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SINCO v LONGA 51 Phil 507 STREET; 1928
INA FACTS - Hacienda Rosario was owned by Escolastico Sinco, who was married to Saturnina Lopez. They had 3 children, Sergio, Maria Paz, and Coloma. Coloma had 3 children of her own, Vicente, Pilar, and Desemparados. Coloma’s children are the plaintiffs in this case. - When Escolastico died, his estate was indebted for P14k. In order to pay for this, Saturnina and their children leased the hacienda for 7 years to Longa & his sister-in-law (Longa). The lease agreement was such that the lessees would assume the indebtedness and the rentals would be applied to the payment of the estate’s debts. The lease was extended for 2 years. - Coloma predeceased Saturnina. When Saturnina died, she left a will acknowledging the encumbrance of the hacienda. Sergio and Maria Paz tried to question the right of Coloma’s children (plaintiffs) to inherit, but the opposition was abandoned (kasi medyo obvious diba). - After Saturnina’s death, Sergio was hardpressed for money to sustain his huge family, so he offered to sell his 1/3 undivided share in the hacienda to Longa. Longa wanted to buy the whole property because he was trying to borrow money from the Tabacalera Company to pay the purchase price of the hacienda and the company wasn’t secure in having a 1/3 undivided share as security for the loan. Maria Paz got on board. They sold their undivided shares to Longa. So what was left to sell was the share of Coloma’s children, who at that time were all minors under the guardianship of Emilio Tevez, which couldn’t be sold without court approval. - Before the approval of the court to sell, uncle and auntie executed a document, guaranteeing to Longa that (1) they will not take back their 2/3, regardless of the decision of the court; and (2) they will not oppose the sale of the children’s share, once approved by the court. - The court approved the sale. And so the children’s share was sold to Longa. The children brought a case, questioning the regularity of the sale of their property. ISSUE

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WON the sale of the property of the minors was attended with fraud (of Longa). HELD NO. - In passing upon controversies of this character experience teaches the danger of accepting lightly charges of fraud made many years after the transaction in question was accomplished, when death may have sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes effected by time may have given a totally different color to the cause of controversy. In the case before us the guardian, Emilio Tevez, is dead. The same is true of Trinidad Diago, mother of the defendant Agueda Longa; while Agapito Longa is now living in Spain. It will be borne in mind also that, in so far as oral proof is concerned, the charge of fraud rests principally of the testimony of a single witness who, if fraud was committed, was a participant therein and who naturally would now be anxious so far as practicable, to put the blame on others. In this connection it is well to bear in mind the following impressive language of Mr. Justice Story: xxx But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as it thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to verify the nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may be incumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is that the material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol agreements the most that we can hope is to arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the legal presumption is the other way; and as to the dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable

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doubt. (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U. S.], 481, 498.) - The attorneys for the appellees criticize the order of the court of November 16, 1910, authorizing the sale of the share of the minors in the hacienda as irregular and beyond the jurisdiction of the court. We are unable to concur in this view. The petition presented by the guardian stated a case, we think, for a sale of a portion of the guardianship estate for reinvestment, as contemplated in section 569 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the petition it was clearly set forth that the income of the children's property was insufficient property to maintain and educate them and that it was for their benefit that their share should be sold. It was also therein stated that the property was encumbered. Admitting that these statements of the petition were untrue the jurisdiction of the court to authorize the sale was not thereby affected, because the jurisdiction of the court rests on the averments of the petition and not upon the truth of those averments. The suggestion that the order was irregular and beyond the jurisdiction of the court because publication was not made over the whole period required by law losses its force in view of the fact that the next of kin of the minors are stated in the order to have personally appeared in court. * The court here said that the minors here were really in a dangerous position since no one intervened in the sale who was really looking out for the minors’ interests. Uncle and Auntie were protecting theirs. Even the guardian was after the cash that would be realized from the sale to apply to his own uses, instead of reinvesting it. Especially considering that the minors were not in dire need of the proceeds as was reflected in the petition for the authorization to sell. They had sufficient properties aside from the 1/3 share in the hacienda to support them (as evidenced by the fact that they got by without even using the proceeds kasi nga kinuha ni Tevez). Tsk tsk tsk.

MARGATE V RABACAL 7 SCRA 894 PAREDES; April 30, 1963 APPLE
FACTS -This is an application for the registration of a residential land, with a house, containing an area

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of 465 square meters, situated in Iriga, Camarines Sur, by Jose Margate, who claims to have purchased the property from Julia Rabacal for P4,000.00. -Rabacal and her minor children opposed the application, on the ground that the property was under guardianship proceedings when sold; that the sale was not authorized by the court; that the purchase price of P4,000.00 was not fully paid, as there was a remaining balance of P500.00 and that the market price of the lot and house was P10,000.00. -After due hearing, the registration court confirmed the title of the applicant, and ordered that the same be registered in the name of Margate -Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified the case to SC stating that the issues involved are purely legal in character. **(facts as found by trial court) -the parcel of land and house, was owned by Dr. Julio Berina, who died on October 15, 1945, survived by his widow, Julia Rabacal, and his minor children, the oppositors herein. -Rabacal was appointed guardian of her minor children and letters of guardianship was issued in her favor. She filed a petition alleging that it was necessary to sell parcel 4 of the inventory, in order to defray the expenses in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 919 and for the support and education of the wards. This petition was approved by the court, authorizing the guardian to sell the residential lot and its improvements. -Rabacal offered to sell to Margate the residential lot in question, for P5,000.00. After negotiations, the parties agreed on the selling price of P4,000.00. After the agreement, Rabacal began getting money from Margate, such that when Rabacal secured the authority to sell from the court, she had already obtained from Margate the sum of P500.00, and after having secured the order of authority to sell, Rabacal showed to Margate a copy of the order. On May 27, 1948, a deed of sale was executed by Julia Rabacal, acknowledged before a Notary Public, selling the land in question to Margate for P4,000.00, on which date Margate paid the balance of P3,500.00 to Rabacal. -Notwithstanding the fact that Rabacal had sold parcel 4 of the inventory, and executed a deed of sale on May 27, 1948, Rabacal, in the guardianship proceedings, asserted that despite her efforts, she was unable to

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find a buyer for said parcel of land, leading the court to cancel the granted authority to sell ISSUE WON the sale of the land to Margate was valid HELD Yes. -Appellants argue that the deed of sale executed by Rabacal had no binding effect because the authority to sell was cancelled and the sale was not approved by the guardianship Court. -the cancellation of the authority to sell did not, and could not, affect, the rights of the buyer, because at the time that the order cancelling the authority to sell was entered, the guardian, Julia Rabacal, had already acted in accordance with authority, and sold the land to Jose F. Margate. -The authority of the Court had already been exhausted, after it was fulfilled by the guardian, and there was nothing to cancel. -Moreover, the cancellation of the order to sell was entered by the Court due to the deception of the guardian. If the court had been informed of the sale, the court would certainly not have revoked the authority. -Moreover, the revocation was entered without notice to the purchaser Jose F. Margate -With respect to the lack of approval of the sale by the court, the law merely requires that the guardian should be authorized, and that the authority to sell did not impose the condition that the deed of sale executed by the guardian should be approved by the Court. The approval of the sale by the court, under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, would then be merely pro-forma, since the appellants were not able to show any reason why the guardianship would have refused to approve the sale which was already a fait accompli and within the authority given by said court. -Being the petitioners-vendors, appellants cannot validly attack the proceedings had in the sale, on certain formal technicalities, considering the fact that they were the very persons who requested, obliged and prayed the court in the guardianship proceedings to approve the said sale, and that they had derived the utmost advantage and benefit out of the proceeds thereof.

