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G.R. No. L-27211 July 6, 1977 G.R. No. 143791. January 14, 2005 PETER D. GARRUCHO, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL CASE: The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the CA, the RTC, Sheriff Flora and Binamira, for the nullification of the CA resolutions dated June 23, 1999 and November 26, 1999, the June 22, 2000 Order of the RTC, as well as the June 28, 2000 writ of execution issued by the latter court. FACTS: The petitioner and Commissioner Domingo appealed the decision OF RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 9, 1999, the CA sent a notice by registered mail to the petitioners counsel directing the latter to file his brief as appellant. However, the notice was returned to the court. The CA resent the notice dated March 5, 1999 to the petitioner at his office at the Department of Tourism building, Agripino Circle, Manila. The notice was returned to the CA on May 5, 1999, again, having been unclaimed. The CA issued a minute resolution on June 23, 1999, declaring that the service of notice on the petitioner was complete as of May 5, 1999. A copy of the said resolution was sent by registered mail to the petitioner in the Department of Tourism. On November 26, 1999, the appellate court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal of the petitioner for his failure to file his brief. A copy of the resolution was sent by registered mail to the petitioners counsel, but the said resolution was returned to the court with a notation stamped on the envelope Return To Sender, Moved Out. The CA then had a separate copy of the notice served by registered mail on the petitioner at his office address, but the same was returned to the CA with the notation Unclaimed. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his right to due process when the CA dismissed his appeal because of his failure to file his brief HELD: The petition has no merit. RATIO: The records show that the counsel of the petitioner in the trial court was the law firm of Remollo & Associates with offices at Suite No. 23, Legaspi Suites, 178 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. Under Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the counsel of the parties in the court of origin shall be considered as their counsel in the CA. Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel unless served upon the party himself is ordered by the trial court. Notice or service made upon a party who is represented by counsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not to his counsel of record is not notice in law. The rule admits of exceptions, as when the court or tribunal orders service upon a party or when the tribunal defendant is waived. In the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record. It is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of the counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his address. It is also the responsibility of a party to inform the court of the change of his address so that in the event the court orders that an order or resolution be served on the said party to enable him to receive the said resolution or order. In the present case, the law firm of Remollo & Associates, the petitioners counsel of record, moved out from their office at the Legaspi Suites to Dumaguete City without informing the court of such fact. Neither did the petitioner inform the court of his home or office address after his resignation as Secretary of the Department of Tourism where copies of the said order or resolution could be sent. EUSEBIA BARRAMEDA, vs. ENGRACIO CASTILLO, defendant-appellee plaintiff-appellant,

This case is about the effectiveness of the service of a court's decision by registered mail Facts: Eusebia Barrameda sued Engracio Castillo in the municipal court of Lopez, Quezon Province (nature of suit was not mentioned) A copy of the court's decision, which was adverse to Barrameda, was sent by registered mail on January 28, 1966 to her lawyer at San Pablo City o That mail was received in the city post office on the following day, January 29 On that day and on February 3 and 9, 1966 the city postmaster's office supposedly sent to Barrameda's counsel three notices regarding the registered mail Barrameda's lawyer did not claim that mail. It was returned to the municipal court and was received there on March 3, 1966 as unclaimed mail Eusebia Barrameda must have been informed that the adverse decision could not be served upon her lawyer. o On March 9, 1966 she received personally a copy of the decision. Through a lawyer, Barrameda filed a notice of appeal o Castillo did not interpose in the municipal court any objection to her appeal o The court gave it due course Castillo filed in the Court of First Instance a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. o His theory was that the fifteen-day reglementary period within which Barrameda could appeal should be counted from the expiration of five days from the date of the first notice sent by the postmaster to Barrameda's lawyer Eusebia Barrameda opposed Castillo's motion to dismiss her appeal o that Castillo failed to prove that her counsel actually received the supposed three notices sent by the postmaster o that because in the municipal court Castillo did not object to her appeal, his motion could no longer be entertained The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal o that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 7, 1966, the date of the third notice and the period expired on February 21, 1966 Hence, this petition

Issue: W/N the trial court was correct in computing the 15 day period counted from the service of the 3rd notice Held: Ratio: Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides: No. Trial courts order of dismissal is reversed

SEC. 7. Service of final orders or judgments. Final orders or judgments shall be served either personally or by registered mail. ... SEC. 8. Completeness of service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. ... Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time In service by registered mail, the general rule is that service is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. The exception is that when the addressee does not claim his mail within five days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, then the service takes effect at the expiration of such time As illustrated by Justice Cesar Bengzon, if the first notice is received by the addressee on December 1, and he gets his mail on December 3, the service is complete on December 3, the date of the actual receipt (general rule) But if the addressee gets his mail only on December 15, service is deemed complete on December 6 or five days from December 1, the date of the first notice (exception) If the addressee never gets the mail, service is also deemed complete on December 6, as provided in the exception to the general rule. If he receives his mail two months after it is registered and there is no proof of the first notice, then service is complete on the date of actual receipt, following the general rule. Bearing in mind that the exception in service by registered mail refers to constructive service, not to actual receipt of the mail, it is evident that the fair and just application of that exception depends upon conclusive proof that a first notice was sent by the postmaster to the addressee. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed should not be applied to such a situation. A certification from the postmaster would be the best evidence of that fact. Separate Opinions ANTONIO, J, concurring: In case the service of the order or judgment is sought to be effected by registered mail, but there is no proof that the notice for the registered mail was received by the addressee, the presumption, under Section 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, of the delivery of the registered mail or completion of the service after five (5) days from date of the first notice, certainly does not arise PNB v. CFI of Rizal Facts: PFC to review the orders of the then CFI of Pasig, Br. 21 Respondents are the registered owners of 3 parcels of lands in Pasig of the RD of Rizal 1 March 1954 Respondents entered into a Contract of Lease with Philippine Blooming Mills, Co., Inc., (PBM) whereby the latter shall lease the aforementioned land

In accordance with the Contract, as PBM was allowed to use the property as a factory site, PBM introduced several constructions and improvements and this was likewise registered with the RD of Rizal and annotated at the back of Respondents Certificates of Title (COT) 11 Oct 1964 PBM executed in favor of PNB a Deed of Assignment, conveying and transferring all its rights and interests under the Contract which it executed with Respondents o The assignment was for and in consideration of the loans granted by PNB to PBM

6 Nov 1963 PBM executed in favor of PNB the real estate mortgage for a loan of P100k 23 Dec 1963 PBM executed in favor of PNB an addendum to real estate mortgage for another loan of P1.59M covering all the improvements constructed by PBM on the leased premises PBM then filed a Petition for Registration of Improvements in the titles of real property owned by Respondents o 7 Oct 1981 Respondents filed a Motion seeking to cancel the annotations on Respondents COTs pertaining to the assignment by PBM to PNB of the formers leasehold rights, inclusion of improvements and the real estate mortgages made by PBM in favor of PNB Ground: The Contract entered into between PBM and Respondent-Movants had already expired by the failure of PBM and/or its assignee to exercise the option to renew the second 20-year lease and also by the failure of PBM to extend its corporate existence

The Motion also states that since PBM failed to remove its improvements on the leased premises before the said expiration, such improvements shall accrue to Respondent

22 April 1982 The CFI of Rizal directed the cancellation of the inscriptions on Respondents COTs PNB filed a MR 28 June 1982 Respondent court denied the motion 25 Aug 1982 Respondents filed a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment and the issuance of a writ of execution 14 Sept 1982 Court granted the above Motion PNB filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the entry of judgment

Ground: It has no prior notice or knowledge of the order dated 28 June 1982 and that while there was a certification from the Bureau of Posts that 3 registry notices were sent to Petitioners counsel, there was no allegation or certification that said notices were actually received by the addressee

on June 29, 1967, respondent judge denied said motion pertinently holding that the motion to set aside order of probate filed by petitioner did not amount to a Motion for New Trial under the Rules of Court Notice of this denial order was served on petitioner' counsel by registered mail According to the certification: the registered mail containing said order and "addressed to Atty. Andres R. Narvasa at 232 Madrigal Building, Escolta, Manila was delivered on July 24, 1967 to Cometa Villaflor for the addressee upon presentation of the third notice issued on July 19, 1967" and that "the first notice was issued on July 10, 1967." on August 9, 1967, Petitioners' notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal were filed and they filed a "Motion to Amend Record on Appeal" on August 18, 1967 respondent judge refused to act upon this because, according to him, his order of probate had already become final he held that from May 3 to May 17, petitioners consumed 14 days, and if the resumption of their period to appeal is to be computed from July 24, 1967, when their counsel actually received delivery of the order of denial of June 29, 1967, August 9, 1967 would appear to be the thirtieth day of said period, there being 16 days from July 24 to August 9, 1967

Issue: Held: Ratio: -

12 Jan 1983 Respondent Court denied the Omnibus Motion Hence this petition

W/N service by registered mail was validly effected upon Petitioner Yes Rule 13, Sec. 8 of the ROC: Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within 5 days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time o The fair and just application of that exception depends upon the conclusive proof that the first notice was sent by the postmaster The best evidence of that fact would be the certification from the postmaster

In the instant case, the Respondent Court found that the postmasters certification stated that the 3 notices of registered mail were sent to Petitioners counsel at Escolta, Manila. Hence, as between the denial of the Petitioners counsel that he received the notice and the postmasters certification, the latter should prevail The postmaster has the official duty to send notices of registered mail and the presumption is that official duty was regularly performed

respondents on the other hand contended that petitioners filed mere scraps of paper entitled notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond and that the purported notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond were filed much beyond the period within which to perfect an appeal they argue that: (1) petitioners' motion of May 17, 1967 to set aside the order of probate is pro-forma, and did not, therefore, suspend the period for appeal (2) assuming the contrary, the period for appeal of petitioners, after the order of denial of June 29, 1967, should be considered as having been resumed on July 10, 1967, when the first notice, as aforestated, was "issued" by the Manila Post Office and not from July 24, 1967 when petitioners actually received delivery of said order

Petitions is DISMISSED G.R. No. L-28296 November 24, 1972 Hernandez vs. Navarro

ISSUE:

whether or not petitioners took their appeal on time by filing their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on August 9, 1967

Petition for mandamus to compel respondent judge to give due course to the appeal of the petitioners on April 24, 1967, respondent Judge Navarro Pasig CFI issued an order admitting to probate the will of the deceased Maximo C. Hernandez, Sr., father of petitioners on May 3, 1967, notice thereof was served on petitioner on May 17, 1967, petitioners filed a motion to set aside said order

HELD:

Yes

Section 8 of Rule 13 Completeness of service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court

otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time. the period for appeal of petitioners should be deemed to have resumed upon the expiration of five days from July 10, 1967, the date the first notice was "issued", as certified by the post office, and not from July 24, 1967, when the registered mail containing the denial order was actually received by petitioners' counsel respondents do not point to any evidence proving the date when the first notice from the Manila Post Office was actually delivered to the address of petitioners' counsel. All that appears in the record before Us is that the said notice was issued by the Post Office on July 10, 1967 proof should always be available to the post office not only of whether or not the notices of registered mail have been reported delivered by the letter carrier but also of how or to whom and when such delivery has been made when the post office makes a certification regarding delivery of registered mail, such certification should include the data not only as to whether or not the corresponding notices were issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof was made. the certification in the case at bar that the first and second notices addressed to Atty. Narvasa had been "issued" can hardly suffice to requirements of equity and justice. It was incumbent upon the post office to further certify that said notices were reportedly received When there are several related acts supposed to be performed by a public officer or employee in regard to a particular matter, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions would not arise and be considered as comprehending all the required acts, if the certification issued by the proper office refers only to some of such acts, particularly in instances wherein proof of whether or not all of them have been performed is available under the law or office regulations to the officer making the certification the omission of some of the acts in the certification may justify the inference that from the proof available to the officer there is no showing that they have also been performed where the certification is worded in general terms that reasonably comprehend performance of all the related acts, the presumption of irregularity holds as to all of them QUELNAN vs. VHF Under consideration is' this' petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the decision dated September 17, 1997 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. SP-41942, and its resolution dated April 27, 1999, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. FACTS:

MTC of Manila found that 'summons together with a copy of the complaint was served [on petitioner] thru his wife on August 25, 1992 by substituted service and that petitioner 'failed to file his answer within the reglementary period'. November 23, 1992 it rendered judgment in favor of respondent, ordering Quelnan to vacate the premises of the unit and pay for back rentals, etc. Copy of the aforementioned decision was served on petitioner by registered mail but the same was returned unclaimed on account of petitioner's failure to claim the same despite the postmaster's three (3) successive notices on November 25, 1992, December 7 and 11 of year 1992. No appeal having been taken by the petitioner, the MeTC decision became final and executory. May 18, 1993 a writ of execution, a notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served on petitioner's wife who acknowledged receipt thereof. May 24, 1993 petitioner Quelnan filed with the Manila RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary restraining order, alleging that: o He was never served with summons' and was' completely unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit, o He learned of the judgment rendered thereon only on May 18, 1993 when a notice of levy on execution came to his knowledge. o He thus prayed the RTC to annul and set aside the MeTC decision and the writs issued in connection therewith. June 3, 1996 the RTC granted petitioner's petition for relief and set aside the MeTC decision. The RTC explained that petitioner had been unduly deprived of a hearing and had been prevented from taking an appeal for the reason that petitioner's wife, in a fit of anger, tore the summons and complaint in the ejectment suit in the heat of a marital squabble. To the RTC, this constituted excusable negligence as would justify the filing of the petition for relief from judgment. Respondent sought reconsideration of the RTC decision but its' motion was denied by said court in its order of July 5, 1996. Respondent directly went to this Court on a petition for review, which petition was remanded by this Court to the Court of Appeals (CA), whereat the same was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41942. September 17, 1997 CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and reinstated that of the MeTC. Petitioner filed MR but CA denied in April 27, 1999.

