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HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, JUSAN TRUST MINING COMPANY, and J & S PARTNERSHIP, respondents. Lobruga Rondoz & Cardenas Law Offices for petitioner. Fortunato de Leon for respondents. 1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS; WEIGHT AND VALIDITY THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining Law have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims involved. In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly located, surveyed and registered.'' Such finding or interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect. 2. REMEDIAL LAW; PETITION FOR REVIEW; QUESTIONS NOT RAISED BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE BODY MAY NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT. A question not raised before the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources cannot be raised for the first time on review by the Supreme Court. For this reason, even assuming that there is justifiable issue between the parties, this question cannot be passed upon. ABAD SANTOS, J.: This is a petition to review a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated July 8, 1970, in DANR Cases Numbered 3502 and 3502-A. The decision affirmed a decision of the Director of Mines dated November 6, 1969. The appeal was made pursuant to Sec. 61 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137, as amended) which provides: "... Findings of facts in the decision or order of the Director of Mines when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be final and conclusive, and the aggrieved party or parties desiring to appeal from such decision or order shall file in the Supreme Court a petition for review wherein only questions of law may be raised." The factual background is given in the brief of the petitioner-appellant which has not been contradicted by the respondents-appellees and is as follows: On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode mineral claims, viz.: (1) Finland 2, (2) Finland 3, (3) Finland 5, (4) Finland 6, (5) Finland 8 and (6) Finland 9, all registered on December 11, 1964 with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya. The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode minerals claims covered by LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) encroached and overlapped the eleven (11) lode mineral claims of the herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust, viz., (1) A-12, (2) H-12, (3) JC-11, (4) W-11, (5) JN-11, (6)WM-11, (7) F-10, (8) A-9, (9) N-9, (10) W-8, and (11) JN-8, all situated in Sitio Taduan Barrio of Abaca, Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and duly registered with the office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on May 14, 1965. The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above- mentioned six (6) lode mineral claims of respondent Jusan Trust Mining Company, null, void, and illegal; and denying lode lease application LLA No. V-7872 over said claims. Further, the adverse
claimant prayed for such other reliefs and remedies available in the premises. This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502. Likewise, on the same date July 26, 1966, the same Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-9028 of the J & S Partnership over six (6) lode mineral claims viz.: (1) A-19, (2) A-20, (3) A-24, (4) A-25, (5) A-29, and (6) A-30, all registered on March 30, 1965 and amended August 5, 1965, with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and situated in Sitio Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya. The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode mineral claim covered by LLA No. V-9028, encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13) lode mineral claims of herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust, viz.: (1) Wm-14, (2) F-14, (3) A-13, (4) H-12 (5) Jc12, (6) W-12, (7) Jn-11, (8) Wm-11, (9) F-11, (10) Wm-11, (11) F-11; (12) H-9 and (13) Jc-9, all situated in Sitio Taduan, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya and duly registered with the office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, on May 14,1965. The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above- mentioned six (6) claims of respondent J & S Partnership, null void, and illegal; and denying lode lease application LLA No. V-9028 over the said claims. Further, the adverse claimant prayed for such other reliefs and remedies available in the premises. This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502A. These two (2) adverse claims, MAC Nos. V-403 and V-404 were jointly heard in the Bureau of Mines, and also jointly considered in the appeal in the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by the Director of Mines reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office believes and so holds that the respondents have the preferential right over their "Finland-2", "Finland- 3", "Finland-5", "Finland-6", "Finland-8", "Finland-9", "A19", "A-20", "A-24", "A-25", "A-29" and "A-30" mining claims. Accordingly, the protests (adverse claims) filed by protestant Sierra Madre Trust should be, as hereby they are, DISMISSED. And that of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reads: IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by the appellant, Sierra Madre Trust is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Director of Mines dated November 6, 1969, affirmed. " The adverse claims of Sierra Madre Trust against Jusan Trust Mining Company and J and S Partnership were based on the allegation that the lode lease applications (LLA) of the latter "encroached and overlapped" the former's mineral claims, However, acting on the adverse claims, the Director of Mines found that, "By sheer force of evidence, this Office is constrained to believe that there exists no conflict or overlapping between the protestant's and respondents' mining claims. " And this finding was affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources thus: "Anent the first allegation, this Office finds that the Director of Mines did not err when he found that the twelve (12) claims of respondents Jusan Trust Mining Company and J & S Partnership did not encroach and overlap the eighteen (18) lode mineral claims of the appellant Sierra Madre Trust. For this fact has been incotrovertibly proven by the records appertaining to the case." Page | 1
It should be noted that according to the Director of Mines in his decision, "during the intervening period from the 31st day after the discovery [by the respondents] to the date of location nobody else located the area covered thereby. ... the protestant [petitioner herein] did not establish any intervening right as it is our findings that their mining claims do not overlap respondents' mining claims." After the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had affirmed the factual findings of the Director of Mines to the effect that there was no overlapping of claims and which findings were final and conclusive, Sierra Madre Trust should have kept its peace for obviously it suffered no material injury and had no pecuniary interest to protect. But it was obstinate and raised this legal question before Us: "May there be a valid location of mining claims after the lapse of thirty (30) days from date of discovery, in contravention to the mandatory provision of Section 33 of the New Mining Law (Com. Act No. 137, as amended)?" It also raised ancillary questions. We see no reason why We have to answer the questions in this petition considering that there is no justiciable issue between the parties. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining Law have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the questions will not materially serve the interests of the petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect.' In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly located, surveyed and registered." Finally, the petitioner also asks: "May an association and/or partnership registered with the Mining Recorder of a province, but not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, be vested with juridical personality to enable it to locate and then lease mining claims from the government?" Suffice it to state that this question was not raised before the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. There is also nothing in the record to indicate whether or not the appellees are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. For these reasons, even assuming that there is a justiciable issue between the parties, this question cannot be passed upon. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987 ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, -versusTHE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, respondents. 1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES EXERCISE AND PERFORM ADJUDICATORY POWERS AND FUNCTIONS. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. (See Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs. Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., G.R. No. 63558, May 19, 1987). 2. ID.; ID.; QUANTUM OF JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS DEFINED IN ITS ENABLING ACT. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasijudicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY. The extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree." Section 3 of this statute provides as follows: "National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree." 4. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; POWER TO RESCIND AVAILABLE ONLY TO INJURED PARTY; CASE AT BAR. Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed, under the general Civil Law, in view of petitioner's breach of its contract with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the option either to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of all installment payments (with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner. 5. REMEDIAL LAW; MOTIONS; DUE PROCESS; PRINCIPLE NOT VIOLATED WHERE PARTY WAS GIVEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ITS SIDE AND TO BE HEARD. We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the right to due process. This assertion lacks substance. The record shows that a copy of the order denying the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978, was duly served on counsel for petitioner, as evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy indicating that such service had been effected. But even if it be assumed, arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the petitioner, nevertheless the latter was not deprived of due process, for what the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. In the instant case, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side and to be heard on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion to dismiss; the claim of denial of due process must hence sound even more hollow.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS' DECREE (PD 957); SALE OF LOTS ON INSTALLMENT BASIS; ORIGINAL PERIOD OF PAYMENT DEEMED EXTENDED. To permit Antipolo Realty to collect the disputed amount in a lump sum after it had defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, would tend to defeat the purpose of the authorization to lot buyers to suspend installment payments. As the NHA resolution pointed out, "[s]uch must be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments." Upon the other hand, to condone the entire amount that would have become due would be an excessively harsh penalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust enrichment of the private respondent at the expense of the petitioner. FELICIANO, J.: By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract, including payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter Clause 17 reads: Clause 17. SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the beauty of the subdivision in line with the modern trend of urban development, the SELLER hereby obligates itself to provide the subdivision with: a) Concrete curbs and gutters b) Underground drainage system c) Asphalt paved roads d) Independent water system e) Electrical installation with concrete posts. f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall g) Developed park or amphi-theatre h) 24-hour security guard service. These improvements shall be complete within a period of two (2) years from date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER shall permit the BUYER to suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges until such time that such improvements shall have been completed. 1 On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed by and Page | 3
Inc. "evidently.73. had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would mean duplicity of suits. and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Petitioner further asserted that. as against the previous P. We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit. In an Order issued on 7 February 1978. Antipolo Realty again asserts that. the jurisdiction of the NHA was assailed. Once more. Mr. No. under Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell. the choice should fall on fan administrative agency]" ' (NFL v. Thereafter. Thus.. amendment splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts. In Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo. though to a limited extent only. the NHA had not only acted on a matter beyond its competence.g. retain all the prior installment payments made by the latter. said: In the fifties.e. the NHA denied the motion to dismiss and scheduled Case No. Tropical Homes. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was heard on 2 September 1977. . The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 by respondent NHA General Manager G. etc. Yuson. moved for the consolidation of Case No. Samar Mining Co. and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 932. et al. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . et al. Yuson and. 8 vs. Antipolo Realty.. the Court. the Court noted that 'between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court. had accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed i. De Guzman (113 SCRA 52. in 1984. petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the Office of the President which. the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge. representing installments which. through Mr. speaking for the Court. L-49051. who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. 428. 5 "without prejudice to petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy. dismissed the same through 6 public respondent Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. but that its counsel had 3 failed to attend the hearing. Justice Gutierrez. the unmistakeable trend has been to refer it to the former. and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered" (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocably. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.. the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under the following conditions: l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a statement of account for the monthly amortizations from November 1976 to the present. the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in corporations. . Antipolo Realty came to this Court with a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction. and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. In the present petition. 2123 for hearing. . in hearing the complaint of private respondent Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e. then pending before the NHA. but had also. as a consequence 4 thereof. 941 ). The Court in the earlier case of Ebon vs. "Increasingly. which was docketed as G. in restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in labor cases.. experience. m) No penalty interest shall be charged for the period from November 1976 to the date of the statement of account. observed that: There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts. 2123. a formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16.. citing precedents)." A motion for reconsideration was denied on 29 January 1979. In this era of clogged court dockets. Mr. subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion has become well nigh indispensable. Antipolo Realty alleged.R. Hon. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell. Rafael dela Cruz. Clave.994. without presenting any evidence. since that complaint involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell. National Housing 9 Authority. He also found that Antipolo Realty had in fact been served with notice of the date of the hearing. Inc. Mr. experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters. it could validly terminate its agreement with Mr. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. Eisma. Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell. This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11 December 1978. After hearing. Tobias. et al. in effect. 56 ). between September 1972 and October 1976. public transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution of labor management controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive.D. basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged." In addition. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA through a lettercomplaint dated 10 May 1977 which complaint was docketed in NHA as Case No. .between the lot buyers and the respondent. Page | 4 . The case was submitted for decision.. noted that the lawmaking authority. . 94 Phil. assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not authorized to perform.V. although it did not so expressly state in the law. the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor 7 Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction. the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge. and n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay the arrears 2 shown in the statement of account. 2123 with several other cases filed against it by other subdivision lot buyers. 127 SCRA 419. solely on the evidence presented by the complainant. On 2 October 1978. and eventually decided. vs. not in the NHA.. Chief Justice Teehankee. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had been denied due process of law since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled hearing." In an even more recent case. on 9 March 1979. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions.
and C. petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling. for what the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. was duly served on counsel for petitioner. that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner. otherwise. if not wholly. 957. the notice of cancellation based on the refusal to pay the s that were not due and demandable is also null and void. 14 But even if it be assumed. under the general Civil Law. In other words. the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. 10 In the exercise of such powers. or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. at his option. WHEREAS. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. in any case. 23. Monthly installments during the period of suspension of payment did not become due and demandable Neither did they accrue Such must be the case. (emphasis supplied. Such being the case. and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value . Thus. on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. broker or salesman. no question that under Presidential Decree No. and to pay real estate taxes. petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. 957. water systems lighting systems and other similar basic requirements. after due notice to the owner or developer. the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. arguendo. Consequently. Respondent informed complainant on November 1976 that the improvements have been completed. 17 Page | 5 . drainage. 957 which reads: Sec. (emphasis supplied. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub. that such notice had not been served on the petitioner. Unsound real estate business practices: B.) Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell. when private respondent had suspended payment of his monthly installments on his chosen subdivision lot. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite specific terms: SECTION 1. Indeed. let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. the claim of denial of due process must hence sound even more hollow. known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree. nevertheless the latter was not deprived of due process. with interest thereon at the legal rate. it is the latter who is vested with the option either to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of an installment payments (with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question. the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely. such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances. petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side and to be heard on a motion for reconsideration as well. exercisable only by our regular courts. operators. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function. desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. there is no sense in suspending payments. dealer. (emphasis supplied) Presidential Decree No. We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the right to due process. The NHA in its 9 March 1978 resolution ruled that the regular monthly installments under the Contract to Sell did not accrue during the September 1972 October 1976 period: [R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspend payment of his monthly installments until the improvements in the subdivision shall have been completed." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides as follows: National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree (emphasis supplied) The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute which provide: WHEREAS. numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners.In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. and not just on a motion to dismiss. This assertion lacks substance. broker or salesman. 13 in view of petitioner's breach of its contract with private respondent. 957.division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner. be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization and interests but excluding delinquency interests. the demand of respondent for complainant to pay the arrears due during the period of suspension of payment is null and void. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers. as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed. 16 We turn finally to the question of the amount of P16. 15 In the instant case.) The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the instant case are found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. Such buyer may. developer. sewerage.994. The record shows that a copy of the order denying the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978. Hence. as evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy indicating that such service had been effected. developer. the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner.73 which petitioner insists had accrued during the period from September 1972 to October 1976. If the suspension is lifted the debtor shall resume payments but never did he incur any arrears. just noted. dealer. and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads. developers. No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer. Neither did the NHA commit any abuse. the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements.
to condone the entire amount that would have become due would be an expressively harsh penalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust enrichment of the private respondent at the expense of the petitioner. Clearly. not the private respondent. the lot buyer should not be regarded as delinquent and as such charged penalty interest. [s]uch must be the case. the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. otherwise. albeit tardily. during which extended time private respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been paid. The NHA decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for the lengthening of the original contract period for payment of installments under the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months. 23 of Presidential Decree No.The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need of certification and amplification. To our mind. As the NHA resolution pointed out. by four (4) years and two (2) months) during which extended time (tacked on to the original contract period) private respondent buyer must continue to pay the monthly installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been paid. The suspension of installment payments was attributable to the petitioner. At the same time. 957. We think that such is the intent of the NHA resolution which directed that "[i]f the suspension is lifted. SO ORDERED. In the words of the NHA resolution. The NHA correctly held that no installment payments should be considered as having accrued during the period of suspension of payments. its obligations to its lot buyers under their Contracts to Sell. "never would [the buyer] incur any arrears.. the debtor shall resume payments" and that such is the most equitable and just reading that may be given to the NHA resolution. there is no sense in suspending payments.e. The tacking on of the period of suspension to the end of the original period precisely prevents default on the part of the lot buyer." Upon the other hand. To permit Antipolo Realty to collect the disputed amount in a lump sum after it had defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers. No pronouncement as to costs. would tend to defeat the purpose of the authorization (under Sec. the critical issue is what happens to the installment payments which would have accrued and fallen due during the period of suspension had no default on the part of the petitioner intervened." WHEREFORE. supra) to lot buyers to suspend installment payments. It should be recalled that the latter had already fulfilled. Page | 6 . the NHA resolution is most appropriately read as directing that the original period of payment in the Contract to Sell must be deemed extended by a period of time equal to the period of suspension (i.
