Leszek Nowak Department of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University THE IDEALIZATIONAL APPROACH TO SCIENCE: A NEW SURVEY(*) (I) Five paradigms

of idealization Various approaches to idealization differ, first and foremost, as to what the paradigmatic case of this procedure is. One may distinguish at least five approaches to idealization. Each of them localizes this procedure in a different element of the theory construction: at the level of the construction of scientific facts, of theoretical notions, of laws, etc. (1) The neo-Duhemian paradigm. Idealization is basically a method of transforming raw data. For instance, systematic errors that are generated by measuring devices are corrected and due to that scientific facts can serve the goals of testing, explaining, etc. It is Suppe's semantic theory of science (e.g. Suppe 1972) that is an explication and a development of this kind of approach thus deserving the name of neo-Duhemian paradigm 1. (2) The neo-Weberian paradigm. Idealization is basically a method of constructing scientific notions. Having a certain typology in mind, one may identify its extreme member. If the member is an empty set, it is termed an ideal type and the notion attached to it is labelled idealization. It is particular notions, or their definitions, that exemplify idealizations in science. The source of this approach lies in Max Weber's methodology. In modern philosophy of science it is Hempel's conception that is an explication of Weberian ideas (Hempel/Oppenheim 1936, Hempel 1961). (3) The neo-Leibnizian paradigm. Idealization is a deliberate falsification which never attempts to be more than truthlike. An idealizational statement is a special type of a counterfactual which has to do with what goes on at possible worlds given by the antecedent of that statement. The smallest is the distance between the intended possible world of the kind and the actual world, the truer the counterfactual is. That conception has been developed by Lewis (1973, 1986).
(*) By Leszek Nowak. A significantly expanded version of the paper published in: J. Brzeziński, L. Nowak, Idealization III: Approximation and Truth, Amsterdam/Atlanta 1992, pp.9-63. 1 Another, and formally elaborated, approach of the neo-Duhemian type is formulated by Wójcicki (1974, 1979), cf. also below Chap. 19.


Leszek Nowak

(4) The neo-Millian paradigm. No mathematical structure fits any piece of reality with full precision, there is always discrepancy between a mathematical formalism and reality we want to describe with the theory. Idealization is a means to fill a gap, i.e. to create a construction that would fall exactly under the mathematical formalism serving thus as a model for the imprecise world we live in. Ideas of the kind may be found in Mill2 and they are developed in the socalled Ludwig-approach (Ludwig 1981, Hartkaemper/Schmidt 1981). An approach to idealization presented below could be termed neo-Hegelian as it refers to Hegel's idea that idealization ("abstraction") consists in focussing on what is essential in a phenomenon and in separating the essence from the appearance of the phenomenon. Yet, not all idealizations may be interpreted realistically in this sense. Since I am interested here more in the methodological contents of the conception in question than in the philosophical presuppositions of it (cf. Part V below), I shall label that conception the idealizational approach to science. In this paper, I would like to summarize the main results of this approach. That seems to be worthwhile because of the fact that the significant majority of writings I shall refer to is in Polish. I shall also answer the main criticisms which have been recently put forward against the idealizational conception of science (cf. also my replies to older criticisms1974c, 1975c, 1976b). In particular, what I keep to be the main deficiencies of the idealizational approach to science revealed in some critical papers (e.g., Kuokkanen and Tuomivaara 1992, Paprzycka and Paprzycki 1992, Balzer and Snoubek 1994, Hoover 1994) will be corrected which results in some significant amendments of this paper in comparison with its previous version (Nowak 1992). (II) The core of the idealizational approach to science 1. Idealization and the notion of significance On the notion of essentiality. A scientific law is basically a deformation of phenomena being rather a caricature of facts than a generalization of them. The deformation of fact is, however, deliberately planned. The thing is to eliminate inessential components of it. It is taken for granted from the methodological tradition that not all the methodological notions need to be defined; some notions may be introduced as conceptual primitives, it is only the rest which is to be defined with the aid of earlier terms, in the final instance with the aid of primitive notions. As has been noted (cf. my 1980a, p. 97), the notion of influence is such a

Cf. Kotarbińska (1974), Cartwright (1989), Hamminga and De Marchi (1994).

The Idealizational Approach to Sceince…


conceptual primitive whose legitimation is that it serves as a means to define other notions of the conception under consideration. That notion was only characterized formally in order to justify a construction of the notion of essential structure, and images of the essential structure, of a magnitude. It has been presupposed that for every magnitude F there exists a set of all the parameters influencing it (the space of essential factors for F). These parameters were assumed to be differentiated as to the level of their significance for the determined magnitude. The relation: ... is more influential for .-.- than --- was supposed to be antisymmetric and transitive. The most influential factors are termed principal factors for F, the remaining ones are secondary factors for F. The (partially) ordered set of parameters of the kind is called the essential structure of F. The notion of significance (of one magnitude for another) is normally adopted as a primitive one. There have been several attempts to define that notion in more elementary terms (Nowakowa et al. 1977, Nowak 1989, Machowski 1990) but these definitions suffer from some more or less severe drawbacks (cf. Pogonowski 1978 for criticism of Nowakowa’s proposal, and Kuokkanen and Tuomivaara 1992, K. Paprzycka and M. Paprzycki 1992 for criticism of my own definition). Making use of these criticisms, I have corrected my (1989) formulations as follows (cf.1997, 1998). A value b of factor B influences factor F iff given that, for some x, B(x) = b, it is, for some m, neither F(x) = a1, nor F(x) = a2,..., nor F(x) = am. The set {a1,..., am} is termed the exclusion range of F relative to B,b and symbolized eB(F)b. The more essential a factor for F is, the greater is the range of values of F excluded by the fact that this factor adopts a given value. According to this intuition, the notion of the essentiality level of B for F, eB(F), is introduced as a ratio of the sum of all the ranges of exclusion of F relative to values bi of B to the cardinality of the set of all the values of F, Val(F). that is eB(F) = ! #EB(F)bi /# Val(F). If eB(F) = 0, B is inessential for F, otherwise it is essential for F. Now, B is more essential for F than A iff B has greater essentiality level relative to F than A has, i.e. eB(F) > eA(F). B and A are equi-essential for F iff eB(F) = eA(F). Let us make the division of the set of factors into sets of equiessential factors relative to F. The essential structure SF of the parameter F is termed the sequence of sets E1, ..., Ek such that (a) B, A " Ei iff eB(F) = eA(F), (b) for each A " Ei , for each B " Ei+1, eB(F) > eA(F). Factors of the highest significance for F, i.e. those from the set Ek, are termed principal factors for F, whereas all the remaining ones are secondary for F 3.
Kuokkanen and Tuomivaara (1992, note 5) found some real deficiences of my (1989) definition of significance and their criticism inspired – apart from that of Paprzycka and Paprzycki (1992) – the change in my formulations. I do not agree, however, with their suggestion to eliminate the „over-determination case”. The point of the criticism is that definition of eB(A)b admits the limiting case when the range of exclusion is identical with the set Val(A) of all values of the parameter A, and hence Val(A) determined by B relative to b may be empty.

instead. p. E1 = { p11. Some people ascribe the method of idealization an intention to identify the "hidden essence of phenomena".Hn}. ... . pu11}. in order to tell whether a magnitude belongs to the (mentioned) set (the space of essential magnitudes for a given magnitude – L.4 Leszek Nowak Assume that the sets of equi-essential factors for F are of the form: Ek ={H1..... obviously.... It is. p1k-1..... This is understandable only on the supposition that.276). it becomes clear why Jorland demands: Nowak's "main task" should be "to give a criterion of 'influence'.277)...... at least for what I call the negativist unitarian metaphysics (cf. puk-1k-1. E1 = {p1}. For the thesis does not follow from the definition of influence (quite to the contrary. ..Hn H1...... Yet.N. according to the quoted author.Hn.. I must admit.. we will usually adopt some simplification assuming that for a parameter F given is its essential structure SF whose secondary part is composed of singletons and the principal part counts many elements: Ek ={H1. .. 1998.. the investigator would have to know it beforehand.. A term is self-effective iff its intension provides a procedure to determine whether an arbitrary object belongs to the extension of that term or not.]?" (Jorland 1995..Hn. Ek-1 = {pk-1}. Nowak 1997.. p11.] or not" (ibid. puk-1k-1 .. The problem is whether this is a deficiency of the proposed approach or not. a reconstruction of the thesis of (strict) determinism in the proposed framework and hence a philosophically oriented restriction imposed upon the conceptual possibilities admitted by that framework. H1. is.Hn}. 1998a).. .. even if defined in the above way. The importance of it perhaps is not too visible in philosophy of science but metaphysically it is even crucial... Ek-1 = { p1k-1. However. for example "(According to the idealizational approach to science) in order to discover the essence.... the notion of influence.... that was a deliberate move to admit this limiting case (the so-called total essentiality cf. etc) is to be self-effective... or even reducing the set of principal factors Ek to one factor only: Ek ={H}. I do not agree with the claim of Kuokkanen and Tuomivaara (1992. p.... The essential structure of F will then be of the form: SF: H1... the notion of influence (and hence of the essential structure of a magnitude.. Nowak 1995)... p1k-1.. The requirement of self-effective definitions. Moreover.... puk-1k-1 }. pu11 Below.... w being the value the parameter in fact assumes.... p. ... What is thus the purpose of the method (of idealization – L. ... Let us then try to see what the history of methodology teaches us... the definition admits that the range of exclusion may be empty)........ as well. not self-effective...93) that the over-determination case is at variance with my thesis that the maximum of the range of exclusion is the set of values of a given parameter minus singleton {w}... .. .N. I do not have any elaborated meta-methodology at my disposal.... Now...

It is the task of methodology to explain the notion and the cognitive role of "essentiality" as it functions in science. Moreover. There. such a definition-and-criterion of influence would make a serious task of empirical sciences – putting forward what may be termed essentialist hypotheses (cf. say. On a similar basis a self-effective definition of influence equipping us not only with the notion of essentiality but also with a general criterion to decide which factors are essential for which ones would make useless the building of empirical theories. For in order to know whether. the idea of reducing all concepts to mere bulks of operations failed entirely. Indeed. for instance. It turned out. That was Bridgman's operationalism. If not to offer any workable criteria of essentiality. But it is the task of empirical sciences to offer possibly many different criteria of influence of which they may make use building their theories. what is the purpose of the method of idealization? Simply: to reconstruct the way science works. However. According to the idealizational methodology. the velocity of a body is essential for its length not the testing of the theory of relativity would be necessary but simply a verdict of a methodologist applying his general criterion. Take. my 1980a. it is not a deficiency but actually a merit of the idealizational methodology that it does not mix the notion and the criteria of essentiality. philosophy instead of understanding human creativity. there are three main stages of scientific conduct: I. A general procedure enabling us to decide whether an arbitrary statement is true or false would follow from such a definition. II. This Tarski-condition does not give any imaginable procedure to decide whether a given statement is true or not.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 5 Let us note that there was a methodological orientation which put forward the requirement that all concepts be self-effective. pp. there are epistemological notions of undeniable significance which are overtly not-self-effective. pre-theoretical stage: postulation of essentialist hypotheses putting forward possible images of the essential structures of considered magnitudes. Is this bad? Imagine that it is possible to define truth as a self-effective concept. would just eliminate it with the aid of its alleged "algorithm". What would be the use for human creative thinking then? Creativity would be utterly superfluous in such a world: the question of truth would be in this world simply decided by philosophers applying such a definition to all possible statements.111ff) – entirely superfluous. the semantic notion of truth: "p" is true iff p. theoretical stage: postulation of a body of idealizational hypotheses which subsequently undergo the process of concretization. . The purpose of the idealizational methodology. To my understanding. that this idea forces us to admit that there is not one notion of length measured in various way but as many as the (historically available) methods of measurement of distance. for instance.

Were we. and science is the best example of that. it is not so that "after" gaining the "knowledge" of what is essential for what (stage I) the theoretician builds an idealizational theory (stage II) and tests it (stage III). suppositions. There is no knowledge in the Platonic sense. It is rather so that it is only the test of a hypothetical theory which confirms the essentialist hypotheses adopted at the very beginning. if we realize that science uses idealization and that the testing of a(n idealizational) theory is at the same time the main practical means to assess the reliability of the essentialist hypotheses underlying it. it is this. The three ideas of human cognition – as knowledge. Popper opened the third epistemological tradition: nothing is certain. for more than one and a half thousand of years. Instead. risky hypotheses whose initial subjective probability is always very low. For it is not true that we cannot put forward hypotheses concerning the hidden essences of phenomena. In particular. The only thing we are able to realistically demand of ourselves is to increase the probability of our convictions. A final refutation of . the most interesting for us would be tautologies which have the highest possible probability. It was only Hume who called it into question and opened a new tradition . order at all but a network of mutual connections. In other words. First one was that of Plato: to know something meant to be able to recognize for certain the hidden essence of things. Or stereotypes whose probability is. What is available to us are more or less probable suppositions. The latter is not. Philosophy kept this notion of knowledge. very high. 1978) – with the Popperian idea of hypothetical cognition. p. or hypothesis – are based on some metaphysical assumptions. The idea of knowledge presupposes essentialism. the ideas of supposition and hypothetical cognition deny it. Now. Knowledge. We can. and the belief that it is available for us. the idealizational methodology attempts to combine metaphysical essentialism – rather in the style of Hegel than of Plato (cf. This notion of knowledge is still present in Descartes. hypotheses. my 1980a. what is available for us is nothing more than a (far from being certain) supposition based on experience. supposition. the "order of reconstruction" in methodology is not the "order of justification" in science.6 Leszek Nowak III. claims Popper. or originality. of our hypotheses that matters to us. my 1977a-b. This becomes even quite obvious. It is novelty. that is correct. There have appeared three basic notions of cognition in Western epistemology (Marciszewski 1972). empirical testing of the theory. Another claim of the conception is that the three stages are mutually tied in the sense that what is decided in one may be questioned on another which forces the theoretician to come back to the "earlier" stage (Brzeziński 1977. we are interested in new. strictly speaking. If the above point of view requires a philosophical legitimation. but we are not interested in increasing probability of our convictions at all. in our assessment.33). and that is all. 1985.

2. our explanations of the research practice do not prejudge our understanding of science. Such is the dialectics of definitions of the crucial notions of a theory: when they are lacking. if anything. not in the nature of that something. That is why. Etc. and vice versa. Everything may be grasped hypothetically. How science is understood depends on our reconstruction of the scientific practice given by methodology of science but also on our metaphysical views on the nature of reality and/or our epistemological understanding of the position of the cognitive subject. Therefore. 1992a). The hidden essence is not something which can only be dogmatically believed in. than before.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 7 such a theory implies that the initial view of what is essential for the explained phenomena was doomed to failure from the very beginning. A remark on methodology and philosophy. Obviously. even if correct. It turned out that the primitive notions for the idealizational approach begin a bit earlier than expected. Let me add that the definition of essentiality plays an important role in a metaphysical conception for which it has been elaborated (cf. but for the idealizational methodology. Basic ideas and notions Idealization is not abstraction. That is why. The hidden essences of phenomena may be treated as subject of hypotheses as everything else. everything in the theory appears to be unclear and dependent on the sense which is attached to the primitive notion. empirical facts or God may be grasped either dogmatically or hypothetically. for the hypotheticity lies in our attitude towards something. technically this means a lot – the conceptual structure of the theory becomes more clear and comprehensible – but its explanatory power does not profit very much from such an innovation. the idealizational approach to science is practically independent of the above definition. new essentialist hypotheses and a new project of a theory must be tentatively proposed. Who accepts the body of concepts and hypotheses termed the idealizational approach to science may be equally well a follower of the instrumentalist (or relativist) vision of science or he may support the realistic (in the aristotellian or platonist sense) vision of science. And that is what should be expected. When such a definition is already given. The present writer is inclined to believe in an interpretation of science of the platonic origin but some people working on the same idealizational approach to science are of other philosophical inclinations. my 1991a. One should not mix the explanatory tasks of methodology of science with the problems of philosophical understanding of science. any definition of the notion of essentiality does not matter too much for the methodology of science. it appears that the theory does not explain much more. In other words. The crucial point which follows from the proper understanding of the notion of idealization is that idealization is not abstraction . and that is all. it means much less than one could expect.

pp. their extension decreases (they become more and more This distinction (cf. Wojcicki (1974) employs in this context again the term "idealization". According to the famous classical formula. 1971a. whereas. p. the two procedures are often mixed.g. in English 1975d) – I have finally decided to use the term "idealization" (1970c.82ff.8 Leszek Nowak (cf. But in part it is also a matter of the terminology. 1970b) to distinguish the idealizational procedure I had used the term „modelling” (modelling conditions. But in all these cases there were merely terms being changed. Rudner (1966) and Barr (1971) apply the term "idealization" in the meaning close to what is termed here as ideation. Not so. my 1971c.1)students are laborious applies to our world directly. 1990).2) on the gravitational constant (g) and the time (t) of free fall. say. For instance. for instance. as the intension of a series of terms increases (they become more and more abstract). Coniglione 1986. Harre 1970 or my 1970c. abstraction consists in a passage from properties AB to A. Roughly.31ff) 4.c) is perhaps quite obvious but far from being methodologically exploited. and finally – recognizing an enormous confusion resulting from the latter decision (1971c. etc. Zielinska (1981) labels "abstraction" which is termed below reduction and "idealization" which is termed below ideation. In (1968. 1980a. modelling statements. Hempel (1952) and Cohen (1970) apply the term "idealization" in the meaning similar to what is termed here so. The intuitions of Dilworth (1990) are similar and covered by the same terminology. idealization consists in a passage from AB to AB. Let us then compare the terminology applied here with those of other authors. I must admit that the terminological confusion may be found in my early writings as well. then s(x) = 1/2 gt2(x) does not.277). 1971a. b and further on). Etc. it is actually the "operation of abstraction and determination" which suffices to show why the analyzed claim fails. not to the general statements. Sometimes it is claimed that the method of idealization "is akin to the classical abstraction and determination operations" known from the textbooks of logic (Jorland 1994. Cartwright (1989) applies the term "abstraction" in the sense close to that which is termed below idealization.. the move from the notion of an open capitalist economy (CEO) to the notion of a capitalist economy (CE) is an act of abstraction. 1975d. Quite the reverse so.. Instead. in a passage from CEO to the notion of a closed capitalist economy (CE-O). whereas "idealization" is used in the sense similar to what will be termed below "ideation". the statement:: (2.). Moreover. Suppe (1972) terms "abstraction" roughly which is labelled here idealization but in reference to the data. e. 4 . whereas an act of idealization would consist.2) if (ff(x) & R(x) = 0. An abstract (general) statement: (2. In part this is due to the prevalence of the empiricist tradition of "abstraction" in the philosophy of science which differs greatly from the Hegelian tradition (cf. the notion was the same all that time. pp. For instance.2) applies to the ideal world in which freely falling (ff) bodies do not meet any resistance (R) on their path(s) depending in the way shown in formula (2. (2. then revealing the affinity of the underlying ideas with Hegelian/Marxian intuitions I passed to the term "abstraction" (1970a).

.... T0 are its concretizations: Tk-1: if (G(x) & p1(x) = 0 & p2(x) = 0 & .. etc...... He removes the condition replacing it by its realistic negation and introduces a correction in the formula (consequent) of the statement.... pk(x). By introducing idealizing conditions of the form p(x) = 0 the researcher eliminates factors thought to be secondary..... T1......... Ti: if (G(x) & p1(x) = 0 & . for the series of idealizational terms.. & pk-1(x) # 0 & pk(x) # 0) then F(x) = f1(H1(x).. then F(x) = fk(H1(x)... that is the intersection of these extensions is empty....... ......... T1: if (G(x) & p1(x) = 0 & p2(x) # 0 & .. that is ones whose meaning characteristics (a set of meaning postulates.pi+1(x)].... A hierarchy of factors considered to be the essential structure for F is termed the researcher's image of the essential structure for that magnitude..... pk(x)....& pi(x) = 0 & pi+1(x) # 0 & ........ & pk-1(x) = 0 & pk(x) = 0)............ Hn(x).p2(x)] T0: if (G(x) & p1(x) # 0 & p2(x) # 0 & ...... This procedure of concretization leads to a more realistic statement referring to the less abstract conditions than the initial idealizational statement... Idealization is counter-actual. vice versa... An idealizational statement is a conditional possessing an idealizing condition in its antecedent............ We have already considered an example of such a series of terms: "open capitalist economy". however.... where Tk is an idealizational law: Tk: if (G(x) & p1(x) = 0 & p2(x) = 0 & . the two have no elements in common........... Having established such a statement the researcher must take into account the neglected factor....p2(x).... & pk-1(x) # 0 & pk(x) # 0) then F(x) = f0(H1(x)..... pk(x)] ....... & pk-1(x) = 0 & pk(x) # 0)... Such a rule does not work... the idealizational structure of the F-phenomena is of the form: (T) Tk.. The extension of the term "closed capitalist economy" is not narrower than the extension of the term "capitalist economy".... then F(x) = fk-1(H1(x)........ Thus. Hn(x).................) embraces at least one idealizing condition.... What remains is the factor considered principal for the determined magnitude.... p1(x)] .. T1... pk(x)............ as the intension decreases...... "economy"..... a partial definition.. T0.. ...... Hn(x)........ "capitalist economy"... Hn(x)] and Tk-1.. their extension increases.. a definition. Tk-1................. & pk-1(x) # 0 & pk(x) # 0) then F(x) = fi(H1(x).......The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 9 determinate) and.. Hn(x)................ ............................ The "law of decreasing extension and increasing intension" from the textbooks of elementary logic does not hold for idealizational terms.....

