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Robert Jervis

The Remaking of a Unipolar World

ommon sense and most academic thinking argue that a hegemon’s prime objective should seek to maintain the prevailing international system, but that is not the world in which we live today. Measured in any conceivable way, the United States has a greater share of world power than any other country in history. Whether it is referred to as the world leader by those who approve of its policies or an empire by those who oppose them, it is a hegemon in today’s unipolar world order. The irony is that Washington seeks to change the rules of that order. Why? Positioned at the top of the hierarchy, the hegemon should want to maintain and solidify it. Even though it may have to pay a disproportionate share of the costs, including heavy UN dues and a high defense budget, such burdens are difficult to shirk and represent a small price to pay for the international order that provides the hegemon with so many benefits. Other states may appear to get a better deal by prospering within the international system without having to pay the high price; western Europe, for example, can free ride on U.S. efforts in many spheres while still complaining about U.S. dominance. Yet, enormous U.S. power brings unprecedented benefits, ranging from the key role of the U.S. dollar in world finance to the centrality of the English language throughout the world to Washington’s ability to block most political initiatives that would bring it harm. The current international system, although not necessarily perfect, is certainly satisfactory, partly because the United States has played such a large role in establishing it. No state can have a greater stake in the prevailing order than the hegemon, nor can any state have greater power to maintain the system. The United States should then be a very conservative state in its
Robert Jervis is the Adlai E. Stevenson professor of international politics at Columbia University in New York. © 2006 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 29:3 pp. 7–19. T HE WASHINGTON Q UARTERLY
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W. written under the direction of Paul Wolfowitz for then–Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Washington had to maintain a military force so modern and potent that no one could consider challenging it. with all its power and stake in the system. and few other problems were severe enough to merit this kind of attention.S. most changes in world poli8 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 . Such interventions could be short lived. some critics argued that the United States was confusing foreign policy with missionary work while others decried its passivity in the face of world poverty. Accordingly. The thrust of the argument was that the United States should do what was necessary to maintain the trajectory of world politics. insufficient attention has been paid to the odd fact that the United States. defined by some as dull and characterized by frequent if small military interventions. Bush administration: the 1992 draft Defense Guidance. The first President Bush and Clinton had the same basic idea: support the status quo and intervene only to prevent or reverse destabilizing shocks such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait or Serbia’s brutalities in Europe’s backyard. In fact. there were no pressing reasons for more dramatic action. and argued that the United States should follow a policy of selective engagement and maintain a role as an offshore balancer. interests by producing great conflict if not major wars. In the fierce debate over the merits of its post–September 11 foreign policy. policy from the end of the Cold War to the September 11 attacks.l Robert Jervis foreign relations. it should be the quintessential status quo power. the draft argued that the United States should ensure that no peer competitor would arise. This conservative stance was endorsed by perhaps the most famous statement of the George H. For most people. is behaving more like a revolutionary state than one committed to preserving the arrangements that seem to have suited it well. The Post–Cold War Conservative Impulse U. with its power and dominance thus assured. especially those of a realist stripe. genocide in Rwanda. which is anything but conservative. it stands as the standard conservative position. and growing autocracy in Russia. It also had to handle a range of problems that were important to other states so that they would not need to develop their own robust military capabilities. Under President Bill Clinton. and although the bellicose tone of the document had to be modified once it was leaked to the press. yet neither critique gained great traction. sought to bolster the international system.S. It makes a puzzle of Washington’s current behavior. Many international politics experts agreed. Because either bipolarity or multipolarity would recapitulate the history of world politics and threaten U.

