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To: Organizations addressing Trade-Finance Linkages
1) Doha Round taboo broken at G20 Cannes Summit 2) Developing country issues in transfer pricing ‐ Report from workshop now available 3) Sovereign debt restructuring and trade and investment treaties 4) Index investment and financialization of commodities 5) UNCTAD XIII Conference Accreditation now open _________________________________________________________________________ 1) Doha Round taboo broken at G20 Cannes Summit The G20 Cannes Summit was one of broken taboos. As the possibility of expelling Greece from the Eurozone was openly discussed by the G20 Leaders meeting in Cannes, on November, 3‐4, a big taboo was being broken. However, for trade‐watchers, a more important taboo that was broken concerned the WTO Doha Round completion. In 2001 the WTO Ministerial in Doha controversially launched the Round at an eleventh‐ hour decision made after several Ministers had had to abandon the venue of the meeting. Year after year since then, no official high level gathering had gone without a repetition of the pledge to bring to successful conclusion the round. In their Declaration the Leaders said that they stood by the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). But, for the first time since 2001, they said "it is clear that we will not complete the DDA if we continue to conduct negotiations as we have in the past. We recognize the progress achieved so far. To contribute to confidence, we need to pursue in 2012 fresh, credible approaches to furthering negotiations, including the issues of concern for Least Developed Countries and, where they can bear fruit, the remaining elements of the DDA mandate." The standstill commitment on protectionist measures until 2013 was repeated in the Declaration, alongside the G20 commitment to "roll back any new protectionist measure
that may have risen, including new export restrictions and WTO‐inconsistent measures to stimulate exports." Trade was also a theme in an annex which reported the discussions by the G20 Development Working Group (Development Working Group) over the last year. But, in what that Working Group reported, there was very little that could advance development objectives. The G20 called for a significant increase of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)' share in global trade and states that "the G20 should foster trade capacity and market access for developing countries, in particular LDCs/LICs," but with little indication of detail over how this would be done, let alone a timetable. They recognized that Duty Free‐Quota Free (DFQF) access, along with simple and transparent rules of origin, can play a major role in increasing trade that supports growth and poverty reduction in LDCs. But there is no commitment attached to this recognition, only a statement of fact that developed countries already provide full DFQF access and that others have reached 97 per cent. But the 97 per cent figure had long ago been shown to be of little value for LDCs, as the export items that really matter to them could be well covered in the remaining 3 per cent. Over the last year, significant barriers have reportedly been raised for LDCs exports even in countries that supposedly enjoyed DFQF access. Kathrin Berensman quotes the Global Trade Alert to say that " 141 governmental measures have had a detrimental effect on the commercial interests of the least developed countries (LDCs) since November 2008. With the exception of Tuvalu, all LDCs were affected, particularly Bangladesh, Tanzania, Yemen, Senegal and Sudan." On the issue of African regional integration, the Development Working Group report recommended: ‐ technical and financial assistance to African countries and to Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to strengthen their capacity; ‐ measures to foster trade, including trade facilitation; ‐ the African Union Minimum Integration Plan to support African efforts to rationalize RECs; ‐ Aid for Trade for Africa including through enhanced financing of regional infrastructure by MDBs; and ‐ the development of regional trade corridors that will support improved regional trade infrastructures, regional trade facilitation and expanded intra‐regional trade. Since the Leaders' Declaration "supports" the report of the Development Working Group, it is reasonable to presume this recommendation has been endorsed. The same could be said of a recommendation on trade facilitation, for an "improved forum for exchange of information on trade facilitation and to build capacities providing a pool of customs officials and trade facilitation experts." The Development Working Group also expressed the G20 would welcome "an invitation from the African Union and the African Development Bank to jointly review progress at their annual meeting." The Declaration committed to maintain the level of support pledged in the Seoul
Declaration, which was the average level of the 2006‐2008 period. There was also a commitment to improve quality and results, but it is not clear what is meant by quality or whether the results will be measured in terms of development, poverty reduction, domestic capital formation, or other parameters. In its report the Development Working Group also referred to trade finance, mentioning that it continues to be problematic for many countries and that a significant number of countries have not so far received any trade finance support from the MDBs. The two main recommendations made here were for the G20 to consider further how best to improve data, including with regard to the existing database on trade finance, and to establish a trade finance facility at the African Development Bank. Trade issues were also addressed in the sections devoted to food security and agriculture investment. The Declaration said that more stable, predictable, distortion free, open and transparent trading system allows more investment in agriculture. This is a surprising statement because it flies in the face