Engr. however. 1966 to Narcisa A. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules reading: SEC. who has been occupying the lot. Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources. by Ordering Petitioner Niño and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto. Claravall thereupon moved to have the Order of Execution previously issued by the DENR-CAR amended. contested the award by filing a Petition Protest on December 23. Thus disposed the appellate court: WHEREFORE. Branch 6 of the Baguio RTC dismissed the petition of Niño et al. the Demolition Team of Baguio City and the Baguio City Police Station. the Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Review. the then-Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Autonomous Region (DENR-CAR). Baguio City. prompting Narcisa to file a complaint for ejectment before the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). FRANCISCO NIÑO. 1996. (Underscoring supplied) applies. vs. Claravall. xxxx SO ORDERED. Public respondent City Mayor Mauricio Domogan thru the Demolition Team and City Engineer s Office are hereby ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the amended order of execution issued by Oscar N. 10 (the lot) located at Saint Anthony Road. issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. with the assistance upon request of the City Sheriff of Baguio City. By Decision of December 11.R. The DENR-CAR also invoked Section 14 (now Section 10 (d)) of  Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Niño appealed the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court but he did not succeed. The Niño spouses later filed an Amended Petition by impleading Emmanuel Niño and Eurlie Ocampo as therein co-petitioners and the City of Baguio(hereafter petitioner) and Narcisa as therein additional respondents. Hamada.  (hereafter respondents) for lack of merit. EMMANUEL NIÑO. you are hereby enjoined to enforce the aforementioned order. JOSEFINA NIÑO. desisted. 1998 are hereby SET ASIDE. Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed. DECISION CARPIO MORALES. started demolishing the  houses of Niño and his herein co-respondents.    (Emphasis and The DENR-CENRO. by  Order of August 7. Atty. citing lack of jurisdiction over the City Sheriff of Baguio.: The Bureau of Lands awarded on May 13. the City Police Station. Francisco Niño (Niño). who later advised Niño that the DENR-CENRO would implement the Amended Order of Execution  on August 4. the officer shall not destroy. on orders of then Baguio City Police Officer-In-Charge (OIC) Donato Bacquian. Teofilo Olimpo of the DENR-CENRO. however. April 12. petitioners. in their earlier attempt to  enforce the Amended Order of Execution. 1997. 10. Placino (Narcisa) a parcel of land identified as Lot No. MAURICIO DOMOGAN. As amended. Niño and his wife Josefina Niño thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City against Guillermo Fianza. temporarily stopped upon the instructions of DENR-CENR Officer Guillermo Fianza. underscoring supplied)  On July 16. they filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules before the Court of Appeals. together with the Demolition Team of Baguio City and the Baguio City police. and EURLIE OCAMPO. which was granted. one of the herein respondents. the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Orders dated September 24.  (Underscoring supplied) Page | 7 . however. The decision of the Director of Lands dated November 11. pursuant to the provisions of Section 1844 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. Respondents Motion for   Reconsideration having been denied. xxxx (d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. concerning the demolition or removal of the structures made by petitioners until private respondent applied for a special order abovementioned with the proper court. Atty. Mayor Mauricio Domogan (hereafter petitioner). 1976. Execution of judgments for specific act. the Order of Execution addressed to the CENRO Officer read: WHEREFORE. Dominican-Mirador Barangay. 1976  having become final and executory. Claravall). Rolando Angara. and the Demolition Team of the City Government. Narcisa s counsel. 1993 directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the decision by ordering Petitioner Niño and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and  remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto. and ORLANDO GENOVE. THE CITY OF BAGUIO. J. the City Police Station. Edilberto Claravall (Atty. 2006. 2002. Atty. The MTCC dismissed Narcisa s complaint. 3077. holding that Sec. issued an Order of Execution dated February 1. 1975 before the Bureau of Lands. and the Demolition Team of the City Government to demolish or remove the improvements on the lot introduced by Niño. demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court.G. When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent. 161811. The demolition was. Orlando Genove (hereafter petitioner). 1997 and November 23. SO ORDERED. on petition of Narcisa. and further praying for damages. The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest by Order of November 11. respondents. The DENR-CAR denied the petition. No. and Police Officer Donato Bacquian challenging the Amended Order of Execution issued by the DENR-CENRO. 1997. later petitioned the DENR-CAR for the issuance of a Special Order authorizing the City Sheriff of Baguio. the Demolition Team of Baguio City headed by Engineer Orlando Genove and the Baguio City Police.
The petition fails. [w]hile the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve the disposition of public lands. . Alleging that respondents built their house without the required entry and building permits. National Housing Authority teaches: 2. . The Court of Appeals denied both parties  reconsideration by Resolution of December 17. for the first time. In support of the first ground. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession. if not wholly. (Underscoring supplied) There is. x x x the power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and turn over the possession of the land to the party adjudged entitled thereto. the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely. the present petition of the City of Baguio. Antipolo Realty Corporation v. 2003. petitioners raised before the appellate court. raising the following grounds: 1. motions for Hence. physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts. The rationale is evident. 2003. WHEREFORE. building. liberty or property without due process of law.Respondents filed before the appellate court an Ex-Parte Motion for  Reconsideration on January 9. (Underscoring supplied) In general. this is but in aid of making the proper awards. That an administrative agency which is clothed with quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of Execution is of no moment. 2003. No pronouncement as to costs. petitioners argued that the City Mayor may order  the demolition of a house without a special court order. In other words. . since the requirement in Sec. (Emphasis added) Consequently. on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such  agency. IN APPLYING SEC. and turn over possession of. nor shall any person be  denied the equal protection of the laws. . Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. . not appellate. Indeed. faulting the appellate court: 1. theories or arguments not brought out in the proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered by a  reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. IN RULING THAT A SPECIAL COURT ORDER IS NEEDED FOR THE DEMOLITION OF RESPONDENTS STRUCTURES. the power of the City Mayor to validly order the demolition of a structure constructed without a building permit pursuant to Sec. 10 (d). the power to determine who has the actual. for the first time. belongs only to the courts of justice and not to the Bureau of  Lands. however. invoked said section of the Local Government Code and respondents lack of building entry permits in their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to the National Building Code of the Philippines. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code to order the demolition or removal of an illegally constructed house. THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE CITY MAYOR HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THE DEMOLITION OF ILLEGALLY-BUILT STRUCTURES. it being settled that matters. Petitioners having. and Orlando Genove. the RTC having rendered the questioned decision in the exercise of its original. or structure within the period prescribed by law or ordinance and their allegation that respondents structures  were constructed without building permits were not raised before the trial court. SO ORDERED. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell social  unrest. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires does not lie. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW. jurisdiction. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In fine. THE HONORABLE COURT MISAPPLIED SEC. . Petitioners invocation of the City Mayor s authority under Sec. . the petition is DISMISSED. it was correctly  denied of merit. no explicit provision granting the Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over the Land Management Bureau) the authority to issue an order of  demolition which the Amended Order of Execution. Page | 8 3. Mayor Domogan (now a Congressman). is. alleging that some of the reliefs they  prayed for in their petition were left unacted upon. this Court overlooks the error in view of the  merits of respondents case. in substance. the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. Petitioners contention that the enforcement of the Amended Order of Execution does not need a hearing and court order which Sec. . instead of under Rule 41. it is the court sheriff which is empowered to remove improvements introduced by respondents on. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police public lands. 3. Petitioners too filed a  Motion for Reconsideration on January 28. While it is noted that respondent s appeal to the Court of Appeals was erroneously brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. this Court held:  2. RULE 39 of the RULES OF  COURT. IN ENTERTAINING RESPONDENTS  PETITION FOR REVIEW. . the lot to Narcisa. in their Motion for Reconsideration. 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court echoes the constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of life. . 10(d) RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT IN THIS CASE.
SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner). we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law  The ruleand must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. fixed the following retention limits. respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the  CARL. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.O.O. PONCE (OIC). 9. SO ORDERED. On April 27. also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The fundamental rule in administrative law is that. On September 14. Hence. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform s ruling that petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the government is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No. The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy. i. Their motion was denied. 09.O. It ruled that DAR A. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A. 9.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising.e. the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. 9. s. respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they  submitted in connection therewith. No. this petition. 1992. On December 4. On appeal. No.209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes. 162070.e.G. No.: This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. PUNO. 1987. does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A. dated September 19. petitioner submits that it issued DAR A. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE. the A. inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. they are not immune from judicial review. Series of 1993 is hereby DECLARED null and void. s. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A. void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government.O. and a maximum of 102. null and void for being violative of the Constitution. Petitioner ignored their request. series of 1993. J. s. 9. under  the Luz Farms doctrine.O. 1993. Masbate. respectively. s. 9. petitioner exempted 1. On February 4. which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL.A. 1993. petitioner. represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A. Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL.) No. Hence. No. In determining the area of land to be excluded. in an en banc decision in the case of Luz  Farms v. In view of the Luz Farms ruling. took effect. then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. sought to regulate livestock farms Page | 9    . On December 21.O. 9. 1993. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM.O. which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising. Respondents moved for reconsideration. Republic Act (R. No.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. ELLA T.O. 6657. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle- raising. be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned. and a ratio of 1.O. October 19. No.) No. The A.R. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock. pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the  government. while administrative rules and regulations have the  They may force and effect of law.O. their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program. In the case at bar. which declared DAR Administrative Order (A. No. in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature. premises considered. 2003 and February 4.O. the power to make rules and regulations. Petitioner s arguments fail to impress. Masbate. It declared DAR A. On December 27. respondents. 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. we find that the impugned A. 2005. poultry and swine. No. 1995. inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. the Office of the President affirmed the impugned  Order of petitioner DAR. DELIA T. respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as. this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. series of  1993. making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. 9. 1990. 2001. Secretary of DAR. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. On October 9. On June 10. DAR Administrative Order No. 1993. 9. However. 1993. was left for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue. 1994. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. series of 1993. vs. a new agrarian law. and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A. However. 2004.5635 hectares for infrastructure. 1988. The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A. SUTTON. SUTTON. poultry and swine as of June 15..O. the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A..O. DAR issued A. the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy. Garilao issued an  Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies  and the scope of their regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. On October 26. 1993. viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i. which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock.
A. inter alia. even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies. clearly does not apply in this case.  We stressed commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL. deepwells. the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to  With this significant commercial livestock. pumphouses. could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands. Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. modification. Lands devoted to raising of livestock. The assailed A. Again. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets.. The raising of livestock. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A. feedmill with grinders. which are arable yet still undeveloped. Thus. On the other hand. the petition is DISMISSED. swine and poultry. residential. conveyors. Specifically. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A. To be valid. However. it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. respectively. they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. the latter prevails. not an agricultural. Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. the term agricultural land does not include lands classified as mineral. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands. IN VIEW WHEREOF. swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. after the passage of the 1988 CARL. No. swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. Congress enacted R. The subsequent case of Natalia Realty. by  making a new law. Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. sprayers.O. elevated water tanks. not agricultural. anew that while Section 4 of R. 2004. Indeed. No. it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution.raising. petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. 2003 and February 4.  7881 which amended certain provisions of the CARL. poultry and swine have been classified as industrial. poultry and swine-raising. Petitioner DAR argues that. Moreover. dated September 19. are AFFIRMED. In Natalia Realty. Clearly.A. antipollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds. exhausts and generators. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL.O. In the case at bar. the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude. Page | 10 . Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. we find neither merit nor logic in this contention. the Court held that industrial. there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the  provisions of the Constitution. SO ORDERED. No pronouncement as to costs. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the  coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution. it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. v. and  other technological appurtenances. such as: animal housing structures and facilities. Inc.O. It is an industrial. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly  known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. activity.by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership.O. in issuing the impugned A. In sum. in Natalia Realty. drainage. forest. all lands exclusively devoted to livestock. commercial or industrial. DAR reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. mixers. A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. waterers and blowers. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.