Although the second element in this trilogy can perhaps be squared with a conservative view of the role of the hegemon. Three linked elements that have become central to contemporary U. the United States has justified the use of force by arguing that even though Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Together. and prosperity. This may be a political and psychological rationalization. the contrast between the two is actually quite severe. One way or another. Second. it must be transformed. states that rule by law and express the today’s unipolar interests of their people will conduct benign foreign policies. even if effective in the short run. It was better for the United States to act rather than wait for this to occur. the other two cannot. however. the three argue that even if the status quo is in some sense satisfactory. In a way that T THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 9 . especially if deterrence cannot cope with dedicated adversaries. The questions are who will change it and whether it will be for better or worse. current doctrine emphasizes that peace and cooperation can exist only when all important states he irony is that are democratic.S.S. the United States must use preventive measures. as the Defense Guidance advocated. foreign policy had little place in the draft document almost a decade earlier. he would have developed them when conditions were propitious. ery abroad as well as at home. When defense is also inadequate. when the United States did intervene. Thus. In extreme cases such as Iraq. most notably terrorists. Because a country’s foreign Washington seeks to policy reflects the nature of its domestic rechange the rules of gime. world politics will change drastically. including preventive war.The Remaking of a Unipolar World l tics could be tolerated because they were not great enough to threaten the fundamentals of the unipolar system. Preventive actions. and tyrannies will inflict misworld order. the system must not simply be preserved. To bring lasting peace. stability. a vital instrument to preserve world order is what the administration calls preemption but is actually prevention. A New Beginning: Hegemonic Revisionism Although the 1992 Defense Guidance was drafted by neoconservatives and is often seen as foreshadowing current U. First. policy. it is an illusion to believe that it can be maintained. but the argument does have a strong logic to it. will only be a stopgap if international politics were to proceed on its normal trajectory. it was playing an essentially conservative role.

The United States simply cannot maintain its hegemonic position through the policies advocated by realists and followed before September 11. The Limited Explanatory Power of September 11 The most simple and obvious explanation for this strategic shift is the September 11 attacks. Although cynics may see these beliefs as mere rationalizations for policies arrived at on other grounds. but will it abandon its use of terrorism? The extent of Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism in Kashmir and India has not ebbed and flowed with the extent to which Pakistan has been democratic. will sponsor terrorism and that without state backing. terrorists cannot inflict great damage. terrorism will disappear. this leads to the conclusion that the world can only be safe if all countries are transformed into democracies.l Robert Jervis should shock Henry Kissinger and other students of the order established by the Congress of Vienna. The more fundamental claim that terrorism is such a threat that it requires transformation of the international system must also be questioned. 2001. U.1 The Palestinian semistate is democratic. most nondemocracies shun terrorism. they are likely sincerely held and are partly responsible for the revolutionary U. foreign policy should be more closely modeled after Napoleon than after Talleyrand and Metternich. Aside from killing their vocal opponents who have gone into exile. Few analysts have dissented from the administration’s claim that radical measures are required to confront the threat of terrorism. For George W. fewer people were killed on that day than die in automobile accidents in one month. Unless they use nuclear weapons or deadly contagious diseases.S. the change has been even more drastic as the September 11 attacks greatly heightened his sense of threat and strengthened his belief that there is a tight link between tyrants and terrorists. As Gregory Gause has written. especially because terrorists are difficult to control. so current doctrine argues that the United States must instead be a revolutionary power. if not all nondemocratic regimes. the connection between tyrants and terrorists is tenuous at best. Acquiring nuclear weapons and even infectious bio10 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 . even if they disagree with many of its policies. Bush.S. they do appear to believe that only nondemocratic regimes. policy. Iran sponsors some terrorism and yet is much more democratic than Saudi Arabia. which does not. Although Bush and his colleagues may have cynically exaggerated the ties between Saddam and Al Qaeda. This is not to say that the beliefs are well founded. 2 As terrible as the September 11 attacks were. Combined with the belief that terrorism constitutes a fundamental threat to the rest of the world.

