to Mujahideen to withdraw from Kargil. The prime minister declared that Pakistan was capable of thwarting any aggression “but we never pray for war as it becomes difficult to find out the winner after a war between the two atomic countries”. hopes were raised in the international community that both the countries wanted to resolve their differences without using military means. He refuted the argument that after capturing Kargil.” He said that now when the Kargil crisis had started subsiding. we have given another opportunity to diplomacy to succeed. This was the background in which the Washington Declaration was prepared in which it was very clearly stated that all the disputes between India and Pakistan would be resolved though dialogue and the LoC should be respected by both the parties”. Let us sit on the negotiating table in order to save our people from the danger of war. The PM said that people of Pakistan had refused to become a tool in the hands of political parties. “No road from Kargil leads to Srinagar. the prime Minister dwelt on the Kargil crisis and said he had talked to his Indian counterpart many times by telephone and subsequently visited the United States to end the heightening conflict between the two countries. The contents of his address published in daily Dawn are as follows……. some top government officials had made an attempt to mislead the people about the Gulf war. they would defeat the enemy. We have not taken this decision in any panic or fear. He said he was in contact with his Indian counterpart and suggested a meeting of the regional military commanders so that the threats of war could be removed. the clouds of war will continue to hover on the region. adding that international sanctions were boldly faced by the nation. he said when the situation was becoming serious he decided to meet President Clinton. The PM recalled that with the Lahore Declaration in February.” he said. “he said. “No doubt the Kashmiri freedom fighters have created history during this crisis but there is also no denying the fact that the clouds of visible war between the two countries were surfacing very fast. He called upon India to resolve the Kashmir problem through peaceful means. Addressing the nation on radio and television. He said Pakistan were a peace-loving nation but if war was ever imposed on them. the prime minster deliberately avoided mentioning the Kargil defeat so as to save the honor and prestige of the armed forces. India intensified the gross violations of the Line of Control and started killing and wounding innocent and unarmed Kashmiris. He said India and Pakistan should end their differences so that their economic conditions could improve by avoiding billions of expenditures on their defence. He said that during his first term in office. The PM said: “I am happy to tell you that President Clinton has accepted that as long as Kashmir dispute is not resolved. Mr Sharif said. he said it was already too late and both Pakistan and India should not vaste any more time and turn to peace and security in the region. adding that dialogue was the only way out to resolve differences between the two countries.” said Mr Sharif. “I would urge the Indian leadership to respond to our efforts of peace so that there is no more bloodshed and there is no killing of Kashmir. paying rich tributes to those soldiers who gave their lives for the motherland.
While the diplomatic front continues to squeeze Pakistan on the Kargil issue. Before the Prime Minister’s visit to China last week. officials said that in his meetings in Beijing. by a margin of 22 to 5. Sources said Prime Minister Nawaz sharif’s discussion with the Chinese leaders was the turning point in Pakistan’s decision to use its influence on Kashmiri Mujahideen to suspend their operation in Kargil. comparing the present diplomatic pressure on Pakistan with the pre-nuclear tests situation. General Zinni delivered another letter to Nawaz Sharif from President Clinton. Within the next 24 hours. While in Islamabad. Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and the Chief of Army Staff Gen. that encouraged the US Administration to consider opposing loans from international financial institution to Pakistan unless it withdrew its forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control. The resemblance in the Sino-US positions on Kashmir. the government didn’t even acknowledge that Zinni had delivered a personal letter from Clinton to Sharif. where the top echelon of the political and military leadership is represented. as any escalation of tension could lead to a larger conflict that may not suit the long term interest of Pakistan. General Anthony Zinni. also briefed Pakistani officials as to the reasons why the US administration believed that Pakistan was responsible for backing an intrusion into the Kargil sector. however. “Given the tough international circumstances Pakistan has clinched the best deal by earning Clinton’s personal commitment to help resolve the Kashmir issue. he was told that the influential House Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress had approved an amendment. Sources said that throughout Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to China. particularly the importance of the Lahore Declaration. powerful nations such as Britain. In the pre-nuclear situation. both General Zinni and a senior US official dropped broad hints that Pakistan’s refusal to reverse its current Kargil policy may push the country into diplomatic isolation and would definitely revive US economic sanctions against Pakistan sooner rather than later. Pakistan’s political and military leadership that form the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) had concluded that only an intelligent restructuring of the Kargil operation could save Pakistan from imminent diplomatic. Although nothing was publicly stated on this subject. there was hardly any difference between the US public posture and the Chinese unpublicized stance. we sincerely hope that India and Pakistan will respect the LoC and resume negotiations at an early date in accordance with the spirit of the Lahore Declaration. the Chinese political and military leadership. To illustrate the seriousness of the US commitment to peace in the subcontinent by arranging a withdrawal of Kashmiri Mujahideen from Kargil. the Prime Minister and his financial managers were concerned about how . noted that China’s posture marks the basic difference between the two situations. privately sought that unnecessary haste should not be shown in seeking a quick military solution to the Kashmir crisis. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was advised both by Chinese Prime Minister Zho Rongji and Chairman of the Committee of the Chinese People’s Congress. sources said that during their meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. 1999 deserves special attention. What surprised Pakistan officials was the unanimity of views in the messages delivered separately by the United States and China since hostilities began in Kargil in May. when its embassy in Paris was told that because of the perception in the French government that Pakistan was responsible for backing intruders in Kargil. Officials familiar with the background developments in all the three key areas told the News intelligence Unit (NIU) that the developments that took place on the diplomatic.Impartial witness The following report by Kamran Khan on the Kargil front published in The News edition of 8th July. France and Japan separately urged Islamabad to use its influence for an immediate withdrawal of Mujahideen from Kargil. France may not be able to fulfil its commitment for the delivery of Mirage III jets that were to delivered to the Pakistani authorities in the next few days. The NIU has learned on authority that a decision to call an urgent meeting of the DCC. in a statement stopped short of holding Pakistan directly responsible for the Kargil crisis. Pakistan had a contract France for the supply of 40 upgraded Mirage III jets. Pervez Musharraf had separately visited China in recent weeks. was taken soon after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s crucial meetings with the Chinese leaders in Beijing on June 28 and 29. “Before they adjourned for Friday prayers after several hours of debate at the Prime Minister’s House last week. “Proceeding from the aspiration of maintaining peace and stability in South Asia. Informed officials. But because of the tone of the message. Although details about General Zinni’s meeting with the military commanders at the GHQ are still sketchy.” said a ranking security official. that Pakistan must ply its role in reducing tension in Kargil. the US and Chinese officials remained in constant touch with each other from their respective capitals. as opposed to the view held by other world powers. was highlighted yesterday when the Chinese Foreign Ministry made a rare public comment.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhang Quiye said in Bejing yesterday. while reaffirming their commitment to the long term security and economic interest of Pakistan. While the world’s most industrialized nations. In the Kargil situation. grouped under the G-8. economic and strategic disaster. Pakistan received another piece of “bad news”. the CENTCOM chief and the state Department official who accompanied him during the visit. While the not-so-delighted Sharif was on his way back from Beijing to Islamabad. the Chinese government had fully understood Pakistan’s security compulsions to go ahead with its tests. that followed an unexpected visit to Pakistan by the US CENTCOM chief. Li peng. The sources said that thrice in the past five weeks. economic and strategic fronts in the week prior to the DCC meeting on Friday had left Pakistan with no option but to take some urgent measures that also included seeking US President Bill Clinton’s intervention on the Kashmir issue.
navy and their nuclear tipped missiles. about the mujahideen and Pakistani troop casualties. within 48 hours of Pakistan’s commitment to seek the withdrawal of the Mujahideen from Kargil before President Clinton.” Former columnist Anees Jillani is his article “Fooling ourselves” published in July’s 13 edition of The News wrote: Whoever planned the Kargil phase of the Kashmir liberation struggle must be credited with a low intelligence and complete lack of foresight. would help the long term objectives of the guerrilla moment in Kashmir. did not expect that the Indians would raise the level of confrontation to a full-fledged war involving their helicopter gunships. Instead they are hurriedly buried lest the world suspects that Pakistani troops are involved in the Kargil imbroglio. coupled with a fresh ban from multilateral agencies. Informed officials said that although a strategic retreat from some positions in Kargil. Rashid Qureshi on the directions of his boss General Musharraf misled the nation about the Kargil Operation right from its launching and continued this practice for many years. and a majority of them are likely to return. The US intelligence community estimate that of all the stinger missiles distributed during the Afghan war. Except for the toothless OIC. only a dozen are still missing or unaccounted for. And in Kargil. warned Sharif that fresh economic sanctions from the US government. as in the case of Operation Gibralter. but clearly the lack of coordination at the highest level of decision making was the major factor. Source said that finance Minister Ishaq Dar. Kamal Matinuddin in his article “What Went Wrong” published in The News on July 14. re-energise and strike again. coupled with the use of “air burst” shells by the Indian artillery. They had not plan for the worst scenario. but they were not sure if all the guerrilla groups would respond favorably to the government of Pakistan. July 08. There is no clear cut evidence to inform the domestic polity. would push Pakistan back to the post-nuclear tests economic scenario. Urdu Digest wrote: “Difficulties were mounting for Pakistan but DG ISPR (Major General Rashid Qurreshi) was making tall claims of military victories to boost the morale of the nation. Dar had also informed the Prime Minister that a constant unexpected drain on the national exchequer because of the battle in Kargil might require a re-examination of various budged proposals that would further increase pressure on the average citizen. Almost the entire strength of the Swedish Bofors guns available with the Indian Army has now been deployed in the Kargil sector. Under the agreement as announced by a jubilant Finance Minister Ishaq Dar in Islamabad on Tuesday. what to talk of any other details. Gen. on more then one occasion in past few weeks. When they did so unsustainable. The NIU had reported last week that another two months of the Kargil battle would cost Pakistan excess of US$ one billion. leaving no money for any development project. which is what military colleges teach us. the London club concluded its negotiations to reschedule US $877. Officials privately concede that the human cost of the operation from the Mujahideen side was likely to increase manifold because of the constant carpet bombing of the entire area by India’s Mirage 2000 aircraft. Informed sources denied widely held opinion that some of the Mujahideen groups in Kargil were equipped with shoulder-fired stringer missiles. no other organization or country supported the actions of the contention that the Pakistan army was not part of the . the fresh arrangement would free Pakistan from making any interest payment until January 2001. as a majority of those remaining from the war had been bought back from the Afghan Mujahideen by the US government under a special operation.3 million loans to Pakistan. a situation that could have forced Pakistan to use its “ultimate option”. recommending that Pakistan must find a graceful solution to the Kargil crisis. Incidentally. while dangerous signals emerged at a rapid pace on the diplomatic and economic fronts.” Kargil adventure in the eye of defence analysts Lt. • The reaction of the international community was misjudged.” observed an official. airforce. On this role of General Qureshi. Who are we fooling the world or ourselves? Dr Shireen Mazari wrote: “The information war was lost from the start because of the decision not to inform the public at home and an equally half-hearted approach regarding what to give out to the international community. sources said that intelligence reports from New Delhi consistently suggested that the Indian political and military leaders were getting desperate to win a bargain chip by occupying some territory in Azad Kashmir on Pakistani side.the situation on the borders would effect the outcome of the IMF mission that is scheduled to visit Islamabad next month for a review of the economy before the next IMF trance of US$ 200 million is released. Either the Indians are shelling rose petals instead of artillery that no one is getting hurt on our side except little girls or we are concealing facts. Gen. recognizing their greatest service to Pakistan and even awarding them medals. It is not difficult to forecast the final outcome of this combat. 1999 said: • The planners of Operation Kargil. Is it a good strategy for the morale of our troops? The least their nation can do for them is to give them a decent public burial. – News. While the Indian media is continuously playing up the humane side of its casualties we do not even mention the names. because of an unhealthy international climate. Role of ISPR The then ISPR Director-General Maj. the concentration of Mujahideen in a limited area against the full might of the world’s fourth largest army was also developing into a less ideal situation for a guerrilla war. General Qureshi hid the losses suffered by Pakistan in the battlefield and exaggerated the Indian losses to make the nation believe that Pakistan was winning this battle. 1999. “13 divisions of Indian army and about 100 air force planes are now fighting less then 800 Mujahideen.
1996 to April 21. in an interview with South Asia tribune on Oct 6. 1997. which it could ill afford except at its own peril. However. Narasimha Rao (June 21. however.) and Atal Bihari Vajpayee (March 19. Lahore). • Pakistan’s economy is still vulnerable to outside pressures. as it would avert a greater catastrophe. General Musharraf got scared and started claming that he had opened the Kargil front to free the Indian Occupied Kashmir and victory was at hand when Nawaz Sharif succumbed to the US pressure and signed the withdrawal plan thus changing a sure victory into a defeat. he. 1991 to May 10. • The time chosen to seek a military solution was inappropriate as world leaders were looking forward to the implementation of the Lahore Declaration by Pakistan. • Holding of territory is not the fore of unconventional forces. Pakistan’s “moral. 2006 said: “now I am free to speak because the minimum term to stay quiet after leaving the navy job had been completed. Nawaz Sharif constituted an inquiry committee of military officers which recommended court-martial of General Musharraf and those responsible for the Kargil misadventure. decided to topple the government. armed forces or the Mujahideen for this debacle. 1999 due to certain unavoidable factors. the short-coming of Pakistan’s national security decision-making were revealed by the Kargil Conflict were not episodic but systemic. A proactive policy in Kashmir an only be sustained if the country is not too dependent on foreign assistance. 1999. 1999 said: “Pakistan had to choose between reinforcing the Mujahideen and risking an all-out war. who had resigned a week before the Oct 12 coup. 2004) led to the signing of the historic Lahore Declaration on 21st February 1999. Gujral (April 21. 1997.” Lt. the general said. They can do so only if they are reinforced by regular troops and supported by adequate ground and air power. General Musharraf stole his decade-long labour bringing the two neighbours on the brink of a nuclear war and earning a stupendous insult for the valiant armed forces. It will be erroneous to place blame on any one party. “Nawaz Sharif was to present this report to the nation when General Musharraf toppled the government and stole this report from the Prime Minister’s House. THE COUP-D’ ETAT Musharraf’s steps after retreat After the withdrawal of Mujahideen from Kargil when grim facts about Kargil Operation began to unfold raising serious questions among the army and the nation. This was also what the Prime Minister said in his address to the nation to justify the Washington agreement. Defence analyst Dr Shireen Mazari said: In fact. Musharraf decides to topple government In the June 1999 meeting when it became abundantly clear to General Musharraf that he will be punished for the defeat. Deve Gowda (June 1.” (It is evident that in Pakistan decisions are often taken by generals likewise The Kargil adventure was planned and executed by General Musharraf). H.infiltration force. or opt for a withdrawal. he started working on a coup d’ etat. Even Nawaz Sharif admits that for the mujahideen to reach Srinagar by this rout was a pipe dream. I. 29th July. when the armed forces have to rely heavily on foreign sources of supply for their critical weapon system. our time-tested ally.May 22. Since General Musharraf feared court-martial. Nawaz Sharif also wanted to ensure that in future the military did not take decisions with out taking the civil government and the other two services chiefs into confidence. Besides. political and diplomatic support” was not enough for the mujahideen to have gained a decisive victory. Fasih Bokhari spills the beans Former Naval chief Admiral Fasih Bokhari. It was his cherished desire to see Pakistan and India live as peaceful neighbours that this decade-long consultations with Indian prime ministers P. which upset the applecart. 28. Nawaz Sharif believed that the environment of peace brought forth by Lahore declaration would bring foreign investment to Pakistan.” Adm Bokhari said in Islamabad after he had attended an SDPI seminar on the plight of the Okara tenants and the role of the Army in evicting them . He also held Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif responsible for this loss of life. boost its exports and enhance national production making Pakistan an Asian tiger. honour and prestige. the Indian artillery and air force bombed them resulting in a huge human loss. In order to stop such events from occurring in future. Besides other steps. they cannot fight a war for a long duration without the backing and full support of major powers. with the help of the other two guilty generals. Some knowledgeable circles claim that he wanted to take over in the first week of August soon after the completion of withdrawal from Kargil on July 26. D. V. The latter was considered a more prudent course. 1996). About casualties. 1998. 2000.Nov. is believed to have advised us to avoid a war and continue to seek a peaceful solution to the Kashmir crisis. a week before Musharraf’s coup of October 12 because I had come to know that he had decided to topple the Sharif government. 1997). I resigned on October 5. Gen Musharaaf also started this baseless propaganda that he had taken the prime minister into confidence long before launching the Kargil operation. he had to postpone the plan up to October 12. K. be it the politicians. PM constitutes inquiry committee Kargil Operation was like a thorn on the side of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif because General Musharraf’s adventure had neutralized his decade-long efforts to make friends with India without compromising national interest. Pakistan was totally isolated as even China. (Begum Kulsoom Nawaz. Gen Talat Masood in his article “Lesson to learn from Kargil” published Dawn on July 17. when Mujahideen were retreating from Kargil. This was the only course of action to save their skin.
The former premier demanded a high-powered national commission to probe the “ill-conceived” Kargil expedition. Nawaz Sharif was talking to reporters at the hut-cum-barrack of Attock Fort where he is detained for trial in a corruption case. Former Prime Minister’s visit to Washington and his seeking protection from President Clinton were also his own decisions. I would have asked Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to defer his Pakistan visit there would have been no Lahore Declaration which stresses dialogue for Kashmir solution. he issued such a statement. The biggest setback Pakistan had to sustain due to this operation was that the whole world bracketed the Kashmir freedom movement with terrorism. he. the spokesman said. This limited war inflicted huge losses on Pakistan and was worst than the 1965 war. “ I even chose not to utter a word during the hearing before the Anti-Terrorist Court. “I went Washington to meet UA President Bill Clinton during Kargil crisis in consultation with Army chief General Pervez Musharaf. Nawaz Sharif disclosed that the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) during the Kargil fight was wiped out completely and with every passing day we were losing strategic posts. The spokesman said Nawaz was responsible for all policies and political decisions.” he said. “I was told that the operation was safe and we would suffer minimum casualties.” said Nawaz. These facts reflect that the Army was doing contrary to what the then political government was doing in national interests.” he said. “Had. Nawaz Sharif had paid tribute to the martyrs and heroes of the Kargil conflict and gave them awards. who was the Prime Minister during the Kargil conflict. When Sharif was brought to the court set up inside the Attock fort on June 12. The biggest flaw in the Kargil operation. “The situation got so worse that I was asked to find immediate solution to the crisis as any delay could have resulted in retreat from other posts.from their lands. The ISPR chief said that when Nawaz Sharif realized that he got life imprisonment and his other accounts have been opened. 2000.” ALLEGATIONS COUNTERD Nawaz Sharif’s statement from Attock Fort and government’s reaction General Musharraf continued character-assassination of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif with reference to the Kargil front even after toppling the PML-N government. but I was told in May 1999 when the fight had begun. “Even many of the corps commanders and the chiefs of the naval and air forces were also kept in the dark about the operation.” he alleged. The operation was so “ill-conceived” and “ill-planned”. the two other services chiefs and many corps commanders in dark about the Kargil Operation. “But what prompted me to divulge everything is the recent clarification by the government spokesman which is based on false claims in a shameful language. He told the nation that India was wiping out unit after unit of the Northern Light Infantry and Mujahideen. for the first time since the Kargil fiasco. he said. Nawaz Sharif made it clear that he earlier had decided to keep quiet on Kargil debacle in the best interests of the nation. “Kargil conflict had the potential of full-scale nuclear catastrophe therefore it was necessary to stop it immediately otherwise it could have resulted in the martyrdom of scores of our Army officers and Jawans. the portal reported. Adm Bokhari said: “Because he feared he will have to face a court martial for masterminding the Kargil (debacle). I know abut the operation in advance. Nawaz.” said Nawaz Sharif. Major General Rashid Qureshi said the former Prime Minister was saying such things earlier through some other persons. According to press Trust of India. the most important being the “Tiger Hills” and the post “1514”. Nawaz Sharif claimed that he was kept in the dark and never taken into confidence on the Kargil operation. that even the officers and Jawans deputed at the front complained about hampered supplies of ammunition and ration.” he added. the spokesman added. It was nothing but hollow claims that we would have reached Srinagar had the operation been not stopped. told reporters that US General Zinni. News Desk adds: Director General Inter services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Rashid Qureshi has termed the Nawaz Sharif statement on the Kargil issue terrible and controversial. Nawaz Sharif has alleged that corps commanders and chiefs of navy and air force were not aware of the Kargil operation. Unfortunately the Kargil conflict culminated into much casualties even much bigger than those we sustained during the full-scale Indo-Pak war in 1965. Asked why in his view Gen Musharraf wanted to topple Nawaz Sharif. (JangNews Service) PTI adds: An official spokesman as shameful. He said Nawaz participated in several meetings held in connection with the Kargil issue and was fully aware of the Kargil operation. he said. the spokesman said Nawaz Sharif was Prime Minister of the country when the Kargil dispute surfaced. We have to see how much is baseless and how much is baseless and how much he knew as Prime Minister. issued a written statement to the media telling the nation that General Musharraf kept him. He said that he would provide irrefutable proof to substantiate his claim. was that it was never leading us (Pakistan) and the Kashmiris to a logical end on Kashmir issue. “The plan was conceived in January 1999.” he said.” he claimed. He said now in the Kargil year 2000 Nawaz’s statement terming the Kargil operation a misadventure is not only language of Indian .” Nawaz said. The contents of the prime minister’s statements as published in The News are as follows…… “Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Monday said he visited US president Bill Clinton with the consent of Army chief General Pervez Musharraf and demanded a highpowered national commission to probe the entire episode. Nawaz deplored. British Prime Minister John Major and other friendly countries have openly held Pakistan responsible for the Kargil “debacle”.