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ROMUALDEZ; November 21, 1923 ATHE
NATURE Appeal from the judgments of the CFI of Manila FACTS - Galo Lichauco, Geronimo Jose as guardian of the spendthrift Zacarias Lichauco, and Amparo N. Jose as guardian of the minors Luis and Julita Lichauco entered into a contract of lease of land with Tan Pho in his capacity “as general atorneyin-fact of Tan-U, widow of the late Chua Piengco, and administrator of all of the property of the latter’s heirs.” The contract of lease provided for the erection of a building of strong materials for the period of twenty years, from the date of the execution of the contract, for the price or rent of P1,560 monthly. Upon the termination of the period of the lease, all the improvements or buildings constructed on the leased land shall become the property of the owners of the land, without the lessee being entitled to payment or compensation of any kind, either by reason of said building or by the improvements on the land. - At the time the contract of case was executed, the owners of this and were: Galo Lichauco, of one-third pro indiviso; Zacarias Lichauco, at that time incapacitated, of another one-third pro indiviso; and Luis Lichauco then a minor and Julita Lichauco also at that time and still a minor coowners of the remaining one-third part pro indiviso. - Faustino Lichauco, the new guardian ad litem both of the minors Luis and Julita Lichauco, and of the incapacitated Zacarias Lichauco, filed a case against the lessee Tan Pho, his principal Tan U (alias Tan O), the children of the latter and against Galo Lichauco one of the lessors. In said case, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment finding, among other things, that said contract of lease is valid. From this judgment plaintiff appealed. Faustino assailed the contract as void raising the following issues: ISSUES 1. WON the contract of lease is valid a. WON the guardians of the incapacitated person and of the minors could not execute it b. WON the contract was not, and could not have been authorized by the court;

LICHAUCO VS TAN PHO

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c. WON Tan Pho had no power to enter into it. 2. WON the registration of the said lease in the registry is final and conclusive. HELD 1. NO. That the contract of lease is void as regards the plaintiffs, and the effects of this declaration of partial nullity retroacts to September 17, 1920, the date on which the complaint for nullity was presented. a. YES. Article 1548 of the Civil Code provides that “No lease for a term of more than six years shall be made by the husband with respect to the property of his wife, by the father with respect to that of his children, by the guardian with respect to that of his ward, or by a manager in default of special power with respect to the property entrusted to him for management.” Reasoning: - The lease was for a period greater than six years and the respective guardians of the incapacitated Zacarias Lichauco and the minors Luis and Julita Lichauco lacked the special power required by this legal provision. b. Although the lease in question could be approved by the court, nevertheless, such approval was neither obtained in due time, nor subsequently. Reasoning - There was an allegation that Amparo Nable verbally requested the presiding Judge Crossfield to execute said lease. Judge Crossfield also executed an affidavit stating that he approved of the lease, in the presence and with the complete approval of all the parties interested and he ordered that clerk to prepare orders for entry in the record. However, F. Canillas, the deputy clerk denied that Crossfield ordered him to prepare orders for entry in the record nor did the judge give him any orders or instructions with reference to the approval of the lease. Thus, the alleged approval signed by Judge Crossfield was not attached to the court records of the case, nor did ever form part thereof. Consequently, the approbatory nunc pro tunc1 order impliedly
1 The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a former time which was not then carried into the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon

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entered in the judgment appealed from, is invalid on account of having been entered without a sufficient legal basis therefor. c. NO. If Tan Pho was the administrator of the estate of Chua Piengco, then he had the power to manage to manage the property of said estate. The employment of funds of the latter for the construction of a building on leased land, for the purpose of obtaining rents from such building is an investment of capital which may be considered as included in the powers of an administrator of a decedent's estate. We cannot force ourselves to believe that, in view of the facts of the case, Tan Pho took part in this lease as direct attorney-in-fact of the heirs of the deceased Chua Piengco. If at the time, the estate had not been partitioned, as it appears in the case, such heirs had as yet no hereditary property to dispose of, nor to answer for their acts, seeing that the estate was legally in the hands of the administrator. 2. NO.

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DISPOSITION: the judgment appealed from is reversed and it is hereby declared and ordered: 1. That the contract of lease here in question executed by Galo Lichauco and the respective guardians of Zacarias Lichauco and the minors Luis and Julita Lichauco on the one side, and by Tan Pho on the other, is void as regards the plaintiffs, and the effects of this declaration of partial nullity retroacts to September 17, 1920, the date on which the complaint for nullity was presented. 2. Without prejudice to any contract or contracts which the interested parties herein may desire to execute in accordance with the law and in harmony with this opinion, the plaintiffs, from the time Tan Pho is notified of this decision, shall be entitled to appropriate two-thirds part pro indiviso of the buildings and improvements constructed by the party represented by said Tan Pho on the property in question, upon payment of the proper indemnity, according to the provisions of articles 361, 453, and 454 of the Civil Code in force or said plaintiffs shall have the right to compel the party represented by the defendant Tan Pho to pay to the plaintiffs the value of twothirds pro indiviso of the land. 3. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to demand and to receive from the party represented by the defendant Tan Pho a rental for the occupation of two-thirds part pro indiviso of the land, from September 17, 1920, until said two-thirds part pro indiviso of the buildings and improvements constructed by said Tan Pho becomes the property of the plaintiffs, as aforesaid, or until the two-thirds part pro indiviso of the land belonging to the plaintiffs becomes the property of the party represented by said Tan Pho in the manner specified in the preceding paragraph. The amount of this rental mentioned in this paragraph shall be fixed by the interested parties, reserving them the right to resort to the courts for its determination, in case they cannot reach an agreement; provide that the rents, which by virtue of the lease in question the plaintiffs may have received or may receive from Tan Pho from September 17, 1920, shall be applied upon said rent to be agreed upon by the interested parties or judicially fixed. 4. The registrar of deeds of Manila is hereby ordered to amend the certificate of title to the land in question issued under decree No. 17729 in registration proceeding No. 9667, as also the corresponding books of registry, as well as the

the record evidence of judicial action which has been actually taken. It may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc tunc has no power to construe what the judgment means, but only to enter of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which had not been entered of record as rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not furnish the basis for such an entry. (15 R. C. L., pp. 622-623.) The phrase nunc pro tunc signifies "now for then," or that a thing is done now that shall have the same legal force and effect as if one at the time it ought to have been done. A court may order an act done nunc pro tunc when it, or some one of its immediate ministerial officers, has done some act which for some reason has not been entered of record or otherwise noted at the time the order or judgment was made or should have been made to appear on the papers or proceedings by the ministerial officer. (Secou vs. Leroux, 1 N. M., 383, 389.)

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copies of said certificate of title, to the effect that said lease therein registered, as far as the plaintiffs are concerned, has been extinguished and rendered void and of no effect by virtue of this decision.