ISSUE/S: (1) If a party fails to claim his copy of the adverse decision which was sent through registered mail, when is he deemed to have knowledge of said decision? (2) Will the presumption of completeness of service of a registered mail matter under Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure apply in relation to the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 3 of the Rules? HELD:

Respondent, VHF Phil. Inc. filed an ejectment suit against petitioner, Andy Quelnan, involving a condominium unit at the Legaspi Towers which respondent claimed to have been leased by petitioner.

Petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed. RATIO:

1. Petitioner: He contends that the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief from judgment must be reckoned from the time a party acquired knowledge of the judgment. Hence, prescinding from his premise that he became aware of the MeTC decision only on May 18, 1993 when a notice to pay and vacate was served on him by the sheriff, petitioner submits that his petition for relief from judgment was timely filed on May 24, 1993. SC: Section 3 of Rule 38 reads: Time for filing petition; contents and verification. ' A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within: (a) 60 days from knowledge of judgment, order or other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. o These two periods must concur. o Both periods are also not extendible and never interrupted. o Strict compliance with these periods stems from the equitable character and nature of the petition for relief. Relief is allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. A petition for relief is actually the 'last chance given by law to litigants to question a final judgment or order. And failure to avail of such last chance within the grace period fixed by the Rules is fatal.

There arises a presumption that the service was complete at the end of the said five-day period. This means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given by the postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have received and to have been notified of the judgment at that point. R13 SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT vs. RICAFORTE (1998) FACTS: 1997, SOLAR filed before RTC Paraaque a complaint for recovery of possession and damages, with prayer for a writ of replevin (to recover movable property) Summonses and copies of the complaint were given to the private respondents, they asked for an extension of time to plead, it was granted. o The private respondents (defendants in the lower court) filed their Answer with counterclaims A copy thereof was furnished to the counsel for SOLAR via registered mail The pleading did not contain WHY the service was not made personally, as required under Sec 11, R 13. SOLAR filed a motion to expunge the Answer with counterclaims and to hold private respondents in default, since they failed to comply with Sec 11, R 13 o [A]bsolutely no valid reason why defendant[s] should not have personally served plaintiffs ... counsel with [a] copy of their answer [as] (t)he office of defendants (sic) counsel, Atty. Froilan Cabaltera, is just a stone [sic] throw away from the office of [petitioners] counsel, with an estimate (sic) distance of about 200 meters more or less. o Petitioner further alleged that the post office was about ten (10) times farther from the office of Atty. Cabaltera private respondents filed their opposition to the above mentioned motion o alleging that petitioners rigid and inflexible reliance on the provisions of Section 11, Rule 13 ... is an adventitious resort to technicality and is contrary to Section 6 of Rule 3 ... which admonishes that said Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective in securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of [e]very action and proceeding; and that Section 11, Rule 13 notwithstanding, private respondents religiously complied with [Section 5 of Rule 13] by personally present[ing] to the clerk of court their said Answer ... furnishing a copy thereof to the counsel for [petitioner] by way of registered mail. On 8 September 1997, public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an order stating that under Section 11 of Rule 13 it is within the discretion of the [trial court] whether to consider the pleading as filed or not, and denying, for lack of merit, petitioners motion to expunge the Answer (with Counterclaims) and to declare private respondents in default. (Im sorry? Naguluhan ako, the petition was denied? But she held the private respondents in default? Kara) SOLAR MR, but the Judge denied to motion

2. The records clearly reveal that a copy of the MeTC decision was sent to petitioner through registered mail at his given address on November 25, 1992. It should be noted that petitioner was not represented by counsel during the proceedings before the MeTC. The first notice to him by the postmaster to check his mail was on November 25, 1992. Subsequent notices were sent by the postmaster on December 7, 1992 and December 11, 1992.

A certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by the petitioner and thus returned to the sender after three successive notices was issued by the postmaster. Service of said MeTC decision became effective five (5) days after November 25, 1992, or on November 30, 1992, conformably with Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads: Completeness of Service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. (Emphasis supplied) Under the Rules, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice, service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days therefrom.

Section 6 [of] Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ordains that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleading is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice

personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed

SOLAR thus filed the instant special civil action of certiorari o contending that public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she admitted private respondents' "Answer (with Counterclaims)" notwithstanding private respondents' clear, admitted and inexcusable violation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in that: (a) the "Answer (with Counterclaims)" was not served personally upon petitioners counsel despite the undisputed fact that the offices of private respondents counsel and that of petitioners counsel are only about 200 meters away from each other; and (b) the Answer did not contain any explanation as to why the answer was not served personally.

Section 11 refers to both service of pleadings and other papers on the adverse party or his counsel as provided for in Sections 6, 7 and 8; and to the filing of pleadings and other papers in court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge GADLEJ in denying Solars motion to expunge private respondents answer with counterclaims on the ground that said pleading was not served personally (and there was not written explanation for thus)? HELD: NO. It is well settled that litigations should, as much as possible be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. private respondents aver that public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort correctly admitted private respondents Answer (with Counterclaims) in light of Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; that Section 11 of Rule 13 begins with the phrase whenever practicable, thereby suggesting that service by mail may still be effected depending on the relative priority of the pleading sought to be filed; and when service is not done personally, it is more prudent and judicious for the courts to require a written explanation rather than to expunge the pleading outright or consider the same as not being filed. Section 5, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes two modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers, namely: o (1) personal service; is governed by Section 6 o (2) service by mail. Section 7 o If service cannot be done either personally or by mail, substituted service may be resorted to under Section 8 thereof. Section 11 of Rule 13 The party concerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally. o SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. -- Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done -

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. o Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; o Minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. o personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered parcel containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers. Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. o Whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. SO, when it isnt practicable, they may resort to other modes But it must include a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable! Here, the proximity between the offices of opposing counsel was established; moreover, that the office of private respondents counsel was ten times farther from the post office than the distance separating the offices of opposing counsel. o but exceptions may nonetheless apply private respondents counsel violated Section 11 of Rule 13 and the motion to expunge was prima facie meritorious. o However, the grant or denial of said motion nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of the trial courts discretion. o Thus, as guided by Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordains that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding, as well as by the dictum laid down in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910]

The trial court opted to exercise its discretion in favor of admitting the Answer (with Counterclaims), instead of expunging it from the record. Amen-Amen v CA G.R. No. 143424, August 8, 2001 Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 Facts: Danilo Amen-Amen (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) filed a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal, separation pay, 13th month pay, performance incentive pay and sick leave pay against Toyota Davao City, Inc./Duratrak Corp. and/or Jose A. Lim, III, Presidentbefore the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI in Davao City. The labor arbiter ruled in favour of Amen-Amen. The NLRC reversed the appealed decision, ruling that petitioners dismissal from employment was for a just cause and with due process of law. Petitioners motion to reconsider the above Resolution was denied by the NLRC. Consequently, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.As mentioned at the outset, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground of lack of explanation of service by registered mail? Held: No.It is not disputed that petitioners Petition for Certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals did not contain an explanation why resort was made to other modes of service of the petition to the parties concerned.The Court of Appeals considered the same as not having been filed and dismissed the petition outright. Pursuant to the above-quoted section, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally. To underscore the mandatory nature of this rule requiring personal service whenever practicable, said section gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place." The petition for certiorari without the written explanation was filed on February 4, 2000, that is, three (3) years after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997; and two (2) years after the promulgation of the Solar case in 1998. Clearly, there is no excuse for its non-compliance, especially, not on mere reliance on the liberal construction of rules. We adhere to the pronouncement in the Solar case that, "if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 were to be indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1.

Macrosman Dona (Respondent) filed a complaint against petitioners for Abatement of Nuisance with the MTC, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro which was tried and decided under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Respondent claims that in front of their house is a barangay road where the petitioners constructed their house against the objection of the respondent. They claim that the house is a public nuisance. The petitioners defend that the house was constructed by the late Praxido Penoso, way ahead before the respondent arrived and that they have no action to file the case. MTC ruled in favor of petitioners on the ground that respondent has no cause of action against petitioners and that the house may only be abated by the Municipal Mayor unless it is specially injurious to a private person. Respondent appealed to the RTC and the decision of the MTC was reversed. The RTC declared the house as a nuisance. The RTC denied the petitioners MR. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA, which was dismissed OUTRIGHT for failure of the petitioners to include in their petition the required explanation on why personal service upon the respondent was not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners filed a MR attaching a Certification from the Postmaster that the pleading in question had been actually received by the respondent as well as a letter to the CA Clerk of Court stating that if the docket fee is insufficient, counsel for the petitioners shall remit the balance immediately, if any. MR was denied stating that petitioners subsequent compliance with the Rules does not cleanse the petition of its infirmity. Hence the instant Petition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioner to include in their petition the required explanation on why personal service upon the respondent was not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and on the ground that docketing fees was short? Held: The CA erred. Ratio: Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed. Jurisprudence holds that the rule that a pleading must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally is mandatory.8 However, in Ello v. Court of Appeals,9 the Court defined the circumstances when the court may exercise its discretionary power under Section 11 of Rule 13, viz: However, such discretionary power of the court must be exercised properly and reasonably, taking into account the following factors: (1) "the practicability of personal service;" (2) "the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein;" and (3) "the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. x x x"10 Considering the prima facie merit of the pleading involving the issues whether the petitioners house is a public nuisance; whether the subject house is constructed on an abandoned road; and whether the alleged nuisance is specially injurious to respondent; and, considering further the fact that the MTC and the RTC decisions

MARTIN PEOSO and ELIZABETH PEOSO, Petitioners, vs. MACROSMAN DONA, Respondent. Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution1 dated March 22, 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69472, which dismissed the appeal before it because Martin Peoso and his mother Elizabeth Peoso (petitioners) failed to submit a written explanation why service of pleading was not done personally as required under Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and to pay the requisite docket fees; and, the CA Resolution2 dated June 3, 2002 which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Facts:

are conflicting, the CA had valid grounds to refrain from dismissing the appeal solely on technical grounds.11 Furthermore, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the shortage of the payment of the docketing fee cannot be used as a ground for dismissing petitioners appeal before the CA. It is undisputed that they and their counsel are living in a remote town and are not aware of the exact amount of the lawful fees for petitions for review. Hence, it is understandable why they place sheer reliance on the Rules of Court, notably, Section 1 of Rule 42, which only specifies the amount of P500.00 for the appeal cost in question. Petitioners sent P500.00 with a request from the Clerk of Court for notification of any insufficiency which will be sent immediately if there is any. The deficiency in payment was not at all intentional. The petitioners acted in good faith and substantially complied with the Rules. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is directed to REINSTATE the petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69472, for further proceedings. Heirs of Lopez vs Enriquez This is a petition for review. Alfonso Sandoval (Sandoval') and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. (Ozaeta') filed an application for registration of title before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. On 31 May 1966, the land registration court granted the application. LRA issued on 20 October 1977 Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao. GR # 146262

Petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA. LRA said notice of lis pendens is not regristrable. Petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for review of the LRA's decision, CA dismissed it. WHETHER PETITIONERS' MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS A PROPER BASIS FOR FILING THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS SC = The petition has no merit. We hold that the motion filed by petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in the land registration proceedings for purposes of filing an application of a notice of lis pendens. A notice of lis pendens should contain a statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the court where the same is pending, and the date of its institution. A notice of lis pendens should also contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate description of the land affected and its registered owner. The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens because 'the application was bereft of the original petition or complaint upon which this office will base its action. Petitioners' enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied with the requisites. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties. Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending litigation. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment. Second, it binds a purchaser, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the filing of a notice of lis pendens does not create a right or lien that previously did not exist. Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good faith.

On 16 July 1997, petitioners heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion in LRC No. N18887. The motion alleged that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970. Petitioners prayed that the court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale over the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Petitioners also prayed that the court issue the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses only on 18 August 1998. Petitioners filed another motion on 25 November 1998 to declare void Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT') Nos. O-1603 and O1604, but was denied by the LRA Administrator. On 25 November 1998, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration court a motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 void. Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied the application to annotate the notice of lis pendens.

[G.R. No. 124893. April 18, 1997] LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, Petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, Respondents.

Facts:

whether the fax pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. G.R. No. 175334 March 26, 2008 Sps. Belen v Chavez Petitioner: SPS. DOMINGO AND DOMINGA BELEN Respondents: HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, SPS. SILVESTRE AND PATRICIA PACLEB Facts: A petition for review on certiorari which sought to nullify the RTC decision. Sps. Pacleb filed an action for enforcement of foreign judgment against Sps. Belen before the RTC of Batangas. The complaint alleged that Pacleb secured a judgment by default from California Superior Court ordering the petitioners to pay $56,204.69 as loan repayment and share in the profit. The summons was served on petitioners' address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, as was alleged in the complaint, and received by a certain Marcelo M. Belen. Atty. Alcantara entered his appearance on behalf of the petitioners and filed an answer to the complaint and alleged that the petitioners were actually resident of California, USA contrary to respondents averments. He also claimed in his answer that petitioners liability was extinguished by the release of an abstract judgment in the same collection case. For petitioners failure to attend the pre-trial conference, the RTC ordered an ex-parte presentation of evidence in favor of respondents. However, before the scheduled presentation of evidence, Atty. Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss citing the judgment of dismissal issued by the Court of California. The RTC suspended the said presentation pending the submission of the order of the Court of California. But Atty. Alcantara failed to present the said order of dismissal. Subsequently, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. The respondents then filed an amended complaint and explained that they were forced to withdraw the case in California for high cost of litigation. Petitioners claimed in their answer the defenses of lack of cause of action, res judicata, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the defendants. Petitioners failed to appear on the pre-trial conference, and were declared in default. Atty. Alcantara passed away without the RTC being informed at such fact until much later. And the copy of the order intended for Atty. Alcantara was returned with notation Addressee Deceased. And on Aug. 14, 2003, it was then sent to the purported address of the petitioners and was received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. Upon the motion of the respondents, the RTC issued a writ of execution. On 16 December 2003, Atty. Carmelo B. Culvera entered his appearance as counsel for petitioners. On 22 December 2003, Atty. Culvera filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution (With Prayer to Defer Further Actions). On 6 January 2004, he filed a Notice of Appeal from the RTC Decision averring that he received a copy thereof only on 29 December 2003.

