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13, 1906, nighttime – Arturo Pelayo, a physician based in Cebu, was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron & Juana Abella (defendants) in San Nicolas. Their daughter-in-law was about to give birth & they requested him to render medical assistance. Since it was a difficult birth, he had to perform a surgery to remove the fetus using forceps. He also removed the afterbirth. He finished all of these until the following morning. He visited the patient several times the following day. Just & equitable value for the services he rendered: P500.00. Without any good reason, defendants refused to pay said amount. Thus he filed a case praying for a judgment in his favor against defendants for the sum of P500.00 + costs along with other relief that may be deemed proper. The Defendants alleged that their daughter-in-law died in consequence of the childbirth. Also, that their son & daughter-in-law lived independently & her giving birth in their house was only accidental. They prayed that they be absolved. CFI: Defendants absolved due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish right of action. ISSUE: WON the defendants are bound to pay the bill for the services Pelayo has rendered. HELD: NO. CFI judgment affirmed. RATIO: Rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is among the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 & 143, CC) The party bound to give support should therefore be liable for all the expenses including the fees of the physician. Thus, it is the husband’s obligation to pay Pelayo and not the defendants. The husband would still be liable even if his parents were the one who called & requested for Pelayo’s assistance. The defendants are not under any obligation to pay the fees claimed (An obligation according to CC Art. 1089 is created by law, contracts, quasi-contracts, & by illicit acts & omissions or by those in which any kind of fault/negligence occurs.). There was no contract between Pelayo & the defendants thus they can’t be compelled to pay him.
The appellate court appears to have belittled petitioner’s submission that under the prevailing circumstances time was of the essence in the delivery of the materials to the grave site.e. petitioner went to respondent’s store to inquire the availability of materials to be used in building his wife’s niche.110. However. he sued respondent for damages because of delay For his part.Barzaga vs CA 1998 (DELAY) Facts: Petitioner’s wife died and her wish is to be buried before Christmas. Petitioner however purchased the materials from other stores. petitioner had already complied fully with what was required of him as purchaser. Later that day.00. However. are liable for damages. the materials were not delivered on time.100 to secure the delivery of the materials. (Art 1170 of the Civil Code). After her death on Dec 21. Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of delay that will entitle petitioner for damages. Several times petitioner went to respondent’s store to ask for the delivery. the petitioner was forced to dismiss his laborer since there is nothing to work with for the materials did not arrive. It could not be ready for the scheduled burial of petitioner’s wife. we find petitioner’s assertion to be anchored on solid ground. Respondent’s employee advised petitioner that to come back the following morning. respondent offered a lame excuse of fortuitous event that the reason for delay is because the trucks tires were flat. in addition to the fact that work at the cemetery had to be put off on Christmas day. petitioner made a payment of P2. negligence. i. 1990. After his wife was buried. Respondent’s delay in the delivery of the construction materials wasted so much time that construction of the tomb could start only on the twenty-third. or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof. the payment of the purchase price of P2. .. That following morning. This undoubtedly prolonged the wake. in fulfillment of her wishes. This case is clearly one of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. 7 In their contract of purchase and sale. The niche had to be constructed at the very least on the twenty-second of December considering that it would take about two (2) days to finish the job if the interment was to take place on the twenty-fourth of the month. although it was not specified in the invoice the exact time of delivery? Held: Yes! The law expressly provides that those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud. It was incumbent upon respondent to immediately fulfill his obligation to deliver the goods otherwise delay would attach.
1988 [Narvasa. Issue: W/n the petitioner incurred delay in fulfilling his obligations HELD: In reciprocal obligations. No. a party incurs delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. therefore. There was a perfected contract of sale. The house contemplated was one that could be occupied for purpose of residence in reasonable comfort and convenience. J. Respondent cancelled the award. . it cannot invoke the petitioner’s suspension of payment as a cause to cancel the contract between them. it was then the duty of GSIS as seller to deliver the thing sold in a condition suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer and for the purpose contemplated. L-30056 August 30.:] Facts: Petitioner was awarded the house by GSIS on the condition that he should reside on it immediately. GSIS G.Agcaoili v.R. petitioner vacated the area after 1 day and refused to pay further installments until respondent make it habitable. Respondent did not fulfill its obligation to deliver the house in a habitable state. As the house is uninhabitable.