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capacity would be heard in the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 19, 1918. [a] In reply to this, a cablegram was received from Barcelona on October 14, 1918, signed by the Consul General of the United States in that city, advising that Inchausti had been duly notified according to instructions. [b] The trial judge held that notice to the ward had been given as required by law, and he proceeded, on the appointed day, to dispose of the petition upon its merits in accordance with the proof then submitted. - The notification of the ward required in section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not intended as a personal service of process in the sense necessary to give the court jurisdiction over the ward. It is, therefore, of no moment that the person to be notified was living in a foreign country and thus beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila court. Nor is the manner in which the court procured service of the notice of any importance. It is sufficient that the notice was given. - Rationale of notification upon petition by friend: Notification to the ward � where the petition to rehabilitate him is presented by a friend � is required merely as an assurance that the individual chiefly concerned shall have cognizance of what is being done. It at least gives him an opportunity to advise the court in case action taken by the mover of the petition was officious or unauthorized. That the messages were sent and received by cable, as above stated, affords sufficient evidence, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that notification was duly effected, as reported in the return of the Consul General. 2 YES - The violent access of dementia which manifested itself prior to the original appointment of the guardian passed off after Inchausti was taken away from Manila in 1915 and the same extreme manifestations of derangement have not reappeared. Furthermore, the evidence shows that at the time the petition for his rehabilitation was heard, the ward was in normal mental state

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and had been in this condition for a period sufficiently long to justify the belief that he is permanently restored - The opposition to the termination of the guardianship seems to be based chiefly on the fear, entertained by his mother, that Inchausti, if placed in control of the large property to which he is heir, will prove to be a spendthrift. Even though this fear should be well-founded, it affords no reason for maintaining a guardianship which had its origin in his mental incapacity. Anyway, proper proceedings can be instituted to protect him from wasteful proclivities in the event the derangement reoccurs. But present mental capacity being proved, he is entitled to be discharged from tutelage.

IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF INCHAUSTI, V MANUEL SOLER G.R. No. L-15119 STREET, J.; January 19, 1920
TERRY FACTS - On January 18, 1915, CFI Manila ordered the appointment of Maria Consuelo Rico, mother of Inchausti, as guardian of the person and property of her son Jose R. de Inchausti, as he had become demented and incapable of properly caring for himself and estate, after which he was sent to Barcelona, Spain, where he has continued to reside. - On August 30, 1915, Manuel Soler, Inchausti’s friend, petitioned the court to rehabilitate him and end the guardianship. - This was opposed by the guardian, on the grounds (1) that the ward had not been given sufficient notice of the hearing and (2) that it had not been satisfactorily shown that he is now capable of taking care of himself and property. - Upon hearing the petition the trial judge overruled both of these objections and adjudged the ward, Jose R. de Inchausti, to be of sound mind, notwithstanding an ordering to the guardian for an accounting of the estate of Inchausti ISSUES 1 WON the proper procedure of due notice to ward was followed 2 WON there was a sufficient showing that Inchausti was already capable of taking care of himself HELD YES - The clerk, by order of the court, sent cablegram to the United States Consult Barcelona, requesting him to notify Jose R. Inchausti that the petition for his restoration

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA LUIS & EDIPOLA SANTOS V REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR L-22523 ANGELES; September 29, 1967 MAIA
NATURE Appeal from decision of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court dismissing the petition for adoption of Edwin Villa FACTS - Santos spouses filed the petition on January 8, 1963, to adopt minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, and brother of petitioner-wife Edipola. - the spouses are both 32 years old, Filipinos, residing in Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. - Edwin is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza (Edwin is the younger brother of Edipola). Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with various business interests. His income is

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approximately P600/month. His wife Edipola, is a nurse, with an average monthly earning of P300 - Edwin was born on May 22, 1958 and was a sickly child since birth. Due to the child's impairing health his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter, and as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the child, a deep and profound love for each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners. - trial court dismissed the petition, saying that “the adoption will result in an incongruous situation where the minor Edwin Villa, a legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of the court, that incongruity not neutralized by other circumstances absent herein, should prevent the adoption.” ISSUE WON an elder sister may adopt a younger brother HELD YES Ratio There is no provision in the law that relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited from adopting one another. Reasoning The only objection raised is the alleged “incongruity” that will result in the relation of the adopter and the adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted who is the brother of the adopter, will also be her son by adoption. The theory is, therefore, that adoption among people who are related by nature should not be allowed, in order that dual relationship should not result - It cannot be stated as a general proposition that the adoption of a blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of the US, no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes authorizing adoption, although laws of other jurisdiction expressly provide that adoption may not take place within persons within a certain degree of relationship (1 Am. Jur. 628-629). Courts in some states hold that in the absence of express statutory restriction, a blood relationship between the parties is not a legal impediment to the adoption of one by the other, and there may

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be a valid adoption where the relation of parent and child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d 869). Principles vary according to the particular adoption statute of a state under which any given case is considered. It would seem that in those states originally influenced by the civil law countries where adoption originated, the rules are liberally construed, while in other states where common law principles predominate, adoption laws are more strictly applied because they are regarded to be in derogation of the common law. - Art.335, CC enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that adopters herein are not among those prohibited from adopting. Art.339 names those who cannot be adopted, and the adoptee here is not one of those excluded by the law. Art. 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a stepchild by the stepfather or stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear and educate them - wrt objection that the adoption here will result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the

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legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. So even considered in relation to the rules on succession which are in pari materia, the adoption under consideration would not be objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting relationship between the adopter and the adopted. Similar dual relationships also result under our law on marriage when persons who are already related, by blood or by affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is not within the degrees prohibited by law, such marriages are allowed notwithstanding the resulting dual relationship. And as there is no provision in the law that expressly prohibits adoption among relatives, they ought not to be prevented. Disposition Decision reversed. Adoption granted

REPUBLIC VS HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO & SPOUSES CLAVE 233 SCRA 9 Puno ; June 8, 1994 MEL
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of RTC Zambales (Iba) in Special Proceeding entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named Solomon Joseph Alcala” FACTS - In a verified petition filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. The petition was set for hearing. - The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are physically,

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mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. - Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. - Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption. - Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge rendered a decision granting the petition for adoption - Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed ISSUE WON petitioner’s argument is correct (won Alvin and Evelyn are qualified to adopt under Phil law) HELD YES Ratio Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. - There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse

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jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988. - Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. - Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. 3 - This was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. DISPOSITION: Petition granted

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verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. - At the hearing spouses Miller adduced evidence showing that: 1. Claude A. Miller, 38 years old and Jumrus S. Miller, 40 years of age, both American citizens, are husband and wife, having been married on June 21, 1982. 2. They were childless and "do not expect to have sibling out of their union on account of a medical problem of the wife." 3. Claude A. Miller was a member of the US Air Force assigned at Clark Air Base. The family maintains their residence at Angeles City, since 1985. 4. The minor Michael has been in the custody of respondents since the first week of August 1987. Poverty and deep concern for the future of their son prompted the natural parents who have no visible means of livelihood to have their child adopted by respondents. They executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption by respondents. 5. DSWD recommended approval of the petition. - RTC rendered decision granting the petition for adoption petitioners. - Solicitor General interposed an appeal ISSUE WON aliens may adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family Code, effective on August 3, 1988 when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt. HELD YES. The SC has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. - As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it

REPUBLIC VS MILLER
G.R. No. 125932 PARDO; April 21, 1999 EVA NATURE CA certified the case to the SC because the petition raised only questions of law. SC treated the appeal as one via certiorari from a decision of the RTC. FACTS - July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the RTC Angeles City a

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until it fully disposes of the case. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effective of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code. - Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objective of the law. DISPOSITIVE Affirmed.

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abandoned their children, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.” (Simplicio was guardian ad litem) - Meaning of abandonment. In adoption proceedings imports “any conduct on the part of the parent which evidences a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children.” - The Court further said that adoption proceedings being proceedings in rem, constructive notice, such as the publication duly made in a newspaper of general circulation, is enough where the residence of the parents is unknown. Notice is not required in adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent. 2 NO, adoption cannot be attacked collaterally. - On the MR, the Court said that the adoption cannot be attacked collaterally, and that the action appealed with the CA was not the adoption decree but the settlement, the adoption cannot be attacked collaterally there being no evidence to be re-examined in the present action. The court also declared that leaving children in the custody of others constitutes abandonment especially when permanently and indefinitely.