Petitioner applied for registration as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo. The Board of Election Tellers (BET), however, denied her application because petitioner exceeded the age limit for membership as laid down in Section 3(b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter with the MTC, which found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member. Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of SK Chairman, which respondent Election Officer Rios disapproved again due to her age. Petitioner appealed this to the COMELEC Regional Director who set aside the order of respondent and allowed petitioner to run.

Without the knowledge of COMELEC officials, private respondent Sales, a rival candidate for SK Chairman, filed with the COMELEC en banc aPetition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy against petitioner. The petition was sent by fax and registered mail. The COMELEC issued an order directing the BET and Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won the election. Petitioner won, hence, the BET did not proclaim her in accordance with the COMELEC resolution. Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari. Subsequent to the filing of instant petition, the BET proclaimed petitioner as SK Chairman. Petitioner then ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga SK for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, in which she won as auditor. Issue: W/N COMELEC had jurisdiction to entertain petition Held: No. Petition is dismissed and petitioner is declared ineligible. Ratio: Under the Omnibus Election Code, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order suspending the proclamation of petitioner. The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Every pleading before the COMELEC must be filed in at least 10 legible copies and must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or by registered mail. In the instant case, only 2 copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC. Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by fax, not by registered mail. Filing a pleading by fax is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A fax is not a genuine and authentic pleading. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face

The RTC denied the motion to quash as well as the MR. On appeal under Rule 65, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and the subsequent MR.

Facts: Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation (petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamus and damages against several defendants including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents). After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, Gregorio Zapanta (Zapanta), court process server, resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon respondents househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names. September 24, 2004 Zapanta, the court process server, caused the service of summons together with a copy of the complaint with its annexes to defendant Spouses Lourdes Estudillo Paez-Cline and Orlando Villa at their given address at 905 Padre Faura Street, Ermita Manila, as per information given by two lady househelps who are also residing at the said address, the defendant spouses are not around at that time. September 27, 2004 Zapanta went back to the same residence and served summons to the two househelpers but they refused to sign to acknowledge receipt and they refused to tell their name as per instruction of the defendants. Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, prompting petitioner to file a Motion to Declare Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005. January 30, 2006 - respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, denying the existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended that assuming that the allegations were true, the helpers had no authority to receive the documents. July 17, 2006 - the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein respondents five days to file their Answer, but respondents, again failed to file their answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to declare them in default. February 21, 2007 - trial court again granted Motion to Declare respondents in default April 18, 2007 - respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons. May 22, 2007 TC denied MR and proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence for petitioner. Respondents challenged TCs orders before CA CA ruled ruled in favor of respondents. Petitioners MR was likewise denied ISSUE: WON respondents filing of the first Motion to Lift the Order of Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.

Issue: W/N there was a valid service of the copy of the RTC decision on the petitioners. NO. Held: Petition was GRANTED. The notice of appeal was GIVEN DUE COURSE. Rationale:

As a general rule, when a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law. The exception to this rule is when service upon the party himself has been ordered by the court. In cases where service was made on the counsel of record at his given address, notice sent to petitioner itself is not even necessary. In this case, the Court ruled that upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship between him and petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the RTC decision on him is ineffective and did not bind petitioners. The subsequent service on petitioners' purported "last known address" by registered mail is also defective because it does not comply with the requisites under Section 7 of Rule 13 on service by registered mail. It contemplates service at the present address of the party and not at any other address of the party. Service at the party's former address or his last known address or any address other than his present address does not qualify as substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 7, Rule 13. Therefore, service by registered mail presupposes that the present address of the party is known and if the person who receives the same is not the addressee, he must be duly authorized by the former to receive the paper on behalf of the party.

In this case, since the filing of the complaint, petitioners could not be physically found in the country because they had already become permanent residents of California, U.S.A. It has been established during the trial that petitioners are former residents of Alaminos, Laguna, contrary to the averment in the complaint that they reside and may be served with court processes thereat. The service of the RTC decision at their former address in Alaminos, Laguna is defective and does not bind petitioners.

RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS ORLANDO VILLA and LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA Petition for Review on Certiorari

RULING: YES! It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latters voluntary appearance. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. And Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens: Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the courts jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court. PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION v. JAPZON as presiding Judge xxx Public Respondents (PR) LARA and PAED PFC and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction RTC Manila FACTS: PR Lara contracted the services of a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Garcia to transport family and relatives from Manila to Pangasinan. Jeepney was driven by Macasieb. On the same day in the vicinity of Tarlac, a Ford Truck owned by Manuel (and I guess driven by Natividad) overtook an unidentified motor vehicle and in the process hit and sides swept the passenger jeepney. Lara and Paed sustained serious physical injuries. Laras arm needed to be amputated and Paed was incapacitated to work for more than two weeks. The insurer of the truck was Paramount Insurance Corp. Natividad filed a notice of claim with Paramount Lara and Paez filed a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence During the pendency of the case, Lara filed a manifestation reserving the right to file a separate civil action against the operators of the 2 vehicles: Natividad&Garcia, Manuel&Macasieb Lara filed a case for damages against Natividad&Garcia, Manuel&Macasieb and impleaded Paramount as the insurer of the truck. A certain Atty. Gloria filed a notice of appearance and informed the court that he was appearing for and behalf of Natividad, Manuel and Paramount During the criminal case, Manuel pleaded guilty

November 19, 1981 a fire burnt all the records in the city hall of Manila January 25, 1982 Lara and Paed filed a petition for reconstitution of the judicial records of the case which was approved without opposition February 17, 1983 the court reiterated its order before the reconstitution of the judicial records declaring defendants in default for continued failure to appear during the trial and allowed the plaintiffs (lara and paed) to make a formal offer of exhibits and considered the case submitted for decision August 30, 1983 RTC found in favor of Lara and Paed A copy was served on petitioners (Paramount) counsel and no appeal was filed within the period. Respondents filed an ex-parte motion for execution March 3, 1984 Paramount filed a motion to set aside the decision raising the issue that the court has not validly acquired jurisdiction over its person o Paramount was not validly served with summons and a copy of the complaint o It did not actively participate in the proceedings o It alleged that Atty. Gloria was not its retained counsel at the time and was not authorized by the petitioners to act for and its behalf RTC TRO enjoining the execution

ISSUE: WON the court validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner despite the appearance of Atty. Gloria who allegedly was not retained or authorized to file an answer for it. HELD: YES RATIO: Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons is intended to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it. The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Petitioners contentions re: Atty. Gloria are untenable Petitioner failed to substantiate its allegation that it was not properly served with summons. The disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed prevails Records of the case show that all the pleadings, answers, cross claims and counterclaims were filed by Atty. Gloria and stated that he represented the three defendants (herein plaintiff/s) and he filed a notice of appearance pa It strains credulity that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he has not been authorized or employed by the party concerned. The court thinks that this petition is filed just to derail its execution since it took Paramount almost 6 years to question the jurisdiction of the RTC. There is no justification to reopen a case that which has long been final. TRO lifted

G.R. No. 70403 July 7, 1989 SANTIAGO vs. HON. JOSE P. CASTRO SYJUCO, INC., petitioner,

Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus FACTS:

After being served of Supreme Courts decision, Lims caused the filing with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of still another action, the third, also designed, like the first two, to preclude enforcement of the mortgage held by Syjuco. This time the complaint was presented, not in their individual names, but in the name of a partnership of which they themselves were the only partners: "Heirs of Hugo Lim." QC Judge Castro issued restraining order and summons of which Syjuco claims not to have received.Then, Sheriff Perfecto G. Dalangin submitted a return of summons to the effect that on December 6, 1982 he .. served personally and left a copy of summons together with a copy of Complaint and its annexes x x upon defendant's office formerly at 313 Quirino Ave., Paranaque, Metro-Manila and now at 407 Dona Felisa Syjuco Building, Remedios St., corner Taft Avenue, Manila, through the Manager, a person of sufficient age and discretion duly authorized to receive service of such nature, but who refused to accept service and signed receipt thereof.

Since the sheriffs return constitutes primary evidence of the manner and incidents of personal service of a summons, the Rules are quite specific about what such a document should contain:SEC. 20. Proof of service The defective sheriffs return thus being insufficient and incompetent to prove that summons was served in the manner prescribed for service upon corporations, there is no alternative to affirming the petitioner's claim that it had not been validly summoned in Civil Case No. Q-36485

EFFECT OF INVALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS:

strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court

Lims through Atty. Canlas filed an ex-parte motion to declare Syjuco in default which was granted and by virtue of which the trial court held void the mortgage in question because it was executed by the Lims without authority from the partnership which was and had been since March 30,1959 the exclusive owner of the mortgaged property, and making permanent an injunction against the foreclosure sale that had issued on January 14,1983. Syjuco filed this petition praying that the default judgment rendered against it by Judge Castro in said Civil Case No. Q-36485 be annulled on the ground of lack of service of summons, res judicata and laches, and failure of the complaint to state a cause of action

lacking such valid service, the Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner Syjuco, rendering null and void all subsequent proceedings and issuances in the action from the order of default up to and including the judgment by default and the order for its execution ELISEO BOTICANO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL CHU, JR., respondent. RULE 14 Petitioner Eliseo Boticano is the registered owner of a Bedford truck with plate No. QC-870, T-Pilipinas '77 which he was using in hauling logs for a certain fee. while loaded with logs, it was properly parked by its driver Maximo Dalangin at the shoulder of the national highway it was hit and bumped at the rear portion by a Bedford truck owned by private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. and driven by Jaime Sigua, the former's co-defendant in this case. Manuel Chu, Jr. acknowledged ownership thereof and agreed with petitioner to shoulder the expenses of the repair of the damaged truck of the latter When Manuel Chu, Jr. failed to comply with aforesaid agreement as well as to pay damages representing lost income despite petitioner's demands, the latter (plaintiff in the lower court), filed a complaint on November 24, 1977 at the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VII at Cabanatuan City, against private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. (truck owner) and Jaime Sigua (his driver) both as defendants in Civil Case No. 6754 "Eliseo Boticano v. Manuel Chu, Jr. and Jaime Sigua" for damages. Summons was issued on December 12, 1977 but was returned unserved for defendant Jaime Sigua because he was no longer connected with San Pedro Saw Mill, Guagua, Pampanga, while another copy of the summons for Manuel Chu, Jr. was returned duly served on him thru his wife Veronica Chu at his dwelling house. On February 15, 1978 petitioner moved to dismiss the case against Jaime Sigua and to declare Manuel Chu, Jr. in default for failure to file responsive pleadings within the reglementary period. The motion was granted by the lower court in an Order dated September 4, 1978, allowing petitioner to adduce his evidence ex parte on October 17, 1978.

ISSUE: Was there a valid service of summons? HELD: The sheriffs return creates grave doubts about the correctness of the Judge's basic premise that summons had been validly served on Syjuco. RATIO:

the return is unspecific about where service was effected No safe conclusion about the place of service can be made from its reference to a former and a present office of Syjuco in widely separate locations, with nothing to indicate whether service was effected at one address or the other, or even at both failure to name the person served who is, with equal ambiguity, identified only as "the Manager" of the defendant corporation (petitioner herein)

TC From the evidence adduced by the plaintiff (petitioner herein) the trial court November 28, 1978 found that private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. is responsible for the fault and negligence of his driver Sigua under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, whose negligence and lack of due care was the immediate and proximate cause of the damage to petitioner's truck and ruled in favor of plaintiff-petitioner. On March 19, 1979 private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. filed with the trial court a "Notice of Appeal" and an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to file Record on Appeal which was granted by the trial court on the same date On March 26, 1979, Atty. Hermenegildo D. Ocampo, counsel of record of private respondent, filed a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel" while the new counsel Atty. Wilfredo G. Laxamana entered his appearance on April 18, 1979 and filed his record on appeal on the same date On May 4, 1979 petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for execution which was set for hearing on May 14, 1979 wherein private respondent's counsel personally appeared and opposed petitioner's motion while on the latter date petitioner filed his reply to opposition, On May 16, 1979 the trial court issued an order denying aforesaid motion, while on May 22, 1979, the trial court issued another order approving private respondent's Record on Appeal.

Petitioner contends in favor of validity of such service while private respondent maintains the opposite view which was sustained by respondent Court of Appeals to the effect that the Sheriff resorted to substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, without first complying with the mode of personal service required under Section 7 of the same Rule.

CA the appealed judgment is hereby set aside, for being null and void. This case is directed to be remanded to the court of origin; that appellant be properly served with summons and a copy of the complaint; and that the necessary and appropriate proceedings or action be taken thereafter, as the circumstances and the case win warrant.With costs against appellee. On April 20, 1981, petitioner filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration and on June 3, 1981 a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. On August 28, 1981 respondent Court of Appeals issued an order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration There is no dispute as to the facts of this case, as shown by the admission of private respondent to the extent of making an agreement with petitioner to shoulder the expenses of the repair of the damaged truck of the latter and the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's evidence fully supports the findings of facts of the trial court as well as its judgment under appeal. Neither does private respondent deny receipt of the summons in question. The bone of contention appears to be in the manner of service of said summons on the wife of private respondent at their dwelling instead of on private respondent himself personally.