........ there is no need to visit ideal worlds (constructed nicely by Niiniluoto himself.... It is now visible that T0 refers both to the empirical domain G0 to which (T0) applies and to the idealized domains G1. Gk that the idealizational statements (T1)....p2(x). whereas Tk.... p..... (Tk-1)..... p1(x)] where T0 is a factual statement..is somewhat puzzling and seems to make sense only for a metaphysical realist” (p... x " G0 iff x " G & p1(x) # 0 & p2(x) # 0 & ... Idealizations reduce to the role of counterfactual special cases of it and concretization becomes cognitively superfluous at all.... 0 G is a set of empirical („real”) objects..... (Tk) refer to......... to be sure. The semantic status of conditionals of the kind deserves a careful analysis .... .. rather to take a risk and remain with the not so precise concept which at least allows us somehow realize the cognitive importance of the method which for the first glance is something really common in science.. the initial assumption seems to fail. „this scheme does not cover all forms of scientific laws. k).. predicting and programming the empirical world is T0.. (Tk1 )...... I believe........ .... 34ff..... correspondingly..34ff) proposes that instead of material implication....... the formulation of the idealizational statement is to employ the counterfactual reading of „if ..... Facing the so-destructive implications of the otherwise largely and precisely elaborated approach. indeed.2-ideal types (of the second degree) of empirical objects...............64).. Once we know that. then it would be the case that.... as all the empirical objects G0 of the universe G satisfy the conditions pi (x) # 0 (i = 1 . Niiniluoto’s stand the epistemological sense of the method of idealization becomes dubious... & pk-1(x) = 0) $ F(x) = fk-1(H(x). x " Gk -1 iff x " G & p1(x) = 0 & p2(x) = 0 & ... both because of the semantic and epistemological reasons. G1 is the set of p1-ideal types (of the first degree) of empirical objects...... pp. ...64.... allegedly factual a statement. n. All we need for explaining. (Notice that also Kuokkanen and Tuomivaara 1992... but T0 is not....... adopting I..T1 are counterfactuals claimed to be consequences of T0 (on the basis of the correspondence principle).. 99ff). & pk-1(x) = 0 & pk(x) # 0) x " Gk iff x " G & p1(x) = 0 & p2(x) = 0 & . but (T0) cannot be simply replaced by T0...... 1980a..10 Leszek Nowak with its subsequent concretizations5... Niiniluoto derives from that supposition important conclusions (1992. As a result.. G2 is the set of p1. T1: (G(x) & p1(x) = 0) $ F(x) = f1(H(x)...... T0 is then a kind of both „supra-factual” and „supra-idealizational” statement.......... They add to the second point in the footnote „This identity...... for instance it does not cover purely qualitative laws” (p.... pk(x).92 express some doubt as for the applicability of I.... and the same applies to Ti and (Ti). 6 Balzer and Zoubek (1994) pose two objections against the form of concretization employed in the text..p2(x)] T0: G(x) $ F(x) = f0(H(x). Assume T0 is somehow justified. the value of property F remains identical” (p....... (T0) is a factual statement.. .... pk(x)] . then” as „if it were the case that ...... First.Gk-1..43ff) with universes Gi (0 < i % k). etc. for 0 < i < k. 42ff). 21). Niiniluoto (1989...... Let us define (Nowak 1971a... pp. Niiniluoto’s reconstruction in this respect). pp.. & pk-1(x) = 0 & pk(x) = 0). .... pp.......... & pk-1(x) # 0 & pk(x) # 0) x " G1 iff x " G & p1(x) = 0 & p2(x) # 0 & .. (T0) is proposed to be rewritten as: Tk: (G(x) & p1(x) = 0 & p2(x) = 0 & . Second...... Although I.... pk(x).. and will change.. one should..65)..... & pk-1(x) # 0 & pk(x) # 0) ... . say inductively......... Epistemologically... the sequence (Tk ). while „during the [concretization] transition the. pp. & pk-1(x) = 0 & pk(x) = 0) $ F(x) = fk(H(x)] Tk -1: (G(x) & p1(x) = 0 & p2(x) = 0 & .......” (briefly........ ........ Semantically...connections [dependencies] may change.. including T0 lacking any idealizing conditions and being a factual statement 6.... 1992. $)... 5 .

Now. also idealization and concretization for the purely qualitative laws can be somehow conceptualized (Nowakowa 1996). The classical laws of physics seem to be „classsical” cases of laws of science [a] And the kind [b] of development of the idealizational approach to science was openly postulated (cf. also above Chap. i. p(x)). the criticism addressed to the above formulations is correct. above Chap 2). Łastowski and Nowak 1982.. then F(x) = f0(H(x). velocity. p(x)) would be simply selfcontradictory. and (b) each of the elements of the chain of succesive explication is more general than their predecessors. How to understand this metaphysically is a separate matter.. Indeed.31 of this book). let us consider the conditionals: (T1) if G(x) & p(x) = 0. that is in fact presupposed which simply means that the range of property F includes both empirical objects from G0 and their p-ideal types (of the first degree) from G1. V) in order to cope with the complexity of types of idealization and concretization in science. then F(x) = f1(H(x)) (T0) if G(x) & p(x) # 0. let us distinguish the three cases. The above schemes are far from being general enough to „cover all forms of scientific laws”. However.21. This is admissible but only on the extreme case of what is . For the sake of simplicity. as the object satisfying the conditions: G(x) & p(x) = 0 & p(x) # 0. However. III and par. It couldn’t be. Tk1 . etc.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 11 As to the first point. etc. i. and – on the strength of (T1) and (T0) – the conditions: F(x) = f1(H(x)) & F(x) = f0(H(x). That is something which is not postulated at all. Nowak 1974a. Not only the sun but also the mass point possess a mass. empirical objects of the type G.) are defined on a universe transcending that of the „empirical discourse”.e. The second possibility is the „identity of magnitude F” in (T1) and (T0). also Chap. 2). however. then he/she simply ascribes the sun’s mass to it making the „theoretical sun”.. Darwinian laws presumable belong not to the classsical centre of the colloquial class „idealizations”. Klawiter (1978. summary in English 1989) has elaborated a scheme of adaptive idealizational statement. c. they do not fall under our standard formulae Tk. 273ff. summary below par. an explication in note 3a above) of the latter G0. cf. Let us come back to the criticism of Balzer and Zoubek (1995). tied in a special manner: the former G1 are ideal types of the first degree (cf. how it should be. a. My present views on the subject are given in (1995.e. the Poznań type idealization schemata is not the best way to describe it” (p. it covers the „classical” representatives of a given kind. as it is visible from the form of Darwin’s laws (cf. pp. They are. Sintonen and Kiikeri’s objections still presents a real problem. As to their second point. Actually those satisfying (T1) and (T0) are different. but rather to its peripherry and some derivative schem of „idealization” is to be expected here. in particular. This procedure seems to be admissible on the following two conditions: (a) the initial explication is „natural”. 1980a. part III) and actualized in numerous writings (cf. 1998. 1987. But this is. In this sense to a certain extent. a scheme of the adaptive concretization etc. In the light of the above explanations. cf. b. legitimizing thus the intuitive work on the idealization in the theory of natural selection (Łastowski 1977. In fact. in F(x) = n one should distinguish three things and the postulate of their „identity” through the concretizational transition seems to have quite different methodological sense.207/208). One is the „identity of object x”. Let us add that similar objection is put forward by Sintonen and Kiikeri (1995) complaining that „although evolutionary theory is an idealizing theory in some sense. although not straightforwardedly. The third possibility of understanding of the objection is to comprehend it as the „identity of the value F(x) of the magnitude F”. All these so commonly employed in science operations are possible on the condition that scientific magnitudes (mass. there are difficulties in linking these schemata with the standard formulae Ti and Klawiter’s construction remains an interesting but separate conceptualization of some kind of „idealizations”. English summary 1994. making a general scheme need be not the starting point but rather an (ideal) outcome of the developing chain of explications. If the researcher wants to model the sun. That is adopted in our construction and very well.

a certain path from such a simplified scheme to more realistic.. Re: (i).Hn being the principal factors. inessential for F and hence for all elements of G (objects satisfying G(x)).Hn.. and thus more complicated. i... For simple idealizational theory (T) presupposes a certain view on what ifluences the considered magnitude F. . pk. Then one may say that what is presupposed by the idealizational structure (T) is the image of the essential structure: I(SF): H1... H1. p.12 Leszek Nowak An idealizational law on F is thus identified with that of idealizational statements concerning F which is most abstract.. f1(H(x)) = f0(H(x)... neglecting all the factors claimed to be secondary for F.. pk......... I(PF). gives no reason to a methodological objection. Below. The levels of this hierarchy of factors correspond to subsequent elements of the simple idealizational structure....p2. as far as I see it. b) during concretization which. (iii) interactions between determinants of a given magnitude are neglected..... termed the degenerate concretization (Nowak 1974a.192). holds only in the extremely idealized picture of science..p2. (ii) they are first order-predicates. is the set {H1... the „essence”. for genuine concretization when p is in fact influential for F. and takes into account what is considered to be principal for F... the idealizing condition p(x) = 0 turns out to be superfluous. against the researcher’s expectation. when p proves to be. In our simplified scheme of the idealizational theory of property F the image of the space of essential factors of F. Since all these effects might make. f0(H(x).. Obviously.. This results in the following: (i) predicates in the schemes of idealizational statement. and that this order corresponds to the sequence of idealizing conditions. schemes of the scientific theory is outlined 7. its concretization etc. As a result. 7 An important simplification silently adopted here is that only properties are considered whereas relations are neglected.92... p1. p(x)) # f1(H(x)). p1}.. H1.e. It follows from the above that the „postulate of the identity” that is presupposed in the presented approach is one of identity of the magnitude (cf.. This is easy to be removed.. I would like to comment on them in short. etc. pk.. H1. are monadic... The factors thought to be secondary are omitted on the strength of the idealizing conditions whereas those considered to be principal are taken as "independent variables" from the very beginning.. p..p2.. Apart from the case of the (mistaken or instrumental) degenerate concretization.. that there is a linear order of the strength of influence among the secondary factors upon F in the set I(PF). This notion of law allows then to preserve the traditional connections between the concepts of law... .. not without justification. by introducing relations and relational predicates. pk. 1980a. Hn.. 1977).. p(x)). Hn... on the price of a complication of the conceptual apparatus from the very beginning (cf. regularity. an impression of assuming the "purely Aristotelian ontology". All the factors taken to influence upon F form an image of the space of essential factors for F... whereas the remaining ones are secondary. Hn. Hn H1.

p. What about the way the theoreticians of literature test (or `test') their proposals? What I claim is that the level of the development of methodology is akin to that of the traditional humanistic disciplines (Nowak 1974a. G') is essential for F.1982) and Patryas (1979). the view of their inductive nature.. to be sure. This might be expressed by saying that although G and G' are insignificant for F. it does not embrace the case in which two properties G and G' are non-essential for F. if somebody proven that reconstructing physical laws. 277ff). I have not included these problematics because it would complicate our schemes very much. A doubt may raise as to the methodological status of the thesis stating that science applies idealization (Batóg 1974. This is silently assumed already in the adopted definition of the notion of an essential property. P. Indeed. if taken separately.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 13 Anyway. the method for testing methodological conceptions is on the level of the science of . and the further concretizations of the law reconstruct more realistic dependencies holding on subsequent levels of the structure. Kirschenmann claims that "it is not clear what kind of scientific practice Nowak would possibly count as an instance telling against his methodology" (1985. Namely. E. for some types of statements this limitation ceases to be trivial. but are essential for F. a single factor H essential for F) or of the third kind (if the interaction is the only element influencing F). p. Re: (iii). in the form of the initial law. It will be mentioned below. Therefore. in Brzeziński's (1975) terms. justifies enclosing the term in quotation marks. or economic ones. the way in which methodologists `test' their conceptions is different from the way physicists take account of observation and the difference. To be sure. if taken together. Yet. It is presupposed here that no interactions between the elements of the space of essential factors occur. the fact that it is possible within Sneed-Moulines-Balzer's paradigm to reconstruct the whole of physical or economic theories is a significant argument supporting the structuralist theory of science. 15). in an irreducible manner. This would also be a serious argument against the hypothesis of essentialism as it would then be difficult to maintain both that the world is essentially differentiated and that our best form of knowledge of it does not reveal this ontological property it has. this concerns adaptive statements employed above in Chap. of the second kind (if there is. 4lff). as idealizational statements leads to the distortion of their contents and what is considered to testify to their idealizational character (e. predicates of higher orders (Kmita 1976. denied. "closed economies" and so on) in fact supports. Re: (ii). but its attachment to the methodology of science would be. Namely. Kirschenmann 1985). their interaction int(G. an interesting logical innovation. Kosmicki 1985) and which involve. 4). etc. To put this in Hegelian terms: the (simple idealizational) theory can be thus claimed to be a discovery of (what is considered to be) the „hidden essence” of F-facts and a reconstruction of its „manifestation” through (what is considered to be) secondary influences 8.g. Lastowski 1982. for example . 2 (an initial analysis of these cf. 8 When a methodological conception is unable to conceptualize in its own terms any concrete example of a piece of scientific practice. Of course. p. section (V. the essential structure for F is. The question of applicability of the operations of idealization and concretization in the realm of these statements is analyzed by Klawiter (1977. the crucial idea is that the theory begins with reconstruction. natural sciences are not the only form of science. it would be recognized to be. of the dependence holding on the first level. my 1975) which appear in different branches of science (Klawiter 1977. On the contrary. I conjecture.g. for example. then the idealizational conception of science would be falsified. For instance. comments referring them to "inertial systems". additionally.

correctly) identifies the principal factor(s) for the investigated magnitude. . (b) considering the as axioms of a theory (Barr 1971). And so. Let us allow people supporting different approaches to develop them. does not) the principal factor(s) for the magnitude F but is mistaken (resp. (c) identifying "counter-factual elements" as rules of the interpretation of a theory to some purified data (Suppe1972).14 Leszek Nowak Naturally. namely those of set Ik. is similar to it derivatively) iff it does identify (resp. my 1970. I(SF) differs derivatively from the structure SF (resp. the (c)-approach allows for explanation of some intriguing aspects of the structure of scientific theories (Kupracz 1991. . I suspect that the greatest problem the conceptions (b) and (c) meet when facing scientific practice is the lack of the analogue of concretization of conception (a). similar) from the appropriate essential structure iff it wrongly (resp. pk (x) = 0 of idealizing conditions. ways of testing its theories will be applied. . is correct) in enlisting the secondary factors for F. . 1998. either basically or derivatively. that is it reduces itself to quoting more or less accidental exaxnples. For me possibility (a) is the most intriguing because of its philosophical presuppositions that allow. for example for the reconstruction of a large part of the Hegelian-Marxian heritage (Nowak 1980a. One may distinguish at least three of them: (a) treating idealizing conditions as antecedents of some (idealizational) statements (cf. 9 So. . we are not obliged to do so. Nowakowa 1977. literature. If Sk was applied to the world. The image is basically different (resp. as this is the only available means to state which of them has the largest explanatory power. The latter can be said to be a concretization of Sk. Ck-1) is put forward. also below Part V). 1995. This approach seems to be convenient to explain the use scientists sometimes make of idealizing conditions. cf. the more rigorous. But it seems that this may be better or worse met also in terms of these approaches. However. 1972). in which Ak-1 differs from Ak only because of the said replacement of pk(x) = 0 by the realistic condition pk(x) # 0 and set Ck-1 differs from Ck as much as the replacement changes deductive sequences in the new system. . have been accepted because of the requirements of simplicity and are to be removed. 1971a. IV2). 1992) and will be discussed in Part VI 9 10. is a proper one and at least because of this it is worth developing all of them. Sk-1. the more methodology comes to understand of science. the image I(SF) of the essential structure SF may differ from the structure itself. cf. an alternative approach 1991. also below par. The analysis of possible relationships between the essential structure SF and its image I(SF) and their epistemological meaning leads to the problematic of truthfulness (Nowak 1977e. It is obvious that the role of abstraction in science may be conceptualized in a variety of ways. the results would be clearly false. arguments supporting one of them and discriminating against the other. Let us take for example conception (b) and consider the set (Ik) p1(x) = 0. I conjecture. indeed. An idealizational theory will be termed a deductive system Sk = (Ak. if any. . . The full theory would then be composed of the sequence of systems Sk. But this is not a (methodological) argument since one could be found only in the explanatory power of a given conception as to what is taking place in science. only scientifc practice may give. We can say after all that some of the axioms. However. whereas Ck are derivative consequences of Ak. condition pk (x) = 0 is being replaced with its negation and a new deductive system Sk-1 = (Ak-1. Similarly. sometimes they use them as premisees of reasonings. It is also obvious that nobody knows a priori which of these conceptualizations. then. And so on. Ck) in which set of axioms Ak includes set of idealizing conditions Ik.

....g.Hn.. Once the ceteris paribus modifier has been attached........... the idealizational statements Tk1.......... And it is as legitimate as every concretization is..... 190-91)...& Hn-1(x) # 0 & Hn(x) # 0. that is all the sets of secondary factors for F are supposed to be empty........” (Cartwright 1989..... Assume that k = 0..59). superposition is a concretization of a special sort.... When nothing else is going on.... mixed circumstances – but only if you assume that the factor has a fixed capacity that it carries with it from situation to situation. In this case. you can see what tendencies a factor reveals by looking at what it does. pp..... to be added.. ...... then only H2 is accounted for and all the remaining Hi-s (including H1) are abstracted from...The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 15 10 Let us comment somewhat upon the famous thesis of N..... This law can explain in only very simple......... Tk2. In (1989) Cartwright is closer to such an understanding of the matter Here is a nice formulation of the idea underlying the notion of concretization: in case of an ideal situation „all other ‘disturbing’ factors are missing.... Similarly. . Tkn1) form a special case of idealizational statements and are as legitimate as all the idealizations are..Hn(x)). All this. In the extreme case. or ideal... and the laws that say they are there must also be given a metaphorical reading” (ibid. It can account for why the force is as it is when just gravity is at work. fn-1k)...... Cartwright (1983) that the fundamental laws of physics „do not satisfy the facticity requirement” (p......... the law of gravity is irrelevant to the more complex and interesting situations (Cartwright 1983.... and the only determinants of F are its principal factors H1........ the appropriate idealizational statements are put forward: Tk1: if G(x) & H1(x) # 0 & H2(x) = 0 & H3(x) = 0 & .. the concretization is possible only on the assumption of superposition (e...& Hn-1(x) = 0 & Hn(x) # 0........60)......... For the ‘component’ forces are not there....... then F(x) = f1k(H1(x)) k T 2: if G(x) & H1(x) = 0 & H2(x) # 0 & H3(x) = 0 & .......... H2(x).. however.. In such a situation........ but it is of no help for cases in which both gravity and electricity matter.. Then she refers to the rule of addition of vectors stating that it does not help too much as „[n]ature does not ‘add’ forces... p.. pp...... & Hn(x) = 0 (i2) H1(x) = 0 & H2(x) # 0 & H3(x) = 0 & . circumstances......... only H1 of the determinant is accounted for and all the remaining Hi-s are omitted via idealization. ..... In other words.... & Hn(x) = 0........ the following series of idealizing/realistic conditions are postulated (Nowak 1971a. the factor manifests its power explicitly in its behavior. „fundamental laws” in the sense of Cartwright (of the form Tk1. does not undermine the validity of „fundamental laws”. Let us consider the scheme of the image I(SF) with n principal factors and k sets of (equiessential) secondary factors. f2k ....... then Tk is a factual statement T0...... If k = 0 in fact. in any but a metaphorical sense..... p...When all other disturbances are absent. then F(x) = fk(H1(x)..184ff): (i1) H1(x) # 0 & H2(x) = 0 & H3(x) = 0 & .& Hn-1(x) = 0 & Hn(x) # 0............ adding) of component influences into the global one: fk = &(f1k... (in-1) H1(x) = 0 & H2(x) = 0 & .. introducing the idealizing conditions eliminating particular Hi-s is possible only without any essentialist justification. .. Having assumed such a principle of superposition..... then F(x) = f2k(H2(x)) .... Thus.. Tkn-1 lead to: Tk: if G(x) & H1(x) # 0 & H2(x) # 0 & . She argues that One of the chief jobs of the law of gravity is to help explain the forces that objects experience in various complex circumstances..... & Hn(x) = 0 .. Tkn-1: if G(x) & H1(x) = 0 & H2(x) = 0 & ... Under these.58). This tells you something about what will happen in very different... then F(x) = fnk(Hn(x))....... & Hn(x) = 0. etc.

then. What matters. The list of those factors always changes and is never considered to be complete. to understand why the scientists call the formulae the scientific laws. 1980A.16 Leszek Nowak The form of a law of science. Prima facie then. For instance: Kittel et al. calling them scientific laws. If I am not mistaken. The answer is that they spontaneously look for the factors considered to be principal for the investigated magnitudes. (1969.e. The way such a factor influences a given magnitude is grasped in the formula of the appropriate idealizational law. It is not surprising that in his linguistic custom he focuses on what is crucial for him. Therefore. i. In case of finding counterexamples for the formula.77) expresses the law of inertia as follows: "a = 0. the following: assuming a given linguistic stipulation. then the market prices of commodities correspond to their natural prices. the scientist normally assumes that the formula is correct. It is notoriously true that scientists use not the conditionals but the formulae. pp. the structuralists. Well. 20). the conditional Ti. that is. the way in which an expression is used often does not matter too much: sometimes it is of significance. I think. when F = 0". for example equations. Think. the antecedent of the conditional changes with the formula which is kept in force (cf.. for instance. The adopted form of a scientific law may appear today out-of-dated (indeed.g. are arguments. their . below Chap.201ff. sometimes it is confused. however. I cannot. also below section 6 and Chap5). it is only the list of secondary factors which is incomplete and attempts to find a source of the discrepancy. My arguments would run as follows. imagine how the approach identifying a law with the appropriate predicate could explain the fact that sometimes scientists explicitly formulate idealizational conditionals calling them the laws of nature. the followers of the idea „law is a predicate” (e. however. try to explain from your standpoint the reasons underlying the contrary one adopted by your protagonist. However. As a result. the antecedent of it abstracts instead from the working of factors treated to be secondary for this magnitude. quite "symmetric" from the methodologist's point of view is for the scientist evidently "non-symmetric" – the consequent of it is for him much more important than its antecedent. Diederich 1994 calls it "anachronic"). p. that is really a rather traditional point of view. The problem from my point of view is. given my assumptions it is possible to explain why science applies the terminology contrary to mine. Wójcicki 1974. Marx formulated the law of value in the following manner: "if demand and supply balance each other. 1979 and others) are in a better position as what they claim does accord with the linguistic custom in science. of a biologist who would be inclined to classify plants according to the natural language – a crucial category for him would be one of "vegetables" which is an absurd notion from a theoretical standpoint (cf. an hitherto unknown secondary factor causing the deviations. A proper criterion for such a discussion would be.

not to their concretizations closer to the actual facts. we are instead obliged to respect the metaphysical assumptions accepted in science. it teaches us that no "decisive arguments" in our domain exist. and not any concretization of the already established law. Consider the current terminology in science. etc. The quite spontaneous criteria of evaluation in science incline us to name a crucial discovery (an interesting or innovative idea etc. My conjecture is that science respects an ontology which is closer to Hegel rather than to Bacon. b. "real" means in science "essential". How to decide between the two without engaging in an open metaphysical discussion which I want to avoid here? As philosophers of science we should not develop an overt metaphysics. a.) a new proposal of the idealizational law in the given domain. "Lorentz's transformations". this is the Hegelian tradition in which "real" stands in an intimate relation with "essential" (and "true" – cf. It is Newton's most idealized laws for the mass points. For the structuralists. rather. For the new idealizational law as such does not contribute to the diminishing of the discrepancies with facts (sometimes . inertial systems etc.) are attached most often to idealizational laws (i. What can be seriously said is simply this: in the respect analyzed above the conception of law as an idealizational conditional agrees with scientific facts better than one identifying the law with a formula. Part IV of this book). "basic law".The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 17 values defined by the corresponding amounts of labor indispensable for the production of these commodities" (Marx 1845.141.e. If the history of philosophy of science teaches us anything at all. "Domar-Harrod's model" etc. one could rightly expect the reverse to be true. Is it really permissible for a methodologist to make the law of inertia "shorter" distorting the original formulation? When a theory is realistic? Obviously. Also proper names ("Ohm's law". the most abstract idealizational statements). Were the attitude of scientists close to the one adopted by my critic. the terminological custom noted above is only a manifestation of this. "realistic" in science means "sufficiently close to the empirical facts". this is an empiricist tradition or. p. I am perfectly aware that there are also respects under which the latter prevails the former. For me. I do not take arguments of this kind as "decisive" in any sense. The idea in question is that of realistic interpretation of a scientific theory. I guess. The closer is a statement to the empirical facts the lesser chance it has to gain the dignity of a "principle". Diederich adheres to. that are termed "principles" not their numerous concretizations much closer to the empirical world. italics of the original). Everything is instead a matter of balancing arguments and counterarguments in order to keep the basic idea that underlies the whole conception working. that is "not disturbed by the accidentalities". etc. The most straightforward reasons are these.. what remained out of it in the so sophisticated approach as structuralism W.