132.50 for actual damages. MAKALINTAL. MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS. No. L-21486 May 14. commonly known as La Mallorca-Pambusco.400.R. vs. La Mallorca-Pambusco.” and (2) in holding petitioners liable for moral damages.00 as compensatory damages. P14. 2100. Inc.000. . Respondents. filed this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its Civil Case No. “to pay to plaintiffs the amount of P2.. and P3.00 as counsel fees. now petitioner.: La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company. VALENTIN DE JESUS.000. J. 1966 LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY. entitled “Valentin de Jesus and Manolo Tolentino vs. P10. Petitioner. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.” The court a quo sentenced the defendant.La Mallorca vs De Jesus 5092011 Rate This Read the case digest here.” Two errors are attributed to the appellate Court: (1) “in sustaining the decision (of the court a quo) holding that the petitioners were liable for the accident which was caused by a blow-out of one of the tires of the bus and in not considering the same as caso fortuito.00 to each plaintiff by way of moral damages.
1959. however. vs. on which she was a passenger. in the morning of October 8. Regala.. Barrera.R. or rigid check-up before it took to the road that morning. . Zaldivar and Sanchez. in a head-on collision between petitioner’s bus. In the present case. with costs against petitioners. Villa-Rey Transit vs. 1958. In this jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier.R. CA-G.. 18480. Palapad. 1963. Concepcion. Wherefore.. J. Bautista Angelo. by itself alone and without a showing as to the causative factors. not only are not binding on this Court but were based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. Lira. said Court correctly held.L. The appellate Court there made no findings of any specified acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined itself to the question of whether or not a tire blow-out. Bello. and People vs. JJ. of the Civil Code. Dizon. Reyes. CA-G. a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough. No. No. the judgment appealed from is affirmed. June 27.” This was. in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded.P. would generate liability. Paras. 20-year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino. Sept. citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez vs. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new – petitioner describes it as “hindi masyadong kalbo. The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. 29. These articles have been applied by this Court in a number of cases. Red Line Transportation Co. December 29. according to petitioner’s own evidence and as found by the Court of Appeals “was pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel. Bengzon. 1954. L-10605-06.B. J. Mercado vs. concur. The inner tube of the left front tire. Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the bus was running quite fast immediately before the accident.J.” or not so very worn out – the plea of caso fortuito cannot be entertained. 1961. June 30. Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for negligence. and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction.. These rulings.The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus. L-13328-29. 8136. L-18957. the cause of the blow-out was known. C.. April 23. et al. etc. Bengzon. in relation to Article 2206. as provided in Article 1764. among them Necesito.. 1958.
rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. including barges like of appellant's. For in the ordinary course of events. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft. After due trial. The Republic of the Philippines sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damage caused by its employees. 1960. smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. it was undeniable that the unusual event that the barge.REPUBLIC VS. the court rendered judgment on June 11. that plaintiff has no capacity to sue. exclusively controlled by appellant. such a thing will not happen if proper care is used.000. ISSUE: Was the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge caused by fortuitous event or force majeure? RULING: Yes. The river. Defendant Corporation disclaimed liability on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure.561. In Anglo American . was swollen and the current swift.72. 1960. amounting to P200. and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation. with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint. 1963. holding the defendant liable for the damage caused by its employees and ordering it to pay plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge which amounted to P192. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION 21 SCRA 279 FACTS: In the early afternoon of August 17. barge L1892. on account of the heavy downpour in Manila and the surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16. owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig River by two tugboats when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge. at the time.
therefore. are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. and concludes that it had done all it was called to do. These very precautions. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition. had the towlines. "events that could not be foreseen. were inevitable" (Art. not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated. the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule The appellant strongly stressed the precautions taken by it on the day in question: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge L1892. as was commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.Jurisprudence. but actually foreseen. 1174. therefore. should be held due to force majeure or fortuitous event. It was. or which. completely destroyed the appellant's defense. that it assigned to the task the more competent and experienced among its patrons. however. and was not caso fortuito. and that the accident. engines and equipment double-checked and inspected' that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions. The very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable. Civ. Code of the Philippines). . The mere difficulty to foresee the happening was not impossibility to foresee the same. though foreseen.
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