F. D.A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false. Sia Bernas. Canon 3. Underscoring supplied. respondent further contends that neither he or his client Pascual has commenced any criminal action. dishonest.That on April 16.A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities simed (sic) at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.01 . inclusive of submarkings knowingly subverted and perverted the truth when he falsify certified (sic) and verified under oath in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article.. JR. It was only upon request of the NBI the he assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting an affidavit-complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant. J. That respondent Ramon B. A-4. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange (sic) or any other kind of commercial documents.000 pesos shall be imposed upon: 1. In his Supplemental Comment. 65646. G. I am hereto quoting verbatim. and certify that he cause the preparation of the foregoing pleading. which case was raffled to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. Jesus Cabarrus.. E. 1995.: On August 30.. shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.01. Complainant. a xerox copy of said complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annex B. the same legal issue in Civil Case No. and 2. 3. including the Supreme Court. subscribe under oath before Marie Lourdes T.. under oath. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR. DECISION TORRES. Jr. the Court of Appeals. an agency within the ambis (sic) and purview of the circulus (sic) of the Supreme Court prohibiting forum shopping. Rule 1. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION. the verification and certification of non-forum shopping which states: Ramon B. A. 172. 1996. undignified. Pascual. and 22.02. the Court of Appeals. he undertake to report to (sic) that the fact within Five (5) days from the notice to this notice (sic) to this Honorable Court. facilitated by forgery as gleaned from paragraph 15. respondent by Page | 11 3 2 . respondent and his counsel Jose Antonio Bernas caused the preparation and filing of a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document on April 11. import and meanoing (sic) of the allegation under 1-B of the instant complaint. D-2. That Jose Antonio Bernas. A-3. Respondents. OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. immoral or deceitful (sic) conduct. Pascual. In his Comment. filed and administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. CANON 10. Any person who. denominated as Civil Case No. the gravaman of the affidavit complaint of the respondent is forgery. with the intent to cause such damage. respondent Ramon B. B.. (three days before the filing of the aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic) Ave. on the basis of Annexes A.01 . Where verification-certification was placed under oath and was conveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of respondent in both cases at Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI. copies of said letter complaint are hereto attached and marked as Annexes (sic) C. 1996. A-5 and A-6. including the Supreme Court.A. September 24. to the damage of the third party. RTC. deceptive. Jr. the content of which are true to his personal knowledge and that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court. vs. JR. A-1. Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or the damage of another or who. depose and states: He is the plaintiff in this case. Likewise.01. HONEST. Rule 1. In his 1 complaint-affidavit dated August 12. Mr. the pertinent provisions of which are herein below quoted and a copy of said code is hereto attached and marked as Annex E. 1996. or with the intent to cause such damage. He emphasized that forum shopping only exist when identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple fora. Canon 10 of the code of Professional responsibility for Lawyers. wife of lawyer jose Antonio Bernas. blatant and deliberate violation of Art. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. would be appropriate. C. CANON 3 A. B. If he should learn that a similar action of (sic) proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court or any other Tribunal agency. or any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article. Jr. 1. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE. 16. 65646 is the same lawyer who instigated a criminal complaint at the NBI for forgery and respondents themselves conspired and confabulated with each other in facilitating and insuring the open. and left it to the NBI to determine whether the filing of an endorsement to the prosecutor. fraudulent. or any other tribunal or agency. D-1.That as early as August 14. 1996. who would determine probable caused.. Pascual. or any other Tribunal or agency. Pascual merely requested the NBI to assist in the investigation or prosecution. FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 1. Jr. respondent counsel. A photocopy of said complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annexex (sic) A.That contrary to the tenor. 172 of the Revised Penal Code which states: Art. C.A lawyer shall not engage in lawful. 65646 is fraud.02 . respondents Jose Antonio Bernas avers that he has not committed forum shopping because the criminal action is not an action that involves the same issue as those in the civil action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not yet been prosecuted in the criminal case. shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.That as stated in Annex B. CANON 1. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code of professional Resposibility. Contrary to Canon 1. misleading. 4634.That the cause of action relied upon by the respondents in Civil Case No. the test (sic) of Annex A-6.That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of public document. the counsel on record of the respondents in Civil Case No. Jose Antonio Bernas filed a written complaint at the NBI for the same cause of action which was reiterated in another letter submitting to the NBI standard specimen signitures dated October 1995. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated abetted and facilitated the perversion and subversion of truth in the said verification and certification of non-forum shopping.. Rule 3. filed before the Regional Trial Court in National Capital Region. No. FAIR. self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualified (sic) or legal services. a notary public in Makati City.C. D. that: He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court. 1997] JESUS CABARRUS. 65646. a verification and certification of non-forum shopping which was appended to a complaint for reconveyance of property and damages. complainant alleged as follows: A.The penalty of prison correctional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than p 5. DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OF (sic) STATEMENT OF FACTS. JOSE ANTONIO BERNAS.
(h) To perform such other related function as the secretary of Justice may assign from time to time. Revised Circular No. The filing of the civil case for conveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City does not preclude respondent to institute a criminal action. 28-91. Pascual. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those person responsible for defrauding his client. 157. whenever properly requested in the investigation of cases of administrative or civil nature in which the Government is interested. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure-which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as 6 possible. Bernas. viz: Section 1. 28-91. respondents approached two different for a in order to increase their chances 4 of obtaining a favorable decision or action. Act No. specifically section 1 hereof provides. Jesus Cabarrus. It renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what Atty. Explicitly. identification records of all person without criminal convictions. The NBI cannot be an agency contemplated by the circular. In this case.A. It is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. 28-91 must be so interpreted and applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular No. (c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal and other infromations for the benefit and use of the prosecuting and lawenforcement entities of the Philippines. Jr.counsel reiterates that the letter transmitted to the NBI cannot constitute an action or proceeding because the NBIs functions are merely investigatory and informational in nature. premises considered. (e) To extend its services. characteristics. a party to a case resort to forum shopping because by filling another petition involving the same essential facts and circumstances. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. As succinctly put it by R.. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding. Page | 12 . The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty. records of identifying marks. The rule allows the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal case without violating the circulars on forum shopping. tribunal and agencies referred to under Circular No. we find the administrative complaint bereft of merit and should be dismissed. declaratory or otherwise. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Adjunct to this. but to make binding orders or judgments. revised Circular No. the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED. Therefore. There is forum-shopping whenever. the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. (d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and law-enforcement officers and entities of the Government as well as the courts that may request its services. WHEREFORE. a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. 7 (g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crime laboratory and to conduct researches inn furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal investigation. there is no forum shopping to speak of Atty. After a careful scrutiny of the records. It cannot even determine probable cause. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice which shall have the following functions: (a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 28-91. The courts. upon its initiative and as public interest may require. whenever properly requested in the investigation or detection of crimes and other offenses. NBI has no prosecutorial functions or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting relief or remedy. It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. the function of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and informational in nature. and ownership or possession of all firearms as well as bullets fired therefrom. Bernas transgressed Circular No. as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum. SO ORDERED. 04-94 on forum shopping. merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate the the alleged fraud and 5 forgery committed by Mr. xxx. 157 . and administrative Circular No. (f) To undertake the instruction and training of representative number of city and municipal peace officers at the request of their respective superiors along effective methods of crime investigation and detection in order to insure greater efficiency in the discharge of their duties. or even grant any relief. as counsel of Mr. (b) To render assistance.
2000. hereby imposes the administrative penalty of SUSPENSION FROM AIRING/BROADCASTING any program on EMC Channel 27 for a period of seven (7) days which period shall commence immediately upon receipt of this Order. by the undersigned. while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program. denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be 9 enforced. 2001. operates and manages the UHF television station. According to the CA. television program or related publicity material shall be imported. The January 7. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner. the subject program was a publicity for the movie. Petitioner GMA Network. produced. -. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 18. 148579 : February 5. leased. Consequently. Even if that were so. and (2) newsreels. It is thus unenforceable since it has not been 12 filed in the ONAR. EMC Channel 27. On the other hand. Respondent. Clearly.G.. exported. 11 the same is yet to be effective. expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. It also filed a letterprotest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby. informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11. The only exemptions from the MTRCB's power of review are those expressly 6 mentioned in Section 7. review and examine all motion pictures. "Muro Ami: The Making" (which petitioner claims to be a public affairs program) was well within the purview of MTRCB's power of prior review.: Subject of this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the June 1 18. our resolution of this issue would not change. a cross between pure television news and newsrelated commentaries. INC. was not binding on petitioner. which provides for the penalties for the first. Inc. Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed in the now assailed June 18. 2000 2 order of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) which read:cra:nad In view thereof." did not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore within the power of review of MTRCB. The facts follow. DECISION CORONA." In adopting this finding.No motion picture. chanroblesvirtuallawlibary Memorandum Circular No. WHEREFORE. 98-17. at the same time. No pronouncement as to costs. insofar as it affirmed the public respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board's jurisdiction over "Muro Ami: The Making. the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. "Muro Ami. 2000. particularly Section 7 thereof. Inc. exhibited or broadcasted by television without prior permit issued by the BOARD after review of the motion picture. such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited 5 by the Philippine Government and/or departments and agencies. 2000. No. 2001 decision. pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. First. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. Petitioner. has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27. 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the January 7.described as a variety of news treatment. The Administrative Code of 1987. petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder. 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto. Hence. Hence. 1998 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB. v. chanroblesvirtuallawlibary The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated 4 December 15. analysis and/or exchange of opinions -. This power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and Regulations. Your failure to comply with this ORDER shall be construed by the BOARD as defiance on your part of a lawful order of the BOARD. which reads:cra:nad SECTION 7. particularly Section 3 thereof. J." is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the suspension order issued against petitioner GMA Network. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and. sold. SO ORDERED. distributed. However. 98-17 is hereby declared null and void. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD. television programs including publicity materials. 2007 GMA NETWORK. Memorandum Circular 98-17. copied. This Court has already ruled that a public affairs program -. Section 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen. second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to 10 exhibit. Page | 13 . television program or publicity material.is within the 8 MTRCB's power of review. On January 7.R. petitioner claims that "Muro Ami: The Making" was a public 7 affairs program. respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 3 1986. in effect. which was the basis of the suspension order. this recourse. The pivotal issues for our resolution are: (1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior to its broadcast by television and (2) whether Memorandum Circular No. the BOARD. we hold that "Muro Ami: The Making.
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM. 1985. Significantly. that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette. CRUZ. both on the original petition and on the instant motion. directly conferred by the Constitution. the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was 5 not supported by eight members of this Court. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? 3." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. One can think of many non-penal measures. when necessary. No.. and that. among others. the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees. MELQUIADES P. and indeed especially. however. To be valid. which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. " It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. at present. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. without its previous publication. Responding. and unless so published. unless it is otherwise provided. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or. or some of the people only.R. 2. petitioners. they ask the following questions: 1. and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding.ADA. as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his 6 separate concurrence in the original decision. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette. ET AL. TUVERA. In fact. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President. and that the publication must be 2 made forthwith in the Official Gazette. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. it was not so when it was "otherwise provided. We hold therefore that all statutes. The reason. this time to move for 1 reconsideration/clarification of that decision. This elicited a 4 Reply refuting these arguments. and.: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. DE LA CRUZ. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"? 2. he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published. is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication. that publication. that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative. The petitioners are now before us again. even in the courts of justice. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. they shall have no binding force and effect. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events. After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties. he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed. it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence. the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. did not have to be made in the Official Gazette. 1986 LORENZO M. What is meant by "publication"? 4. that publication means complete publication. An example. vs. and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD. Specifically. a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as anultra vires act of the legislature. declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: WHEREFORE. SARMIENTO. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication). (MABINI). The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule. HON. like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. or on any other date. INC. and t to the public as a whole. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual. The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows: 3 Page | 14 . Section 18. shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual. the legislative enactments of the government. this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. ABRAHAM F. which cannot in any event be omitted. TAÑ. RESOLUTION ART. which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate. including those of local application and private laws.. if he is a proper party. Publication is indispensable in every case. on the merits. JUAN C. HON. Where is the publication to be made? 5. In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General. J. L-63915 December 29. the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application. respondents. but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law. that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself. in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President. In the decision of this case on April 24." and this certainly applies to. which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. When is the publication to be made? Resolving their own doubts." as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. of the Rules of Court. ETC.G. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or. we have come to the conclusion and so hold. like a law on prescription. under Rule 3. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. JOAQUIN VENUS.
This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed. need not be published. Parenthetically. This is not even substantial compliance. in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. There is that possibility. to say the least. no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. say. to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication. is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. This was the manner. a presidential decree undeniably of general 7 applicability and interest. those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. incidentally. even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.. that we do not need to examine at this time. to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. have a wider readership. This is a matter. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere. At any rate. We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Page | 15 . and we have no information that it exists. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic. as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature. deep secrets. That is not our function. There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette. SO ORDERED. and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. to cause its publication as required. the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree. of course. One reserved his vote and another merely acknowledged the 11 need for due publication without indicating where it should be made. say. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. "with Secretary Tuvera"). Undoubtedly. Consequently. with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners. although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive. the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available. the supposed date of effectivity. its whereabouts (e. As far as we know. We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible. WHEREFORE. the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. Accordingly. however. they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.g. That function belongs to the legislature. the title of such decree. though. All presidential decrees must be published. was "published" by the Marcos administration. with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975. newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating. considering its erratic releases and limited readership. it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval. or as soon thereafter as possible. However. Finally. or on another date specified by the legislature. no publication is required of the instructions issued by. it obviously has not yet been published. through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. If it does. and deserves no further comment. including even.Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Coming now to the original decision. the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. The trouble. Although they have delegated the power of legislation. it is true that only four justices were 8 categorically for publication in the Official Gazette and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently 9 10 informed. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. that is. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law. It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote. This is once again an open society. and come out regularly. The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code. for whatever reason. we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code. be published in full in the Official Gazette.
