TAULE vs. SANTOS August 12, 1991 G. R. No.

90336 x----------------------x This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void. Facts: An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president. Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989. Thus this petition before the Supreme Court. Issues: 1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC. 2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest. Decision: Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 resolution is SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.

However, the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers of the FABC be conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted.

respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code. It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it. 2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC. The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09. DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the VicePresident presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said mandatory provision. Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public

Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79 (1989) FACTS: Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who is suing Solid Homes for failure to deliver the certificate of title. The complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid Homes contended that jurisdiction is with the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD 957, as amended by PD 1344 granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA. ISSUE: W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award damages HELD: SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction. In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP 129 and PD 1344 the special law. On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government. Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan Issues: WON the SB gas jurisdiction over the subj matter of the controversy WON the petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the VIR as depositary of distrained property Facts: Azarcon owned and operated an earthmoving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services contracted by Paper industries Corp of Phil PICOP Engaged services of sub-contractors like Ancla whose trucks were left at pets premises. In May 1983, Warrant of Distraint of Personal Prop was issued by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the Reg Director Batausa commanding him to distraint the goods, chattels or effects of other personal property of Ancla, subcontractor of Azarcon and delinquent taxpayer. The warrant of garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to surrenter, transmit, or remit to BIT the property in his possession. Warrant was received by Azarcon in June 1985 Azarcon signed the Receipt for goods, articles and things seized under auth of the National Internal Revenue which stated that he promised to faithfully keep, preserve, to protect goods articles and things seized xxx and will produce and deliver all said goods, articles etc upon the order of any court in the Phill or upon demand of Commr of Internal Revenue or any agent of BIR. Azarcon wrote letter in 1985, November which stated that Azarcon ceased his operations and surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from custody. Incidentally pet reported taking of truck to security manager of PICOP and requested him to prevent truck being taken out of the PICOP concession. By the time the order was given, it was too late. In 1986, Calo, Revenue Doc Processor of Revenue Region sent a progress report about the surreptitious taking of the dump truck and that Ancla was renting

out the truck to a certain contractor, Cueva, at PICOP, the same company which engaged pet earth moving services. She suggested that a warrant of garnishment be reissued against Mr. Cueva (PICOP) for whatever amount of rental is due from Ancla until he has paid his tax liabilities. Instead of doing so, Batausa filed a complaint against Pet. Prov Fiscal forwarded to Tanodbayan and then prelim invest was conducted. Ancla and Azarcon were charged before SB of malversation 217 in relation with 222. The charge states that since the private individual voluntarily offered himself as custodian of the truck and has become resp and accountable for said prop to satisfy the tax liability, the truck became public prop and the value thereof as public fun. Pet defense: 1. was not present during the prelim invest 2. not a public officer SB ruled that pet is guilty of malversation

SC HELD: On jurisdiction: SB has no jurisdiction over the individual. Jurisdiction must appear clearly from the statue law or it will not held to exist. jurisdiction determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action. Applicable prov. PD 1601 amended by 1861 but prior to their amendment by RA 7975. SB jurisdiction: a. Violations of 3019, anti-graft and corrupt practices b. other offenses by public officers and employees. C. In case private indiv are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with public officers or employees, they shall be tried jointly with the public officers and employees. Therefore, jurisdiction of SB is hinged on WON Azarcon is a public officer by the meaning of law. On status of Azarcon: He is still a private individual. crime doesnt charge pet as co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer. ART 203 states what a public officer is. He doesnt fall within the ambit of the definition.

Even when the pet, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he still may not be deemed a public officer. Not by popular election, not by appointment by direct provision of law or competent auth. SOL GEN: takes case of US vs. Rastollo which ruled that the power to designate a private person who has actual possession of a distrained prop as a depository of distrained prop is necessarily implied in the BIRs power to place the prop of a delinquent tax payer in distrained as provided of the NIRC CODE. SC disagrees. Different facts of the cases. Judicial deposit vs. BIR administrative act of effecting constructive destraint. While the BIR had auth to require pet to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it the power to appoint Pet a public officer. Although sec 206 of the NIRC authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person to preserve distrained prop there is no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a private indiv to act as depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Consideration of ART. 222 private indiv as public officer. SC ruled that a private indiv who has in his charge any of the public funds or prop enumerated and commits any of the acts defined should likewise be penelized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in the said provision is it expressed or implied that a private indiv be deemed a public officer. Azarcon and Ancla, his co-accused, are both private indivs.