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citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. 2. Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own. 3. Belen based his decree primarily on the “findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor.” 4. On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. Judge says the DSWD findings and recommendations are contained in the “Adoptive Home Study Report” and “Child Study Report” prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Vedaña. 5. However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, it turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a “Home and Child Study Report” in the case. 6. FURTHER, there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor’s adoption. 7. ARTICLE 33, PD 603 states: Petitions for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive parents. Circular No. 12 directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases: (1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed; (2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree… The Staff Assistant V (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. 8. It was also alleged by the DSWD that respondent Elma P. Vedaña had asked for an undisclosed amount of money from the adopting

SANTOS VS. ARANZANSO 16 SCRA 345 BENGZON; February 28, 1966 JP
FACTS - Eight years after the order of adoption of then minors Paulina and Aurora Santos, one of their adoptive parents, Juliana Reyes, died leaving substantial properties. - In the settlement of her estate, her cousins, respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Mendoza intervened alleging the invalidity of the marriage of Juliana Reyes to Simplicio Santos, and the adoption decree of the two minors. ISSUES 1 WON adoption is valid adoption 2 WON adoption can be attacked collaterally HELD 1 YES. - After holding that it matters not whether the marriage was valid or invalid, the deceased can still adopt, the Court addressed the allegations of the respondents upholding the adoption decree. - Parental Consent. “Consent of parents not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned. Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have

DSWD v. BELEN 275 SCRA 645 (1997) DIANNA
FACTS - Administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social Welfare Officer IV of the DSWS Field Office in La Union. - Respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen is charged with rendering an erroneous decree of adoption in violation of Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and the corresponding SC Circular No. 12. - Respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is charged with disregarding the provisions of the same Circular No. 12. 1. Spouses Desiderio Bernardo-Soriano, both Soriano and Aurora naturalized American

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parents in order to expedite the adoption case with the DSWD. 9. Respondent judge, in compliance therewith, claimed that he directed respondent Vedaña to conduct the home and case study, and thereafter submit the required reports thereon. Belen contends that, except only for direct coordination with the DSWD in the preparation of said reports, no approval from the DSWD is necessary for the home and case study reports and it need not be furnished therewith. 10. The OCA recommended that respondent judge be administratively punished for violating Circular No. 12 and Article 33 of PD 603. 11. Vedaña meanwhile, pointed out that there never was any directive from respondent judge for her to coordinate with the DSWD concerning the adoption in question. She was only ordered to conduct the case study and submit her report thereon to the court at least one week before the initial hearing of the case, as was also the practice in the other RTCs. ISSUE WON approval from the DSWD is necessary for the home and case study reports (and whether a judge may decide based on such report). HELD NO. - Belen definitely rendered the adoption decree in derogation of the provisions of Article 33 and Circular No. 12 and Vedaña should have coordinated with the DSWD in connection with the preparation of the home and case study reports. Ratio 1. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of the Special Proceeding so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department. 2. DSWD has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. 3. Belen should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.

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4. Belen may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child. 5. As for Vedaña, she has compromised the prescribed process in the administration of justice in proceedings such as the one under consideration. 6. Belen acted in good faith however in presumably believing that it was standard procedure for the Social Welfare Officer II of a Regional Trial Court to do so in coordination with the DSWD. Also, there is no evidence whatsoever that respondent Vedaña sought to obtain any amount from the adopting parents.

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then pressed upon the witness to reveal the identity of said mother. The witness refused to divulge the same on the ground that there existed an attorney and client relationship between them. She had been instructed by her client not to reveal the latter's identity. She could not now violate such privileged communication. - The petition for adoption was dismissed. The principal reason given for the dismissal of the petition was that ". . . the consent given in this petition Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the express requirement of the law." - CFI: The contention that for her (Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the witness for the petitioners who gave the written consent to the adoption of the child in her capacity as loco parentis to said child) to reveal the identity of the mother would be violative of the client-attorney relationship existing between her and the mother cannot hold water, because in the first place, there was no such relationship existing between them in so far as this case is concerned and secondly, it is not only a question of revealing the identity of the mother but rather, of giving consent to the adoption by that alleged unwed mother. ISSUE WON the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in this case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person required by law to give such consent. HELD YES. - Art. 340 of the Civil Code. The written consent of the following to adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over; (2) The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted. - Rule 99, Sec. 3.Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not an insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian, or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home or society, or by such person; but if the

DUNCAN V CFI OF RIZAL 69 SCRA 298 February 10, 1976; ESGUERRA, J. LORA
FACTS - Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen are husband and wife, the former a British national residing in the Philippines for the last 17 years and the latter an American Citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines. - A child, only 3 days old was given to petitioners for them to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on baptized as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan with the aforementioned spouses appearing in the records of said baptism as the parents of said child - Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez received the infant from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her (the mother's) identity because she wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her future. The mother instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the maintenance and support of her child - In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners Atty. Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of the adoption petition, gave the written consent required by law - Learning from the testimony of witness Atty. Velasquez that the natural mother of the child sought to be adopted was still alive, the court

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child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required. - Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons particularly described by law may be considered here as legally capable of giving the required written consent. They are: 1. Under Art. 340 of the Civil Code: parent, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted 2. Rule 99.3 of the Rules of Court: each of the known living parents who has not abandoned such child. - The father's consent here is out of the question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized. - The natural and unwedded mother, from that date on to the time of the adoption proceedings in court which started in mid-year of said 1967, and up to the present, has not bothered to inquire into the condition of the child, much less to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. - In short, this parent is the antithesis of that described in the law as "known living parent who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child." - Said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child. Abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child. Applying this legal yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in this case can be declared, as she is hereby declared, as having abandoned her child with all legal consequences attached thereto. - Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown parent, there appears to be no more legal need to require the written consent to such parent of the child to the adoption. - Santos vs. Aranzanso: the parental consent required by the law in adoption proceedings refers to parents who have not abandoned their child. - Since there had been no showing that the identity of the natural mother was made known to the trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said mother seen fit to present herself before the court despite the public notice given to the proceedings as required by law, there clearly appears only one person who could be considered as the guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since there was no

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guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the guardian of said infant. - It was she who had actual physical custody of the infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant which otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate, like being thrown into some garbage heap as had often happened to some unwanted illegitimate babies. - Court stated that the least that it could do is to recognize and acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is to extend, as it hereby extends, to her the recognition that she was a de facto guardian exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child. - The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt application in many other legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. - The herein petitioners appear to be qualified to adopt the child. There is no showing that they suffer from any of the disqualifications under the law. Above all, they have the means to provide the child with the proper support, care, education and love that a growing child needs, even if they have previously adopted another child as theirs. - The fact that even before they have applied for legal custody and adoption of the infant they have already showered it with love and care and had it baptized, with them appearing in the records of the baptism as the parents of the child, speaks well of the genuine desire of petitioners to have the child as their very own. The child was born in May, 1967, and he will be at this time, 1976, about 9 years of age. In all the years, from the time he was turned over to the herein petitioners when he was only about a week old, (there is no showing that the said child was ever placed at any time in the care and custody of some other persons) he had been cared for and

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loved by the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen. He must have known no other parents than these persons. - To sustain the decision of the court below, Court will be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all other children who might be similarly situated. - Court considered it to be justifiable and more humane to formalize a factual relation, that of parents and son, existing between the petitioning spouses and the minor child baptized by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, than to sustain the hard, harsh and cruel interpretation of the law that was done by the respondent court and Judge. Disposition Decision annulled and the minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan declared the adopted child and the heir of petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen.