hearing thereof was started before Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo and Hearing Officer Jorge Benedicto. relying on the provision of Section 25. series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. No. overtime and separation pay. namely.R. but said court certified the case to us. the court dismissed the case. De Veyra. 20-A. No. petitioner-appellee. MARDO. and SIA SENG. the court rendered a decision holding that Republic Acts Nos. ETC. without being paid separation pay. which certified the case to us. 1241. As prayed for. In G. L-15138 July 31. No. and CRESENCIO ESTAÑO. 997. respondents-appellants.. L. for which service he was not paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and for Sundays and legal holidays) and vacation leave pay. plaintiff-appellant.R.. filed their answer and. did not repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts of first instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims arising from violations of labor standards. petitioners-appellees. for which service she was underpaid and was not given overtime. x---------------------------------------------------------x G. as well as vacation and sick leave pay. the records of the case were referred to Regional Labor Administrator Angel Hernando for issuance of Page | 16 VICENTE ROMERO. No. sick and maternity leave pay filed by the same plaintiff (appellant) against the same defendants-appellees). 26826)). No. L-16781 July 31. No. L-16781. claiming to have been their driver from June 17. Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. for recovery of alleged unpaid wages. vs. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. ATANACIO A. 997 and 1241. 20-A is null and void and therefore. ATANACIO A. 759) praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer from proceeding with the case. BARRERA. From this decision. MACARIO TAN. overtime and separation pay. issues having been joined. 2 of the Department of Labor a complaint (Wage Case No.R. in relation to Republic Act No. L-12249. Acting on said motion.) which was dismissed for lack of merit in our resolution of July 7. No. From this order. on the ground that they have no jurisdiction to entertain the same. vs. as it involves only questions of law. R. 1955. respondents Hearing Officer and Gonzales interposed the present appeal now before us. 20-A and on our resolution in the case of NASSCO v. et al. and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. series of 1956. L-16660 July 31. and MARIANO PABILIARE. At the date set for hearing the latter did not appear despite due notice to him and counsel. 1957. regional offices of the Department of labor have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards or working conditions. She prayed for judgment on the amount due her for the same plus damages. insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages. 20-A. for the reason that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. 218. appellant Raganas appealed to the Court of Appeals. 218. From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. R-5535) against appellees Sen Bee Trading Company. in Manila. a decision was rendered by the Hearing Officer in favor of Romero. Answers were then filed and the case was heard. as well as Executive Order No. empowering them to adjudicate the complaint. series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. C. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him. granted the writ of prohibition making permanent the preliminary injunction previously issued. vs. The latter file their separate motions to dismiss the petition. 20-A and Executive Order No. 997. Vicente B. Villavieja for respondents-appellants. et al.. as amended by Republic Act No. to restrain the hearing officers from proceeding with the disposition of the case. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed. etc. 1961 CHIN HUA TRADING COMPANY. Upon his petition.R. JORGE BENEDICTO. 1961 FRED WILSON & CO. 3 of the Department of Labor. 218. defendantsappellees. etc. Whereupon.G. J.R. Said motions to dismiss were denied by the court. L-17056 July 31. a preliminary injunction was issued by the court. under Reorganization Plan No. respondentsappellees. 1952 to January 11. and SERGIO TAN. and LAO KANG SUY. 874) against Chin Hua Trading Co. L-15377 July 31. 1956 to October 31. Chin Hua Trading. as amended by Republic Act No. filed an answer. Macario Tan and Sergio Tan. issued a writ of preliminary injunction. 196-W) against Sia Seng... May 6. are here treated together in this single decision because they present but one identical question of law. plus attorney's fees. Upon receipt of said complaint. the claimant and the hearing officers appealed to the Court of Appeals. a complaint (RO 3 Ls. 1961 and Gonzales to answer and. No.R. No. 997 and 1241. and there is pending before the regional office of the Department of Labor. L-15377. INC. is invalid or unconstitutional. the validity of Reorganization Plan No. MELITON C. claiming that she was employed by appellees as a seamstress from June 5. a claim for separation vacation.R.R. To said complaint. Before trial of the case could be terminated. Romero was allowed to present his evidence. improper venue. 1947 to June 4.R. Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. et al. PARDUCHO. Chin Hua Trading. as prayed for. x---------------------------------------------------------x G. as Manager and Assistant Manager thereof. vs. 20-A issued pursuant thereto. Thereafter. x---------------------------------------------------------x G. as Reorganization Plan No. The question of venue was also dismissed for being moot. etc. vs. however. 1241. In G. appellant Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint (Civil Case No. SEN BEE TRADING COMPANY. ANGEL HERNANDO ETC. appellees filed a motion to dismiss.R. 1958. the same having been already raised and decided in a petition for certiorari and prohibition previously filed with this Court in G. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong. Sia Seng. 1961 BILL MILLER. (G. v.R. petitioner-appellee. Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. Case No. L-15138. 1961 NUMERIANA RAGANAS. . L-14007 (Mardo. No. on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear the case as it involves a money claim and should. 3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to file an answer.. respondents-appellants. Thereafter. and MANUEL GONZALES. Resurreccion for Paciano C. 3 of the Department of Labor. 1958. respondents-appellants. In G. a complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1. x---------------------------------------------------------x G. L-16660. 20-A be filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor. Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 1957). Upon the latter's motion for execution. on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Arca.: These appeals. although originating from different Courts of First Instance. respectively. He prayed for judgement for the amount due him as separation pay plus damages. it being argued that pursuant to Republic Acts Nos. In G. Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition (Civil Case No. MARDO. After due hearing the court rendered a decision holding that Reorganization Plan No. as implemented by Executive Order No. petitioner-appellant. No. The court then required the Hearing Officer petitioner-appellee.
1959. 20-A is valid. in enacting Republic Act No. is a new conferment of power to the Department of Labor not theretofore exercised by it. underpayment. 997. And the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. which is hereunder quoted: 25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law. but action thereon was deferred until the case is decided on the merits. VII of the Constitution). Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 41954) to restrain respondent hearing officer from proceeding with the case." Said motion to dismiss having been denied by respondent Hearing Officer Meliton Parducho. amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997. After hearing. of the Rules and Regulations No. on the ground that said regional office "being purely an administrative body. appealed directly to us from this decision. vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help. the court rendered a decision declaring that "by the force of Section 6 of R. or functions which may not be necessary. Inc. et al. As prayed for. the court granted a writ of preliminary injunction. as enjoined by Section 48. Petitioner Fred Wilson & Co. And so we held in Corominas et al. in spite of the fact that the decision sought to be enforced by appellee Romero was rendered by a hearing officer who had no authority to render the same.(Sec. Br. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. No. separation pay. from these to the officials to be appointed or offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan. 1961). Sia Seng filed his answer questioning the validity of the rules and regulations issued under the authority of Reorganization Plan No. 20A. offices. then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government. inter alia. separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers. 1. petitioner Fred Wilson & Co. that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as those sought to be enforced in these proceedings. the latter was empowered (2) To abolish departments.A. (c) all cases for unpaid wages. judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. 997. It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion. on the ground that it states no cause of action. Romero filed with the Court of First Instance of Isabela a petition for mandamus (Case No.A. . or to take away from these their jurisdiction and transfer said jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under the Reorganization Plan.. Art.A. Under this provision. The specific legal provision invoked for the authority of the regional offices to take cognizance of the subject matter involved in these cases is paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of theExecutive Branch of the National Government (See Section 3 of R. 1241. underpayment. that Reorganization Plan No. the remedy 1 is to file a complaint in the proper court. It is true that in Republic Act No. or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service. authority. Respondents Hearing Officer and Pabillare filed answer and the case was heard. as incident to the performance of administrative 2 functions. June 30. when he was summarily dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. He also claimed that during his employment he was not paid for overtime rendered by him. obviously refer merely to administrative. It is evident.". But in so doing. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorariand prohibition. Vicente Area. the regional offices have been given original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law. vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help. 1 of the Labor Standards Commission. 1241. separation pay. and cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages. 20-A. which plainly did not include the creation of courts. as amended by R. If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions. overtime. 1957 in National Shipyards Steel Corporation v. it was not the intention of Congress. among others. activities. overtime. had no compulsory power to settle cases under (b) and (c) above. No. overtime. Appellant Sia Seng urges in his appeal that the trial court erred in not dismissing the petition. 20-A.R. nor jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim sought to be recovered in the action. L-14837 and companion cases. the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt. (Emphasis supplied. v. No. with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. of May 6.) But these "functions" which could thus be created. . respondent Regional Labor Administrator to forthwith issue the corresponding writ of execution.R. The question thus presented by these cases is whether this is valid under our Constitution and applicable statutes. Labor Standards Commission. from October 1947 to February 19. as amended by R. an executive body. alleging that petitioner engaged his services as Chief Mechanic. insofar as it vests original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims (to the exclusion of regular courts of justice) on the Labor Standards Commission or the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor. After hearing. agencies. (G.A. Sia Seng and Regional Labor Administrator Hernando appealed to us... The Commission was not authorized to create courts of justice. Air conditioning Department. Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. L-12249). From this decision of the Court of First Instance. to authorize the transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice. 997. In G. overtime. separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers. (b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions. No. only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the 3 courts. Hernando. 3 of the Department of Labor a complaint (IS-2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co. except the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation law. as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice any Page | 17 . be declared null and void and unconstitutional. Thus. has no power. the only authority it had being to mediate merely or arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing.said writ of execution. Inc. and in failing to hold that Reorganization Plan No. however. In case of refusal by a party to submit to such settlement. Inc. It follows that the questioned reorganization Plan No. refused to issue the writ of execution and ordered a re-hearing. 1241). 20-A was deemed approved by Congress when it adjourned its session in 1956' (Res. and praying. and . 196-W. No. As a consequence. The Legislature could not have intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission. being the officer charged with the duty of issuing the same. the Department of Labor. 20-A. which created the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission. therefore. No. and functions.. To this petition. respondent Regional Labor Administrator filed a motion to dismiss. L-17056. 20-A was not validly passed as a statute and is unconstitutional. believing that Sia Seng should be given a chance to present his evidence. G. the court rendered a decision ordering. and unpaid wages. II-35) praying that an order be issued commanding respondent Regional Labor Administrator to immediately issue a writ of execution of the decision in Wage Case No. if they are to be valid. not judicial functions. unpaid wages. . Congress is well aware of the provisions of the Constitution that judicial powers are vested 'only in the Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may establish'. Plan No. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him for such overtime and separation pay.R. as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited.
directing the Regional Labor Administrator to issue a writ of execution of the order of the Regional Office No. and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other. independent of the matter of delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier in this opinion). vs.R. because of weakness or indifference. 997. in effect. Under the first. Shreveport. invoked in favor of this argument reads as follows: SEC. consent or approval is to be manifested by silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution. 77 L. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by the President during the Second Session of the Third Congress shall be deemed approved after the adjournment of the said session. On the basis of the foregoing considerations. (Sec. SO ORDERED. (c) The order of dismissal issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu appealed from in case G. ed 175. together with the objections. emanating from the lack of authority of the Reorganization Commission has been cured by the nondisapproval of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A by Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. after such reconsideration. Art. 42 P. G. be presented to the President. in one of the cases. as amended. VI). under our Constitution. Furthermore. likewise. No. if Congress is so disposed. except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. modification thereof. G. (e) In case G. Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any measure. If he approves the same. Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. 1957. It is." In either case. 7th ed. but if not. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed. 997. to preserve the control of the legislature and its share in the responsibility for the adoption of proposed 4 regulations. L-16781 is hereby affirmed. but is in fact an act of Congress itself. No. insofar as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him. a regular statute directly and duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers in the mode provided in the enabling act. (Chinese Flour Importers Assoc. (d) In case G. pursuant to the abovequoted provision. No.R. exercising its delegated powers. July 12. No. The said plan of reorganization or any modification thereof may. nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of Congress. Every bill passed by the Congress shall. L-17056. Such a procedure would constitute a very dangerous precedent opening the way. is invalid and of no effect. 1951. the contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate action by each House of Congress. (b) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila questioned in case G. transmitted the same to Congress on February 14. is but a technique adopted in the delegation of the rule-making power. If. Surigao Consolidated vs. as that word is commonly used and understood. he shall sign it. San Diego. for under it. Collector of Internal Revenue G. is already one of the strongest among constitutional heads of state. VI of the Constitution). Constitutional Limitations. in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after adjournment. be approved by Congress in a concurrent Resolution within such period. Jur 921-922. It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted Reorganization Plan No.S. No. without costs. L-15138 is hereby affirmed. 21-[a]. Art. the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. said plan. p. 20-A is not merely the creation of the Reorganization Commission. two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill. vs. 2. which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it.R. in turn. we hold ad declare that Reorganization Plan No. A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is in distinct contrast to the latter. without costs. L-5692. the same shall become a law in like manner as if he has signed it. L-4465. to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered. unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return. he shall return it with his objections to the House where it originated.R. This ruling does not affect the resolution of this Court in the case of National Steel & Shipyards Corporation v. 287 U.R." (Cooley. real head of the Government. as seems to be the impression expressed in one these cases. 249. shall be deemed approved after the expiration of the seventy session days of the Congress following the date on which the plan is transmitted to it.R. before it becomes a law. and . and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. the section.R. if given the effect suggested in counsel's argument. By specific provision of the Constitution No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its passage by the National Assembly (Congress).S.. 77.) But it is urged. 1954. is a member of Parliament). 3.R. is hereby reversed and the preliminary injunction at first issued by the trial court is revived and made permanents without costs. No. (Sec. considering that the said case refers to a claim before the Workmen's Compensation Commission. The procedure has ever been intended or utilized or interpreted as another mode of passing or enacting any law or measure by the legislature. is hereby reversed. L-15377 is set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. 20. the decision rendered after hearing by the Court of First Instance of Manila. No. To sanction such a procedure will be to strike at the very root of the tri-departmental scheme four democracy. the procedure outlined in Section 6(a) herein before quoted. In a sense. U. L-12249. argued that Reorganization Plan No.. WHEREFORE (a) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio involved in case G. the President would propose the legislative action by action taken by Congress. and the question upon its final passage shall be taken immediately thereafter. Even in the United States (in whose Federal Constitution there is no counterpart to the specific method of passaging laws prescribed in Section 21 of our Constitution) and in England (under whose parliamentary system the Prime Minister. dated May 6. and Johnson vs. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No.) (Emphasis supplied. Price Stabilization Board. to eventual abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive who. L-16660. Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. 1956.other agency of the Government. and those of the plan or plans or modifications of any plan or plans to be submitted after the adjournment of the Second Session. It is contrary to the "settled and well-understood parliamentary law (which requires that the) two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations. Page | 18 . without costs. as amended. that the defect in the conferment of judicial or quasi-judicial functions to the Regional offices. without costs. 187). 20-A to the President who. and with the requirement presentation to the President. cited in 11 Am. it shall be sent. either House by simple resolution disapproves the reorganization plan or any. and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered on its journal. would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the Constitution. March 5. which exercised quasi-judicial powers even before the reorganization of the Department of Labor. 20-A. It is now contended that. unless between the date of transmittal and the expiration of such period. dismissing the complaint for annulment of the proceedings before the Regional office No. No. Arca et al.