Approximation Normally. consist actually in replacing one idealizational law by another (e. On the other hand. to a better understanding of its role..4) the conclusion does not follow from the premisees. Most important changes in science.4). That is a matter of theoretical hypotheses which undergo constant tests eliminating less adequate images of the hidden. . passage from (2. In other words.g. which is falsified by finding such a that G(a) & F(a) # f(H(a). not the latter. then F(x) = f(H(x)). final concretization is not met in science. p(a) # 0. sometimes referred to as revolutionary. Therefore.4) if (G(x)& p (x)= 0 & q(x)= 0 & r(x)= 0. The reason for considering this reasoning pattern fallacious is obvious. Given the idealizational statement: (2. p(a) = 0. Some errors of idealization.2) is forbidden as long as it is merely a means of saving a threatened theorem. then F(x)= f(H(x)) G(a) 'F(a)= f(H(a). it is the concretizations of the old idealizational law that do. the Aristotelian principle of inertia by the Galilean-Newtonian one). 3. however. without concretization or approximation) to reality using the following reasoning pattern: (2. And so on.e. q(a) # 0 and r(a) # 0..3) if (G(x)& p (x)= 0 & q(x)= 0 & r(x)= 0. All this testifies not to any negligence of the empirical testing in science but. according to the knowledge on which our idealizational statement t is based. This is the fallacy of reification of idealization. which make the whole machinery closer to empirical facts. then F(x)= f(H(x)) one thing is forbidden: to relate it directly (i. it is forbidden to add an idealizing condition ad hoc. and so forth. nobody knows in advance what is essential for what. essential sides of reality. will be added to the scheme (2. if the enthymematic premisees. that is. without making an effort to remove it and to correspondingly correct the formula of the statement. First and foremost. that is all the idealizing conditions are removed at once and their joint influence is assessed as responsible for the deviations up to a certain threshold (. etc. not in their concretizations although it is actually the former.5) to (2. For. c. given the factual statement: (2. Normally. after introducing some corrections the procedure of approximation is being applied. Let us add for the sake of symmetry that. the body of premisees will prove to be contradictory.5) if (G(x). I would risk saying. In inference (2.18 Leszek Nowak the opposite holds true).

its approximation Ati is true). he refers to approximating his idealizational statements. 4. then F(x) )( fi (H(x). pk(x). Let us note that in the Polish methodological literature the idea of admissibility of idealizational laws whose approximations are empirically false mentioned in the text has been vividly discussed. Krajewski 1974b. 1974a. This procedure continues until the most realistic model becomes a sufficient approximation of the given system.153). ATi+1 are true) and it is only the idealizational statement Ti (i < k) that is „approximatively true” (i. . And also the body of them in subsequent models of the increasing realism becomes larger and larger. Ti are of the above form whereas ATi is an approximation of Ti. a factual statement of the form: ATi: if (G(x) & p1(x) # 0 & ..... Obviously. .. Then they are concretized by gradually admitting the previously neglected secondary properties and modifying the formulas of these statements. Tk-1. i. They are pure fictions” (1983.. given the threshold (.. pi+1(x)]. When building an idealizational theory in science.. it is both possible that already the approximation of the idealizational law ATk is true and that it is actually false and some concretization steps are necessary to obtain a formula complicated enough to deviate from the empirical F-facts by (.e.. 11 ...e. i. In the second case idealizational statements Tk.. Compare Cartwright’s thesis that there are fundamental laws which „are not even approached in reality.. p. & pi (x) # 0 & pi+1(x) # 0 & .. usually criticically (Wójcicki 1974. idealizational laws that do not apply to the empirical facts even approximatively are fully legitimate (Nowak 1973. more statements are equipped in one and the same list of idealizing conditions. ATi.. Tk-1. The laws become more and more complicated and therefore ever closer to the empirical reality. and others). . their approximations ATk. Still. ATk-1.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 19 explaining the F-phenomena the researcher will be referring to the simple approximative structure of the type: (AT) Tk. When a researcher is not in a position (or.e. there is no cognitive need) to apply the latter. & pk-1(x) # 0 & pk(x) # 0)... In science one may find examples of both cases which is to say that „pure idealizations”... Tk-1. Siemianowski 1976.. pp. where Tk. Idealizational theory and explanation The sequence (AT) is somewhat better approximation to theories that are built in the actual scientific practice than the simple idealizational structure (T).. 158-60) 11 Approximation proves then to be a subsidiary means in relation to the concretization procedure. Ti+1 are „approximatively false” (that is. it is far removed from the scientific practice. . Ti.

. that is how the phenomenon deviates from its essence. T1. and appropriate initial conditions C. And this is actually the idea which is adopted in the idealizational approach to science. the statement E (explanandum) describing the given F-fact 12. Tk-1. The model of perfect explanation is thus the following: to explain perfectly a certain F-fact means (1) to identify and select in an accepted idealizational theory a sequence of statements Tk. i. where x ranges over the class G whose member is a.. F(c). (ii) to deduce from the last member of the sequence. (a. .. T0 where (i) its first member is the idealizational law of the magnitude F and the remaining ones are the subsequent. truly or not. i.. is an idealizational statement which neglects all the factors claimed. There are two ideas of explanation. b. This suffers from the famous objection of Feyerabend: it is strange to answer to the question why F(a) by recourse to the facts that F(b). to be secondary. . Such a statement refers then to (what is considered to be) the way in which the principal factors influence the given magnitude.Mi being its subsequent concretizations.. Nowak 1971a. Identifying the „fundamental” laws with idealizational ones and „phenomenological” laws with their (final) concretizations or approximations of their (far enough) concretizations one may state that her criticism is both too strong and too 12 .. 1980a).20 Leszek Nowak The structure of a scientific theory is thus given by a sequence of models Mk. One is that to explain that F(a) means that it is always the case that F(x). where Mk is the most abstract model equipped with k idealizing conditions.e.. The concretizations of the law reveal instead how the regularity manifests itself in the conditions closer and closer to reality . the factual statement T0.e. Mk-1 ... c.. given a definite image of the essential structure of the determined magnitude. All of them reconstruct how the essence is deformed by all the actual disturbances. to (what is considered to be) the regularity. AMi.. N.104). Mi. Cartwright puts in question the deductive-nomological (D-N) model of explanation emphasizing that „[i]t is never strict deduction that takes you from the fundamental equations at the beginning to the phenomenological laws at the end” (1983. that is to the facts which are ununderstandable well as the initial fact to be explained. concretizations of the law provided by that theory.. The other tradition is that to explain means to find the essence of what is to be explained. and all. p. finally. AMi is an approximation of the least abstract of these models Mi to the empirical reality (cf. The idealizational law. Mk1 .. are members of G).

. (t’) if (G(x)& p(x) = 0 & q(x) = 0. i. Diederich (1994) claims that in the model of explanation (let us take for the sake of simplicity its non-approximativist version) which I defend the whole story with concretization is redundant because what actually explains the fact F under the initial conditions E is the factual law T0. including the first of them. when n = 0.107). That is really a serious problem and it may be solved in various ways. One is them is what Diederich claims: concretization is a special case of the relation of entailment. we use in explanation only the final expression T0 & E which is to perfectly agree with Hempel's model . Chap. Second. The second argument is much more subtle for it refers to a controversial problem of the logical relationship between an idealizational statement and its concretizations. r(x). & r(x) then F(x)= f(H(x)) to . not as one of replacing it with an appropriate realistic condition. They legitimate T0. Tk-1. But that position is not mine. explain the (general) factual statement T0. if concretization is understood as a passage from: (t) if (G(x)& p(x) = 0 & q(x) = 0. For instance.. „Too weak” because the relation of concretization is not a „weakened deduction”. q(x)) .The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 21 In the limiting case. „Too strong” because the D-N model is not simply „wrong” as Cartwright calls it (1983. Two arguments are given for this supposition. the D-N model holds good in the extreme. That is so obvious that it should be explained how it is possible that the prominent methodologist does not acknowledge this very fact. One could say that the idealizational premisees.e. factualist case. I do not agree with the first argument. 16.e. the law Tk. i. is that concretization is (mis)conceived as an operation of deleting an idealizing condition (cf. also Krajewski 1977). The I-C model is but a generalization of the D-N model: it says that the D-N model works for the factual statements but it is wrong for the idealizational laws. It is visible that Ti-1 is not more general than Ti : their ranges of application do not intersect. In the light of the idealization-concretization (I-C) model of explanation. then F(x)= f’(H(x. r(x)) . Cf.. The model of approximate explanation differs from the above only by reference to a sequence: Tk. whereas the latter explains the (singular) statement about the fact F. all the idealizational statements are consequences (the limiting case) of the factual presumption T0. The reason. then F(x)= f’’(H(x). I conjecture. not E directly. and finally to: 13 . That is why not the given F-fact but a class of F-facts defined by the threshold of approximation ( can be derived from such a structure 13. we obtain the usual D-N model of explanation: T0 C 'E. . It will be useful to employ the well-known distinction between "explaining laws" and "explaining the facts". First. weak. ATi. further to: (t’’) if (G(x)& p(x) = 0. but a relation sui generis. p. The legitimation for the use of idealizational statements in explanation is their role in deriving the factual statement T0 via concretization. Ti.because we cannot apply the idealizational laws to the real conditions.

that is to form the approximation of that law limited to C: ATk/c: if (C(x) & p1(x) # 0 & . The statement (t) is neither factual.. economical) interpretation but the conditionals. ones underlying the writings W. p. summary in 1982). Lewis's doctrine of modal possibilism requires a significant strengthening and to admit the existence of the ideal worlds including the empty world ("nothingness") in which all the magnitudes are idealized (reduced . and approximate that law for the classical conditions. i.22 5.. then F(x)= f’’’(H(x. as ccct is.. and so do statements (t’’) and cct. This statement can be tested directly. p(x)) then it is obvious to claim that concretization consists in generalization. the matter is easy to comprehend. q(x). If.a special case of the formula of its concretization. no classical cases can either be found or created there. & pi(x) # 0 & pi+1(x) # 0 & . however. If not. (t’’’) is a more general statement applying both to the ideal worlds deprived of factors p and/or q and/or r and the actual world in which all these factors operate. nor idealizational as t is.31).let alone the formulae treated formally. It is only the formula (consequent) of the idealizational statement which is .. The procedure of testing the idealizational statements is not easy to imagine from the standpoint of the idealizational approach to science. I am still inclined to think. How to interpret this metaphysically is another matter. i. If the outcome is positive. if the approximation of a given idealizational law is false for all the subsets of its actual range. 1998) would lead us too far here. But the outlining of this metaphysical proposal (cf. and (t’’’) and cct. and my present views on that subject. In part. call them classical ones.1) F(a) = k (t’’’) if (G(x). 215. (t’) differs from ct. also Chap. for a more sophisticated account cf.e. one may identify a special sort of conditions C. the researcher may create them. . 1991.g. Patryas 1976. then the problem is how an idealizational statement could be tested against the empirical data: (5.cf.if taken in itself . I am rather inclined to think that D. Given the idealizational law Tk .e. the standard Tk is disconfirmed. it confirms the idealizational standard from which it is a deviation. differ from those of the seventies. Diederich deals with. I would like to add. But the unit of science are. At present. That is how the role of experiment is explained – the sense of it is to secure approximation for the idealizational laws (Nowak. not the formulae themselves . Testing idealizational laws Leszek Nowak The rule of delayed falsification. & & pi-1(x) # 0 & pk(x) # 0) then F(x) )( fk(H(x)]. However. For the task of this discussion it suffices to say that what I have not changed are the above schemes of an idealizational statement and its concretization. 1971a. r(x). without a substantive (e. If the classical conditions cannot be found. And those schemes imply that the former is not a special case of the latter.

. pi+1(a))* % ( then ATi is confirmed (directly.4) k = f(l).5) if G(x) & p(x) # 0 & q(a) = 0. then F(a) = k or negative ones: (5. if it is the case that (5.2) if G(x).The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 23 For the sake of clarity.6) if p(a) = 0& q(a) = 0.5) if G(x) & p(x) = 0 & q(x) = 0. Whether ATi is true. under the asssumptions (5. One thing seems to be certain: Popper’s paradigm of falsification (Popper 1959) according to which science tests its theories following the modus tollendo tollens (MTT). If *F(a) – fi(H(a).. then F(x) = f’ (H(x). and indirectly so is also Tk). let us consider simplified schemes. my 1971a.5) is an idealizational statement. then Tk is disconfirmed. then F(x) = f(H(x)) Indeed.1) or its negation cannot be derived from (5. then the factual statement (f) is confirmed. The last idealizational statement is approximated to reality and ATi is obtained. What may follow from (i) are merely positive idealizational observational statements: (5. otherwise it is not. then F(x) = f(H(x)) can be tested against data concerning the empirical object a – i.3) G(a) & H(a) = l . In both cases the error of reification (cf.5). The idealizational statement is concretized step by step by admitting the previously neglected secondary properties and modifying its formula.6)* if p(a) = 0 & q(a) = 0. does not work in the case of idealizational statements at all. then F(a) # k which dismisses Popperian rule of falsification. how the statement with idealizing conditions: (5. The answer is easy in case of a factual statement: (5. Yet. what is necessary is a concretization of (i) of the form: c(5.e. For if (5.. or not. p(x)). 1980a). because statements of the form cannot be found with the aid of observation.. A tentative solution to this problem was the following (cf. If not. pk(a). Under assumptions: . above 2) is committed. then neither (5. only experience will decide. one which does not meet any of these conditions – is not clear at all. In case of our simplified example.

49). AT1. Hoover (1994) asks the following question.. For it results from what is inherent in a model without any additional statements.8) *k – f’ (l.e. Now. otherwise it is not. if it is the case that (5. How to empirically discriminate among idealizations? Sometimes the cognitive usefulness of the rule of delayed falsification is put in doubt. Not so in case of the rule in question. Such a grasp makes it necessary to get rid of the famous claim that a universal for which a counterexample has been found is to be rejected. 1980a.24 Leszek Nowak (5. my 1971a. And when a fact negating such a statement is being found. Assume that there are two competing This is the rule applied by Marx in Capital (cf. ł)* % (. that it suffices to concretize that law in order to explain the discrepancy and take what seems to negate the law as a confirming case (Nowak 1971a. in actual scientific practice the prima facie counterexamples are taken as confirmations. 14 .5) is confirmed.'see' a counterexample. and not disconfirmations. One should distinguish between real counterexamples and prima facie counterexamples. that means that the deviation inherited in this fact is smaller than the threshold of deviations from the corrected formula in the consequent of Ti. Hoover (1994) claims that the rule of delayed falsification outlined in the text makes of the initial. The hard core is immune from the negative outcomes of experience due to adoption of the additional hypotheses making possible a reinterpretation of those outcomes. A fact is a prima facie counterexample of Tk if it negates the approximation ATk of it but there is such a concretization Ti of Tk that the same fact does not negate the approximation ATi any more. In a sense yes. It has also been argued that the outlined grasp of testing allows for including the well-known idea that a theory provides empirical facts with a definite interpretation (Klawiter 1975a).erroneously .. of the idealizational law.) and contrast it with the Marxian one. i.7) G(a) & H(a) = l & p(a) = ł & & q(a) # 0. Not so for the idealizational universals. I would say that the Marxian rule actually consists in revealing to the critic that where s/he sees a counterexample (to a too early approximation of the idealizational law) it proves to appear (after further steps of concretization) actually an example confirming the law. On the other hand. then the main effort of theoreticians is to prove that it is merely a prima facie counterexample. and also the final concretization T0. Hamminga and De Marchi (1994) correctly observe that Marx would manage with counterexamples in that style (p. however. 1980a).. a real counterexample is one which negates all approximations ATk. on what basis they distinguish McCulloch's rule of dealing with counterexamples ("Whereas you .ibid. But still there is a significant difference. 38). then the concretization c(5. I teach you to recognize that it is actually an example" . It is not clear. pp. Hence. 163-64) 14 . most idealized model something similar to "a Lakatosian hard core" ( p.

But what about their commensurability? How could we decide which of them is better not internally but externally. a linear approximative explanatory chain: T: Tk . ... An example of further problems.qj+1(a)]*. There will then take place progress in explaining empirical facts better and better – within each theory taken separately.q j+1 .. (c) If the level ( does not discriminate between T and S.. (b) Take the whole range of the magnitude F and impose ( as the level of admisssible approximation.. ATi. Assume also that both T and S develop according to the rule of delayed falsification and that they have reached their maximally concretized statements. That explanation which retains the level ( for a larger fraction of objects from the range of F is cognitively better.. then the explanation T is better than S for a. Let also the competing approximative explanation of the same facts be given: S: Sn .. Ti. qn (a). between technical idealizations made for reasons of tractability (mathematical or statistical) and essentialist idealizations . It invokes another image of the essential structure of the magnitude F.... . So much on the main structural aspects of the method of idealization. as Nowak does not... Let us consider a simple conceptual structure called. composed of K. in the idealizational approach to science. ASj . How can we decide which is cognitively better? The answer may be given by reference to the following criterion: (a) Take an arbitrary object a from the range of the investigated magnitude F and measure the intensity F(a).The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 25 idealizational theories each developing according to the rule of delayed falsification. qn .. that is by reference to empirical facts? The author provides us with a decisional procedure in econometric terms. Ti and Sj correspondingly. Take a simple example.. pk(a).q i. for example if ( = *F(a) – f (H(a). pi+1(a)]*< *F(a) – g (K(a). The more so.... impose (1 < ( as the level of approximation and continue the procedure until such (p is found which allows to discriminate in the sense (b) between T and S. one should state that the structural problematics of idealization is far from being exhausted and that is visible... In further parts of the book many of them will be presented largely and made more subtle... Hoover (1994) makes the following remark: Bert Hamminga has suggested to me that one needs to distinguish. Si . That explanation which gives smaller discrepancy with F(a) is cognitively better for the object a. That is really an important problem for the idealizational methodology and I would like to reconstruct such a procedure in general terms..