such safety could not be guaranteed because nondemocracies will always threaten the United States.S. Although significant prophylactic efforts are necessary. Despite the intrinsic value it places on democracy. unlike the countries of western Europe. a product of it mean that many of the threats that had been so prominent previously have now disappeared. citizens feel that a heterogeneous world is unsafe.S. empowers it to pursue Terrorism also seems so threatening beits revolutionary cause U. it must impinge on the security of nondemocracies. Yet. Psychologically if not logically. Ironically. There is little else to compare it to today. which of course could kill the terrorists’ friends as well as their enemies.S. when the United States and the Soviet Union were mutually threatening and threatened because their contrasting ideologies and domestic regimes made each an inherent menace to the other. Herein lies the paradox. but this conclusion does not follow ineluctably from these events. Hope as well as fear. THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 11 . it might be willing to live in a mixed world if it were a safe one. many scholars deny that the terrorist threat requires the United States to transform the world. On the other hand.The Remaking of a Unipolar World l logical agents. To make itself secure. and the visual image of the twin towers burning he fact that the and collapsing has been etched vividly U. Something more deeply rooted is involved. is extraordinary difficult. hegemony and the dramatic decline in international war that may be impulse. the situation resembles that of the Cold War. On one hand. is a hegemon and indelibly on the American psyche. the fact that the United States is a hegemon feeds its revolutionary impulse. opportunity as well as threat are at work. The September 11 attacks are part of the explanation for why many U. including some who opposed the war in Iraq as a counterproductive digression. it is not only Bush and a neoconservative cabal who believe that it does but also a significant segment of elite opinion. Although the current world system is unipolar. there is a great disproportion between the threat and the remedies that Washington proposes. The threat looms large to the United States in part because. T The Hegemon’s Security Dilemma The United States believes itself caught in a version of the familiar security dilemma. it had not experienced a successful terrorist attack of this scale in the past. small threats appear to be in the same class with fundamental challenges such as the Cold War.

with the disintegration of the USSR. and free enterprise. this form of government will thrive when the artificially imposed barriers to it from old autocratic regimes are H 12 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 . stance is mere rhetoric. one can argue that the U. All instruments are to be deployed to this end: military power. Yet.”3 Because almost all countries pay lip service to democratic values. Optimism is also prominent in his belief that. Furthermore.4 Although Bush recently has avoided calling for the overthrow of regimes in North Korea and Iran. presidents. Bush’s stance is both pessimistic in its assertion that standard tools of international politics are insufficient to tame tyrannical regimes and optimistic in its argument that democracies will be well behaved internationally and will accept U. and even critics have been surprised (some horrified and others heartened) by the unprecedented extent to which Washington has pressed friendly and probably unstable regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia to democratize.S. nongovernmental organizations. the law. even if it has not used the most extreme instruments at its disposal. as it was in the past. the logic of his policy clearly points in that direction. egemony also The key is to lead other states and societies magnifies the sense to become liberal democracies and respect inof threat. and their neighbors. and diplomacy. with U. The only way to ensure that the mullahs of Iran or the dictator of North Korea do not acquire nuclear weapons is to remove them from power. democracy can be brought to all other countries. because they have attacked democratic governments that follow unacceptable policies.S. leadership.S. leaders can readily believe that now is the best time for the United States to remake the system in its own image. assistance. all signs indicate that Bush and many of his colleagues believe in what they say. dividual rights.l Robert Jervis THE POWER TO CHANGE The fact that the United States lacks a peer competitor means that it can turn its focus elsewhere. Even the most effective antiproliferation policies leave room for cheating. democracy. covert action. such as Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela or the Palestinian government under Hamas. as well as that of previous U. More importantly in this context. which is to be reorganized to support a “transformational” program. One can disagree with the theory that democracies are benign or note Bush’s hypocrisy. According to the Bush administration. Bush’s 2002 national security doctrine is correct to assert that “[t]he great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom.S. U.S.

but doing so just recreates them. the best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world” 5 echoed then–Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s statement in 1950 that “[w]e are children of freedom. a hegemon will find itself threatened by whatever is beyond its reach. but by the difficulties of establishing local order. U. and although the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century was able to develop tolerable working relationships with European states. Having established trading outposts. The very fact that the United States has interests throughout the world leads to the fear that undesired changes in one area could undermine its interests elsewhere. President Woodrow Wilson wanted to make the world safe for democracy. Hegemony thus also ironically magnifies the sense of threat. The very extent of the hegemon’s influence means that all sorts of geographic and ideological disturbances can threaten it. but the basic point is the same: preservation of a desirable and ordered zone requires taming or subduing areas and ideologies of potential disturbance. 7 For the United States. including the United States. position in the world is without precedent.The Remaking of a Unipolar World l removed. it was driven to further expansion not only by competition with other European states. Despite the fact that or perhaps because it lacked what would now be referred to as peer competitors. the Roman empire was never able to establish stable frontiers. arguing that only in a world of democracies can the United States be safe. President Ronald Reagan took Acheson’s position to heart. the United States vacillated between accepting a heterogeneous world and believing that the USSR would be a threat as long as it was Communist.S. Democracy does not require demanding preconditions and the prior transformation of society. Most changes will harm the United States if they do not improve its situation. The U. the frontier is ideological rather than geographic. Bush extends and reverses this. REMAKING THE SYSTEM IN THE HEGEMON’S IMAGE The other side of this coin is that as long as many countries are undemocratic. We cannot be safe except in an environment of freedom. cannot be secure. hegemony means that even those who share its THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 13 . its empire expanded beyond the original intention in part because of the inability to control and limit its holdings in Africa and Asia. The ringing cry in his second inaugural address that “[t]he survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. Frontiers can be expanded.” 6 Throughout the Cold War. democracies elsewhere. although perhaps only when it appeared that the Soviet system might indeed be brought down without triggering a war.S. Furthermore. but the basic impulses animating it are not. Having established order within its large sphere.