CANG V. COURT OF APPEALS [& SPS. CLAVANO] 296 SCRA 128; ROMERO; Sept 25, 1998 MARGE
FACTS: -Spouses Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano begot 3 children: Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband’s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. -Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then JDRC of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to “live separately and apart or from bed and board.” They further agreed that their children shall be entitled to a monthly support of P1,000, constituting constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the house and lot jointly owned by the parties. -Herbert Cang then for Nevada, USA where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie. The divorce decree was granted. Sole custody of the three minor children was granted to Anna Marie,

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reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to Herbert. -Thereafter, Herbert took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried. While in US, a portion of his income was remitted to the Phils for his children’s expenses and/or deposited in the bank in the name of his children. -Sept 25, 1987: Sps. Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano [brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie] filed Spec Proc No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before RTC Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-yr-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had “evaded his legal obligation to support” his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the US to attend to a family business, “leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;” and that her husband had “long forfeited his parental rights” over the children. -Upon learning of the petition for adoption, Herbert immediately returned to the Phils and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although the Sps Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children, he could not “in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.” -Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, Herbert moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the US thereby leaving custody of their children to Sps Clavano. -Jan 11, 1988: RTC Cebu City Br. 19 issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to Herbert. -March 27, 1990: RTC Cebu City Br. 14 issued the decree of adoption, citing as impelling reasons the ff: (1) the Cang children’s “close filial ties with the Clavano family; (2) the childless Clavano spouses had substantial assets and income; (3) the natural mother Anna Marie approved of the adoption;

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(4) the Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual direction; (5) the children manifested their desire to be adopted by the Clavanos. -RTC further ruled that Herbert’s opposition rested on “a very shaky foundation” because of its findings that: (1) Herbert is “morally unfit to be the father of his children” (2) Authenticity of joint deposit of around $10,000 could not be verified (3) Possibility of reconciliation w/ Anna Marie was “dim if not nil” (4) as US citizen, his attachment w/ Filipino children is an open question -RTC quoted with approval the evaluation/recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her Child Study Report, that the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children thereby dispensing with his consent to the adoption. -CA affirmed the decree of adoption, ruling that: (1) Consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their children or the withholding of the parent’s presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary affection. (2) Oppositor’s argument that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children is belied by the fact that he was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. His claim that he has maintained bank accounts in the children’s name is negated when we consider that such bank accounts were “withdraw-able by him alone.” -Herbert filed MFR but CA denied the same. ISSUE: WON the minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of their natural parent HELD: NO. Both RTC and CA failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of WON petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby

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making his consent to the adoption unnecessary. But here, there was no abandonment. [guys, sorry ang haba ng digest. ang dami kasing doctrines, eh.. ^_^] -Written consent of natural father is required by Art.31(2) of PD No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code2, and Art.188(2) of the Family Code3. -Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. As such, when Clavano spouses filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the PD 603, as amended by EO91. -During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on Aug 3, 1988, the Family Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity “insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” -Notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
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PD 603, Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by EO 91: “Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. - The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over; (2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving counselling and appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social Services and Development or from a duly licensed child-placement agency; (3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed child-placement agency under whose care and legal custody the child may be; (4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.” 3 Family Code. “Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over; (2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper govt instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and adopted children, 10 yrs of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4) The illegitimate children, 10yrs of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said parent and the latter’s spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.”

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Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99.3 of the RoC. GenRule: The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Exception: if the parent has abandoned the child OR if such parent is “insane or hopelessly intemperate” >In these cases, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption. >In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for adoption. Herbert’s consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father. This allegation vested the court with jurisdiction. -However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits. -In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon” means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. xxx The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of “putting under a ban.” The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.” Physical estrangement alone, without financial and

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moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. -In the case at bar, while admittedly, Herbert was physically absent as he was then in the US, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. Herbert also presented certifications of banks in the US showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. This is further evidenced by copies of checks sent by Herbert to the children from 1985 to 1989. -The courts below attached a high premium to the prospective adopters’ financial status but totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children. True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keith’s testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to. -The courts below emphasized respondents’ emotional attachment to the children. This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to their presence. Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones’ act of snuggling close to Ronald was not indicative of their emotional detachment from their father. The Clavano spouses, being the uncle and aunt of the children, could not but come to their succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick and Ronald spent for his hospital bills. -Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. It is enough that the natural parent is earning a decent living and is able to support his children according to his means. In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. The

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welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. -The record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare of the children was not exactly the “paramount consideration” that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption. The adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her children but is often out of the country leaving her children to the care of her relatives. When the family first discussed the adoption of the children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Marie’s brother Jose. However, because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the task upon Ronald (businessman) and Maria Clara (international flight stewardess) who however could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. -A close analysis of the testimonies of siblings Ronald, Anna Marie and Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away from their father, allegedly a “womanizer.” -Herbert described himself as single in status and denied being a womanizer and father to the sons of Wilma Soco. As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point. In any case, the actuality that Herbert carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that he was necessarily an unfit father. Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children. -Sps Clavano themselves explained why Herbert failed to abide by the agreement re: support of the children: he was an illegal alien in the US. As such, he could not have procured gainful employment. Counsel for Clavanos argue that the authority given to Anna Marie by the legal separation decree to enter into contracts was “all embracing” and included giving her sole consent to the adoption. SC: This conclusion is anchored on the wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into agreements leading to the adoption

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of the children. The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity, deprive Herbert of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. The law only confers on the innocent spouse the “exercise” of parental authority. -Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. -As such, in instant case, Herbert may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the spouses. -While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie back to Herbert. The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie’s MFR thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to Herbert, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them. -The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is WON Herbert had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this

A2010
case precisely because the finding of the courts below on the issue of Herbert’s abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation, tantamount to nonappreciation, of facts on record. [In other words, there was no abandonment ^_^] -As regards the divorce obtained in the US, this Court has ruled that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While Herbert is now an American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal effect. -Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest of a child who needs the love and care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry Adoption [approved 7 June 1995] and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of Filipino children [approved 25 February 1998]. -The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of recent laws4. Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the government and its officials are also duty bound to comply with its mandates5. Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic
4

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statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible. -Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was filed. Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them. Disposition Petition for review on certiorari granted. Questioned CA Decision and Resolution, as well as the RTC Cebu decision, set aside thereby denying the petition for adoption.

TAMARGO V CA 209 SCRA 518 FELICIANO; June 3, 1992 MONCH
FACTS - Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. -Petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses
Art. 9, par. 3. “States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests.” Art. 10, par. 2. “A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts with both parents. . .” Art. 14, par. 2. “States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.”

R.A. No. 8552. Domestic Adoption Act. Art. 1, Sec. 2. (a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards the full and harmonious development of his/her personality. (b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child. (c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s). 5 Convention on the Rights of the Child Art. 5. “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”

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Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents filed a complaint for damages against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. - A case for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was also filed against Adelberto. It was dismissed on the ground that he was exempted from criminal liability since he acted without discernment. - Prior to the incident, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted after the incident. - Spouses Bundoc claim that the Rapisuras are the indispensable parties since parental authority has already shifted to the latter upon the filing of the petition to adopt. Petitioner however contend that the Bundocs are the indispensable parties since Adelberto still lived with them, thus, parental authority has not yet shifted. ISSUE WON parental authority has shifted from the filing of the petition for adoption HELD NO Reasoning Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which reads as follows: Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied) - The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code: Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall: (2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent; xxx

A2010
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed. - Uthe Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule: Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis supplied) - Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage: Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied) - We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents. To hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. - Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows: Art. 35. Trial Custody. � No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied) - Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual

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custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

SAYSON V CA Cruz; GR 89224 23 January 1992 ICE
FACTS At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting it for themselves to the exclusion of all others. Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five childrenMauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno and Rafaela died. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died after them. His wife died 9 yrs. later. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful descendants. A different action was filed by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation. ISSUE WON Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted WON Doribel is a legitimate child using the Birth Cert as only basis

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HELD 1 YES. On two grounds argumentative inconsistency and timeliness. They argue that Delia and Edmundo could not be adopted because Doribel was born already prior to the adoption and such disqualifies the couple from adopting while they also argue that Doribel was born of another perso, Edita Abila. It is also untimely made. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. Assuming that the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth. When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded. Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified. A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue. The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven.