I did not make it and neither did it any of my collaborators. for example . independently of whether this is really the case. Science uses "technical idealizations" when deforming a given domain of objects as to make possible the adoption of the mathematical apparatus.e. is difficult to say. or not. it contains more idealizing conditions) and there occurs in as given science a statement t'' concretized with respect to all the idealizing conditions with which t' differs from t (Nowakowa 1972. summary in 1975b) criticizes the standard implicational notion of correspondence for its neglect of idealization and she introduces the notion of correspondence appropriate to the idealizational laws. On the strength of the assumption of continuity scientists lead reasonings as if the given domain were continuous. Clearly both simplifications occur. And it is of considerable importance. then F(x) = f(H(x)) (ct) if G(x) & p(x) # 0 & q(x) = 0. It is decided (truly or falsely) when the standard idealization is made. If it proves after a time that it is not. It may be that a given field is continuous. then F(x) = g(H(x). p. In case of "technical idealization" the matter is not decided. Anyway. The Dynamics of Idealization A conceptualization of the dynamics of science has also been done in the idealizational terms. 6. of the following form: T: (t) if G(x) & p(x) = 0 & q(x) = 0. That is correct. when the „technical idealization” is put forward. they simply apply the developed theory. Whether such differences between normal idealizing conditions and assumptions underlying the application of mathematics allow to speak of homogeneous „idealization” in more general sense reducing in the extreme cases to the mentioned both cases. When we adopt an idealizing condition we are certain that a given factor acts in reality.46). Nowakowa (1975a. for example . If it is. The problem is open. so it is excluded that the condition is fulfilled in the world. The simplest idealizational sequence would be. The statement t' is said to dialectically correspond to t iff t' is more abstract a statement than t (i. p(x)) . The distinction is necessary. we adopt the assumption of continuity of a given domain in order to employ the differential calculus. the matter of the nature of the given field of reality is not (subjectively) decided.. enough of a family resemblance between them to class them both as idealizations (1994. The issue is whether there is . in English 1974a).26 Leszek Nowak made to isolate the fundamental from the secondary. they try to conceptualize the explained phenomena in a discreet mathematical apparatus. Even superficial glance reveals that there is a serious difference between such assumptions and idealizing assumptions.

p(x). including concretization with regard to the newly discovered source of deviations r: (ct') if G(x) & r(x) = 0 & p(x) # 0 & p(x) = 0. Assume (cct) has been falsified. r(x)). Nowakowa 1982) but its methodological sense was revealed and a more systematic analysis was given . then F(x) = g(H(x). however. then F(x) = h(H(x). In science. q(x). by appropriate acts of concretization. p(x)) (cct') if G(x) & r(x) = 0 & p(x) # & q(x) # 0. In this way the old theory T has been replaced by the new one T'. The basic point for finding a natural explication of the principle of correspondence in terms of the law forces science to abstract from the source of deviation by introducing explicite a corresponding idealizing condition and to remove the condition concretizing the formula of the law at the same time. p(x). The relation which holds between T' and T is termed dialectical correspondence. q(x)) 27 being less and less abstract and more and more realistic at the same time. then F(x) = k(H(x). p(x). which indirectly testifies to the falsity of the initial idealizational law (t).The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… (cct) if G(x) & p(x) # 0 & q(x) # 0.e. i. in other words. An act of abstraction must be complemented. then F(x) = f(H(x)). statement (ccct'). q(x)) (ccct') if G(x) & r(x) # 0 & p(x) # 0 & q(x) # 0. The idea of changes in science that consist in revising the repertory of factors thought to be principal appeared earlier (Nowak 1975. in English 1994) examples are taken from physics to illustrate how the proposed explication works. then F(x) = h(H(x). it is possible to abstract from the sources of deviations only on the condition that it will be shown at the same time how this very factor which is responsible for the deviations influences the given magnitude. In Nowakowa (1975. Then the source of deviations. is identified and abstracted from in order to hold the old formula of (t): T': (t') if G(x) & r(x) = 0 & p(x) = 0 & q(x) = 0. say factor r. more complex. (t') – (ccct') which is to be accepted provided that the facts that have falsified its predecessor can now be explained on the ground of the new. The secong monograph attempts to expand the simple solution outlined above to the level of scientific theories of the increasing complexity and to adjust it to the more and more realistic approaches to the method of idealization that have been found in the idealizational conception to science until recently.

that the repertory of factors claimed to be principal for the determined variable is constant. it is the positivist methodology which reconstructs the actual scientific practice. There are also some reasons to believe that we are witnesses of the fourth revolution of the type made in linguistics by Chomsky (cf. called. 15 Hamminga and De Marchi (1994) argue that Marx had predecessors: McCulloch and J. Therefore.e. There have also appeared. Such 1978. in the second. 1987. they basically differ).e. above Chap. somewhat unfortunately. cf. Paprzycka (1990) introduces the relation between such idealizational laws whose images of the essential structure of the determined magnitude possess different repertories of principal factors (i. cf. 3) 15. St. in economy by Marx (Nowak 1971a-b. the methodological breakthrough is connected with the work of Galileo (Nowak 1971a. Applications and expansions The body of ideas roughly outlined above has been applied in numerous writings to various domains of science. dialectical reduction – dialectical refutation seems to be a better term will be employed here – connects laws separated by a scientific revolution. Two stages in the development of empirical sciences It has been argued that each empirical science undergoes two stages in its development: the inductive and the idealizational. The relation holds between t' and t. above Chap. some of these ideas have proven to be too narrow. p. That is why the relation. the idealizational breakthrough was accomplished by Darwin (Lastowski. in the new idealizational structure. In the first. 1980a. above Chap 2). 26ff. in biology. 7. writings revealing quite numerous procedures akin to the method of idealization/concretization. require either generalization or making these explications narrower in order to appropriately correspond to these intentions.28 Leszek Nowak only by Paprzycka (1990). as for the underlying intentions of the scientists making idealizations and. 8. below). if – roughly – the images of the essential structure of the magnitude determined in t and t' are basically different but there is a common part in them.1). the original reconstruction of the idealization/concretization method had to be expanded in order to cover also some similar deformational (or counterfactual) procedures applied in science. and still do. therefore. cf. i. some data discussed in Chap 20. Egiert (1998) generalizes definition given by Paprzycka and applies it for more conceptually possible cases. it is the idealizational methodology which corresponds to what is going on in science (Magala/Nowak 1985).. In physics. . Due to that at least some elements of the old law are preserved at subsidiary positions in a chain of concretizations. That idea presupposes that the compared laws assume basically similar images of the essential structure of a given magnitude. or too large. Mill. Apart from that.

in English 1980a).The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 29 I shall outline what I take to be more important applications and more important extensions of the initial approach. one with which s/he begins to construct explanation of F-facts) does not contain any other theory (the simplification A). one that put the procedure of idealization in the heart of the scientific activity. And the methodologician who is inclined to see the central scientific procedure in idealization. it is assumed that our researcher always can determine – truely or falsely – the way in which factors considered by him/her as secondary for a given magnitude influence it (simplification B). According to the next simplification. our researcher might be mistaken as to the assessment of the way a given factor influences the magnitude F but it is postulated that s/he has a definite view about that. 1. viz. It is assumed. Obviously. The next simplification claims that the only goal of the scientist is to explain phenomena (assumption D). each of the models containing hypotheses concerning the methodological structure of scientific theories. At this point I shall limit myself to one dimension of the conception alone. then. The theory has been formed as an idealizational theory itself. (III) Idealization of idealization The conceptual apparatus outlined above served to form a kind of a methodological theory of science. (see Nowak 1977a. that is it is composed of several models of increasing realism. And so. the scheme of explanation. we adopt a simplification that the background knowledge of our ideal economist (i. the way of testing. is obliged to abstract at the beginning of his/her analyzes from all the procedures except idealization. . Moreover. etc. also this condition is an unrealistic one as in the standard theoretical situation there are very many "disturbances" the researcher cannot identify.e. In other words. so should the methodologist try to idealize the scientific research practice.. to the structure of scientific theories. In order to do that our scientist-theoretician has to be very strongly simplified. the researcher can always count factors that seem to him/her to be secondary (assumption C). that s/he works on the "theoretical fallow" having at his disposal only his philosophical presumptions and observational knowledge of singular facts. The adopted (methodological) idealizing conditions In the same way as the scientist is inclined to abstract from all the influences s/he decides to be secondary.

.30 Leszek Nowak 2.. this is the case at least at the most idealized level of analysis . it is supposed that if simplifications (AD) were satisfied all theories would be models-I. In other words.e. and therefore modelling such a set of factors need not go beyond the modelled set of them. Let us add that the sense in which model-I is the deep. Its aim is to find an objective system of factors and to reconstruct interdependences between them.. (i = 1. the statements of Q1. 2. proposed in the theory of economics. Let us conceptualize these intuitions somewhat. the set of factors considered to be principal ones for F is included in I(S). Quite the contrary. our idealized theoretician was applying the simple hypotheticist rule "invent hypotheses and . Usually. an image of the system is termed a set I(S) of factors such that. Such factors are looked for which are principal ones for one another. As long as it was in force. the set of all factors principal for F is a subset of S. are equipped with the maximal amount of idealizing conditions of all the statements of the system). that are therefore more often met in the actual research practice are obtainable by removing the adopted simplifications. . for every F of S. it is rather doubtful whether the simplified forms defined by only one relation.. for every F of I(S). which meets the following conditions: (a) for every magnitude of a statement of Q1 all the independent magnitudes shown in it belong to the set I(S). namely that revealing exclusively the working of idealization as the only theoretical procedure. (b)the set Qi-1. A set S of factors is said to be a system iff. The theoretical role of deduction (Model-II) Let us remove simplification (A). that is they would possess their deep form. that of concretization. The deep form of theory (model-I) can be identified with a theoretical system in the outlined sense. . not single factors but some wholes of them are investigated. What is meant by saying this is that model-I is the simplest methodological scheme from which more realistic models.n). appear in the actual practice of scientific modelbuilding at all. or basic. .. form of the scientific theories cannot be comprehended in terms of its typicality. A theoretical system over I(S) is a sequence of sets of statements Q1. and not single statements but some wholes composed of them are. . hypothetically. are idealizational laws (i. is composed of statements which are concretizations of those of Qi. Correspondingly. The deep form of a theory (Model-I) Let us begin with the most idealized form of the economic model. A criterion for characterizing such wholes as objects of modelling in science seems to be the following. Qn.

e. The procedure of the theory-building on the present stage of abstraction is then the following.. .. that is models I. (2a) Those assumptions are removed step by step and appropriate corrections are introduced. the "accumulated theories" denote those which are admitted on the strength of our previous considerations. (lb) From the body of statements conclusions concerning the magnitudes the theoretician is interested in are derived.. all being in force under the same idealizing conditions. at most some of the latter might be irrelevant for some of them... at most those steps in concretization that involve the removal of irrelevant idealizing conditions turn out to be degenerate concretizations (i. (Q0.. On the present stage of abstraction our now (less) ideal theoretician applies another rule of theory-building: "deduce a model-I of a given system from the body of accumulated models-I.... The theoretical role of deduction consists then in enlarging the body of the accumulated models-I. only if the latter turns out to be too weak for that. According to this model-II will be identified with the following structure of statements: (Qk.. After removal of (A) the situation changes: the research may use accumulated theories of his (enlarged) background knowledge.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 31 test them against empirical data" (Popper 1959). (2b) From concretizations obtained in this way the consequences concerning the same magnitudes are deduced: they are valid at the appropriate lower level of abstraction.. but for every such a condition there exists a statement for which it is relevant. (3) This procedure is repeated until the level of factual statements is attained.. C0 ) in which (a) (Qi. Obviously. invent hypotheses and test them against empirical data". possessing the same formula in the consequent as the concretized statement of the higher idealized order).. (1a) Of the accumulated knowledge a set of idealizational statements is selected.... Co) is a pair of sets of factual statements. Ci) are pairs of sets of idealizational statements (k % i % 1).. (b)statements of Qj (assumptions of the jth chain) are independent from one another whereas those of Cj (solutions of the jth chain) are consequences of the former. that is the idealizational statements are concretized. Ck ) (Qk-1. (Qo. Ck-1 ) ..

factors N. Hn(x)) in which x ranges over the universe U of domain D. . . `Y. However. . etc. the direct substantial interpretation of formula (1) in a given domain D would lead to the evidently false statement: F(x) = f(Hl (x). As result the following conditional is put forward (3) if W(x) & q1(x) = 0 &. Formula (1) may hold in domain D only if idealizing conditions eliminating the working of some disturbing factors pl. .. economic. The same may happen not only for domain D. Models-II are more realistic methodological constructs than models-I because they involve not only the relation of concretization but also that of entailment. which plays such an important role in the structure of scientific theories 16. Hn(x)) which is in due course concretely approximated. . . .32 Leszek Nowak (c) each statement of Qj+1. then N(x) = g(K1(x). of the first kind etc) idealizational theories is an inverse of the procedure of formal analogy as presented in my (1980a) book: what is the point of departure in the latter (idealizational theories of phenomena) is the point of arrival in the former.. . that function f is considered to be a mathematical representation of a physical. . .. & pk (x) = 0. . and vice versa. then F(x) = f(H1(x). . Ym) and may be treated as purely formal ones as long as no substantial interpretation of the expressions `X'.. the substantial interpretation of formula (1) together with the idealizational procedure leads to the conditional (2) if U(x) & p1 (x) = 0 &. 17). 16 . then one would say that `framework theories' (e. qr. Let us then make it more realistic removing simplification (B). . Km and the disturbing factors q1. . the structure of models-II is still highly abstract and very far from the actual complication of scientific theories. such theories seem to be systems of mathematical formulae: (1) X = f(Y1. pk are being accepted.. . The outlined procedure for obtaining the (simple. . . . Kirschenmann (1985) is right in maintaining that the idealizational conception of science does not do justice to the framework theories "which might be said to capture part of the general structure of the world rather than essentiality of particular phenomena" (p. cybernetic ones) could be included willy-nilly into the framework of the idealizational conception of science. . . . Approximation (Model-III) In spite of this. Ym are identified as factors F. 3. is a (strict or degenerate) concretization of some statement of Qj (k < j % 0). .. If this tentative grasp proves to be tenable..' is considered. . H1. . . . At the present stage of abstraction our theoretician has information – true or not – as to the working of only some factors s/he considers to be secondary for the investigated ones. Yet this seems to be in principle possible At the first glance. but also for another domain E with the universe W. . . etc. Km(x)j is further concretized and approximated as well. Therefore. Hn being connected in the f-way.& qr(x) = 0. f-dependency. This would testify to the fact that both a formal analogy of the tested idealizational laws may lead to general formulae which can be then ordered in a `framework theory' and the latter may serve as a basis for proposals of different idealizational theories being then formally analogical. `f'.. . . K1.g. . . . They become of some interest for the methodology of the empirical sciences if X and Y1.

. . Kuhn 1976.g. ACi) are approximations of those of Qi (resp. pi. pk-1. . . pk(x). (b) entailment – deducibility within singular "models" (chains) and (c) approximation – none of the "models" (chains) grasps the whole complexity of the actual empirical domain which is "always more complicated" and therefore can at most approximate it. and pk(x) # 0. Ci).. and pk(x) # 0. pi+1(x)).. What is said here is that the structure of theory is composed of the following three relations: (a) concretization – "models" (in our terms. viz.. .. (AQk.. say pk.. .. . ACk). . The sequence of statements Tk. and pi(x) = 0 and pi+1(x) # 0 and. Ck-1 ) . .. . that is concretization works till the ith level of abstraction and then is replaced with approximation 17. p. ... Nonetheless.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 33 Let it be so that the researcher's background knowledge contains such information as to some most significant factors for F. Sneed 1976.120. 182). .. and pi(x) # 0 and pi+1(x) # 0 and. ACi) which differs from model-II only in that the statements of the set AQi (resp. . . Tk-1. Ci ) (AQi..144) can be interpreted within the proposed conceptual apparatus as those cases that confirm already the approximation of the first chain in a given idealizational theory: (Qk. . chains of them) are put in a "sequence of increasing realism". p2. ATi is termed an approximation sequence. Ck). ... p. In this Let us add that Kuhn's "paradigmatic examples" (e.g. TI might be approximated. . . p1. Ti.pi+1. that is the structure common to all economic theories.. . 17 . then F(x) = fi(H(x). pi+1(x)). Niiniluoto 1985.. i (Q .. In other words... are "small enough" so that one might expect the deviations between the left and right side of the formula of the consequent of TI do not exceed the "sufficiently small limits". . . then F(x) ) fi(H(x). A model-III will be termed the sequence: (Qk. that is referred to those facts in which the effects of working factors pI.. pk(x). Ck ) (Qk-1. p... p1 Then s/he is unable to concretize the hypothesis: Ti : if G(x) and p1(x) = 0 and. . the approximation of Ti is of the form: ATi: if G(x) and p1(x) # 0 and.. . and lacks any informations of the kind concerning the remaining magnitudes essential for F. so important for the structuralist concept of theory (e. . . And it appears that model-III itself gives a sufficient approximation to the general structure of scientific theories.

e. i. On the other hand. Yet. below Chap. and the only inhabitants of them might be possibilia only. . 74-75). A pure theory is just a. there would be no distinction between the "empirical" and "pure" theories but in every (idealizational) theory there would be a "pure" and an "empirical" part 18 . . . Our investigator knows thus that there are some factors besides those shown in his image of the essential structure (as principal or secondary) that are essential for a given magnitude.657(7)o. will be read: every factor of the set iF takes on zero value for object x. . Ci) in fact do not speak about the actual world for they refer to (less and less) idealized worlds. 4. even the structure of scientific magnitudes seems to exclude any "empirical theory" in this meaning of the word. Yet. . Yet. the statement is termed a semi-idealizational statement of the first kind. If it contains additionally some idealizing conditions. The expression +-iF(x) = 0. if I am not mistaken. the next chain in model-III. Obviously. . If the researcher adopts this condition being convinced that the set iF is non-empty. for example . (Qi. (AQi. s/he is unable to enumerate them.34 Leszek Nowak sense model-III is supposed to represent the basic structure of the scientific modelling. Ck).cf. Yet. if model-III give a proper view on the basic structure of scientific theories one might say that every one of them "intends to speak about reality". it appears to be a general pattern from which different types of scientific theories are obtainable through taking into consideration some additional structural dimensions 18. assuming realistically that in some cases the investigator is unable to identify all the secondary factors influencing a given phenomenon. #) that are likely empty in the actual world. The general statement containing in its antecedent a semi-idealizing condition will be called a semiidealization statement. not to mention determining their influence upon the investigated magnitude. the expression will be called a semi-idealizing condition. If this is not Haendler (1982) distinguishes between an "empirical theory (which) is characterized by the claim that the entities forming its models are part of the ontological inventory of the actually existing world" and a "pure theory (that) does not intend to speak about reality. Statements of (Qk. Deterministic and probabilistic theories (Model-IV) Let us remove simplification (C). Factors of this kind will be termed interfering factors for the magnitude in question. For every continuous magnitude contains some classes of abstraction (Ajdukiewicz's 1974 construction of a magnitude. The set iF of interfering factors for F can be identified as the difference between the space PF of essential factors for F and its image I(PF) established by our researcher. generalized by Wojcicki 1979. If this grasp is tenable. model-III is far from reproducing all the methodologically significant structural properties pertaining even to the typical scientific theories. is to speak about the real world (among other possible worlds). ACi). as a family of the equivalence classes is presupposed here . 36.picture of a possible world which does not actually exist" (pp.

.and pk(x) # 0.. .... .. .... Let us consider the following semi-idealizational statements: (STk) if G(x) and +-iF(x) = 0 and p1(x) = 0 and... The statement PATI removes the semi-idealizing condition. and pI(x) = 0 and pi+1(x) # 0 and..... pi+1(x)) on the condition that G(x) and .. ... the higher is the percentage of the cases of the first type where the dependence fi occurs........... The ratio of occurrences of f.. the probability of F(x) ) fi(H(x).... the dependence fi might not appear..-iF(x) # 0 saying that at least some interferences take on values different than zero for an object x.. ... pi+1(x))...... and pk(x) # 0. ....... then F(x) = fk(H(x)) . ... (STi) if G(x) and +-iF(x) = 0 and p1(x) = 0 and . ... pk(x). and pk(x) = 0.r (r is a level of admissible fluctuations). . (STi) are semi-idealizational statements of the first kind whereas (SATi) is that of the second kind: it takes into account the influence of the principal factor and the influence of the secondary ones (some in the strict. .. When the total influences of the factors iF cancel each other... accounting for the influence of interfering factors leads to a probabilistic statement: PATi..... the rest in the approximate manner) but it does not account for any interferences. .. If more essential factors belong to iF.... . the dependence fi holds but when some interferences prevail over the remaining ones... and pI(x) # 0 and pI+1(x) # 0 and.. ..e.. . then the percentage of occurrences of fi is smaller... ...... The less essential factors belong to iF.... objects satisfying the realistic condition G(x)) is a relative frequency of the realization of fi...... pk(x).. .... . . This justifies the terminological stipulation according to which PATI is termed a probabilistic counterpart of ATI and a probabilistic approximation of TI..... ... .... the statement in question is a semi-idealizational statement of the second kind. and pk(x) # 0 equals 1........ to the total number of elements of the universe of discourse (i. ... pi+1(x)) (SATi) if G(x) and +-iF(x) = 0 and p1(x) # 0 and. .... .. . then F(x) ) fi(H(x)... (STk).... replacing it with the condition . The univocal dependence fi which is claimed to hold in (SATi) is subject to an influence of interfering factors of the set iF...-iF(x) # 0 and p1(x) # 0 and. . .. .The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 35 the case... then F(x) = fk(H(x)....... pk(x)... Hence.

.. approximation... SACi) (PAQi. If not. there are theories aiming only an explanation of what happens in the actual economic life. .. . A probabilistic model-III will be termed the sequence: (SQk. SCi) (SAQi.. . 179ff).. consequence (between SQj and SCj). A magnitude-value is optimally realized if realized is the extreme (minimal or maximal) case of it. (SQi . SATI. In fact.. . . approximation (between SQi and SAQi) and probabilistic approximation (between SAQi and PAQi). Reconstructional and optimizational theories (Model-V) Let us now remove condition (D) claiming that the explanation is the only goal of the economist... then Fextr(x) = fk(H(x)) where F is a magnitude-value and H is an instrumemal variable to be manipulated by management in order to create a value for H(x) such that F(x) = Fextr(x). but there are also "normative models" whose goal is of a quite different nature. s/he considers it to be necessary to explain phenomena by a probabilistic model. If the researcher thinks the set iF to be empty. the only difference is that ... 5. .. ...STI. standard and probabilistic. SCk) (SQk-l. Now. SCk-I) . p. the growth of national income is an economic magnitude but usually a social value as well. might be defined on optimization statements quite analogically as they have been defined for standard (reconstructional) statements considered until now. I shall only outline how to include intuitions of this kind into our conceptual apparatus. SACi) determined by the relations of concretization (between statements of SQk. Instead model-III in the sense employed until now will be identified as deterministic.. For instance.. Let us notice that some magnitudes are at the same time values in a given society (for a more detailed construction cf. and pk(x) = 0.36 Leszek Nowak The sequence of statements STk. SQi). An optimizational semi-idealizational statement differs from the above one only in that it possesses additionally a semi-idealizing condition... 1980a. One might thus distinguish statements in which the determined magnitude is at the same time a value in a given society and which state what the optimal realization of the magnitude-value depends upon. an optimizational idealizational statement (of the highest order) will be termed the following claim: OTk: if G(x) and p1(x) = 0 and.. s/he is inclined to build a deterministic model. PASTI is termed a semiidealizational approximation structure.. Operations of concretization.