national newspapers. The conflict ended when Mr Sharif ordered the withdrawal of the Islamic fighter amid US-led international pressure. He further said that Mr Sharif not only paid rich tributes to the troops and the army leadership for their valour during the conflict but also decorated those who sacrificed their lives and limbs in the defence of their motherland. –The News.APP/NNI –Dawn. The military government has repeatedly denied organizing the operation. “As Prime Minister I was not taken into confidence over the conflict. Petition filed for high treason On 22nd June. submitted a petition to the Lahore High Court demanding that Nawaz Sharif should be tried for high treason. it was ironic that Nawaz Sharif should be speaking about being kept in the dark about the Kargil conflict at this belated stage. June 14. Military officials and key Islamic groups have rejected Mr Sharif’s claims as absurd. This nation has the right to know whose brainchild the Kargil operation was. 2000. who were the military and political personalities involved or not involved in the operation. I went to their homes because it was not their fault. 2000. “The Lahore high Court has issued a notice to the Attorney General asking him to state whether the deposed Prime Minister. _AFP – Dawn. “If Nawaz Sharif had actually held such strong views about the Kargil conflict. “leveling unfounded. Arif Noor. The contents of his statement published in daily Dawn are as follows…. June 13. Mr Sharif said as he arrived at the start of an ongoing appeal against his wife sentence for terrorism and hijacking. Following are the contents of his statement released to the press…. June 14. no one was aware in January 1999 that the Kashmiri freedom fighters were planning an operation against the Indian occupation army in Kashmir. However.” . 2000 On June 13. may be the result of a deliberate distortion or the result of his well-known limited concentration and memory span. politicians and intelligentsia supported Nawaz Sharif’s demand for constituting a national commission on Kargil. He described the Kargil conflict in Kashmir as one of the biggest debacles in the country’s history and again called for an official investigation. Mr Sharif said the Kargil operation was planned secretly by the military and he was not aware of it until after the fighting erupted in May. he will expose them. factually incorrect and wild accusation against the army. The spokesman recalled that in the Lahore Declaration Nawaz Sharif had tried to lower the importance of the Kashmir dispute by accepting Kashmir as a “issue” instead of a dispute.” (Editorial Dawn. asking . the spokesman added.leaders but also a treachery to the great sacrifices of Mujahideen and heroes of Pak army. a resident of Lahore. Nawaz Sharif issued another statement in which he said that he knew the names of those responsible for the Kargil defeat and if a commission was constitutes on Kargil. Justice Muhammad Qayyum issued the notice. “An official spokesman on Tuesday strongly deplored the recent statements made by the former Prime Minister.” he added. how is it that he previously agreed that everyone was on board” the spokesman said. “I know the people who were behind this conflict but I will reveal their names at the commission. the spokesman said.” he said. “Deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Tuesday vowed to expose the Kargil “debacle” and launched another broadside on the military from the sidelines of his appeal against a terrorism conviction. The very next day. Nawaz Sharif. “Kargil was the biggest debacle after the 1971 war with India” which led to the dismemberment of Pakistan. The 10-week May to August battle left more than a thousand dead on both sides and brought the two nuclear states to the verge of an all out war. the former Prime Minister was briefed about whatever was known of the Indian design regarding the occupation of the LoC opposite Kargil-Drass in detail. He also said that he had lot more important thing up his sleeves. which have been published by a section of the press.” he said. The spokesman said. June 14. The contents of the news are as follows……. It was really unfortunate. Military officials dismissed the allegation as shameful attempts to distract attention from his alleged crimes. The spokesman strongly deplored the fact that the former Prime Minister was trying to defend the Indian Prime Minister by claiming that he would have stopped Atal Behari Vajpayee from coming to Pakistan had he been aware of the Kargil conflict. for the former head of the government to decry the supreme sacrifices of the officers and jawans by describing Kargil as a “misadventure” only to gain political mileage at the cost of national dignity. according to local press reports on Tuesday. General Musharraf’s spokesman and DG ISPR Maj. The spokesman said “the fact that he (Nawaz Sharif) claims not to remember it. He said he had a “lot more to say” once the commission was set up. and who should be held responsible. Gen Rashid Qureshi termed Nawaz Sharif’s statement a pack of lies and said that he will be tried for making national secrets public. in fact. Daily Dawn’s editorial “We could not agree more with the former Prime Minister when he says that a commission be set up to investigate the Kargil episode to let the nation know the facts that even after one year remain confined to the realm of secrecy. Nawaz Sharif. 2000).. “I salute the soldiers who were killed during conflict. Mr Sharif said he would name those responsible for the bloody conflict with India last year if he was allowed to testify before a military commission. 2000 With the publication of this news. a move which dismayed the military and triggered widespread protests by religious parties.” Commenting on the statements. should stand a trial on treason charge. He repeated his calls for a high-powered military commission or a panel of independent judge to investigate the Kargil conflict.
perhaps even at the level of the Hamood Commission. but exploratory and recommendatory. second. The ex-PM is serving life imprisonment in the infamous plane hijacking case and facing many more corruption cases. which was headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan. in the event of the latter case being tried. Nawaz Sharif had remarked in his June 13 statement that the Chief Executive. that it was a military failure. with casualties much greater than he had been told to expect. It should also be left to the Commission. 2000 FACTS UNFOLD Musharraf’s friend testifies Musharraf’s friend General Anthony Zinni in his book “Battle Ready” unveiled the truth: “I met with the Pakistani leaders in Islamabad on June 24 and 25 and put forth a simple rationale for withdrawing: “If you don’t pull back. what he called ‘a misadventure’. which would have only added to public confusion. rather than the government. The petition has cited ‘leakage of state secrets’ as the basis for the case. India has carried out such an exercise with relatively little furore. However. But despite that he continued blaming Nawaz Sharif for the Kargil withdrawal. Suggestion by the Nation “THAT Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf has declared that this government will not prosecute deposed Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif for his remarks about Kargil episode earlier this month. and if it had proceeded under the Pakistan Penal Code for attempting to bring the armed forces into disrepute. certain key issue needs to be clarified in the developing cloud. The Musharraf government has chosen only to respond to the first charge. If General Musharraf had clean hands. to decide which parts of its report it sees fit to make public. 2000. in his capacity as the chief of the army staff. He had demanded setting up of a high level commission to for a thorough inquiry into. July 03.the AG to appear before the court on June 30. you’re going to bring war and nuclear annihilation down on your country. even in the case of successful operations. it would not necessarily have been a denial. on the basis of which Mian Nawaz had decided to set up a full-fledged commission. However. Gen Musharraf has rejected the claim as an attempt to ‘belittle and undermine’ the army saying that it spoke very low of ex-premier’s patriotism. silence will only breed further rumours. As if on cue after Musharraf’s expression of intent not to prosecute her either. Musharraf refuses to charge Nawaz Sharif with treason Talking to reporters after inaugurating Makran Coastal Highway on July 1. for if it had preferred charges under the Official secrets ACT. Mian Nawaz had alleged two things principally: first. Gen Pervez Musharraf.) After this statement.” (Dawn July 02. and with the Pakistani posts about to be wiped out when he made his infamous dash to Washington. – Nation. it would have been an admission that Mian Nawaz had indeed disclosed the truth. which had led to an armed conflict with Indian armed forces and resulted in heavy casualties on Pakistan side. The government was caught in a cleft stick. Begum Kulsoom Nawaz has raised another bogey. Indeed. Her claim that the report had since been stolen reminded us of the stories that circulated about the copies of the Hamoodur Rehman commission report after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was overthrown. he in his own judgment closed this chapter for good. to identify not only causes of failure to be rectified but factors in success to be reinforced. Third. Further. That’s going to be very bad news for . a process of review is necessary. the people of Pakistan have the right to information about at least the broad features of the affair. even if he has not opened it entirely. 2000. An enquiry commission of the highest possible level. Second. is welcome. had initiated the Kargil operation without his knowledge. Arif Noor’s petition reached its logical conclusion. claiming that the PM was as much in the know as anyone else. on a petition filed by a resident of Lahore. and should not be subject to partisan argument. especially against a man already sentenced to life imprisonment and facing further heavy penalties on various NAB charges. –Agencies – Dawn. “If a case is brought up in the court it will further damage national security as the issue is very sensitive. June 23. the courtroom would have witnessed an exchange of highly partisan versions of events between prosecution and defence. as it would endanger national security. The process of enquiry should terms of reference. is now only a moot point. and which parts it decides to restrict for reasons of national security. First. The process of enquiry should not be adversarial or fault-finding. that he had not been informed of the operation in advance. it would enhance security by restricting the area of national debate to interpretation of agreed facts rather than to wild rumour-based claims and counterclaims. that of an enquiry report into the Kargil affair. he would have tried Nawaz Sharif but since he was guilty and feared that Nawaz Sharif would expose him to the nation and the entire world.” said he CE when asked whether he was contemplating bringing up treason charges against the ousted premier and his wife who had also leveled serious charges against him. Whether Mian Nawaz should have gone to town on Kargil or not. by doing so he has managed to raise the lid of the Pandora’s Box a little. a trial would serve no useful purpose. even though Kargil was also a politically contentious issue there. 2000. As the Chief Executive has realized. Be that as it may. Arif Noor. “The CE indicated that his administration might not bring up treason charges against Nawaz Sharif and his wife Kulsoom for their statements on the Kargil conflict as it would endanger national security. There seems no good reason why Pakistan’s security would suffer from a similar exercise. General Musharraf said that he would not bring up treason charges against Nawaz Sharif and his wife Kulsoom for their statements on Kargil conflict. it is indeed a national security issue. needs to be constituted with broad terms of reference.
Before the publication of “Battle Ready” Bruce Reidel in his research paper “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil summit at Blair House written for an American university on May 2002 disclosed that Saudia Arabia and China both had advised Nawaz Sharif to withdraw from Kargil”. no such thing happened. The problem for the Pakistani leadership was the apparent national loss of face. Kargil occurred even though an elected civilian government with an unprecedented mandate was supposedly in control of the Army. The simple lesson Kargil provides has been spelled out much before it was even dreamt of: war is too serious a business to be left to the General. However. Sharif was reluctant to withdraw before the meeting with Clinton was announced (again.” Nobody actually quarreled with this rationale. The precipitous withdrawal led to the loss of precious lives of brave soldiers. then what can one do?” is so erroneous that one just cannot imagine it. The got Musharraf’s attention. “If he could not understand. the prime minister reached Muzaffarabad at the invitation of the then AJK prime minister and addressed a public meeting there. reportedly heavier than that suffered during the 1965 war. but they cannot get their head round it. Another testimony Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif met with President Clinton on 4th July 1999. he continued his propaganda that during a briefing at the ISI Headquarters he had taken Nawaz Sharif into confidence about opening the Kargil front. In his resent book. said that General Musharraf wanted to seek the prime minister’s approval for construction of a safer road in the sector for defence purpose which was estimated to cost Rs9-10 billion. but after I insisted.everybody. Raja Zafarul Haq said. then what can one do? The general said ironically. but we would announce the meeting only after a withdrawal of forces.” Zinni’s testimony and The Nation’s editorial “GENERAL Anthony Zinni. Seven years later on July 12. his problem was maintaining face). General Zinni has pointed out that the civilian leadership was inclined to withdraw. general Musharraf repeated his claim that during their visit to the Keil Sector on 5th February 1999 he had given a briefing to the prime minister of the Kargil operation. COAS at that time. The sooner the lesson is learnt and the army accepts the supremacy of Parliament.’ That the adventure ended in disaster for the country is no longer in question. for that would have meant loss of face and political suicide. both sides. Battle Ready. have kept pointing the finger at each other.” –Nation. . He said that the prime minister asked General Musharraf to give him a briefing at the site. The book exposes the truth plainly. since as Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM he was a major player in persuading Islamabad to do so. The truth behind who conceived and implemented the Kargil incursion has so far also stayed wrapped. Raja Zafarul Haq’s statement was also aired by some local TV channels after which the government’s at the cost of repetition that Aziz-Musharraf tapped conversation of May 29. Nor could he be expected to deliberately present a falsified version of an event that might show a personal friend in an unflattering light. who had accompanied the prime minister to keil sector. the entire operation was planned and executed by the Pakistan Army. Fact about taking PM into confidence Though General Musharraf failed to blame Nawaz Sharif for the Kargil withdrawal. 2004. Imagine that the chief of army staff and other generals are giving a briefing to no other than the prime minister and his ministers of the stature of Raja Zafarul Haq. 2006. political leadership and army circles. be finally came around and he ordered the withdrawal. It is worth-mentioning here that this briefing was also attended by the then federal ministers raja Zafarul Haq. We needed to come up with a face-saving way out of this mess. General Musharraf’s taunt that “If Nawaz Sharif could not understand. Raja Zafarul said. When the operation was going ‘well’ it was being touted as a master stoke of strategic planning and execution that would internationalise the Kashmir dispute and put strong pressure on New Delhi to resolve it quickly. whose word on the circumstances under which Pakistan Army withdrew from Kargil must be reasonably reliable. 1999 also endorses Nawaz Sharif’s stance that he had not been taken into confidence before launching the operation. After this. As the subsequent events proved. Backing down and pulling back to the Line of Control looked like political suicide. General Mehmood briefed the prime minister on the project in the presence of general Musharraf after which the prime minister approved the project and these pictures were taken on this occasion. has laid to rest the story that Mian Nawaz Sharif had tamely bowed before US pressure to pull back the troops. It was General Musharraf. Clinton’s secretary on South Asia Affairs. What a joke! On the other hand. What we were able to offer was a meeting with President Clinton. Bruce Riedel speaks out. The complete report can be seen in the chapter titled. Raja Zafarul Haq. Raja Zafarul Haq said that during the briefing General Mehmood did not utter even a single word about the Kargil Operation. Pakistan was made to eat humble pie and had a close shave with a nuclear conflagration. June 6. Instead. The general also released a few pictures in support of his claim. who has repeatedly rejected this claim of general Musharraf that he had taken the prime minister into confidence on Kargil Operation. Sartaj Aziz and Ishaq Dar on opening a war front packing the danger of nuclear war and possible killing of millions of people. the better for all. and he encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out. General Musharraf stopped his baseless propaganda against Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. Ironically. in an interview with Daily times. for despite strong public demand it has not been considered advisable to constitute a commission of inquiry to go into the matter and lay the actual facts before the people. who “encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out” and that finally clinched his consent. Bruce Reidel also attended the meeting. After these irrefutable facts became a public knowledge. which would end the isolation that had long been the state of affairs between our two countries.
After getting these confirmed reports through proper channel. it was keeping its eyes peeled. 2002. cabinet secretary. respective. the IB further reported mine-laying and other ominous activities by Pakistan Army. • He had assured the nation and the entire world that President Muhammad Rafiq Tarar will complete his five-year constitutional term. home secretary and director-general military operation.htm?q=tp say. • General Musharraf flagrantly violated his military oath of being loyal to the constitution of the Islamic Democratic Republic of Pakistan and keep from politics. home minister. home minister. Moreover. its March 1999 report emphasized the financial constraints that would inhibit Pakistan from launching on any such adventure. conveying an “authentic” message that India did not visualize any threat from Pakistan in Kargil. cabinet secretary. 19998 to the prime minister.B report. Kargil Committee report tells us that Indian leadership knew in the eighties that Pakistan was planning to capture Kargil. Infact. It has been proved beyond any doubt that the Indian political and military leadership had already decided to covert Kargil sector into a death cage for Pakistan Army and derive maximum political. posted in the region. In this regard. “The intelligence Bureau (IB) is meant to collect intelligence within the country and is the premier agency for counterintelligence. this assessment was dropped. diplomatic and economic interests. if any. • For five long years. “An army brigadier posted in the Kargil area. he was silenced by the COAS. that I will not engage myself in any political activity what so ever and that I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan in the Pakistan Army ( ) as required by and under the law. after occupying Siachen. The R&AW reported the development of new Pakistan Army units into the area and warned that the Pakistan troops were being special training.rediff. But again he reneged on his promise. submitted a detailed report under his signatures to the prime minister. Obviously R&AW March 1999 report was a deception for Pakistani agents. Oath under Articale244 for member of the armed forces: “I_________________do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the constitution of the Islamic republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people. therefore. In addition to the I. May Allah almighty help me and guide (Ameen)”. http://www. but when General Anthony Zinni and Bruce Reidel exposed him.”R&AW (had also) assessed the possibility of “a limited swift offensive threat with possible support of alliance partners’ in its half -yearly assessment ending Sep 1998 but no indicators substantiating this assessment were provided. home secretary and director-general military operations – the most concerned persons—on June 2. in its next six monthly report ending March 1999. he continued this baseless and unfounded propaganda that Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and his ministers were responsible for calling back troops from Kargil. “corps commander ordered that the part worn serviceable (PWS) clothing used in the Saichen area in the previous year (1998) be preserved. Previously. • After his agreement with the MMA on the 17th Constitutional Amendment. it also came into made an unsuccessful attempt to seek Benazir Bhutto’s approval for launching the operation. 1998. we will confine ourselves to quoting a few examples here. Later on. The Indian military on the direction of political leadership kept Musharraf’s Kargil adventure a complete secret to the extent that when Brigadier Surinder Singh. became active and started feeding up-to-the-minute information to their leadership. • General Musharraf had often said that he was not interested in politics and will play golf after handing power over to the civil government after the October 2002 elections. he kept quite.” In July 1998. Shymal Dutta. He addressed public meetings in uniform and concentrated all powers in his hands. the then director of Indian Intelligence Bureau. But General Musharraf ratted on his promise and removed him from the President House before leaving for Agra on 20th June.Musharraf’s track record of commitments • General Musharraf often claims that he is an upright person and insists that whatever he says should be trusted. these were silent on the fact that India was aware of the Kargil plan 15 years ago and had put a plan in place to trap Pakistan. General Musharraf announced in his address to the nation on TV and Radio on 24th December 2003 that he will put off his uniform by 31st December 2004 meaning that he will keep the office of the president only. who had . which had achieved perfection in electronic communication and satellite imagery. tried to mark it public. But the Pakistan military leadership continued to labour under the illusion that India was not aware of it In fact. The respective paragraph of the report says. The president’s term was to expire on 31st December. This PWS stock was also issued to the troops during the Kargil action”. The Indian intelligence agencies. India was expecting a reaction from Pakistan. It had also been proved that he could unabashedly rat on his words and tell a lie when it came to securing his own loaves and fishes. Though we have a long record of his “truthfulness” and “uprightness”. It further came to their knowledge that when Musharraf became Corps commander 01 corps. Pakistan Army had increased its activities in the Kargil sector during 1997-98. THE TRAP Indian trap Though reams of paper have been written on Kargil. “troops returning from Saichen duty discarded their special clothing which was usually disposed of by auction” (Kargil Committee Report).com/news/2006/may/05raman. 2001. At that time Pervez Musharraf was DG Military Operations. This agency got certain inputs on activities in the FCNA region which were considered important enough by the Director IB to be communicated over his signature on June 2. But the entire nation and the world saw him more involved in politics.
is the better part of accountability. For maintaining the façade of national unity. the Indian leadership sacrificed 524 lives and milked unprecedented benefits for a . what we desperately need is limited transparency in order to affect some accountability.000 men not with drawn from WAPDA in the face of a near. Mr. Why is Kargil Inquiry Commission necessary? Eminent columnist Ikram sehgal in his article “Beware the ostrich” published in The nation on 31st July wrote: “Instead of benefiting our mistakes. Discretion. Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif invited the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Lahore. On the other hand. or the need to maintain cohesion/cooperation between government and its subsidiary institutions by refraining from casting aspirations in the national interest. On his invitation. must therefore. There i9s no satisfaction for us in the knowledge that we could have faced for military disaster to go along with the diplomatic and media debacle if our diehard opponent was not such a blunderer militarily. to the foreign office and the information ministry to counter possible Indian diplomatic moves and propaganda?(6) given that a possible war was likely . This invariably involves the fabrication of misinformation. the perpetrators thereof escape retribution and survive to make even greater mistakes to the detriment of the nation.and in the light of these details India had killed all gorillas one by one bringing the operation to an end. Just to save his own skin. Later on. On their confidential findings and recommendations action must be taken against the individuals or individuals who have brought us to this sorry pass. was a full briefing of the likely Indian military reaction given to the pm? (4) IF explicit permission was not given by the pm and/or the government. Vajpayee reached Lahore by Dosti Bus and signed the historic Lahore declaration on 21st February 1999. the Indian military had made all necessary preparation to foil the possible aggression. What benefits Kargil brought to India? Under a well-thought-out plan.how well( and when)were the corps commanders and principal staff officers in GHQ informed?(7)why were the core supervisors of several infantry divisions and one armored division comprising 33. Pakistan would have long achieved its objective of making south Asia a haven of peace and harmony. The historic visit was termed a huge victory of Pakistan and India and a boon of peace and harmony in south Asia. He committed the unpardonable crime of hiding the loss of over 3.000 NLI officers and Jawans and Mujahideen from the nation. sometime for the sake of maintaining a façade in the name of national responsibility but mostly out of fear of the “agencies”. In private gatherings they express their candid opinion but proceed to step-dance around their views in print. When Mujahideen took over their positions on the Kargil heights. The international community too doled praises on Pakistan and India. The greater the blunder the greater the chances for survival. The question that boggles one’s mind is that what were our intelligence agencies doing at that time? It is also a hard fact that RAW had also stolen the details of the 1965 operation Gilbralter. It won’t be out of place to mention that the Indian intelligence agencies had advanced to such an extent that they bugged every word of the Musharraf-Aziz conversation about Kargil on May 29. who was the senior most person under whose authority this operation was undertaken?(5)what briefing was given. Among the question this committee can enquire into are: (1) why were the immediate and long. the Indian military came into action and cut off all supply routes converting Kargil heights into a death cage for Mujahideen and NLI. While general Musharaf and his two other accomplices had” fined tuned” the Kargil Operation and were biding their time. we have mastered the art of covering up our follies.also warned General Malik of likely Pakistani intentions and moves. In this way. this conversation was published by the Times of India on 9th June. those who blunder must survive.Pakistan where he recognized Pakistan as an independent and sovereign state. The citizens of Lahore also hosted a reception in his honor at Shalimar Bagh where he read out his famous poem “Ab Jng Nah Honey Day Gey”. Bugles and trumpets are only a temporary slave for the national psyche.term compulsions for invoking the Kargil plan?(2) was explicit permission obtain from the PM and /or the government?(3) if explicit permission was obtained. the image of the motherland and the national security at stake but also titled the balance of power in favors of India. While we recognize that military issues cannot be made public. He. Had the adventure Pakistani generals done away with their tradition of takeovers. they have no stomach to face the truth. if any. meet his just deserts for his serious crimes. in this case. In those days the Indian Prime Minister was seriously upset by the nuclear detonations of Pakistan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s robust diplomatic initiatives for the solution of Kashmir dispute.Vajpayee showed his sincerity to the people of Pakistan and the entire world that India wanted normalization of its relations with Pakistan and relieved himself of the international pressure. Mr. 1999. The government must immediately constitute a committee of enquiry whose deliberations and findings may be kept secret in the national interest. was sought to be intimidated into silence by General Malik through a departmental enquiry when he tried to go to the media with his story”. Our media is a hostage to the face that its controller give only lip-services to the obivious. he not only put the national interest. He also visited Minar-i. What we can not conveniently hide under the guise of patriotic duty. the pain of ultimate losses that much greater.war situation?(8) why was the performance of ISPR erratic through out this crisis?(9) why were conflicting statements given by the ISPR in the face of the government stance? Musharraf’s crimes General Musharaf Kargil adventure made Pakistan a laughing stock of the international community. He not only the dealt a deadly blow to the Kashmir cause and hurt the sentiments of kashmiri brethren but also brought subcontinent on the brink of a nuclear war. We camouflage beneath the cove of national unity.