A2010
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail. 2 YES, Doribel is a legitimate child. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar. Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party. The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose . . .

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JOHNSTON V REPUBLIC 205 SCRA 1040 LABRADOR; April 30, 1963 REAN
FACTS - Petitioner Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana, 2 yrs and 10 mos. old, then under the custody of the Hospicio de San Jose, an orphanage situated in Manila. The petition shows that petitioner is 48 years old, married to Raymond Arthur Johnston, Filipino; that the couple are childless; that the consent of the mother Superior of the orphanage and the husband of Isabel was obtained. - After due notice and hearing petition was granted by the CFI of Rizal. Petitioner filed a motion, praying that the surname given to the minor be "Valdes Johnston", instead of "Valdes" only, but this motion was denied by the lower court in. Hence, this appeal. - Petitioner argues: [a] Since she is now using the surname of her husband (A370, par. 1 NCC), and bec. “Valdes Johnston “ is the surname she used in filing the petition in the present case, under which she is now known to all her relatives, friends and acquaintances, she had ceased to be known by her maiden surname, so CFI should have decreed that the minor she adopted should be allowed to bear the surname she is now using. [b] The use of surname "Valdes" by adopted child will create the impression that she is the illegitimate child of petitioner begotten before her marriage, a situation humiliating to both adopter and adopted. - SolGen: Although a married woman is permitted to add to her surname her husband's surname, the fact remains that petitioner’s surname is Valdes and not Johnston; that a married woman has a surname of her own to which may be added her husband's surname if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surname Valdes Johnston, much confusion would result because the public would be misled into believing that she was adopted by Isabel’s husband also, which is not true in this case. ISSUE WON CFI erred authorizing or prescribing the use of the surname Valdes by the adopted child

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HELD NO. - Art. 341, par. 4, NCC which entitles the adopted minor to the use of the adopter's surname, refers to the adopter's own surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage. Isabel's real surname is Valdes and not Johnston, and as she made the adoption singly w/o her husband’s concurrence, and not as a married woman, her name as adopter was her maiden name. The adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes' husband, to the adoption by her individually, did not have the effect of making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the use of Johnston's own surname. - Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, NCC), much confusion would indeed result, as correctly pointed out by the SolGen, if the minor child were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the adoption. - To allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would mislead the public into believing that she had also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband's consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption. Disposition: CFI’s order prescribing the use of the surname "Valdes" by the adopted minor Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana, is AFFIRMED.

A2010
both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion was a high school teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after 15 yrs of marriage. The couples showered their adopted children with parental love and reared them as their own children. -Upon reaching 22, Maximo, by then married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname. -On July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in favor of Maximo, TC decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted. On appeal to respondent CA, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic through the SolGen, TC decision was affirmed in full, hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES 1. WON the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition HELD 1. YES. Ratio The purpose of the law in allowing of change of name under Rule 103 is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his best interest. In granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available is required. Reasoning Art 364 to 380,CC provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surnames. Art 365 mandates that "an adopted

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child shall bear the surname of the adopter," in correlation with Art 341 on the effects of adoption, among which is to "entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname." This same entitlement of an adopted child is maintained in Art 39(3), PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code. The Family Code echoes the same statutory right of an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter. Clearly, from the very wordings of the law, it may be inferred that this use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a right. Under Art 376, CC, "no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority." The application for change of name thereunder involves a special proceeding governed by and conducted under the strictures of Rule 103 and one which involves substantial changes, with the declared objective of such judicial proceedings being the prevention of fraud. Its purpose is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving his his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem, so strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover. For this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. The change of name under Art 376 and reglementarily implemented by Rule 103 must not be confused with and cannot be effected through the summary proceeding proposed in Art 412, as procedurally regulated by Rule 108, which refers only to correction of clerical errors, such as those which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, or an error made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or writing, or some harmless or innocuous change. We find unacceptable the assertion of the Solicitor General that private respondent's allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of his present surname is unsubstantiated. The testimony of private respondent in the lower court bears out the existence of valid cause in his bid for change of name: Q Now, after you adopted the surname "Wong?" in your studies, what did you observe?

REPUBLIC V WONG 209 SCRA 189 REGALADO; May 21, 1992 BAUZ
FACTS -Respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was 2 ½ yrs old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret, was then 9 yrs old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents and by order of the court in SP Case 593 issued on Sept 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong,

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A I observed that "Wong" as a surname embarrassed me to my friends and when I go with Chinese friends I cannot talk Chinese. I am living in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no one can believe that I am Muslim. I have a little business of Furniture but I have little (sic) customer because no one believes me that I am Muslim. This was materially corroborated by the testimony of private respondent's adoptive mother. From the testimony of Maximo and of his adopter mother, it can be discerned that he was prompted to file the petition for change of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his family name brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends. Another cause is his desire to improve his social and business life. It has been held that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only hampers social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for change of name. Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or other persons. Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

A2010
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Art 365 is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the adoptive parents the custody of the child's person, the duty of obedience owing by the child, and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed. The SolGen maintains that to sustain the change of name would run counter to Art 365 and the ruling in Manuel vs. Republic that "one should not be allowed to use a surname which otherwise he is not permitted to employ under the law," and would set a bad example to other persons who might also seek a change of their surnames on lame excuses. We do not believe that by reverting to his old name, private respondent would then be using a name which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and only subjects such recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. If we were to follow the argument of the SolGen to its conclusion, then there will never be any possibility or occasion for any person, regardless of status, to change his name, in view of the supposed subsequent violation of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in the event that the petition is granted. Rule 103 would then be rendered inutile. Sec 1 of Rule 103 uses the generic term "persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain judicially accepted exceptional

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circumstances, petition the court for a change of name, there is no legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an adopted child. Herein respondent is already of age and as such he can decide what is best for him. His experience with regard to his social and business dealings is personal and it is only he who can attest to the same. Finding his predicament's proper remedy is solely through legal process, herein respondent accordingly filed a petition pursuant to Rule 103 which was granted by theTC. It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private respondent to the use of the name of his parents by nature as crass ingratitude. To go by the SolGen's suggestion that private respondent should have his adoption revoked if he wants to use the surname of his natural father would be to exact too clear a toll for making use of an appropriate and valid remedy available under the law. Herein private respondent, before he filed the petition for change of name, asked for his adoptive mother's permission to do so. As proof of her assent to the filing of said petition, Concepcion executed an affidavit in Cotabato City on May 27, 1985. There could be no other plausible reason for private respondent to first secure his adoptive mother's consent before resorting to the questioned legal recourse other than the parental respect and reverence which is owed by and to be expected of a dutiful child. Moreover, worthy of note is the fact that private respondent's adoptive mother emphasized that she executed the above affidavit "without affecting the legal adoption granted by the Court on Sep 9, 1967, making him as one of my legal and compulsory heirs." This is incontrovertible proof that she never entertained any misgivings or reservations with respect to her consent to his petition. This likewise dispels any possible confusion as to private respondent's legal status or adoptive paternity and his successional rights. Concordantly, a change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; all that is altered is the name.