Descriptive analysis of the method of applied science of the sort mentioned above induces also the epistemological problem of what the possible practical effficiency of a theory testifies to. (1990) makes a typology of various conceptions of idealization and reinterprets the approach in question in his own conceptual apparatus. 1980a. . The field is. A note on some comparisons In several writings comparative analyzes of the above outlined approach with some famous theories of science have been undertaken. (1990a).. in English 1990) compares the above outlined idealizational conception of science A far going expansion of the methodological approach to the practical sciences presented in the text is one elaborated by Nowakowa (1991). writings reproduced in Part IV below) but also in axiological discours(es). 6. another collection of that sort is Brzeziński et al. so that their degree of approximate truth or truthlikeness increases” (p. O’Neill 1988. Sandri (1977) and Coniglione (1978). 127).56) or Koj’s thesis on the overt applicability of the notion of truth to moral norms (Koj 1998. attempting to find additional. still far from being exploited. and is.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 37 these operations hold between optimizational statements. #) – seem to testify that idealization and truth may be tied not only in science (cf. The problem is discussed by Niiniluoto (1994) who argues that „[w]hen the idealized model is concretized. the derived predictions and technical norms can be likewisely improved. Indeed. p. Nowak (1971a. It is quite obvious that even model V is far from the actual scientific practice. Ibarra and Mormann (1995) attempt to paraphrase the basic ideas of this approach in the sophisticated language of the structuralist philosophy of science. Klawiter and Nowak (1979) paraphrase Lakatos' theory of science in idealizational terms. Kuhn’s theory of paradigms and Weber’s theory of ideal types. Part 3) compares the idealizational approach to science with positivism. The fact that among scientific theories there appear both reconstructional and optimizational ones testifies that today theoretical science is theoretical enough to give foundations for practical applications 19. Balzer and Zoubek (1995). It is argued that the former three theories of science ignore the method of idealization. Optimizational modelsIII contain optimizational statements at least among solutions of particular systems. Kuokkanen and Tuomivaara (1990). Kuipers's reader (1980) includes various approaches to idealization in one collection of papers. Hamminga (1989). Kuipers (1992). 19 . however. silent simplifications in order to bring the construction closer to the scientific reality. whereas the latter conceptualizes it in quite different way. hypotheticism. (1990a-b) take the idealizational approach to be one of post-positivist conceptions of science and conduct a comprehensive comparative analysis with the remaining members of that orientation. a large part of writings in the idealizational approach to science was. Chap. And so. Kuokkanen (1988). pp. In this connection a question arises of whether these concepts might be applied to the moral discourse. 1992. . Some partial proposals – formal analogy between the idealizational discourse in science and the moral discourse (Nowak 1974b. Kupracz (1988. part 2. this analysis is deepened and further developed by Egiert (1999). on some limitations of the analogy cf.II(2). Niiniluoto (1986). to say the least.

moreover. also Chap. Chap. V. Cohen's theory of eliminative induction.J. Zaandvort’s approach to research programs. Three barriers for any methodological theory of science All the methodological theories of science suffer from the sin of locality: what they claim applies. Cartwright (1989) examines the notion of idealization and concretization comparing them with the ideas of her own. at best. Suppe and Cartwright. Humphreys. Paprzycka (1990) compares the idealizational model of laws and explanation with those of Hempel. It is claimed that induction is the method of science. (II) the barrier of meta-language: a methodology should understand not only natural and social sciences but it should also understand itself. Take the classic example. Kuipers’ idea of reduction – into the language of the idealizational methodology. Nowak (1990) does the same by analysis of L. cf. Assume that this is correct not only for physics but also for jurisprudence. Another example: it is claimed that the criticism of hypotheses is the main method of science. also Chap. the (hypo)thesis of the existence of three worlds? What about "basic statements" that would legitimize the hypotheticist methodology itself? For instance. Nowak and Nowakowa (1990) analyze Bunge’s theory of truthfulness comparing it with the idealizational methodology (cf. 31 below). Nowakowa (1991. not generalizations. is the above claim of the criterion of science scientific in itself? If not. why is science of science not to be a science? Here are three typical barriers for any conceivable methodological theory: (I) the barrier of generality: one should demand from methodology to understand all the object-language sciences at once. . Egiert (1998) paraphrases several crucial ideas of the Groningen approach to science – Hamminga’s conception of „interesting theorems”. (IV) Applications 1. to a particular domain of science and fails entirely for other scientific disciplines. for instance. their instances are based not on observation but on the understanding of texts or of other cultural products. Assume that this holds for the natural sciences. 13 below) paraphrases the inductivist idea of enumerative induction in the language of the idealizational approach to science finding in the latter some gaps to be filled by means of positivist ideas.38 Leszek Nowak with that of Suppe. and. But what about philosophy? Which are the "basic statements" whose negations would legitimize. But what about jurisprudence? The theses of the traditional humanities are normally singular statements. Salmon.

I am unable to refer to the latter effect in a concise summary. (4) sometimes – especially in the humanities – a possibility to explain difficulties in understanding the theory leading. numerous attempts have been undertaken to reconstruct particular theories of various disciplines as idealizational. (B) the first model. p. (D) approximation of the theory.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 39 (III) the barrier of formal sciences: the task of methodology is not only to understand sciences of the world including this peculiar part of the world which is science itself. the so-called categorial one. (C) a sequence of derivative models. could be shown. Their goal is not only to illustrate the general methodological grasp of science but also to introduce a kind of conceptual order to a given science itself. 1988) or in linguistics (Nowak 1972e. Zielinska (1986) reconstructs the theory of the evolution of stars as a special sort of idealizational theory. 237-65). pp. but also to explain in terms of the proposed approach formal sciences (mathematics. for short) and its role in understanding the world. Zgolka 1976. Krajewski (1974) interprets the Copernicus's opposition against Ptolemaic astronomy as a methodological breakthrough leading from the inductivist methodology to the idealizational one.31-32) – will not be summarized here. 1982 and Sobczynska 1982. (3) usually an explication of the relation of a given theory to the preceding one. (2) clarification of the methodological structure of the crucial theoretical concepts by attaching them to definite levels of abstraction (models) of the theory. some occasional applications – for instance in chemistry (Stasiak 1979. viz. to fruitless discussions 20. As far as the idealizational approach to science is concerned. Kmita 1972. 20 . Applications in the natural sciences Astronomy. in which the repertory of the principal factors As an example. 2. One should add that the following review will only be concerned with the most important groups of writings. Let us present a (very) rough outline of the analyzes of the kind. Therefore. not as idealizational. some criticisms of Marx's theory based on treating it as factual. as it happened more than once. therefore let me only notice that the standard effects of the writings to which I shall refer are normally the following: (1) clarification of the methodological structure of reconstructed theory by distinguishing typical elements of the theory: (A) idealizing conditions. An analysis of these criticisms may be found in Nowak (1980a.

Nowak (1973a. p. pp. is comprehensively analyzed by Patryas (1976. 314-16) appears to testify to the fact that physicists observe the non-Popperian rule of falsification (cf. pp.311-13) argues that the classical Eratostenes measurement had evidently made recourse to some idealizing conditions which had been next removed in order to correct the final outcome of measurement. Physics. Patryas was also concerned with the role of idealizations in mental experiments playing so important a function in inventing physical theories (1976. non-structural aspects of the procedure of concretization. An analysis of the relationship between the law of Clapeyron and van der Waals' law is the paradigm of concretization. Newton had not believed in the absolute space and time but treated these as useful ideal types. Also certain standard ways of concretization of idealizational laws in physics have been reconstructed. An analysis of the indirect method of testing of the law of perfect fluid (Nowak 1973a. pp. The role of experiments in testing idealizational laws in science. 42-43). Kocikowski's (1977). Such (1990) analyzes the specificity of the relationship between the idealizational law of gravitation and the facts focusing on some pragmatic. pragmatic direction . This paper includes four steps of concretization of the law of free fall. Boscarino (1990) argues that contrary to the stereotype. The initial reconstruction (Nowak 1971a.5): they reject a statement as late as the attempts to explain the deviation by concretization have failed definitely. pp. A detailed historical reconstruction of the law of free fall. an alternative interpretation of that law in terms of isolating assumptions is proposed by Kmita (1976. 2225) illustrates what she calls the threshold generalization of idealizational laws by examples taken from the theory of solid bodies. Nowak (1971a. II. 96-99). Nowak 1977a-b). (1978) analyzes of the method of constructing ideal types in physics go in a similar. The law of gravitation and its formal Coulomb's counterparts is analyzed in Nowak (1971a.40 Leszek Nowak changes in subsequent stages of the evolutionary process (for a general characteristics of the categorial processes cf. summary in 1982). illustrated mainly by physical experiments. pp. 259-60) interprets the method of perturbations in terms of idealization and concretization. . summary in 1975a). both relative to Galileo's mechanics and to the mechanics of Newton. 173-76) is made more complete by Zielinska (1976) and far more sophisticated by Kuipers (1985). pp. A methodological analysis of the astronomical measurements also proves that they are done under some idealizing conditions. is undertaken by Such (1978). The same author analyzes a certain method of removing systematic errors in the astronomical observations proving that this method presupposes revealing the tacit idealizing conditions and correcting the outcomes of observations by way of concretization (1974b. 212). Zielinska (1981. above. pp. pp. Nadel-Turonski (1978. 184-89) analyzes the method of superposition.

the relationship between the law of gravitation and III Kepler's law (1975a. genetic ecology and sociobiology on the one hand. pp. Moreover. Biology. pp.48-51. summary 1982b) reconstructs the Hardy-Weinberg law and four steps of its concretization generalizing then his findings on the status of theoretical biology (1978a-b).39) in terms of his approach to idealization. Paprzycka (1990) analyzes the relationship between the formulae of special physical relativity force and Newtonian force as a case of dialectical reduction (cf. He finds a similar methodological structure in the ecological theory of behavior (1986. The same author interprets the classical model of the growth of a biological population as a kind of idealizational theory (1974b. 6-18) has reconstructed Pavlov's theory as one formed of idealizational-adaptive statements and constructed according to the rule of concretization of a special kind.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 41 Numerous writings are concerned with the development of physical theories. Nowakowa is analyzing the relationship between classical mechanics and Galileo's law of free fall (1975a. 1977. Nowak (1974b. The first two of them is still differently reinterpreted by Such (1974) in terms of his modification of Nowakowa's notion of dialectical correspondence. and the Darwinian theory of evolution on the other hand. 1976. Nowakowa (1974b) analyzes in these terms the transformation of the notion of mass in the relativistic mechanics. 39-65). in terms of a certain type of The same example is analyzed by Niiniluoto (1990.262-63) argues that the transformations of Lorentz dialectically correspond to those of Galileo. 55-57) 21 in the terms of dialectical correspondence (cf. Kosmicki (1986. 1982a) in the light of his renewed implicational concept of correspondence. Lastowski and Nowak (1982) present the Darwinian theory of evolution as an idealizational theory. These and some additional examples are reinterpreted by Krajewski (1974. 24-131. the transformations of Ohm's law (1975b). appropriately modified at some point. pp. pp. summary in Lastowski 1994). It is argued that the ecological-populationary theory of evolution dialectically corresponds to the theory of Darwin and the genetic polymorphism theory stands in the same relation to Hardy-Weinberg theory. synthetic evolutionism and the genetic-populationary theory of evolution dialectically correspond to both Darwin and Hardy-Weinberg theories (1987. In a subsequent book the author reconstructs the relationships between classical ecology. On the other hand. The author reconstructs in his terms several non-trivial examples of concretization in physics and mathematical biology (pp. pp.35-42). pp. above II. p.6). 1982). Lastowski (1976. Lastowski (1982a) employs the distinction between idealization and abstraction in order to delimit different types of cognitive constructs in theoretical biology. above II. pp. The same author undertakes a reconstruction of evolution of the theory of evolution according to the principle of dialectical correspondence. 21 .6). Nowak (1971c) reconstructs the McCulloch-Pitts model of the neuron as an idealizational concept. 129-30).

There are some examples of the reconstruction of particular laws and their concretizations (Maruszewski 1983. Piontek (1985) and Lastowski (1985b) attempt to reconstruct the methods of biological anthropology. Notarrigo 1985 and Hamminga 1990) and Marx's theory of reproduction (Nowak 1980a. Zielinska 1981. Krause. The same author reconstructed in terms of the idealizational approach – otherwise expanded by himself (cf. in English 1997) reconstructs in terms of idealizational method the process of forming several important psychological notions from the theoretical level to the level of operationalization (pp. Balicki 1978. The same authors (1978) also explicate how Marx's theory of reproduction have further been transformed in the later development of Marxist economics: it turns out that Nonomura's. pp.42 Leszek Nowak dialectical correspondence (1988. p. 64-71) argues that the relationship between Rosa Luxemburg's theory of reproduction and Marx's theory is not one of dialectical correspondence. ex post facto and correlational-regressive (1978. 47-58. 1980a. pp. Hornowska (1989. the relationship should be labelled dialectical reduction. summary 1985). for alternative reconstructions in terms of idealization cf. 1982). Lastowski (1985a) analyzes the significance of the Darwinian adaptive-idealizational theory for psychology. pp. Nowakowa and Nowak (1973) examine the methodological rules of the transformation of Ricardo's law of value into Marx's law of value. semi-experimental. Gaul 1990. Gaul 1990. Brzeziński (1976. he himself) as following the rule of . Psychology. Nowak 1987a. Roemer. notably the typological approach to race. Economics. 1979) examines the essentialist procedures (experimental. One should mention here reconstructions of Marx's theory of value (Nowak 1971a. 3-22. pp. 61-96). 33-41. Applications in the social sciences. cf. 143-52). pp. in Paprzycka's (1990) terms. Garcia de la Sienra (1990) interprets recent theories based on Marxian economics (Morishima. 3. pp. also Chap 3 above). pp. And so. but the main effort concentrates on the reconstruction of the empirical research as undertaken in psychology. in terms of idealization and approximation. below) – three main models of testing applied in the behavioral sciences: experimental. the classical discipline for the idealizational conception of science. Lange's and Nagels's models of reproduction dialectically correspond to the model of Karl Marx (cf. pp.25-27. statistical) that serve to assess the significance of particular factors and thus enable the researcher to hypothetically form an image of the essential structure of a given magnitude. apart from physics. pp. Applications of the idealizational approach in the natural sciences concern mainly the theoretical level of scientific activity. Not so in psychology. That domain. 1032-33) interpreted the notion of norm commonly applied in psychology as presupposing the notion of idealization. Nowak (1984. 25-27). p. 130ff] and even of the whole theories (for instance the signal detection theory. 58120. 11-84. Nowak (1983.

The Idealizational Approach to Sceince…


removing subsequent idealizing conditions due to which the subsequent models are "increasingly less idealized and more general" (p.123); this may be understood in terms of dialectical correspondence. What applies to Marx's economics applies outside it as well. Nowak (1972, pp. 92-132) presents a certain classification of economic models and shows that all of them fall under the general notion of idealizational theory. Among examples of models of particular types there have been reconstructed, for instance, Kalecki's theory of the business cycle (pp. 92-106), Kozniewska's theory of the renewal of production means (pp. 106-116), the standard econometric model (pp. 117-128, for an alternative interpretation in the idealizational terms cf. Kupracz 1978, 1992), Keynes's multiplier model (pp. 129-32). In (1974b, pp. 132-35) of the same author, Kaldor's theory of growth is presented with the aid of the conceptual means of the idealizational method. J. Birner argues that the strategy of correspondence (which he defines somewhat differently (1990b, p. 71-72)) works in today's capital theory where new models corresponding to the older ones result from reflection upon the theoretical or formal role of idealizing assumptions rather than from an analysis of their empirical applicability (1990a, p.146). Idealization in micro-economics appears quite often in the form of the rationality assumption. Its role in the economists' reasonings is explored in Balicki (1972, 1973) and Nowak (1972b). Sociology. In this domain, two main traditions have been analyzed in terms of the idealizational approach, viz. Marxism and Liberalism. With respect to the first, two theories have been idealizationally reconstructed in details, viz. Marxian historical materialism (for civilized societies) and Engelsian historical materialism (for primitive societies). Marxian historical materialism is interpreted as an adaptive-idealizational theory. The first model of the theory is being composed of the explication of famous formulae: (A) productive forces determine relations of production; (B) the economic base determines the political superstructure; (C) the social being determines social consciousness. Determination is understood as accomplishment to certain conditions and thus all of these formulae are adaptive. For instance, the first of them is explicated as follows: (A') among the historically given systems of the relations of production, that one becomes widespread in a given society which, for a given level


Leszek Nowak of productive forces yields the greatest surplus product to be appropriated by the class of disposers of the means of production of that society.

Similarly are reinterpreted the others. The adaptive formulae (A')-(C') are equipped with numerous idealizing conditions and constitute model Ist of Marxian historical materialism (Nowak 1975a). Numerous authors have reconstructed further models. And so, Lastowski (1977, summary 1982) employs analogy of Marxian historical materialism with the theory of evolution in order to obtain some dynamic models of social development in the latter theory. An alternative interpretation of models of social dynamics in adaptive-idealizational terms is elaborated by Buczkowski (1981, pp. 12-128, 1982a). The same author presents a model of inter-societal relations in terms of the theory in question (1981, pp. 128-210, summary 1982b). Buczkowski, Klawiter and Nowak (1982) propose a model accounting for more subtle interconnections between the economic base, political superstructure and social consciousness based on the observation that for all these domains some analogues of the claims (A') – (C') may be formulated. In sum, under the adaptive-idealizational interpretation, Marxian historical materialism proves to constitute a network of eight models with the most idealized one, composed of the formulae (A') – (C') equipped with appropriate idealizing assumptions, at its centre. Nowak (1972d, cf. also 1977d, pp. 220-63) reconstructs the sequence of eight definitions of the Marxian concept of class of increasing concreteness, i.e. containing more and more complete divisions of capitalist society, which are attached to various levels of abstraction of the Marxian theory of social classes. This result implies that the theory is to include at least eight models. By a later reconstruction that supposition has been half-proved: Jasinska and Nowak (1976) present the Marxian theory of class as a body of hypotheses ordered in four models of the increasing concreteness. One should perhaps add that some historical studies have been undertaken in order to find earlier interpretations of historical materialism in the idealizational terms. And, indeed, they can be found in the history of Polish (Krzywicki, Rosa Luxemburg) (Klawiter 1975a, Nowak 1983a, p. 64ff] and Italian (Labriola, young Gramsci) Marxism (Coniglione 1986). Unfortunately, later on these ideas were somehow forgotten and the Marxist tradition went in the direction of either positivistic naturalism ("Eastern Marxism") or idealistic anti-naturalism ("Western Marxism"). The second theory which is explored by means of the idealizational method is Engelsian historical materialism, that is a theory which is to apply to the so-called primitive societies. Burbelka (1975) explicates a piece of that theory as an idealizational structure and then went on to reconstruct the whole Engelsian approach in a systematic manner as an adaptive-idealizational theory historically prior to Marxian historical materialism (Burbelka 1980, and summary in 1982).

The Idealizational Approach to Sceince…


Another tradition which is analyzed in idealizational terms is Liberalism. Nowak (1971a) presents Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy as a qualitative idealizational theory, that is in terms transgressing Weber’s own ideal-typical approach (Nowak 1980a, Chap. V). Banaszak (1999) reconstructs the classic Hobbes’ theory of state as a sequence of four models of increasing realism. It is also shown that the author of Leviathan was to some extent aware of the method applied in building at least some of these models. Przybysz (1996a, 1999) reconstructs Rawl’s theory of justice as an idealizational theory composed of three models of a special, both descriptive and normative status. He similarly interprets also the theories of Buchanan and Nozick (Przybysz 1999). The main focus of his interpretation is put, however, on deciphering what the mixed „descriptive and normative” idealization consists in. Przybysz distinguishes the two styles of idealizing social matters – radical and moderate. A given domain of social life is radically idealized if the intuitions people partaking in it have are to be rejected by the theoretician as misleading; for instance for Marx consciousness of capitalists is grounded in „the structure of appearance” and thus suggests a false theory of the economy. A domain of social life is moderately idealized, if the agents’ intuitions are to be kept by the theoretician and his/her theory is to follow them as a source of its significance hypotheses. That is what Przybysz (1999) claims to be a real peculiarity of liberal methodology: the theoretical idealization is to follow the spontaneous, practical idealization submerged in everyday activity of an appropriate sort. Apart from these reconstructionist efforts, some methodological analysis of research in sociology have been undertaken. Tuchanska (1980, pp. 33-68) distinguishes typical stages of sociological research attempting to conceptualize them in terms – otherwise expanded by herself (cf. section V below) – of the idealizational conception of scientific conduct. Suchoccy and Walkowiak (1984, pp. 11-193) attempt to systematize the methodological problems of the sociological empirical research in terms of the method of idealization as expanded by Brzeziński and Tuchanska (cf. section V below). 3. Applications in the humanities General. The methodological analyzes of the humanities in the Poznan milieu were guided by Kmita's (1971) idea that it is the humanistic interpretation – whose major premise is the assumption of rationality – which plays the crucial role in these disciplines. Kmita and Nowak (1970) put forward a conjecture of the idealizational nature of the assumption of rationality. Nowak (1971d, pp. 6065, 1974b, pp. 161-63) and Kmita (1972) formulated the assumption of rationality as an idealizational law, but it was only Patryas' monograph (1979) which reconstructed, in ten steps, the procedure of the concretization of that statement (pp. 5-46, short summary in 1982). The same author applies his findings in a detailed analysis of the concretizations of the assumption of

Topolski devoted much attention to reconstruction of the application of the peculiar type of idealization. 1985) made it possible to justify anew the idea that there is no crucial difference in methods between the natural sciences and the sciences of man. He also reconstructs some models built by historians. These results – combined with numerous writings of Kmita and his collaborators testifying to the commonness of the humanistic interpretation in the humanities (cf. Paprzycki (1992). the anti-naturalist programme in the philosophy of the humanities is based on the lack of understanding of what is going on in the natural sciences (Nowak 1979a). whereas in the latter case that law is far too simplified (that is. Several authors (Chmara and Nowak 1972. on the one hand (Topolski 1973c). Pomorski (1981) proposes an exposition of ontological (essentialist) and methodological (idealizational) presuppositions that are to be assumed by historians in their daily work.e. pp. and. An important ontological peculiarity of the social processes that historians deal with was analyzed by Brzechczyn (1995. For the underlying method in them is that of idealization and concretization. Lawniczak 1976 and their analysis in Swiderski 1984. He explores not only applications of the standard form of that assumption (Topolski 1978. 140ff]. 1990a) but also its limiting cases such as the problem of rationality of group behavior. Kmita 1971. p. its approximation holds true). Nowak (1974b. on the other (Topolski 1977. Zamiara 1974.46 Leszek Nowak rationality as presupposed in penal law (1988. the ranges of appropriate essential structures) of both kinds. may be found in the historical research (Topolski 1974. pp. this is what the so-called cascade-processes are marked by. 1977. Pomorski 1981) propose various interpretations of the directive of historicism in idealizational terms. for instance. pp. M. in historical research. In the former case an apppropriate idealizational law is close enough to the empirical facts (that is. those that are dominated by the principal factor(s) and those that are not. and the problem of rationality of the subconsciouss motives. The idea is that there are two different types of essential structures. including his own model of the development of capitalism (Topolski 1965). 276ff. History.. Topolski 1977. 37ff. The abovementioned peculiarity of the historical processes consists in the fact that one and the same phenomenon passes during its life-time through the areas of influences (i. This approach to the nature of the . pp. Zgółka 1976. the assumption of rationality. 213) examines peculiarities of modelling in history on the example of Kula's famous model of feudal economy. p. That is why. 161ff. 75-130). its approximation is false) and demands to be concretized. viz. Nowak 1979b. according to him. 315ff]. Topolski (1973a) employing the conceptual apparatus of the idealizational approach to science distinguishes certain types of historical models. 1998) who was developing an idea put forward by K. The same author analyzes variations of concretization procedure that.

and also in the claim of the chaotic nature of social processes. The assumptions formulated as idealizational statements form eight models of decreasing abstractness. Chap. Pomorski (1981) also considered elementary statements and historical generalizations of the idealizational nature that play so important a role in the historical narration. 179ff]. and is made more subtle by Wronkowska's (1982. 1987. Nowak (1973a. which is their goal. pp. 1990. also Ziembiński and Zieliński 1988. A systematic reconstruction of the historical narration as a special case of the idealizational structure is presented by Nowakowa (1990. Nowak 1980a. Applications in the practical sciences The peculiarity of the practical sciences is interpreted so that it is programming. a short summary in 1987b) reconstructs a ramified system of assumptions concerning the legislator that are hidden in the rules of the so-called "juridical logic" (for instance. also Patryas and Wronkowska 1985) and Kustra’s (1980) efforts to bring it closer to the actual problems of legislation. cf. argumenta a fortiori. cf. and not explaining. he finds a rationale in Windelband’s idiographic understanding of historical sciences reconstructing its ontological presuppositions in terms of cascade-processes. a possibility to include the construction of perfect legislator into the framework of the communicative rationality in the Habermasian style. 191ff] analyzes of the notion of the legislator as employed in the theory of law. Kmita (1990) and ZirkSadowski (1990) have considered. p. Malinowski and Nowak (1972) discuss a possibility of employing the method of idealization in the theory of law. a statement is called optimization if the determined magnitude is at the same time a value (of cases of the type Nowak 1974f] and the formula of the statement provides the method of obtaining the extreme case of this magnitude-value. Jurisprudence. Programming is realized by building optimization statements and theories. Roughly. lex specialis derogat generalis. 162ff. pp. 1976. Some pieces of physical engineering (Chwalisz . Brzechczyn (1995) developed that conception significantly. 1997) makes focus on. The idea of the paper has been significantly transformed in a fully elaborated and well justified conception in a monograph by Patryas (1991). 4. An alternative way of dealing with the notion of chaotic causality and a delimitation of the range of its occurrence was presented by Nowak (1994). the former with the negative and the latter with the positive outcome. cf. The practical theory is an idealizational theory that has optimization consequences in all of its models (Chwalisz et al. This still abstract construction is complemented by Ziembiński's (1982. For instance.). Nowak (1974d) finds numerous idealizing conditions underlying the notion of guilt in the penal law and attempts to find out the implicit way of developing that notion in juridical writings.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 47 historical process has numerous methodological implications that Brzechczyn (1996. etc. 1985. 21 below).