international law limits the changes that are likely to accompany shifting power relations. It will be the hegemon’s forces that are engaged in the most difficult activities. with the hegemon having a role distinct from that of other states. Although China cannot beexplanation lies in come a peer competitor in the foreseeable Bush’s personality future. Only the hegemon can nip problems. including others’ problems. greatly reduces the costs the hegemon has to pay for inducing others to comply. Given the difficulties of the task it has taken on. the Bush administration’s claim that other states cannot adopt the doctrine of preventive war and its rejection of the ICC make a great deal of sense. and is thus generally conservative. and its status makes it the obvious target for those with multiple motives ranging from jealousy to domestic policy to regional aspirations that can be furthered by embarrassing it. rejection of international law in general and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in particular demonstrates why its stance is not and cannot be conservative. knowing that Washington cannot shirk its role. It is a truism of realism that increases in national power bring increases in interests. and the very fact that it acts preventively means that others need not and must not do so. a hegemonic system is quite differentiated.S.8 Because it is developed by the most powerful actors. Seen in this light. P HEGEMONIC POWER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW The U.S. At first glance. Disturbances that would be dismissed in a multipolar or bipolar world loom much larger for the hegemon because it is present in all corners of the globe and everything seems interconnected. even those who are not paranoid beand religious lieve that China will intrude on the U. U.S. doorstep. Yet. in the bud. fears about the rise of China follow a certain logic. It is not only with aggressors that the appetite grows with the eating. Unless China becomes a benign democracy. Thus. whereas a legal system applies the same rules to all actors. order because the latter extends to China’s conviction.l Robert Jervis values and interests have incentives to free ride on its efforts. one would think the United States would seek to strengthen many legal restraints. although the United States has few intrinsic interests in the borderlands around China and Japan is strong enough to carry much of the weight in this region. increases in its art of the regional influence will diminish that of the United States. Hegemony similarly requires the use of military force in a way that exposes the hegemon to ICC action. it is unlikely that the hegemon can live by any set of rules that cannot encompass all the 14 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 .

especially his attraction to certainty and grand gestures and. Bush is prone to look for missions that give his life and his country meaning. and to believe in the possibility and efficacy of transformations. Bush’s predisposition here converges with strands of neoconservative thinking that see the need for the United States to undertake ambitious foreign policy missions to maintain its domestic political and moral health. the president did not have deeply rooted views about foreign policy. This way of thinking was reinforced by the terrorist attacks.” 11 As a born-again Christian.12 Incrementalism and accepting the ways things are cannot save souls or bring lasting peace. When early in his administration he said that he was “tired of swatting flies”10 as a counterterrorism policy.9 Growing out of the way in which turning to Christ enabled him to break with his aimless and alcoholic past. brushing aside the question of whether these might prove excessively costly and even counterproductive. political culture. to an even greater extent. as summarized by the 1992 draft Defense Guidance. Bush was indicating his predilection toward more sweeping solutions. An associate of the president reports that.S. He sees himself and his country as involved in a struggle against evil. THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 15 . other elements besides September 11 are also at work: Bush’s personal religious outlook and personality and U. as well as the related belief in the possibility of international progress through converting people to correct ideas and ideals. Part of the explanation for this shift lies in his personality. after the September 11 attacks. and indeed as late as September 10. he adopted the new stance with extraordinary speed and within days became committed to preventive action and spreading democracy around the world. American Missionary Zeal and Its President Besides the systemic factors leading today’s hegemon to change rather than preserve the system. Yet. Those that he did have had inclined him toward a traditional if assertive realist policy. to see the world in terms of good and evil. it cannot adopt the egalitarian and collegial model so favored by standard liberal theories of international cooperation. Bush thought “[t]his is what I was put on this earth for. he is strongly attracted to the idea of transforming people. and world politics. BUSH’S RELIGIOUS CONVICTION Coming into office. 2001. after the September 11 attacks. If the United States is to transform the system. the religious conviction that permeates his way of thinking. which led Bush to feel that he had now found his mission.The Remaking of a Unipolar World l unforeseen circumstances in which it may have to act. societies.