ISSUE: whether or not the question of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be raised for the first time on appeal. SC: NO The question has been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court in a long line of decisions. In fact, one of the circumstances considered by the Court as indicative of waiver by the defendant-appellant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction over his person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first opportunity. It has been held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of process may be waived by a failure to make seasonable objections. jurisdiction was properly acquired by the trial court over the person of respondent thru both service of summons and voluntary appearance in court; he was therefore properly declared in default for not having filed any answer; despite respondent's failure to file a motion to set aside the declaration of default, he has the right to appeal the default judgment but in the appeal only the evidence of the petitioner may be considered, respondent not having adduced any defense evidence; We agree with the findings of fact by the trial court. In fact, one of the circumstances considered by the Court as indicative of waiver by the defendant-appellant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction over his person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first opportunity. It has been held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of process may be waived by a failure to make seasonable objections. It has been pointed out that during the stages of the proceedings in the court below, defendant-appellant could have questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court but he did not. private respondent voluntarily appeared thru counsel in the trial court. He filed a Notice of Appeal, Appeal Bond, Motion for Extension of Time to File Record on Appeal, Record on Appeal, Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance, Notice of Appearance and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Not only did he submit pleadings and motions, but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel in the hearing held on May 14, 1979 at 8:30 a.m. and orally argued in open court on the pending incident. In the case at bar, there is no question that summons was timely issued and received by private respondent. In fact, he never denied actual receipt of such summons but confined himself to the argument that the Sheriff should prove that personal service was first made before resorting to substituted service, WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City in Civil Case No. 6754 "Eliseo Boticano v. Manuel Chu, Jr. and Jaime Sigua" is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. Pan Asiatic Travel Corp. v. CA

Facts:

G.R. No. 82986 October 2, 1992 Destinations Travel Phil., Inc. (DESTINATIONS) filed a complaint against Pan-Asiatic Travel Corp. (PAN-ASIATIC) for the refund of alleged unutilized airplane tickets A few months thereafter, DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default After receipt of said motion, PAN-ASIATIC (by way of special appearance) filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the court had failed to acquire jurisdiction over its person Ground: PAN-ASIATIC was allegedly not properly served summons A copy of the amended complaint and summons were then served on PANASIATIC PAN-ASIATIC filed several motions for extension of time within which to file its answer However, instead of filing an Answer, it instead filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars which was granted by the trial court DESTINATIONS did not file a Bill of Particulars; instead, it served and filed a Motion to Admit attached Second Amended Complaint TOMAS G. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents MAPA, petitioner,

The validity of a substituted service of summons upon the petitioner is raised as the common issue in these two (2) cases. Since identical parties are involved in both, this Court ordered their consolidation Facts: G.R. No. 79374 involves a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review Decision of public respondent Court of Appeals denying, for lack of merit, the petition therein which sought to set aside the decision of RTC of Manila A similar petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was filed in G.R. No. 82986 to review the decision of public respondent Court of Appeals that set aside (a) the Order of RTC of Manila reversing its earlier decision on the ground that the herein petitioner was not validly served with summons and (b) the Order denying the motion for reconsideration of the latter High Peak Mining Exploration Corporation (hereinafter referred to as High Peak), through its duly authorized corporate officers Encarnacion C. Tittel and Juergen Tittel, borrowed various sums of money from the private respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), the latter acting as trustee of a Trust Account o No security being required, none was put up by High Peak for the faithful performance of its obligations under the Promissory Notes o 3 Promissory Notes expressly provide that demand and dishonor are waived by High Peak and its officers High Peak failed to pay the said loans o Despite the waiver of notice of demand, the LBP nevertheless sent demand letters to the former which ignored the same o LBP was thus constrained to take legal action based on the 3 notes The first note become the subject matter of a complaint for the recovery of a sum of money with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment filed solely against High Peak The complaint was filed with the then Court of First Instance (CASE A) The complaint was thereafter amended to implead as additional defendants o the petitioner herein, in his personal capacity and as Chairman of High Peak's Board of Directors o and the abovenamed signatories to the promissory notes The amended complaint was admitted by the court in its Order The second and third Promissory Notes, on the other hand, became the subject matter of a complaint for the recovery of a sum of money filed against High Peak and the aforementioned signatories to the three (3) Promissory Notes o complaint was likewise filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila (CASE B) The amended complaint in Civil CASE A & B both allege that the defendants could be served with summons at the Second Floor, First Midland Condominium Bldg., Gamboa St., Legaspi Village Makati, Metro Manila

Said amended complaint was admitted by the trial court judge; but no new summons was served PAN-ASIATIC DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, which was granted PAN-ASIATIC filed its Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default, alleging that the trial court's decision was rendered without jurisdiction

Ground: PAN-ASIATIC was never served summons on the Second Amended Complaint; it was thereby deprived of its day in court

The court denied said motion PAN-ASIATIC filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the CA The same was dismissed Hence the instant petition Issue: W/N summons on the Second Amended Complaint was necessary for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of PAN-ASIATIC Decision/Ratio: NO Ong Peng v. Custodio (G.R. L-14911): if the defendant had already appeared in response to the first summons, so that he was already in court when the amended complaint was filed, then ordinary service of that pleading upon him, personally or by mail, would be sufficient, and no new summons need be served upon him. CAB: Summons on the first amended complaint was properly served on PANASIATIC Thereafter, PAN-ASIATIC filed several motions for extension of time within which to file responsive pleading Subsequently, PAN-ASIATIC filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars Having filed these motions, PAN-ASIATIC is deemed as having effectively appeared in the case and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court Hence, no new summons on the Second Complaint was necess

G.R. No. 79374 October 2, 1992

CASE A Deputy Sheriff Romulo A. Flores of the Office of the Provincial Sheriff filed a return of service of summons certifying the receipt of summons through

Susan O. Dela Torre, a person claimed to be authorized to tecieve the processes at the office

No answer having been filed by the defendants, the trial court, upon motion of the LBP, issued an order declaring the defendants in default and ordering the LBP to present its evidence ex-parte o rendered a decision against the defendants; Herein petitioner, as one of the defendants below, received a copy of the decision in his residence Then, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside Judgment on the ground that service of summons upon him and High Peak was fatally defective because it was not made in accordance with law o sheriff's return did not show that the sheriff exerted efforts to personally serve the summon thus, substituted service pursuant to Section 7 and 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court was not warranted o actual service upon Susan O. dela Torre cannot be considered valid it was left not at defendant Mapa's residence and dela Torre was not residing therein that he was actually holding his regular office at his residence The motion was denied by the trial court A motion to reconsider the same was likewise denied Petitioner then sought redress from the respondent Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari o respondent Court of Appeals denied the petition on the ground that ". . . respondent Court was right in assuming jurisdiction over the defendants on the basis of its finding that the substituted service of summons pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court was properly affected o of summons upon Susan O. dela Torre, an employee of the corporation, may be regarded as service upon an agent of a corporation within the meaning of Section 13 of Rule 14 His motion to reconsider the adverse decision having been denied in the respondent Court's resolution, petitioner filed the instant petition

the former immediately resorted to substituted service upon Susan O. dela Torre who cannot be considered a competent person in charge of the office a mere employee thereof, is not one of those explicitly authorized to receive summons in behalf of a corporation under Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court It denied, however, the motion to dismiss; instead, it allowed the petitioner "to file his answer or responsive pleading within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order," and directed the issuance of summons on the other defendants. o Unable to accept the above orders of the trial court, the LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus Court of Appeals promulgated its decision the trial court to have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged orders His motion to reconsider the said decision having been denied, the petitioner filed the instant petition Both cases were then consolidated W/N there was a valid substituted service of summons in both Civil Cases Yes

Issue: Held: Ratio:

Both cases are unquestionably actions in personam. Jurisdiction over the petitioner, as defendant therein, can therefore be acquired either by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction, as when he appears in court, or by service of summons upon him. Voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons; in fact, it even cures the defect of summons. Since petitioner did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court in both cases, personal service became imperative Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court explicitly requires personal service of summons which is accomplished "by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." However, if personal service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service, as provided for in Section 8 of the abovementioned Rule 14, may suffice: Sec. 8 Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof While the separate Sheriff's returns indicate that the summonses in both cases were served on 10 November 1982, these returns do not show that prior attempts at personal service were made by the Sheriff and that such attempts had failed, prompting the latter to resort to substituted service In Keister vs. Navarro, 24 this Court described how the impossibility of personal service should be shown:

CASE B Deputy Sheriff Romulo A. Flores of the Office of the Provincial Sheriff filed a return of service of summons certifying the receipt of summons through Susan O. Dela Torre, a person claimed to be authorized to tecieve the processes at the office No answer having been filed by the defendants therein, the LBP a motion to declare them in default, which the trial court granted o said court, per then Judge Eduardo R. Bengzon, handed down a decision against the defendants

petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside Judgment on the ground that service of summons to him and the corporation was fatally defective; he reiterated the same arguments he raised in the similar motion he filed in CASE A o it was partly granted because no jurisdiction was acquired over both the petitioner and High Peak o there is no showing that efforts were exerted by the sheriff to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner

Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is "in derogation of the common law"; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be "used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute."

The summonses for High Peak in Civil Cases A & B were received by Susan O. dela Torre who is described in the separate sheriff's returns as an employee authorized to receive processes. In his separate motions to dismiss, while petitioner categorically admits that this Susan O. dela Torre is an employee of the corporation, he does not disclose her specific duties and responsibilities. He does not even deny the statement, made in the said returns, that Susan is "authorized to receive processess (sic) of this nature." Until rebutted by competent evidence, these returns would have to stand in the meantime for they enjoy the presumption of regularity. Susan O. dela Torre may thus be deemed an agent of High Peak for purposes of the aforesaid Section 13 of Rule 14. It is then logical to presume that she delivered the copies of the summonses and complaints to the corporation, considering especially the fact that she was working in the office of the said corporation as indicated in the complaints. This latter presumption has not likewise been rebutted. Accordingly, even if Miss dela Torre may not strictly be considered as the proper agent for purposes of the aforecited Section 13, there was, nonetheless, substantial compliance therewith In G&G Trading Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, Although it may be true that the service of summons was made on a person not authorized to receive the same in behalf of the petitioner, nevertheless since it appears that the summons and compliant were in fact received by the corporation, through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons. Indeed the purpose of said rule as above stated to assure service of summons on the corporation had thereby been attained. The need for speedy justice must prevail over a technicality Sandoval v. HRET Facts: This is a PFC with Prayer for a TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone congressional district of Malabon-Navotas during the 14 May 2001 national elections 22 May 2001 Petitioner was proclaimed duly elected representative by the District Board of Canvassers of Malabon-Navotas. After taking his oath of office, he assumed the post at noon of 30 June 2001 1 June 2001 Respondent filed with the HRET an election protest against Petitioner alleging electoral fraud and anomalies 4 June 2001 The HRET issued the corresponding summons for service upon Petitioner 7 June 2001 HRET Process Server Pacifico Lim served the summons by substituted service upon a certain Gene Maga who signed the process servers copy of the summons and indicated thereon his position as "maintenance" along with the date and time of his receipt thereof as 7 June 2001 at 1:25 p.m.

The proof of service alluded to is the return required by Section 6 of Rule 14 which reads: Sec. 6. Return. When the service has been completed, the server shall give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the plaintiff or his counsel, and shall return the summons to the clerk who issued it, accompanied with the proof of service As earlier adverted to, the sheriff's returns in Civil Cases A & B are patently wanting it particulars that would justify the substituted service. Accordingly, it is fatally flawed and defective; on that basis alone, therefore, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner It must nevertheless be emphasized that the absence in the sheriff's return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may be submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service. While the sheriff's return carries with it the presumption, albeit disputable, of regularity in the sense that inter alia, the entries therein are deemed correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation of the official duty for which the return is made was not done simply because it is not disclosed therein Unfortunately in these instant cases, the private respondent failed to present evidence during the hearings of the petitioner's separate motions to dismiss and set aside judgment to prove that substituted service of summons was indeed effected in strict compliance with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The conclusion then is inevitable that neither a valid personal nor substituted service of summons in Civil Cases A & B had been effected on the petitioner However, Branch 10 of the RTC of Manila gravely erred when, in its Order, it set aside the decision of 18 September 1983 because it was also of the opinion that there was no valid service of summons on High Peak and the other defendants. It entirely forgot that it was only the petitioner herein who filed a motion to dismiss and set aside the judgment. For reasons which remain undisclosed, petitioner did not include his co-defendants in the said motion. In any event, the validity of the service of summonses on Encarnacion Tittel and Juergen Tittel has not been raised in issue; moreover, based on the sheriff's return of service in said case, this Court is satisfied that there was a valid service of summons on High Peak. Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides for the manner in which service of summons upon a private domestic corporation shall be made. It reads: Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, services may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors

12 July 2001 HRET issued Resolution No. 01-081 which took note of petitioner Sandovals failure to file an answer to the election protest within ten (10) days from date of service of the summons on 7 June 2001 and entered in his behalf a general denial of the allegations set forth in the protest 18 July 2001 HRET ordered both petitioner and respondent to file their respective preliminary conference briefs 20 July 2001 Petitioner received the order 1 Aug 2001 It was only the Respondent who filed the required preliminary conference brief 6 Aug 2001 Instead of filing a preliminary conference brief, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 01-081 and prayed for the admission of his answer with counter-protest

W/N a substituted service of summons was validly effected on Petitioner Federico Sandoval II in the election protest filed by Respondent Rosario Oreta before the HRET

Held: Ratio: -

No

The propriety of the substituted service of summons upon petitioner Sandoval is therefore no less pivotal, for upon it depends not simply the jurisdiction of the HRET over the person of petitioner but also the breadth of fairness of the proceedings therein Compliance with the rules on the service of summons is both a concern of jurisdiction as it is of due process It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If however efforts to find him personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings

He argued that the substituted service of summons upon him was improperly effected upon a maintenance man Gene Maga who was "neither a regular employee nor responsible officer at [petitioners] office."