1974b. p. Nonetheless. That theory might be thus reconstructed as an idealizational one. is asserted with certainty. Various systems of beliefs may even be ordered (cf. pp. Applications in philosophy The above remarks seem to confirm the conjecture that the idealizational approach to science passes the barrier (I). pp. This supposition is developed in details by Egiert (1998) who reconstructs in idealizational terms the method of criteria of adequacy put forward by Rescher (1968) and Castaneda (1980). Categorial ontology as an idealizational theory. Nowak (1976d.). models of the policy of economic growth (ibidem and Nowak 1972b.47ff). etc. 237-39). pp. The status of philosophical logic. the theory of games (Nowak 1974b. 5. in order to prove that the underlying relation of concretization allows to localize the majority of the material discussed in the analytical theory of acceptance and to throw a new light upon some important points of the incessant debates in the analytical philosophy. also referring in part to the peculiarity of the method of idealization in this domain.48 Leszek Nowak et al. Nowak 1974b. pp. It is composed of five . Patryas (1987. pedagogy (Kozowna 1976) and criminology (Konieczny 1984) have been examined in terms of the above conception. whatever X accepts. 242-44). The ontology is built as an idealizational theory in itself. A further step in deepening of the optimization conception of the practical research was done by Nowakowa (1991. 1971) from the strongest system of absolute knowledge based on axiom X believes that p iff p up to the weaker systems of hypothetical acceptance. Here evidence is really limited and far from systematic.166-69) examines von Wright's system of the logic of preference finding that its axioms of it postulating asymmetry and transitivity of preferences of the arbitrary person X are based on some idealizing conditions (X accepts all the tautologies of the classical propositional calculus. Marciszewski. 1978b] presents a reconstruction of ontology presupposed by the method of idealization. the less restrictive idealizing conditions are assumed. 1976. from the most to the least idealized. is elaborated by Siemianowski (1976). i. The weaker the axioms. pp. Similarly all the other domains of the so-called philosophical logic are based on idealizations of a certain kind and one of the strategies of development of that domain would be that of weakening the hitherto adopted axioms which might be interpreted as building systems which dialectically correspond to the old ones. Let us discuss in idealizational terms a possibility of understanding what the status of philosophy is. 240). Nowak (1974b. there is some which testifies to the fact that the idealizational methodology appears to meet the criterion of adequacy (II). p. 59-205) systematically builds eleven definitions of believing. it seems to be able to explain some important traits of the object-sciences.e. The same concerns the logics of beliefs. An alternative approach to the practical tasks of science. 191ff.

if categorially changeable. however. the fact that they hold on various level of complexity of objects.e. The image of the method in science agrees with the method of making the very image (Nowak 1980a. hypotheticism is not a result of criticism of hypotheses. Basic theses of the model impose some limitations on possible essential changes. As presented in Nowak (1980a) it is a sequence of five models of increasing realism: in the initial model the main type of theoretical construct is a simple sequence <idealizational law and the series of its concretizations> whereas in model IV the main theoretical construct is rather a complicated structure in which the relations of concretization. According to hypotheticism. i. science applies the method of criticism of hypotheses with the aid of empirical tests. II] proposes an epistemological theory composed of five models adopted to categorial ontology. whereas it is obvious that the thesis of instrumentalism is to be realistically interpreted in the domain of science. The first model deals with the rules of transformation of an arbitrary category. Nowak (1976-78.e. whereas it is obvious that this is not what the inductivist methodology does. The relationship between categorial epistemology and idealizational methodology is analyzed by Nowakowa and Nowak (1985) and Gaul (1990a. i. instrumentalism is not a mere instrument. pp. summary in 1990b). inductivism is not a product of induction. as they take into account the peculiar relations characteristic of practical sciences. In a nutshell. to be idealized in different times in quite a different manner. vol.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 49 models. approximation and statistical concretization are involved. According to positivism. The list of models is much longer as may be found in the expositions of the idealizational approach to science in Kupracz (1988) and Nowakowa (1991). may be roughly understood as a kind of idealizational theory. the structurality of phenomena. that a characteristic feature of the main methodological orientations is the incompatibility between the image of science which it presents and the image of itself which it offers. Indeed. entailment. which makes it necessary for one and the same phenomenon. Idealizational methodology is an idealizational theory in itself. The main claim of the model is that phenomena undergo not only events but also essential changes. the transformations in the composition of their essential structure. Further models take into account the previously neglected dimensions of the essential change: the mutual influence of phenomena. 195-96). for it applies logical reconstruction which is neither of the two methods prescribed for science. Self-referential application. Note. i. And in model V the things become even more complicated. The idealizational methodology. the idealizational . etc.e. empirical science builds a pure calculus which does not say anything about the world. According to instrumentalism. science is to observe and generalize observations. a phenomenon with its essential structure. whereas methodology is to produce "conventions" concerning scientific conduct.

a formal scheme of which it is built by substantive interpretation.) of idealizational constructs. including methodology of science. at best. Third. Zielinska (1976b) examines the method applied in geometry arguing that it is formally analogical to the method of idealization and concretization from empirical sciences. Idealization and mathematics Much worse with the criterion of adequacy (III). promise that fulfilling this criterion is not excluded. roughly. etc. Nowak (1974b. classes (or classes of classes. Each scientific law presupposes. Applied mathematics is composed of idealizational statements with the analytic basis. only some separated facts can be quoted that. and formal sciences. First.e. i. Nowak (1974b. to meet the criterion of adequacy (II). 6.1).147). and hence to meet the criterion of adequacy (III). From that time on it has been often argued that the conception is too narrow to capture the research practice and consequently that it requires a generalization. for instance the geometrical point is a class of mass points. Empirical sciences are composed of idealizational statements with the synthetic basis. that is mathematical constructs are to be. ones . Generalization and expansion The conceptualization of the method of idealization outlined above originates basically from the core conception outlined above in (II). pp. Nonetheless. i. economic. Pure mathematics contains formal schemes. etc.50 Leszek Nowak methodology appears to follow its own image of scientific method. overtly or tacitly.5. As a result. 118-21) proposes to understand the nature of mathematical entities as set-theoretical abstracts built over ideal types. The remaining statements are ones with the synthetic basis.) magnitudes (Nowak 1980a. Second. (V) Generalizations and expansions 1. p.e. geometry or game theory (cf. for instance applied logic. Now. they seem to testify that there is a chance to fill a gap between the idealizational image of empirical sciences. by assigning to variables from the scheme certain (physical. above III. 117) distinguishes between two types of idealizational statements. p. an idealizational statement with the analytic basis is one whose formal scheme is a theorem of a given mathematical (including logical) science. Here. These several points are very far from any systematic theory of formal sciences. more general definitions of an idealizational law or of concretization would be offered. the conception has been elaborated in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

Chwalisz (1979) argues that the scheme of idealizational statements does not reveal the role which is played in scientific laws by constants. As a result. scientific laws. As a result of a generalization. and so forth. Nowak (1979b) remarks that realistic assumptions G(x) in statements of the form (Tk) are chosen arbitrarily and he attempts to discover an objective criterion of choosing such assumptions. Almost all of the proposed generalizations and extensions pertained to the statics of science. It ought to be distinguished from the procedure of extending the conception by new. the notion of idealizing condition should be generalized in order to include conditions of the form p = const. it turns out that the method of idealization is applicable to a wider field of research practice than it was thought before. it turns out that a new. for instance the law of Gay-Lussac postulating that pressure is constant. procedure is derivative from idealization. From among numerous elaborations of this kind. The concept of magnitude was modified so as to accomodate the criticisms posed to the original account. . One of the goals of the present chapters is to systematize these generalizations and extensions of the idealizational conception of science as well as to study their consequences for the dynamics of science – to study the modifications they require of the original model of correspondence relations. In this chapter. Tuchanska (1980) analyzes the procedure of constructing concepts introduced in idealizational statements. First. Szaban (1979) and Witkowski (1985) argue that the construction of magnitude accepted in the standard exposition of the idealizational conception of science does not fully correspond to the language of science and they propose various ways of generalizing this construction. Stefanski (1977). not yet conceptualized. on the other hand. another such criterion is proposed by Paprzycka (1992). we shall present only two and discuss their implications for the problem of diachronic relations between the basic units of scientific knowledge. As a result of extension. The author claims that an adequate scheme of the idealizational law is to contain two corrections in comparison to the standard one. And so on.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 51 that would be capable of including those cases of laws or procedures which did not fall under the original characterization. Zielinska (1981) draws a distinction between idealizing and abstract assumptions and between respective procedures of waving them. 2. research procedures. that scheme does not embrace the laws of science which abstract not from a magnitude but from its variability. we shall discuss some of the generalizations of the idealizational conception of science and consider their implications for the problem of correspondence. Brzeziński (1977). L. Second. This is what the procedure of generalizing consists in. not as yet conceptualized. Forms of idealization Stabilization. We shall begin with some examples of generalizations.

In the limiting case when c is zero. & pk-1(x) = 0 & pk(x) = 0. Such a statement may for one factor abstract from its influence upon the magnitude in question and. cf. the list of determinants of temperature varies from the highest temperatures to the middle ones and then to the lowest. An idealizational statement in the generalized sense is a conditional which possesses in its antecedent idealizing conditions in the above. Also a weakened form of idealization termed quasiidealization has been introduced (Nowak 1977a. 1980a). However. A statement which – apart from the realistic condition – possesses in its antecedent only stabilizing conditions is termed stabilizational. The explication of the procedure has been correctly criticized by Kuokkanen and Tuomivaara (1992. at the same time. and purely idealizational ones that are based exclusively upon idealizing conditions (in the narrow sense).. .52 Leszek Nowak constants are to appear also in the formulae of idealizational statements. by analogy to concretization. Quasi-idealization. Below. When the magnitude from the above considered condition takes on a value different from zero. initial sense) conditions. they sometimes play the role of parameters which are not abstracted from at all. Nowakowa (1991) analyzes certain peculiarities of the testing of the stabilizational statements. Obviously. The standard scheme of the idealizational statement (Tk) is based on a silent simplification that all the factors influence the determined parameter F universally. the generalized notion of idealizing condition passes into the initial one. i. that Gay-Lussac law falls under the generalized notion of idealizational statement. it need not be the case. generalized. also Sintonen and Kiikeri 1995). I shall present a new version of my previous explication. p. This may be schematized „in the first approximation” as a quasi-idealizational statement: (QTk) if G(x) & G*(x) & p1(x) = 0 & .. Note. For instance. consists in removing the stabilizing condition and introducing a correction h(p) into the consequent. then the idealizing condition is termed stabilizing assumption (Zielinska 1979. The author defines an idealizing condition as a propositional function of the form p(x) = c. meaning. then F(x) = fk(H(x)). possessing both stabilizing and idealizing (in the narrow. Simplifying the complex matter one may say that a factor which is essential for F on all the objects from the subset G* of the universe G is not essential for F on all the objects from the rest of the universe. it may abstract from another factor's variability admitting thus its existence and influence upon the determined magnitude. i.e.e. Destabilization. that is on the whole universe of discourse G = {x*G(x)}. where c is a constant and it follows from the background knowledge that for no object in the considered universe of discourse this function is satisfied. apart from stabilizational statements there are idealizational-stabilizational ones. 96).

.. Those who possess both idealizing and quasi-idealizing assumptions are called idealizational statements of the second type. Let us add that statements which possess in their antecedents only idealizing conditions are termed idealizational statements of the first kind.. p... we obtain a quasi-idealizational treestructure of the form: (Q Tk) (Q1 Tk -1) (Q0 Tk -1) (Q11 Tk -2) (Q10 Tk -2) (Q01 Tk -2) (Q00 Tk -2) . Again.. if G* = G. then F(x) = fk(H(x)]. The dychotomic form of the tree is due to the assumption that each time the range of the quasi-idealizing clause from the (quasi-)concretized statement is divided into two parts only which obviously need not be the case... in the list of assumptions (cf... The statement of the form: (Q1Tk-1) if G(x) & G1*(x) & p1(x) = 0 & .. then F(x) = fk-1(H(x)... idealizational structure generated by the standard concretization Tk..... those possessing only quasi-idealizing clause are of the third type...... & pk-1(x) = 0 & pk(x) # 0. that is there are some additional factors which are not identified and which ....The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 53 where the condition G*(x) is termed the quasi-idealizing clause....... pk(x)] where G1* is a subset of G* is termed a limited concretization of (Q Tk)..... T0...... Often scientists are perfectly aware that they do not list all the factors essential for the determined magnitude and that. As a result......73): x is a planet & x # sun & x # Uranus & mass(x) = 0 the first is a realistic condition.. G0* is empty. therefore..... their images of the essential structure of that magnitude are open. Kuokkanen and Tuomivaara 1992. when G1* = G*. & pk-1(x) = 0 & pk(x) # 0.Tk-1... Semi-idealization and the ceteris paribus clause. instead of the linear. For instance.... Obviously.. For the rest of the set G1* nothing changes in the consequent of (Q Tk) which justifies the label „degenerated concretization” attached to the following statement: (Q0Tk-1) if G(x) & G0*(x) & p1(x) = 0 & .. and (Q1 Tk-1) reduces to the standard concretization (Tk-1).. Finally.. the next two constitute a quasi-idealizing clause and the fourth is an idealizing condition.T1. then (QTk) reduces to (Tk)...

summary in 1990) distinguishes two types of magnitudes: those which are defined on the objects of one and the same level of complexity (intralevel magnitudes) and those which are defined on objects of various. that is the fact of the appearance of disturbances is to be a source of the probabilistic approach in science. in the theory of evolution three levels of complexity are studied: genotypes. also above section III4]. Some of them have put forward stronger theses. and. by definition. However interesting these proposals are. 168ff. cf. 200ff]. first and foremost. in order to formulate any explicit statement. p. According to the other proposal. in fact. W. levels of complexity (interlevel magnitudes). A statement based on the semi-idealizing condition is termed a semiidealizing statement. organisms and populations. also 1980a. There have appeared two alternative ways of dealing with the removal of the semi-idealizing condition. English summary in 1975a and 1982). reinterpreted from the standpoint of the present author. Similarly. For instance. Kupracz (1992) claims that all scientific laws are semi-idealizational (and not idealizational in the initial sense). An aggregating condition assumes counterfactually that the determined magnitude which is. the reconstruction of the way of testing actually applied in science. A statement possessing both idealizing and semi-idealizing conditions belongs to semi-idealizing conditions of the first class and that possessing only the semi-idealizing assumption belongs to semi-idealizing statements of the second class (ibid. According to one proposal (Nowak 1974b. Thus. I omit these elements of their conceptions in the present survey. Lastowski (1987. Patryas in the writings quoted above has not simply found a new type of deformative (counterfactual) statements.e. removing it the semi-idealizing condition transforms a semi-idealizational statement which. those with the ceteris paribus clause. Thus. so to speak. 22 . the theoretician must adopt the semi-idealizing condition that neglects all the other factors there are no disturbances is called a semi-idealizing condition (Nowak 1974b. Both derive from their theses some important consequences concerning.54 Leszek Nowak influence the given magnitude (the disturbances).195). His original thesis was that there are no idealizational laws in that sense in science at all. at least two. because its goal is not so much to make a voyage on the territory called the idealizational approach to science but also to present a certain map of that territory which presupposes a definite interpretation of the writings constituting it. various interlevel parameters belong to that theory. the removal of the clause in question (termed ceteris paribus clause) transforms a semi-idealizational statement of the univocal nature into a factual statement with a certain range of the admitted deviations but still univocal (Patryas 1976. 22 Aggregation. which is to add to idealizational laws in the initial approach. Sometimes this interpretation is simply a repetition of what the summarized authors working in the idealizational approach overtly have declared. all That seems to be a proper to add that all the material referred to in this exposition is. But not always. interlevel is to be an intralevel parameter. i. is of the univocal nature into a factual statement of the probabilistic nature. p.. p. that all scientific laws are tacitly at least equipped in the ceteris paribus clause. appropriately.

by analogy to concretization. Brzeziński (1978. SA-. (ii) IS-. neglected. IQ-. however. Ss-. The latter is a superposition of the initial intralevel dependence (stated in the aggregating law) and of interlevel dependencies expressing influences holding between various levels of complexity.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 55 the influences that come to the given magnitude from other levels of complexity studied in a given science are. s-. sA-. 1990) proposes a ramified classification of aggregating statements and reconstruction of various types of the disaggregating procedure. aggregation (A). IQA-. In the process of disaggregation the actual complexity of a given phenomenon occurring at various levels of organization of matter is reconstructed.and IQ-types have been considered by Nowak (1974b). ISA-. An aggregational statement is one equipped in the aggregating condition. Is. IsQ-. the remaining types of deformational statements have not been methodologically examined. SA.. Q-. And disaggregation. IS-. To my knowledge. Kupracz (1988) distinguishes deformational statements of the following 31 types: (i) I-. SQ-. IA-. IsQA-. We have confined ourselves to several simplest. in the "first approximation". quasi-idealization (Q). S-. (v) ISsQA-. semi-idealization (s). IsA-. SQA-. ISQ-. SsQA-. ISsA-.and QA-types have been considered by Lastowski (1987). consists in that the dependence between parameters treated as if they were intralevel is transformed into an interlevel dependence. The following forms of deformational procedures have hitherto been distinguished: idealization (I). Statements of the S-. (iv) ISsQ-. Lastowski (1987. (iii) ISs-. In the idealizational approach to science. SQ-types have been analyzed by Chwalisz (1979) and Zielinska (1981). Q-. stabilization (S). Statements of the A-. sQ-. Types of deformational statements. Let us just name some of them. SsQ-. SsA-. deformational procedures which are also easiest to summarize. summary in 1985b) depicts in the research practice of the behavioural sciences a deformational procedure hereafter . (i) Proto-idealization. IA-. ISQA-. Is-. QA-. more procedures of the kind have been analyzed. Some other deformational procedures. s-. A-. Statements of the I-.

whereas the latter is to neglect its influence upon other magnitudes. The former is to neglect the very existence of a given magnitude.1). Hornowska 1989. This procedure reveals similarity to the theory of inductive tests of L. This conception serves as a methodological tool to analyze research practice in behavioural sciences (cf.56 Leszek Nowak called proto-idealization. . Nowak (1997) argues that the procedure of isolation is a special case of idealization of a sort. A normalization statement is based on normalizing assumptions and its specifications take into account abnormal areas of the appropriate magnitudes. "abstractive" and "idealizing" ones. What is more. An abnormal area is composed of objects which undergo an influence on the part of the principal factor(s) and. Zielinska's distinction has some philosophical presuppositions made clear in the so-called negativist unitarian metaphysics (Nowak 1990. but the methodological significance of the whole procedure elaborated in an abstract way has not hitherto been recognized yet. Nowak (1991c) analyzes the procedure of normalization. (iv) Isolation. thereby modifying the form of the dependence and the explained variance. Cohen (1977) and can even be claimed to be a paraphrase of that conception in the idealizational approach to science. a set of objects on which that magnitude is determined by the principal factor(s) alone.e. additionally. i. Machowski 1990. on the part of secondary factors.J. Let us call a standard magnitude one which in its range an area of normality. vol. I prefer to use the terms "reductive" and "ideating" conditions (Nowak 1990). Variance created by the non-controlled factors is termed residual variance. The author divides the class of essential factors for a given magnitude into those which are controlled by the researcher (the principal. writings of Brzeziński 1978. and part of secondary) and those which are not (the rest of secondary factors and the disturbing factors). 1998. realistically. (ii) Reduction. A normalizing condition counterfactually reduces the whole range of a given magnitude to its area of normality. (iii) Normalization. Maruszewski 1983. Protoconcretization includes. the given magnitude in the set of controlled magnitudes. A proto-idealizational statement is based on proto-idealizing conditions and represents not a single dependence but a certain class of them. The hidden sense of that procedure is to neglect a factor common to at least two essential structures of the investigated magnitudes and thus to „isolate” them. Gaul 1990). A proto-idealizing condition counterfactually includes a controlled factor into the set of non-controlled magnitudes. Specification consists in attempting to apply what is proven correct for the normal area of a given magnitude to its abnormal area. Zielinska (1981) makes a distinction between two types of deformating clauses. Criticising Maeki’s (1992) claim of the central role of isolation in the realm of scientific procedures. the conditions of the applicability of this procedure can be formulated only in the idealizational terms.