Judgment annulled and set aside.

AKBAYAN-YOUTH v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioners in this case represent the youth sector and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to them, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 disapproving the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before the SC the instant which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELEC s Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections. Issues: 1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution 2. Whether or not the SC can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC s imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections. Held: 1. No The right of suffrage invoked by petitioners is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of

Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voter s Registration Act of 1996. Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, explicitly provides that No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election. The 100-day prohibitive period serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well end up with a voter s list full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and ghosts Likewise, petitioners invoke the so called standby powers or residual powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Sec. 28 of RA 8436 Designation of Other Dates for Certain Preelection Acts. The act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, (a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board. It bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from contradicting each other. SC hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. The provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior to election day.The stand-by power of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise. Moreover, the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands. Wellentrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the

law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. 2. NO SC believes that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters.

MMDA vs Garin GR No. 130230 2005 Chico-Nazario, J.: FACTS:

April 15,

services. All its functions are administrative in nature.

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition. ISSUE: Whether of not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional? RULING: The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, Peoples Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of

G.R. No. 143377. February 20, 2001 SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four parcels of land. Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed by Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale. Then Mamaril et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. Unknown to the latest owner, the CIR of La Union issued an Order in Land Registration Case No. N-361 declaring the deed of sale between Galvez and Mamaril, et. al. (OCT No. 0-381) null and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to herein petitioner Shipside Inc. Lots No. 1 and 4. Twenty-four years after, the lots have never been executed. Consequently, a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles was filed by the OSG. ISSUE: WON Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival of judgment herein despite the issue of prescription. HELD: NO. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of government programs. Parenthetically, petitioner was not a party to the original suit for cancellation of title commenced by the Republic twenty-seven years

for which it is now being made to answer, nay, being made to suffer financial losses. It should also be noted that petitioner is unquestionably a buyer in good faith and for value, having acquired the property in 1963, or 5 years after the issuance of the original certificate of title, as a third transferee. If only not to do violence and to give some measure of respect to the Torrens System, petitioner must be afforded some measure of protection. Facts: The petitioner filed a certiorari with the CA containing the requisite certification on non-forum shopping but failed to attach proof that the person signing the certification was authorized to do so. The CA dismissed the petition. The petitioner submits a motion for reconsideration which attached a secretarys certificate attesting to the signatorys authority to sign certificates against forum shopping on behalf of the petitioner. When the court of CA denied the motion, the petitioner sought relief with the SC. Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of Shipside Inc. Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in the dismissal of the petition. The SC revised the decision of CA recognizing the belated filing of the certifications against forum shopping as permitted in exceptional circumstances. It further held that with more reason should a petition be given due course when this incorporates a certification on non-forum shopping without evidence that the person signing the certifications was an authorized signatory and the petitioner subsequently submits a secretarys certificate attesting to the signatorys authority in its motion for consideration. The court allows belated submission of certifications showing proof of the signatorys authority in signing the certification of forum shopping.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006 Facts: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. Paranaques Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned andcontrolled corporations upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax. MIAAs contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor. Issue: WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws?

Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Paraaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void. Held: 1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation must have members. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order. 2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, are owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one intended for public use. The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed users tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Paraaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-

hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax. c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic. n MIAAs case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of conveyance. d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAAs assets adverse to the Republic. e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the real property tax. However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax. MIAA v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006 Facts:

The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of its Charter. Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June 2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport lands and buildings. At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was dismissed for having been filed out of time. Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is exempt from real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself as a justification for exemption, since the airport lands and buildings, being devoted to public use and public service, are owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On the other hand, the City of Paraaque invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC. It asserts that an international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Paraaque posted and published notices announcing the public auction sale of the airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon before the scheduled public auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance of a

TRO to restrain the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the auction sale, however, the same was received only by the City of Paraaque three hours after the sale.
Issue: Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax? Held: The Petition is GRANTED. The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of local governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in favor of national government instrumentalities. MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. As long as the airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing these properties from public use, they remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt from real estate tax. However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a consideration to a taxable person.