In Resolution No. 01-118, the HRET denied reconsideration of the assailed resolution and admission of petitioners answer with counter-protest

30 Aug 2001 Petitioner filed the instant Petition o In due time, we denied the plea for injunctive writs -

Petitioner was constrained to file his preliminary conference brief ad cautelam and to attend the preliminary conference on 18 October 2001 29 October 2001 Respondent Oreta filed her Comment to the instant petition 3 January 2002 The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment o The Solicitor General found that the substituted service of summons upon petitioner was faulty and thus recommended favorable action on the petition

o -

As safeguard measures, it is required that statutory restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed

12 Feb 2002 - HRET also submitted a Manifestation and Motion In lieu of Comment manifesting that as a nominal party in the instant case it was not filing a "separate comment" from the Solicitor Generals pleading

In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to establish the following circumstances, i.e., (a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and, (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein or some competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business. It is also essential that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or officer's return itself and only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde.25 Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent

Issue:

The preferential rule regarding service of summons found in the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to the Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Hence, as regards the hierarchy in the service of summons, there ought to be no rational basis for distinguishing between regular court cases and election protest cases pending before the HRET o The argument that personal service need not be exhausted before substitute service may be used is unmeritorious (Respondent Oretas argument)

Rep. Federico S. Sandoval II,"33 does not ipso facto render him competent to receive the summons

To be "in charge" means to have "care and custody of, under control of, or entrusted to the management or direction of." o Maga had obviously no control and management of the district office as noticeably shown by his occupation as "maintenance" man

The purported substituted service of summons was irregularly executed

The HRET findings were instead based on the 27 July 2001 joint affidavit of Process Server Pacifico Lim and Accounting Clerk Aurora Napolis executed long after the summons was served on 7 June 2001. The joint affidavit is clearly not the officer's return referred to in the rules on substituted service of summons but a specie of evidence aliunde generally inadmissible to prove compliance with the requirements of substituted service unless under exceptional circumstances -

The process server or any other responsible HRET employee did not present evidence confirming the necessity for such method of serving the summons nor exhibiting the authority of Maga, the "maintenance" man, to receive the document Lastly, there is no proof that petitioner actually received the summons as well as a copy of the election protest which would have otherwise satisfied the purpose of giving notice of the pending suit Petition is GRANTED

There is absolutely nothing in the process server's affidavit of service indicating the impossibility of personal service of summons upon petitioner within a reasonable time The affidavit of service, indeed the entire record of this case, does not specify the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally upon petitioner

The Answer with Counter-Protest of Petitioner is admitted and now forms part of the record G.R. No. 152776 October 8, 2003 HENRY S. OAMINAL, petitioner, vs. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and GUIA S. CASTILLO, respondents.

Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the March 26, 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals Petitioner Henry Oaminal filed a complaint for collection against Respondents with the Regional Trial Court the RTC the summons together with the complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal, secretary of respondent the sheriff issued a certification which stated: "THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 30th day of May 2000, copies of the summons together with the complaint and annexes attached thereto were served upon the defendants Pablito M. Castillo and Guia B. Castillo at their place of business at No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City thru MS. ESTER FREGINAL, secretary, who is authorized to receive such kind of process. She signed in receipt of the original as evidenced by her signature appearing on the original summons. "That this return is submitted to inform the Honorable x x x Court that the same was duly served." respondents filed their 'Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective' alleging that the Sheriff's Return has failed

The record does not show that the summons and a copy of the election protest were served on a competent person in charge of petitioner's office. It must be emphasized that Gene Maga, the recipient of the summons, was merely a "maintenance" man who offered his services not only to petitioner but to anyone who was so minded to hire his assistance Granting that Gene Maga was an employee of petitioner at his district office, an assumption that we stress is contrary to the evidence on record, still it cannot be said that he was qualified to receive the summons. To be a "competent" person to receive the summons means that he should be "duly qualified" and "having sufficient capacity, ability or authority."

"The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof

The mere fact that Maga allegedly identified himself to the process server as "member of the staff of [petitioner]

to comply with Section (1), Rule 14 of the Rules of Court or substituted service of summons scheduled hearing of the Motion did not take place because RTC Judge Felipe Zapatos took a leave of absence petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare Respondents in Default and to Render Judgment because no answer was filed by the latter Respondents filed Motion to Dismiss judge denied [respondents'] Motion to Dismiss, admitted their Answer, and set the pre-trial respondents filed an 'Urgent Motion to Inhibit Ad Cautelam' against Judge Zapatos Judge Zapatos denied the motion and moved the pre-trial to another date Respondents filed an 'Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration with the Accompanying Plea to Reset' the pretrial Judge Zapatos ruled that respondents' 'Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim' was filed outside the period to file answer and therefore dismissed the same Judge [Zapatos] rendered a decision in favor of petitioners HELD: Yes

the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter's voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter's voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for by Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court Although the Sheriff's Return9 failed to state that efforts had been made to personally serve the summons on respondents and that it was impossible to do so within a reasonable time, respondents did not deny actual receipt of the summons through their secretary, Ester Fraginal. Their "Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective"11 did not deny receipt thereof; it merely assailed the manner of its service In fact, they admitted in their Motion that the "summons, together with the complaint, was served by the Sheriff on Ester Fraginal, secretary of the defendants at No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City on 30 May 2000 defendants' actual receipt of the summons satisfied the requirements of procedural due process The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such flaw was cured and respondents are deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an Answer with Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to Reset Pretrial

respondents filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari and the latter held that that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on them It based its finding on the Sheriff's Return, which did not contain any averment that effort had been exerted to personally serve the summons on them before substituted service was resorted to Petitioner contends that the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of respondents, because the latter never denied that they had actually received the summons through their secretary he also argues that respondents automatically submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss or Admit Answer, a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and litis pendentia, and an Answer with Counterclaim respondents on the other hand insist that the substituted service of summons on them was improper. Thus, they allege that the trial court did not have the authority to render its August 23, 2001 Decision

ISSUE:

whether or not the summons were properly served on respondents thus vesting the court with jurisdiction over the respondents

The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief -- to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration -- are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons cannot be promptly served on the defendant in person and after stringent formal and substantive requirements have been complied with

For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to establish the following circumstances:

(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's office or regular place of business 8 It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances are stated in the proof of service or officer's return. respondents did not raise in their Motion to Dismiss the issue of jurisdiction over their persons; they raised only improper venue and litis pendentia. Hence, whatever defect there was in the manner of service should be deemed waived MASON vs. CA This petition for review assails the decision, dated May 12, 2000, of the Court of Appeals and its resolution dated August 25, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54649 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The decision set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, in Civil Case No. 98-1567 and directed said court to conduct further proceedings on the complaint for rescission of lease contract. FACTS: Petitioners, Sps. Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of land located along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue in Pasay City.

March 30, 1993 petitioners and private respondent Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation (Columbus) entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus undertook to construct a building worth ten million pesos (P10,000,000) at the end of the third year of the lease. Columbus failed to comply with this stipulation. November 13, 1998 petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages against private respondent before Pasay RTC. Summons was served upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriffs return described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes. Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading, hence petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondent in default. The motion was granted and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-parte. The case was submitted for decision. April 22, 1999 RTC rendered its decision in favor of Sps. Mason and rescinding, terminating and cancelling the contract of lease. Decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following day, private respondent filed a motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by petitioners. RTC ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the trial court on May 26, 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default because the decision rendered by

RTC on April 27, 1999 has become final and executor on May 12, 1999. The motion for execution was granted in favor of Sps. Mason. Private respondent filed MR, which was denied. Private respondent filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution. It was denied for being dilatory. The branch sheriff was directed to proceed with the enforcement of the decision. CA ruled in favor of Columbus. It ordered the court a quo to require petitioner to file its answer and conduct further appropriate proceedings with reasonable dispatch. o CA held that the trial court erred when it denied private respondents motion to lift order of default. o Since private respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer. o Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that service of summons upon domestic private juridical entity shall be made through its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Since service upon private respondent was made through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in private respondents office, as evidenced by the latters employment record, such service cannot be considered valid. o Consequently, the subsequent proceedings, including the order of default, judgment by default and its execution, were also invalid because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. o Judgments by default are not favored, especially so when there is a prima facie showing that the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, which in this case was grounded on the contract of lease sued upon, said the Court of Appeals. ISSUE/S: a. b. Whether there was valid service of summons on private respondent for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction. (main issue) Whether private respondents motion to lift order of default was in order.

HELD: Petition denied. CA decision is affirmed. RATIO:

1.

Petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly specifies the persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical entity, said provision did not abandon or render inapplicable the substantial compliance rule. a. Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation v. Tan effectively ruled that said provision is the statement of the general rule on service of summons upon corporation and the substantial compliance rule is the exception. b. Also, SC has upheld the substantial compliance rule when it allowed the validity of the service of summons on the corporations employee other than those mentioned in the Rule where said summons and complaint were in fact seasonably received by the corporation from said employee. c. Petitioners insist that technicality must not defeat speedy justice. d. Petitioners stress that even though the summons was received by a mere filing clerk in private respondents corporation, there was substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 because the summons actually reached private respondent. This can be gleaned from private respondents motion to lift order of default

where private respondent did not question the validity of the service of summons but explained in paragraph three thereof that its failure to answer the complaint was due to its impression that the case would not be pursued by petitioners because the corporation already made payments to them. Private respondent counters that: Nowhere in the Millenium case did this Court expressly state or remotely imply that we have not abandoned the doctrine of substantial compliance. The Millenium case held that as a general rule, service upon one who is not enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14 of the then Rules of Court is invalid, according to private respondent. An exception is when the summons is actually received by the corporation, which means that there was substantial compliance with the rule. The case law applicable in the instant case, contends private respondent, is Villarosa which squarely provides for the proper interpretation of the new rule on the service of summons upon domestic corporation, thus: The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. According to private respondent, service through Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk of private respondent and not one of those enumerated above, is invalid. *In short the supreme court sides with the respondents, Columbus. Ayreen Rejalde is not one of those enumerated to validly accept summons. NOTE: In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that personal service of summons was not legally possible. Also, service by publication is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal suits such as the present one which is for specific performance. (Court nagsabi, not me! Again, the court is getting mad! So nakalagay toh before the facts - Kara) JOSE vs. BOYON (2003) *Im sorry, theres so many facts and arguments in this case, I cant make it any shorter, PLUS there are a lot of important things the Court discussed - Kara Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 26, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals FACTS: [petitioners] Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance against [respondents] Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. o lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa issued summons to the respondents o substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the BOYONs failed. -

o o o

JOSEs filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. Public respondent issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. The respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring herein BOYONs in default for failure to file their respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were allowed to submit their evidence exparte. Spouses Helen and Romeo Boyon are directed to execute the necessary document with the effect of withdrawing the Affidavit of Loss they filed and annotated with the Register of Deeds of Makati City so that title to the parcel of land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Plaintiffs be transferred in their names.

also directed to pay Plaintiffs actual expenses in the amount of P20,000 and attorneys fees of P20,000 including costs of this suit Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States of America, was surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of the resolution issued by the respondent court. o BOYONs filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. o The public respondent (the Judge) issued an Order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted BOYONs supposed loss of standing in court. MR, but was likewise denied JOSEs moved for the execution of the controverted judgment which the respondent judge ultimately granted BOYONs filed before the CA, petition for certiorari (under Rule 65, therefore, GADLEJ toh) o The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders. the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them First, the sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons, because he did not specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific performance and therefore an action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution and the Orders were null and void, since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the proceedings in the lower court are null and void due to invalid and defective service of summons and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents?

HELD: No. Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that the service of summons on respondents was invalid. They submit that although the case filed before the trial court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually an action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece of real property located in the Philippines. o in actions quasi in rem involving ownership of a parcel of land, it is sufficient that the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res. o the summons by publication, which they effected subsequent to the substituted service of summons, was allegedly sufficient. Respondents maintain that the proceedings in the trial court were null and void because of the invalid and defective service of summons o The Return of Summons issued by the process server of the RTC failed to state that he had exerted earnest efforts to effect the service of summons. He allegedly tried to serve it personally on them on July 22, 1998 at No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang o He, however, resorted to substituted service on that same day, supposedly because he could not find respondents in the above address. o They further allege that the person to whom he gave the summons was not even a resident of that address. Respondents argue that the case filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance and, therefore, an action in personam o The summons by publication was insufficient to enable the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents. o Respondents conclude that even granting that the service of summons by publication was permissible under the circumstances, it would still be defective and invalid because of the failure of petitioners to observe the requirements of law, like an Affidavit attesting that the latter deposited in the post office a copy of the summons and of the order of publication, paid the postage, and sent the documents by registered mail to the formers last known address.1awphi1.n In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court1

Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. the proof of service of summons must o (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; o (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and o (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant o It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. o The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.

Defective Personal Service of Summons In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents. A review of the records9 reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents. While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the Return of Summons is reproduced as follows: "That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendants Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon were made but the same were ineffectual and unavailing for the reason that defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere in the United States of America and defendant Romeo Boyon is in Bicol thus substituted service was made in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court." The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. o without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.

"Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. "Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof."

The service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. o Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective

Summons by Publication Improper

It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. o The first is an action against the thing itself instead of against the defendants person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individuals interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it. In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in personam. Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void.

and that he never informed the respondent of his receipt of the said summons and complaint. Domagas answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted service on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf. TC ruled in favor of Jensen. The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, considering that she left the Philippines on February 17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway, and her brother Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and in her behalf.The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Issue: WON there is valid service of summons? Held: No, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. As gleaned from the said return, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void. MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, Respondent. Petitioner, Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco, seeks a review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67489 dated August 27, 2003, which denied her petition for annulment of judgment, and the Resolution2 dated December 15, 2003 which denied her motion for reconsideration. Facts: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco (Petitioner). While employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank. As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank. The real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand. The amount due had already reached P1,080,676.50. The written demand proved futile. Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental.