The procedure of data-correction. Kupracz (1988). Normally. d2. Formally. For Suppe. assumptions that the measuring design is perfect in a certain respect. Suppe 1972. . Tuchanska 1980. to improve his/her actual data transforming them from their actual erroneous form into one deprived of the error E. That is why . such an assumption is an idealizing one. 1974). the goal of the researcher is quite different. He wants not to restate the error E in his/her data but. attempting to remove it by concretization. one may apply the idealizational law to the empirical fact F. dn must be abstracted from and the idealized form of F ("model"). on the condition that this fact is made more idealized. claims Kupracz. The main task undertaken in Hornowska (1989) is to introduce operationalization into the image of testing of the idealizational law. i. observes that in the case of at least some idealizing assumptions the procedure of concretization does not work at all. Testing the idealizational statements 57 The criticism of the initial approach. Meanwhile. i. Now. The disturbances d1. the terms such as "F" and/or "H" in Tk are theoretical terms and that is why the procedure of their operationalization is necessary.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 2.e. ones that might be applied to the empirical objects directly. Yet.e. Model Fn reveals the shape of the phenomenon F. a) # 0 and thus that I commits error E. The description of the model is therefore at the same level of abstraction as the idealizational law in question. Hornowska (1989) claims that the above outlined image of testing presupposes that all terms appearing in the tested law Tk are observational terms. for instance. Fn. that it does not commit errors of a given type. Another point of criticism has been that the connections between theoretical terms occurring in the idealizational laws and empirical terms have not been reconstructed in the terms of the idealizational approach (Brzeziński 1977. These are. The initial approach to the problem of empirical testing of idealizational statements has been criticized for leaving the concept of observational fact. Kupracz (1988. unanalyzed in idealizational terms (Kupracz 1988). As is well-known.. provided that all the disturbances do not appear at all. but making them more correct is the goal of the procedure which is engaged in testing of idealizational laws with regard to certain idealizing condition. Let the idealizing condition d(I. is compared with the law. 1990) finds the idea of datacorrection in Suppe's semantic theory of science (cf. a) = 0 be introduced allowing thus to omit the fact that I brings about error E. inspired by some ideas of Suppe (1972). on the contrary. we state realistically that d(I. Imagine that in fact the instrument I gives on a measured object a the error E due to certain disturbances d. that is not normally the case.. The main goal of Kupracz (1988) is to analyze this procedure of data correction and to compare it with concretization.. removing it via concretization would lead to absurd results. Hornowska 1989). Not the reconstruction of empirical facts (the acts of measurement in their actual form). or empirical data.

2-1). then L(a. then L(x. that is the data are corrected because they commit certain systematic errors that are effects of disturbances. let us express the result of this act in the following statement: (2. the author claims.t(v) (2) d(a. Let us explain his idea on the example of the simplest act of measurement of the length of a given body a with an instrument I. Let this act be influenced by disturbance d to the effect that the outcome of the measurement commits a systematic error. I) = w. to test idealizational statements.2-3). economics. Kupracz terms statements of the kind principles of modification of a given instrument.58 Leszek Nowak this description. however. Yet. Assume that the following belongs to the theory of the instrument I: (2. I) > 0. As a result. The following then holds: (2. the disturbance d occurring in the degree v changes the outcome of the measurement with +-t(v). 1992) criticizes this claim by referring to numerous examples of the concretization procedure in physics. Such a procedure suffices. II). the procedure of concretization would be superfluous. I) = 0 one could abstract from the disturbance. then L(x. above. I) = w . Modifying a little – and simplifying very much – the author's formulations. I) = z +. etc. analyzed in the idealizational approach to science taking them to testify to the fact that not only the singular descriptions of the empirical facts are idealized but also the abstract laws are made more realistic (cf. how to correct the report (2. The point is that both the procedures occur in science and therefore they must be accounted for in every adequate theory of science. I) = 0. the act of measurement must be mistaken. I) = z +. where z is the standard outcome of measurement with I (for instance. can be deduced from the law. On the strength of the idealizing condition: d(a. as a matter of fact d(a.t(v).2-1) L(a. I) = v. I) = D (3) L(a. according to Suppe. or its negation. a certain multiplication of the length of the measuring rod) and t(v) is a modification of that outcome under the influence of disturbance d. I) = v. is limited to the realm of testing. Knowing that the researcher knows. The field of application of the data correction. Accepting this view. Kupracz (1988.2-3) if d(x. According to (2. I) = w.2-2) if d(a. therefore a correction is necessary. The data correction in our simplified case runs as follows: (1) if d(x. The claim of the semantic theory of science to neglect concretization is thus as unsound as the claim of the idealizational approach to science to neglect data correction.

The final concretization cannot be applied via approximation. Introducing appropriate idealizing conditions.. Dn. This concerns. Then.... whereas the act of measuring bringing the raw data D0 is under the influence of factors d1. i. Kupracz failed to draw all general conclusions that follow implicitly from his analyzes. II. This innovative conception is not. If the data Dn is sufficiently close to the final concretization of (Tk).e..t(D) 59 Instead of (2.e. dn deviating the act of measurement. The last one.. dn obtaining the corrected data D1. The researcher omits then the disturbances d1 ..e. Due to the procedure of correction. i. I) = w .. p1 are abstracted from and the idealizational law (Tk) is put forward. p1. the phenomenon F undergoes the working of factors H.. 23 .. Not as a reconstruction of what is going in the experience but as an improvement of that. above 2. d2. i. Otherwise. both are necessary.. the factors pn. According to the researcher's view. Testing neither consists entirely in concretization and approximation (cf. A generalization of the procedure of data-correction. Simply. if it falls under the approximation of that statement.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… ' (4) L(a. be set with the raw data D0.. the act of measurement disconfirms the appropriate statements or testifies against the applied way of correcting the raw data D0. Therefore. .. completed. it is possible to convert the readings of malfunctioning measurement devices into results corresponding to the readings of perfect devices. then it directly confirms this approximation and indirectly confirms the idealizational statement (Tk). we obtain the following image of testing of the idealizational statement that is implicitly suggested by the reviewed works 23: I.. It is only Dn which is attempted to be derived from the final concretization of the idealizational law (Tk). pn. ..2-1) the corrected report (4) is thus put forward. D2. . IV. in a way. since the latter commits systematic errors resulting from the disturbances d1. taking the two procedures into consideration together..1) nor can it be fully characterized in terms of data correction. III. among other things. .. these conditions are removed step by step and appropriate concretizations of the law (Tk) are formed. a comparison between the semantic and idealizational theories of science. dn... d2. I refer here to formulations of Nowakowa (1991) who makes Kupracz’s ideas more definite and precise. Dn being idealizations of the raw data D0. The book shows us that none of these offers a self-sufficient means to reconstruct the actual practice of testing. is deprived of all side disturbances being thus the closest to the real state of the phenomenon F. d2..

For no real instrument allows the researcher to discriminate between all the classes of abstraction constituting a given magnitude. it does not state yet how to relate theoretical concepts to the empirical notions. that is it still presumes that all the notions employed in the idealizational law are equipped with the criteria of empirical applicability. This approach is criticized from the standpoint of the methodology of behavioral sciences.e. The initial approach presupposes that every scientific notion is equipped with an ideally discriminating instrument which is obviously not true. it tacitly presupposes that every scientific notion is equipped with an ideal measuring instrument. Call an idealizing notion one whose meaning postulates contain idealizing conditions. Let us briefly outline the subsequent attempts to cope with this problem. Therefore. That is the subject of Hornowska (1989) study. Concept-formation and operationalization. a transformative chain. In the idealizational approach to science the problem of how theoretical notions are equipped with the criteria of empirical applicability becomes especially troublesome. Now. a notion N' which is introduced under k-1 idealizing assumptions and a negation of the kth one. and if it does not distinguish between ones which belong to the same class of abstraction of F. will be termed a transformation of N. Namely. Assume that a given notion N is introduced under k idealizing conditions. Certainly. a family of classes of abstraction generated by a certain equivalence relation (Ajdukiewicz. especially in psychology. Let us call the sequence of transformations of a notion.60 Leszek Nowak This image seems to be the most complete model of testing of the idealizational law elaborated in the idealizational approach to science. a factual notion is characterized merely by realistic assumptions. It was postulated that a theoretical notion is being introduced in science only as a member of a transformative chain. Such a notion refers to a factor. 1976. As has been argued (Nowak 1971a). not to its models. a device attached to a notion being unable to distinguish between certain objects also generates a relation of equivalence. It is argued (Brzeziński. The structure of the transformative chain corresponds thus to the structure of an idealizational theory. In contradistinction to that. 1978) that it neglects the peculiarities of measurement in science. And the scale does not assign . and whose connotation is enlarged with the feature to which the kth assumption refers. Now. the structure of concept formation is an analogue of theory formation. A device d is termed ideally discriminating relative to the factor F if it distinguishes between all the objects of the range of F which do belong to different classes of abstraction of F. The latter element of it is supposed to correspond approximately with the colloquial notions referring to reality . i. 1965). the real instrument generates a "less subtle" relation which does not overlap with the relation of equivalence generating the (theoretical) magnitude. from the most abstract one to the factual one.

the researcher constructs a theoretical concept.. Let us call a notion equipped with a device allowing for a merely non-ideally discriminating device a partially operationalized notion.. In other words. N0 (c'') Nopk. to be a member of the appropriate transformative chain provided that a corresponding partially operationalized magnitude has been constructed.. A necessary condition for a notion to be introduced into science is. Thus Tuchanska replaces the idea of single transformative chain (c') with the idea of double chain of the kind: Nk. the researcher is able to use merely partially discriminating devices.. *Nk-1.. She claims that finding a device to measure a factor is only a part of the story. *Ni. It is composed of a family of classes of abstraction which s/he considers to be identical with those constituting the factor in question.. the quantitative structure of the factor. Nk-1.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 61 to the cases of the operationalized magnitude definite numerical values but merely numerical intervals (Brzeziński 1976)... On the numerical level. his idea was that instead of single transformative chains: (c) Nk. where the first component includes theoretical magnitudes.. Nop0 . according to the researcher's supposition. . into a partially operationalized magnitude. Nopk-1. A factor is an objectively existing family of classes of abstraction whose recognition is the researcher's aim. In practice. a magnitude is supposed to be equipped with an ideally discriminating device reflecting. But all that concerns the world of s/her theory. Ni.. Thus. *N0 Tuchanska (1980) proposes to distinguish between three concepts: factor. s/he transforms his theoretical construct. whereas the second one – corresponding partially operationalized magnitudes. . and even a derivative part of it. (1978) proposal was to replace the initial claim with a more realistic one: that the notions occurring in the transformative chains are in science partially operationalized notions. N0 being fully numerically operationalized there occur in science transformative chains whose elements are partially (which will be marked by *) operationalized magnitudes: (c') *Nk. .. Nk-1. a magnitude. Nopi. The main idea of Brzeziński's (1976). theoretical magnitude and operationalized magnitude.. The main subject of Hornowska's criticism is the idea of what has been called above partial operationalization. a magnitude. In order to reconstruct it. then. Ni. And all this is to reconstruct an appropriate factor. The point is that . .

And it is that science's job to find these consequences. that is to recognize not only the factor under consideration but also its identifiers. the first observable factor in that sequence is termed a strong identifier of F. It is a standard assumption of every science that for each theoretical factor which can be defined in it. ontological thesis stating that for every factor F there exists such j that Wj contains at least one observable factor. Etc. particularly in the behavioural sciences. ... The principle of empiricism as reconstructed by the author claims this. is that a theoretical magnitude is linked to a series of less theoretical magnitudes ending with the observational one (an index of the initial magnitude). 1980). certain observable consequences of it always follow. . There is a general. in W2 there occur only factors for which those of W1 are principal. not to mention the initial one. Apart from the notion of identifier. The set of factors influenced by a factor of the set W1 will be termed the area of F's influence of the 2nd degree and marked as W 2. This is the case which the author analyzes as follows (p. This is actually the main task of the book. S. Assume that in the sequence (IF) only the relation of being a principal factor for is taken into account. in terms of the idealizational approach to science 24. one whose constituting equivalence relation is a relation noticeable for creatures equipped with our sensory apparatus. Hornowska (1989) introduces the notion of the strong identifier of a given factor.. Nowak 1965) in terms of the presupposed theory of science. let us call it an identifier of F.. however. Now. ones denoting these factors) notions. W2.88-9).62 Leszek Nowak usually no device is able to assign numbers of its scale to the objects of the particular classes of abstraction of the (theoretical) magnitude.. what is obtained is a sequence of the areas of F's influence: (IF) W 1. and a partially discriminating device is assigned merely to the latter. i. etc. mark a set of them as W1 and call the area of F's influence of 1st degree. that is they did not conceptualize this well-known procedure (for instance.. There is no reason why among the sets of factors being significant consequences of F there must appear any observable factor.e. The methodological sense of looking for strong identifiers of the considered factors is that finding them one can avoid developing the appropriate (i. Thus. i. Given is the factor F influenced by a certain amount of other factors (the space of essential factors for F. Wm.e. as it is usually termed in the idealizational approach to science). 24 This criticism does not work in case of Tuchańska's proposals (cf. The author proposes to consider all the factors influenced by F. Let us present the construction of Hornowska (1989) in a simplified manner. A typical situation in science. And it is the constructing of indices for the theoretical magnitudes which has been neglected in both Brzeziński's and Tuchanska's proposals. that is in W1 there occur merely factors for which F is a principal factor.e. .

however. She reconstructs the connections between the magnitude and the variable much more adequately. obviously. Since H is the identifier of F. if we agree that the latter may be identified with the notion of variable. Let us limit ourselves to one condition only. the researcher may find an unobservable value of the theoretical magnitude F. then. I neglect the idealizing assumptions" (p. What is. then F(x) = f^(n). it presupposes that the researcher has found (2. . (2. Kupracz (1992) which analyze various other aspects of the relation idealization/experience. however.89).4-1) to (2. but a separate magnitude assigned to the theoretical magnitude and equipped with the non-ideally discriminating measurement tool. If f is a perfect (one-one) function.4-2). Hence. (2.4-2) is valid.4-2) and further claims are valid under the relevant assumptions of the kind.4-3) if O(x) = n.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… Let (2. Hornowska (1989) develops the triadic distinction of Tuchanska (1980) assigning it a better terminology: factor/magnitude/variable. not ideal) device. What does it. In other words.4-1) and 25 One should also mention interesting writings of Patryas (1975a-b. the novelty of Hornowska's approach is far from being a merely terminological innovation. However. for every x. The author.4-1) O(a) = r 63 mean that for the specific experimental conditions.4-4). the value of the observable magnitude H for the measured object a is shown by a given measurement tool as r. The author's book is one of the most subtle grasps of the relation: idealizational theory/experience 25. (where f^ is the convert function of f). if at all.4-2) O(x) = f(F(x)). A certain unclarity appears even in the quoted passage from (2. Krajewski (1977). only under certain idealizing conditions? It might only mean that both (2. A variable is not the theoretical magnitude equipped additionally with (real. mean if we are aware of the fact that (2. for every x.4-4) F(a) = f^(r) = s. we obtain the following: Since (2. Thus. not quite clear are the consequences of the author's approach for the reconstruction of the testing procedure of idealizational theories. In sum. disregarding the influence of p. formulating the statement (2. Nowakowa (1991). 1976). the author's contribution consists mainly in conceptualizing the procedure of equipping the theoretical magnitudes with the empirical sense. makes a stipulation: "to formulate the thesis.

the converse-notion N^ will thus be identified with f^(O) on the same condition... Even this simplified scheme 26 reveals that the procedure of developing the notions is involved in the structure of the author's discourse.4-2a) must be concretized: (2. N^. N’0 (c''') .. Nk-1.. for every x.4-4a).... N’’opk-1. N’i....4-1) to (2.. therefore: (2. m) = t being thus different from in case (2. N’k-1.. . and the conclusion of the reasoning will be: (2.4-2b) if p(x) # 0. Ni.... from `(2.. need not be the case...4-4b) if p(a) = m. ..... N0 N’k. But the passage. The passage from (2... p) being respectively developments of the notions N.. then O(x) = f'(F(x).. should be done. in more realistic conditions. Hornowska's proposal.4-1) to (2.. In terms of notions this will mean that the procedure under consideration involves developing the appropriate concept.... But what about the cases in which p takes on values different from zero.. .. then F(z) = f'^(r... that is the real cases? Here (2. N’’opk.. My objection would then be that this is too little exploited in the book.4-2a) if p(x) = 0. N’’op0 .p(x)).. That is seen even in the extremely simple scheme considered above.. and less visible than it could be.....4-4a) if p(a) = 0. N’’opi. for every x....4-4a) involves merely these two notions. the real novelty of E. at the same time. then O(x) = f(F(x)).. And that is what. then F(a) = f^(r) = s. For... N^' = f^'(O.64 Leszek Nowak (2. Let N be defined as f(F) on the condition that p is neglected.. to my understanding. as compared with the earlier mentioned conceptions consists in the fact that she replaces the idea of double transformative chain (c'') with the idea of multiplied chain of the kind: Nk.4-4b) involves the following pair of notions: N'= f'(F. obviously. 26 . where every member of the first line (the transformative chain of theoretical magnitudes) initiates a sequence of its significance-consequences up to its Among other things it is assumed that the secondary factor p is significant for both F and O which. For only this would allow to do justice to the author's contribution by relating it to the conceptions discussed above.. p)..

basic model. the identifiers stand to one another in the relation of transformation reflecting thus the structure of the preceding chains. I shall be even more concise than above. (ii) IS-. ISA-. SA-. (v) ISsQA-. determined only by the relation of concretization. sQ-. (iii) ISs-. IQ-. QA-. apart from the relation of concretization also the relation of approximation defines the methodological structure of a theoretical construction. ISQA-. IA-. 1974b). One was to take into account derivative forms of deformational statements and to analyze how they are joined into groups. IQA-. Is. pp.and IQ-types have been considered by Nowak (1971a. s-. IsQA-. ISQ-. SsQA-. therefore. 1980a. called models. Q-. the factual model based on no idealizing conditions. Is-. SQA-. Typology of theories.and SA-types have been considered by . One may guess that according to the author. such that the axioms of a given model are concretizations of axioms of the preceding system up to the initial. provided that a corresponding identifier has been constructed and that this identifier has been transformed up to the factual shape. The basic form of a theory is simple linear idealizational theory composed of a sequence from the idealizational law to the factual one. A complex linear idealizational theories are sequences of deductive systems. SsA-. Theories of the S. A simple linear approximate theory contains a factual approximation of the last idealizational concretization of the initial law. IsQ-. Q-. Theories The material to be presented in this section is in a large part available in English.e. the last chain of the sequence of models is the final concretization. closer to reality of science. sA-. S-. Complex linear approximate theory ends with a factual model composed of statements that are approximations of the least idealized model of the sequence. Ss-. IsA-. ISsA-. Here. 95-196). 1972a. A-. Theories of the A-. Basic forms of theories (cf. SsQ-. my 1974b. a necessary condition for a notion that it is introduced into science is then to be a member of the appropriate transformative chain. This leads to the typology of theories analogical to that of statements (Kupracz 1988): (i) I-. therefore. Theories of the I-.and IS-types have been analyzed by Zielinska (1981).The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 65 identifier – the final chain is actually composed of the identifiers of the initial theoretical magnitudes. (iv) ISsQ-. There have appeared two ways of making things more complex and. 3. s-. i. IA. SQ-.

Tid.aMk-1..e. F is a formal language... or "healthy". 1Mk-1. Pathology of theories. 1990b). The idealizational theory in the above sense is something which may be considered a normal. O(AMi) = <1O(AMi). Tid is an idealizational network-theory. OAMi. Also numerous intermediate forms between the star-system and the linear system appear. up to models of the ith order all of which are then approximated to reality (ibid. the remaining types of deformational theories have not been methodologically analyzed. for instance. 1AMi.. 133-35). cD is a set of observational statements each p' " cD being a correction of a raw observational statement p " D.66 Leszek Nowak Lastowski (1987). then the same assumption is made valid anew and another idealizing condition is removed. Network theories... etc.. i. Obviously. this assessment refers to the presented approach to science. etc. that is one assumption is removed and an appropriate correction is introduced. c. however. bMj .... models (equally abstract) of the third order. Rs is a set of rules of substantiation: for every conditional p " Tid there exists a formal formula f"F such that the consequent of the conditional p is a substantive interpretation of f. by reconstructions of . p.. 92-132). above III) and the inner formal-substantive structure of an idealizational statement (cf. The other way to enlarge the notion of theory is to replace the linear structure of models by a ramified one.. cD> where a.. Therefore. models (equally abstract) of the second order whose axioms are concretizations of axioms of the initial model.e. pp. d. A star-system contains thus the idealizational statement in its centre and a set of single concretization of that law... b. Leaving aside variations of deformational procedures (cf. in economics (Nowak 1972a.. . General notion of an idealizational theory. theory... It often science happens that a given idealizational law is not concretized by removing one condition after another but in a star way. Nowak 1974b. bAMi>.. 114ff. O(AMi) is the sequence of operationalizations of the approximations of the least idealized models.. Such a qualification is confirmed. one can define the general notion of an idealizational theory as follows. bO(AMi)> e. It is a system <F.. otherwise it may make no sense. To my knowledge. Tid = <Mk. the general notion of a network-theotry is the following: it is composed of the first order model. i. Rs. 1Mj.