Throughout the Cold War.S. Yet. Even when it was not seeking such grand a goal. Although these views were not uniquely American—Wilson was in part influenced by the writings of British liberal reformers—they have deep resonance within the U. to name only the two most obvious cases. tradition that feed a transformationalist approach.l Robert Jervis THE AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE People who lack Bush’s personal history and beliefs may reach similar conclusions.S.S. they are influenced by the strands of the U. leaders stressed that the United States was a revolutionary power. It has always had deep reservations about traditional power politics and is much more prone than the Europeans to believe that a country’s foreign policy is strongly influenced by its domestic arrangements. Both critics and defenders of U. U. and has expected its own model to be tradition feed a readily replicated. 14 This was partly a rhetorical device to counter the impression that the Soviet Union stood for progressive change while the United States stood in its way. Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. this perspecapproach. values that Americans hold dear are instinctively shared by others even if they do not know it. It was one reason why Reagan did not feel inhibited to label the Soviet Union an evil empire and confidently push for ending the Communist system. but the message was not entirely fictional. Under current circumstances. Therefore. The United States had never been happy with a world of nondemocratic states. helped shape the Bush doctrine. Wilson thought that the United States could spread democracy abroad and that these regimes would be inherently peace loving and cooperative. other countries will become liberal democracies. and once the heavy hand of oppression is lifted.S. but few of its allies. foreign policy often noted its distinctively reformist characteristics. the United States has had great difficulties understanding societies that are not trands of the U.S. A second and related tradition is Wilsonianism. it helps explain the combination of fear and optimism that characterizes the United States. As Harvard political theorist Louis Hartz brilliantly argued 50 years ago. liberal. the United States was prone to react to setbacks and obstacles during the Cold War not through S 16 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 . 13 Often incorrectly reviled transformationalist as conservative if not apologetic. tive remains powerful and penetrating. polity. has misunderstood revolutionary impulses. as Americans. as a society founded by a middle-class fragment. a heterogeneous world is a dangerous one. although their personalities are very different from his.

over the long run. power. Bush and his colleagues fervently believe that transformation can succeed.The Remaking of a Unipolar World l midcourse corrections.” 16 A impulse will continue month later he declared. “We understand hisbeyond Bush. the very fact of its great power means that even those sympathetic to it will worry with good reason that their interests may be neglected. but rather by seeking bold initiatives. Foot dragging if not active resistance is to be expected. establishing a working democracy is difficult. A THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 17 . is far from unlimited. U. although Bush is undoubtedly correct that few people want to be ruled by dictators. tory has called us into action. but there is very little in historical experience or social science theory to lead one to expect these transformations to be quick or easy. national. And we’re transformationalist going to seize the moment and do it. but each of its aspects is flawed. the United States sought far-reaching changes. and people all over the world want to be free. or overruling British and French resistance and pushing for German unity in 1989–1990. but spreading democracy is in everyone’s interest. a variety of systemic.S. Most would agree with Bush that. and we are not going to miss that opportunity to make the world more peaceful and more free. and individual reasons explain why the United States is a revisionist hegemon seeking a new and better international system rather than a status quo power continuing the order in which it now wields significant power and exercises great influence. This is particularly troublesome because widespread and active support from a very broad coalition could help spread democracy by showing that it is not merely a cover for U. and not only by France. Rather than deal with specific difficulties on their own terms. then. More importantly. This is a marvelous story.S. power. the president responded to a question about the predictable French criticisms of his policy by saying that “history has given us a unique opportunity to defend freedom. Indeed.” 17 This is an opportunity because not only does the United States have great power. such as unifying Europe. although great.15 Some of these moves succeeded and others failed. but they were not the sort of system-maintaining prudent policies that one expects from a status quo state. democracy would prevail. ameliorating them or designing around them. The Implications of a Revisionist Hegemon For better or for worse. except the few remaining dictators. modernizing the Third World. In February 2002.