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Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

A2010
HELD 1. YES. Reasoning SolGen's contention is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child, invoking the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for adoption and the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her name in the record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). It was held that this was a "substantial defect in the petition and the published order of hearing." Indeed there was a question of identity involved in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience would indicate. - The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child. The correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the SolGen admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case. 2. YES. Reasoning The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. This case falls under letter "(o)" of §2 referring to changes of name. Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code - to implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the rules of Court in 1964 - covers "those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled."' Thus, in Yu vs. Republic' it was held that "to change 'Sincio' to 'Sencio' which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel 'i' in the first name into the vowel 'e' amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic it was held that "the change of petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous

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alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate." - Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now §3 of this Rule provides: § 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. - The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. - Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by Rule 108, § 4. While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, § 4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard. The necessary consequence was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter. Disposition Decision of the CA MODIFIED by deleting from the decision of the RTC the order to the local civil registrar to change the name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the child. AFFIRMED with respect to the adoption.

REPUBLIC v. CA, CARANTO 255 SCRA 99 MENDOZA; March 15, 1996 RICKY
FACTS - Spouses Jaime and Zenaida Caranto filed a petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, with prayer for the correction of the minor's first name "Midael" to "Michael." Midael, then 15 years old, had been living with Jaime Caranto since he was 7 years old. When respondents were married in 1986, the minor stayed with them under their care and custody. - The SolGen opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the ROC. - The RTC granted the petition for adoption and dismissed the opposition of the SolGen on the ground that Rule 108 applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. It cited Rule 108, § 1, which provides that "any person interested in an act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of the persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto." It held that the correction of names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, §2 as "entries subject to cancellation or correction." According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions, and inconvenience to the petitioners. The CA affirmed. ISSUES 1. WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for adoption. 2. WON the trial court erred in granting respondents' prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry.

REPUBLIC v HERNANDEZ 253 SCRA 509 REGALADO; February 9, 1996 JOEY
NATURE Appeal by certiorari of the decision of RTC Pasig FACTS - Spouses Van and Regina Munson filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. In the very same petition, they prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to

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Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since he arrived at their residence. - The Republic opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. - RTC granted the adoption and change of name. ISSUES 1. WON TC erred in granting the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption 2. WON there was lawful ground for the change of name. HELD 1. YES Ratio The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. Reasoning - Art. 189 of the FC enumerates the legal effects of adoption: “(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; (2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and (3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.” - The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption

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and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption cannot properly be granted. - The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one’s official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change. - A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system. - Neither can the allowance of the subject petition be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Rule 2.5 allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the

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parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character. - While it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. - A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopter’s fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly. On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name. - We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. 2. NO Ratio Grounds sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. Reasoning

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- A person’s name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. - By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person’s birth must be entered in the civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. The only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. - A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change. - A petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. Baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. A name given to a person in the church records or

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elsewhere or by which he is known in the community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name. - The only grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and known by his family, relatives and friends from the time he came to live with private respondents. - While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Dispositive Assailed order is MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law.

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WON lower court correctly granted Go’s petition HELD NO. 1. Lack of jurisdiction by lower court - Proceeding for a change of name is a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction is acquired after publication of order, setting it for hearing, w/c order shld contain data incl the name sought to be adopted, a matter w/c shld be indicated in title of petition. - The reason for the rule is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the order or title of petition. Only if the caption or title strikes him does he proceed to read the contents. Probability is great that he doesn’t at all notice the other names or aliases of applicant if these are mentioned only in body of order / petition. Noninclusion of names or aliases of applicant in caption / title defeats the purpose of publication. - It was not indicated in the title / caption that Gil Go desired to change his name to Henry Yao. Nor was it indicated that his registered name is Gil Co. In his petition, he used Gil Go. 2. Insufficient reason to change name - Change of name is a matter of public interest. It’s a privilege, not a right. Court shld weigh consequences of change of name and deny unless weighty reasons are shown. State has interest in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.

GIL GO V. REPUBLIC 77 SCRA 65 AQUINO; May 25, 1977 CHRIS CAPS
FACTS - Gil GO was born in Tacloban. His name in civil register is Gil CO. - When Gil Go was baptized, he was allegedly given the name Gil Yao Eng Hua. Baptismal certificate wasn’t presented. - Go testified that since childhood, he was known as Henry Yao among relatives and friends. In biz & govt transactions, he used the name Gil CO. No third person corroborated his testimony. - In his alien registration certificate, his is registered as Gil GO. - He wants to use the name HENRY YAO. - Lower court granted. City fiscal appealed. ISSUE

YU CHI HAN v. REPUBLIC 15 SCRA 454 BAUTISTA ANGELO; 1965 INA
FACTS - Yu Chi Han sought to change his name from Yu Chi Han to Alehjandro Go Yu on the grounds that his given name is YCH, but that since birth, he had always been called AGY, that he was baptized according to Catholic rites, and given the name. - The court found no compelling reason to grant the request for change of name. ISSUE

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WON the petition for change of name should be denied HELD YES - This Court has already had the occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. The following may be considered, among others, as proper and reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion - This situation, can easily be remedied by merely asking his friends and business associates to call him simply Yu Chi Han instead of asking for a judicial authority to change his name. His instant petition does not come under any of the cases which may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name as above adverted to.

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examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation, and later on, sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand, and that from then on, he lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. -He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." -The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, saying that: 1. the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity; 2. no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition; 3. no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition. -On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. -On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. -Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied, hence, this petition. ISSUE WON the change of petitioner's name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under the law HELD No. 1. A person's first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment -The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

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SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. -RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. -RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds6 for which change of first name may be allowed
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SILVERIO V REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 CORONA; October 22, 2007 APPLE
FACTS -On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila -Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." -He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, and that he underwent psychological

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion. -A change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. -RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. -Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

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2. No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment -The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes -In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. -Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. -Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. -Among the entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 4077 and 4088 of the Civil Code -To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
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-A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: -ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. -But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause. -Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. -While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. -Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity -The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. -The statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

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- Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with the Cebu CFI a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo and Jessica in the Civil Registry of the Cebu City, seeking to change the nationality or citizenship of the two minors from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single" and her nationality from "Chinese" to "Filipino". SolGen filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc. - The trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng. Leonor Valencia replied, alleging that substantial changes in the civil registry records involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if ---- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the RoC and that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. - Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed an MTD on the ground that the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother. - The lower court denied the MTD. After trial, the lower court granted the petition.

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
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ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

REPUBLIC v VALENCIA G.R. No. L-32181 GUTIERREZ JR.; March 5, 1986 JOJO
FACTS

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Hence this appeal by the Republic. ISSUE WON the lower court erred in granting the petition of Leonor Valencia HELD NO. - It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the SolGen admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding." Appropriate adversary proceeding - One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding." The private respondent distinguishes between summary proceedings contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code and fullblown adversary proceedings which are conducted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. - The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. Under our system of administering justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary system. Excerpts from the Report on Professional Responsibility issued jointly by the Association of American Law Schools and the American Bar Association explain why: "An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combatting this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. The arguments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in

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suspension between two opposing interpretations of it. While the proper classification of the case is thus kept unresolved, there is time to explore all of its peculiarities and nuances. "These are the contributions made by partisan advocacy during the public hearing of the cause. When we take into account the preparation that must precede the hearing, the essential quality of the advocate's contribution becomes even more apparent. Preceding the hearing inquiries must be instituted to determine what facts can be proved or seem sufficiently established to warrant a formal test of their truth during the hearing. There must also be a preliminary analysis of the issues, so that the hearing may have form and direction. These preparatory measures are indispensable whether or not the parties involved in the controversy are represented by advocates.” "Where that representation is present there is an obvious advantage in the fact that the area of dispute may be greatly reduced by an exchange of written pleadings or by stipulations of counsel. Without the participation of someone who can act responsibly for each of the parties, this essential narrowing of the issues becomes impossible. But here again the true significance of partisan advocacy lies deeper, touching once more the integrity of the adjudicative process itself. It is only through the advocate's participation that the hearing may remain in fact what it purports to be in theory; a public trial of the facts and issues. Each advocate comes to the hearing prepared to present his proofs and arguments, knowing at the same time that his arguments may fail to persuade and that his proofs may be rejected as inadequate. It is a part of his role to absorb these possible disappointments. The deciding tribunal, on the other hand, comes to the hearing uncommitted. It has not represented to the public that any fact can be proved, that any argument is sound, or that any particular way of stating a litigant's case is the most effective expression of its merits." Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is "appropriate."