Domagas v Jensen G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005 Nature of Action: This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Facts: FilomenaDomagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title. The respondent, by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioners property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon.The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 879. The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the respondents) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondents house at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same.The court rendered judgment ordering the respondent and all persons occupying the property for and in the latters behalf to vacate the disputed area and to pay monthly rentals therefor, including actual damages, attorneys fees, and exemplary damages.The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. Also, Oscar Layno declaring that sometime in April 1999, he was in the respondents house to collect rentals from Eduardo Gonzales; that the Sheriff arrived and served him with a copy of the summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879;

Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank) located at Jofelmor Bldg., Mortola Street, Cagayan de Oro City.

Ernesto received the summons but for unknown reasons, he failed to file an answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in default upon motion of the respondent bank. Based on the report of the Commissioner, the respondent judge ordered the spouses to pay the bank within 90 days. If there is non-payment, the Sheriff will sell at public auction the mortgaged lot. The sheriff personally served the above-mentioned judgment to Ernesto Biaco at his office at Export and Industry Bank. The spouses Biaco did not appeal from the adverse decision of the trial court. The respondent bank filed an ex parte motion for execution to direct the sheriff to sell the mortgaged lot at public auction. The motion for execution was granted by the trial court. The sheriff served a copy of the writ of execution to the spouses Biaco at their residence in #92 9th Street, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City. The writ of execution was personally received by Ernesto. By virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial court, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction in favor of the respondent bank in the amount of P150,000.00. The amount of the property sold at public auction being insufficient to cover the full amount of the obligation, the respondent bank filed an "ex parte motion for judgment" praying for the issuance of a writ of execution against the other properties of the spouses Biaco for the full settlement of the remaining obligation. Granting the motion, the court ordered that a writ of execution be issued against the spouses Biaco to enforce and satisfy the judgment of the court for the balance of P1,369,974.70. The sheriff executed two (2) notices of levy against properties registered under the name of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. However, the notices of levy were denied registration because Ma. Teresa had already sold the two (2) properties to her daughters.3 Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure proceedings. According to her, she came to know about the judgment in the case only after the lapse of more than six (6) months after its finality. She claimed that extrinsic fraud was perpetrated against her because the bank failed to verify the authenticity of her signature on the real estate mortgage and did not inquire into the reason for the absence of her signature on the promissory notes. She moreover asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. The CA denied the annulment of the RTC decision. On the validity of the service of summons, the CA ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. The CA also ruled that the fraud committed by one against the other spouse cannot be considered extrinsic fraud. Petitioners MR was denied, hence this petition.

Ratio: Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. A judgment may be annulled only on the grounds of extrinsic faud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. (Jurisprudence and Sec. 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) Petitioner asserted that there was extrinsic fraud. The CA correctly ruled that there was no fraud perpetrated by respondent bank upon petitioner, noting that the spouses Biaco were co-defendants in the case and shared the same interest. Summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.16 In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. However, the petitioner avers that she was not personally served summons. Instead, summons was served to her through her husband at his office without any explanation as to why the particular surrogate service was resorted to. The SC agreed with the petitioner which meant that the petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in the judicial foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation of petitioners constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court. There is more, the trial court granted respondent PCRBs ex-parte motion for deficiency judgment and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the spouses Biaco to satisfy the remaining balance of the award. In short, the trial court went beyond its jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal judgment against the spouses Biaco. Significantly, the Court went on to rule, citing De Midgely v. Ferandos, et. al.20 and Perkins v. Dizon, et al.21 that in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, the only relief that may be granted by the court against a defendant over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of summons or by voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to the res. Similarly, in this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioners personal liability. In doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case. Petitioner GRANTED. The CA and RTC decision are SET ASIDE. BPI vs Santiago G.R. No. 169116 Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Respondent Centrogen obtained loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) in different amounts, the total of which reached the sum P4,650,000.00, as evidenced by promissory notes executed by Edwin Santiago. (Centrogen) is a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical business, represented in this act by its President, Edwin Santiago, son of private respondents Spouses Ireneo M. Santiago and Liwanag P. Santiago. As a security for a fraction of the loan obligation, Ireneo M. Santiago executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land registered under his name and located at Sta Cruz, Laguna.

Issue: Whether or not the annulment of judgment was correctly denied by the CA? Held: No the CA erred not because of extrinsic fraud but because the petitioner was denied due process.

Centrogen incurred default. FEBTC merged with the BPI with the latter as the surviving corporation.As a result, BPI assumed all the rights, privileges and obligations of FEBTC. On 13 December 2002, BPI filed an Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. 21 January 2003 the Spouses Santiago were served with the copy of the Notice of Sale. Upon receipt of the Notice of Sale, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI. The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490,000.00, including interest thereon was fully paid. On 27 February 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer to the Complaint filed by Spouses Santiago and Centrogen. On the same day, the Sheriff served a copy of the summons to the Branch Manager of BPI Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch. Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In its Motion to Dismiss, BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of the corporation. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. On 6 March 2003, the RTC ordered the service of new summons to BPI in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court. In compliance with the aforesaid Order, the Branch Clerk of Court caused the issuance of a new summons on 7 March 2003, a copy of which was served upon the Office of the Corporate Secretary of the BPI. On 20 March 2003, the RTC issued an Order granting the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by BPI was denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, BPI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, CA dismissed the case. BPI filed this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. W/N the Court acquired jurisdiction over BPI? SC = Yes. Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation.The officer upon whom service is

made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. Applying the aforestated principle in the case at bar, we rule that the service of summons on BPIs Branch Manager did not bind the corporation for the branch manager is not included in the enumeration of the statute of the persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made in behalf of the corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual. However, upon the issuance and the proper service of new summons on 11 March 2003, before the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued on 20 March 2003, whatever defect attended the service of the original summons, was promptly and accordingly cured. It bears stressing, that on 7 March 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a new summons which was properly served upon BPIs Corporate Secretary on 11 March 2003, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return. In explaining the test on the validity of service of summons, Justice Florenz Regalado stressed that substantial justice must take precedence over technicality and thus stated: The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same where ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it. Prescinding from the above, we deem it best to underscore that there is no hard and fast rule pertaining to the manner of service of summons. Rather, substantial justice demands that every case should be viewed in light of the peculiar circumstances attendant to each. In any event, as it is glaringly evident from the records of the case that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was validly acquired by the court by the valid service of a new summons. Rule 14: A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. G.R. No. 147937. November 11, 2004 THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE & GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 10, and MILAGROS P. MORALES, Respondents. Facts: PfR of the decision of the CA dismissing the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner, and the resolution denying the petitioners MR Respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner with the RTC of Davao City. The complaint specifically stated that the petitioner could be

served with summons and other court processes through its manager at its branch office in Davao City. Thereafter, summons, together with the complaint, was served upon the petitioners Davao regional office and was received by its Insurance Service Officer. Petitioner then filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. It contended that summons were improperly served upon its employee in its regional office, and that the said employee was not among those named in Section 11, Rule 14 upon whom service of summons may be properly made. RTC denied MTD, directed the issuance of an alias summons to be served at its main office in Manila. RTC held that the improper service of summons on the petitioner is not a ground for dismissal of the complaint considering that the case was still in its initial stage. It ruled that the remedy was to issue an alias summons to be served at the principal office of the petitioner. Petitioner filed an MR, which was denied. Petitioner then filed a special action for certiorari (Rule 65) with the CA, which was dismissed. Issue: W/N the court erred in not dismissing the case due to improper service of summons Held: No. Petition is denied for lack of merit. Ratio:

Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known address. Subsequently, on respondent's motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of respondent's employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner's last known address. The petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, and upon motion from respondent the case was set for ex parte reception of evidence. After presentation by PNOCs evidence, the case was deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003. On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." He alleged that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the ex parte presentation of evidence order. The RTC denied the MR and held that the rules did not require the affidavit of service by mail to be executed by the clerk of court. Further, due process was properly observed. And it also denied the admission of the answer of Santos for filing beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner appealed before the CA, but the court sustained the RTC orders. And the subsequent MR was also denied.

A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on said defendant. It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an original or an alias summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons complies with the requirements under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the prevailing complaint. In this case, the alias summons satisfies the requirements under the Rules, both as to its content and the manner of service. It contains all the information required under the rules, and it was served on the persons authorized to receive the summons on behalf of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila. G.R. No. 170943 September 23, 2008 Santos v PNOC Petitioner: PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. Respondent: PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION Facts: A petition for review on the decision of the CA. Dec. 23, 2002. PNOC filed a complaint before the RTC Pasig for collection of sum of money from the unpaid balance of car loan Santos obtained while he was still a member of its board of directors.

Issue: W/N the rule on service by publication applies only in actions in rem. NO. W/N the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court. NO. W/N the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner for improper service of summons. NO. Held: Petition was DENIED. Rationale: 1. The Court ruled that since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication. Sec. 14 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. - In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order. The Court said that the in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the

rule was applicable. Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only. However, this has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

September 25, 2007 - Koyama moved for the RTC to declare Wong in default, and to allow her to present her evidence ex parte and/or to render judgment in her favor due to Wongs failure to file an answer after the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period. On the same date, RTC, presided by public respondent Hon. Adoracion Angeles, issued an Order declaring Wong in default. October 5, 2007 - Wong subsequently filed with the RTC, by registered mail sent on, a Manifestation claiming that he did not receive any summons from said court. September 28, 2007 Wong filed an inquiry with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Caloocan City as regards any case that might have been filed against him. In response, the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Caloocan City issued a Certification dated 3 October 2007 bearing the details of Civil Case No. C-21860, which Koyama had instituted against him. Wong asserted that he would not hesitate to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, should the proper procedure be observed. October 9, 2007 RTC, thru an order, stressed that, as early as 25 September 2007, Wong had been declared in default. October 22, 2007 - Wong, by special appearance of counsel, filed MD asserting that there was no service of summons upon him, hence, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; and that he was not given the opportunity to oppose Koyamas Motion to have him declared in default. November 5, 2007 Koyama filed an opposition to MD November 7, 2007 filed a Reply to Koyamas opposition denying that a Loren Lopez or Criz Mira resided at his home address. Said housemaids were fictitious, as proven by the Certificate issued by Junn L. Sta. Maria, Punong Barangay of San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City on 7 November 2007, stating that Loren Lopez and Criz Mira were not residents of 21-B Westriverside St., San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. December 18, 2007 MD was denied by RTC declared that Sheriff Baloloy validly resorted to a substituted service of the summons, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sheriff Baloloys performance of his official duty enjoyed the presumption of regularity, and Wong failed to rebut the same by merely presenting the Barangay Certificate, which is not a role model of accuracy, especially when referring to mere transient residents in the area, such as lessees, housemaids or caretakers. Wong went before the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring him in default and in denying his Motion to Dismiss the Complaint the same case. January 17, 2008 CA dismissed Wongs Petition for Certiorari outright for being the improper remedy, contending that Certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors of procedure.

2.

The Rules of Court provides that service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendant's last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address." The Court said the rules do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

3.

The Court ruled that the petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.

Sec. 20 Rule 14 Rules of Court Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. ALEXANDER TAM WONG vs CATHERINE FACTOR-KOYAMA, Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court Facts: July 17, 2007 - Catherine Factor-Koyama (Koyama) filed a complaint with the RTC against Alexander Tam Wong (Wong) for specific performance, sum of money and damages alleging that Wong deliberately refused to execute and deliver a deed of absolute sale, and to surrender the condominium certificate of title (CCT) pertaining to a condominium unit. July 24, 2007 - RTC issued summons addressed to Wong at his residence. However, the original summons and the accompanying copy of the Complaint and its Annexes were eventually returned to the RTC by Sheriff IV Renebert B. Baloloy (Sheriff Baloloy) who indicated in his Sheriffs Return dated 14 August 2007 that said court process should already be deemed DULY SERVED. According to his Return, Sheriff Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to serve the summons at Wongs residential address on 27 July 2007, 8 August 2007, and 10 August 2007, but Wong was always not around according to the latters housemaids, Marie Sandoval (Sandoval) and Loren Lopez (Lopez). Sheriff Baloloy then attempted to leave the summons with Criz Mira (Mira), Wongs caretaker, who is of legal age, and residing at the same address for two and a half years, but Mira refused to acknowledge or receive the same.

February 6, 2008 Wong filed MR but the Court of Appeals denied the same for lack of merit in a Resolution dated 18 July 2008.

In the meantime, since neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction, the RTC continued hearing the said case. In an Order dated 20 November 2008, the RTC motu proprio allowed Wong to cross-examine Koyama during the hearing on 23 January 2009, even though it did not lift its 25 September 2007 Order, which had declared him in default. Wong, through counsel, actively participated in the hearing held on 23 January 2009 by extensively cross-examining Koyama. After said hearing, he filed before this Court, on 18 February 2009, a Motion for Clarification as to the validity of the RTC Order dated 20 November 2008 allowing him to crossexamine Koyama, but without lifting the Order of Default. July 8, 2009 - the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Koyama Issue: WON there was a valid service of summons to Wong resulting to the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over his person. Ruling: There was no valid service of summons to petitioner Wong, however, the court acquired jurisdiction over his person by virtue of his voluntary appearance. SC denied Wongs petition. The Court, after a careful study of Sheriff Baloloys afore-quoted Return, finds that he improperly resorted to substituted service upon Wong of the summons. Apart from establishing that Sheriff Baloloy went to Wongs residence on three different dates, and that the latter was not around every time, there is nothing else in the Sheriffs Return to establish that Sheriff Baloloy exerted extraordinary efforts to locate Wong. During his visits to Wongs residence on 27 July 2007 and 10 August 2007, Sheriff Baloloy was informed by the housemaids that Wong was at his office. There is no showing, however, that Sheriff Baloloy exerted effort to know Wongs office address, verify his presence thereat, and/or personally serve the summons upon him at his office. Although Wong was out of town when Sheriff Baloloy attempted to serve the summons at the formers residence on 8 August 2007, there was no indication that Wongs absence was other than temporary or that he would not soon return. Evidently, the Return failed to relay if sufficient efforts were exerted by Sheriff Baloloy to locate Wong, as well as the impossibility of personal service of summons upon Wong within a reasonable time. It must be stressed that, before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is enjoined to try his best efforts to accomplish personal service on the defendant. And since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. Nevertheless, even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it under Section 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary appearance before it in Civil Case No. C-21860. The Court is not referring to Wongs filing of his Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C-21860, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over his person, because that clearly does not constitute voluntary appearance. The Court, instead, calls attention to the RTC Order dated 20 November 2008 allowing Wong to cross-examine Koyama. Wong, through his counsel, took advantage of the opportunity opened to him by the said Order and aggressively questioned her during the 23 January 2009 hearing, despite his

knowledge that the RTC had not yet lifted the 25 September 2007 Order declaring him in default. By actively participating in the 23 January 2009 hearing, he effectively acknowledged full control of the RTC over Civil Case No. C-21860 and over his person as the defendant therein; he is, thus, deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of said trial court. SANSIO v. MOGOL PFRC under rule 45 FACTS: Sansio is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling appliances and other related products July 12, 2000 petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against respondent spouses before the MeTC Respondent spouses purchased air-conditioning units and fans worth 200k++ and 5k++ respectively Mogol apparently issued postdated checks but were dishonored as the account against the checks were drawn was closed Spouses made partial payments leaving a balance of 87k++ and failed to settle their obligations despite demand. Petitioner prayed that the respondents pay their obligations with legal interest, and attorneys fees.