After Victory: Institutions. p. http://www. see Frank Bruni. “Transformational Diplomacy. John Ikenberry. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. much as Bush wishes that it were. 7. 2.” New York Times. 5 (September/October 2005): 62–76.C. and produces instability and anti-American regimes. if the required effort is to be sustained over a prolonged period. See also Steve Erickson. 3 (September 18 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 . no.whitehouse. Quoted in James Harding. and ext. no. 8. 5. p. see John Mueller.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59408. Strategic Restraint. “What Is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory. 12. this seems unlikely. 28–33.C.state. John Galbraith. 2005). p.. commitment is required in the United States. http://www. http://www. for example. 4 (January 2005): 487–505. 2003. 2001. iii. On the latter.l Robert Jervis Furthermore. February 13.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 2.htm.S. Norton. Gregory Gause III. http://www. a Mission and a Role in History. 10. and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton.state. Strategies of Containment. 6. 9. D.” Washington. “Remarks on Foreign Assistance. some of the transformationalist impulse will continue because of its deep roots in the United States’ worldview as well as its hegemony. March 20.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306. 2006. “The ‘Turbulent’ Frontier as a Factor in British Expansion. John Lewis Gaddis.” European Journal of International Relations 11.” January 20. 11. see Condoleezza Rice. it is not likely to be domestically sustainable. September 22. p.” LA Weekly. 4. “President Sworn-In [sic] to Second Term. 2005. rev. See Michael Williams. 3. “Growing Divide Between the Bushes. “George Bush and the Treacherous Country.htm. The U. ed. 2004). See. 106. 1 (January 1960): 34–48. p.html. 2001).W.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.” Financial Times.whitehouse. Although the Bush experiment is not likely to succeed. across society and the political system.: Princeton University Press. N. involves high costs. January 18.” Terrorism and Political Violence 17.” Washington. 202. Everyone wants to see democracies established abroad. For a good discussion. Notes 1. but if the effort runs into trouble. See also Condoleezza Rice. “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs 84. How to balance what is desirable with the constraints of an intractable world will be the challenge for Bush’s successors. “Six Rather Unusual Propositions About Terrorism. (New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. political system was not constructed to support an active foreign policy. 2004.pdf. Quoted in The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. F. January 19. no. For a very perceptive account written shortly after the attacks. D. Office of the Press Secretary.” September 2002. The White House. Yet.J. no. pp. 4.gov/news/releases/2005/01/ 20050120-1. 1. “For President..

The White House.html.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17. 2002. 1975. 1982). The White House. and World.” National Interest. THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY s SUMMER 2006 19 . 16. 15.” August 1. Vice President Discuss the Middle East. Office of the Press Secretary. 17. Louis Hartz.us/ 1953hst.gov/news/releases/2002/ 03/20020321-6. 14.html. “President Bush. 13.fordlibrarymuseum. “Utopianism and the Bush Foreign Policy. 2002. “Ronald Reagan Speeches: Address to the British Parliament (June 8. http://www. Steven Sestanovich. no. and the American Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press.whitehouse. The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt.edu/scripps/diglibrary/prezspeeches/ reagan/rwr_1982_0608. Security. Office of the Press Secretary. Michael Boyle.htm. See also John Lewis Gaddis.” March 21.html.whitehouse. 2004). Ford’s Address in Helsinki Before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. http://www.htm. “President Gerald R. See “Harry Truman: 7th State of the Union Address. “American Maximalism.virginia.gov/ news/releases/2002/02/20020218.The Remaking of a Unipolar World l 2005): 307–337. 1955).” February 18. “President.” http://www. Surprise.” http://millercenter. 79 (Spring 2005): 13–23. Brace. http://www. 1 (April 2004): 81–103. Prime Minister Koizumi Hold Press Conference.theamericanpresidency.gov/ library/speeches/750459. no.