SP No. Quibuloy. chanroblesvirtuallawlibary Without issuing a ruling on petitioner's motion. Petitioner. Pampanga in deciding DARAB Case No. petitioner filed his answer assailing Quibuloy's personality to bring suit. He cited Section 1. The events leading to this petition for review on certiorari stemmed from an 3 agrarian dispute before the PARAD. 147525 : February 26. the provincial adjudicator set the case for hearing on May 22. A special civil action of certiorari is an independent action. cra Just before the decision was rendered. petitioner or his counsel failed to appear. Rule III of the 1989 Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (1989 DARAB Rules). We deny the petition. 1990. Thereafter. petitioner comes to us with practically a rehash of the issues already raised in the CA. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE [PARAD] OF PAMPANGA IS CORRECT IN DECIDING DARAB CASE NO. neither petitioner nor his counsel attended the hearing. On the said date. Under the 1989 DARAB Rules. RULE III OF THE  DARAB REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE. The provincial adjudicator was sufficiently convinced that Quibuloy's allegations were true and correct. 2000 2 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. v. hence the motion was 5 submitted for resolution. As his defense. resort to certiorari is precluded. In this case. raising the question of jurisdiction where the tribunal. IV. Instead of answering the complaint. it has been settled that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal lost by the party entitled thereto 12 especially if the right of appeal was lost through negligence. that is.: Under review are the January 14. It stressed that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. On the first assigned error. board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. He contended that presentation of a certification from the BARC. 3676) OR ANY DOCUMENT TO SHOW HER AUTHORITY TO ACT AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE SAME. Respondents. II. cra Instead of immediately appealing from the adjudicator's decision. Pampanga. 203-P-90 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON THE BASIS OF THE SELFSERVING AFFIDAVIT OF THE LATTER AND HER LONE WITNESS CONSIDERING HER FAILURE TO PRESENT THE TITLE OF THE LAND IN QUESTION (TCT NO. Since it is Page | 19 13 . the dispute was ordered submitted for decision. PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION OFFICE OF PAMPANGA andMARIA QUIBULOY. he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of 14 law. Thus. III. attesting that the dispute had been submitted to it for mediation or conciliation without any success of settlement. Petitioner also offered unsubstantiated denials of Quibuloy's charges. J. that the adjudicator exercised his powers in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostilities. The CA dismissed petitioner Bonifacio Espinoza's petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the provincial adjudicator of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Office (PARAD) of San Fernando. When the remedy of appeal is available but is lost due to petitioner's own negligence or error in the choice of remedies. It is evident that the CA acted on the petition properly. Again. 3676. San Fernando. 8 4 1 WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE [PARAD] OF PAMPANGA IS CORRECT IN PROCEEDING WITH DARAB CASE NO. Even if. 203-P-90. 1991." It reiterated the well-settled rule thatcertiorari lies only in cases of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. cra A petition forcertiorari was never meant as a mode of reviewing errors of judgment committed by an inferior tribunal. an aggrieved party may appeal the decision of a provincial adjudicator to the Adjudication Board within 15 days from receipt. certiorari may be availed of. 203-P-90 WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS. No. the 1989 DARAB Rules exempted parties residing in 15 non-adjoining barangays from presenting the BARC certification. The hearing on the motion to dismiss was set on November 7. providing for conciliation proceedings before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) prior to initiating the case. The appellate court dismissed the petition as "unavailing and vacuous. to wit: I. he concluded that the provincial adjudicator could not take cognizance of the agrarian dispute due to Quibuloy's failure to present the required certificate. was a jurisdictional requirement. Now. The ultimate purpose of such action is to keep an inferior tribunal within the bounds of its 11 jurisdiction or relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts.FIRST DIVISION G. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER'S ANSWER TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT IN DARAB CASE NO. On that note. 203-P-90 WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE SAME. 1994 decision and June 01. it must be shown that the adjudicator acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. petitioner allowed the reglementary period to lapse. petitioner moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Thus. Accordingly. in the greater interest of substantial justice. A complaint for ejectment was filed against petitioner by private respondent Maria V. petitioner allowed the appeal period to lapse and instead filed a petition for certiorari in the CA roughly three months after the assailed decision was rendered. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS CORRECT IN DECIDING DARAB CASE NO. chanroblesvirtuallawlibary As correctly found by the appellate court. Thereafter. Quibuloy was allowed to present her evidence ex6 parte. he denied allegations of nonpayment of rents and non-tillage of the land for lack of knowledge and information to form a belief as to the veracity thereof. 203-P-90 WITHOUT FIRST COMPLYING WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN SECTION 1. She alleged that petitioner had reneged on his obligations as tenant to pay the rent and till the subject landholding.R. V. there is no showing that errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion were committed by public respondent. as co-owner and administratrix of three parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 502 UDK. WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA's] DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 9 AND DENIAL OF [PETITIONER'S] MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS PROPER. or with grave 10 abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 2007 BONIFACIO ESPINOZA. DECISION CORONA. he decided the case against 7 petitioner.
on the fourth assignment of error. Here. petitioner failed to do any of these. Sadly. chanroblesvirtuallawlibary While there may have been a technical lapse on the part of the adjudicator in disposing of the motion to dismiss. Costs against petitioner. Page | 20 . It is now too late for him to dispute the adjudicator's decision. petitioner submitted his answer after the case was submitted for decision. While the 1989 DARAB Rules provides that the non-answering respondent (petitioner) may be allowed to belatedly file his answer. the former was not required to present the BARC certification before the adjudicator taking cognizance of the agrarian dispute. Lubao. administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are not bound by technical rules followed in courts of law. Considering the technical flexibility afforded to agrarian adjudicators.the same 17 is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari . Pampanga while petitioner stayed in San Agustin. the order may easily be construed as a denial of the motion to dismiss. it cannot be overemphasized that only errors of jurisdiction may be reviewed by the CA in a petition for certiorari . WHEREFORE. subject to the essential requirements of administrative due process. Lubao. Lastly. Moving on to the third assignment of error. the assailed acts of the adjudicator did not amount to a grave abuse of discretion justifying a writ of certiorari . the provincial adjudicator did not err in entertaining the dispute notwithstanding the absence of the BARC certification. to be able to expeditiously ascertain the facts of the agrarian 16 dispute." cra In sum. What would have been the prudent recourse under the rules was to submit an answer immediately. Pampanga. Needless to say. we hold that petitioner's answer was indeed filed out of time. the petition failed to prove that the CA committed any reversible error in denying petitioner's petition for certiorari as well as his motion for reconsideration. On the second issue. The adjudicator is given enough latitude. the petition is hereby DENIED.not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision . it also provides that the answer should be filed before the matter is submitted for decision. participate in the hearing and appeal an adverse decision.undisputed that Quibuloy resided in San Nicolas 1ST. "Where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision .
and whose life or liberty is at stake. failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. ID. that. While the admissions of confessions of the prisoner. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. petitioner.00. should he fail in this. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure. so that a maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment. was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle. to remain silent. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Thus. which precisely is the function of habeas corpus.. in asporting the motor vehicle above-described. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA... who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guarantee. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence. Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita".. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION. ID. VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL IS JURISDICTIONAL BAR.1äwphï1. No. Charlie Doe and Paul Doe.. REQUIREMENTS OF WAIVER. Pressure which operates to overbear his will. BASIS THEREOF. PRECEPT." fully echoed in Section 1. Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio. Dy Sun Hiok y Lim. ID. ID. ID. ID. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner thereof. ID. Rule 115." This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial. Therefore. Roger Chavez. Justice Harlan warned that "the constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and the foresighted. if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation. the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.. 5.. to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant. a waiver must be certain and unequivocal. in reality. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a . or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient... it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. and to entrap him into fatal contradictions which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. Because. Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November. 1968 person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction.G. one (1) Thunderbird car. ID. Navarro. the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void. HABEAS CORPUS AS REMEDY WHERE THERE IS BREACH. ID. An accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.S. the accused conspired. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. too. which reaffirms the rule that the constitutional prescription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity. Accused were the following: Petitioner herein. as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person". vs. it may be the product of unintentional statements. and to give testimony regarding the offenses which they were charged. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth P22. MEANING. such waiver follows only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez". vs.. ID. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with. unfettered exercise of his own free. in Quezon City.. 1962. NATURE AND PURPOSE THEREOF. 7. and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. the temptation to press the witness unduly. ID. SANCHEZ.: The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled. of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury. "To be effective. have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence... and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law. it is his right to forego testimony.. ACCUSED DISTINGUISHED FROM ORDINARY WITNESS. The indictment in the court below the third amended information upon which the judgment of conviction herein challenged was rendered. with Plate No. the defendant shall be entitled to be exempt from being a witness against himself." So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court". ID. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.. it secures to a defendant of valuable and substantive right.. Motor No. Edgardo P.. 1. ID..200. pleaded not guilty. ID. and as having been adopted in the Philippines "to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations. ORIGIN. all the accused. BILL OF RIGHTS. Tañada and Fernando take note of U. to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which 1 resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. CONCEPT OF COMPULSION. understandably. ID. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him. The Supreme Court of the United States thru Mr. the ease with which the question put to him may assume an inquisitorial character.R. of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. For. unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted. A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the course of the proceedings due to failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual. and intelligently. directly or indirectly. 8. disable him from making a free and rational choice. 3. he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief. ID. ID. Habeas Corpus is a high prerogative writ. with intent of gain. H9YH143003. respondents. L-29169 August 19. The guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but the capability of abuse. 2.. it is mandatory." It is in this context that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern.ñët Page | 21 ROGER CHAVEZ. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonist that the states." 6. with one accord. Compulsion as it is understood does not necessarily connote the use of violence. ID. an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. An old Philippine case speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United States". and willingly made." 4. The writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. Rules of Court where.. ID. to push him into a corner. There is his prayer. on habeas corpus. in all criminal prosecutions. The privilege against self-incrimination is based on the constitutional injunction that: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Upon arraignment. WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION. Lorenzo 2 Meneses alias"Lory" Meneses. genuine will. when freely and voluntarily made. ID. made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law.. J. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. Peter Doe. ID. made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. except the three Does who have not been identified nor apprehended.
as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez. xxx xxx xxx I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this criminal case are those only listed in the information. FISCAL GRECIA: I am not making him as state witness. FISCAL: We are ready to call on our first witness. It is really surprising that at this stage. the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me to confer with my client. trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City. But surely. because it will incriminate my client. COURT: The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to confer and explain to his client about the giving of his testimony. CRUZ: And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the accused. COURT: The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his crossexamination of this witness.On July 23. COURT: [after the recess] Are the parties ready? . CARBON: . For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet whatever testimony this witness will bring about. ATTY. without my being notified by the Fiscal. 1963. Roger Chavez. is here reproduced:. Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate him. CARBON: On the ground that I have to confer with my client. ATTY. What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him. CARBON: I submit. If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him. COURT (To the Fiscal): MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez by making [him a] state witness?. COURT: As per understanding. The trial opened with the following dialogue. xxx xxx xxx ATTY. COURT: On what ground. I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness. This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the information. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]: I am quite taken by surprise. Page | 22 Your Honor. I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing that it is only at this very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the prosecution. I object. COURT: That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and will give them time within which to prepare for their cross-examination of this witness. ATTY. ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: . This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the prosecution is something so sudden that has come to the knowledge of this counsel. I therefore move for postponement of today's hearing. counsel? . I object. counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witnessstand. counsel. which for the great bearing it has on this case. I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the prosecution this morning after I have explained to him the consequences of what will transpire. my client is being presented as witness for the prosecution. COURT: The parties may proceed. ATTY. FISCAL GRECIA: Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused]. with this move of the Fiscal in presenting him as his witness. ATTY. CARBON: As a matter of right.
00-check aforesaid on condition that it should not be cashed immediately as there were not enough funds therefor. As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City. So Sumilang got P9. After .' COURT: That is premature. by trickery to run away with the car.00 and P22. At Eugene's. Sumilang and Chavez.000.00 to Sumilang because P6. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]: WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT: This witness.000. Thereafter.00 from his mother and another P4.000. already lent Romeo Vasquez P3. an agent of the Pasay City Mayor. found that it was gone. Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment. It was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor. Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee.00. Dy Sun Hiok the vendor. they went to see a lawyer notary public in Quezon City.00 cash and a golf set worth P800. it states: 'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence.000.00. That check was exhibited in court. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the plan. on November 12. Chavez returned P4. Dy Sun Hiok. on one occasion. who disappeared after he left on the pretext of buying cigarettes. Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta. Much later.00 agents commission at the expense of the buyer. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star. in whose name the car was registered. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez by "Fiscal Grecia". Baltazar and Cailles agreed to give the money the nextday as long as the check would be left with them and Sumilang would sign a promissory note for P10. Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station. Baltazar later informed Sumilang that Chavez picked up the money the next day. Came the judgment of February 1. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez. Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money. Chavez said that it could be held for him with a down payment of P10. Sumilang and Chavez then went to Pasay City to see a certain Mario Baltazar. Asistio handed to Sumilang P1. Asistio would then register it. On November 14. On the 14th of November. on October 1. He immediately gave P6. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION ROGER CHAVEZ.The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness. He also sent a check. a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. driving a Thunderbird car. and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto. COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.000. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused know what the prosecution events to establish by calling this witness to the witness stand. a Chinese. The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a price between P20. But Sumilang said that he had changed his mind about buying a new car. The information alleges conspiracy. they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin.00 was enough for the deposit. sell it to a third person for a profit. 1äwphï1. a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. 3 Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase price (P21. took the wheel for a while. the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant.000. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. There. counsel. Chavez.000. Baltazar gave the money after verifying the authenticity of the note. About the end of October or at the beginning of November.000. again left never to return.000. may be condensed as follows: In the last week of September. corroborated in part by Asistio. Ricardo Sumilang's version.000. ATTY. Instead. 1962. intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery. Sumilang sent Chavez to Baltazar and Cailles. Then.000. who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who. 1962.00 on the same Buick car. went to the house of a certain Nena Hernaez de los Reyes who wrote out a check for P5.000. Page | 23 And so did the trial proceed.00 as the latter's share in the transaction.00 from his aparador. all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to that place. introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and.00). Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. known to Chavez for the drafting of the deed of sale.000. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee. declared as follows: ATTY. may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. To raise this sum.00.000. they went to see Luis Asistio. Sumilang asked the two for a P10. it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee. Call the witness to the witness stand. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked.ñët In the morning of November 14. Upon the suggestion of Chavez. Q5311. and three days later. Sumilang told Lee that he already paid part of the price to Chavez. he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10. with a note requesting that they accommodate him once more.000-loan backed up by the P5. Sumilang's driver inspected the car. At the same time he 4 requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop informed him about the Thunderbird. single. Sumilang gave back the P4. Under Rule 123. The version of the prosecution as found by the court below may be briefly narrated as follows: A few days before November 12.000.000. the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind. plus P500. and Narsing Cailles. For Sumilang. whom he knew was in the market for such a car.00 to Chavez. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird.00. Right after the meeting at Eugene's. 31 years old. Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No.00. the registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City. in the name of Asistio in Caloocan. presently detained at the Manila Police Department headquarters.00 as a loan to Sumilang. Chavez asked Sumilang for another P3. So did Chavez. Section 12. Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer.000. after being duly sworn according to law. And so. after the deed of sale is signed. again without funds. buy and sell merchant. Chief of the Fire Department. Then. IBASCO: I submit. After the deed of sale was drawn up. The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee was P21.00 to Baltazar. who had left the table to pose for pictures with some fans and come back. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. Sometime in the afternoon. Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54.000. 1965. From the court's decision. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Four or five days afterwards.
and knowing Asistio's and his friends' reputation for always getting what they wanted.000. For. "Ging" Pascual. the Court of Appeals. and. his testimony as witness for the 5 prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a film shooting at Bulacan. in which case. through a per curiam resolution. counsel for Roger Chavez. to push him into a corner. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. these should not be pursued here. made a denial of the right Page | 24 . As to the other accused. the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum. Asistio offered to buy it from him for P22. to show cause within ten days from notice why Chavez' appeal should not be considered abandoned and dismissed. The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8. After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion. Sumilang consented to the sale. the temptation to press. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical background of this constitutional inhibition. 1968. The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment. It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with 10 "the fundamentals of a republican government". the Court would be too gullible if it were to give full credence to his words even if they concerned a man no less 7 notorious than himself.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In the course of their conversation at the bar. Sumilang drove away in the car with his driver at the wheel. as minimum and not more than fourteen (14) years. 1968. to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant.500. until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688. the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character.000. As the offer was good. the balance he promised to pay the next day after negotiating with some financing company. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation. but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. As a matter of fact. the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted. one (1) day. notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton. Sumilang accommodated. on June 21. As to Roger Chavez. Rule 115. For indeed if this one question is resolved in the affirmative. Asistio liked his Thunderbird parked outside. There. and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power. and Udal. of violation of his right constitutionally entrenched against self-incrimination. resolved to dismiss the appeal. Natividad Marquez. made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner's assertion that he was compelled to testify against himself. when voluntarily and freely made. Before said balance could be paid. And so. Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in court. Upon the petitions. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his conviction. Atty. from a man who has had at least two convictions for acts not very different from those charged in this information. who was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1. Sumilang requested Pascual and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment. however adopted.00. a friend of Pascual. On April 18. with one accord. And they did. representing the balance of the contract price for the car. however." .00. the return. Sumilang mentioned the proposed transaction thru Chavez. After shaking hands with Lee. While the admissions of confessions of the prisoner.000. On May 13. 1965. the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory". despite the foregoing explanation. 1. to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21. he had no one but Roger Chavez to blame. to undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law. But Roger Chavez'accusations of Asistio's participation is utterly uncorroborated. that he paid good money for the car." The trial court 6 branded him "a self-confessed culprit". He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than ten (10) years. 1968. the registration papers and the keys to the car. Johnson Lee turned over to him the deed of sale. Pascual warned that Chavez was a "smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his money. the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself. Sumilang. A certain Bimbo. to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below. the Puritan minister.00 unless the latter chose to pay P21. with proof. The court further continued: It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger Chavez tried to drag his co-accused down with him by coloring his story with fabrications which he expected would easily stick together what with the newspaper notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by the other. It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court. Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals. that [i]t may suit the purposes of despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of 11 political liberty and personal freedom. On May 14. which has long obtained in the continental system.At Eugene's. and to entrap him into fatal contradictions. and to pay the costs. as it does. we need not reach the others. But. and after hearing on oral arguments. Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez. The Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang. the witness unduly. Rules of Court where. the Court of Appeals required Atty. Two or three days afterwards. directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals. 1967 and the period for the filing thereof lapsed on January 27. Asistio tendered a down payment of P1. offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to sign. in all criminal prosecutions. 1968. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness 9 against himself. A move to reconsider was unavailing." fully echoed in Section 1. was not uncommon even in England. we now come to grips with the main problem presented. that he be relieved of the effects thereof. Sumilang was thus cleared. strengthened by Baltazar's and Cailles' corroborations. He saw Asistio with many companions. it has become firmly embedded in English. She also stated that if she were allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along with the factual findings of the court below but will show however that its 8 conclusion is erroneous. Reason for this is that said lawyer received notice to file brief on December 28. and the reply. also saw a friend. 1968 without any brief having been filed. the car was impounded. The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid for his car. When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's.500. have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence. the Court of Appeals. disposed to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal.00. thus: " "The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons. This receipt was offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang. And coming. if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation. as well as in American jurisprudence. which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials." Mr.
and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of 17 duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. to remain silent. the damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense. unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted. Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence.S." It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment. disable him from making a free and rational choice. he claimed the right upon being called to testify. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well 16 as the innocent and foresighted. For. they foreclosed choice. 1äwphï1. of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the 24 probability of the evidence but it is the capability of abuse. in expressive language. counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand. 597." 2. 3. genuine will. Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial." The cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. The foregoing situation molds a solid case for petitioner. The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the People was built primarily around the admissions of Chavez himself. 4th ed. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a witness for the People is at once apparent. it 15 secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right. 40 Law. Constitutionally sound consent was absent. 355. He identified the 27 Thunderbird car involved in the case. no genuine consent underlay submission to take the witness stand.to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law. as accused. 591. To repeat. quoted in VIII Wigmore. While a defendant's knowledge of the facts remains concealed within his bosom. petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force. in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent.. Petitioner. we now turn to the facts. or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself.. in reality. that Chavez "testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that Chavez is "a selfconfessed culprit". What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him. and as having been adopted in the Philippines "to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt. he is safe. so that a maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence.ñët 4. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure. This he broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. directly or indirectly. and he is exposed" to conviction. it is mandatory. Nor could he escape testifying. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating 19 answer is shot at him. To him it was a case of compelled submission. 819. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling 18 lips of the defendant." (Brown vs. The record discloses that by leading questions Chavez. pp. we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself. And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the accused." Thus it is. the law. Because. this circumstance cannot be counted against him. Justice Malcolm. the whole truth and nothing but the truth. on the contrary. 583-584) take note of U. Indeed. The judge's words heretofore quoted "But surely counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand" wielded authority. they deprived him of his will to resist. the accused. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. Tañada and Fernando (Constitution of the Philippines. Just a few months ago. Page | 25 ." So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court". it is his right to forego testimony. and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness 20 stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. backed by the Constitution. And he himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court. And this statement detailed the plan and execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez). Walker. His testimony is not of his own choice. The trial court described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution". With all these. If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him. supra. speaking thru Mr. ed. it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. he did not offer himself as a witness. By those words. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial. and to give testimony regarding the offenses with which they were charged. of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury. Navarro. Robertsons Rep.S. it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. 1968). It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. counsel.. 821). I. There are the unequivocal statements in the decision that "even accused Chavez" identified "the very same Thunderbird that Johnson Lee had offered for sale". vol. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof." Mr. 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 161 12 U. vs. But surely. I." and that defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand. With the foregoing as guideposts. as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person". Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. p." This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint 23 trial. it is mandatory. it may be the product of unintentional statements. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary 22 for his conviction. 25 244. Asistio and himself to deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate him. that it was undoubtedly erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words:. Therefore. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense. which reaffirms the rule that the constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity." An old Philippine case 14  speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United States". unfettered exercise of his own free. occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. but draw it from thence. and jurisprudence. 208. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused. the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate 21 him. Pressure which operates to overbear his will. tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early days 13 "in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. was made to affirm his statement given 26 to the NBI agents on July 17. the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his oath to tell the truth. the Supreme Court of the United States (January 29.
Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ. If. ." The teaching in Johnson vs. under which he was prosecuted and convicted. Thus. We should guard against the improvident issuance of an order discharging a petitioner from confinement. Under our own Rules of Court. " 6. Ricardo Sumilang. which precisely 35 is the function of habeas corpus. is a rampart that gives protection . judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand became fruitless. For the privilege. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case. involving a violation of another constitutional right. 43 Page | 26 . and whose life or liberty is at stake. Respondents' return shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and valid judgment of conviction for another offense. a waiver must be certain and unequivocal. juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to. The parties 42 attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. we say again. The course which petitioner takes is correct. So ordered. no objections to questions propounded to him were made. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with. The foregoing guidelines. Upon the view we take of this case. Just as we are about to write finis to our task. as explained in Johnson vs.ñët There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. plaintiff. No costs. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack. Such defect results in the absence or 33 loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent 34 conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. 5. Quezon City Branch. however. unless he is held. The position we take here is that petitioner herein is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his liberty. who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty. in this wise: Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of Counsel. et al." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Being worthless in itself. It cannot stand.even to the 30 guilty. his original claim remains valid. A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel. "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. kept in custody or detained for any cause or reason other than the said judgment in said Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's authority. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void.. and willingly made. Zerbst is this: "It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. It neither binds nor bars any one. by his own admission. in which event the discharge herein directed shall be effected when such other cause or reason ceases to exist. Here involve is not a mere question of self-incrimination. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already 38 39 final. Quezon City Branch. When this right is properly waived. If the accused. And the objection made at the beginning is a continuing one. entitled"People of the Philippines. From it no rights can be obtained. understandably. unless otherwise expressly provided by law. such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded.It matters not that. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's 32 constitutional rights are disregarded. vs. andintelligently. "To be effective. Quezon City Branch. the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague 28 29 and uncertain evidence. By it no rights are divested. This writ may issue even if another remedy 36 which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. For. and one imprisoned 41 thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus. we are prompted to restate that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. is not represented by Counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right. 1äwphï1. make waiver a shaky defense. defendant proved his guilt. It is a defendant's constitutional immunity from being called to testify against himself. Zerbst." Renuntiatio non praesumitur. in Criminal Case Q-5311. all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. still. failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a 37 recourse to the writ. the writ of habeas corpus as an 40 extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. accused.. Habeas corpus is a high 31 prerogative writ. the assistance of Counsel is no longer a necessary element of the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence.." to discharge said Roger Chavez from custody.
On June 3. 1985.D. said evidences cannot be used against them as mandated by Section 5 of the said P. also filed a separate petition for 15 certiorari on the same ground. In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned cases. through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. They contend that without the immunity provided for by the second clause of Section 5. VER. PEPITO TORIO. two (2) reports were submitted to His Excellency. petitioners. the legal compulsion imposed by the first clause of the same Section would suffer from constitutional infirmity for being violative of the witness' right against self17 incrimination. The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies given by the eight (8) private respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board. The assassination rippled shock-waves throughout the entire country which reverberated beyond the territorial confines of this Republic. MAJOR GEN. Former Senator Benigno S. who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the said Resolution having been 14 DENIED. the pending motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto. the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board Among the witnesses who appeared. all the accused. 1886. SGT. Sgt. private respondents were charged as accessories. now represented by the petitioner TANODBAYAN. He prayed that his aforesaid testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. P. To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a 1 free. economic and social life. because of the latter's failure to invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by P. by its Chairman. SGT. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava. as counsel for the mother of deceased Rolando Galman. LEONARDO MOJICA.G. petitioner having no further witnesses to present and having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing. Upon arraignment. 71212-13 August 30. After 5 conducting the necessary preliminary investigation. vs. P. On June 13. Ver.incrimination before the Agrava Board. was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against 9 self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. PABLO MARTINEZ. JR. including the herein private ate Respondents pleaded NOT GUILTY. 10010 and another. 1886. they now come before Us by way of certiorari praying for the amendment and/or setting aside of the challenged Resolution on the ground that it was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. One. 71208-09 August 30. marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence. 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later 2 became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. Nos. Benigno S. admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the 13 private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P. THE HONORABLE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ. the protagonists are locked in horns on the effect and legal significance of failure to set up the privilege against self-incrimination. PROSPERO OLIVAS. 'the reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. for the killing of Rolando Galman. the Hon. It is the submission of the prosecution.D. on the other hand. Private prosecutor below. Major Gen. that said testimonies are admissible against the private respondents. respondent Gen. Hon. Pepito Torio. Fabian C. 1985.R. MAJOR GENERAL PROSPERO OLIVAS. Aquino which was docketed as Criminal Case No. G. 1985 SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN. Aquino. among others. the individual testimonies of 6 private respondents before the Agrava Board. unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy. claim that notwithstanding failure to set up the privilege against self. an opposition stalwart who was returning to the country after a long-sojourn abroad. Since private respondents did not invoke said privilege. SGT. Sgt. TANODBAYAN. respondent SANDIGANBAYAN. Aquino on that same fateful day. respectively. respondents. the immunity did not attach. and another one. Sgt. vs. Petitioners went further by contending that such failure to claim said constitutional privilege amounts to 16 a waiver thereof. 1886. J. VER. Ernesto Herrera. 1985 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.D. the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes. TOMAS FERNANDEZ. Luciano Salazar. was gunned down to death. jointly authored by the other members of the Board namely: Hon. SGT.. Dante Santos and Hon. PROSPERO BONA AND AlC ANICETO ACUPIDO. Tomas Fernandez. Leonardo Mojica. SGT. The private respondents. Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically Identical issues. Sgt. testified and produced evidence before the Board were the herein private respondents 3 General Fabian C. as well as the legal issues and arguments. along with several principals. 1983.: On August 21. together with the memorandum in support thereof.D. The aftershocks stunned the nation even more as this ramified to all aspects of Philippine political. PABLO MARTINEZ. a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was committed inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the 11 prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. THE SANDIGANBAYAN. GENERAL FABIAN C. without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved.R. 1886. PROSPERO BONA AND AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO. issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AUGUSTO AMORES AND BIENVENIDO VERA CRUZ OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN. Petitioner TANODBAYAN opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by the private respondents in support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies.D. GENERAL FABIAN C. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by P. all of which have been 12 previously marked in the course of the trial. the TANODBAYAN filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN two (2) Informations for MURDER-one for the killing of Sen. Respondent SANDIGANBAYAN ordered the TANODBAYAN and the private respondents to submit their respective memorandum on the issue after which said motions will 10 be considered submitted for resolution. Private Page | 27 . TOMAS FERNANDEZ. Olivas and the rest of the other private respondents likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective 8 individual testimonies invoking the same ground. the Prosecution represented by the Office of the petition TANODBAYAN. 10011. Prospero 4 Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido.D. the two (2) petitioners were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision. Major General Prospero Olivas. In both criminal cases. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the 7 above-entitled cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by P. criminal Case No. SGT. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Marcos. represented by the TANODBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN). 1886.D. the testimonies of private respondents and other evidences produced by them before the Board. President Ferdinand E. SGT. PEPITO TORIO. Sgt. respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution. Pablo Martinez. LEONARDO MOJICA SGT. 1985. Jr.. Thus. SGT. and one accomplice. respondents. UPON termination of the investigation. Hon. Amado Dizon. On May 30. petitioner. 1886. All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion. Nos. SGT. CUEVAS. Private respondents. now assailed in these two (2) petitions.
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under" and investigation". Could there still be any doubt then that their being asked to testify. were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. The then early distortions and exaggerations. it is not far-fetched to conclude that they were called to the stand to determine their probable involvement in the crime being investigated. as any other similar investigation of its sort. as always. all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas. the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination. guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to 20 counsel at any stage of the proceedings..D. both in foreign and local media. Heretofore. they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves. the Board may initiate the filing of proper complaint with the appropriate got government agency. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence. Art. We shall be guided. May that be construed as a waiver Page | 28 . it has been categorically declared that a person detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation has a right to be informed of his right to remain silent. If the investigation was conducted. This notwithstanding. instead of any ordinary police agency. Not only that. Being at the scene of the crime as such. In fact. Should the findings warrant the prosecution of any person. They have to take the witness stand. and to all legal intents and purposes.. are members of the military contingent that escorted Sen. The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Section 5 of P. But the common denominator in both which is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense. In all these cases. not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing. felt and believed to have bungled the case. NBI or by other police agency. the P. Did they lose their aforesaid constitutional rights simply because the investigation was by the Agrava Board and not by any police investigator. they continued testifying. but more importantly. which was already so abundantly supplied by other ordinary witnesses who had testified earlier. They are also entitled to be admonished of their constitutional right to remain silent. it cannot be denied that in the course of receiving evidence. and rumors from uglywagging tongues. Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board. Of course. All the private respondents.D. but more importantly. In carrying out this monumental task. all the herein private respondents could not have been compelled to give any statement whether incriminatory or exculpatory.. the records show that Generals Ver and Olivas were among the last witnesses called by the Agrava Board. of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them may be used against them. by the constitution and existing laws." Considering the foregoing environmental settings.The question presented before Us is a novel one. the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. suspects in the said assassination. It is true a person in custody undergoing investigation labors under a more formidable ordeal and graver trying conditions than one who is at liberty while being investigated. there has been no pronouncement in any of these cases nor in any other that a person similarly undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense. the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The Agrava Board. the first designated investigator of the tragedy. Presidential Decree No. is not entitled to the constitutional admonition mandated by said Section 20. the Board is in truth and in fact. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain and to counsel. being the highest military authority of his co-petitioners labored under the same suspicion and so with General Olivas. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. testify or produce evidence. 22 and to be informed of such right. The findings of the Board shall be made public. And as safeguard. Neither are we impressed by petitioners' contention that the use of the word "confession" in the last sentence of said Section 20.. (Emphasis supplied) The investigation therefor is also geared. Aquino while disembarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on that fateful day. IV of the Bill of Rights. to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits. if not detained. what good will it be to the entire nation and the more than 50 million Filipinos to know the facts and circumstances of the killing if the culprit or culprits will nevertheless not be dealt with criminally? This purpose is implicit from Section 12 of the said Presidential Decree. be charged with the task of conducting the investigation. and to an admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be used against him. the extent of their participation in the said conspiracy? It is too taxing upon one's credulity to believe that private respondents' being called to the witness stand was merely to elicit from them facts and circumstances surrounding the tragedy. They are inadmissible against the source of the 25 confession or admission and against third person. this Court has not been previously called upon to rule on issues involving immunity statutes. the pertinent portion of which provides SECTION 12. The relative novelty of the question coupled with the extraordinary circumstance that had precipitated the same did nothing to ease the burden of laying down the criteria upon which this Court will henceforth build future jurisprudence on a heretofore unexplored area of judicial inquiry. as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person " goes to prove that 24 they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. relative to the probable motive behind the assassination and the person or persons responsible for or involved in the assassination hastened its creation and 19 heavily contributed to its early formation. The papers. The subject matter dealt with and the line of questioning as shown by the transcript of their testimonies before the Agrava Board.. and be informed that any and all statements given by them may be used against them. it may be argued is not the right to remain silent available only to a person undergoing custodial interrogation? We find no categorical statement in the constitutional provision on the matter which reads: 18 . General Ver on the other hand. except Generals Ver and Olivas. officer or agency? True. to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. say by the PC.D. came into existence in response to a popular public clamor that an impartial and independent body. however. their consequent prosecution and ultimately. indubitably evinced purposes other than merely eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding facts and circumstances of the assassination. even at that particular stage of their testimonies. we now have a mass of 23 jurisprudence on this specific portion of the subject provision. . For indeed. 1886 leave them no choice. Similarly. both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our 21 fundamental law. persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. an entity charged. to counsel. for although the word "confession" is used. all point to them as having. but whom others suspected. was to determine whether they were really conspirators and if so. they were among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination.. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. 21 under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. In the light of the examination reflected by the record. This is the lamentable situation we have at hand. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered. in the alleged conspiracy that brought about the assassination. their conviction. especially the foreign media. Among this class of witnesses were the herein private respondents. the protection covers not only "confessions" but also "admissions" made in violation of this section. (Emphasis supplied) Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Article 4 connotes the Idea that it applies only to police investigation. Yet they have not been informed or at the very least even warned while so testifying. in one way or another participated or have something to do. . Significantly however. -a Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P. to counsel.
which grants "use immunity". 1959. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law. then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty. In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities. To satisfy the due process requirement. place and circumstances.D. the same principle obtains as a direct result of American influence.incrimination. McGraw. The United States Supreme Court went further in holding that: the protection of the individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent proceedings of statements obtained under threat or removal from office. We are not persuaded that when they testified. disable him from making a free and rational choice. to be sworn and to testify upon being called as a witness for complainant Col. 562. And yet. Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. Clearly then. 359 US 121). it may be the product of unintentional statements. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books. the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows: That no person shall be . a criminal case No doubt. in the case of Louis J. 367 US 1230) Decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from private respondents fall short of the constitutional standards both under the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE and under the EXCLUSIONARY RULE in Section 20. Correctly.incrimination. documents. but also the right to "due process" which is 31 fundamental fairness. this Court sustained Cabal's plea that for him to be compelled to testify will be in violation of his right against self. Our review of the pleadings and their annexes. whether they are policemen or other members of the body politic. manifestations and admissions of both counsel. which grants what is known as "transactional immunity. The Cabal vs. Fernando. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court. by reason of the statements to be given by him. and the questions were answered. It is the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play(Frankfurter.. So is moral coercion 'tending to force testimony from the unwilling 26 lips of the defendant. due process . 17 L Ed. Further enlightenment on the subject can be found in the historical background of this constitutional provision against self. and that he can invoke his right against selfincrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is profounded to him." Examining Presidential Decree 1886. or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the Page | 29 . 5. Cabal nor a prosecution for a criminal offense. compelled in a criminal case to 30 be a witness against himself. At first. 27 As now worded.D. the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not. "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for 32 an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. at 487).. In the Philippines. The privilege against self. McElroy 1961.. Lefkowitz v. Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence. when Cabal refused to take the stand. official action. We shall rule on the effect of such absence of claim to the availability to private respondents of the immunity provided for in Section 5. pp. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. (Pearson v. It is not a narrow or '"echnical conception with fixed content unrelated to time. Mr. together with the oral arguments. more specifically Section 5 thereof. petitioners and amicus curiae (Ex-Senator Ambrosio Padilla) assert that the "right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" applies only in favor of an accused in a criminal case. 32-33). Quoting the highly-respected eminent constitutionalist that once graced this Court. Hence. the individual testimonies of private respondents cannot be admitted against them in ally criminal proceeding. Maristela in a forfeiture of illegally acquired assets. Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one. 1939. But in the light of the first portion of Section 5 of P.of their rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves? The answer is yes. Illinois. 1886 which issue was squarely raised and extensively discussed in the pleadings and oral arguments of the parties. in its strictest sense. the answers given cannot over their objection be later used in their prosecutions for conspiracy. whether a 29 party or not. Section 20 of Article IV reads: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. which reads: SEC. the private respondents were not merely denied the afore-discussed sacred constitutional rights. Said case is not a criminal case as its title very clearly indicates. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect (democratic) traditions of legal and political thought. P. Negatively put. it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved. is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. 1886 and the awesome contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence. 1983. or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient.. it may not be invoked by any of the herein private respondents before the Agrava Board. To buttress their precarious stand and breathe life into a seemingly hopeless cause. On the other hand. "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant. Article IV. Similarly. if they have the option to do so. the former Chief Justice Enrique M. it has been Identified as freedom from arbitrariness. correspondence. 363 US 20. It is not People vs. Nevertheless. Hannah v. 308 US 313). Larche 1960." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. to paraphrase Cardozo.incrimination. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness. 28 Kapunan doctrine militates very heavily against this theory. New Jersey" where certain police officers summoned to an inquiry being conducted by the Attorney General involving the fixing of traffic tickets were asked questions following a warning that if they did not answer they would be removed from office and that anything they said might be used against them in any criminal proceeding."(Frankfurter. The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. and that it extends to all. they voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right to remain silent. Decidedly then. (Bartkus vs. arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. and the other. We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case. Russel Turley" citing Garrity vs. Pressure which operates to overbear his will. records. 385 US at 500. obedience to the dictates of justice.incrimination is guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify."(Cafeteria Workers v. The Court also held that in the context of threats of removal from office the act of responding to interrogation was not voluntary and was not an effective waiver of the privilege against self. hang on the balance.
violence. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. threat. he has the option to refuse to answer questions and therefore.infringes upon the witness' right against self-incrimination. Any interpretation of a statute which will give it a meaning in conflict with the Constitution must be avoided. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. this exclusionary rule applies not 33 only to confessions but also to admissions. and to be informed of such right. under the oppressive compulsion of P. (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. therefore. Hence. to make such claim. A literal interpretation fashioned upon Us is repugnant to Article IV. which is the first test of admissibility.D. 4 of P.. The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt. .. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against selfincrimination. So much so that if two or more constructions or interpretations could possibly be resorted to. but undaunted by. It reads: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 5 requires a claim which it. matter or thing concerning which he is compelled.D. P. refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Board. Conscious as we are of. which is the hallmark of due process.. let it be known that we are not by this disposition passing upon the guilt or innocence of the herein private respondents an issue which is before the Sandiganbayan. Manalang and we quote: I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the rights and freedoms of the individuals. but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. meaning. we have strictly adhered to the Constitution in upholding the rule of law finding solace in the view very aptly articulated by that well-known civil libertarian and admired defender of human rights of this Court. We hold. thus: SEC. This. With the stand we take on the issue before Us. including . the frightening consequences that hover before Us. It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and urged upon Us by the petitioners that the right against self-incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. We are merely resolving a question of law and the pronouncement herein made applies to all similarly situated. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. But a literal application of a requirement of a claim of the privilege against selfincrimination as a condition sine qua non to the grant of immunity presupposes that from a layman's point of view. 1886. (Emphasis supplied) Lest we be misunderstood. The absurdity of such application is apparent Sec. 38 in the case of People vs. Stated otherwise .D. 5. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against selfincrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness.D. As herein earlier discussed. and considering the temper of the times. The applicability of the immunity granted by P. 4.. however. same are DISMISSED. forecloses under threat of contempt proceedings against anyone who makes such claim. we run the risk of being consigned to unpopularity. Section 20 of the Constitution. To save the statute from a declaration of unconstitutionality it must be given a reasonable 35 construction that will bring it within the fundamental law. A person guilty of .. 1886. after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer. the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. intimidation. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. however. they were denied... he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self.D. demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. Justice Claudio Teehankee. forecloses such option of refusal by imposing sanctions upon its exercise. under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and finding the instant petitions without merit. But in this case. or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. 1886 viewed in the light of the sanctions provided in Section 4.ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture. No force. As a rule. nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office. Mr. But I reject any proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human being. 1886. Page | 30 . such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion. Apparent conflict 36 between two clauses should be harmonized. the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. then that one which will avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even though it may be necessary for this purpose to disregard the 34 more usual and apparent import of the language used. whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. SO ORDERED. The dictates of fair play. but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction.. I have advocated the balancing-ofinterests rule in an situations which call for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of consequential dimensions. that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. irrespective of one's rank and status in society. in jeopardy.. to testify or produce evidence.incrimination. so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. Their constitutional rights are therefore. and impose appropriate penalties therefor. (Emphasis supplied) it is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board. Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves the witness no choice but to answer and thereby forfeit the immunity purportedly granted by Sec. But the strong testimonial compulsion imposed by Section 5 of P. the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co37 extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. No pronouncement as to costs.
SUSAN ROXAS.. Jose Vicente E. influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses. 3.. 4 of the aforementioned Rules.A. schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. Narciso. Thus. acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. POWER TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION. Atty. Cruz. Jose M. 1. 345 US 41). LEONARDO GAMBOA. Termulo.G. Mario D. as held in a recent case. although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases. Benguet Consolidated and the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez. respondents. As held in Jean L. Abelardo S.440. and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing. Jimenez. Vicente T. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not.' including `the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'. intervenor. the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. absolute or unlimited. to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations. WIGBERTO TAÑADA. and his law partners. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann. the Republic of the Philippines. control of some of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines. represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Moreover. ID.. the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. Bengzon. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs..71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc. 89914 November 20. 1991 JOSE F. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico. KURT BACHMANN JR. Jose S. however. resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made. Mamerto Nepomuceno.. Marcos. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. Jr. Valdez. restitution and damages.E. such as the Manila Corporation (MERALCO). They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone. Faustino. in conspiracy with. represented by and through the CHAIRMAN. and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant Complaint.. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez. assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices. and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP. Jr. Jr. AGERICO UNGSON... 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants. 354 USS 178 citing US vs. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.S.. Under the Second Amended Complaint. Jr. Narciso. vs. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action. Amando V. Jose M. No. RULE. with the support. Jr. POLITICAL LAW.. Mantecon. The critical element is the existence of. supoort. J. . must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution. assistance and collaboration of Philgurantee officials led by chairman Cesar E. JOSE S. to appear viable and to borrow more capitals. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.. for reconveyance. and/or executed a series of devices intended to conceal and place.S. JIMENEZ.E. ID. et al. ABELARDO TERMULO. manipulated. Gabaldon. as provided therein. with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J. Carlos J. ID. HON. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it. VICENTE MILLS JR. reversion. Faustino. PADILLA. Now to another matter. Amando V. properties. alleges among others that: 14. Jose Vicente E. engaged in devices. LIMITATIONS. The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners. so much so that its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2 Billion as of June 30. xxx xxx xxx (m) manipulated. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS. Faustino. JOSE MANTECON. The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations therein. Camacho. Narciso. among others: (a) Obatained. beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and collective funds." In another case " . the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution. the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. Edilberto S. V. Amando V. that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. We cannot simply assume.. Rex C." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected. as defendants. and the weight to be ascribed to. with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the FMMC senior manager and some of the Bengzon law partners. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa. Jr." (Watkins vs.. accounting. ERNESTO CALUYA. Jr. Inc. US. Mantecom and Kurt S. without infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of P527. Jose F..: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective relief.S. ELVIE CASTILLO. petitioners.. "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. Jr. Jr. therefore. et al. Marcos and Imelda R. Jr.. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. and Edilberto S. Leon Nazareno. Cruz. press. such as to legislate or to expel a member. Cesar C.. Jimenez. Jose Bengzon. assisted by the Solicitor General. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. 0035 (PCGG Case No. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT. 1987.387..R... The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. BENGZON JR. JOSE V. Mills. namely: Edilberto S. . the purported sale of Page | 31 . the formation of Erectors Holdings. and Leonardo C. Jimenez and Leonardo C. or specifically Defendants Jose F. and taking undue advantage of their relationship. Under Sec. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry." The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation. Sandejas. HAS THE POWER TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE AND EXTENT OF THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES INTO PRIVATE AFFAIRS IN PURPORTED AID OF LEGISLATION. religion or assembly. Aznault vs.". 2. Jr. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech. Rumely. Jr. (n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the February 1986 People's Revolution. ID. Virata and the Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings. shcemed. (o) manuevered. filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. Bachmann. among others. including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self. the inquiry. Inc. such as Attys. SANDEJAS. led by Jose S. REASONS THEREFOR. Bengzon. The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. On 30 July 1987.
the 6. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. thereupon. 1986).011 common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in Subscription" in the amount of P4. Jr. Jimenez. Mantecon. In Angara vs.E. had effectively taken over the firms. Edilberto S." At the hearing held on 23 May 1989. which obtaines in our present system of government. and that there is no appeal nor any other plain. PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only P5. although they know for a fact that what the law declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling "to the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed . Mills. petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. the above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to the Government. in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Electoral Commission. the Fund's (a) 8. Thus. xxx xxx xxx On 28 September 1988. (PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all. 3019. Jr. and Leonardo C.500.177 shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils. Bengzon. and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. even pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations. as legal counsel. Camacho amd Senen J. Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. (ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E). and averring that the publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No.. suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised. Cruz. Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor. for the sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the Government. respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed its comment 10 thereon.500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of P3. among others. after which." 4 On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado. Jose M. one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos crony firms. (p) misused. Jr.972. Inc. Hon. 7 Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated. Drilon II. (q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity. 1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Government on February 28. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Narciso. the Senate Minority Floor Leader. particularly the PCGG. with the connivance. the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund. Bengzon. Jr. and that Ricardo Lopa. the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin T. or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution. the Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million. the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case. Bengzon. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. group" supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the said firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3. (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc. and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the said fictitious sale. much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special commitees like what petitioners seek from making inquiries in aid of legislation. through the use of the names and managerial expertise of the FMMC senior manager and lawyers identified as Jose B.. Faustino. likewise refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process. Mario D." Another daily reported otherwise.028. In its comment.. Romualdez including.555 voting shares or 36.937. we will first tackle the jurisdictional question raised by the respondent Committee. filed with the Court of motion for intervention.S.. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented.defendant Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers. (wjose purported incorporations are all members of Atty.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28 million for the said assignment. for short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG. without PCGG approval. one of the defendants in Civil Case No.8% of the voting stock of the PCIB.929. and making it appear that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his ownership of the same when in truth and in fact. Jose F. Rex C.S.470. Meanwhile. Kurt Bachmann." and not the whole or entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from June 30. for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. while others declared that on 3 March 1986. together with defendants Cesar Zalamea.. Jr. Jose F. from 2 to 6 August 1988. Narciso. Leonardo Gamboa. which they refused to surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. In compliance. Jose F. to a holding company controlled by Romualdez. Abelardo S. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying. and this development (which the defendants themselves orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million shares for allegedly exceeding the 30percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of the General Banking Act. the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief. assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity at 50% each. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial International bank (PCIB). the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). therewith.S. under the doctrine of separation of powers. Equities. particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 1986. Jr. Jose F. It obtains not hrough express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. (iii) First Manila Managerment Corporation (FMMC). his interests are well intact and being protected by Atty. Sandejas. and some of his law partners.S. Bengzon. Each Page | 32 . such as Attys. 3 On 13 September 1988. purportedly to be applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of a "merger company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. prejudice and injury. The contention is untenable. together with the FMMC senior managers who still control and run the affiars of said corporations. 5 Thereafter. Sandejas. Inc. and the consequent reversion of the assigned brought the total shareholding of the Fund to 11. Jr. respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations. Jose S. Antonio Ozaeta. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. 2 Meanwhile. the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.S. Vicente T. in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Jose V. Petitioner Jose F. Jr. support and technical assitance of the Bengzon law firm represented by Atty. Amando V.229. 11 the Court held: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. and to their grave and irreparable damager.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment. to PNI Holdings. the President's brother-in-law. together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers. Termulo. and Edilberto S. and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. 8 which the Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989. 1980 to March 24. conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers.
Moreowever.. Thus. and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process. Who is to determine the nature. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious.." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected. the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. however. considering the claim of Mr. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. in cases of conflict. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution. Section 21.. as follows: Page | 33 . that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies. courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments. petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose." 13 The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of legislation. including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self. A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom." As a consequence thereof. absolute or unlimited. to avail of the privilege hour. such as to legislate or to expel a member. As held in Jean L.e. the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred. scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. sometimes makes it hard to say just where the political excitement. as provided therein. This is in thruth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. as held in a recent case. xxx xxx xxx But in the main. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. in his speech. this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Leon Nazareno. 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter. to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it. during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. 16 the inquiry. not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. the judicial departments is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.. but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantess to them. justice or expediency of legislation." Thus. Mr. it does not assert any superiority over the other departments. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile. xxx xxx xxx The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry. the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines. therefore. Even the. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies. it is not done in aid of legislation. More thatn that. must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution. allotment of power to the executive. The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. and is supreme within its own sphere. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa). the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. 15 The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not. if not entirely obliterated. (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into. Coming to the specific issues raised in this case. The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the Constitution. 4 of the aforementioned Rules. among others. i. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Arnault vs. Narrowed as its function is in this manner. and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines.department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction. 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries. Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made. and that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious. 14 Thus. The ovelapping and interlacing of funcstions and duties between the several deaprtments. Under Sec. et al. although said provision by no means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate cases. 18 Senator Enrile said. it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature.
In fact it was obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we insist on doing normally our assigned task. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative. within the third civil degree. I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid itself of "ineptness.Mr. or Baby Lopa. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him: 12. in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. Mr. contract or application with the Government: Provided. had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege. As of this writing. Lopa. contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law. the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino. Messrs. the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to determine the appropriate price. The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote. Ricardo A. this is. 5. then Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan. signed by Mr. management refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to make available to us the records of the company. community groups and youth of nongovernmental organization had made representations to the Senate Page | 34 . Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11. incompetence and corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm. 212 reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx WHEREAS. to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental petroleum. Gamboa. it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case particularly with regard to Republic Act No.The pertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. transaction. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and malicious statements. President: "The President. i. a. that this section shall not apply to any person who prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related. When he demanded for supporting papers which will indicate aforesaid divestment.k." I other words. President. In view of the impending threat. xxx xxxx xxx Also relevant to this case. Mr. that it has adopted a "getrich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm." The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7. Leyte was not heeded by management because they said another representation was being made to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our sequestrationorder. In his memorandum dated July 3. otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Jimenez including their chief counsel.a. 212. I leave it to this august Body to make its own conclusion. ricardo Lopa. President. of the President of the Philippines. xxx xxxx xxx In answer to Mr. is the brother-in-law of the President. nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession. Lina in view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth. Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote: Sec. he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. to intervene directly or indirectly. is a letter of Mr. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that there have been divestment." Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five. ricardo A. the President of SOLOIL. 3019. leaders of school youth. no intended legislation involved. 1988. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL. community groups and youth of non-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development. the privilege being that I received. President. Atty. Lopa. Gamboa. While we attempted to carry on our order. the President of the Senate. has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business. a letter dated September 4. now Congressman Jose Ramirez. Mr. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D.. the VicePresident of the Philippines. WHEREAS. Mr. President. They even went further by telling us that even Peping Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is also interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL. Mr. and to avoid any untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more categorical stand of this Commission in view of the seemingly influential represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue our work. Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa. Prohibition on certain relatives. Verily. I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the Presidential Commission of Good Government written and signed by former Governor. instead they said it will be submitted directly to this Commission. The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to requires them have never been at issue. To our mind their continuous dropping of names is not good for this Commission and even to the President if our dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of the government.e. in any business. and that the new owner is now Mr. 1986. 1988. nor to any transaction. President: "Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan. There appears to be. and I quote Mr. 1988 issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms. The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor: Mr. Jimenez and Mendiola refused vehemently to submit these papers to us. or the Speaker of the House of Representatives. so the order of sequestration will finally be lifted. I understand. Ricardo Lopa who according to them. They even assured us that Mr. the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation. I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum. management officials assured him that relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. 3019. therefore. particularly Mr. Leyte. which reads as follows. by consanguinity or affinity. wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies which includes SOLOIL Incorporated. 5 of RA No. and the Plant Superintendent." Mr. President.
Since congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate. . In Galman vs. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. honor and efficient management of government services lest our youth become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and form of government which is repugnant to true freedom. that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed." 22 In another case . for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. That power is broad. That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government be investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26. United States. But broad asis this power ofinquiry. Moreover. inefficiency or waste. is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. i. the complaint in Civil No. secondly. it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. 19 Thus. The privilege has consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness. without limitations. democratic participation and human rights: Now. be it. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. United States. In John T.' including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'. therefore. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26. Article XVIII of the Constitution. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary. Article XVIII of the Constitution. 21 it was held that: Broad as it is. since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto. it is not unlimited. the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. an accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions.. but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them. Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG. be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile. The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. as defendants therein. It appeals. 23 One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. it is not the characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. In fine. Pamaran. the power is not. religion or assembly. 20 it was held held: . 26the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. It cannot.. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech. the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted. et al. the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our people such as CARP. Besides.. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case. as accused. This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify. Watkins vs. or possibly needed statutes. firstly. No inquiry is an end in itself. 212 because. that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. whether a party or not. 24 Thir right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness.economic.. Now to another matter. Clearly then.. Investigations conducted soly for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible. WHEREAS. It includes surveys of defects in our social. 25 thus Petitioner. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress. howevern.. however. and employment generation for rural and urban workers. The Honorable Court of Appeals. the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. the issue had been pre-empted by that court. Page | 35 . In short. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. therefore. In Baremblatt vs. free education in the elementary and secondary levels reforestration. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. therefore.. (emphasis supplied) It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners. Resolved by the Senate. but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan. the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public and private lives integrity. and.e. and the weight to be ascribed to. press. a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal. neither Mr. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action. the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. The critical element is the exeistence of. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption. We cannot simply assume. the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act". 3019. it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against selfincrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit It was held that: We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him. would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.
If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear. the petition is GRANTED. the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry. including the circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan. The Court holds that. Page | 36 . testify and produce evidenc before it.We do not here modify these doctrines. SO ORDERED. would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government. under the facts. WHEREFORE. ordained by the Constitution. it is only becuase we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and. if pursued. which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee.
all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan. Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on thisreservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code. against their will. not issue. Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 14078. Mindoro. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660. and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes inMindoro. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. The Solicitor-General adds the following. WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. 7 MAR 1919] Friday. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Page | 37 . and to introduce civilized customs among them. and that confinement inreservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao. Political Law Therefore. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of theirliberty by the provincial officials of that province. were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao. Naujan Lake. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam. and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.RUBI VS. Further. (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. Also. (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam. therefore. NO. Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws. Habeas corpus can. in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. February 06. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province. Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. (3) The protection of the Manguianes. In that case. Thus. petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. 25 wherein nonChristian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands.
January 25. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone. There appears to be. VI. the Romualdez companies were sold for P5 million. no intended legislation involved. vs. Jr. Conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the Romualdezcorporations were carried in various newspapers. Political Law Facts: The Republic of the Philippines.R. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. Senator Enrile also called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law. The matter was referred by the Senate to the Blue Ribbon Committee. and that Ricardo Lopa. The speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation. 89914. November 20. represented by the PCGG. particularly with regard to RA 3019. including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one s self. But the power of both Houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. As provided under Art. and taking undue advantage of their relationship. The purpose of the inquiry was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino. No. the President s brother-in-law. Issue: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee sinquiry has valid legislative purpose as mandated by Art. Senator Enrile delivered a speech on the alleged take over by Lopa of SOLOIL Incorporated. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee G. influence and connection with the latter spouses. to a holding company controlled by Romualdez. particularly Lopa. 21. In the Senate. therefore. had effectively taken over the firm.Bengzon. the investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected. engaged in devices. had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Romualdez to the Lopa group. filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case against Benjamin Romualdez. Sec. This matter appears to be more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Sec. 21 Held: The Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both Houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Page | 38 . Other newspapers declared that shortly after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Republic of thePhilippines and the Filipino people. acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with then President Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos. The complaint alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez. without PCGG approval. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 1991 Sunday. the flagship of the First ManilaManagement of Companies owned by Romualdez. he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possibleviolation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided in the Senate Rules of Procedure. VI. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation.
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