Lastowski and Nowak 1982). (iv) An intuitive-undeveloped-operationalized-purified-theory: <Mk. The theory is formalized but not concretized. Tid. D>. O(AMk].93-104). O(AMi]. of ideal gases (Zielinska 1976. (iii) A formal-developed-operationalized-naive-theory: <F. AMk. more sophisticated accounts cf. Its first task is to classify all the non-normal cases into certain groups and to order them as far as the "distance" from the normal theory is concerned. Example: the theory of cognitive dissonance (for a reconstruction cf. As a result all reasonings are purely intuitive. 119-29). . O(AMI]. a large problem of the pathology of theories appears.212-15). pp. Only the most idealized model is approximated to reality . Example: Rashevsky's model of group behaviour (for a reconstruction cf. one-fourth-theories (iv-vi) and one-eighth theories (vii-viii). the genetic-populationary theory of evolution (Lastowski 1987. Nowak 1980a. It is not a mere incident that all of them are formulated in the language of mathematics.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 67 numerous examples. numerous examples of the theoretical constructs referred to in part II above are not normal theories. p. 14142). the multiplier theory of economic growth (Nowak 1980a. O(AMi]. Nowak 1971a. pp. Let us distinguish several types of them (for a systematic account cf. reconstruction in Lastowski 1987. (ii) A formal-undeveloped-operationalized-purified-theory: <F.276). cD>. If that is a healthy theory. (i) An intuitive-developed-operationalized-purified-theory: <Tid. pp. etc. D>. pp. The empirical material is left uncorrected and lacking therefore any control.70-90). that fall under the above scheme. It is the theory of free-fall (Such 1978). below Chap. Tid. In this case there is no separation between the formalism assumed by the theoretical conception and the conception itself. 15). Nowak 1974b. without any possibility of checking their validity. (v) An intuitive-developed-operationalized-naive-theory: <Tid. Balicki 1978 and Hamminga 1990). then all the remaining types of theoretical constructs in science should be considered as more or less "sick" cases. cD>. Nowak 1971a. Example: the synthetic theory of evolution (cf. Mk. Kalecki's theory of business cycles (Nowak 1972a. Example: Marxian theory of reproduction (for a reconstruction cf. (vi) A formal-developed-speculative-naive-theory: <F. pp. Kuipers 1985). Then. 25-28). Rs. pp. D> Example: Marxian theory of value (for a reconstruction cf. Rs. Rs. cD>. Below there are some types of partial theories: half-theories (i-iii). Indeed. Mathematics is a symptom of health in science. O(AMk]. Example: the Darwinian variation of the theory of evolution (for a reconstruction cf.

pp. pp. This outcome testifies to the significance of the problematics of interaction and poses the problem of what. that all the factors essential for a given magnitude exert upon the latter a homogeneous influence. Burbelka et al. Interactions. evidently false. 29-40). the level of aggreement of the „theoretical data” (calculated by the law) with the empirical values of the given magnitude. its concretization etc. then instead of one idealizational law the set of k0 idealizational laws is to be reconstructed. pp. Brzeziński. Heterogeneity of factors. Burbelka 1980. D>. (1976) find another simplification on which the core ideas of the idealizational methodology are based. Explicating both the notion they prove that it is in fact the case – i. summary in 1975) notes that the basic model of the idealizational approach to science works only under the tacitly adopted assumption that all the factors essential for a given magnitude are inessential for one another.Example: the theory of human rationality (for a reconstruction cf. Example: Weberian theory of bureaucracy (for a reconstruction cf Nowak 1971a. The assumption is. Patryas 1979. an influence that could be expressed in one and the same dependency. the better its accuracy. The author introduced the notion of interaction. pp. mixed). additionally. viz. then instead of one concretization of each of these laws the set of k1 concretizations of each of k0 laws is to be . (viii) An intuitive-undeveloped-speculative-naive-theory: <Mk.68 Leszek Nowak (vii) An intuitive-developed-speculative-naive-theory: <Tid. Brzeziński (1976. distinguished three types of essential structures (isolated – with no interactions. If. generalized the form of idealizational statement. if anything. remains from the initial intuition in case of the pure (or mixed) interactive idealization. i. If the principal factor is heterogeneous in relation to the determined magnitude.e.18-21). the first of the secondary factors is heterogeneous as well.8-46) or Marxian theory of classes (for a reconstruction cf. however. D>. an alternative interpretation – Tuchanska 1980. purely interactive. 99-100) or Engels' theory of primitive societies (for a reconstruction cf. and hence there are no interactions among them.e.e. the level of accuracy of an idealizational statement and of essentiality of a given factor for the corresponding „dependent magnitude” from that statement order the set of determinants paralelly – only on the assumption that the considered determinants are strictly independent. Some other expansions Let us briefly refer to some other expansions of the idealizational approach to science. Paprzycki and Paprzycka (1992) notice that the initial approach to idealization is based on the intuition that the more a law is concretized. 4. i. AMk. An alternative approach to interactions is proposed by Gaul (1985). Jasinska and Nowak 1976.

198). The author generalizes the notion of concretization in order to cover all the possible cases of the kind. This. the inadequacy of the initial approach in the light of facts from a science. or the history of it. For instance. The general schemes proposed by the authors allow us to explain why empirical theories contain many axioms in their initial models. is put forward. The idealizational . the new conception dialectically corresponds to the earlier version of the idealizational theory of science. Another simplification tacitly adopted in the initial approach is. Taking this into account the authors transform simple linear theories into structures of more or less complicated form depending on whether the principal and/or secondary factors are mutually essential or not. all the extensions of the initial idealizational approach fall under the following model: a. Thus. it passes into the initial one if the simplifying assumption (ad b) is adopted anew. Kuipers 1985. Zielinska (1976) observes that the standard form of concretization consisting in a passage from the formula f(H) = H0 to the formula g(f(H). and. second. (1976). it is argued that the new version of the idealizational approach meets two conditions: first. It is. p. one postulating that factors are one-sidedly essential one for another. it is not so in the passage from Clapeyron's law to that of van der Waals (Batog 1976. p. however. Burbelka et al. instead of simple idealizational theory a treeidealizational theory is to be built. b. the initial approach is modified. The answer is: because the set of axioms reveal mutual influences of a given set of factors. But this simplification must be removed and this conception modified. 5. in general. Idealizational approach is self-applicable As has been observed (Nowak 1976d). Enlargement of a factor. a simplifying assumption which must be adopted. The initial approach is formulated at a certain level of methodological abstraction (Nowak 1980a. under which the initial approach is still acceptable. etc. including the one created by van der Waals's concretization. need not be the case. It is not difficult to see that the procedure consists in application of the rule of dialectical correspondence in methodology. h(p)] = H1 presupposes that the secondary factor p is an enlargement of H0. c.189). If it turns out to be inadequate. Mutual significance. well-known that factors sometimes mutually influence one another.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 69 established. if the initial approach is to hold. As a result. according to Brzeziński. it allows to explain what rejects the initial approach (ad a). is stated. then the additional simplification is revealed.

as Cartwright (1983. In the light of the definition. First. One could perhaps refer in this connection to the proposal of Klawiter (1991). The Essentialist Concept of Truth Usually it is shown that the classical definition of truth creates a dichotomous notion of truth whereas the theory of science. It has been proven that the classical definition of truth is an entirely wrong means of evaluating scientific theories because of their idealizational nature. apparent. For instance. it appears that the classical definition of truth is an entirely poor point of departure for the theory of cognitive progress and should be rejected from the very beginning. then s(x) = 1/2gt2(x)) and the „counter-law” if ff(x) & R(x) = 0. This dilemma is. A methodological conception which leads to such a supposition of the common „paradoxicality” of scientific conduct is rather paradoxical itself. This is to lead to the dilemma: either classical mechanics is false as a whole or it would be senseless to admit that the law of inertia is something else than a principally counterfactual statement (ibid.112). It is self-referential also in its dynamics 27. This idea echoes an earlier „dilemma” formulated by Hanson (1963) who notices that the principle of inertia is difficult to comprehend for the law of gravitation denies it (p. then s(x) # 1/2gt2(x)) containing idealizing condition p(x) = 0 are classically true. 113). pp. however.. 28 Thus. Strict self-referential application of the idealizational model of development of science would imply appearance of conceptions that dialectically negate (or reduce to. (VI) Truth and the Cognitive Progress 1. Quite the contrary – all idealizations being emptily satisfied in the empirical world are (classically) true there. generally. But this seems to be misleading since it forces us to construct notions of truth starting from the idea of the classical conception and differing from the latter only in being comparative notions. particularly the theory of scientific progress. And.70 Leszek Nowak theory of science thus develops in the same manner as – according to it – science does. p. almost each scientific law gives an opportunity to pose the same „dilemma” as being an idealizational statement. the point is not that „fundamental laws” are false. all idealizational statements are true. It does not imply that it is empirically false.45ff) has it. Second. both the law of free fall: if ff(x) & R(x) = 0. However. in terminology of Paprzycka 1990) the initial approach. all the idealizational statements are classically true (Nowak 1977e) 28. requires a comparative one. the law of gravitation is not at variance with the law of inertia – the former negates merely an idealizing condition postulating the isolation of a given physical system considered in the latter. The law of inertia is by necessity counterfactual as idealizational. And just because of that the classical notion of 27 . Intuitively.

In this sense one can talk about the truthfulness of a caricature which is based on the omission of some Iess significant features of a given person or situation. V). also below Chaps. 23-25). Chap. . also Chaps. and hence any usefulness. being legitimized for the evaluation of factual statements. various idealization differ a great deal in its relation to what they present. The essential structure of magnitude F is the hierarchy of factors SF influencing (being essential) F. All the concepts involved refer to the tradition of Marxist epistemology. then F(x) = fk(H(x)). 2.. cf. Its image O(SF) is a hierarchy of factors recognized by the researcher as influencing F (Nowak 1976a). cf. (1998a). the image of the essential structure O(SF) assumed by Tk does not have any truthfulness looses its discriminative power. that „truth of the phenomenon” is its essence suggested by the Hegelian heritage (Nowak 1977e. Let us add that the essentialist concept of truth is an ordering one: it can be said that one idealizational statement is more essentially true than another . Chap. I would like only to present some more important cases of this explication. 28. It appears that there are two ways to overcome the difficulty. and on the exaggeration of its more significant features. 23). An alternative approach requires a revision of the standard metaphysics and outlined in Nowak (1991d). Here. is unsuitable for the evaluation of idealizational ones. for more details cf. 25). Essential Falseness. one has to leave out its `appearance'. 1980a. Partial Truth. in order to describe the phenomenon truly. Such a statement is essentially false if. that is why. the truth of a phenomenon is to be contained in its essence. but still classical idea. hence I shall use the terms common to this tradition referring to the explications given by Nowakowa (1977. at all. & pk(x) = 0. 1982. It is a factual statement if k = 0. 31 below. also Chap. the classical definition of truth. roughly.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 71 however. It is not the only idea of truth that may be found in the philosophical tradition. Absolute Truth I shall distinguish four types of truth qualifications. Another idea is that truthfulness consists in a proper deformation of something. One is to refer to another.. developed mainly in the writings of Nowakowa (1977. This intuition has been explicated by Nowakowa (1977. Relative Truth. The classical definition of truth is based on the idea that truthfulness consists in a proper presentation of something. and i an idealizational one if k > 0. Let us consider the statement Tk of the form: Tk: if G(x) & p1(x) = 0 & . Anyway.. That is the idea underlying the approach referred to in the main text.. In such a sense one can also talk about the truthfulness of idealizational statements which aim to omit secondary factors and take primary ones into account (Nowak 1977a). cf. if it assumes a more adequate image of the essential and of the nomological structures of the given magnitudes than the other one.

. Let us add that according to the approach suggested here.Tn-1. 3. Ti. Tn+1. 23). the statement of the form under consideration is relatively true if O(SF) contains the same repertory of primary factors for F as structure SF has... etc. it may be said that the scheme represents cognitive progress in the sense of the essentialist . It might be said. The ideal history of knowledge about phenomenon F is divided. briefly 1982) to put forward the hypothesis that the fundamental form of the development of the theory of phenomenon F is the following sequence of simple idealizational structures (briefly. That is why one can talk not only about the essential truthfulness of particular statements but also about such an evaluation of sequences composed of the idealizational law and its concretizations.. T2. The sequence of idealizational structures contains two thresholds: that of scientificity... the free fall „theory”) reaches the level of partial truthfulness and that of maturity. Despite the highly idealized nature of the scheme in question. rougly. the period of pre-mature science and the period of mature science. Hence.. simple theories) of that phenomenon: (#) T1. but they differ with respect to the repertory of secondary factors.. Galileo's law of free fall as relatively true. partially true. Aristotle's law of fall as partially true. partial truths are formulated. theories are at the level of relative truthfulness.. cf. and Newton's law as relative truth being more essentially true than Galileo’s. even partial truths are not achieved..e. an idealizational statement and its concretizations have the same `degree' of essential truthfulness (Nowakowa 1977). and in the third.. roughly.. that is simple idealizational structures.. image O(SF) is identical with structure SF. In the first one. Statement Tk is partially true if. when a science about phenomenon F (i.. Tz-1 are relatively true theories and Tz is an absolutely true theory of the phenomenon F. when the theory reaches the level of relative truthfulness. while Tn. there is some factor in O(SF) which is treated as secondary for F and it is in fact secondary for it.Tn. Tz where Ti is a partially true idealizational structure of F as are theories Ti+1.72 Leszek Nowak elements in common with the essential structure SF .... The Idealized Scheme of the Progressive Development of Science The previous considerations enable Nowakowa (1977.. In turn. that explanations of the phenomenon referring to the gods' interventions may be treated as absolutely false. Ti+1. therefore. under this condition. At last.. respectively. simple idealizational structures of a given phenomenon may also be evaluated as essentially false.. in the second. The latter statement refers to the ordering notion of essential truthfulness which has been explicated elsewhere (Nowakowa l977.. statement Tk is absolutely true if. below Chap. Let us take the contemporary state of knowledge about the free fall phenomenon as the evaluative standard. into three periods: the period of pre-scientific knowledge.

and (II) why does the actua! scientific development (within a particular `theory' of a phenomenon. basically. Nowakowa (1977) carefully distinguishes between two different problems: (I) why is the pattern of optimum scientific development defined by scheme (#)?. none of the essential factors for the given phenomenon are discovered (and corresponding theories are absolutely false). since observation of this rule makes it possible to attain knowledge which is practically useful. And. then correspondence) defines the line of the optimum development of science (in the sense of the essentialist concept of truth). for example .The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 73 conception of truth. progress of science means. the next theory has to dialectically correspond to the previous one (otherwise the basic discovery of principal factors would be lost). The internal and external history of science The basic conclusion to be drawn from the above considerations is that the rules of dialectical correspondence and refutation establish a pattern of the progress of science in the sense of attaining a higher and higher level of essential truthfulness. then. And it can . The general type of answer to question (II) is the following: science develops according to the principle of dialectical continuation. The principle of dialectical continuation (first refutation. whereas it is possible to give such an answer to (II'). questions: (I') why 2 + 2 = 4?. and with all restrictions concerning the idealizational nature of our conception) fall approximately under scheme (#)? The answer to the first question refers to the dialectical assumptions of epistemology (Nowak 1978) and cannot be given in sociological terms at all. That is why principles defining the epistemology of the succession of scientific theories difer in different periods of the development of science. The answer to the second question refers to actual human cognition which undergoes a process carried forth by social determinants. its optimum development. 4. in the period of mature science. and (II') why people usually think that 2 + 2 = 4? It is nonsense to answer the question (I') in sociological terms. then principal factors are discovered and the secondaries are completed in a more and more exact manner (and corresponding theories are relatively true and at the same time more and more essentially true). In the period of pre-scientific cognition it is difficult to establish some epistemological rule describing the optimal line of succession of theories according to the requirement of the `unity of negation and continuation'. The two questions are as different as. those factors are responsible for the fact that the actual line of the development of science approximates its optimum line (in the sense of the essentialist concept of truth). Initially. then secondary factors are established (and corresponding theories are partially true). the next theory has to be a dialectical refutation of the previous one (otherwise the partial discovery of a secondary factor would be lost). In the pre-mature period of the development of science.

First of all. 191). the more practically effective are practical statements based on it (Nowak 1976a). For instance.74 Leszek Nowak be argued that the more essentially true the statement is. ex post facto procedure and experimental . Maruszewski (1983) uses the basic notions of the idealizational conception of science – otherwise at some points complemented by himself – to conceptualize the whole domain of psychological interest. (VII) Heuristics Apart from the reconstructive (cf. And. part III) strategies. they are not even able to define notions to relate a theory and reality. and perhaps to some other reconstructions that have been mentioned in this paper. p. But no sociological considerations are able to explain why the optimum line of the development of science is such and such. And it can be the servant of social practice at all only because it is the reflection of (essentially differentiated) reality. aside. applying the rule of dialectical correspondence. In this sense the `internal history' of science is poor in comparison with its `external history'. The author finds in the lay cognition the constructs of paraidealization and paraconcretization which are to characterize the specificity of cognitions made by a scientist-in-the-street. He also systematically analyzes the testing procedure applied in the common-sense knowledge and their peculiarities in comparison to science. interesting in themselves. They are to be analogous the correlation procedure. the idealizational approach to science offers a heuristic strategy to build new theories. Leaving these cases. etc. types of reflection about the world. part II) and extensionary (cf. one may conjecture that there have appeared four theories which had been overtly inspired by the heuristics based on the idealizational approach to science. Only when the line is known can the question be asked why cognition. indeed. Kuipers (1985) inventing a sophisticated derivation of van der Waals law contributed not only to methodology correcting the naive reconstruction of the derivation (Nowak 1971a) but also to physics improving standard derivation from the advanced handbooks of that domain (Kuipers 1985. The same applies to the reconstruction of the Marxian theory of value by Hamminga (1990). Science is mainly the reflection of reality. the common-sense knowledge. viz. common sense. one should state that the difference between a particularly creative reconstruction and a new theory is quite often rather fuzzy. And only here does a sociological theory allow for the answer: it happened so because cognition observing the rule of dialectical continuation was better at fulfilling the non-cognitive needs of society. this has been applied in some domains. won in competition with magical. and secondarily it is the servant of social practice. religious. A theory of common-sense knowledge.

theory of revolution and theory of power (Nowak 1988a. unitarian metaphysics is given by Paprzycka (1999). This satisfies. cf. 1991b). Klawiter (1978. although in different terms. theory of education (Nowak 1993). also Chap. also Chap. part II. the requirement of Balzer and Zoubek (1995. Let us add that in that universe of worlds (it is characterized. This conception is built with the aid of idealization itself (the intuitive The most penetrating analysis of the place of idealization procedure in the universe of the negativist. the theory is a modification of Norman Anderson's information integration theory (Maruszewski 1983. The theory (Nowak 1985b. Non-Marxian historical materialism. On the whole and from the psychological point of view. The non-Christian model of man. a systematic acccount 1999) based on criticism of the Christian model of man hidden beneath the norm ordering a Christian to love his/her enemies. The problem resulted from reconstructions of Marxian historical materialism for class societies by Lastowski and Buczkowski on the one hand. p.142ff) there is no world distinguished as „the” real one. 1991d). 234). p. The Author constructs a systematic conceptual apparatus introducing notions more general than economical concepts of Marx and demographical concepts of Engels and puts forward quite general hypotheses being generalizations of both Marxian and Engelsian historical materialisms. etc. The generalized historical materialism.1996. roughly. pp. with the strong plurality-of-worlds thesis admitting apart from possible worlds also worlds simpler („pre-worlds”) and richer („post-worlds”) than possible alternatives of our world. 1987c. identifying „subjective contents” with the states of various worlds or the enigma over them. and Engelsian historical materialism for primitive societies by Burbelka (cf. He also succeeds in some systematization of them which is done according to the rules derived from the methodology applied by both the authors of local historical materialisms. etc. 3129). 29 . The model is developed and applied to the problem of personal development (Nowak 1987e).The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 75 method as used in science. A ramified construction that contains among others two idealizational theories: that of property (Nowak 1983) and that of political power (Nowak 1987f. hence concretization may be relativized to any world (except for the purely negative worlds). summary in 1987d. The latter theory is composed of eight models. in my 1995. It is a system of the attibutivist (with the notion of object constructed from properties). The former theory is built of five models and reduces in the special case to a modification of Marxian theory (for slavery). It proposes a new model which reduces in the special case to the Christian model. A conception that is supposed among other things to play a role of metaphysics of idealization (Nowak 1995. and in details in 1998.2).58). negativistic (with a notion of the negative property as stronger than one of negation of the positive property). The negativist unitarian metaphysics. human rationality (Nowak 1989). a short summary in 1982) attempted to find the common theoretical structure underlying the two. 31.

Such is then the practical effectiveness of the idealizational methodology: it suffices to make one-eighth of science. and in print). It is composed of five models of reality of the increasing realism attempting to solve some more or less traditional philosophical puzzles and to paraphrase numerous alternative philosophical stands. . a systematic one by the same author 1998. *** This paper by necessity is written in a rather non modest manner. It would be then perhaps worthwhile to conclude that the theories ii and iv which the present author attempted to build are in his own methodological categories of the intuitive-developed-speculative-naive type being thus merely one-eight-theories.76 Leszek Nowak exposition Nowak 1991.

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pp.(1974a). A Survey of Methodological Problems). (Biological ----------. Studium metodologiczne (Etological and Sociobiological Extensions of the Theory of Evolution).215-24. ----------. Warszawa/Poznan: PWN.(1988). Przeglad zagadnien metodologicznych (Laws of Science. pp. J. Prawa nauki. 155-70. et al. 380-86. In: Piontek and Malinowski (1985). In: Krajewski (1974c). korespondencja. Etologiczne i socjobiologiczne rozwiniecia teorii ewolucji. Nowa metoda naukowa przeciw dogmatyzmowi i waskiemu empiryzmowi (Copernicus and Galileo against Aristotle. 115-45. Correspondence Przelecki. (1976).(1982a). The Principle of Correspondence and the Growth of Science.195-204. Kopernik i Galileusz versus Arystoteles. In: Nowak (1976d). W. Nowaka [Discussion about L. 3-22. Studia Metodologiczne. In: ----------. .86 Leszek Nowak Idealizational Conception of Science).(1974c) (Ed. Principle and Idealization. pp.(1977). Warszawa: PWN. New Scientific Method against Dogmatism and 'Narrow Empiricism'). 177.). Redukcja. idealizacja. (1976). Kotarbińska. Roczniki Akademii Rolniczej.(1986). ----------. In: J. Struktura teorii optymalizacyjnych w pedagogice. Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel.(1974b). 12. Kmita (1974). Warszawa: KiW. ----------. pp. (1974).(1976). Poznan: The Agricultural Academy Press. Glos w dyskusji nad referatem L. Nowak's paper]. D. Biologiczne koncepcje zachowania Conceptions of Behaviour). Kozowna. Krajewski. ----------. ----------. Zasada korespondencji w fizyce a rozwoj nauki.

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9.(1972e). Idealization. Galileo of the Social Sciences. . Zalozenie o racjonalnosci w ekonomii Marksowskiej i marksistowskiej (The Assumptions of Rationality in Marxian and Marxist Economics). Warszawa: PWN.(1974e). ----------. ----------. A Study in the Methodology of Jurisprudence). ----------.(1973c). Studia Filozoficzne. 4. Studia Semiotyczne. 5-12.(1974c).(1972c). 8. 8. Revolutionary World. 4. Valuation. 5-45.(1972d). Value. 107-120.(1974d). ----------. ----------.(1973b). O dalszych problemach metody idealizacji (On Further Problems of the Method of Idealization). 153-69. An Attampt at a Systematic Reconstruction). Proba systematycznej rekonstrukcji (Principles of Marxist Philosophy of Science.(1973a). In: Kmita (1973). Studia Socjologiczne. An International Journal of Philosophy. Studia Filozoficzne. ----------. Popperowska koncepcja praw i sprawdzania (Popper's Conception of Laws and Testing). Założenia prawniczego pojecia czynu (The Presupposition of the Juridical Notion of Act). ----------. 63-73. Problemy metody idealizacji (Problems of the Method of Idealization). 2. ----------. 7584. Marksowski model struktury klasowej spoleczenstwa kapitalistycznego (The Marxian Model of Class Structure of the Capitalist Society). Warszawa: PWN.The Idealizational Approach to Sceince… 93 ----------.(1974b).(1974a). Prakseologia. III. Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny. 303-24. Quantity and Quality. 83-101. Ruch Prawniczy. ----------. ----------. pp. 129-45. Zasady marksistowskiej filozofii nauki. 2. Interpretacja prawnicza. Uwagi o stosunku logiki do jezykoznawstwa (Remarks on the Relationship of Logic to Linguistics). Studium z metodologii prawoznawstwa (Juridical Interpretation.


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