October 3, 2000 at the request of the petitioner the process server of the MeTC served summons and the copy of the complaint on the respondents at the courtroom of MeTC Manila, Branch 24 as the spouses were waiting for their hearing for violation of BP22. Upon being informed of the complaint, the respondents referred the same to their counsel who told the process server that the copy of the complaint should only be served at the address stated in the documents and advised his clients not to sign the same. October 4, 2000 process server issued a Return on Service of Summons o Par 1 process server tried to serve a copy to the spouses but they refused to receive it with no valid reason at all o Par 2 that they are returned UNSERVED. December 6, 2000 petitioner filed to declare respondents in default December 15, 2000 Respondents filed an opposition. The claim that the summons should have been served to them at the address stated on the documents. MeTC declared defendants in default o Rule 14 Sec6 does not specify where the service is to be effected. For obvious reasons, because service of summons is made by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, the same may be undertaken wherever the defendant may be found Respondents filed MR July 17, 2001 Respondents filed PFC, prohibition and or injuction before the RTC Respondents insisted that there was no valid service of summons RTC dismissed petition for lack of merit. o Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not mandate that summons be served strictly at the address provided by the plaintiff in the complaint. Contrarily, said provision states that the service of summons may be made wherever such is possible and practicable. Respondents filed a notice of appeal to the CA and found it meritorious. o The return of service of summons states that it was UNSERVED. Thus, the respondents never really received the summons

Petitioners argue that the service of summons in the courtroom of MeTC was already valid as it was a more practicable and convenient procedure as opposed to having it served in their residence.

FACTS:

ISSUE: WON there was a valid service of summons when it was given/delivered to them in the courtroom of the MeTC Manila HELD: Yes RATIO: It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished.29 The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself,30 wherever he may be found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.31 The Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol. o To recapitulate, the process server presented the summons and the copy of the complaint to respondent spouses at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24. o The latter immediately referred the matter to their counsel, who was present with them in In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol. o At the express direction of his clients, the counsel took the summons and the copy of the complaint, read the same, and thereby informed himself of the contents of the said documents. Ineluctably, at that point, the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latters behest and consent. o Already accomplished was the operative act of "handing" a copy of the summons to respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by the MeTC of Manila, Branch 25. o That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer material. Also, sec 6 and 7 of rule 14 cannot be construed to apply CA set aside RTC reinstated

On 31 July 1999, petitioner and respondent entered into an Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to render "rip rapping" construction services at respondents Ampeloquio International Resort in Ternate, Cavite Agreements required petitioner to deposit with respondent a cash bond of one percent (1%) of the contract price, to be returned to petitioner upon completion of the project. In compliance, petitioner deposited with respondent a cash bond amounting to P800,000. Respondent failed to fulfill its obligations under the Agreements, resulting in the cancellation of the project. Petitioner demanded the return of the P800,000 cash bond, but respondent refused to do so. petitioner (plaintiff) filed with the RTC a complaint for rescission of contract and damages against respondent (defendant) summons and a copy of the complaint were served on respondent, through its staff member, Romel Dolahoy Respondent failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading to the complaint. Upon motion of petitioner, the RTC issued an Order dated 29 November 2002, declaring respondent in default, and allowing petitioner to present evidence ex parte.

ISSUE: Is the service of summons upon respondent not valid, and hence the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over said respondent. HELD: Petion denied. Summons was not served personally on the defendant (respondent) through any of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14; rather, summons was served by substituted service on the defendants staff member, Romel Dolahoy. Substituted service was resorted to on the servers first attempt at service of summons, and there was no indication that prior efforts were made to render prompt personal service on the defendant. RATIO:

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In case of a domestic private juridical entity, the service of summons must be made upon an officer who is named in the statute (i.e., the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel), otherwise, the service is insufficient The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that

G.R. No. 169919

September 11, 2009

B. D. LONG SPAN BUILDERS, INC., Petitioner, vs. R. S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., Respondent. This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 July 2005 and Resolution dated 30 September 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78259. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated 14 January 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 206 (RTC).

the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him

However, if the summons cannot be served on the defendant personally within a reasonable period of time, then substituted service may be resorted to. Section 7 of Rule 14 Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.

At the time of the service of the said summons, the defendant was not at her home and only her maid was there who refused to receive the said summons [in spite] of the insistence of the undersigned.

The undersigned, upon his request with the Brgy. Clerk at the said place, was given a certification that he really exerted effort to effect the service of the said summons but failed due to the above reason.

The following day, May 21, 2002, the undersigned went back at defendant's residence to have her receive the subject summons but again the above defendant was not at her house.

REMEDIES OF DEFENDANT DECLARED IN DEFAULT: 1. he may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense 2. if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37 3. if he discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38 4. he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him CONSTANTINO A. PASCUAL, substituted by his heirs, represented by Zenaida Pascual, Petitioner, vs. LOURDES S. PASCUAL, Respondent. FACTS: Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can only be acquired by the courts after a strict compliance with the rules on the proper service of summons. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Damages before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan against respondent. The process server, in his Return of Service5 dated May 21, 2002 The undersigned Process Server of this Honorable Court went at defendant's given address at No. 4 Manikling St., Talayan Village, Quezon City on May 20, 2002 to serve the summons and copy of the Complaint together with the annexes thereto in connection with the above-entitled case.

SUMMONS NOT SERVED.

Thereafter, an alias summons was issued by the RTC and, on May 29, 2002,

The undersigned, on May 29, 2002, made a 3rd attempt to serve the alias summons issued by the Hon. Court relative with the above-entitled case at the given address of the defendant. The undersigned, accompanied by the barangay officials of the said place, proceeded at defendant's residence but the undersigned was not permitted to go inside her house and was given information by her maid that the defendant was not there. The defendant's car was parked inside her house and inquiries/verification made on her neighbors revealed that the defendant was inside her house at the time of service of said summons and probably did not want to show-up when her maid informed her of undersigned's presence. SUMMONS WAS RETURNED AND REMAINED UNSEREVED

on August 14, 2002, the process server returned with the following report,7 stating that a substituted service was effected: o Defendant Dr. Lourdes Pascual was out during the time of service of the said summons and only her housemaid was present. The undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter who is at the age of reason but refused to sign the same. o SUMMONS SERVED

For failure of the respondent to file a responsive pleading, petitioner, on September 17, 2002, filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default to which the petitioner filed an Opposition/Comment to Plaintiff's Motion to

Declare Defendant in Default dated October 1, 2002, claiming that she was not able to receive any summons and copy of the complaint. The RTC, in its Order dated October 30, 2002, declared respondent in default and allowed petitioner to file his evidence ex-parte. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 18, 2002 seeking to set aside the above-mentioned Order dated October 30, 2002. However, the said motion was denied by the RTC in its Order dated November 27, 2002. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 18, 2002 seeking to set aside the above-mentioned Order dated October 30, 2002. However, the said motion was denied by the RTC in its Order12 dated November 27, 2002.

specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons. o Hamilton v. Levy substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective. The officer must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly, or that there was an impossibility of prompt service. A cursory reading of the three Officer's Returns does not show any compliance with the said requisite she only came to know of the case against her when she received a copy of the petitioner's motion to declare her in default, the process server's return is undoubtedly more deserving of credit. The said argument, however, is only meritorious, provided that there was a strict compliance with the procedure for serving a summons. In the absence of even the barest compliance with the procedure for a substituted service of summons outlined in the Rules of Court, the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions does not apply the jurisdiction over the person of the respondent was never vested with the RTC, because the manner of substituted service by the process server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due process. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, "any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. the Decision of the RTC, not having attained its finality due to its being void, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, filed by the respondent with the CA, was proper Petition dated May 3, 2006 is hereby DENIED and the Decision dated June 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77789 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. This Court gave an in-depth discussion as to the nature and requisites of substituted service in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, et al. (1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service a. The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned.

on December 3, 2002, the RTC, in its Decision, found in favor of the petitioner.

December 13, 2002,- Respondent then filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default with the argument of non-service of summons upon her but was denied by theRTC

April 28, 2003, filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was also denied by the RTC

June 26, 2003, a Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the Decision dated December 3, 2002 of the RTC.

respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which was granted by the same Court

ISSUE: 1. whether or not there was a proper and valid substituted service of summons, the resolution of which, will determine whether jurisdiction was indeed acquired by the trial court over the person of the petitioner.

Held: The above Return of Summons does not show or indicate the actual exertion or any positive steps taken by the officer or process server in serving the summons personally to the defendant. o IN Jose v. Boyon The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without

(2) Specific Details in the Return a. The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion a. If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein. (4) A Competent Person in Charge a. f the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place Cariaga v. Malaya Facts: Plaintiffs Cariaga-Soon (herein private respondents) filed an action for Recovery of Real Property with Damages against defendants Cariaga (herein petitioners) before the CFI-Laguna Upon motion of the plaintiffs, the court granted them leave to effect extraterritorial service of summons through registered mail upon defendants on the ground that the latter were residing abroad Defendants then filed a motion to set aside said summons The trial court denied said motion Thereafter, the defendants filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (R45) Issue: W/N the summons were properly served upon defendants Decision/Ratio: YES Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court). In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways: (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; and (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. CAB: The third mode of extra-territorial service of summons was substantially complied with G.R. No. 150656 April 29, 2003 petitioner,

granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses Licaros declaring the marriage between the same spouses null and void

Abelardo Licaros (Abelardo, for short) and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros (Margarita, hereafter) were lawfully married and had 2 children o Ironically, marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired o they agreed to separate from bed and board Margarita left for the United States with her 2 kids o Margarita applied for divorce before the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo Margarita was granted the decree of divorce together with a distribution of properties between her and Abelardo Abelardo and Margarita executed an "Agreement of Separation of Properties" This was followed-up by a petition filed before the RTC of Makati for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses and for the approval of the agreement of separation of their properties o a decision was issued granting the petition and approving the separation of property agreement Abelardo commenced a civil case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New Family Code As Margarita was then residing at 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., Abelardo initially moved that summons be served through the International Express Courier Service The court a quo denied the motion o it ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks o furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs Process Server, Maximo B. Dela Rosa, submitted his Officers Return certifying the receipt of the summons Decision was handed down declaring the marriage between Abelardo and Margarita null and void Almost nine (9) years later, on April 28, 2000, the petition at bench was commenced when Margarita received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty. Angelo Q. Valencia o that she no longer has the right to use the family name "Licaros" o her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved The CA debunked the claim of Margarita that there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by Abelardo and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case Hence, this instant petition W/N Margarita was validly served with summons Yes

MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS, vs. ABELARDO B. LICAROS, respondent Facts:

Issue: Held: Ratio:

This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul the Decision of the Court of Appeal as well as the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. o The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition to annul the following decisions rendered by Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati:

Parties contentions Margarita insists that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since she was never validly served with summons. Neither did she appear in court to submit voluntarily to its jurisdiction On the other hand, Abelardo argues that jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate courts made a clear factual finding that there was proper summons by publication effected through the Department of Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court. Thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision declaring the marriage a nullity Validity of the Service of Summons on Margarita Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. The trial court considered Margarita a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines. In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendants last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient The trial courts prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to "any other means that the judge may consider sufficient."