Cashing in on these renewed relations and a better understanding. • The Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) taken by the two countries have so far benefited India. relations. After a quarter century gap in presidential visits to India. • Another joke is that if ever Pakistan got the used and exhausted F16s. It is for the first time in the history of the country that 0. the Congress cut this financial assistance by S35 billion annually.S. Commenting on this. the U. while General Musharraf threw the entire country into the war. Doors opened in New Delhi to Americans that had been shut for years. The clarity of the American position on Kargil and its refusal to give Pakistan any reward for its aggression had an immediate and dynamic impact on the relationship. the most important strategic result of the Blair House summit was its impact on Indo-U. The Afghan and coalition troops too have killed dozens of . army officers and Jawans helped the Indian Army fence the Line of control. he lifted the Glenn sanctions imposed after the 1998 tests and welcomed Vajpayee to the Oval Office”.S government removed sanctions on India imposed in the wake of the September 11 nuclear detonations. “President Bush has accelerated and intensified the process of U. talking to reporters. the Indian leadership got the indigenous Kashmir freedom struggle declared as terrorism. Clinton’s spring visit symbolized a new level of maturity i n the relationship between the world’s two largest democracies.population of over one billion people and the future generation. the Indian government managed to get General Musharraf’s assurance in Islamabad declaration (January 06. We all know there is terrorism in (South Asia) region. Mr. • It also succeeded in increasing international pressure on Pakistan with regard to its nuclear programme and forcing General Musharraf to arrest and humiliate eminent nuclear scientist and national hero Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan and a number of other scientists. • On the orders of General Musharraf.000 cusecs of water. • Through its robust diplomatic offensive and Kargil victory. Our troops have martyred hundreds of their own compatriots without discriminating between women and children.” • The most recent US “reward” for General Musharraf’s loyalty and faithfulness to the US administration was that Under Secretary of State Richard Boucher after his three-hour consultations with the Indian government officials and traders on August 7 in New Delhi said that both US and India should take a united action against terrorism in any part of the world including Pakistan. an eminent journalist said: “It means these F16s are being purchased for aerobatics during the 23 March military parade. violence. • By bugging and publishing Musharraf-Aziz conversation about Kargil Operation. The most important things was that it opened Americans doors to the Indians which were lying closed for decades. Another demerit was that continuity of this financial assistance was subject to annual approval by the US Congress. “The stage was set for the unprecedented back to back summits between President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2000. • Our indigenously-built peaceful nuclear program came under immense international pressure and our patriotic nuclear scientists were branded as criminals. The most important words of this Declaration are as follows… “Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process. After the September 11th attack on America.5 billion spanning five years with numerous strings attached.1 million Pakistani troops are engaged in the war against a handful of “foreign terrorists” on Pak-Afghan border. • After 9/11. Boucher said: “The two sides discussed joint effort to fight terrorism and felt that terrorism should be fourth in all places and all its forms. Later. • According to a Pentagon survey. Some of the terrorism is in Pakistan. these would not be able to carry nuclear weapons and their use during war would be subject to the US approval. • General Musharraf remained in stupor while India was constructing Baglihar dam in total violation of the Indus Water treaty and officially lodged a complaint with the World Bank when it had almost completed half of the dam. Vajpayee’s return visit formalized the commitment. In 2006. General Musharraf started currying favor with India and propagating ridiculous one-sided solutions for Kashmir dispute which were not heeded to by India. India managed to build the world opinion that Pakistan Army was a rough army and it must be neutralized. It is strange that India did not give the US even an inch of its land or commit even a single troop during its war on terror. • India also won an over S15 billion US investment and signing of 12 agreements including an agreement on nuclear cooperation. Pakistan’s losses • The October 12 military takeover by General Musharraf tarnished the image of Pakistan in the eye of the international community and damaged its UN-supported decade-long principled stand on Kashmir to such an extent that General Musharraf himself joined the chorus of enemy voices calling Kashmiri freedom fighters as terrorists.S-India rapprochement. Feeling ostracized in the international community. The Indian elite_ including the military – and the Indian public began to shed long held negative perceptions of the U. The dam would deprive Pakistan of 8. 2004) that Pakistan won’t let anyone use its territory for terrorism against any country.S. According to Bruce Reidel. President Musharraf assured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner”. Some of the groups that have designs against India still have pieces in Pakistan”. hostility and terrorism must be prevented. rendering two and half million acre of its land barren and forcing it to spend S15 million to import food items. Pakistan suffered a loss of S10 billion in the war on terror but General Musharraf could hardly get a “financial assistance” of S3. while 800 officers and Jawans have so far been killed.
what steps should be taken to curb it? Are our military academies and colleges preparing brave and incorruptible soldiers committed to their oath of defending the country’s geographical borders and being loyal to the Constitution? If no. It is tragic that this military establishment completely ignored the civil leaders and civil bureaucracy in decision.innocent Pakistanis. Whether they were officers or the rank and file. this commission should also take stock of these questions: 1) Are our intelligence agencies well-equipped and competent to ensure the security of the motherland? In case of an outright no. they considered these colonial rulers their masters and the best creature on earth. And right from Field Marshal Ayub Khan up to General Pervez Mushahrraf. this military transformed into Pakistan army that hated the guts of the civil rulers and was averse to seeing them ruled by them. A consensus high-powered commission should be constituted on Kargil debacle that should submit its recommendations to parliament within six months. removal of democratic governments and disrespect and disregard for the Constitution? 6) What changes should be made to the constitution and the Army Act to close this chapter for good? 7) Should the military be allowed to continue to play ducks and drakes with the public money by building GHQs and golf clubs? Why military spending not be audited? Are the armed forces free from corruption? If there is corruption. color. Pakistan became a thorn on the side of some western countries because a dominant majority of its population believed in one Allah. It is strange that military rules in Pakistan always proved beneficial to India. it carried them to the letter. General Musharraf must admit to his blunders and offer himself for court-martial. It had one culture and was endowed with the sterling qualities of mind to forge ahead. what changes should be made to their syllabus and the training system? EPILOGUE Why Pakistan continues to be plagued by military rules? This question boggles the minds of many person. conscientious and patriotic politicians so much so that their spiritual father Ayub Khan shamelessly rigged the elections when his rival was no other than Madar-i-Millat Mohtaram Fatima Jinnah. serving and retired military officials can be seen allegedly grinding their own axe to the detriment of disturbing an already disturbed situation. it will command influence in the Islamic world thus damaging their some particular economic interest. “these generals had such mentality that if father of the nation Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had been alive for another five or six years after the creation of Pakistan. Kargil misadventure is an exact personification of this saying. what steps should be taken to set the things in order? 5) What damages have been inflicted on the country and the nation during the 31-year rule of generals marked by violation of the military oath of defending the geographical borders of the country. the real fact in this regard is horrible. Soon after its creation. they decided to arrest its march towards the most cherished national goals. these western countries are least bothered about the extent of corruption of these witless generals or their business concerns. Generals take the plea that they are invited by the opposition politicians. housing and construction not affected its professionalism? In case of yes. what steps should be taken to confine the military to its professional obligation of defending the geographical borders of the country? 3) Has the concentration of power in the hand of COAS not created troubles for Pakistan? 4) If yes. According to a sage. These military dictators always looked down upon the fore sighting. The worst of its was that soon after the creation of the Islamic democratic republic of Pakistan. Having no regard for religion. this military ate at the hands of its colonial rulers and was always at their beck and call to render every kind of sacrifice for securing and defending their interests. 3. Since these countries were well aware of the structure of this military and its disposition. It is strange that general Musharraf could not present the body of even a single foreign terrorist before the national and international media in support of his claim that foreign terrorists are operating in our tribal areas.” Sincere to their own interest. In majority of civil institutions. race and area. . they would have toppled his government too or assassinated him like Quaid-i-Millat Liaqat Ali Khan. There goes a Persian saying “Kare Bacha kham. For this military royalty to the constitution was also a worthless thing. Though this propaganda carries some weight. dwarfing all other factors. “These military dictators need such selfish and dishonest persons who serve their interests. Theses countries continued their contacts with this military establishment on various pretexts and through their carrot and stick policy whatever orders they gave to this establishment. all military dictators were an epitome of this saying. If he fails to do this then his courtmartial is a must to close the chapter of future military takeovers. Therefore. 2. There was no dearth of resources and capabilities either. His last prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the Holy Quran as His final book. Besides other questions. The opponents staunchly believed that if this God-gifted Islamic state was given a free reign to strengthen it through continuity of constitution and democracy. they decided to use its might to defend and promote their interests. Aqale Ghulam Gum” meaning that a child’s work lacks maturity and a slave has his wits lost.making. what steps should be taken in this regard? 2) Has the military involvement in commercial activities like banking. In fact. They breed them and label them as politicians telling the world that there is complete democracy in Pakistan and that it is progressing in leaps and bounds. the purpose of the military created by the British colonial rulers in the subcontinent was to defend their interest on the domestic and foreign front. RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
foreign Secretary will also say and Rashid will also say. (Aziz spoke from Pakistan to Musharraf. this is better. it pursues double standard. we insisted that a meeting should be held. in those positions? P: In those position.. who was on a visit to China. in the evening. we must burry our differences and forge unity in our ranks to take the serious challenges in our stride. It has happened yesterday also and today. C: On their side. Their leaders send a general packing home for giving political suggestion during war and retire three generals in a row. is the only way to evolve lasting peace in the world and realise mutual interests judiciously. I am neither an enemy of the west nor of India. After that. That has been upgraded a little. generally speaking. I have just one complaint with the west. I bear no grudge against a developing and progressing India. Pakistan on 26 May 1999. Meaning: verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change it themselves. Where the bombs have been dropped they have tried to drop from a good position where they are in difficulty. the incumbent of my old chair. harmony and security across the globe. Only then Allah will help and guide us and steer us out of the stormy waters because he helps those who help themselves. secure and strengthened country enjoying respect and honors in the International community. Politics is not a forbidden fruit. these possibly they are taking under the garb having intention for operation the craft (?) line of control . So I have spoken to the foreign secretary and I have told him that he should make the appropriate noises about this in the press. I have no enmity with or animosity towards any general. C: They (Indians) should also be told. I request these western countries to do away with their double standard and not only support continuation of democracy in the third world countries but also respect their sovereignty and territorial integrity. our stand should be that all these bombs are falling on our side. Chief of General Staff China: Gen Parvez Musharraf. in my humble opinion. We will not come into that situation. P: That we have told. has there been any talk with them? Any meeting etc? P: Yesterday. they will be an apple of the nation’s eye.. I believe in unity of humanity like the threads of a rope and rule of peace. This. therefore. It is quite distance apart. very well. and Gen Parvez Musharraf. If the ongoing situation continued no one would be able to save Pakistan from destruction. C: Who all were there? P: Actually. What to speak of mustering up to courage to take our country. the entire build-up we want to give this co lour. I just wish to see Pakistan as a prosperous. A little ember can ignite a civil war in the country and this is exactly what the enemies of Pakistan want. but in today’s bombing about three fell on our side. what else is the news on that side? P: Ham-dul-ullah. political and diplomatic and military sectors. These military dictators need to take a leaf out of the book of the armed forces of the develop countries. If they join politics after two years and serve the country. And. we thought lest he give something ourselves by going there. we quote Aya Number 11 of Soorah ar-Ra’ad.Is what happened? So. The most dangerous thing is that the military’s constant involvement in the country’s civil affairs has weakened it professionally. which does not appear to be a result of inaccuracy. Chief of Army Staff.and this need to be taken note of and we would retaliate in kind ….(?). The country’s history is witness to the fact that the decision made by armed hands did no good to the motherland. In this regard. but those having germs for it must wait for the mandatory two years to take part in active politics. Chief of General Staff. Today high altitude bombing has been done. The basic reason for a strong and strengthen Indian military is that it has strictly confined its activities to the defence sector in the light of guidance of the civil leadership. we can do it on the other side as well. The guideline that they have given stressed that we should say that this build-up and employment of air strike which has been done under the garb of …. it can’t even question the Prime Minister’s decision to retire generals during war. it is a sort of giving of a message that if need be. The 59-years chequered history of Pakistan speaks otherwise. industrial. Chief of Army Staff P: How is the visit going? C: Yes. actually they are targeting our position on the LoC and our logistic build-up. He will not.Every second citizen of Pakistan is witness to their corruption due to which their hatred for army has reached its peak.) Pak: Lt Gen Mohd Aziz. . In my interpretation. We also request the west to strike up a real friendship with the east and take result oriented measures for the solution of contentious issues like Kashmir and Palestine. This is space age in which our eastern neighbor India has made rapid paces in economic. their own unenviable history. Okay. There is no change on the ground situation. Yes. because otherwise that friends of ours. I also request the national political leadership. They have started rocketing and strafing. from behind the LoC but they have fallen on our side of the LoC. C: Absolutely okay. DOCUMENTS Transcript of conversation between Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz. again. the intelligentsia and the entire nation to play their unreserved attention to their own home-the Islamic democratic republic of Pakistan – gifted by the great politician and statesman Quaid-iAzam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (May Allah shower his blessings on him). make any such mistake about those other bombs falling on our side. I only desire that it let the oppressed Kashmir is decide their fate.The thunder:”……………”.
C: Was he little disturbed. I heard that there was some trouble in Sialkot. myself &Tauqir. and without your support they could not be there. Then he said we had briefed the PM earlier & given an assessment.. there was once in Daska. American diplomacy And the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House BRUCE REIDEL INTRODUCTION July 4th. Keep using this—let them keep dropping bombs. what is happening there? Then I will ask the concerned people and then we will get back to you. and all this build-up that you are doing----one or more brigade strength and 50-60 aircraft are being collected. certainly among the most eventful. P: Yes.. we played the tape of Tauqir. we will not let them stay there. he would say. in Mia sahib office. C: Absolutely. When you come. Then Tauqir told him that if your boys tried to physically attack the Line of Control and go beyond it…. 1999 was probably the most unusual July 4th in American diplomatic history. we gave the suggestion that there was no such fear as the scruff (tooti) of their (militants) neck is in our hands. Because before going. This term he used. and those very stages of the military situation were being seen. C: Even your seat man? P: Yes. successfully persuading Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull back Pakistani backed fighters from a confrontation with India that could threaten to escalate into a nuclear war between the world’s two newest nuclear . As far as internationalization is concerned. when Corps Commanders were told. he was little disturbed about that but I told him that such small things keep happening and we can reply to such things in a better way. C: Oh I see. we could regulate it. no change in ground situation. and every time Tauqir said that please tell us some detail. they did not. He would put three points again and that they (militants) should not be supported. On this issue there was trouble. C: Rest (baki). We told him there is no reason of alarm & panic. I will play it for you.Sir. So whenever he asked these details. C: So. So the top priority is to accord confidentiality. P: So. no one was in a particularly disturbed. did they talk of coming out and meeting somewhere? P: No. very good thing. to ensure our success. This means. C: Was there some other talk of putting pressure on us? P: No. whenever you want. We should respect this and the advantage we have from this would give us a handle. He gave a very good presentation of our viewpoint. Then he said the same old story. Those two’s views were that the status quo & the present position of Gen Hassan (?) no change should be recommended in that. This could be the next round of talks between the two PMs which they are expecting it…. was the forum the same as where we had done previously? There. Mehmood. is Mian Saheb okay? P: Ok. He was confident just like that but for the other two. then I will give details. Our experience was that our earlier efforts failed because of lack of secrecy. he was disturbed. they have your help and artillery support. so I had put him on the defensive. at Jamshed’s place? P: No. You may have seen in the press about UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s appeal that both countries should sit & talk. There. what was he (Indian counterpart) saying? P: That is very interesting. But he was also saying that any escalation after that should be regulated as there may be the danger of war. C: So. its focus was that these infiltrators. P: There is no such thing to worry. The entire reason of the success of this operation was this total secrecy. But this is not a friendly act. which it would not be a problem for us to handle. Ch Zafar Saheb coped very well. we will talk about this when we meet. dialogue must be kept open & rest. He said we had briefed the PM earlier & given an assessment. as they had been even earlier. I thought that there wan good enough indication you would not enter into this type of misadventure. no problem…. detail about how many have gone into your area. Rest. it was for your guidance how to deal with the political & diplomatic aspects. for the last two hours the BBC has been continuously reporting on the air strikes by India. We carried that tape with us. without which they could not have come to J&K. Also. this is the fastest this has happened.. this is not a friendly act and it is against of the spirit of the Lahore Declaration. What was he saying? P: Form here we had gone—Choudry Zafar sahib. C: So that briefing to Mian sahib that we did. they have sophisticated weapons and we will flush them out.) blessings and yesterday also I told him that the door of discussion. they are possibly looking forward to the next round of talks. who are sitting here. C: So. many times we had discussed. Then he said that when I came to know seven days back. President Clinton engaged in one of the most sensitive diplomatic high wire acts of any administration. Shamshad as usual was supporting. taken your (PM’s?. He said that will be flushed out.and that the bombs were planted on the Turtok bridge and the dead body received in the process was returned with military honours and I said. Today. On this logic. Malik Saheb was disturbed. in which the two sides could meet. He only said that they (militants) will be given suitable reception. Yes. Tauqir had spoken with his counterpart. No. After this. frame of mind. These are excuses for undertaking some operations against the various spaces.
Assistant Secretary for South Asia Rick Inderfurth and I traveled to Islamabad to try to persuade him. The events of the 4th accelerated the road to a fundamental reconciliation between the world’s two largest democracies. Instead.000 alone. Central Command chief General Anthony Zinni.S.S. which has been punctuated by three wars. Pakistani backed Kashmir militants and regular army units moved early into evacuated position of the Indians. General Pervez Musharraf was a refugee from New Delhi. but all to no avail. seeking third party support (Pakistan from China and the Arabs. Musharraf and Sharif have already put out different versions of who said what to whom. Each of the players has his own reasons for selling a particular version of the process. His military chief. We could all too easily imagine the two parties beginning to mobilize for war. What was all the more alarming for Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s hard-line Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government was that the Pakistani military incursion came after the Prime Minister had made a bold effort in early 1999 at reconciliation with Pakistan by traveling by bus to the Pakistani city of Lahore for a summit with Sharif. The situation was further clouded because it was not altogether clear who was calling the shots in Islamabad. Others like former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto have also given their views. cheating on the tradition. By late may and early June 1999 a serious military conflict was underway along a hundred fifty kilometer front in the mountains above Kargil (some of which rise to a height of 17. India from Russia and Israel) and a deadly decent into full scale conflict all along the border with a danger of nuclear cataclysm. By advancing onto these mountaintops overlooking the Kargil highway. Pakistan denied its troops were involved. one of the million sent into exile in the 1947 catastrophe that split British India and the subcontinent. The dispute is not a cold confrontation like that between the two superpowers over Germany in the Cold War. The Pakistani backed forces thus gained a significant tactical advantage over the only ground supply rout Indian forces can use to bring in supplies to the most remote eastern third of Kashmir. After a few weeks of agonizing. assistance. In the new post-May era we confronted the reality of two nuclear tested states whose missiles could be fired with flight times of three to five minutes from launch to impact. Clinton had spent days trying to argue Sharif out of testing in response and had offers him everything from a state dinner to billions in new U. Given these consequences for escalation. The spirit of Lahore was intended to be the mechanism for breaking the two giants of south Asia out of their half century of violence and fear and moving the subcontinent to a better future. but also set the scene for another in the series of military coups that have marred Pakistani democracy. Kargil and Kashmir For fifty years Pakistan and India have quarreled over the fate of Kashmir.000 feet above sea level). Prime Minister Sharif had seemed genuinely interested in pursuing the Lahore process when he met with Vajpayee and he had argued eloquently with a series of American guests. was quick to make known our view that Pakistan should withdraw its forces back behind the Line of Control immediately. that he wanted an end to the fifty year old quarrel with India. the U. The nuclear scenario was obviously very much on our minds. the Indians felt betrayed. however. At first Rick Inderfurth and Undersecretary Thomas Pickering conveyed this view privately to the Pakistani and Indian ambassadors in Washington in late May. Bombay.powers.000 and 850. He was said to be a hardliner on Kashmir. As the President’s Special Assistant for Near eastern and South Asia Affairs at the National Security Council I had the honor of a unique seat at the table and the privilege of being a key adviser for the day’s events. The United state was alarmed from the beginning of the conflict because of its potential for escalation. with a small bomb would kill between 150. Both India and Pakistan deploy hundreds of thousands of troops in the area. What is clear is that the civil-military dynamic between Sharif in Islamabad and Musharraf in Rawalpindi was confused and tense. Traditionally the Indian and Pakistani armies had withdrawn each fall from their most advanced position in the mountains to avoid the difficulties of manning them during the winter and then returned to them in the spring. Pakistan was threatening to weaken Indian control over a significant (yet barren) part of the contested province. claiming that only Kashmiri militants were doing the fighting—a claim not taken seriously anywhere. Since the surprise Indian tests in May 1998 the danger of a nuclear exchange had dominated American nightmares about South Asia. including U. (I had the Israeli Chief of Staff deny categorically to the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington any such plan the reality before the tests but that fact mattered little to Islamabad). India and the United States.S. including furious artillery clashes. a man some feared was determined to humble India once and for all. In the spring of 1999 the Pakistanis sought to gain a strategic advantage in the northern front of the LOC in a remote part of the Himalayas called Kargil.UN Ambassador Bill Richardson. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talboot. Secretary Albright then called Sharif two days later and General Anthony Zinni. The two armies respected each other’s development pattern and did not try to take advantage of this seasonal change. who had a very close relationship with his Pakistani . In the winter of 1999. We will probably never know for sure the exact calculus of decision making in Islamabad. One well-informed assessment concluded that a Pakistani strike on just one Indian city. air battles and costly infantry assaults by Indian troops against well dug in Pakistani forces. Since the early 1990s it has been particularly violent with almost daily firefight along the Line of Control (LOC) that divides the state and within the valley between the Indian security forces and the Muslim insurgency. Rather it is a hot confrontation. deceived and misled by Sharif and were determined to recover their lost territory. Sharif had gone forward with his own tests citing as a flimsy excuse an alleged Israel plot to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in collusion with India.
S. Sharif had met the President several times earlier. They had also spoken extensively in the spring of 1998 when the President had pleaded with Sharif no to follow India’s example and tests its nuclear weapons. (sandy) Berger and chief of staff John Podesta. Strobe.-Pakistan relations had cooled significantly after 1990 when the U. the second a statement which would be used if Sharif refused. Vajpayee would not negotiate under the threat of aggression. Although U. He urged Sharif to consider carefully the wisdom of a trip to Washington under these constraints. the senior point man on South Asian issues in the department and Karl (Rick) interfaith. Logistic were one problem. The white house and state department spent much of the rest of the 3rd preparing. Te first was a draft statement the president would issue if Sharif agreed to pulling back his forces to the LOC.S. direct talks between India and Pakistan were the only solution to Kashmir. would always back them against India and India because they could not believe the U. The casualties the Indian forces were taking were mounting. was not bound by the past. Pakistan had been the take off point for U2s flying over Russia and for Henry Kissinger’s trip to China. would judge the crisis on its merits. Although that effort failed (despite promises of enormous U. the danger of escalation was high. New Delhi could easily decide to open another front elsewhere along the LOC to ease its burden and force the Pakistanis to fight on territory favorable to India. The latter would make clear that the blame for the crisis in south Asia lay solely with Pakistan.S. So we went public and called upon Pakistan to respect the LOC. Nawaz Call for Help By late June the situation was deteriorating fast. along with Saudi Arabia.S. During the soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s Pakistan had been the U.counterparts. Our intelligence assessments were pointing toward the danger of full-scale war becoming a real possibility. whose bureau had the strongest expertise on the subcontinent in the U. in New York and Washington and at the funeral of King Hussein in Amman. Assistant Secretary of South Asian affairs at state. Casualties were mounting on both sides. The president sought to reassure Vajpayee that we would not countenance Pakistani aggressions. Blair House had to be made available for the Pakistani and the secret service needed to secure Pennsylvania Avenue. also called Chief of Army Staff General Musharraf.S. For the previous fifty years.S. The president also consulted with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee on the phone. These messages did not work. Sharif was more desperate and told the president he was ready to come immediately to Washington to seek our help. On the 2nd of July prime Minister put in a call to the president. rather than side automatically with its long time Pakistani ally. The state effort was led by Deputy Secretary of state Strobe Talbot. On the 3rd. I laid out our position in an on the record interview at the Foreign Press Centre in Washington. nothing else would do. position: Pakistan because Islamabad assumed the U. it was slow and both sides were mobilizing more and more of their regular forces. with a few exceptions. He appealed for the American intervention immediately to stop the fighting and to resolve the Kashmir issue. tens of thousands of Americans come down to the mall to see the fireworks. Sharif became increasingly desperate as he saw how isolated Pakistan was in the world.e.S. The product of this work was pieces of paper. The Indians were adamant – withdrawal to the LOC was essential. On the third more information developed about the escalating military situation in the area –disturbing evidences that .i. In 1971 the Nixon Administration had “tilted” toward Pakistan and against India during the war that led to Bangladesh’s freedom. Sharif said he was coming and would be there on the 4th. many come via the area around the white House and would be inconvenience by a shut down of Pennsylvania avenue. was more tough sanctions on both countries in 1998 (so-called Glenn sanction) after they tested nuclear weapons had not altered the perception of American bias for Pakistan. Rick and I had already logged many hours traveling to south Asia to work to advance the presidents agenda of improving our relations with this too long neglected part of the world. aid to Pakistan). I can’t help you if you are not ready to pull back. National Security Advisor Samuel R.S. Both protagonists were rooted in the history of their half-century conflict and astounded that the U. not reward them for violating the line of control and that we stood by our commitment to the Lahore process. while India had been aligned with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Washington was clear---the solution required a Pakistani withdrawal behind the LOC. The president was very clear—he could help only if Pakistan first withdraws to the LOC. not third party intervention. ‘critical ally in aiding the mujahedin freedom fighters against communism. the popular and elite perception in both countries was that the U. As any visitor to the Mall on the a 4th of July knows. While the Indian forces were making some progress against the Pakistanis and their militant allies.S. I led the effort at the NSC to prepare the President. In the last days of June Sharif began to ask to see President Clinton directly to plead his case. The Pakistanis and Indians were both surprised by the U. The two parties were engaged in an intense conflict along the Kargil front and both were mobilizing their forces for larger conflict. The president repeated his caution—come only if you are ready to withdraw. government. determined Islamabad was building a nuclear arsenal (leading to an aid suspension). The danger was that the Indians would grow weary of attacking uphill (actually up-mountain) into well dug in Pakistani positions. A small group also prepared for the substance of the encounter. Even if the conflict remained confined solely to Kargil. the United States had been tied to Pakistan.S. The President then called both leaders in mind-June and sent letters to each pressing for Pakistani withdrawal and Indian restraint. He urgently requested American intervention to stop the Indian counterattack. the two leaders had developed a genuine personal bond and felt comfortable talking to each other.
if only the president would devote 1% of the effort he gave to the Arab –Israeli dispute to Kashmir it would be resolved. armies mobilizing and disaster looming. including Pakistan’s ally china. Sharif had a couple of hours to rest and refresh himself since his arrival early in the morning. Sharif opened by thanking the president for resolving the long outstanding quarrel between the two countries over the suspended delivery of F 16 fighters – suspended when sanctions were imposed in 1990.S. If the United States appeared to be acting under the gun of a nuclear threat its ability to restrain others from threatening use of their nuclear forces would be forever undermined. Clinton said this is what worried him. He said he was ready to go and we crossed Pennsylvania Avenue to Blair House. Again the president said that was all true but the fundamental reality of the day was the Pakistani army and its militant allies were on the wrong side of the LOC and must withdraw. which is direct contact with India. Sharif noted that India had been the first to test nuclear weapons and refused to hold an election to determine the future of Kashmir. Like us. the British were increasingly worried over the direction the crisis was headed and danger of escalation to full-scale war. help Islamabad.S. it must now retreat before disaster set in. There was more disturbing information about Pakistan preparing its nuclear arsenal for possible use. The president urged Sharif to give him that money in the bank. The PM was distraught. Shari’s intention also became clearer. The president told the Pakistani team that he had just read john Keenan’s new book on the First World War. British prime minister also contacted Sharif to weigh in as well on the need for withdrawal. A full and complete withdrawal without pre-conditions would give the U. Sharif must act today. He then framed the days discussion by handing the PM a cartoon from the days Chicago tribune newspaper that showed Pakistan and India as nuclear bombs fighting with each other. particularly not when the Foreign Secretary.S.the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenal for possible deployment. where his commercial PIA flight was being diverted to form JFK. The 4th Dawns The president advisors gathered early on the 4th to brief him on the meeting ahead and provide advice. Strobe noted the importance of being very clear with Nawaz and not letting the prime Minster be alone with the president so that he could later claim commitments not made. I recommended that he use this only when Sharif was without his aides. shared these concerns as well and we asked Beijing to weigh in with Islamabad. I met with him on his McLean home and gave him our sense of the crisis. He was bringing his wife and children with him to Washington.30 in the afternoon with a plenary session with their teams. The president began by noting he had to travel on the 5th to America’s poorest state. Clinton secured a sizeable cash payment to Pakistan that compensated Islamabad for the cost of the never delivered fighters. But he warned there could be no quid pro quo. Sandy Berger opened the session by telling the president that this could be the most important foreign policy meeting on his presidency because the stakes could include nuclear war. a long planned event to help eradicate poverty in America and thus was glade the Pm could be available on the 4th. Bandar called and told me the results of his discussion with Sharif.who was known to be very close to Pakistani military intelligence (ISI)was earshot. He appealed to the president to intervene directly to settle the dispute by pressing India. a possible indication that he was afraid he might not be able to go home if the summit failed or that the military was telling him to leave. The room was tense and Sharif visibly worried. The mood was somber. Only if Pakistan withdrew completely and quickly could the U. Sharif handed the president a document which he said was a non-paper provided to him early in the crisis by Vajpayee in which the two would agree to restore the sanctity of the LOC (a formula for Pakistani withdrawal) and resume the Lahore . Sharif would be met at Dulles Airport. At a minimum. but equally worried about his own hold on power and the threat from his military chiefs who were pressing for a tough stand. played a role in the Arab-Israeli conflict because both sides invited it to mediate. Pakistan was threatening to undo all of that and plunge the world into its first nuclear exchange. Bandar promised to weigh in forcefully with Sharif on the ride from Dulles to Blair House and he secured Crown Prince Abdullah’s support for our position. The best approach was the road begun at Lahore. Shamshad Ahmad. deeply worried about the direction the crisis was going toward disaster. the president pushed back by reminding Sharif that the U. by the Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan. The president had sent strobe and his team to south Asia a half dozen timed in the last year to try to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan had completely undermined that opening by attacking at Kargil. Sharif seemed to be hedging his bet on whether this would be a round a trip. Bandar asked for a briefing on what the president needed from Sharif. A record of who said what was critical. money in the bank of showing America could help India. much of his argumentation we had heard before – only the U. some leverage with India. etc. ease indo-Pakistani tensions and build confidence on both sides. I briefed the president and the team. no hint that America was rewarding Pakistan for its aggression nor for threatening its nuclear arsenal at India. Sharif then went into a long a predictable defence of the Kashmiri cause. He had to press Sharif to withdraw while also giving him enough cover to keep him in office to deliver the retreat.S. The presidents meeting opened at around 1. Bandar had a long history of helping assist key American diplomatic initiatives and also had worked with Pakistani extensively in the past during the afghan war against the soviet. could save a billion and a half South Asians from the war. that is not the case with Kashmir. Rick and I briefed the president on the latest information we had. The Kargil crisis seemed to be eerily like 1914. We concluded that the Chinese played a constructive role in trying to defuse the crisis. Other governments.
Sharif read the statement several times quietly. The President called Vajpayee to preview the statement. I said we could easily agree to his because the President already supported the Lahore process but we need a clear understanding on how we would portray the LOC issue—we would need to explain to our press that this language meant a Pakistani withdrawal. The President said he had a draft statement ready to issue that would pin all the blame for the Kargil crisis on Pakistan tonight. would have more credibility with India and the President expressed his determination to do what he could on Kashmir. Aftermath: New Deal in New Delhi. Sharif was getting exhausted. The statement was acceptable with one addition. Sharif had been warned by others as well. The President dismissed this with a wave of his hand and then told Sharif that he warned him on the second not to come to Washington unless he was ready to withdraw without any precondition or quid pro quo. As the U. The president refused. The president put on the table a short statement to be issued to the press drawing from the non-paper Sharif had given us and the statement we had drafted before the meeting to announce agreement on withdrawal to the LOC. The prime minister told Clinton that he wanted desperately to find a solution that would allow Pakistan to withdraw with some cover. Did Sharif realize that if even one bomb was dropped…. We all were consumed by the tension of the moment and drama of the day. Sharif then asked that the meeting continue just with the two leaders. Instead the ISI worked with bin Ladin and the Taliban to foment terrorism. The President was getting angry. Once the withdrawal from the Kargil was done the U. The key sentence read “the Prime Minister has agreed to take concentrate and immediate steps for the restoration of LOC. He approached Sandy Berger with a list of alterations in the text. Clinton told Sharif that they had tasted their personal relationship hard that day but they had reached the right ending. up to fail and I won’t let it happen. withdraw behind the LOC and the moral compass would tilt back toward Pakistan or stay and fight a wider and dangerous war with India without American sympathy. After an hour break the President. His draft statement would also mention Pakistan’s role in supporting terrorists in Afghanistan and India. After the intensity of the first round. His mood was glum. Every one left the room except Sharif. Was that what Sharif wanted. The President suggested a break to allow each leader to meet with his team and consider next steps. Sandy dismissed him with a curt your boss says it is ok as is. Sharif asked again to have me leave the room. The president and I briefed the others in our room in Blair House while Sharif handled with his team in another room. the fundamentalists in Pakistan would move against him and this meeting would be his last with Clinton.process. the Prime Minister said yes. he was not looking forward to the trip home. The journalists were convinced there must be some quid for Pakistani withdrawal. He asked to talk with his team and we adjourned again. Clinton and myself. The President was clear and firm. The president insisted he wanted a record of the event. Sharif wanted a sentence added that would say “the President would take personal interest to encourage an expeditious resumption and intensification of the bilateral efforts (i.S.S. said he was against that but he was worried for his life now back in Pakistan. Rick and I had drafted this key sentence during the break. the president lay down on a sofa to rest his eyes for a few minutes. Finally. Vajpayee had little to say. The statement also called for a ceasefire once the withdrawal was completed and restoration of the Lahore process. Sharif’s brief was confused and vague on many details but he seemed a man possessed with fear of war. He would also call Prime Minister Vajpayee to brief him on the discussions. Clinton asked Sharif if he knew how advanced the threat of nuclear war really was? Did Sharif know his military was preparing their nuclear tipped missiles? Sharif seemed taken aback and said India was probably doing the same.S.” The president handed the sentence to me and asked my opinion. Clinton agreed and told Sharif that was his intention. Coup in Islamabad Sharif came to the White House early the next morning for a photo up with his family and the President. The president reminded Sharif how close the U. After ninety minutes of intense discussion the meeting broke up. Without something to point to. The prime minister then briefed the president on his frantic efforts in the last month to engage Vajpayee and get a deal that would allow Pakistan to withdraw with some saving of face. After a few minutes Sharif returned with good news.e. Pakistan is messing with nuclear war. Reluctantly. Sharif said at first India had agreed to this non-paper but then changed its mind. The president put through a short call to New Delhi just to tell Vajpayee the he was holding firm on demanding the withdrawal to the LOC. even asking the President “what do you want me to say?” there was no give in New Delhi and none was asked for.” Strobe. and Soviet Union had come to nuclear war in 1962 over Cuba. Clinton asked? Did Sharif order the Pakistani nuclear missile force to prepare for action? Did he realize how crazy that was? You‘ve put me in the middle today.S delegation was exiting the door from Blair house. The mood changed in a nano-second. Sharif’s Foreign Secretary Ahmed made a last effort to reopen the text. Lahore) once the security of the LOC had been fully restored. se the U. the statement included a reaffirmation of the President’s long standing plans to visit South Asia. The Prime Minister knew he had done a right thing for . He denied that he had ordered the preparation of their missile forces. Sharif warned ominously.Sharif finished his sentence and said it would be a catastrophe. Sharif had promised often to do so but had done no thing. Sandy. We made clear there was none.’ The press briefing by Rick and I was a tough event. Sharif had a choice. He told Sharif that he had asked repeatedly for Pakistani help to bring Usama bin Ladin to justice from Afghanistan. Sharif and I returned to the discussion. He had flown to china to try to get their help to press India to agree to a fixed time table for talks to resolve Kashmir. Sharif asked again to be left alone.
He ordered his army to pull back its men and its allies and they did so. That outcome would have been a horrible one for all Pakistanis and would have considerably set back the country’s already slim hope of a better future. he lifted the Glenn sanctions imposed after the 1998 tests and welcomed Vajpayee to the Oval Office. U. Though the voluminous Kargil Committee report is in the safe keeping of Indian government. Indians usually claim 1300 killed on both sides. The Indian elite---including the military—and the Indian public began to shed long held negative perceptions of the U. it has purposely posted a 30-page executive summary of the report on the Internet. Also useful is Gaurav Sawant’s Dateline Kargil (Macmillan. “India. We are publishing this summary in its essence and believe that its careful study will help our enlightened and discerning readers draw positive conclusions. Pakistan and the Bomb. Dixit. as it was in 1999.V.-India rapprochement. Vajpayee’s return visit formalized the commitment. The only explanation offered was that it was difficult to decide whom the right person combining the PM’s trust and the background on Kashmir was. a time bomb capable of exploding upon the subcontinent with little or no warning. It soon became apparent. His plane was denied permission to return to Karachi or anywhere in Pakistan.H. the governor of Lahore. The military rebelled and forced open the airport.S. Pakistan morose. He stopped in London and Riyadh on the way home. to Washington for the long awaited discussions. The Prime Minister good to his word.S. Clinton’s spring visit symbolized a new level of maturity in the relationship between the world’s two largest democracies. The clarity of the American position on Kargil and its refusal to give Pakistan any reward for its aggression had an immediate and dynamic impact on the relationship. Finally in September Sharif sent his brother.S. From Surprise To Reckoning Kargil Committee Report Executive Summary Friday 25 February 2000. but he was not sure his army would see it that way. 2000) for descriptions of the fighting by a journalist who was there.S. References There is a large library on the India-Pakistan conflict. Ramana and A. The President also lived up to his word. A day-long downpour of rain made the capital a wet and dreary place. that all was not well in Islamabad. Finally.S. The fighting had taken a toll.Pakistan and the world. “A Defining Moment. He all but said that they knew a military coup was coming. Rick Inderfurth and I met with him for hours in his suit at the Willard Hotel. With our encouragement the Saudis pressed hard for Sharif’s freedom. however. could do to help his brother stay in power. But the tensions following the attack on the Indian Parliament show the Kashmir issue remains as dangerous today. We tried to get a feel for how the Prime Minister wanted to pursue the Kashmir issue. The best discussion of the background to Pakistan’s incursion into Kargil and the strategic significance of the territory I have seen is by India’s former Foreign Secretary. 1999 it came. however. A few pieces are particularly notable as they apply to the Kargil episode. relations. it was Nawaz who provoked the coup’s timing by trying to exile Musharraf when he was on an official visit to Sri Lanka. 1999).” in Scientific American December 2001. After the September 11th attacks on America. Both our allies gave him their support. Instead Shahbaz Sharif only wanted to discuss what the U. What is clear is that President Clinton was direct and forceful with him at Blair House – there were no option except withdrawal or isolation. The most important strategic result of the Blair House summit was its impact on Indo-U. As soon as the Pakistani forces were back across the LOC he pressed India for cease-fire in the Kargil sector. We conclude the Pakistani internal situation was not ripe for Sharif to take action. Within hours. Whatever hopes Sharif and the rest of the Pakistani leadership had of getting American support for their Kargil adventure vanished that afternoon in Washington. relations with Pakistan have substantially improved as well thanks to the Musharraf’s government’s role in the war against the Taliban and Usama bin Ladin. Doors opened in New Delhi to Americans that had been shut for years. President Bush has accelerated and intensified the process of U. Ironically. Estimates of the dead on both sides very. Why did Sharif agree to withdraw on the fourth? Only the former prime Minister can answer this question authoritatively. Nayyar. India was jubilant.N. After a quarter century gap in Presidential visits to India. The Kargil Committee report . Nawaz was in hail and the army was in control. On October 12. a striking reversal of earlier Pakistani policy. in December 2000 Sharif was exiled to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. After this occurred he privately invited Sharif to send a senior trusted official to Washington to begin discrete discussions on how to follow up on his “personal commitment” to the Lahore process. A recent useful update on the nuclear dimension of the India-Pakistan conflict is the essay by M. Pakistanis cite around 1700. J.” in Guns and Yellow Roses: Essays on the Kargil War (Harpers. The President instructed the NSC to do all we could to convince the new Pakistani leadership not to execute Sharif as General Zia had executed Prime Minister Bhutto in 1978. The President urged Musharraf to let Sharif free. The stage was set for the unprecedented back to back summits between President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2000. For weeks the Prime Minister did not respond to our queries to send someone to discuss Kashmir.
These factors. P.V. Singh.Prime Ministers V. It made four visits to various parts of J&k to hold discussions with local officials and non-officials. the proxy war in Kashmir and the nuclear factors. Narasimha Rao and I. Findings I-Developments leading to the Pakistan aggression at Kargil The Review committee had before it overwhelming evidence that the Pakistani armed intrusion in the Kargil sector came as a complete and total surprise to the Indian Government. The committee has sought to analyse whether the kind of Pakistan aggression that took place could have been assessed from the available intelligence inputs and failures which led to the nation being caught by surprise. It undertook a visit to Bangalore to obtain a first hand knowledge of certain defence research and development facilities and for discussions with experts regarding technological options. the Union Government vide its order dated July 29. However. the time constraint and.G. B. Apart from this. the Indian Army were able to dominate the Pakistani forces on these heights. The Committee did not come across any agency or individual was able clearly to access before the event the possibility of a large scale Pakistani military intrusion across the Kargil heights. the actual conduct of military operations has not been evaluated by the Committee as this lay outside the committee’s mandate and would have called for different types of expertise. including those with the highest classification and to officials of the Union and J&K Governments. The findings and recommendations of the committee are set out in the succeeding sections of this summary. The Committee’s findings are based primarily on official documents. and To recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed instructions. Record of Discussion and source materials have been put together in 15 volumes and appended to the Report. The Committee’s Report comprises 14 Chapters in addition to a Prologue and an Epilogue. Lieutenant General (Retd. as a result of Cabinet Secretary’s directions. State Government and its agencies. In the 1948. they would have a bearing on future threats to the country whether on its land borders or otherwise. most importantly. Given its open-ended terms of reference.)K. However. and to get a better sense of the terrain and the prevailing field conditions. Army and intelligence agencies as well as to the J&K. What was conceived of was the limited possibility of infiltrations and enhanced artillery exchanges in this sector. Other relevant documents. Detailed questionnaires were prepared by the committee to elicit information. Subrahmanyam (Chairman). Since some of these are generic in nature. ex. External affairs Minister. had generated an . A. A number of former Army chiefs of Staff and Director Generals of Military Operations were near unanimous in their opinion on the scale attempted was totally unsustainable because of the lack of supportive infrastructure and was militarily irrational. To deal with Kargil episode in isolation would have been too simplistic: hence the Report briefly recounts the important facets of development in J & Kashmir and the evolution of the LOC. Defence Minister. Secretariat (NSCS) who was also designed as Membersecretary. Defense services. 1999 constituted a Committee to look into the episode with the following Terms of Reference: To review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir. while other parts of the Report draw on materials received by the Committee and views of experts and knowledgeable persons who were invited to interact with it. the Cabinet secretary.P. the need for clarity in setting about its task. The Committee invited reliable information from the public pertaining to events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in Kargil through a press note in the national dailies and the regional media. it perused several books published in recent moths on the Kargil episode.K. Indo-Pak relations since 1947.Venkataraman. This has enabled the committee to look at developments immediately preceding the intrusions more intensively. the Defense Secretary. including media persons. it was able to sure the widest possible access to all relevant documents. It viewed its task as a cooperative venture with the concerned Ministries. the Deputy Chairman.Against the backdrop of an animated public discussion on Pakistan’s aggression in Kargil. journals and magazines. the National Security adviser. 1965and 1971 conflicts. together with the nature of the terrain and extreme weather conditions in the area. the foreign Secretary.B. Vajpayee. the committee’s ‘review’ commences essentially from 1997 onward coinciding with Nawaz Sharif’s return to office as Prime Minister of Pakistan. the Home Minister. Although the committee was not statutory in nature. The committee approached its task in a spirit of openness and transparency with its focus on establishing the facts. It held meetings with those who in its judgment were in a position to throw light on the Subject. This area has been the scene of fierce artillery exchanges but minimal cross-LOC military activity. the Governor and chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Important documents referred to by the Committee are enclosed as annexure with the main Report. K Gujral). the committee found it necessary to define its scope of work precisely. it met former President R. Prime Minister. The Committee held over a hundred to the report. The committee comprised four members namely K. Home Secretary and a host of the other officials and non-officials. The committee’s recommendations for preventing future recurrence of Kargil-like episodes are confined to the country’s land borders. Planning Commission. It scanned a large number of news items and commentaries published in the national dailies.Hazari. Intelligence Agencies and other concerned organizations and avoided getting into adversarial relationship with the officials and non-official with whom it was to interact. In the pursuit of its task the committee sought presentations from the concerned organizations and agencies. In this process. Given this approach it was able to enlist the willing cooperation of all concerned. Verghese and Satish Chandra.
They apparently did not do so. In 1965. The nearest approximation to the events of May 1999 was a 15 Corps war-game in 1993 which envisaged a Pakistani long range generation group positioning itself south of NH 1 A and bringing the Srinagar-Leh highway under fire from troth sides. however. The steps of conversations between General Musharraf and Lieutenant Aziz. It is evident from Pakistani pronouncements and the writings of those with access to the highest decision making levels. based upon political considerations. Several Pakistani writers agree that the ‘Kargil plan’ was formulated in the eighties in the last year of General Zia-ulHaq. He had served in Northern Areas for several years and had been associated with the crackdown on the Shias. Such an assumption could not have been made without close consultation with the Pakistani political leadership at the highest level. the intruders did not have rations for more than two or three days in many forward ‘sanghars’. Kaksar and Batalik areas. It has obviously been a victim of its own propaganda. The same pattern of behavior was evident this time too. They were even running short of water at these heights towards the end of the operations. In 1947. and a drastic reduction in Defence outlay. however. in whose place he appointed General Musharraf who superseded two others. commitments in Sri Lanka. Chief of General Staff. Written accounts of foreign observes have highlighted that since 1980. the Pakistani military establishment had entertained ideas of deterring Indians nuclear and conventional capabilities with its nuclear weapons and of carrying out a brash. when Dr. Chief of Army Staff. Khan conveyed a nuclear threat to India in a press interview to an Indian journalist. hold strike to liberate Kashmir which would go unchallenged if the Indian leadership was weak or indecisive. 1999. In 1971. subsequent deployments in Punjab. such an expectation was unreal. There was a heady combination of circumstances and personalities. ex-serviceman and tribals under the command of Major General Akbar Khan. hard driving man. the North East and Kashmir. Some Pakistani columnists claim that Nawz Sharif through that if he succeeded in seizing a slice of Indian territory in . Such an assumption would be totally unsustainable in purely military terms. An attempt to capture a post or two on the LOC was. Dras. Even this was not the kind of intrusion that actually took place in the Mashkoh. It would only be logical on the expectation.understandable Indian military mindset about the nature and extent of the Pakistani threat in this sector. been no intrusions since 1990. It is difficult to stay whether the initiative for this move came from the Army or was politically driven. that Pakistan would be able to engineer international intervention to impose an early ceasefire that would allow its troops to stay in possessions of the territory captured by them. There had. Pakistan had in the past intruded into the Indian side of the LOC and the Indian Army had responded adequately. There are different versions on whether it was sought to be operationalised during the tenure of Benazir Bhutto and General Jehangir Karamat. Even that assessment did not visualize an intrusion to hold ground by hundreds of Pakistan Army regulars. An operation was also planned to apprehend the infiltrators if they returned in the summer of 1998. Pakistani writings over the years have highlighted the Indian Army’s involvement in counterinsurgency in Kashmir and its perceived degradation as an effective fighting force. it took Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s advice that India would not cross the international border to deal with Pakistan’s offensive in the Akhnur sector. General Musharraf’s disclosure that it was discussed with the political leadership in November 1998 soon after he assumed office has been referred to in the Report. The terrain here is so inhospitable that the intruders could not have survived above 4000 meters for long without comprehensive and sustained re-supply operations. Pakistan was convinced that its nuclear weapons capability would deter India’s superior conventional forces. had successfully removed from office the President. notably the increased shelling of Kargil. The development of 1998 as reported in various intelligence inputs. General Musharraf has disclosed that be operations were discussed in November 1998 with the political leadership and there are indications of discussions on two subsequent occasions in early 1999. Q. Successive Indian Chiefs of Army Staff and Director General of Military Operations told the Committee that bringing to bear India’s assumed conventional superiority was not a serious option in the last ten years for a verity of reasons. Re-supply could have taken place only if there was no air threat and the supply lines could not be targeted by Indian artillery. it did not anticipate the swift Indian military intervention in Kashmir when it planed its raid with a mix of army personnel. The Pakistani reconnaissance mission in August 1997 in Gharkun village was noted and a patrol base established in Yaldor. He is a Mohajir and an ambitious. the reported increased presence of militants m the Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA) region and their training were assessed as indicative of likely high level of militants activity in Kargil in the summer of 1999 and the consequent possibility of increased infiltration in this area. that at least from 1987 onwards. anticipated as revealed in the press briefing of the acting GOC 15 Corps on January 11. the Chief Justice and the then Army Chief. He had commanded the Special Services Group (SSG) which launched an attack on Bilafond La in Siachen but was frustrated. Nawaz Sharif. Though heavily armed. the likelihood of a ceasefire and the knowledge and support of the Foreign Office. In other words) it would appear that the Pakistani intruders operated on the assumption that the intrusions would be under counter attack for only a few days and thereafter some sort of ceasefire would enable them to stay on the heights and be re-supplied. General Karamat. it developed high but totally unwarranted expectations about the likelihood of US-Chinese intervention on its behalf. the Prime Minister. The Pakistani establishment has long and consistent history of misreading India’s will and world opinion. also revealed their expectations of early international intervention. A. General Musharraf himself served in Afghanistan and had ties with Osama Bin Laden and other extremists. In retrospect. This is presumably the price the Pakistani leadership has paid for its inability to come to terms with the military realities. Intrusions across the LOC are not uncommon.
Some argue that Nawaz Sharif could not have been so duplicitous and therefore tend to absolve him and lay all blame on General Musharraf. Care was exercised by the intruders to move only in the gaps between the Indian winter posts and to avoid detection by winter Air Surveillance Operations (WASO). By May 24. among leaders in and out of office. Nonetheless. by “shepherds” who are occasionally retained by the Brigade Intelligence Team for forward information gathering. They would also have to suffer unacceptable casualties in attacking the heights. and a willingness to accept possible casualties. After a full in the winter from late December 1998. All the Indian military Commanders the Committee met emphasized the point that while it would have been possible for patrolling to be carried out even under these conditions. The committee has not come across any assessment at operational levels that would justify the conclusion that the Lahore summit had caused the Indian decision-makers to lower their guard. and peace time safety requirements of maintaining a certain height above the ground and a given distance from the LOC. by the end of May an additional divisional headquarters had been inducted to take over command of a portion of the Kargil Sector from 3 Infantry Division. However. There is no clear evidence on the basis of which to assess the nature and extent of Nawaz Sharif’s involvement in the Kargil adventure. two additional Brigades had moved into the area and the Indian Air Force was committed on May 26. The committee has attempted a partial reconstruction of operation BADR based on diaries and notebooks recovered from Pakistani personnel during the operation as well as intercepts. the situation would be distinctly in their favor. there was euphoria in some political quarters. The patrols sent out in the next few days confirmed the presence of intruders on May 7. Until now. Presumably they felt that with the advantage of the commanding heights. there was very heavy snowfall in March 1999 which compelled 121 Infantry Brigade to vacate one of its25 winter posts in South West Spur of Point 5299 in the Kaksar Sector. their better acclimatization and by now their more secure logistics. Simultaneously. The Pakistani creeping forward also suffered avalanche casualties in the month of March 1999 as revealed by a diary captured in Mashkoh Valley. they moved up a further two to three kilometers. Those who know Nawaz Sharif personally believe that he has a limited attention span and is impatient with detail. these was support for a ceasefire but once Tololing fell and the Indian Government and Army exhibited their determination to clear the entire instruction. in the next few days three more battalions were moved from the Valley into the Kargil sector to counter known and possible intrusions in other sub-sectors. Track-11 diplomacy and intelligence collection. they used Igloo snow tents and constructed ‘sanghars’ of loose rock. It would appear that reconnaissance parties comprising officers started crossing the LOG in late January/early February 1999. It would appear from the locations of ‘sangars’  that the plan was to avoid initially confronting the Indian forces by moving stealthily along the unheld gaps. At that stage. collation and assessment. two well acclimatized battalions returning from Siachen hand been concentrated in the Batalik sector to contain the intrusion. Accordingly. All these factors made the WASO patrols of negligible value as is also evident from the records of previous years. more men joined them and perhaps the bulk of the intruders entered Indian territory in late April. They were equipped for extreme cold and snow conditions. the international community . In the initial advance. This has been confirmed by the discussions the Committee had with a number of concerned officials. opportunity for concealment on hearing the sound of approaching helicopters. it is reasonable to assume that Nawaz Sharif was at least aware of the broad thrust of the Kargil plan when se so warmly welcomed the Indian Prime Minister in Lahore. as in Siachen. it would have required the troops to be specially equipped to withstand glacial conditions. though some others saw serious pitfalls in the Lahore process. helicopters vibrations which hampered observation. This was probably Pakistan’s expectation. most flights flew along valleys and not across the ridges. A combination of factors prevented their detection: camouflage clothing. This is borne out by the tapes referred to earlier and the repeated assertions of General Musharraf. Since the effort was largely to detect infiltration. Perhaps late in April. Influential sections of the Indian political class and media have been outraged at the duplicity of the Pakistani leadership. March saw heavy snowfall and so they could move further forward only in April. having a declaratory policy different from that actually pursued is not unknown in internationalist divergence between the two necessitates diplomatic interaction. They established a first line of administrative bases within a limited distance across the LOG in February. In fact. continuous political analysis. the intrusion was detected on May 3 1999. this had not been considered necessary or acceptable. Pakistan tried to lobby with the international community for a ceasefire. Winter patrols sent out in early April 1999 were unable to carry out their task due to adverse snow conditions. This sequence of events appears logical as earlier induction of larger numbers would have added to logistic problems and increased the risk of detection. The Pakistani intruders were meant to disclosed themselves in the later part of May 1999 and demonstrate that they were in possession of the Kargil heights along a “new LOG” before the normal opening of the Zojila pass when regular patrolling by the Indian Army would commence. however.Kashmir. The Indians would need time to assemble their forces. The Indian Army’s response was very rapid and by May 9. WASO helicopters and operational reconnaissance flights repeatedly flew over them as is evident from one of the diaries captured in Mashkoh Valley. he would be hailed as a ‘Liberator’ and hereby enabled to gain absolute power through amendment of the Shariat Law. popularly known as Bajrang post. The balance of probability suggests that he was fully in the picture. acclimatize their troops and build up their logistics which would be difficult before Zojila opened. This rapid and strong Indian reaction was now their turn to be totally surprised . This would ensure time enough for an internationally arranged ceasefire.
When hostilities commenced. There were also comments in the media that Army jawans were inadequately equipped for the extreme cold and hazardous conditions when ordered to assault the Kargil heights. The record establishes that the 15 corps Commander carried out his deployment with commendable expedition and competence providing adequate margins for all possible contingencies. in the previous year. then available in the Ministries of Defence and Home in Delhi as is evident from the statements of concerned officials. This was lacking even at the joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) because of the low level of representation by DOMI at the assessment process and the DGMI representative not coming fully briefed on the latest situation. that in the initial stages. sharp war in which the Indian Army and Air Force suffered 474 killed and 1109 wounded (as of July 26. most troops are yet to be equipped with light rifles. the country should be prepared for a Pakistani response. there was still no clarity in the assessment of the magnitude of the intrusions and the composition of the intruders. The committee found that though the corps Commander had moved adequate forces to contain the intrusion in the Batalik sector and fallowed it up with a similar deployment of forces in Kaksar.called on Pakistan to withdraw from and respect the sanctity of the LOC. This measure sent out a clear message to Pakistan and the rest of the world that India was determined to oust the invader by military means. The Northern Command had already made request for the use of helicopters gunships on May 8. There are reports in the media. The Kargil action saw the deployment of a limited number of troops and aircraft on a restricted front in response to a shallow Pakistani penetration across the LOG of no more then eight to nine kilometers at most. Many countries have established separate Defence Intelligence Agencies and generously provided them with resources and equipment to play a substantive role in intelligence collection. there was still an overall shortage. The consequences of its failure for Pakistan are there for all to see. For historical reasons. However. The assessment of the nature and composition of the intruders was hampered by a number of factors. Secondly. and special (glacial) clothing for heights above that. Dras and Mashkoh valley sectors. It is also apparent that the assessment was conditioned by the two decade old mindset the Kargil was unsuitable for cross-LOG military action.  In order to ensure that Pakistan would be deterred from any adventures escalation. The Army had prescribed extra-cold clothing meant for heights between 9000-13. Special clothing is issued for use in the Siachen area and certain limited reserves were held in stock. Their weapons and equipment compared unfavorable with those of the Pakistani intruders.000 feet in this sector for use in normal times. For the 15 corps. 1999. there was inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies. II – Intelligence It is not widely appreciated in India that the primary responsibility for collecting external intelligence. this reserve clothing was issued to the men. the Indian Army suffered avoidable casualties.56 mm Insa) has been inducted into service. Pakistan insists on projecting most of the intruders as Mujahideen) with NLI troops in a supporting role. However. as pointed out elsewhere. increasing the fire power and combat efficiency of infantryman has also suffered as has the modernization process as a whole. It is essentially restricted to the collection of tactical military intelligence and its main role is to make strategic and tactical military assessments and disseminate them within the Army. taken as it was by surprise. 1999). This needs to be specially rectified. In borders terms. This was implied by Nawaz Sharif in his address to the nation on July 12. given the terrain and political implications were a “new LOC” to be created. some of which are said to have originated from young officers. From intercepted signals. and in the background of nuclear capability on both sides. is vested in RAW. . the Indian Armed Forces progressively moved to deploy in a deterrent posture. Though a new light rifle (5. the Corps Commander had ordered that part-worn serviceable (PWS) Siachen clothing be preserved. Therefore. The CCS finally authorized the use of air power on May 25. This is evident from the statement of the Corps Commander on May 19. The Western and Eastern fleets of the Indian Navy were concentrated in the North Arabian Sea.  The Air Chief further maintained that if air power was to be used. JCOs and other ranks. Despite this. the progressive data of Indian casualties from May to July 1999 obtained by the Committee did not go into the matter further as its terms of reference do not require it to do so. To regard it as anything less would be mistaken. The Northern Command issued orders on May 12 that the whole J&K theatre be put on alert and additional troops be included in to the Kargil sector. the Indian Armed Forces are not so . There are obvious discrepancies between the documented responses of 15 Corps and the Northern Command and the information regarding the nature and extent of intrusions at that stage. it would appear that these steps had a healthy restraining effect on the Pakistani Armed Forces. The sitrep issued by 15 Corps on May 11. Troops returning from Siachen duty discard their special clothing which is then usually disposed of by auction. an operation on a single brigade front was a localised’ action. including that relating to a potential adversary’s military deployment. The DGMI’s capability for intelligence collection is limited. that relevant Air Commanders and units were activated. This PWS stock was also issued to the troops during the Kargil action. this was not a minor skirmish but a short. Adequate attention has not been paid to lighting the load of infantry soldiers deployed at high attitudes. Pakistan deliberately violated the normal rules of war by sending a serviceman as Mujahideen and obfuscating their service identities. Moment of forces within a corps is entirely within the competence of the corps commander and does not require clearance from any other authority. 1999 was explicit on eight identified instructions in the Batalik sector involving 160 to 240 intruders. This warrants a review of standards of provisioning for reserves as well as a policy of holding special clothing for a certain proportion of other troops in Kargil and other high altitude sectors. Nevertheless.
Director. this assessment was dropped. Prisoners of War have disclosed the presence of 5. who is responsible for external intelligence and had the resources to follow up the leads in the IB report. The Indian side resorted to heavy firing since it was necessary to suppress Pakistani fire aimed at disrupting the traffic on NH-1A from Srinagar to Leh. In the absence of this information. its March 1999 report emphasized the financial constraints that would inhibit Pakistan from launching on any such adventure. An analysis carried out by the committee on the basis of information now-available shows that there were in fact a number of changes in the ORBAT of Pakistani forces in FCNA region during 1998/early 1999. These unites did not figure in the Order of Battle (ORBAT) supplied by RAW to the DGMI dated April 1998. Brigadier Surinder Singh also related in increased infiltration. Information on training of additional militants with a view to infiltrating the across the LOC was not sector-specific. Moreover. There are need for greater appreciation of the role of intelligence and who needs it most and also more understanding with regard to who must pursue any given lead. to a much lesser extent. The Committee feels that a communication of this nature should have been directly addressed to all the officials concerned. 6 and 13 NLI battalions and 24 SIND in the FCNA region from October 1998 onwards. Very few of these could be considered actionable intelligence. RAW assessed the possibility of “a limited swift offensive threat with possible support of alliance partners” in its half-yearly assessment ending September 1998 but no indicators substantiating this assessment were provided. 1998 to the Prime Minister. information regarding the induction of two additional battalions in the FCNA region and the forward deployment of two battalions could have . Such lapses. The reports on ammunition dumping. This agency got certain inputs on activities in the FCNA region which were considered important enough by the Director. There was an increase in shelling in 1998 both in the Neelam Valley (in POK) and Kargil (India). These changes included the turnover of some units. which also did not show any changes in the area opposite Kargil between April 1998 and May 1999. Home Secretary and Director-General Military Operations. and Director-General Military intelligence. The station was under Srinagar but reported to Leh which was not focused on Kargil but elsewhere. Home Minister. since Pakistan was focusing upon Kargil. No specific indications of a likely major attack in the Kargil sector such as significant improvements in logistics and communications or a substantial force build-up or forward deployment of forces were reported by any of the agencies. That would partly explain the larger vehicular movements reported on the side. IB to be communicated over his signature on June 2. It could be argued that given the nature of the terrain. if no de-inductions took place.mandated. The Indian Army has also assessed that elements of 5. In other words. JIC. It further highlights the need for closer coordination among the intelligence agencies. There were many bits and pieces of information about activities within the FCNA region. In fact. induction of additional guns and the construction of bunkers and helipads all fitted into and yet more intensive shelling in the summer of 1999. induction of two additional battalions over and above the 13 already in the Sector as reported by RAW in April 1998 and the forward deployment of two battalions from Gilgit to Gultari and from Skardu to Hamzigund (near Olthingthang) respectively. there was no way of anticipating the intrusion during the winter provided Pakistan accepted the risk of incurring casualties in avalanches. Therefore. there was a net increase of two battalions in the FCNA region over and above RAW’s projections as well as a forward deployment of two battalions within the sector during the period April 1998 to February 1999. and 13 NLI were amongst the unites that were initially used by Pakistan to launch the intrusions in April/May 1999. since then. This did not happen in respect of Secretary (RAW) who at that time was also holding additional charge as Chairman. which it did. However. committed at one time or the other by all agencies. namely. Chairman JIC. 6. the responsibilities for obtaining information on them was primarily that of RAW and. These illustrate a number of deficiencies in the system. Most of them tended to indicate that Kargil was becoming a growing focus of Pakistani attention which had been clearly demonstrated by the marked increase in cross-LOC shelling in 1998. This communication was not addressed to the three officials most concerned with this information. that of DGMI and the Division or Brigade using their intelligence and field Surveillance Unit (IFS) and Brigade Intelligence Team (BIT) capabilities. in its next six monthly report ending March 1999. While the intelligence agencies focused on ammunition dumping on the other side. The Indian Army did not share information about the intensity and effect of its past firing with others. RAW could not correctly assess the significance of enemy activity in term of ammunition storage or construction of underground bunkers. Cabinet Secretary. IB stated that he expected the information to filter down these officials through the official’s hierarchy. coordination and follow up were weak. Unfortunately the RAW facility in the Kargil area did not receive adequate attention in terms of staff or technological capability. Hence intelligence collection. and until Indian troops came into contact with these battalions in May-June 1999. The critical failure in intelligence was related to the absence of any information on the induction and de-induction of battalions and the lack of accurate data on the identity of battalions in the area opposite Kargil during 1998. This provides another illustration of lack of inter-agency coordination as well as lack of coordination the Army and the agencies. who would have taken such information into account in JIC assessments. for which the Committee lacks evidence. Secretary (RAW). The intelligence Bureau (IB) is meant to collect intelligence within the country and is the premier agency for counter-intelligence. came to the notice of the committee. they appeared to lack adequate knowledge about the heavy damage inflicted by Indian Artillery which would have required the Pakistani army to undertake considerable repairs and re-stocking. the climatic conditions and the unheld gaps in existence since 1972. The enhanced threat perception of Commander 121 infantry Brigade. whether across a broad or narrow front. it is primarily RAW which must provide intelligence about a likely attack.
In the Committee’s view. In most advanced countries. namely.proved to be an indicator of the likely nature of Pakistani activity in this sector. In the absence 3f an overall. During this period. This circular process entails the Army having to depend upon inputs from RAW for its own threat assessment. RAW which has a virtual monopoly in this regard. periodic and comprehensive intelligence briefings it the political level and to the Committee of Secretaries. Those of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) of RAW were no doubt extremely valuable. There is no institutionalized process whereby RAW. These are summarized below. in turn. special indents on the ARC. mainly a move for political and diplomatic gain. There is a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need ‘or assessed intelligence at all levels. This ensures that there are two streams of intelligence which enables governments to check one against the other. it is interesting to note that “Operation TOPAC” has since been mistakenly attributed even by high placed Indian officials and agencies to Gen. weather permitting. This shows how close the authors of “Operation TOPAC” were able to get into the mind of the Pakistani establishment in relation to their aims in J&K. As mentioned earlier. former Foreign Secretaries and former Prime Ministers. statements by some of the main actors in the Indian nuclear weapons programme. The Indian intelligence structure is flawed since there is little back up or redundancy to rectify failures and shortcomings in intelligence collection and reporting that goes to built up the external threat perception by the one agency. The post was in fact left unfilled for 18 months until December 1998. wherever necessary. This lacuna is perhaps responsible for RAW reporting the presence of one additional unit in Gultary in September 1998 but not following it up with ARC flights on its own initiative. The intruders had by then come out into the open. India has no tradition of undertaking politico-military games with the participation of those having political and diplomatic expertise. and the next in May 1999. BSF and Army intelligence officials interact periodically at levels below the JIC. WASO did not provide intelligence inputs of significant value. It studied the Indian perception of the Pakistan nuclear threat as well as the sequence of developments of the Committee’s findings are based on published literature. JIC reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. JIC. The Army never shared its intelligence with the other agencies or with the JIC. One of the most realistic assessments of Kashmir developments as they unfolded during Pakistan’s proxy war was “Operation TOPAC”. a significant gap in information prior to the detection of the Kargil intrusion was the inability of RAW to accurately monitor and report changes in the Pakistani ORBAT in the FCNA region during 1998 and early 1999 and to a extent that of DGMI. In that event. There is no evidence that the intelligence agencies have reviewed their role after India became a nuclear weapon state or in the context of the increasing problems posed by insurgencies and ethnicnationalist turbulences backed with sophisticated hi-tech equipment felt the need to initiate any such move. the Armed Forces have a Defence Intelligence Agency with a significant intelligence collection capability. The assessment process has been downgraded in importance and consequently various agencies send very junior officials to JIC meetings. the Indian threat assessments are largely a single-track process dominated by RAW. Secretary (RAW) doubled as Chairman. the BITs and IFSUs to notice the additional forward deployment of troops in the vicinity of the LOC. The committee examined this proposition in detail. after the intrusions had commenced. Zia-ul-Haq. Unlike other countries. The DGMI did not send any regular input to the JIC for two years preceding the Kargil crisis. As it happened. classified reports. therefore. It is neither healthy nor prudent to endow that one agency alone with multifarious capabilities for human. The Chairmanship of JIC had become the reserve of an IPS officer who was generally a runner-up for the post of secretary (RAW) or DIB. The armed forces play their war games essentially within parameters.The Nuclear Factor A lot has been written both at home and abroad about Pakistan being able to commit limited aggression in Kashmir because of the mutual nuclear deterrence deemed to have been established as a result of the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests in May 1998. then the possibility of limited intrusions to internationalize the Kashmir issue might have been visualized. In other words. operational security framework and objective! Each intelligence agency is diligent in preserving its own turf and departmental prerogatives. There are no checks and balances in the Indian intelligence system to ensure that the consumer gets all the intelligence that is available and is this due. perhaps greater risks in patrolling in snow conditions might have been found acceptable. imagery and electronic intelligence. President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto committed Pakistan to acquiring nuclear weapons at a meeting held in Multan on . Had RAW and DGMI spotted the additional battalions in the FCNA region that were missing from the ORBAT. Nor did the Army press RAW specifically for more information on this report. a war game written by a team of retired Indian Army Officers in 1989. The Army makes six-monthly indents and. there might have been requests for ARC flights in winter and these might have been undertaken. The IC was not accorded the importance it deserved either by the intelligence agencies or the Government. If such games had been practiced. These indents and their prioritization depend on the nature of the threat perception which. communication. More focused intelligence about the activities of Pakistan in FCNA region would have followed. The Kargil intrusion was essentially a limited Pakistani military exercise designed to internationalize the Kashmir issue which was tending to recede from the radar screen of the international community. The present structure and process in intelligence gathering and reporting lead to an overload of background and unconfirmed information and inadequately assessed intelligence which requires to be further pursued. It was. IB. is shaped by inputs from RAW. former intelligence Chiefs. There is no system of regular. the last flight was in October 1998. There was no system of Army minorities at different levels from DGMI downwards providing feedback to the Agencies. III. long before the intrusion.
While all Indian Prime Ministers treated this programme as strictly confidential. the Kahuta establishment was evacuated. the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment. In August 1990. This was well before the Pokhran and Chagai tests in May 1998. The Pakistanis described this as one more instance when their nuclear deterrent prevented Indian aggression. I. General Aslam Beg. Successive Indian Prime Ministers failed to take their own colleagues. Gujral added that every Indian Prime Minister sustained the nuclear weapons programme. Otherwise. Even as late as May 1998. the former Air Chief that flight trails for delivery of Indian nuclear weapons were conducted in 1990 and those efforts to adapt the delivery system to the weapon commenced even earlier. Sahibzada Yakub Khan. In January 1990. openly talked of Pakistan having acquired nuclear weapons. they reassured the public that the country’s nuclear option was being kept open.P. none of these Prime Ministers took any one other than Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission [not all]. V. The Chiefs of the staff. In 1987. Indian intelligence was aware of the China-Pakistan nuclear weapons deal. Pakistan’s Prime Ministers. By the early 1980s. united Democratic front and BJP. The 1998 Pokhran tests were the outcome of a policy of consensus on nuclear weapon development among Prime Minister belonging to the Congress. In a speech on the April . Singh and I. The Indian Prime Minister inquired of the then Air Chief whether it was possible for the IAF to intercept hostile Pakistani aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. without being unduly concerned about India’s “conventional superiority”. Pakistan might use nuclear weapons as a first resort. senior Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants were kept out of the loop. even while the supporting the weapons programme. visited Delhi and spoke to the Indian Foreign Minister. the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability. On the 1990 events referred to above.Q. there are varying perceptions among Indian Officials. as evident from a declassified document of 1983.P. V. As has been highlighted by a number of eminent Pakistani writers. According to Pakistani perceptions. The committee was informed by Air Chief Marshal Mehra. Air Chief Marshal Mehra replied that no such guarantee could be given and that the only logical answer for India was to acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own. when both sides conducted their nuclear tests) India had not used its conventional superiority during the preceding nine years of sustained proxy war by Pakistan in Kashmir. Pakistan had enough weapons grade enriched uranium to make one or two uranium weapon cores. Pakistan fully understands that nuclear deterrence can work both to its advantage detriment. American accounts describe Robert Gates’ visit to Islamabad in May 1990. Arunachalam. Pakistan conveyed a nuclear threat to India at the time of Operation Bras Stacks. and its Chief of Army Staff. SK Singh. the Indian Air Force was placed on alert following the Pakistan Air Force being similarly ordered. The majority view is that there was an implied threat.K. Singh said that he inherited the programme from Rajiv Gandi and pursued it further. It is quite likely that this secretiveness on the part of the Indian’s Prime Ministers and the country’s inability to exercise its conventional superiority could have conformed Pakistan in its belief that its nuclear deterrent had indeed been effective in Kashmir since 1990 and it could therefore pursue the proxy war and the Kargil adventure with impunity on the basis of its own prescribed rules of the game. According to a statement made before the Committee. It would not be unreasonable for Pakistan to have concluded by 1990 that it had achieved the nuclear deterrence it had set out to establish in 1980. On the other hand. So also the US. The Prime Ministers. inflicting thousands of casualties. For reasons of security. the Chief of Staff and the foreign secretaries into confidence on the nature of the Pakistan’s nuclear threat and the China-Pakistan nuclear axis. Singh in terms which they regarded as verging on an ultimatum. it is inconceivable that it could sustain its proxy war against India.while the former was in the dark about Indian’s nuclear capability. Three former Indian Chiefs of Army Staff expressed unhappiness about this asymmetric situation. RAW had assessed that by 198182. and the scientific Adviser to the Defense Minister into confidence. In October 1990.K Gujral have a vivid recollection of this report. The nuclear posture adopted by successive prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart . Gujral and the Prime Minister V. This was officially communicated by Pakistan’s Minister of state for foreign Affairs. a fact that the Indian mission in Islamabad communicated to Delhi.P. Janata Dal. Former President Venkataraman and the then Scientific Adviser.January 24. both said that Indira Gandhi agreed to a nuclear weapons test in 1983 but called it off under US presser. It was also communicated by the Pakistani nuclear scientist. Khan to the Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar. Successive Indian Army Chiefs and Director General of Military Operations told the Committee that the idea of using India’s conventional Superiority did not arise for various reasons other than the nuclear factor. the primary motivation for this effort was to deter India’s conventional arms superiority. information was received from a sensitive intelligence source that in any future confrontation. implicitly confirming to the world that Pakistan possessed nuclear explosive capability. Zain Noorani to the Indian Ambassador in Islamabad. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister. Dr A. kept the intelligence and the nuclear weapons establishments in two watertight compartments.S. Dr V. and his warning to president Ghulam Ishaq Khan and General Beg against any rash action against India. Some time later. Foreign policy was being conducted without foreign Ministers and the Indian diplomats being apprised of the nature of the threat to the country or of Indian’s own nuclear capability. During this crises. A report published in 1984 indicated that Pakistan had obtained from the Chinese the design of its fourth nuclear weapon tested in 1966. 1972 in the wake of the country’s defeat in the Bangladesh war. It was therefore a proven design. the major political parties. it was able to do so on three occasions.
leads to fatigue and the development of a mindset that detracts from its primary role. This could have encouraged Pakistan to conclude that what it is caretaker Prime Minister in 1993. Having partially achieved this objective. IV – CI Operations. it used to be urged by strategist that ‘salami slicing’ of small pieces of territory which the adversary would not consider worth escalating to nuclear levels was always feasible. raised and equipped to deal with trans-border terrorism by well-trained mercenaries armed with sophisticated equipment who are continuously infiltrating across the border/LOC. At the height of the cold war. even if linked to Kashmir. What Pakistan attempted on Kargil was a typical case of salami slicing [***]. the quality of these forces has not been appropriately upgraded effectively to deal with the challenge of the times and this has led to the increased dependence on the Army to fight insurgency.insurgency and devise more costeffective means of dealing with the problem. which is to defend the country against external aggression. Osama Bin Laden and increasing Islamisation. and the North East to involve the Indian Army in counter-insurgency operations and neutralise its conventional superiority. proxy wars were not only possible but very likely. to seize Kashmir in a bold. General Mushrraf stated that though the possibility of large scale conventional war between India and Pakistan was virtually zero. This was vividly demonstrated when the Committee was referred to the Union Home Ministry's "Action Plan" for fighting militancy and the proxy war in J&K prepared in May 1998. needed to act in 1999. The heavy involvement of the of the Army in counter-insurgency operations cannot but affect its preparedness for its primary role. in turn. Pakistan. However. Moeen Qureshi. This point has often been emphasised by Pakistani analysts. the Army had to withdraw [‘’*] battalions deployed in J&K from their counter-insurgency role. Further. Some accounts claim that the Kargil intrusion was planed in1997and that preliminary reconnaissance and training of personal commenced that year. The net result has been to reduce the role of the Indian Army to the level of a para-military force and the para-military forces. 1998 and the Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 6. brash move when the Indian leadership appeared weak and indecisive. This defined the role of the Army as being to ensure "zero infiltration" across the LOG. the actual nuclear test conducted in May 1998 would not in themselves be all that significant as nuclear deterrence between the two was in place as far back as 1990. Pakistan’s image was damaged by its association with the Taliban. This caused consternation in the State Government and some worry even to eh paramilitary forces which were largely reliant on the Army in this regard. At the same time. Pakistan has ruthlessly employed terrorism in Punjab. J&K. Given Pakistan's unrelenting hostility towards this country. to the level of an ordinary police force. when mutual deterrence was in operation between the superpowers. There has also been criticism that redeployment of military units from CI duty in the Valley to the Kargil sector resulted in providing easy passage for a large number of hardened militants who were infiltrated by Pakistan across the Shamsabari Range into the Kupwara-Uri area and even South of the Pir . would progressively lose credibility. Pakistan obviously overlooked this factor. The para-military and Central Police Forces are not trained. It exhorted both countries to sign the CTBT and NPT and to referred to Kashmir as a root cause of tension between them. With in Kashmir. it has also persuaded itself that nuclear blackmail against India has succeeded on three occasions.in south Asia must have further encouraged Pakistan. there was no analogous pronouncement in this country. `crying nuclear wolf. State Governments and para-military forces tend to assume that the Army will always be there to combat insurgency. 1998 condemned the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests. With the passage of time. Pakistan would have realized that the impact of sanctions on India was only marginal and should Jaswant Singh-strobe Talbot talks make progress. 1999. Pakistan was unable to link its Kargil caper with a nuclear flashpoint. The Army's prolonged deployment in a counter-insurgency role. namely. the effort to conjure up escalation of a kind that could lead to nuclear war did not succeed. political and economic well being. though some foreign observers believe it was a near thing. The international community dose not favor alteration of the status quo through nuclear blackmail as this would not be in the interest of five major nuclear powers. The P-5 statement of June 4. President Clinton’s statement in China assigning a role to that country. If this is accepted. while Pakistan’s reliance on its nuclear deterrence to prevent India from escalating would still be important.12. it is necessary to evolve a long term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counter. It is possible that Pakistan’s political and military leadership concluded that the window of opportunity for internationalizing the Kashmir issue by projecting it as a nuclear flashpoint was fast closing. the Indian security Forces were steadily gaining ascendancy over militancy. In the present international security environment. claimed as the objective of linking Kashmir with the nuclear issue had been achieved and that Pakistan was in a position to implement a strategy outline as far back as 1980. To counter the risk. the nuclear card might not be available for too long. proxy war and terrorism have become preferred means of hurting a neighbor’s social. therefore. A coherent counter-strategy to deal with Pakistan's terrorist-nuclear blackmail and the conventional threat has to be thought through. Over the years. The US also titled in favor of Pakistan in imposing sanctions following the nuclear tests on the ground the its economy was weaker. Since India did not cross the LOG and reached strictly within its own territory. This conclusion is born out by the veiled nuclear threats held out by the Pakistan’s political leaders and officials at the time of the Kargil crisis. Except for one irresponsible editorial in an Indian party paper. Such a situation has arisen because successive Governments have not developed a long-term strategy to deal with insurgency. the US developed a strategy of flexible response. Kargil and Integrated Manpower Policy In going on alert to deter any Pakistani escalation and then focusing on eliminating the intrusion at Kargil. Despite its best efforts. The Committee believes that a comprehensive manpower policy is required to deal with this problem. adversely affects its training programme. the Ministry of Home Affairs.
The decision taken two years ago to reduce the Indian Army's strength by 50. a number of instances were brought to the notice of the Committee in respect of which there have been significant cost and time overruns in the development and induction of indigenous weapons and equipment for the three Armed Services.reliance and indigem'sation arc sound principles. The media moulds national and international opinion and can be a potent force multiplier. but would still leave untouched the question of how best to structure Unified Command HQs in the future. V . The kind of manpower reorganisation the Committee proposes could provide a partial answer. was a wise one. The terrorist comes equipped with rapid fire. The latter was relieved of this responsibility to enable him to devote full attention to his principal national defence task.The Technological Dimension Technology has added significantly to the potential of armies and terrorists. but illegal migration. Information is power. especially in this Information Age. coverage by the print and electronic media was by and large satisfactory. This was evident at Kargil . The Kargil battle was fought with less than optimum communications capability. the Committee understands. This does not appear to be the case at present and there is no mechanism to monitor that the process of equipment acquisition serves the best interests of the country. He is highly motivated and often a person conditioned by years of fundamentalist schooling. More thought must be given to some of these issues. There is an equally pressing need to fashion an effective border management policy which covers not only terrorist infiltration. This is an unhappy state of affairs and should not be allowed to linger. high explosives. the fact is that the Services have had to do without such items whereas Pakistan has not been similarly handicapped. Only after the Kargil intrusion was direction-finding equipment acquired in increasing numbers. These are all matters of national concern but are being looked at compartmentally. The Unified Command was also reorganized. smuggling and the flow of narcotics. para-military and Central police forces. VI . The dilemma has always been to determine the correct balance between "make or buy". Despite the challenge of terrorism over the past many years.Media Relations and Information If the media served the country well. the Indian Army and other security forces have lagged behind in the quality of their surveillance and communication equipment although technologically superior equipment is readily available the world over. However. While self. many of its more substantial recommendations await implementation. Yet it was apparent that. He can act alone and also as a member of an integrated team. India has not had access to some of the Western technologies that have flowed to Pakistan. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the chain of defence laboratories under its jurisdiction is responsible for indigenising and constantly upgrading the country's weapons and equipment inventory and related supplies. the availability of critical equipment in time of combat is the supreme consideration that must govern acquisition policy. The manpower integration proposed would also ensure compatibility of equipment and render it easier for the Army and the other forces to operate side by side effectively when required to do so. The AK 47 has transformed the lethal potential of the terrorist who has often outgunned the country's security forces in Punjab and J&K. wherever they might be required. media personnel lacked training in military affairs and war reporting and that the Armed Services lacked training and preparedness to facilitate the task of the media and counter disinformation. which is critical for the success of CI operations. But whether in J&K or Assam.Panjal. the status quo ante was restored. there has sometimes been tension both between the Army and Para-military/CPO/Police formations and between the civil and military authorities. with some exceptions. with the Director General Rashtriya Rifles (DGRR) being brought in from Delhi to replace GOC 15 Corps. . DGRR returned to Delhi and GOC 15 Corps resumed his place in the Unified Command." (and with a somewhat different structure. much of the credit goes to the initiative it itself took and to some individuals within the Government and the Armed Forces. Helicopters employed for air surveillance patrolling do not have sophisticated monitoring and sensing devices. All things considered. Some of these issues were in fact examined in detail by the Committee on Defence Expenditure (1990-91). There are obvious constraints such as of foreign exchange and the non-availability of state-of-the-art technology from advanced nations which are at best only prepared to share these with their military allies. These considerations demand that the country develop a degree of self-reliance in defence-related technology and military hardware. Nevertheless. wads of currency (real and fake) and sophisticated communications equipment. The achievements in this field can neither be denied nor denigrated. As a non-aligned power. Unified Command HQs have also been set up in Assam from time to time under different circumstance. This reduction in numbers had no bearing on the Kargil crisis and it would be a gross misunderstanding of military realities to believe otherwise.000 men and reinvest the savings on establishment costs in force modernisation. Considerable progress has been made in this direction. there has been no integrated equipment policy in respect of the Army. The Committee also found Unified Command HQ's intelligence structure lacking In timely and continuous analysis and assessment of intelligence. stand-off weapons. In spite of continuing counter-insurgency operations over the past many years. The inevitable result has been sub-optimal border management at a time when the narcotics trade has been playing a crucial role in Pakistan's promotion of cross-border terrorism.India's first television war. This report has unfortunately not been made public and. While extenuating circumstances can be cited. within weeks of the conclusion of Operation VIJAY. Dual-use technology-denial regimes have also operated against India.
had acted promptly and vigorously to deal with even larger eventualities. civilian casualties. with the COSC in attendance. Such a dispersal offers to hold uninhabited territory of no strategic value.Was Kargil Avoidable? A Kargil type situation could perhaps have been avoided had the Indian Army followed a policy of Siachenisation to plug unheld gaps along the 168 km. Human rights violations. Nor were there arrangements to brief officers and men at the ground level on daily developments nor to interface with the civil authorities. Pakistani political and military leaders have repeatedly highlighted their nuclear capability and their will to use it. This was followed by a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) chaired by the Prime Minister on May 18 and a briefing of the Prime Minister and Defence Minister on May 24. Accounts have also appeared in Pakistan of how India was thrice deterred by its nuclear capability. with the COSC in attendance. the nation can be proud of the manner in which the Armed Forces and the people as a whole acquitted themselves. This should be supplemented by a comprehensive space and aerial based surveillance system. destruction or commandeering of property. Recommendations The Findings bring out many grave deficiencies in India's security management system. If. Padmanabhan. The briefing function during the Kargil crisis was taken over by a triad of senior military and civil spokesmen. India's reticence in setting the record straight about the earlier conflicts and the developments in the nuclear field appear to have influenced the Pakistani mindset and led to the adventurous miscalculation over Kargil. The framework Lord Ismay formulated and Lord Mount-batten recommended was accepted by a national leadership unfamiliar with the . This enabled Army Headquarters both to monitor and disseminate information in a better calibrated manner than would have been the case otherwise. in whose area of responsibility the intrusion (as it was subsequently discovered to be) occurred. A number of simple misperccptions became apparent in newspaper reports questioning the absence of the Army Chief in Poland during the early part of May 1999 and the Northern Army Commander going to Pune about the same time. The Army Commander. The result was generation of a lot of inaccurate information such as the reported capture of a number of Indian Army bunkers (whereas the enemy only occupied one permanent patrol post which had earlier been vacated on account of extreme weather conditions). however. He too -was in constant touch with his Command and HQ 15 Corps and had already set in motion various precautionary measures. such a policy can only be regarded as no more than a temporary expedient. But efforts have to be made to review information handling procedures within the Armed Forces and their public dissemination. Division and Brigade levels. in turn. earlier meetings of May '99 were briefing sessions). The outcome of the Kargil operation was both a military and diplomatic triumph for India. The Army needs such improved public relations capability even otherwise when deployed on counterinsurgency duties. A Comprehensive account of the Kargil operations remains to be brought out. would have dissipated considerable military strength and effort and would not have been at all cost-effective. The first overall briefing on the Kargil situation in the Military Operations Room was given to the Defence and External Affairs Ministers on May 17 with the Chiefs of Staff Committee in attendance. The alternative should be a credible declaratory policy of swiftly punishing wanton and wilful violations of the sanctity of the LOG. Reporting on the campaign revealed a lack of public information about the command structure of the Armed Forces and how responsibilities arc distributed within the national intelligence framework.Defence Public Relations is routinely handled by the Ministry of Defence through regular Information Service cadres. While arrangements were made for official briefings at Delhi. This establishment is not equipped to handle media relations during war or even proxy war. The COAS remained in touch with developments at home and there was no vacuum in the higher military leadership because of his absence abroad during the early phase of Kargil developments. Such liaison was lacking during the Kargil action and points to a deficiency that must be made good. While attending to such shortcomings as have been brought to light. This calls for the creation of a civil-military interface at various levels to deal with a whole range of problems on an emergency basis. Some of all this is inevitable in the fog of war. the existence of three-storied enemy bunkers equipped with television sets. it has had to be done now. The Army Chief had returned from Poland by May 20 when the CCS met again on May 25 (CCS met formally only on 25-5-99. there were inadequate arrangements at the Corps. This would have entailed establishing a series of winter cut-off posts with communications and other logistic support and specially equipped and trained troops to hold these positions and undertake winter patrolling despite risk of cold injuries and avalanche casualties which would have had to be accepted. Nevertheless. Army Headquarters set up an Information and Psychological Warfare Cell under an officer of the rank of Major General with direct access to the Army Chief. The sanctity of the LOG received international recognition and Pakistan was isolated in the comity of nations. VII . refugee movements and the disruption of infrastmcture and livelihoods must be expected. went to Pune for a briefing from his predecessor. There was no need to cancel the Army Chiefs visit which had been long planned and was of some political significance. now Southern Army Commander. the Corps Commander. stretch from Kaobal Gaii to Chorbat La. Public relations are presently managed by the Ministry of Defence and at the formation level by military officers who have no media background. and the purchase by the intruders of cement from the Dras-Kargil market. Lieutenant General S. War and proxy war do not leave the civil population untouched. The Pakistani intruders were evicted with heavier casualties than those suffered by India. and the use of the air power was cleared. by when the magnitude of the Kargil intrusion had been more or less fully assessed. The early military appreciation was of limited infiltration in Kargil.
military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo. the 1965 stalemate and the 1971 victory. Adequate attention has not been paid to developing encryption and decryption skills. especially if they have night vision and thermal imaging capabilities. National Security Council The National Security Council (NSC). An independent body of credible experts. The political. formally constituted in April 1999. the defence intelligence effort is limited in relation to the role assigned to the external intelligence agency (RAW) except for limited tactical and signal intelligence. There has also been a gross shortage of direction-finding equipment which could contribute significantly to counterinsurgency operations. The centralised communication and electronic intelligence agency should feed all the information it generates to the country's premier national intelligence agency which should in turn disseminate this material to all concerned users. National security management recedes into the background in time of peace and is considered too delicate to be tampered with in time of war and proxy war. parochial departmental interests should be effectively countered. bureaucratic. end of the cold war. The problems and purposes of monitoring communications within the country and the effort devoted to listen in on external communications are different. in the interim. This can be done through periodic intelligence briefings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) with all supporting staff in attendance. The United States has grouped all its communication and electronic intelligence efforts within a single organisation. having a National Security Adviser who also happens to be Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. particularly through satellite imagery. Every effort must be made and adequate fund3 provided to ensure that a capability of world standards is developed indigenously and put in place in the shortest possible time. Institutionalised arrangements should be made to ensure that the UAV imagery generated is disseminated to the concerned intelligence agencies as quickly as possible. The equipment needs to be modernised in keeping with the advances made by Pakistan in inducting advanced communication technologies. UAVs could also prove effective in counter-insurgency operations. The Committee believes that there must be a full time National Security Adviser and it would suggest that a second line of personnel be inducted into the system as early as possible and groomed for higher responsibility. Since the Indian system is still in the initial stages. are extremely useful and effective in surveillance.in regard to the downloading and interpretation of the imagery may not be a better alternative than depending on a single agency. Similar efforts should be made for the acquisition of high altitude UAVs.oriented interaction between the agencies and consumers at different . The Committee strongly feels that the Kargil experience. is required to conduct such studies which must be undertaken expeditiously.intricacies of national security management. Intelligence Kargil highlighted the gross inadequacies in the nation's surveillance capability. Whatever its merits. The resources made available to the Defence Services for intelligence collection are not commensurate with the responsibility assigned to them. The desirability of setting up a similar organisation in India with adequate resources for this extremely important and non-intrusive method of gathering technological intelligence calls for examination. the growing nuclear threat. However. In India. reporting. technological intelligence collection is undertaken by an integrated Defence Intelligence Agency with adequate resources. organised crime and anti-national elements are using encrypted communications. UAVs have just been inducted and are operating in the plains under the charge of the Army. In many advanced countries. Members of the National Security Council. regional and international issues. with a rational division of functions. Some countries have created a national surveillance command. is still evolving and its procedures will take time to mature. Increasingly. decisions taken at this juncture will have long term implications. They may replace WASO patrols in the long run. whether a national commission or one or more task forces or otherwise as expedient. Such a review cannot be undertaken by an over¬burdened bureaucracy. The Committee has drawn attention to deficiencies in the present system of collection. the senior bureaucracy servicing it and the Service Chiefs need to be continually sensitised to assessed intelligence pertaining to national.civil and military .little change over the past 52 years despite the 1962 debacle. The specific issues that require to be looked into are set out below. responsibilities and areas of specialisation. the possibility of using more stable WASO platforms than Cheetah helicopters and equipping them with thermal imaging sensors should be explored. While the effort to build up adequate communication and electronic intelligence capability should be tailored to suit India's particular needs. The Committee notes with satisfaction that steps have been initiated to acquire this capability. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) also known as Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). There is no institutionalised mechanism for coordination or objective. the continuing proxy war and the prevailing nuclearised security environment justify a thorough review of the national security system in its entirety. The most spectacular intelligence coup of the Kargil operations was the interception of a series of high level Islamabad-Beijing telephone conversations. There has been very. There are distinct advantages in having two lines of intelligence collection and reporting. continuance of proxy war in Kashmir for over a decade and the revolution in military affairs. The Committee is of the view that the issue of setting up an integrated defence intelligence agency needs examination. This highlights the capabilities of communication intelligence which in India is fragmented among a number of agencies and is not adequately funded. It is for consideration whether a two-stream approach . the National Security Agency (NSA). collation and assessment of intelligence. can only be an interim arrangement.
if not the elimination. the JIC was devalued. All major countries have a mechanism at national and often at lower levels to assess the intelligence inputs received from different agencies and sources. instead of the present practice of having 17 years of colour service (as has been the policy since 1976). The Committee finds that for various reasons cited in the Report. the present structure and procedures for border patrolling must be reviewed. the role and the tasks of the para-military forces have to be restructured particularly with reference to command and control and leadership functions. Border fencing in Punjab has produced positive results. The development of such country/region specialisation along with associated language skills is a time consuming process and should not be further delayed. there is no mechanism for tasking the agencies. It is now handled by the Assam Rifles. the then existing JIC under the Chiefs of Staff Committee was upgraded and transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat. These are all standard features elsewhere in the world. Pakistan's action at Kargil was not rational. Army pensions rose from Rs 1568 crores in 199091 to Rs. Border Management Border management has become immensely more complex over the years. terrorists and arms. The Committee would not like to advocate any percentage share of GDP that should be assigned to Defence. its efficacy has increased since it became part of the National Security Council Secretariat. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies. illegal migrants. In other countries. If the country is to acquire increased capabilities for area surveillance and electronic fencing. thereafter. The Army pension bill has risen exponentially since the 1960s and is becoming an increasing burden on the national exchequer. national security dictates certain imperatives which the country may ignore only at its peril. The Committee is aware of the complexities and sensitivities involved in any such security manpower reorganisation. its role and place in the national intelligence framework should be evaluated in the context of overall reform of the system. A generalist administration culture would appear to permeate the intelligence field. release these officers and men for service in the country's para-military formations. Defence Budget and Modernisation A number of experts have at various times suggested the need to enhance India's Defence outlays as budgetary constraints have affected the process of modernisation and created certain operational voids. Therefore.6932 crores (budgeted) in 1999-2000. man-portable arms and explosives. Similarly. It is necessary to establish think tanks. While taking note of recent steps to entrust the NSCS with some of these responsibilities the Committee recommends a thorough examination of the working of the intelligence system with a view to remedying these deficiencies. in the inflow of narcotics. The para-military and police forces have their own ethos and traditions and might well be chary of such lateral induction as has been proposed. The possibility of adopting an integrated manpower policy for the Armed Forces. They also contract studies with university departments and think tanks with area specialisation. older cadres might be further streamed into the regular police forces or absorbed in a National Service Corps (or a National Conservation Corps).military formations. encourage country specialisation in university departments and to organise regular exchanges of personnel between them and the intelligence community. the equivalent of almost two-thirds of the current Army salary bill. the Government and the nation do not know whether they are getting value for money. The proposed reorganisation would make a career in the armed forces attractive on the basis of the lifetime employment offered by the two or three-tiered secondment formula. as provided for under Article 51A(d) of the Constitution. Its behaviour patterns require to be carefully studied in order to gain a better understanding of the psyche of its leadership. illegal migration and the infiltration of trained mercenaries have all exacerbated border management. The Committee is therefore of the view that the entire issue needs detailed study in order to evolve force structures and procedures that ensure improved border management and a reduction. Among aspects of modernisation to which priority should be given is that of equipping infantrymen with superior light . After the 1962 debacle. It was further upgraded in 1985 with the Chairman being raised to the rank of Secretary to the Government. The Army must be young and fit at all times. The smuggling of narcotics. and also reduce pension costs and other entitlements such as married quarters and educational facilities. This would reduce the age profile of the Army and the para-military forces. monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality. This must be left to the Government to determine in consultation with the concerned Departments and the Defence Services. Narcotics is dealt with by the Finance Ministry while other aspects are handled by the Home Ministry. Nevertheless. para-military forces and the Central Police Forces merits examination. In the absence of such procedures. This is sadly neglected in India. the Border Security Force and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. Elsewhere. it would be advisable to reduce the colour service to a period of seven to ten years and. They need to be trained to much higher standards of performance and better equipped to deal with terrorist threats. intelligence agencies have developed large 'White Wings' of high quality analysts for in-house analysis. to spearhead a range of land and water conservation and physical and social infrastructure development on the model of some eco-development battalions that have been raised with a fair measure of success. . Counter-Terrorist Operations There is general agreement that in the light of the new situation of proxy war and large scale terrorism that the country faces. This objection might be overcome were the para-military forces to undertake recruitment on the basis of certain common national military standards and then send those selected for training and absorption in the Army for a period of colour service before reverting to their parent para.levels. After an appropriate period of service here. vested interests have come in the way of effective border management. However.
The US Armed Forces usually operate dedicated radio and TV channels to entertain and inform their armed forces when deployed overseas. The Prime Minister and Defence Minister do not have the benefit of the views and expertise of the Army Commanders and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force so that higher level defence management decisions are more consensual and broadbased. the Armed Forces and the media. The Committee is of the view that the present obsolete system. which is not a real issue. This reveals an obvious lacuna which must be plugged. Most opposition to change comes from inadequate knowledge of the national security decision-making process elsewhere in the world and a reluctance to change the status quo and move away from considerations of parochial interest.P. An objective assessment of the last 52 years will show that the country is lucky to have scraped through various national security threats without too much damage. Chandra Shekhar. however.weight weapons. The Committee therefore recommends that the entire gamut of national security management and apex decisionmaking and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters be comprehensively studied and reorganised. National Security Management and Apex Decision-Making India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure. merits re-examination. Simultaneously. and the threats posed to India through nuclear blackmail. The status quo is often mistakenly defended as embodying civilian ascendancy over the armed forces. They simultaneously discharge the roles of operational commanders and national security planners/managers. there was a failure on the part of successive Prime Ministers to educate the people on the . The Army has decided to revive and upgrade its war correspondents' course at the College of Combat. it is incumbent on the Government to reduce any such gap. equipment and clothing suited to the threats they are required to face in alpine conditions. Neither the Northern Army Command nor HQ 15 Corps nor the lower field formations had media cells which could cater to the requirements of the press corps. Structural reforms could bring about a much closer and more constructive interaction between the Civil Government and the Services. Higher decisions on equipment. locating the Services' Headquarters in the Government will further enhance civilian supremacy. devoted to the operational role. The Chiefs of Staff have assumed the role of operational commanders of their respective forces rather than that of Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Narasimha Rao. Most of their time. is. should be made known. force levels and strategy are not collegiate but command-oriented. The contribution of Indira Gandhi. successive Prime Ministers displayed extreme sensitivity towards the nuclear issue and consistently supported an Indian nuclear weapons programme. India's Nuclear Policy The Report clearly brings out that. Future-oriented long term planning suffers. Rajiv Gandhi. beginning with Indira Gandhi. The country can no longer afford such ad hoc functioning. An effective and appropriate national security planning and decision-making structure for India in the nuclear age is overdue. and the compulsions on them to ensure this. media relations and the techniques and implications of information war and perception management must form a distinct and important module at all levels of military training. The record clearly establishes that the Indian nuclear weapons programme had a much wider consensus than is generally believed. taking account of the revolution in military affairs and threats of proxy war and terrorism and the imperative of modernising the Armed Forces. The Government should seriously consider similar dedicated facilities for the Indian Armed Forces. The record must be set straight. especially in relation to future equipment and force postures. In a democracy. local and international. It was also the country's first television war and one in which the Indian Army had to handle the media right on the battlefront This has been a learning experience for the Government. The Committee therefore recommends the publication of a White Paper on the Indian nuclear weapons programme. except in 1962. as is bound to happen. the Armed Forces and senior civil servants into confidence. some of the misleading reports and rumours that gained currency could have been effectively countered. Army Headquarters has developed a command rather than a staff culture. While the country's nuclear programme must remain confidential. While dealing with the information issue. The media should avail of this opportunity so that there is a cadre of trained war correspondents at any time. None is less important than the other. the Committee would also like to draw attention to the fact that Indian security forces are deployed year round in very difficult and inhospitable terrain ranging from high mountains to dense forests and sandy deserts. This Report brings out the vast gap between the actual policies pursued by the Government and developments on the ground on the one hand and popular perceptions derived from public pronouncements on the other. It must also be recognised that the media has to be serviced at many levels national. Media relations and information Kargil was the first war which Indian correspondents covered by going to the front in significant numbers. This has led to a number of negative results. If such facilities had been available at the time of Kargil. V. They judged it necessary to envelop it in the utmost secrecy and consequently did not take their own party colleagues. Singh. The present obsolete system has perpetuated the continuation of the culture of the British Imperial theatre system of an India Command whereas what is required is a National Defence Headquarters. This will also bring out the stark facts of the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear capability with assistance from countries who tirelessly decry proliferation. Deve Gowda and Inder Gujral to India's emergence as a nuclear weapon state. Mhow. bequeathed to India by Lord Ismay. This has caused many in the country to believe that India's nuclear weaponisation programme is a departure from the traditional policy of merely keeping the nuclear option open indefinitely. In fact.
The dedication and valour of the Ladakh Scouts and J&K. There is an element of truth in this assertion but none can be faulted for desiring the best. Experience would suggest that such a review is presently overdue. A true partnership must be established between the Services and the DRDO to ensure that the latter gets full backing and funding from the Services and the former. with appropriate security deletions. Likewise. is most necessary to smoothen relationships during times of emergency and stress. Likewise.in the Universities and IITs. like war and proxy war. and to ensure that there is no room for friction and alienation of the local population.and not only within the DRDO and designated defence undertakings. The Government must review its information policy and develop structures and processes to keep the public informed on vital national issues. Situations of no-war -no-peace call for norms and procedures that avoid delay and endless red tape. While this Report appends. Even the 1971 defeat is blamed on the Soviet Union. that were made before the Committee. the UN resolutions and why they could not be implemented. There is a whole gamut of issues here which merits consideration. comprehensive official publication containing details of the Kashmir question. but by a cold marshalling of the facts regarding contemporary events and past history. the better utilisation of highly sophisticated industrial capacity and related manpower and enable Defence laboratories and Defence undertakings to concentrate on those areas which cannot be hived off to the civil sector. It would appear that one of the major factors influencing Pakistan's aggressive behaviour in 1947. Declaratory Policy for LOG More attention should be given to monitoring and analysing developments and trends in "Azad J&K" and the Northern Areas which are in ferment and whose fate and future cannot be divorced from any consideration of the Kashmir Question. get the indented equipment they require without undue delay. the three Service Headquarters' presentations of Operation VIJAY. from the ranking Command HQ to the operational formations on the ground. This will render NH-1A an exclusively civilian highway and not a military target. the Kashmiri diaspora overseas must be kept better informed about the situation in J&K and what happened in Kargil. Civil Military Liaison The establishment of a civil-military liaison mechanism at various levels. 1965.realities of nuclear security confronting the country. It is necessary to publish authentic accounts of the 1965 and 1971 wars and to establish the facts. 1971 and 1999 has been its self-image of martial superiority and a deliberately cultivated perception of an ineffectual Indian Army and a weak and vacillating Indian Government. The record needs to be set right. extent and history of India's nuclear weapons programme should be an essential part of the exercise of deterrence. The design and development of special materials as well as Defence stores and equipment often entails working at the frontiers of technology. Operation SAFED SAGAR and Operation TALWAR. Light Infantry merits recognition through the raising of additional units of these regiments with a higher component of men from Kargil being inducted into the Ladakh Scouts. Developments in Afghanistan and its final denouement have been portrayed as projecting Pakistani military prowess in defeating the Soviet super-power. pending its extension to other or all parts of the State. It is therefore possible and desirable to harness national talent wherever it lies . Relocating villages behind the Army's forward defence line in J&K can best be done through an initially limited experimental move and further action on the basis of policies evolved as a result of that learning experience. Technology The longstanding controversy between the Services and the DRDO on drawing the line between "make" or "buy" resulted in the formulation of a new Procurement Policy in 1995. Casting the net wider would be advantageous and would ensure a greater degree of competition and technological spin-off into the civil sector. on grounds of high security or limited applicability of end use for civilian purposes. A rehabilitation programme for Kargil must be put in place as a precursor to a longer term development package that includes the completion of by-pass roads for strategic movements between Zojila and Leh. India has not published authoritative histories of the 1965 and 1971 wars. public or private. not through strident propaganda. Misperceptions and ambiguities about the Siachen/AGPL sector need to be dispelled and the facts of "cartographic aggression" here made known. steps should be taken to issue ID Cards to border villagers in certain vulnerable areas on a priority basis. Such a policy would also be relevant in the North-East. Division) Brigade or Battalion. One problem the DRDO faces is that the armed forces borrow unique features from weapons and equipment on offer from advanced military suppliers around the world and marry these in their "General Staff Requirements" to make "impossible" demands. This liberalised the procedures for the import of equipment as against its indigenous development. In the case of Defence policy and insurgency situations. There is no warrant for departing from the logic of extending the LOC from NJ 9842 . There is no single. This would also facilitate Defence exports. skirting as it does a part of the LOG in this sector. we recommend that an authoritative account of this unique high altitude war be published at an early date. and m the private and public sectors . terrorism and ethnic cleansing together with Pakistan's involvement in all of these. as well as of more recent developments in Kashmir through the years of proxy war. this policy needs periodic review in the light of changing circumstances. Though Pakistan was discomfited in all the four military adventures it undertook. in turn. The Kargil Sector and other areas along the LOG have suffered loss and damage on account of war and shelling. it has attempted to portray each of them as a narrowly-missed victory. communicating the scope. However. sufficient public information is not available. Sikkim and part of West Bengal. Further to these.
long-term settlement that can bring enduring peace and tranquillity to J&K and stable and cooperative Indo-Pakistan relations on the basis of the Simla. political and economic. media and the nation as a whole have to learn. (iv) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries. There will be many who suggest the most careful deliberation on the report. (iii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non¬interference in the internal affairs of each other. We are presenting here the contents of the five historic agreements signed between Pakistan and India during the past 59 years three of which had been signed by the Pakistani military dictators. This broadly upholds the current Actual Ground Position Line. Half measures will not do. development and stability of the nation. the interests of the peoples of India ad Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. and enable the victims of ethnic cleansing to return to their homes in the Valley or elsewhere in the State with security and honour. (i) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighborly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Parliament. The fallacy of showing the LOC as running northeast to the Karakoram Pass must be exposed. having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. It was against this background that Jammu & Kashmir was discussed. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan. is not and cannot be held to be escalatory and that the aggressor and his victim cannot be bracketed and placed on par. The following is a brief introduction of these agreements. and each of the sides set forth its respective position. Procrastination has cost nations dear. 1949 which was subsequently converted into the Line of Control by the Simla Agreement in 1992. The Committee trusts that its Recommendations will be widely discussed and acted upon expeditiously so that the sacrifices made will not have been in vain. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and indeed. The country must not fall into the trap of Siachenisation of the Kargil heights and similar unheld unpopulated "gaps" in the High Himalaya along the entire length of the Northern border. including that within its own side of the LOG.and "thence north to the glaciers" as set out in the delineation of the Ceasefire Line under the Karachi agreement of July 29. the Union and State Governments must jointly initiate a twin policy of reform and devolution to and within J&K and a dialogue with Pakistan. The best tribute to the dedication of those killed and wounded will be to ensure that "Kargils" of any description are never repeated. Troops Withdrawal (ii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966 to the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965. attend to genuine discontents. India's commitment to maintaining the sanctity of the LOC/AGPL and the international endorsement of this position won during the Kargil crises has within it the seeds of a larger.Lahore process within the framework of SAARC. and both sides shall observe the cease¬fire terms on the cease-fire line. 1966 after the end of the 17-day war between the two countries in 1965. ensuring progress. Others will no doubt advocate monumental change. and public opinion to determine. The proper response would be a declaratory policy that deliberate infringement of the sanctity of the LOG and wanton cross-border terrorism in furtherance of proxy war will meet with prompt retaliation in a manner. The Committee has after very wide interaction sign-posted directions along the path to peace. Pakistan and the world must know that India's defence of the integrity of its own territory. leading to a purposeful action. Parliament. to win back alienated sections of the population. There is both comfort and danger in clinging to any long established status quo.They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. 1966 The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan. These have been set out in the preceding findings. How exactly the country should proceed to refashion its Security-Intelligence-Development shield to meet the challenge of the 21S1 Century is for the Government. Such a declaratory policy must be backed with credible measures in J&K. Intelligence agencies. To this end. These should stimulate introspection and reflection. Tashkent Declaration January 10. (v) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan of India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of . Epilogue The Committee's review brings out many lessons that the Armed Forces. TASHKENT PACT This pact had been signed between Pakistani military dictator Field Marshal Ayub Khan and Indian prime minister Lai Bahadur Shastri on January 10. time and place of India's choosing. Government. There is no turning away from that responsibility. synergy will be lost.
Lieutenant General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA gives a solemn assurance that personnel who surrender shall be treated with dignity and respect that soldiers are entitled to in accordance with provisions of the GENEVA Convention and guarantees the safety and well-being of all PAKISTAN military and para¬military forces who surrender.diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. This surrender includes all PAKISTAN land. These forces will lay down their arms and surrender at the places where they are currently located to the nearest regular troops under the command of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA. air and naval forces as also all para-military forces and civil armed forces. (x) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan record their feelings. Jagjit Singh Arora when 93. Gen. Gen. JAGJIT SINGH AURORA AMIR ABDULLAH KHAN NIAZI Lieutenant-General Lieutenant-General General Officer Martial Law Administrator Commanding in Chief Zone B and Commander India and Bangladesh Eastern Command Forces in the Eastern (Pakistan) Theatre 16 December 1971 16 December 1971 Simla Agreement This agreement was signed between the Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on July 2. the Govt of India and the Govt of Pakistan have agreed as folio ws:- . communications as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan. the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for their constructive. In order to achieve this objective.000 Sq Km territory. Trade Relations (vi) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations. They further agree to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse. signing the Instrument of Surrender in front of General of Officer Commanding in Chief of India and Bangladesh Forces in the Eastern Theatre. AGREEMENT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN (SH1MLA AGREEMENT-1972) Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Shimla. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. Prime Minister of India President of Pakistan Lai Bahadur Shastri Mohammed Ayub Khan Tashkent. January 10. Lt. Pakistan got back 93. Under this agreement. July 1972 The Govt of India and the Govt of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the Sub continent. Soviet Leaders Thanked (ix) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue meetings both at highest and at other levels of matters of direct concern to both countries. Amir Abdullah Niazi and the Indian military commander Lt. K. Protection woll [sic] be provided to forcing [sic] nationals. (viii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue the discussions of questions relating to the problems of refugees and eviction of illegal immigrations. This agreement led to the creation of Line of Control in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. and to take measures to implement the existing agreement between India and Pakistan.000 troops and civil servants and 5. The decision of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA will be final. 1971 Text of Instrument of Surrender The PAKISTAN Eastern Command agree to surrender all PAKISTAN Armed Forces in BANGLADESH to LieutenantGeneral JAGJIT SINGH AURORA. ethnic minorities and personnel of WEST PAKISTANI origin by the forces under the command of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA. 1966 Pulton surrender pact This agreement was signed by the martial law administrator and military commander of East Pakistan Lt. General A.000 Pakistani troops and civil servants had surrendered themselves to India on the orders of chief martial law administrator General Yahya Khan after defeat in East Pakistan on 16th September 1971. 1972. deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union. General Jagjit Singh Aurora. They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality. Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken. Instrument of Surrender: 1971 war Pakistani Army Commander in the Eastern Command. friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. 16th December. so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people. General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian and Bangladesh forces in the Eastern Theatre. should any doubt arise as to the meaning [sic] of interpretation of the surrender terms. They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to witness this declaration. Lt. (vii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war. Niazi. The PAKISTAN Eastern Command shall come under the orders of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA as soon as the instrument has been signed. Disobedience of orders will be regarded as a breach of the surrender terms and will be dealt with the accepted laws and usages of war. A.
In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details. Schedule of Various Meetings The delineation of the Line of Control was effected during nine meetings as follows :Venue Dates First Meeting 10-12 August 1972 Suchetgarh Second Meeting 21-22 August 1972 Wagah Third Meeting 28-29 August 1972 Suchetgarh Fourth Meeting 03-15 September 1972 Wagah Fifth Meeting 8 Sep. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace. including over flights. including border posts and air links. Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted. both the Governments agree that-Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the International Border. the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations. the 2nd of July 1972 Shimla. That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years /shall be resolved by peaceful means. the 2nd of July 1972 DELINEATION OF THE LINE OF CONTROL IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR RESULTING FROM THE CEASEFIRE OF 17 DECEMBER 1971 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SHIMLA AGREEMENT General The representatives of the Chiefs of Army Staff of India and Pakistan held a series of meetings alternately. on the Indian side and Wagah Check Post. This Agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordanc^ with their respective constitutional procedures.Signed /. a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations. That they shall always respect each other's national unity. on the Pakistan side. Pending the final settlement of any of the problem ‘between the two countries. That the pre-requisite for reconciliation. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line. In order to progressively restore and normalize relation between the two countries step by step. and will come into force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged. In Jammu and Kashmir. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such info as would promote the development of friendly relations between them. The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof. Signed/. the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17.(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) (Indira Gandhi) President Prime Minister Islamic Republic of Pakistan Republic of India Shimla. Both Govt agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that in the meanwhile. That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other. Both Govt will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. political independence and sovereign equality. telegraphic. Trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible. to 01 October 1972 Suchetgarh Sixth Meeting 07-08 October 1972 Wagah Seventh Meeting 14-22 October 1972 Suchetgarh Eighth Meeting 07-09 November 1972 Wagah Ninth and Final Meeting 11 December 1972 . territorial integrity. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally. sea.That the principles and purposes of the Charter the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries. to delineate the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir resulting from the cease fire of 17 December 1971 in accordance with Paragraph 4 (ii) of the Shimla Agreement signed between the Govt of India and the Govt of Pakistan on 02 July 1972. on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co¬existence. That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country. land. neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations. it was agreed that:Steps shall be taken to resume communications. including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees. 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. postal. respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
reaffirm their condemnation of terrorismm in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace. VC Lt Gen Abdul Hameed Khan. aimed at prevention of conflict. including Jammu and Kashmir. VC of the Indian Army These map sets are held by both the sides.shall refrain from intervention and inteerference in each other's internal affairs. 1999. PAKISTAN ARMY AND LT GEN PS BHAGAT.Suchetgarh Composition of Indian and Pakistani Delegations The Composition of the two delegations were as under:IndianDelegation Pakistan Delegation Lt Gen P S Bhagat. Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment. .shall promote and protect all human righhts and fundamental freedoms. Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan from 20-21 February. S Pk. VSM. INDIAN ARMY Lahore Declaration This declaration was signed between Pakistan's prime minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Atal Bihari Vajpayee on February 21. on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore . PVSM.reaffirm their commitment to the goals aand objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realization of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth. . social progress and cultural development.shall intensify their efforts to resolvee all issues. A MOSAIC OF THE LINE OF CONTROL DULY SIGNED BY LT GEN ABDUL HAMEED KHAN. and of progress and prosperity for their people. SQA Maj Gen M R Rajwade. Delineation of the Line of Control and Joint Attestation of Maps The Line of Control was duly marked on two sets of maps and thereafter attested by Lt Gen Abdul Hameed Khan. 1999. . Committed to the objectives of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda. . Recognizing that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries. MC Col Mahmud Shaukat Col C M Sahni Col Syed Refaqat. MC Brig S M Abbasi Maj Gen I S Gill. Have agreed that their respective governments:. PVSM. S Pk.shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields. Lahore Declaration The prime ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistani-Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries. A miniaturised copy of one such mosaic is reproduced below. and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence. TQA LtColMS Chahal. SQA of the Pakistan Army and Lt Gen PS Bhagat. Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries. The agreement envisaged the solution of the lingering Kashmir dispute and installation of durable peace in the region after the two countries conducted nuclear detonations in May 1998. enabling them to devote their energies for a better future. each set consisting of 27 map sheets formed into 19 mosaics. Mr Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit. including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. VSM Lt Col M M Afzal Khan Lt Col B M Tewari Lt Col Ahmad Saeed Methodology of Delineation The Line of Control was reproduced on two sets of maps prepared by each side. . . is essential for this purpose. Feb 21: The following is the text of the documents signed at the conclusion of the Indian Prime Minister's visit to Lahore on Sunday. that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues. Recalling their agreement of 23 September. the Prime Minister of India. PVSM. Text of documents signed at Lahore LAHORE. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Atal Bihari Vajpayee Prime Minister of the Republic of India Joint statement 1. Each individual of mosaic of all four sets of maps with the Line of Control marked on them has been signed by the representatives of the Chiefs of Army Staff of India and Pakistan and each side has exchanged one set of signed mosaics as required under the joint statement by the representative of Govt of India and Pakistan signed at Delhi on 29 August 1972. 1998. In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. agreed to the following: L The 'two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort. and issues of international concern. before mid 1999.bus service. to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace. On 21st February. identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries. The two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples. 3. the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels. The two sides shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose. Shamshad Ahmad Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan K. in particular for tackling the problems of Y2K. disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora. Memorandum of understanding The foreign secretaries of India and Pakistani-Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. between the respective Directors. Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. including nuclear related issues. or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries. Mausoleum of Allama Iqbal. 2. The two sides further undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental. 7. 5. and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard. b) The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions. 4. Raghunath Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India . including Jammu and Kashmir. aimed at avoidance of conflict. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. is essential for this purpose. The prime minister of Pakistan received the Indian prime minister at the Wagah border on 20 February 1999. Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links. on the same evening. in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests. and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications. Have on this day. or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. with a view to reaching bilateral agreements. the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21 February 1999. The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations. 5. 7. d) The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalizing the visa and travel regime. set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs. Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers. e) The two sides shall appoint a two-member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWs. They decided that: a) The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security. Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23 September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues. as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions. 3. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee extended an invitation to Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif to visit India on mutually convenient dates. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side.General.Pakistan. and security between the two countries. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee thanked Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit. 4. regional cooperation within SAARC. the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Minar-i. Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e. Where required. 8. and aircraft belonging to the two sides. They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a bus service between Lahore and New Delhi.g. a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor's House. 6. Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit. 6. unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides. 2. c) The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology. and nuclear doctrines. with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary.
Musharraf did not give a clear answer. A careful study of these agreements abundantly clears the difference between the performance of the civil and military rulers of Pakistan. he said. rejected the impression that there was going to be some sort of a secret deal on Kashmir. to its culmination.' he said adding no extremism will be allowed in Pakistan. with inflexible position. security and economic development for our peoples and for future generations. President said the two sides were not discussing the contentious issues yet and for the time being only those issues were touched which could help keep the momentum of goodwill. 'I wished him good health and he wished me protection. ‘Both leaders welcomed the recent steps towards normalisation of relations between the two countries and expressed the hope that the positive trends set by the CBMs (confidence building measures) would be consolidated. however. 'We have to take forward this environment. Kashmir is an issue which needs to be resolved: Second. 'President Musharraf emphasised that a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results. 'The two leaders agreed that constructive dialogue would promote progress towards the common objective of peace.' Musharraf said asserting that he was an open person and did not believe in hiding things. who have extreme positions. Asked whether India had dropped any hint to move beyond its stated positions as was done by Pakistan. The decision was taken after several meetings between the officials of both the countries and Summit-level talks between President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. To another question he said Kashmiris had not been sidelined and taking them into confidence would be in the interest of all. 'To carry the process of normalisation forward the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agreed to commence the process of the composite dialogue in February 2004.' Musharraf told several dozens domestic and international reporters at Aiwan-i-Sadr. 'Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process. violence. He said the two sides were willing to accelerate confidence building process and negotiate all issues through peaceful means.Pakistan and India Tuesday decided to initiate composite dialogue on all issues including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. In this declaration. would come up for discussion when formal talks start. while addressing a Press conference termed the agreement 'historic. we should move as fast as possible. if there is sincerity and desire for moving forward.' He said there were three points which needed attention: one. I am sure.' MusharraPs Reaction: ISLAMABAD . he said Pakistan would take to task any extremists in Pakistan. we will get to them. Musharraf. who may not want peace. may like to sabotage. He said no timeframe was fixed for the conclusion of the dialogue process but expressed his desire that both sides would move forward with sincerity. Both the leaders also exchanged good wishes for each other. General Musharraf indirectly accepted the Indian blame of terrorism and assured India that Pakistan won't let anvbodv use its soil for terrorist activities against any country.' 'We have never reached in the past where we have reached now. including Jammu & Kashmir. 'Whatever we have achieved in the form of investigation is tremendous.' Musharraf strongly supported negotiations and said both the governments should deal with extremists strongly.' Final touches to the agreement were given on Tuesday morning when Vajpayee talked to Musharraf by phone. There are extremists on both sides. 'If all goes well. these extremists. Musharraf. 'The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India met during the SAARC Summit in Islamabad.' Musharraf said. Pakistan's resolve to fight terrorism and not let its territory be used for any terrorist activities. Referring to the joint Pakistan-India statement the President said 'history has been made in that we have arrived at an agreement on taking this normalisation process forward and taking it to its logical end. 'There is no secret deal in the offing. there is nothing more. 2004 on the occasion of SAARC Conference. 'The Indian Prime Minister while expressing satisfaction over the successful conclusion of the SAARC Summit appreciated the excellent arrangements made by the host country. to the satisfaction of both sides. He said that extremists on both sides would try to derail the peace process but Pakistan and India should move forward in the peace process and not be deterred by people having extreme views. 'The deal was sealed after the phone call. 'President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. hostility and terrorism must be prevented. We need to move strongly in the direction of peace as if there are no such people existing on both sides. 'The two leaders are confident that the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues. nothing less. TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT ON TALKS Following is the text of a joint statement issued on Tuesday on bilateral talks between Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf. whatever is visible is visible in the form of the joint Press statement. we should forget divergences and focus on . All issues. we have to have a composite dialogue on all issues including Kashmir and: third. To a question about recent suicide attacks on him.Islamabad Declaration This declaration was signed between General Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on January 6.
which contributed so significantly towards settlement.' Musharraf.convergences. 'Maybe a realisation has set in. Musharraf attributed the peace bid between the lifelong rivals to a globalisation-driven need for peace. National. said he anticipated an extremist backlash to the peace bid with India. Answering a question about the potential of SAARC region.. who blamed two recent assassination attempts against him on militants angered at his moderate policies. to his statesmanship. for coming to this joint statement. No extremism will be allowed here in Pakistan.' he said. that the way forward is peace.' Musharraf repeatedly refused to be drawn out on contentious issues.NO NAME 1 Mir Baz Khan L.Naik 4 NLI 2 Naeem Ullah Baib Sepoy 4 NLI 3 Manzoor Hussain Sepoy 5 NLI 4 Ejaz Ur Rehman Sepoy 4 NLI 5 Zulfiqar Ali Sepoy 4 NLI 6 Muhammmad Moor Naik 6 NLI 7 Iqbal Hussain Sepoy 7 NLI 8 Muhammad Ibrahim Haveldar7 NLI 9 Sajjad Hussain LNaik 7 NLI 10 Ali Madad L Naik 7 NLI 1 1 Amanullah Sepoy 7 NLI 12 Aslam Khan Sepoy 10 NLI 13 AliHyder CK 10 NLI 14 Karim Khan Sepoy 12 NLI 15 Javeed Iqbal Sepoy 12 NLI 16 FazilALI Haveldar 12 NLI 17 Iskander LNaik 12 NLI 18 Karim Khan Sepoy 12 NLI 19 HayatKhan Sepoy 13 NLI 20 Joher Ali Sepoy 3 NLI 21 Muhammad Abbas Sepoy 3 NLI 22 Ali Yar Khan LNaik 5 NLI 23 Daulat Khan Sepoy 6 NLI 24 Abdul Hassan Sepoy 8 NLI 25 Abdur Rehman Naib Subedar 8 NLI 26 Fazil Hussain Sepoy 8 NLI 27 Ghulam Abbas Naik 8 NLI 28 Muhammad Musa Sepoy 8 NLI 29 Muhammad Iqbal Sepoy 8 NLI 30 Akhtar Alam Sepoy 10 NLI 31 Bakhsh Karim Sepoy 11 NLI 32 Zulfiqar Ahmed Sepoy 11 NLI 33 Ghulam Haider Sepoy 12 NLI 34 Muhammad Bashir Sepoy 7 NLI 35 Muhammad Ayaz Sepoy 4 NLI Missing . Musharraf said. January 07. 2004 List of 236 NLI Kargil Martyrs DISTRICT GILGIT Name Rank Unit S. Pakistan and India can take many steps for progress and prosperity of the region. in the whole world.' he said.Whatever shade and colour and we'll take them to task. But the former commando vowed not to be deterred. insisting now was the time to find common ground. Musharraf heaped praise on Vajpayee. he said.' he said. 'We must be strong. ‘I would like to commend the flexibility of the negotiators on both sides.' he added. 'I would like to develop convergences.' Agencies add: During the Press conference. the time has come where if we want to proceed further we need to leave the old divergences so therefore I would not like to get involved in them at all. He said the peace bid was crucial for all of South Asia. complementarities. 'If we have sincerity and trust. we should not get upset and not allow this peace process to be derailed due to some small things. 'I would like to give total credit to his vision.' But. whose backwards development was tied to the India-Pakistan dispute.. There is an unrealized potential and we’re not utilizing its potential. 'I do believe there will be a fallout among extremists. we shall move forward. 'SAARC is the only region which I feel is not cooperating within itself for economic and commercial progress and the prosperity of its people. he said: 'Sky is the limit. 'We need to move strongly in the direction of peace as if there are no such people existing on both sides.
36 Muhammmad Izhar Sepoy 6 NLI Missing 37 Muhammad Jan Sepoy 6 NLI Missing 38 Abdullah Shah L Naik 6 NLI Missing 39 Ourang Zaib Alam Sepoy 6 NLI Missing List of Diamar Dist 1 Furqan Sepoy 5 NLI 2 Afzal Khan Sepoy 6 NLI 3 Ghulam Murtaza Sepoy 6 NLI 4 Ghulab Shah Sepoy 6 NLI 5 Barkat Ullah Sepoy 7 NLI 6 Abdullah Khan Sepoy 12 NLI 7 Sayeed Hussain Sepoy 12 NLI 8 All Noor Sepoy 12 NLI 9 Irfanullah Sepoy 12 NLI 10 Ghulab Wali Sepoy 12 NLI 1 1 Abid Shah Sepoy 13 NLI 12 Ghulam Muhammad Sepoy 13 NLI 13 Abdullah Khan Sepoy 5 NLI 14 Abdul Naqeeb Sepoy 5 NLI 15 Abdul Baqi Sepoy 5 NLI 16 Belal Naik 5 NLI 17 Aqeel Hussain Naib Subedar 5 NLI 18 Sami Ullah Sepoy 5 NLI 19 Abdul Ghafar Sepoy 8 NLI 20 Abdul Qayum Sepoy 8 NLI 21 Abdullah Khan Sepoy 8 NLI 22 Inayat Ali Sepoy 11 NLI 23 Barkat Ali Sepoy 11 NLI 24 Farman Ali Sepoy 11 NLI 25 Muhammad Riaz Sepoy 12 NLI 26 Shamsul Haque Sepoy 12 NLI 27 Hayat Khan Sepoy 12NLI 28 Hazrat Wall Khan Sepoy 12NLI 29 Muhammad Bashi LNaik 12NLI 30 Shah Sayar LNaik 12NLI 31 Ismail Shah Sepoy 12NLI 32 Muhammad Yousaf Sepoy 451 Baty 33 Absullah Khan LNaik 6NLI Missing 34 Bakhmal Khan Sepoy 11 NLI Missing 35 Ahmed Nazir Sepoy 12NLI Missing Here the List of Dist Ghezer 1 Muhammad Salim Khan Sepoy 4 NLI 2 Allah Dad Sepoy 4 NLI 3 Muhammad Issa Sepoy 4 NLI 4 Sher Wali Khan Sepoy 4 NLI 5 Hazarat Qabool Sepoy 4 NLI 6 Muzafar Khan Sepoy 5 NLI 7 Ain Shah Sepoy 5 NLI 8 Rahim Wali Khan Sepoy 5 NLI 9 Babar Khan Sepoy 5 NLI 10 Muhammad Javed Khan Haveldar 5 NLI 11 Muhammad Sher LNaik 5 NLI 12 Syed Baber Ali Shah Sepoy 5 NLI 13 Abdul Rauf Sepoy 6 NLI 14 MutabarShah LNaik 5 NLI 15 Said Ghulam Sepoy 6 NLI 16 Sher Dullah Khan N. Subedar 7 NLI 17 Bulbul Aman Shah L. Havedar 7 NLI 18 Bulbul Madad Shah Sepoy 7 NLI 19 Jan Khan Subedar 7 NLI 20 Niat Wali Khan LNaik 7 NLI .
Subedar 12NLI 67 Muhammad Zamir LNaik 5NLI Missing 68 Mussa Beg Sepoy 6NLI Missing 69 Nafas Shah Sepoy 6NLI Missing 70 Muhammad Hussain Shah Sepoy 6NLI Missing DISTRICT SKARDU 1 Muhammad Qasim Haveldar 4NLI 2 Muhammad Abdullah Sepoy 5NLI 3 Syed Mumtaz Hussain Sepoy 5 NLI 4 Jafar Hussain Sepoy 5NLI 5 Manzoor Ahmed Sepoy 5NLI 6 Muhammad Bashir LNaik 5NLI 7 Fazil L. Haveldar 8NLI 51 Shah Faraz LNaik 8NLI 52 Miran Shah Sepoy 8NLI 53 Sadar Jan LNaik 8NLI 54 AfsarKhan Sepoy 8NLI 55 Qurban Khan LNaik 11 NLI 56 DenarBaig Sepoy 11 NLI 57 Lalak Jan Haveldar 12 NLI 58 Muhammad Aman Sepoy 12 NLI 59 Muhammad Nadir Shah Sepoy 12 NLI 60 Muhammad Ayub Khan Sepoy 12 NLI 61 Nasir Khan Sepoy 12 NLI 62 Abdul GhafarKhan Sepoy 12 NLI 63 Afzal Nabi Sepoy 12 NLI 64 Ghulam Nabi Sepoy 12 NLI 65 UmarYar Khan Sepoy 12 NLI 66 Alim Zar N. Subedar 8NLI 50 Mir Baz L.21 Ali Shah Sepoy 8 NLI 22 Barkat Shah Sepoy 11 NLI 23 Mayoon Shah Sepoy 11 NLI 24 Tajum Khan LNaik 12 NLI 25 Khush Ahmed LNaik 12 NLI 26 Syed Masnovi Shah Lance Naik 12NLI 27 Shakoor Jan Sepoy 12NLI 28 Shakoor Khan Sepoy 12NLI 29 Ibrahim Sepoy 12NLI 30 Shah Rais Khan Sepoy 12NLI 31 Sikandar Shah Sepoy 12NLI 32 Khan Alam Sepoy 12NLI 33 AlamgirSami Sepoy 12NLI 34 Syed Alam Sepoy 12NLI 35 Mehmood Alam Sepoy 12NLI 36 AfiatShah Sepoy 12NLI 37 AmirAfzal Naik 12NLI 38 Ayoub Aman Sepoy 13NLI 39 Mir Sahib Khan Sepoy 5NLI 40 Muhammad Karim Haveldar 5NLI 41 Nadir Jan Sepoy 5NLI 42 Hajat Ali Sepoy 5NLI 43 Noor Wali Khan L Haveldar 5NLI 44 Sher Bahadur Haveldar 7NLI 45 Madad Khan Sepoy 7NLI 46 Abdul Hanan Sepoy 7NLI 47 SyedZaman Shah Sepoy 7NLI 48 Sher Qabool LNaik 8NLI 49 Haji Wali Khan N. Haveldar 6NLI 8 Muhammad Hassan Sepoy 6NLI 9 Syed Muhammad Shah Subedar 6NLI .
Naik 12 NLI 44 Niaz Ali LNaik 12 NLI 45 Muhammad Hajat LNaik 12 NLI 46 Ahmed Ali Haveldar 12 NLI 47 Muhammad Younus Sepoy 3 NLI 48 Ghulam Hussain LNaik 6 NLI Missing 49 Muhammad Hussain Sepoy 6 NLI Missing 50 SherAli Sepoy 6 NLI Missing 51 Taqi Sepoy 6 NLI Missing 52 Ghulam Rasool Naik 6 NLI Missing 53 Fada Ali Naik 11 NLI Missing DISTRICT GHANCHE 1 Ghulam Hassan Haveldar 6 NLI 2 Ismail N. Subedar 6 NLI 3 Abdul Rashid Haveldar 6 NLI 4 Farman Ali Sweeper 7 NLI 5 Muhammad Ali Sepoy 11 NLI 6 Abdul Qadir Naik 12 NLI 7 Ahmed Ali Sepoy 12 NLI 8 Muhammad Hussain Sepoy 12 NLI 9 Hassan Sepoy 7NLI 10 Muhammad Hussain Sepoy 7NLI 11 Ghulam Muhammad Haveldar 5NLI 12FidaAli Sepoy 8NLI 13 Ghulam Hyder Naik 12NLI 14 Muhammad Taqi Sepoy 3NLI 15 Muhammad Hassan Sepoy 5NLI Missing 16 Muhammad Yousaf L Naik 6NLI Missing .10 Muhammad Raza Naik 6NLI 11 Abdul Hussain Naik 7NLI 12 Suleman N. Subedar 7NLI 13 Habib Hussain Sepoy 7NLI 14FidaAli Sepoy 7NLI 15 Farman Ali Naik 7NLI 16 Muhammad Baqir Sepoy 7NLI 17 Nisar Hussain Sepoy 7NLI 18 Ali Musa Ck 7 NLI 19AkberAli Haveldar 7NLI 20 Mirza Ink L Naik 7NLI 21 Ali Muhammad Sepoy 6NLI 22 Rajab Ali Sepoy 10NLI 23 Ali Muhammad Sepoy 10NLI 24 Ghulam Muhammad Sepoy 11 NLI 25 Ghulam Sepoy 11 NLI 26 Sikandar Sepoy 11 NLI 27 Shums ud Din Sepoy 12NLI 28 Muhammad All Sepoy 12NLI 29 Muhammad Jawad Sepoy 12NLI 30 Abuzar Hussain Sepoy 13NLI 31 Syed Hussain Shah Haveldar 5NLI 32 Muhammad Khan Ck 5NLI 33 Ehsan Hav Haveldar 7NLI 34 Musa Ali Sepoy 7NLI 35 Muhammad Hussain Sepoy 8NLI 36 Muhammad Kazim Sepoy 8NLI 37 Hassan Khan Sepoy 8NLI 38 Mussa Haveldar 8NLI 39 Muhammad Raza Naik 8NLI 40 Muhammad Issa Sepoy 8NLI 41 Hassan Naik 11 NLI 42 Hassan LNaik 11 NLI 43 Ghulam Mehdi L.
17 Ghulam Hussain Sepoy 6NLI Missing 1 8 Ahmed Ali Sepoy 6NLI Missing AZAD KASHMIR/OTHERPARTS 1 Muhammad Yaseen Sepoy 3 NLI 2 Muhammad Khaqan N Subedar 5NLI 3 Aftab Hussain Sepoy 5NLI 4 Dilawar Naik 6NLI 5 Malik Ashraf Sepoy 6NLI 6 Ghulam Muhammad Sepoy 6 NLI 7 Muhammad llyas Sepoy 7NLI 8 Ghulam Mustafa Sepoy 7NLI 9 Mir Ali Khan Sepoy 7NLI 10 Mushtaq Ahmed Sepoy 8NLI 11 Abdul Hamid Sepoy 10NLI 12SherGhazi Sepoy 11 NLI 13lshfaq Akhter Sepoy 11 NLI 14 Abdul Ghafoor Sepoy 12 NLI 15MekhtabarKhan Sepoy 13 NLI 16 Muhammad Bashir Sepoy 7 NLI 17 Sher Zaman LNaik 9 NLI 18 Abubakar Siddique Sepoy 6 NLI Missing 19 F Muhammad Sepoy 12 NLI Missing Note: . <img src="http://visit.webhosting.This list is provided by Mr.The End.com/visit.yahoo.geovisit(). Farman Ali of Daily Dawn News Paper.gif?us1219861924" alt="setstats" border="0" width="1" height="1"> Share .