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AS RATIONAL BEINGS, WE MUST PROMOTE THE ENDS OF OTHERS Barbara Herman 2 [Prof.

of Philosophy and Law, UCLA] Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons Ethics, Vol. 94, No. 4 Jul., 1984, p. 597 We are to take the ends of others as our ends, to further them as we can (G 430). We are to take the happiness of others as an obligatory end (DV 47). It would then seem that we may limit our helping activity only when it would put us in the position of needing help ourselves, or when helping would prevent our doing something else we had a duty to do, or when we disapprove of the pursuits we are to lend a hand in promoting (DV 47, 122). Otherwise, wherever we can help we must.
There are passages in the Groundwork and in the Doctrine of Virtue that suggest this stronger version of a duty of beneficence.

Because we are rational beings, we can imagine ourselves outside of our own bodies, and do that which is normatively good without respect to our own personal beliefs. We must therefore understand that without regard to the self, we are forced to help others.
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE CREATES AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED

Pablo Gilabert [Concordia University] Kant and the Claims of the Poor Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXI No. 2, September 2010 you ought to act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law (G 4:421). FUL introduces a test of universalizability to be used when assessing, impartially, the moral correctness of an agents maxim of action (see KpV 5:6771; MS 6:2256). We should only act on maxims that we can conceive and will without contradiction to become universally available to all. 7 If we cannot conceive our maxim to be universally available or we cannot will that it be so, then we are morally demanded not to follow it. Positive duties of assistance to others in need result, according to Kant, from the fact that we cannot will a maxim of never helping others in need to become universally available. Even though a world of universal non-assistance is a possible one (we can conceive it), it would not be one we could rationally will to live in. As imperfect and not omnipotent creatures, we are bound to need help from others, and can therefore not want to live in a world where no one would have an obligation to provide that help to us (G 4:423; see also MS 6:393, 451, 453). Kants discussion of duties of assistance in relation to FUL is very brief, but visits the first and third features of basic positive duties: their being focused on basic needs and their being symmetrical, mutual requirements on all persons toward each other.
The first formulation of the categorical imperative is the Formula of the Universal Law (FUL), according to which

We therefore have a maxim to NOT be non-beneficenciable, and the double negative turns out to a maxim to assist people in need.
BECAUSE WE REQUIRE OTHERS TO ACHIEVE OUR OWN ENDS WE MUST ACCEPT A DUTY OF BENEFICENCE Barbara Herman 4 [Prof. of Philosophy and Law, UCLA] Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons Ethics, Vol. 94, No. 4 Jul., 1984, p. 587 If we are asked to imagine a life independent of things (objects) to be used as means, we cannot do so, for our existence depends on them straightforwardly. The adequacy of our skills to our needs is a contingent state of affairs. The very bounty of nature and ease of life that might make us feel we will never have to place new demands on ourselves are not of our making or within our control. Thus it would not be rational to "freeze" our skills if we could not also control our circumstances.'6 This is parallel to the idea that I mean to capture in

unless one could guarantee in advance that one will not require the help of others as means to ends one could not forgo, it would not be rational to will universal nonbeneficence. It is a fact of our nature as rational beings that we cannot guarantee that we shall always be capable of realizing our ends unaided, as it is a fact of our nature that we need things and skills to pursue our ends. If what we lack is some thing, we cannot call on that object to serve our need; nor can we obtain new skills and abilities at will. But we can call on the skills and resources of others to supplement our own. The willing of a world of nonbeneficence thus conflicts with the practical consequences of the conditions of human rationality: the natural limitations of our powers as agents. This does not involve questions of risk and so of prudence. The natural limits of our powers as agents set the conditions of rational willing within which prudential calculations are made. It is because these limits are not transcended by good fortune that considerations of risk and likelihood are not relevant.'7 Because we are dependent rational beings with true needs, we are constrained to act in certain ways (toward ourselves and toward others). Thus the argument to defeat the maxim of nonbeneficence goes through: the world of universal nonbeneficence is not a world that it is rational for any human agent to choose. And since differences among persons with regard to their neediness, strength, et cetera do not affect the argument, the duty of beneficence that emerges is of the same degree or stringency for all persons.
saying that,

So long as we cannot forsee our entire future, we must assume that one day we will be in need. If this maxim exists, then others will help us in our time of need. Also, we cannot rationally will an omission be universal. The world that results just isnt desirable.