The Process Servers certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate. 16 Before proceeding to declare the marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial court stated in its Decision that "compliance with the jurisdictional requirements have) been duly established." We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule De Midgely v. Ferandos Facts: This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari against Judge Pio B. Ferandos and Lewelyn Barlito Quemada in order to set aside the Judge's order dated May 8, 1971 which denied her motion to dismiss Alvaro Pastor, Sr. was allegedly the owner of properties and rights in mining claims located in Cebu and supposedly held in trust by his son, Alvaro Pastor, Jr. 5 June 1966 Alvaro Pastor Sr. died o He was survived by his wife, Sofia Pastor y Bossio (who died on October 21, 1966) and by his two legitimate children, Mrs. Midgely and Alvaro Pastor, Jr. Respondent Quemada claims to be his illegitimate child

Alvaro Pastor, Sr. in his supposed holographic will dated July 31, 1961 devised to Lewelyn Barlito Quemada thirty percent of his forty-two percent share in certain mining claims and real properties In 1970 the alleged will was presented for probate in Special Proceedings No. 3128-R assigned to Branch I in Cebu City of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Quemada was appointed special administrator of the decedent's estate Quemada filed in the CFI of Cebu at Toledo City a complaint dated December 7, 1970 against the spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Maria Elena Achaval, Mrs. Midgely, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation and Caltex (Philippines), Inc. to settle the question of ownership over certain real properties and the rights in some mining claims, to obtain an accounting and payment of the royalties and income thereof and for the payment of damages amounting to P25,000 Allegedly without complying with the requirements of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Quemada caused extraterritorial service of summons to be made in that case through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected the service of the summons by registered mail upon Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses at their respective address in Alicante and Barcelona, Spain Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Mrs. Midgely, in their respective letters to the Philippine Embassy dated February 11 and 12, 1971, acknowledged the service of summons but reserved the right to contest the courts jurisdiction over their persons

The Minister-Counselor of the Embassy forwarded those letters to the Clerk of Court and apprised him of the manner the summons was served

Held: Ratio: -

No

Through counsel, Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses entered a special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They contended that as nonresidents they could be summoned only with leave of court and that the requirements laid down in section 17 of Rule 14 should have been observed. As additional, ground they alleged that the complaint does not show that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as required in article 222 of the Civil Code in suits between members of the same family As already stated, Judge Ferandos denied the motion. He ruled that Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses had been properly summoned Mrs. Midgely's motion for reconsideration of the order denying her motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Ferandos in his order of September 27, 1971 wherein he ruled that the action filed by Quemada was for the recovery of real properties and real rights He gave Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses sixty days from notice within which to answer the complaint and directed that a copy of his order be sent to them through the Philippine Embassy in Madrid. The petition for certiorari herein was filed on November 3, 1971 It was given due course. Respondent Quemada in his answer alleged that inasmuch as his action against Mrs. Midgely concerns property located here in which she claims an interest, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over her person be acquired. The service of summons upon her was not for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over her person but merely as a matter of due process Quemada alleged that as administrator he has been in actual possession of two parcels of land owned by Alvaro Pastor, Jr In the meantime the spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Maria Elena Achaval filed a verified answer to the complaint o The said spouses-alleged that they were not waiving their defense of lack of jurisdiction over their persons and over the subject matter of the action. They claimed to be the owners of the properties described in the complaint

We are of the opinion that the lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Mrs. Midgely by reason of her voluntary appearance The reservation in her motion to dismiss that she was making a special appearance to contest the court's jurisdiction over her person may be disregarded o It may be disregarded because it was nullified by the fact that in her motion to dismiss she relied not only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person but also on the ground that there was no showing that earnest efforts were exerted to compromise the case and because she prayed "for such other relief as" may be deemed "appropriate and proper"

Thus, it was held that where the defendant corporation (which was not properly summoned because the summons was served upon its lawyer) filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person but in the same motion it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription, it was held that, by invoking prescription, it necessarily admitted the court's jurisdiction upon its, person and, therefore, it was deemed to have abandoned its special appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the court's jurisdiction. (Republic vs. Ker & Co., Ltd.) "When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter." (Flores vs. Zurbito) Where the defendant contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person by means of the publication of the corresponding summons in Hawaii, where he was residing, because the action did not relate to personal or real properties situated in the Philippines in which the defendant had or claimed a lien or interest, actual or contingent, it was held that the said defendant nevertheless submitted to the court's jurisdiction when he filed a motion wherein he contested the court's jurisdiction over his person and at the same time prayed that he be relieved from the effects of the judgment by default, attaching to his motion an affidavit of merits o "He thereby impliedly waived his special appearance assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and voluntarily submitted

On May 10, 1972, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction suspending all proceedings in Civil Case No. 274-T

Issue: -

W/N Judge Ferandos gravely abused his discretion in denying Mrs. Midgely's motion to dismiss based on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction

to the jurisdiction of said court." (Menghra vs. Tarachand and Rewachand) Having shown that Mrs. Midgely had voluntarily submitted to the lower court's jurisdiction when she filed her motion to dismiss, the inevitable conclusion is that it did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying her motion to dismiss The case may be viewed from another angle. Supposing arguendo that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Mrs. Midgely, still her motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada's action against her may be regarded as a quasi in rem action where jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not necessary and where service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the requirement of due process (Perkins vs. Dizon) An action quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein With respect to the extraterritorial service of summons to a nonresident defendant like Mrs. Midgely, Rule 14, Sec 17 is applicable o Under section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines, and (4) when defendant nonresident's property has been attached within the Philippines

The record does not show whether Judge Ferandos was consulted by the Clerk of Court and by Quemada's counsel when the service of summons was effected through the Philippine Embassy in Madrid. But although there was no court order allowing service in that manner, that mode of service was later sanctioned or ratified by Judge Ferandos in his order of May 8, 1971. In another order he corrected the defect in the summons by giving Mrs. Midgely the sixty-day reglementary period for answering the complaint This Court clarified that in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not essential. The service of summons by publication is required "merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process" There is the circumstance that she actually received the summons and a copy of the complaint. Thus, she cannot complain that she was unaware of the action against her. Thus, the requirement of due process has been met Petition is DISMISSED

G.R. No. L-48955 June 30, 1987 BERNARDO BUSUEGO, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE LAZARO, ROMEO LAZARO and VIVENCIO LOPEZ, Respondents. petition for review on certiorari, to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals petitioner Bernardo Busuego commenced action before the Pasig CFI against Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro, Ernesto Lazaro, and Vivencio Lopez (three of whom are respondents herein), to recover possession of a parcel of land and a e unit apartment Immediately thereafter, summons was issued in the name of the four defendants and per sheriff's return, was personally served at the address given in the complaint, upon the defendants "through [defendant] Dr. Ernesto Lazaro, personally On 13 February 1974, defendants, through Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr., filed a motion for an extension of 15 days to file answer motion was granted by the lower court

In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways: (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, and (3) service of summons may be effected in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. That third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially complied with in this case In Civil Case No. 274-T the subject matter of the action for reconveyance consists of properties of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. which are located in Cebu. Mrs. Midgely claims an actual interest in those properties. She has been receiving a share of the income therefrom. Therefore, the extraterritorial service of summons upon her was proper. As already noted, the action against her is quasi in rem

On 28 February 1974, defendants through Atty. Roldan asked for another extension of ten (10) days to answer lower court granted this second extension in an order notwithstanding the extensions granted, no answer was filed by the defendants, for which reason, and upon motion of plaintiff Busuego, the lower court declared the defendants in default Almost two years later, on 12 July 1976, plaintiff filed before the lower court an ex parte motion for execution of the default judgment lower court granted the motion

On 3 September 1976, Romeo Lazaro, one of the defendants and a respondent herein, "on his [own] behalf and on behalf of other defendants," filed a motion to hold execution in abeyance praying that "for humanitarian reasons, an extension of 30 days, within which to vacate the premises lower court granted Romeo's motion, execution of the default judgment was held in abeyance On 28 September 1976, the defendants through Atty. Roldan filed with the lower court a motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default on the ground that neither the defendants nor their counsel were ever furnished a copy of the judgment by default lower court denied the motion finding the above-motion to be purely dilatory in nature and plain harassment on the part of the defendants respondents, through their new counsel, Atty. Oliver Lozano, filed with the same court an omnibus motion, which included a motion to lift the order of default, a second motion for reconsideration and the motion to quash the writ of execution Petitioner opposed the above motion contending that, the defendants could not pretend absence of proper notice after they, through counsel, had filed the two motions for extension of time to answer lower court denied the omnibus motion, holding the motion for extension of time to vacate filed by respondent Romeo Lazaro for all the defendants to be equivalent to waiver of service of summons defendants alleged that lower court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons because of lack of proper service of summons filing what in effect was a third motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default third motion for reconsideration was denied defendants also alleged that the motion for extension of time to vacate the premises, filed by their co-defendant Romeo Lazaro, after the judgment by default had become executory, was not equivalent to waiver of summons. defendants brought a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, upholding the respondents' contention insofar as the petitioners Romeo Lazaro, Jose Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez, are concerned

2) whether or not there was voluntary appearance by the respondents, through Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan and their co-respondent Romeo Lazaro 3) whether or not the affidavits submitted by respondents should be given weight HELD:

1) YES but only with respect to Ernesto Lazaro - with respect to respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez, there was NO valid service of summons effected it appears that the sheriff had availed of substituted service in seeking to serve the summons upon all the defendants by serving a copy thereof "through Dr. Ernesto Lazaro personally Perusal, however, of the sheriff's return 11reveals that the sheriff failed to specify therein what prior efforts, if any, had been exerted to serve summons upon the other defendants personally within a reasonable period of time, and the lack of success of such efforts, before proceeding to substituted service. Such specification in the sheriff's return is essential for enforcement of the rule under the Revised Rules of Court that substituted service may be resorted to only where it is not possible to serve the defendant or defendants promptly in person.

T]he impossibility of prompt service in person should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service

2)

YES

respondents argued that only voluntary appearance during trial is equivalent to waiver of service, and that therefore, the motion for extension of time within which to vacate the premises filed by Romeo Lazaro after trial and after rendition of judgment, was not equivalent to waiver of Summons respondents also submitted affidavits concerning lack of authority of respondent Romeo Lazaro to file the motion pleading "for humanitarian reasons" for an extension of time to locate an alternative residence ISSUES: 1) whether or not there was a valid service of summons upon the persons of the defendants

2 ways by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent: (a) by service of summons upon the defendant; and (b) by voluntary appearance of the defendant in court and his submission to its authority With respect to service of summons, the Revised Rules of Court prescribe that a copy of the summons be served personally upon the defendant by "handing him a copy thereof in person or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service, however, may be dispensed with and substituted service may be availed of if the defendant cannot be served personally "within a reasonable time. defendants appeared before the trial court a number of times without raising any objection to the improper service of summons:

(d) the defendants, through Atty. Gerardo Roldan, appeared in court and filed two successive motions for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint (e) more than two years after rendition of the judgment by default by the trial court, defendants, through their co-defendant Romeo Lazaro, filed a motion for extension of time within which to vacate the premises involved and to look for another place to live in, raising no question concerning the jurisdiction of the trial court over the persons of the defendants (f) the defendants, through their counsel Atty. Roldan, moved for reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court and for dissolution of the writ of execution, again without contesting the jurisdiction of the court over their persons voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person While the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. When the appearance is by motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court 3) NO The affidavits concerning lack of authority of respondent Romeo Lazaro to file the motion pleading "for humanitarian reasons" for an extension of time to locate an alternative residence are thoroughly unpersuasive all the defendants were not only immediate neighbors residing in adjacent units of a single apartment house but also members of the same family Thus, the natural tendency of Ernesto Lazaro (father of the 2 respondents), upon receipt of the summons issued by the trial court, must have been to inform his children living beside him about the summons; similarly, the natural tendency of Romeo Lazaro must have been to inform his father and brother and other relatives living in the same apartment house about the steps taken to defer their ejectment Atty. Roldan was correctly presumed by the trial court to have been authorized by the defendants below to appear on their behalf when he filed the motions for extension of time to answer and, what is more, when he filed the first motion for reconsideration of the judgment of the trial

PINLAC V CA -------------------------------------------------Gonzales v. State Properties (2001) PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTTIORARI ASSAILING THE DECISION OF THE CA FACTS: State Properties filed a complaint for Recovery of Property, based on ownership against Gonzales as well as his brothers and sisters. The complaint also had a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction (PI) The case was raffled to Branch 253 of the RTC Las Pias and summons was duly served to Gonzales o Gonzales filed an Omnibus Motion praying that there be another raffle because the other defendants (his brothers and sisters) did not receive any notice of raffle (there was an Admin Circular requiring it) o State Properties then filed a Motion for Service of Summons BY PUBLICATION on all defendants except the petitioner, for the reason that their (the brothers and sisters) residences could not be ascertained. This motion was granted by the court They also received a Notice of Raffle During the Raffle, Gonzales and his counsel appeared by opposed the holding of the raffle since the other defendants were likewise NOT notified of the raffle (they invoked Admin Circular No. 20-95) o The court granted o State filed an MR which was granted Citing Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court

Issues, HELD, Ratio: 1. Whether or not the CA acted with GADLEJ in holding that if summons COULD NOT be personally served, raffle could be held without notice to parties?

NO. In the present case, respondent was able to show that the whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown, and that summons could not be served personally or by substituted service. Hence, it cannot be required to serve such summons prior to or contemporaneous with the notice of raffle. The raffle, therefore, may proceed even without notice to and the presence of the said adverse parties. Administrative Circular No. 20-95 which provided for the requisites of a raffle of cases, has been incorporated into Section 4 (c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure.2 The pre-requisites for conducting a raffle when there is a prayer for a writ of PI or TRO are: a. b. c. Notice to Presence of the adverse party or person to be enjoined. Notice shall be preceded or accompanied by a service of summons to the adverse party or person to be enjoined.

In any event, the other defendants had been located and served summons. In fact, the case was subsequently raffled on December 8, 1999, and a pretrial conducted on May 9, 2000. The other defendants have not complained of any impropriety in the raffle. Their silence on this question demonstrates the utter lack of merit of petitioner's contention.

The prior or contemporaneous service of summons may be dispensed with in the following instances: i. ii. iii. When the summons cannot be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts When the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom When the party is not a non-resident

The requirement of notice of the raffle to the party whose whereabouts are unknown does not also apply x x x because the case will have to be raffled first before the court can act on the motion for leave to serve summons by publication. The second paragraph of Section 4 (c) of Rule 58 clearly provides that the service of summons may be dispensed with "where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts." 2. Whether or not the CA GADLEJ in holding that in a case where the parties are unknown, the case will have to be raffle first before the court can act on the motion for leave to serve summons by publication?

NO. In ordinary suits, notice of a raffle is given to the parties in order "to afford [them] a chance to be heard in the assignment of their cases." According to Justice Feria, the raffle of cases is done in open session with adequate notice, "so that parties or their counsel will be prevented from choosing judges to hear their case." Petitioner has no ground to object, since he himself had been given notice prior to the holding of the raffle. Furthermore, he has no standing to complain on behalf of the other parties, because he does not claim to represent them.

"(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines. "However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply."