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Conflict, Security & Development

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Challenging the discourse on fragile states
Eka Ikpe

To cite this Article Ikpe, Eka(2007) 'Challenging the discourse on fragile states', Conflict, Security & Development, 7: 1, 85

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To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14678800601176543 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678800601176543

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Conflict, Security & Development 7:1 April 2007

Challenging the discourse on fragile states
Eka Ikpe
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The paper reviews the current discourse on state fragility and examines the definitional basis for this label. It puts forward a model for defining state fragility that is based on the state’s capacity, which is its capability to protect itself, deliver services and manage economic risks and the state’s resilience, which has to do with the management of social relations and political risks. This model also takes into account both middleincome and low-income countries. The nature and extent of state fragility here is a

function of the relationship between state capacity and resilience. The relationship between state fragility and development and security outcomes is addressed with reference to the impact of initial conditions. The paper concludes by examining the resulting aid allocation on the basis of the existing state fragility discourse and puts forward an alternative aid allocation structure based on the proposed model for state fragility, and finds significant differences to the existing arrangement.

If dominant neo-liberal development models of the 1980s and early 1990s posited a false dichotomy between ‘state and the market’, the East Asian economic successes, and the post-9/11 priorities have brought the state firmly back on the agenda. At the other end of the spectrum, radical development and ethnographic theorists have posited a postdevelopment discourse, articulated from solidarist, quasi-Third-Worldist perspectives that propose fundamental global governance reforms and concentrate on radical public sector solutions to development problems.
Eka Ikpe is currently Research Associate and Project Coordinator with the Conflict Security and Development Group, King’s College, London. She is also a PhD Economics candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Her thesis is provisionally titled ‘Agriculture the means to an Industrialisation end: A study of the Nigerian State’s engagement with the Rice economy’.

ISSN 1467-8802 print/ISSN 1478-1174 online/07/010085-40 q 2007 International Policy Institute DOI: 10.1080/14678800601176543

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Eka Ikpe Ideological considerations aside, the failure of traditional development assistance

assumptions and practices in the ‘fragile states’ across vast swathes of Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and elsewhere, have called for a critical re-evaluation of governance as a development factor. The confluence of intellectual trends has led to a resurgence of the state in the development discourse. The nexus between conflict and what is variously described as state fragility, failure, weakness, poor performers and difficult environments
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or difficult partners; has highlighted the state’s vital role in delivering on development and security goals. The human security relevance of state weakness is vast: according to the definitions offered in this paper, the very fragile states constitute 1,372.6 million of the world’s population of which 773.9 million are among the poorest and insecure. Perversely, they receive the lowest per capita aid allocation of any grouping. Yet there has been a dearth of scholarly attention from the perspective of state theory and ‘mainstream’ war/security studies. This paper will look at the concept of state fragility in four parts: definition; characteristics; development and security. It also reviews aid allocation policies with reference to state fragility.

Defining state fragility
State fragility is a continuum. At one extreme, a state can be so frail that it will fail as soon as it is threatened by a hostile internal or external force. In the literature, the focus is skewed to those that fall in this category since they pose the greatest risks to regional and global stability. However, there are those that are weak but not so frail as to risk imminent collapse but are unwilling or unable to guarantee the welfare of their citizens. From a human security perspective, state fragility matters whether or not it affects international security. The key characteristics of fragile countries (variously described as weak, frail, failing, failed or as difficult partners and poor performers) is their instability and lack of responsiveness to human needs. From this perspective, fragility has to do with the capacity of the state to adapt to changed circumstances, protect citizens, absorb shocks and manage conflict without resort to violence. A state is not fragile if it can manage transition processes, and ensure its stability through peaceful management of change. In this paper, we define state fragility as a combination of capacity and resilience. Capacity is the capability of the state to protect

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

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itself, deliver services and manage economic risks. Resilience has to do with the management of social relations and political risks. Fragility (whether due to low capacity, low resilience or both) is a source of instability.1 Instability is not a simple causal process, but a dynamic outcome of various pressures including initial conditions, triggering events and fragility. Capacity and resilience are structural characteristics of the state.2 The resulting instability is self-perpetuating if the
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structural handicaps are deeply rooted and resistant to remedy or if the state is subjected to brutal and recurrent shocks that prevent recuperation. The interplay between external challenges, structural factors and initial conditions is complex so that accurate prediction of system behaviour is not feasible. In other words, fragility characteristics only measure proneness to instability. They have limited predictive value. Development and security outcomes are only partly explained by structural factors. Human agency and exogenous influences also intervene.

The state of the debate
The discourse on state fragility has been driven by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the subsequent war on terrorism and Coalition interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, analysis should not be overly focused on these two country contexts given that they are highly distinct models of state fragility and, therefore, exclude the vast majority of fragile states. Thus, the ‘War on Terror’ led agenda has resulted in a focus on the category of states leaning closest to state failure or countries suspected of harbouring Al Qaeda linked groups, leading to skewed analysis and policy priorities. The UK Department for International Development (DfID) defines fragile states as ‘those countries where the government cannot or will not deliver core services to the majority of its people, including the poor’. It is based on the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA), a set of indicators derived from the state’s performance record on economic management, structural policies, social inclusion, equity as well as public sector management and institutions. The World Bank has a similar category also based on the CPIA- Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS). These are countries plagued by poor policies, institutions and governance so that they cannot deliver effective poverty reduction especially with regard to economic management, social services delivery and government efficacy.3 Here the

4 Downloaded By: [University of California. The indicators used to generate the index are also wide ranging in the consideration of social. First. these are more outcomes than . the DFID definition posits that some countries ‘will not deliver core services to its people’ as if they invariably had the financial and administrative resources to do so. In effect. which inadvertently limits the usefulness of the concept for global security assessments. The Failed States Index. The state fragility model being put forward here. the CPIA measurement. Many definitions co-exist for state fragility. Dollar and Levin also posit that their paper seeks to investigate whether ‘there is a group of ‘forgotten states’ with low income and weak institutions. economic.) with policy performance. Remarkably.88 Eka Ikpe differences are seen as occurring in terms of having conflict or not. but they share some features. which are countries that are noted as having weak capacity and weak states as defined by the Overseas Economic Co-operation for Development (OECD). What is found to be most significant is ‘uneven development’.5 There is clearly an overwhelming use of the ‘development lens’ on the problem of state fragility. etc. wars. Fragile states are also defined with reference to their particular connection to the developed world mostly in terms of donor engagement. However. which comes closest to the Fragility Index in its broader range. which comprises poverty and inequality and criminalisation and delegitimisation of the state. is the focus on low-income countries. middle income countries. as well as varying levels of government capacity. Difficult Partnership Countries (DPC). fails to isolate the initial conditions as it includes debt in its economic management ratings and inequality in its social inclusion ratings. Thus. political and military factors. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Owing to the aid dimension of state fragility. The list comprises both low and middle-income countries with an understanding of a scale in vulnerability. most lists of fragile states are limited to low income countries even though the most severe global security risks may well lie with large. upon which three of the definitions are based. structural characteristics and policy design features it conflates the legacy of history (including colonialism. These lists are as shown in Table 1. by using a mix of initial conditions. aims to overcome these biases. is in contrast to the prevalent narrow scope of what constitutes instability.6 This in essence penalises country policy makers trying to improve the lot of their citizens and handicapped by factors that are beyond their control. which receive significantly less aid than other recipients’. The LICUS are explicitly low income and DfID’s fragile states are so because they are concerned with aid performance and allocations. The final and less clear-cut problem is a subliminal focus on countries that have been weakened by exogenous shocks or internal dissension and are perceived to be vulnerable.

DfID 46 Afghanistan Angola Azerbaijan Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo. Rep of Guinea Guinea Bissau Haiti Lao Liberia Myanmar Niger Nigeria Papua New Guinea Sao Tome and Principe Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Somalia Sudan Tajikistan Timor Leste Failed states index Afghanistan Angola Azerbaijan Bahrain Bangladesh Belarus Bhutan Bosnia and Herzegovina Burma Burundi Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Colombia Cuba Dominican Republic Congo. The Guatemala Guinea Haiti Challenging the discourse on fragile states 89 . The Georgia Guinea Guinea Bissau Guyana Haiti Indonesia Kenya Kiribati Lao LICUS Afghanistan Angola Burundi Cambodia Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo. Dem Rep. Congo. Rep. Rep. Dem. Rep Ecuador Egypt Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia. Dem. Congo. Rep of ˆ Cote d’Ivoire Djibouti Dominica Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Table 1. Rep.Downloaded By: [University of California. Congo. of ˆ Cote d’Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Gambia. The Georgia Guinea Guinea Bissau Haiti Kosovo Lao Liberia Myanmar Niger Nigeria Papua New Guinea Sao Tome and Principe Sierra Leone DPCs Afghanistan Angola Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo. Dem.

90 Table 1—continued Downloaded By: [University of California. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Eka Ikpe DfID 46 Liberia Mali Myanmar Nepal Niger Nigeria Papua New Guinea Sao Tome and Principe Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Somalia Sudan Tajikistan Timor Leste Togo Tonga Uzbekistan Vanuatu Yemen Zimbabwe – – – – – – LICUS Solomon Islands Somalia Sudan Tajikistan Timor Leste Togo Uzbekistan Zimbabwe – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – DPCs Togo Uruguay Yemen Zimbabwe – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Failed states index Honduras Indonesia Iran Iraq Ivory coast Kenya Laos Lebanon Liberia Mozambique Nepal Nigeria North Korea Pakistan Paraguay Peru Philippines Russia Rwanda Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Syria Tajikistan Tanzania .

Challenging the discourse on fragile states 91 . Dollar and Levin. 2005. Foreign Policy July/August 2005.Downloaded By: [University of California. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Table 1—continued DfID 46 – – – – – – – LICUS – – – – – – – DPCs – – – – – – – Failed states index Turkey Uganda Ukraine Uzbekistan Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Sources: DfID. 2005.

a relatively healthy . primary product dominance and ‘landlockedness’. accountability and political freedom. The logic of the state fragility model sees capacity and resilience as antecedents to the security and development. Grievances (and incentives to resort to the exit option) intensify when state capacity to deliver services in a competent and fair fashion is absent. Initial or structural conditions are also considered as these have a strong impact on the development and security outcomes. which together determine both the nature and the extent of its fragility.g.8 Hence. Social services delivery and economic management measure capacity. due to lack of resilience or wholesale capture of the state.7 Of these 70 per cent are either in the ‘critical’ or ‘in danger’ categories of the Failed States Index. Sixty-five per cent of the countries on the Failed States Index appear on the Very Fragile States list. where capacity is needed to achieve development and resilience is needed to mediate conflicting interests and achieve security.g. and resilience is measured by voice. With a breakdown in resilience. Additionally. capacity and resilience are structural characteristics of the state. The model: a basic explanation The state’s ability is seen as being defined by its resilience and capacity. loyalty is presented as a restraint on exit that activates the voice option and depends on the identification of the citizen with the representatives of the state (e. It views violence as an extreme form of exit and voice (a key characteristic of resilience) as its antidote. as a by-product of nationalism or ethnic identification). infant mortality. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 the steady deterioration of social political and economic institutions. The model is rooted in Hirschman’s Exit. e. There is the acknowledgement that state collapse may be sudden or involve Downloaded By: [University of California. inequality. None the less. The ‘democratic glue’ facilitates dialogue about resource allocation and allows peaceful resolution of disputes. debt/GDP. Initial conditions are measured by the following variables: per capita income. The discontent may escalate and culminate in violence when the voice option is not activated. the measure intrinsically comprises initial conditions in the previously mentioned inequality. deficits in capacity or resilience threaten the state’s stability by threatening its security or development. In this scheme.92 Eka Ikpe causal elements of what drives the state’s status. Voice and Loyalty trilogy. malnutrition. With the fragility index. pains have been taken in the Failed States index to target both states that are visibly approaching violent internal conflict and those that are at varying levels of vulnerability.

This means that the least fragile states will therefore be strong on both capacity and resilience and exhibit the highest development and security outcomes. Characteristics of fragile states In applying the state fragility model to the low-income and middle-income groups of countries as defined by the World Bank. Other things being equal. The implied hypothesis of the model is that capacity is strongly linked to development outcomes and resilience is strongly linked to security outcomes. whereas the most fragile states will have the worst capacity and resilience levels and consequently the poorest development and security outcomes. Capacity and resilience are interlinked. Capacity is largely about economics and resilience is largely about politics. The not fragile group of states refers to . a common language. The characteristics of these various categories.Challenging the discourse on fragile states 93 level of state capacity may not be sufficient to prevent violence if the citizens can no longer identify with the state and respond to a performance shortfall or an exogenous shortfall by relying on the voice option. This is confirmed by the high proportion of low capacity states with low development levels at 64 per cent and the even higher proportion of low resilience states with low security levels at 79 per cent. Fragility typology This research has resulted in three rankings of fragile states that are as follows: not fragile (NF). Communist China and the former Soviet Union. a distinctive culture and national symbols can strengthen a sense of identity and contribute to loyalty and preserve state stability (at least for some time) Downloaded By: [University of California. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 despite performance set backs as in Post Independent Sub-Saharan Africa. The interaction takes place in the society that defines the internal dynamics given cultural and institutional factors. very fragile (VF) and somewhat fragile (SF). they are also subject to different dynamics and tension exists between the two characteristics. However. the result has posited three typologies of fragility that will be addressed in this section of the paper. the number of people and the prevalent regions will be examined.9 Another important factor that introduces a different aspect to the logic of resilience is strong and charismatic leadership. in terms of the coincidence of poverty and conflict.

6 million and 21 per cent of the world’s population of which at 773. No countries on the list have both low poverty levels and high insecurity levels. It is important to note that although this is indicative of an underlying relationship pattern between conflict and poverty. 56 per cent are also among the poorest and insecure. and the not fragile states constitute only 12 per cent. however. . it is at this point a mere leaning and can only be better understood with more in-depth research. There is.11 The added categorisation on this point is useful in better addressing the particularity of the fragility and thus positing more efficient rules of engagement. This leans to the suggestion of greater susceptibility of conflict encouraging poverty than of the alternative at the margins. Of the 11412 middle income and low-income countries being assessed. What are the implications for human security (conflict and poverty) of low state capacity and resilience.163.344. the capacity fragile states are most represented in both the country groups with high poverty and low security and high poverty and high security. The very fragile states constitute 1. The somewhat fragile states have 3. where policy oriented research can then be justified as facilitating a real response to a real problem. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 per cent. high state capacity and low state resilience. The somewhat fragile states are either capacity fragile10 or resilience fragile.13 What do fragile states look like? This paper’s contention is based on the coincidence of particular levels of state capacity and state resilience. They also receive the lowest per capita aid allocation at US $33.94 Eka Ikpe states that are strong on both capacity and resilience whereas the very fragile states are weak on both capacity and resilience. The resilience fragile states are most represented among the country group with low security and medium poverty levels at 33 per cent. the somewhat fragile states constitute another 44 Downloaded By: [University of California. high state capacity and high state resilience? The relevance of the state fragility discourse is best identified in its empirical realities. although 16 per cent of the countries have low insecurity and high poverty levels. because of the dynamic nature of fragility that is widely accepted. low state capacity and high state resilience. Alternatively. the very fragile states constitute 44 per cent.4 million.372. This reinforces the importance of identifying the type of fragility to better ascertain the appropriate responses. a need to avoid a stifled and dogmatic approach in favour of a dynamic and adaptable one.9 million.1 million people of which China and India make up 2.

The smallest traders are the countries that are some of the poorest and most insecure. the single biggest trader is a largely manufacturing goods exporter.6 million sans China as compared to the capacity Downloaded By: [University of California. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 fragile states total of 228. Alternatively. The most fragile states are most represented by the Sub-Saharan African countries at 56 per cent. which constitutes 10 per cent and the smallest group is of Central. insecurity and therefore fragility.Challenging the discourse on fragile states 95 The not fragile states have poverty and security levels that range from medium to high in both instances. Central African Republic.5 per cent. the largest group are the Eastern European and Newly Independent States of the Soviet Union at 32 per cent.. following the ‘conflict to poverty’ ` dynamic vis-a-vis the ‘poverty to conflict’ dynamic mentioned earlier.1 in Appendix 2 for data on the Very Fragile states. However. Although. With the resilient fragile countries. Furthermore. whereas the manufacturing product exports for the latter exceeds that of the former. This is a particularly varied group and is indicative of the especially prolific nature of non-resilience.1 million sans India. followed by Central. including Congo Dem Rep.5 per cent as do Central. The capacity fragile states again are most represented by Sub-Saharan African countries at 60 per cent. See Table A2. The resilience fragile states have a total population of 586. the imports of goods and services are similar for both somewhat fragile groups. Asian countries follow at 19. the richest and most secure states have a high representation of capacity fragile states which rather implies that low resilience levels may be more detrimental than low capacity levels on the boundaries. The Sub-Saharan African countries are at 16 per cent and the North African and Middle Eastern States are the smallest group at 13 per cent. Burundi and Sudan. the exports of goods and services are more for the resilience fragile states. The next group is of the Eastern European countries. . The most fragile countries are also overwhelmingly primary goods producers and exporters. and the countries that import and export the most tend to be the mineral resource producers such as Angola and Nigeria. South America and the West Indies at 19. South America and the West Indies at 8 per cent. On average. This poses a great challenge in the face of the earlier intimation of the greater threat posed by the resilience fragile states relative to the capacity fragile states. However. Swaziland. the numbers for both country groups are similar there are some poignant contrasts. South America and the West Indies at 20 per cent and the Asian countries at 20 per cent. The second largest group constitutes the Middle Eastern and North African countries at 13 per cent alongside Asia also at 13 per cent. the primary product exports for the capacity fragile states exceed those for the resilience fragile states.

The majority of the poorest and insecure in this collective group of the most fragile remains the low-income countries. This indicates some difference as to the characteristics of state fragility depending on income levels especially with somewhat fragile states.3 for the data on Capacity and Resilience Fragile states. as income levels are mainly because of capacity levels. As expected. This is as would be expected. However. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 weak resilience to fragility and security as was indicated earlier. It is certainly not a myth that the majority of the most fragile countries are indeed low income as they have the lowest capacity levels coupled with the lowest resilience levels. the resilience fragile countries on average receive less per capita aid that their capacity fragile counterparts at US $48 compared with US $54. The majority of these very fragile middle-income countries are in Africa and the Middle East at 66 per cent. This is a substantial proportion to warrant addressing the vulnerability of middle-income countries in this group. Please see Tables A2. but the middle-income states make up 24 per cent of the total. different? The literature on fragile states has overwhelmingly focussed on low-income states. The especially significant findings arise in the somewhat fragile states. where the resilience fragile states overwhelmingly consists of middle-income countries at 90 per cent as compared with the capacity fragile states at 45 per cent.96 Eka Ikpe An important related factor is that 53 per cent of the resilience fragile group are middle-income group whereas 45 per cent of the capacity fragile group are middleincome countries. where middle-income countries would clearly perform better. The majority of fragile states are indeed low-income.2 and A2. as they tend to have the less favourable initial conditions as well as the poorer outcomes. more analysis of these countries will be especially pertinent for addressing proneness to conflict and therefore abating low security outcomes. Given the possibility of relatively more severe problem of the impact of Downloaded By: [University of California. putting them at risk of both high poverty and insecurity. a truer picture as to the extent of state fragility emerges. in isolating initial conditions and the development and security outcomes. . The low-income countries do remain in the worst conditions. Middle-income fragile states and low-income fragile states. which are interestingly concentrated in Africa and Central/South America and the West Indies.

the disparity is lower at 43 per cent for the middle-income countries and 31 per cent for the low-income countries.1. the figures are also dire. It is of course probable that the level of state fragility is reinforced by the outcomes on the ground as low development levels make it more difficult to invest in strengthening capacity levels as a result of financial limitations. For the somewhat fragile states. low-income countries are again in the minority at 27 per cent to the middle income countries’ 59 per cent as with the resilience fragile states at 49 per cent. within the ‘very fragile’ states. development and security Fragility is intended to provide insight to the development and security levels experienced by a country. low resilience is further threatened by violent conflict where the citizens are unable to exercise voice and therefore decide on exiting in the most extreme mode of violence. Fragility. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 states at 39 per cent and 44 per cent compared to the low-income countries’ 26 per cent and 21 per cent respectively. causality is seen as stemming from state fragility to the development and security outcomes.Challenging the discourse on fragile states 97 Looking at Table A2. the very fragile states have the largest proportion of low development and security countries at 65 per cent and 82 per cent respectively. In this analysis. Interestingly. Likewise. such as is possible in a country case study. Exports as a proportion of GDP are also higher for the middle-income countries for both the capacity and resilient fragile Downloaded By: [University of California. Alternatively. Any stringent claims in this regard will be best confirmed by more extensive and specialised research into the linkages in a particular relationship between development. With the capacity fragile states. in unpacking the somewhat fragile states the resilience fragile states are more likely to achieve high development than the capacity fragile states at 45 per cent to 38 per cent respectively. at 58 per cent low development and 52 per cent low security respectively. security and state fragility. . capacity fragile states are more likely to achieve high security than the resilience fragile states at 67 per cent and 35 per cent respectively. manufacturing exports are higher for the middle-income countries than for the low-income countries at 38 per cent to 28 per cent respectively. In other words. For the very fragile states. An additional interesting factor is that capacity levels do not appear to matter as much for development as resilience factors do for security. for instance.

Sixty-eight per cent of countries with unfavourable initial conditions deliver poor development outcomes and again 68 per cent of them are insecure.98 Eka Ikpe Why is looking at only fragility insufficient to explain outcomes? In order to proffer policy recommendations to address less than favourable outcomes it is necessary to identify the key factors that are responsible. Even in this instance.20 Separating out initial conditions enables the focus to be placed where there can be beneficial change by identifying where state performance can bring . although it began as resilience fragile. building state capacity has rightly become the focus15 with the understanding that it will impact security outcomes by improving development outcomes. It may be argued that the US/UK coalition’s engagement with Iraq in 2003/04 has affected security outcomes more so than the level of the state’s fragility. Although state fragility is at the core of the factors that will most affect outcomes. but none the less an example of where state fragility may not have been the initial basis for troubled security and development outcomes.16 Another factor that has been seminally addressed with regard to influencing state’s performance in Picciotto et al. One of the most influential is the state of the international community. the more favourable the development and security outcomes. This is of course an extreme example. From this experience with the breakdown of the state. there are exogenous14 factors that also heavily affect development and security. The Downloaded By: [University of California. initial conditions are very relevant for both development and security outcomes.17 in spite of being well overdue18 is the role of initial conditions. state capacity and therefore the development outcomes. They influence development and security outcomes. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 international working of the global economy progressively means that international politics can also be an important factor in determining outcomes. is clear that the less favourable the initial conditions the lower the development and security outcomes and the more favourable initial conditions are. especially with the increasingly globalised world. Here one sees the problem with the CPIA measurement in its failure to isolate the initial conditions as it includes debt in its economic management ratings and inequality in its social inclusion ratings. some degree of coercion-restrained violence and to some degree loyalty in the customs. and they are not subject to state performance. but has worsened the security outcome. The external intervention may have improved state resilience in the recent elections.19 From Table 2. Clearly. rules and social protocols perhaps emanating from a largely Islamic state appear to have held it together.

Initial conditions. State fragility and poverty State fragility exceeds the boundaries it is attributed by the focus on poverty. where they reinforce one another and causality is highly complex and can therefore not be generalised. but rather . An additional and very pertinent factor is the limited collaboration between development and security discourse on poverty and conflict within the same context. security and development High development No. colonisation. (%) Favourable initial conditions (44) Unfavourable initial conditions (70) Total (114) 26 (59) Low development No. The issue at hand is that the state is responsible for the welfare of its populace and this comprises both poverty reduction and strengthening security. although with the outbreak of conflict remains a salient concern.21 The absence of middle-income states in the state fragility discourse is also because of the overwhelming emphasis on poverty. (%) 17 (39) 99 Low security No. it is notable that the less fragile a state. However. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 22 (32) 48 (68) 22 (32) 48 (68) about change and where the problems are subject to more factors than the state performance such as geographical conditions. the better it will be able to manage poor initial conditions. poverty is unlikely to feature substantially. (%) 27 (61) Downloaded By: [University of California. less fragile states may have acceptable development levels coexisting with low security outcomes. as has already been noted. There is a relationship between poverty and conflict. However.22 This state fragility model is not premised upon poverty with conflict treated as an appendage. (%) 18 (41) High security No. disease epidemics and international markets’ activity. In these situations.Challenging the discourse on fragile states Table 2. This is evident in the high coincidence of poverty and conflict among the most fragile states. Collier and Dollar noted the relevance of conflict situations to aid allocation with regard to its impact on poverty but conceded difficulty in its inclusion in aid allocation assessment due to a poor theoretical base.

security and human rights all imperative. and debt levels will positively influence development and security outcomes. the MDG indicators comprise of both initial conditions and capacity as the former includes malnutrition. . and debt levels. The path to achieving these MDGs is relevant to whether or not the process will reduce the chances of conflict as complex and interlinking factors that can push progress such as governance reform. The reverse implications of conflict on the progress on the MDGs is clearer and sharper. Accordingly we will not enjoy development without security. This shows that the MDGs are closely associated with one another so that improvements in some will likely be coincidental with improvements in others. Our very fragile list. . which implies low capacity levels. a vital crisis-MDG nexus has been insufficiently examined. They also constitute the most difficult and necessary environments in which to achieve the goals. In this framework. even though human welfare. As a result. countries at some level of achievement on the MDGs are less susceptible to conflict. we will not enjoy security without development . therefore.100 Eka Ikpe emphasises the importance of both in their own right.25 Among our most fragile states. Our conclusion has been that countries with low initial conditions tend also to be fragile. is threatened. except in . in spite of its acknowledgement. The MDGs are. whereas the latter deals with literacy rates and health service delivery. most relevant to any attempt to tackle state fragility and improve human security levels. Poverty alone draws the discussion to looking at measures that mostly address development. . the status of the progress on the millennium goals is similar to the PRDE report on the progress in DfID’s fragile state list in 2000. rule of law and human rights are vital for state resilience. the progress on MDGs that are especially linked to initial conditions such as malnutrition. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 State fragility and the millennium development goals Pro-poor development has become the acceptable mandate for many of the poorest countries in the world. security outcomes are sidelined. has 73 per cent of which have low initial conditions.24 One may observe the reinforcing impact of capacity on resilience with regard to state fragility. . as Kofi Annan stated that ‘Not only are development. infant mortality. a number of which are very fragile states as has already been mentioned. they also reinforce each other .’23 Thus. Poor outcomes on the MDGs can exacerbate conflict situations and conversely. . Furthermore. Downloaded By: [University of California. infant mortality. therefore. . with crises slowing down and often reversing hard won gains.

thus building resilience. poverty levels remain the best indicator that MDG 1 is very much threatened by the situation in fragile states. .84.26 Although the data is largely flawed. which is reportedly twice as high as in other developing countries. as it is a vector borne disease. the UNDP also address possible means of dealing with negative security outcomes by presenting a forum for political and social dialogue.27 Progress on this has been notably slow in all developing countries.000 births respectively. UNDP posits that MDGs will be best served when adapted to local conditions. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 cent in fragile states.000 and 604 per 100.29 Universal Primary education is also a vital minimum as completion rates are unlikely to be as high as enrolment rates. For MDG 3 the elimination of gender disparity by 2015 seems distant as it is currently only at 0.Challenging the discourse on fragile states 101 the instance of the Malaria Death Rate (Table 3). simply sustaining this as the status quo will be insufficient for achieving the target. This will be addressed later in the section. so that in conflict settings it is essential that the right entry point to plugging in to the MDGs be sought.30 MDG 4 and MDG 5 of reducing the child and maternal mortality rates are very much behind the 2015 targets particularly in the fragile states at 116 per 1. As the MDGs are directly targeted at the development outcomes in the primary aim of tackling poverty. The malarial death rate is even higher than the Difficult Environment estimate as has been previously mentioned. On average approximately 28 per cent of the countries that are fragile states are undernourished. A three-fold improvement is needed as compared to the other developing countries. At the current improvement rates the child mortality target of 26 per 1. Although improvements have been reported in the difficult environments.28 MDG 2 of primary education enrolment is also not on schedule at 74 per Downloaded By: [University of California.31 They are overwhelmingly concentrated in these fragile states at 33 per cent. Additionally. This has not faired better due to poor progress in meeting the necessary challenge for achieving this goal of increasing the number of people with access to safe water. The pursuit of the Goals should always be a means of reducing difficulty and not its source. Factors that may help to determine the path of MDGs achievement to adopt include the typology and duration of the crisis as well as the paths to development and governance structures that can determine the best response on the MDGs to ease the situation. It is very much related to MDG 7 of maintaining environmental sustainability. For MDG 6 the Very Fragile states have about 78 per cent of those living with HIV in the developing world.000 seems implausible given the high fragile states’ and difficult environments’ average.

This consensus is based upon the mood of contemporary global economic and political arena brought about by eventualities. it is necessary to address them with reference to the particular outcomes of fragility that are encountered. MDG progress in difficult environments and very fragile states Very fragile states 468 million 28% 74% 0.000 % of population without access to safe water Downloaded By: [University of California.33 This will often serve to undermine the long-term objective of rebuilding state capacity. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Source: PRDE (2004) and Human Development Indicators 2004.84 116 604 26. because these difficult environments make up about 14 per cent of the world population32 and our most fragile states list make up about 21 per cent it is evident that immense developments must be pursued for any progress overall.35 If the MDGs are to be achieved. Furthermore. UNDP has a guide that focuses on how to use the Millennium Declaration in these complex settings.1 million 90 38% MDGs Number of people living on less than US $1 a day Proportion of undernourished Primary education enrolment Primary education female:male enrolment Ratio Child mortality rate per 1000 Maternal mortality per 100. Additionally. the acknowledgement of the failure of conditionalities.84 138 734 17.34 These challenges have meant that this group of countries has remained largely neglected. there is a rising consensus that neglect is not a viable option but rather developing a new means of engagement. These include the drive for the MDGs in the fight against poverty. when to use trade offs such as when to raise the MDGs and when it may be best to be less ‘vocal’ about them as well as other .102 Eka Ikpe Table 3. and that tend to put off meaningful donor engagements with the state in favour of engaging with non-state actors. the fear of disease spread and the perceived post 9/11 security threats. The challenges of achieving the MDGs in these countries are in that the weak capacity levels of the states greatly diminish the opportunities for progress. These states also have weak resilience levels that can be indicative of severe legitimacy and governance problems.4 million 6678 33% Difficult environments 343 million 33% 70% 0. These include poor state capacity and hence administration capability as well as poor security levels. However. a number of factors make engagement especially difficult in these states. which impinge on personal security of the staff.000 Number of people living with HIV/AIDS Malaria death rate per 100.

the Millennium Declaration details a commitment to peace. but not far enough DfID’s approach to aid in difficult environments is to be guided by ‘improving human development outcomes for poor and vulnerable people. government . As a result. The focus on the targets and indicators associated with the MDGs also drive capacity building in the concerned sectors at least initially. monitoring and statistical analysis. state fragility improves on this progress in that. Additionally. being proposed here is also cognisant of initial conditions. aid allocation to the developing world was being steered by their policy status. The additional dimension. where slight concessions are being made to this stance. Aid allocation and poverty: a step forward.36 This is discussed as follows. and so goes even further in addressing the dynamics of factors that the state may not be directly responsible for.Challenging the discourse on fragile states 103 means of effective communication. prioritising policy action and resources. the Millennium Declaration provides a useful tool for advocacy as along with the MDGs they address clear-cut targets within specific time frames and present a sense of urgency to addressing the development challenges. it considers both capacity and resilience levels. The MDGs can also provide a framework within which to position external support in alignment with ongoing domestic progress for the most efficient outcomes. thus tackling poverty and conflict. coordination of related activities. whereby countries conceived as having poor policies and capacity levels were receiving less aid.37 Furthermore. with regard to budgeting. Building pro-poor. As has been discussed so far. Although the provision for security outcomes and state resilience is limited within the MDGs. the additional factor that is considered is the poverty level in the country. aid allocation based on state fragility takes a holistic approach in aiming to address development and security outcomes. resilience may be strengthened by consensus and coalition building as well as the provision of information to the public that can result from an efficient national dialogue about local and national needs and priorities. Aid allocation in fragile states Until recently. security and human rights. The Declaration along with the MDGs can directly impact resilience by providing a Downloaded By: [University of California. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 means through which the state apparatus may be held to account by its populace.

this would necessitate a focus on counter cyclical budget support to cover non-deferrable recurrent expenditure. Collier and Dollar . therefore.104 Eka Ikpe led systems’. thus. Guillaumont and Chauvet report that aid especially raises the growth rate in countries that are most susceptible to shocks. When conflict is considered if at all.41 Collier and Dollar also note that although research on aid allocation in vulnerable environments is in its infancy. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 which is also largely a consequence of the poverty alleviation drive.40 However. the goal is increasingly of human security as well as human development. It has been widely established that there is a clear link between poverty and conflict although the argument is skewed to the effect of the latter on the former. Collier and Dollar’s work on poverty efficient aid allocation also focuses on poverty levels as guidance on aid allocation. Aid allocation: the emerging consensus on aid in fragile states As mentioned earlier. State fragility would be a vital component of the process and. it fails to address the issue of human security. serving the status of the state and identifying those at or near the threshold of the ‘risk of state failure’. Indeed. Downloaded By: [University of California. thus raising a country’s level of shock proneness. which is likely to be adversely affected. it is in its effect on poverty and therefore implies looking at conflict only after it has occurred. be an external stabilising factor to supporting country capacity and resilience. so that there is certainly a movement in the discourse about the greater need for human security but practical measures to achieving this are not likewise pursued. the poorest of the poor countries do not have the best policy efficiency levels and hence remain receiving the least aid.44 This is notably pertinent for the pursuit of the MDGs in support to the vulnerable health and education departments.38 This clearly targets human development in focussing on poverty. results have suggested that shocks need to be taken into account. albeit with a continued focus on policy efficiency so that the poorest with the best policies are to be the highest aid recipients. Both allocation systems barely consider middle-income countries.43 Particularly relevant for low capacity levels.42 A more systematic approach will have to be developed given the hitherto ad hoc system of donor engagement that has been in place in conflict societies. state fragility is a core element of the level of instability that could ensue. Aid can.39 As is to be expected. With conflict and conflict susceptibility as an integral part of the consideration for aid allocation. as aid provides a bolster for government revenue.

Additionally. and Collier et al. and therefore.48 It also addresses a range of resilience levels as it tackles both post conflict and non-post conflict countries via peace building efforts. aid is found to reduce the risk of conflict. as it does not deal with capacity. The security sector comprises an Downloaded By: [University of California.Challenging the discourse on fragile states 105 acknowledge the need for aid allocation to take on an enlarged spectrum of consideration in addressing security outcomes in addition to the previous focus on poverty. justice and law enforcement organisations as well as civil management and oversight bodies. The largest aid instrument by DFID in the LICUS was humanitarian aid at 34 per cent as opposed to 11 per cent in non-LICUS.. humanitarian aid may fail to address fragility in itself.47 Also in some less resilience fragile states. The oft-employed ad hoc approach of aid to fragile states has led to an overwhelming dominance of humanitarian aid within ‘difficult environments’.45 In Collier and Hoeffler. controlled for the basic country characteristics of population and income and . The expectation is that more aid is allocated to the countries with the more fragile states. This allows for useful distinctions within this group of countries that is often treated as homogeneous.50 The concern with humanitarian aid is that it may be at odds with longer-term developmental goals. particularly through economic variables. Fragile states with serious governance deficits may require a fundamental transformation of relations between the civil authorities and civil society on the one hand and the security forces on the other hand in order to provide stable environments for sustainable development. the capacity element of fragility. Fragility and initial conditions efficient (FICE) aid allocation State fragility based aid allocation addresses the specificity and extent of fragility in the relevant countries. the reform of these institutions is an essential process of effecting change in the way the security establishment is governed.46 The best identifiable mode of addressing aid with respect to resilience is examining its impact on Security Sector Transformation or Reform. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 array of institutions including the security forces.49 This has been notably because of a bid to tackle disasters that have already occurred and to bypass the states. it takes into account the initial conditions in these countries so as not to penalise states for factors beyond their control.51 In bypassing government structures. This analysis is based on a simple relationship between aid and state fragility and initial conditions.

the Collier and Dollar. where development can thrive.59 Security Sector Transformation or Reform necessarily aims to address consistent and long-term break down of governance in fragile states.106 Eka Ikpe focuses on aid volumes specifically. Nigeria and Pakistan56 do receive more. Its ethos mirrors that of Collier and Dollar. In McGillivary. Therefore. even though some countries.57 Likewise with the fragility efficiency allocation model.53 This is the case in this model where this need is defined by fragility levels. in any given country. It is important also to acknowledge that research on the subject is very young and emerging. The particular innovation with a fragility-based system is that the countries being addressed have very low capacity and are therefore what is widely termed ‘poor policy’ countries. as donors quite often have more country specific information and pre-existing relationship patterns. donor agencies have a responsibility to use it as effectively as possible to reduce poverty’ with the additional aim of improving security outcomes. including Honduras. it is a complex process as a fundamental shift in the way security is conceived and a resolute pursuit of an inclusive governance agenda is necessary to transform these countries into stable and secure environments. As was discussed earlier aid allocation has generally favoured the countries with the best policies because of the implication that these countries have the best absorptive capacity levels.52 However. As Chauvet and Collier rightly note. as is the forte of humanitarian aid.54 They are largely found to allocate less aid than the actual aid allocations. Lesotho and Uganda55 as well as Ethiopia. in that ‘aid is scarce. these vulnerable countries require particular consistency and commitment in aid flows not least of all. some countries receive less aid than would otherwise be the preferred case. it is not intended to limit donor engagement but rather serve as a guide for structured aid allocation to influence not only development but also security. aid can be an effective component for building capacity both directly and indirectly. Furthermore. . a good pattern of aid allocation must be primarily in proportion to its need.60 The intricate steps that the process entails will require a strategic and systematic funding procedure given the particularly unstable environments involved. however. it can enable long term planning as opposed to crisis management. McGillivray and White and Llavador and Roemer models are examined along with the resulting aid allocation levels. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 According to McGillivary and White. Downloaded By: [University of California.58 When it is efficiently channelled. in light of their lagging performance on the MDGs as well as their aid dependence. the most fragile states receive more total aid under the system than their actual allocation. India.

Therefore. Although better policy is important to raise growth levels and best utilise investment. Additionally the ‘aid darlings’ so called because of their stronger policy performance are allocated less under the fragility efficient mechanism and include Ethiopia and Uganda.5 m compared to the FICE aid allocation of US $22.61 Additional ‘aid orphans’ include non-post conflict countries such as Central African Republic. The allocation does not use policy as criteria for aid allocation as this marginalises Downloaded By: [University of California.7 m. Equatorial Guinea and Gambia.148. The smaller states that are also prone to being ‘aid orphans’. which has given rise to the higher aid volumes than the Actual ODA allocation.62 Even though the post-conflict countries such as Sierra Leone and Rwanda are considered ‘aid darlings’. allocation here should have the largest impact on fragility reduction. The total actual ODA allocation to the very fragile states in 2002 was US $19.Challenging the discourse on fragile states 107 Findings In this analysis. This is an interesting picture given that both these countries are not formally democracies and it points to the fact that ‘formal democratic governments’ need not necessarily heighten resilience. Haiti. Our findings confirm that the FICE allocation allocates a substantially higher proportion of total aid to the most fragile states than the actual ODA aid allocation. . such as Comoros. which will also tend to have the lowest levels of policy performance. ‘Aid darlings’ like the militarily strategic countries including Egypt and Pakistan. cutting aid allocation to these countries is unlikely to enable a means of improvement. The differences in the two sets of allocations have been both in increases to certain countries and decreases to others. Figure 1 illustrates the differences and highlights greater consistency in accordance to fragility and initial conditions. The central goal is reducing state fragility by strengthening capacity and resilience. Chad. Sudan and Guinea which have had their allocation increased under the FICE allocations. actual aid allocations are compared to fragility and initial conditions efficient (FICE) allocations for the very fragile states that constitute the priority group in this assessment as well as the LICUS. which are decreased under the FICE allocations. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 the most fragile states.63 the FICE allocation leaves allocation a little higher than actual levels as these countries are amidst attempts to rebuild shattered livelihoods and are concurrently at the greatest risk of relapse into conflict. on account of their size are some of the largest gainers under the FICE allocations. as they are not deemed the most fragile of the group. receive substantial actual allocations.244. Lao PDR.

Fragility and initial conditions efficient and ODA allocation to VF states. See Table A2. Clearly countries like Congo Dem Rep. Syria.9 m as compared with US $9919 m under the FICE allocation system. Based on the desperate confines of current aid volumes. As for the Very Fragile States in Figure 2. Likewise. such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are also largely recipients of higher allocations under the FICE measure. . hence. The allocation system is strengthened in a consistent higher allocation for the Bank’s own LICUS. It is again clearly necessary that political considerations be taken into account. This may be attributed to the fact that they are on the brink with very fragile states. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Figure 1. there is the need for a push for a substantial increase in their levels all round.5 for data on FICE Aid Allocation as compared to Actual Aid Allocation for LICUS. where they are actually allocated US $6773. As the measure is devoid of political considerations it allocates higher aid volumes to the Arab states including Iran. See Table A2.5 for data on FICE aid allocation as compared to actual aid allocation for the very fragile states. It is important to note that the end suggestion is not that these figures are the most appropriate.108 Eka Ikpe Downloaded By: [University of California. larger countries including Bangladesh and Indonesia have suffered slight decreases to their allocation under the FICE allocation. we see a more consistent FICE aid allocation leading to higher aid disbursements than the Actual ODA allocation. largely at the mercy of low resilience levels as the recent64 revolutionary movements have indicated. the earlier caveat that this analysis represents a guide that is only useful when used with the specific information available about particular countries. and Congo require substantial increases in aid allocation but suffer decreases in the FICE allocation mechanism because they are competing with some countries that are worse off and/or have been hitherto marginalised by the system as well as having comparatively more favourable initial conditions. Source: Human Development Report 2004. The newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Libya and Saudi Arabia on the basis of fragility and initial conditions.

Liberia. Judge and Jury. 5. HLFHM. World Bank. Judge and Jury.’ Free Market Iraq? Not so Fast by Daphne Eviatar. 40. 38. 20. UNDP. Development Effectiveness in Fragile States. 9. Scott Castle. DfID. Why we need to work more effectively 14. 41.’ 22. 16. 30. Ibid. Available at: http://www. Collier and Dollar. World Bank Group Work. Countries at Risk of Instability. 29. 15.Challenging the discourse on fragile states 109 Downloaded By: [University of California.aspx?id ¼ 4914 (accessed on 13 May 2005). UNDP. the General Counsel to the Coalition Provisional Authority justified the Coalitions’ economic endeavours in Iraq based on the premise that ‘There’s a close nexus between the economic health of Iraq and the security of Iraq. Violent Conflict.. 34. MGDs in Crisis.imnsr. The countries in the World Bank low and middle income categories for which published data on all the variables being used are available.. Ibid. Goodhand. Ibid. 10 January 2004. Endnotes 1. 4. UN Report. 10. Collier and Dollar. 8. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Ibid. 28. Fragility and initial conditions efficient and ODA allocation to LICUS. Ibid. 12. Striking a New Balance. ‘Development Effectiveness’. World Bank. From the State’s construct. At least initially. Ibid. Goodhand. 19. Alexander. 23. Judge and Jury. Chauvet and Collier. ‘Service Delivery in Difficult Environments’. Alexander. Violent Conflict. com/DisplayNewsEn. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Figure 2. 33. 31. New York Times. The Forgotten States. Countries at Risk of Instability. Alexander. 27. In Larger Freedom. Ibid. Moreno-Torres and Anderson. Striking a New Balance. Millennium Declaration. Merlin. March 2005. 17. Available at: http://www. Donovan et al. 13. Donovan et al.. 37. Save the accepted very fragile states that were not included in the Fragility Index computation namely Afghanistan.htm (accessed on 15 April 2005). MGDs in Crisis. Picciotto et al. . North Korea and Somalia. 11. Capacity Fragile refers to a state that is very weak in capacity but strong in resilience.. Commercial legislation is focussing on developing state institutional capacity. 3. Ibid. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e. 32. Resilience Fragile refers to a state that is very weak in resilience but strong in capacity. 36. 18. 21. ‘Development Effectiveness. 25. Fragile States. World Bank Group Work. Ibid. Iraq. 7. 24. 39. 6. 35. 26. Ibid. Picciotto et al. 2. Ibid. Dollar and Levin. HLFHM. Ibid. Source: Human Development Report 2004 Acknowledgements I am grateful to Professor Picciotto and Howard Mollett for valuable comments.

Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries. Collier and Dollar. McGillivary. Ibid. Available at: http://www. Kiso. Moreno-Torres and Anderson. Heger. Descriptive and Prescriptive Analyses.. Downloaded By: [University of California.. For example.. Development Effectiveness in Fragile States. Saferworld. 63. Olonisakin. Olonisakin. 2004. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform. ‘The Challenges of Security Sector Reform’. Department for International Development. London. L. 58. Andrzej. ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction’. Violent Conflict. L. Reynal-Querol. 1998. 45. Collier. HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS. 2005. The Forgotten States. Donovan. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. DfID. 6. Chauvet. 55.uk/pubs/ files/fragilestates-paper. Journal of Development Studies 37(6). Hendrickson. DfID. ‘An Equal Opportunity Approach’. George. Oxford University Press. 2005. P. Guillaumont and Chauvet. and Hoeffler. The Failed States Index Foreign Policy. and Levin. Why we need to work more effectively with fragile states. Saferworld. Nicole. Ole 42. 61.http://www. DfID. 52. 54. ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction’. 53.. Department of Economics. Centre for the Study of African Economies. J. ‘Development Effectiveness’. 2000.gov. ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction’. N. 2000. Smart. Nick. Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: High Risks for Donors. For DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships.. and Sambanis. 2002. 2003. 2005. 62. and Dollar. Elliot.110 Eka Ikpe ESAU Working Paper 2. 2004. Report on an International Symposium. Foreign Policy. 2004. M. Hoeffler. Oxford University Press and the World Bank. High Returns for Development. Hendrickson et al. Citizens’ Network on Essential Service 2004. Judge and Jury: The World Bank’s Score card for borrowing governments. ‘Aid and Performance: A reassessment’. Brief 15.. London. References Alexander. London. 51. Oxford University. 2001. Collier and Dollar. Bonn International Center for Conversion. Beynon. Aid and Performance. Department for International Development. Moreno-Torres. 2003.pdf (accessed on 18 February 2005). Poverty and Chronic Poverty. McGillivary. Bonn International Center for Conversion. 57. ‘Service Delivery in Difficult Environments’. 2005. London. 64. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Disarmament. pp. L. Overseas Development Institute. 47.. Collier and Dollar. 2000. P. Stockholm . 50. Manchester and Birmingham. P. Ibid. Fragile States. servicesforall. ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction’. Bonn. Collier and Dollar. ‘The Challenges of Security Sector Reform’. Washington DC and New York. Descriptive and Prescriptive Analyses. Merlin.. Chalmers.. Available at:. Dollar. Collier et al. Armaments. Chauvet and Collier. pp. Security Sector Reform. Development Criteria. McGillivray and White. Ibid.. Poverty Efficient aid Allocations. London: UK. Jan. Magui. D. J.. Economic and Statistics Analysis Unit. pp. D. Malcolm.org/html/otherpubs/judge_jury_scorecard. N. The Forgotten States: Aid Volumes and Volatility In Difficult Partnership Countries (1992 – 2002). Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective. Development Criteria. 244 – 271. Collier. The Economic Journal 114 (496). 44. A. 2002. Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure. pdf (accessed on 18 March 2005). 59. European Economic Review 26 (6). and Chauvet. Llavador and Roemer. (2005) Countries at Risk of Instability: Risk Factors and Dynamics of Instability.. Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government. see Hendrickson and Karkoszka.dfid. H. 2004. July/August. 49. McGillivary and White. Collier.. Security Sector Reform and Development Cooperation. 2001. D. ‘Development Effectiveness’. Collier. Collier and Hoeffler. P. and International Security. 46. Guillaumont. Chalmers. Ball. Zachariah. 56. Oxford Economic Papers Oxford. McGillivary and White. and Collier. Breaking the Conflict Trap. 1475 – 1500. Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds. P. and Dollar. Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit Background Paper..Collier/Dollar Revisited. 43.. and Ball. 66 – 92. Security Sector Reform. A. CPCR Working Paper No. Dylan and Karkoszka. Greed and Grievance in Civil War.. 48. Collier and Dollar. 60. Development Criteria. Dollar and Levin. Dollar and Levin. P. Goodhand. Malcolm. Ibid. ‘Development Effectiveness: What have we learnt?’. The Forgotten States. D.

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United Nations Development Programme http://hdr.pdf Downloaded By: [University of California. World Bank www. 2003 Global Refugee Trends.cfm?page ¼ 237&year ¼ 2003 Capacity Economic Management—Inflation.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_54_1_1.worldbank. John Edward Porter. Jeremy M.transparency.undp. 1998 – 2003 On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security: A Report of the Commission for Weak States and US National Security. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Severe Political Change the Global IDP Project/Norwegian Refugee Council-Regional Database on Causes and Background of Displacement from 1998 – 2002 Refugee Figs. Refugee Population by Origin. New Arrivals. Durable Solutions. http://www. 79 pp.org/data Social Services Delivery—Full Immunization (Measles) of 1 year olds (%) Human Development Report 2004. Eizenstat. Asylum Seekers and other persons of concern to UNHCR. Transparency International.org/docs/Full_Report. http://www. GDP Deflator (Annual %) 2003 World Development Indicators 2004. 2004.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2004 Political Freedom 2003.worldbank. Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS): 1996 –2002.112 Eka Ikpe Wars in Low Income countries. Population Data Unit/PGDS Division of Operational Support UNHCR Geneva.ch/statistics Legitimacy and Resilience Voice and Accountability 2002 Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality. and Stuart E. 2003 UNHCR. Table of Independent Countries. Weinstein.unhcr. Washington: Center for Global Development. KKZ (Kaufmann. Overview of Refugee Populations. www. Freedom House. 2004.cgdev.org/governance/kkz2002/ Corruption Perception Indices 2004. Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton) http://info. http://www.html .freedomhouse.org/template.

ODA per capita 2003 US $ http://hdr.worldbank.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_186_1_1. United Nations Development Programme Downloaded By: [University of California.html Primary Product Dominance Food. 2001 Structure of Merchandise Exports 2001 World Development Indicators 2004. Ores and Metals as a % of total exports. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 113 http://pooh.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ac.cia.undp.html .pdf HIV Prevalence Rates (% ages 15 –49) 2003 Human Development Report 2004.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_138_1_1.worldbank.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/indic_9_1_1. Agricultural Products.html Tax Revenue as a % of GDP 2001 World Development Indicators 2004.undp.org/maindiv/hdr_dvpt/statistics/data/indic/indic_69_1_1.org/data Inequality Inequality measure—Gini Index Human Development Report 2003 http://hdr.undp. Fuels. World Bank www.html Debt-GDP Ratio.org/data Structural conditions Per Capita Income GDP Per capita 2003 US $ Human Development Report 2003 http://hdr.html Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book 2004 http://www.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04_HDI.Challenging the discourse on fragile states Social Services Delivery—Adult Illiteracy (15 AND Above) %—2002 Human Development Report 2004. World Bank www. United Nations Development Programme http://hdr.undp.

org/statistics/data/indic/indic_125_1_1.html Undernourished (by FAO estimates) as a % of total population.un.html .asp?rowID ¼ 566&fID ¼ r5&cgID ¼ Landlocked (L)/Not Landlocked (NL) Holt.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_8_1_1.com/atlas/norm_htm/world.114 Eka Ikpe Infant Mortality—No of deaths (infants aged between birth and one year) per 1.htm Development GDP per Capita Annual Growth (%) Human Development Report 2004 http://hdr.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_125_1_1. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 http://unstats.undp.2000 United Nations Statistics Division 15 October 2004 Downloaded By: [University of California.hrw.html Human Development Indices 2004 Human Development Report 2004 http://hdr.undp.undp.000 live births http://hdr. Rinehart and Winston (HRW) World Atlas http://go.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.

9 18.9 43.8 65.5 32 6.5 Challenging the discourse on fragile states 21 30 31 23 – 85 34 72 18 48 24 16 – 29 16 54 – 85 90 47 – – 86 82 – 21 10 35 – – 14 17 15.7 27. Very fragile countries Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 26 70 19 19 67 28 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 36 77 14 7 59 27 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 98 – 8 – – 93 Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 2 – 92 1 – 7 Very fragile Countries Algeria Angola Bangladesh Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Congo.1. Rep.2 17 65 31 54 12 12 15 81 – – – – – – 8 – 15.2 42 57. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Table A2.1 35. Dem.3 26.6 115 .3 40.5 115.3 16. of the ˆ Cote d’Ivoire Ecuador Egypt Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia Per capita ODA 2002 11.APPENDIX 2 Downloaded By: [University of California.9 43.7 18.

7 50.8 14. TFYR Mauritania Mauritius Nepal Niger Nigeria Pakistan Rwanda Saudi Arabia 20.6 14.9 18.116 Table A2.7 29.1 1. Rep.1—continued Downloaded By: [University of California. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Very fragile Countries Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 28 30 36 29 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 16 24 13 35 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 65 72 – 44 Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 35 28 – 54 Per capita ODA 2002 Eka Ikpe Guatemala Guinea Haiti Indonesia Iran. Lesotho Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Macedonia.3 43.6 19.9 25.9 6 29 – 107 31 – 51 91 – – 9 – – 1.5 36 57 68 57 29 25 44 19 25 23 48 38 39 61 16 16 38 19 8 41 – 30 – 27 – 95 100 14 98 91 – 70 – 73 67 3 ( –) 85 3 10 1. Of Lao People’s Dem.2 126.3 42.1 .9 2.9 135. Islamic Rep.

3 30.Downloaded By: [University of California.6 25.9 7. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Table A2.7 27. Source: Human Development Indices 2004.2 10.2 59.2 10.1 28 72 50 27 52 34 17 39 42 22 37 58 33 12 56 38 29 38 29 24 90 87 50 92 32 – 89 – 86 62 7 13 43 8 67 – 13 – 14 38 4.7 23.9 15.6 Challenging the discourse on fragile states Note: Low-income countries are in italics and middle-income countries are in Roman text.5 9.1—continued Very fragile Countries Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 40 13 100 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 18 15 91 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 – 97 53 Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 – 3 76 Per capita ODA 2002 Sierra Leone Sudan Swaziland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Togo Uganda Ukraine Uzbekistan Venezuela Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe 74.4 2. 117 .

3 559.118 Table A2.2.5 2.6 472.9 41 1.5 111 68. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Eka Ikpe Capacity fragile countries Belize Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Cape Verde Dominican Republic Ghana Guinea-Bissau India Jamaica Mali Mongolia Mozambique Namibia Papua New Guinea Philippines ´ ˜ Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 74 26 37 22 68 35 55 77 16 60 41 81 38 49 – 49 95 41 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 55 14 51 9 31 26 43 45 15 39 32 67 24 48 – 49 44 31 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 – 94 9 81 – – 85 – 22 27 – 64 91 47 98 8 – 49 Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 1 6 91 19 96 34 16 – 75 64 – 36 8 52 2 50 – 51 Total ODA 2002 22.4 1.6 33.1 166 45. Capacity fragile countries Downloaded By: [University of California.60 135.2 220.1 203.4 203.5 .4 81.9 36.2 37.1 208.4 9.057.8 Per capita ODA 2002 88.1 18.4 7.2 31.8 59.7 652.2 156.3 37.7 26 448.70 24.7 92.462.3 472.2 37.6 21.

Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Table A2. Source: Human Development Indices 2004.9 South Africa Suriname 31 45 34 21 37 22 63 78 656.6 Note: Low-income countries are in italics and middle-income countries are in Roman text.2—continued Capacity fragile countries Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 Total ODA 2002 Per capita ODA 2002 14.Downloaded By: [University of California.7 26. Challenging the discourse on fragile states 119 .8 11.

475.1 112.5 34.9 21.5 36.3 1.4 1.7 31.1 78.9 27.1 186 377.3 36.8 3.1 85.4 41 55.80 441 77.1 100.6 434.3 188.1 95.9 312.4 64.1 71.3 12.5 636. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Eka Ikpe Resilience fragile countries Albania Antigua and Barbuda Armenia Azerbaijan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina China Colombia Djibouti El Salvador Fiji Gabon Georgia Honduras Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kyrgyzstan Malawi Malaysia Maldives Morocco Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 43 68 47 51 27 59 26 21 63 41 65 39 39 53 67 46 30 43 43 97 67 37 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 19 60 30 44 22 26 29 20 45 27 71 59 27 37 46 47 27 39 25 114 88 32 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 14 – 39 93 78 – 10 62 – 41 55 98 65 74 32 81 76 67 90 19 – 35 Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 86 – 61 6 17 – 90 38 – 58 44 2 35 26 68 19 24 33 10 79 38 66 Total ODA 317 14 293.1 60.8 142.2 12.2 .5 349.3.9 192.4 681 587.120 Table A2.3 393.5 42.8 233. Resilience fragile countries Downloaded By: [University of California.6 88.1 10.9 534.2 Per capita ODA 100.

80 475 635. of Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Viet Nam Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 35 43 24 43 24 49 30 47 60 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 57 31 35 36 17 45 30 47 56 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 84 84 69 25 83 19 15 92 – Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 15 15 22 74 17 82 84 7 – Total ODA Per capita ODA 14.5 1. Rep.80 Challenging the discourse on fragile states Note: Low-income countries are in italics and middle-income countries are in Roman text. U.Downloaded By: [University of California.8 56.8 9 8.232.90 344 1.300.2 34 48.7 1.8 40.3—continued Resilience fragile countries Oman Paraguay Russian Federation Sri Lanka Tanzania. Source: Human Development Indices 2004 121 .9 40.7 9.276.5 15. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Table A2.9 9 18.

0 30184.0 441.4 155.5 419.6 59.2 419.122 Eka Ikpe Table A2.4 60.6 6773.4 168.7 1.2 501.6 399. 2002) 526.0 266.4 172. Niger Nigeria Papua New Guinea Sierra Leone Tajikistan Togo Uzbekistan Zimbabwe Sub-total to LICUS Sub total to non LICUS Total Downloaded By: [University of California.3 298.7 327.3 353.8 445.9 436. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 Source: Human Development Indices 2004 .1 452.068.3 589.4 200.1 187.6 277. FICE and actual aid allocation to LICUS FICE allocations (US$ MN.4 403.1 420.6 640.6 249.7 434.7 9919.9 Total aid ODA (US$ MN. 2002) 421.6 398.8 806.8 203.9 40103.8 233 32.9 278.4 51 189.5 438.1 59.0 387.2 340.5 313.4.9 LICUS Angola Burundi Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Congo.3 429. of the ˆ Cote d’Ivoire Eritrea Gambia Georgia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Haiti Honduras Lao People’s Dem.9 389.80 230.9 33330 40103. Dem.5 312.4 379. Rep. Rep.6 421.

6 416.6 370.3 615.8 172.7 327. Dem.7 249.8 233 32.6 398.3 589.9 365.2 760. Lesotho Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Macedonia.0 436.308.6 123 Total aid ODA (US$ MN. Rep.7 1.10 20.3 452.9 24.286.3 395.7 80. TFYR Mauritania Mauritius Nepal Niger Nigeria Pakistan Rwanda Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone Sudan Swaziland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Togo FICE allocations (US$ MN.70 60.9 387.5 419.1 420.6 640.2 59.8 403.1 566.4 912.9 634. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 .0 398.9 533. of Lao People’s Dem.4 51 Downloaded By: [University of California.1 501.7 1.0 492.4 23.70 356.5 377.068.6 155.2 438.3 526.1 486.10 115.9 353.8 806.0 399.5.4 350.6 340.1 26. Rep.306.4 1.3 428.6 379. Islamic Rep.8 400.9 389.143.2 230.9 92.8 174.9 631.5 346.0 894.9 322. 2002) 464.3 76.9 390.4 10. 2002) 361 421.2 366.5 313.8 278. FICE and actual aid allocation to very fragile states Very fragile states Algeria Angola Bangladesh Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Congo.6 501.6 566. of the ˆ Cote d’Ivoire Ecuador Egypt Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia Guatemala Guinea Haiti Indonesia Iran.6 355.7 400.8 2.4 276.5 298.1 429.Challenging the discourse on fragile states Table A2.8 168.4 441.80 216 1.5 248.2 419.

8 497.7 17955.6 405.3 421.7 640. 2002) 637.2 40103.9 Downloaded By: [University of California.7 380. Santa Cruz] At: 14:23 19 May 2010 . 2002) 384.6 200.8 189.4 40103.4 57.9 Total aid ODA (US$ MN.6 19244.2 474.124 Eka Ikpe Table A2.1 583.7 22148.5—continued Very fragile states Uganda Ukraine Uzbekistan Venezuela Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe Sub-total to VF states Sub-total to non VF states Total FICE allocations (US$ MN.5 20859.0 445.9 483.