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Under pertinent sections of Rule 108, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are ---(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to ---- (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: ---- (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought. - If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings. - In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia.

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- The petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action. - To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding without in any way intimating what is the correct proceeding or if such a proceeding exists at all, would result in manifest injustice. - Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are 4 other sisters and 1 other brother born of the same father and mother. Not only are all five registered as Filipino citizens but they have pursued careers which require Philippine citizenship as a mandatory pre-requisite. To emphasize the strict policy of the government regarding professional examinations, it was the law until recently that to take the board exams for pharmacist, the applicant should possess natural born citizenship. The sisters and brother are: 1. Sally Go licensed Pharmacist; 2. Fanny Go - Registered Nurse; 3. Corazon Go - fourth year medical student, qualified to take the government board examinations after successfully completing the requirements for a career in medicine, and presumably is a licensed physician now; 4. Antonio Go - engineering student during the 1970 trial of the case and qualified by citizenship to take government board examinations; 5. Remedios Go - licensed Optometrist. - The above facts were developed and proved during trial. The petitioner failed to refute the citizenship of the minors Bernardo and Jessica Go. - In this petition, it limits itself to a procedural reason to overcome substantive findings by arguing that the proper procedure was not followed. - There are other facts on the record. Leonor Valencia is a registered voter and had always exercised her right of suffrage from the time she reached voting age until the national elections immediately preceding the filing of her petition. The five other sisters and brother are also registered voters and likewise exercised the right of suffrage. - An uncle of the mother's side had held positions in the government having been elected twice as councilor and twice as vice-mayor of Victorias,

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Negros Occidental. Respondent Leonor Valencia has purchased and registered two (2) parcels of land. These allegations are well documented and were never contradicted by the Republic. As correctly observed by the lower court. - "The right of suffrage is one of the important rights of a citizen. This is also true with respect to the acquisition of a real property. The evidence further shows that her children had been allowed to take the Board Examinations given by the Government for Filipino citizens only." - It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother and father enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument that the "correct procedure" not specified or even intimated has not been followed.

PROF. BATTAD
held the petition was for a judicial declaration of citizenship, which was not allowed under existing rules. ISSUE WON change in the birth entry regarding a person’s citizenship is now allowed HELD YES. Article 412 of the Civil Code simply provides: "No entry in the civil registry shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." Changes in the birth entry regarding a person's citizenship is allowed as long as adversary proceedings are held. Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution (Valencia ruling). We note that in the case at bar the petition was dismissed outright without a trial being held, on the justification that it was not permitted. In the light of the Valencia ruling, the Orders of the respondent judge must now be reversed, to give way to the appropriate proceedings necessary to the resolution of the substantial issue raised by the petitioner. The records show that the publication requirement has already been complied with. 13 The next step, therefore, is for the petitioner and all adverse and interested parties to be given their day in court in a regular trial on the merits. DISPOSITION The challenged Orders are hereby set aside, and Special Proceeding No. 3596-R of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch V, is reinstated for trial on the merits without delay. No pronouncement as to costs.

LIM vs ZOSA CRUZ; December 29, 1986 ATHE
NATURE Appeal by certiorari from two Orders of the respondent judge dismissing a petition for the correction of an allegedly wrong entry in the birth records of Kim Joseph describing him as a Chinese national instead of a Filipino citizen. FACTS - The petitioner filed a petition for the correction of an allegedly wrong entry in the birth records of Kim Joseph describing him as a Chinese national instead of a Filipino citizen. - The petitioner had offered to prove the error through several pieces of evidence, among them an earlier birth certificate of Kim Joseph describing him as a Filipino citizen, the birth certificates of his seven brothers and sisters all describing them as Filipinos, and a decision of the Court of Appeals recognizing their grandfather as a Filipino citizen. - On opposition by the local civil registrar of Cebu, however, the respondent judge dismissed the petition and sustained the contention that only clerical errors were allowed to be corrected in the summary proceedings authorized under Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Substantial issues like citizenship were not covered as held in several cases. In effect, it was

REPUBLIC v. BAUTISTA G.R. No. L-35316 FERNAN; October 26, 1987 GLAISA
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari to annul the judgment of the then CFI of Rizal

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SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS 5-6
FACTS - Petitioner Imelda Mangabat Sorensen testified that she is married to Bo Huage Sorensen, a Danish citizen and begot two children, namely: Launny and Raymund. In the birth certificate of her second son Raymund, her husband's nationality was erroneously stated as 'American.’ - Bo Huage Sorensen testified that he was born of a Danish father in Denmark, and presented a certification issued by the Royal Danish Consulate of Manila. He is still considered tourist and living with his wife and two sons in Pasay. - The Republic opposed the petition and moved for the dismissal on the ground that a correction of entry in the Civil Registry is allowed only when the same refers to mere clerical errors or mistakes, but not to substantial changes affecting the civil status, nationality or citizenship of the person concerned. - CFI ordered the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City as prayed for to make the necessary corrections in the entry of birth of minor Raymund Mangabat Sorensen. ISSUE WON the challenged decision which involves the question of citizenship is a matter which can legally be treated under the provision of Article 412 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 3 HELD YES. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. - If the procedural requirements provided in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court are followed, the procedure ceases to be summary and becomes litigious. Proceedings following the aforementioned sections may then be appropriate for the correction of substantial matters in the civil registry. - The consistent rule laid down was that the revision of any entry pursuant to Article 412, as implemented by rule 108, referred to those changes that are harmless and innocuous. In those cases, however, it was intimated that rectifications regarding nationality or citizenship

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in the civil register may be undertaken as long as the appropriate remedy is used. - The appropriate remedy may well be a petition filed by way of special proceeding for the cancellation and/or correction of substantial entries in the civil register with the requisite parties, notices, publications and the proceedings to be taken thereafter pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 108 because then the proceedings will be adversary in character. - In the present case, the records show that the Pasay City Local Civil Registrar and the Solicitor General were made parties to the petition for correction of entry in the civil registry filed in the CFI. The proper notice was published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Rizal Weekly Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. The Republic appeared through a trial attorney of the OSG who was present and did not object to the presentation of evidence, although after the hearing, the said trial attorney filed an opposition and or motion to dismiss on the ground that the correction being sought did not refer to a mere clerical mistake but to a substantial change involving the nationality of a person. - In the light of the foregoing which show compliance with Sections 2, 4 and 5 of Rule 108, the proceedings undertaken in the lower court were unmistakably adversary, thus removing the initial apprehension of the State that "if the entries in the civil registrar could be corrected . . . through a mere summary proceeding and not through an appropriate action wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, we would set wide open the door to fraud or other mischief, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far-reaching." Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby denied for lack of merit and the decision of the court a quo is affirmed.

PROF. BATTAD

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