of the well‐known reality of the neglect of agricultural investment that took place precisely in a period that the World Trade Organization was established and begun to function (mid‐1990s and on). It also seems incompatible with other passages in the Declaration that offer support for agriculture by smallholders or small producers, given that, where applied, trade liberalization in agriculture has been associated with decreased viability ‐when not outright dismantling‐of smallhoder agriculture. The G20 also agreed to "remove food export restrictions or extraordinary taxes for food purchased for non‐commercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Program and agreed not to impose them in the future," encouraging adoption of a declaration by the WTO at its upcoming Ministerial Conference. Commodity derivatives regulation, trade and investment This year, studies from the International Monetary Fund providing global and regional outlooks have stressed the continued high level of exposure of developing countries to commodity price fluctuations and the challenges this poses to their macroeconomic stability. The findings echoed points repeatedly made by the International Working Group on Trade‐Finance Linkages such as a Statement issued in 2009, preceding the G20 Seoul Summit last year, which said: "Two‐thirds of developing countries are net food import‐ dependent and, for many of them, excessive speculation in commodities markets led to food crises. In addition, the ability of a large number of commodity exporting countries to use trade for increasing domestic capital accumulation has been limited." If one could take price fluctuations as an "act of God," there would probably be merit to an approach limited to a mitigation of the impacts. But this is not the case. The argument that in the last few years speculation on commodity‐linked assets in financial markets had a strong influence on the rises and fluctuations of food, oil and other commodities' prices continues to gather substantial support in studies by academic and some regulators.
Two task forces that had the chance to address this issue, set up by the G20, however, came up short of a strong endorsement of this thesis, and the correlative need to take action. One of the reports was entrusted to a task force of inter‐governmental organizations set up by the G20 as part of its Development Action Plan agreed at the Seoul Summit to "develop options for G20 consideration on how to better mitigate and manage the risks associated with the price volatility of food and other agriculture commodities." On the issue of the impact of financial speculation on price volatility the report generally stayed away from taking any position. It referred to an ongoing debate on whether speculation stabilizes or destabilizes markets and the need for research to clarify these questions. It only recognized existence of broad agreement that for agricultural commodity derivatives markets to function well "appropriate regulation needs to be in place across all relevant futures exchanges and markets. In particular, there is need for greater transparency about transactions across futures markets and especially across over‐the‐counter (OTC) markets, where transactions take place off the regulated commodity exchanges. Comprehensive trading data need to be reported to enable regulators and participants to monitor information about the frequency and the volume of transactions to understand what is driving commodity prices." Another report came from a study group set up by the G20 in March of this year to understand the evolution and drivers of commodity price fluctuations, chaired by the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Japan, Mr. Hiroshi Nakaso. The report underscored the growth of commodity‐linked portfolio investments since the mid‐2000s and identified "Index investors, including index and other dedicated commodity funds" as important new entrants into the market in the past few years, alongside hedge funds, Exchange Traded Fund sponsors and proprietary trading desks of commercial banks broker‐dealers and trading units of large non financial corporate. From the perspective of trade in developing countries, the report had also the merit of inquiring into the macroeconomic and trade‐related impacts of commodity price movements. The study referred to the "Dutch disease" dynamic that might be triggered in commodity exporters. It also addressed the investment‐trade interphase of this problem: "Higher price volatility of production inputs (such as energy and metals) and a larger uncertainty about future price levels could hamper investment in both commodity production ... and in industries that are heavily reliant on commodity inputs. As a consequence, the capital stock (and potential output) may be lower both in commodity exporting and importing countries, impacting negatively the level of economic activity." In looking at macroeconomic policy consequences, the Study Group referred to the inflationary impact of higher commodity prices directly adding that "the share of commodities in consumer price indices ‐approximated by food and energy components ‐ is typically higher in EMEs and low‐income countries than in advanced economies." It
stated that a developing country's attempt to provide a macroeconomic policy response to inflation originated in that way, when it tightens monetary policy, may lead to its own problems. "Higher interest rates can encourage capital inflows, causing upward pressure on the exchange rate and, in certain cases, nurture domestic asset price booms." Unfortunately this is as close as the report gets to a recognition that typical inflation‐ targeting approaches do a particularly poor job in these cases or to endorse alternatives. The fiscal impacts of volatility were also addressed. In addition to the now familiar reflection on how higher import prices on food and energy subsidies or revenues derived from them affect fiscal prospects, the report draws the link between volatility and fiscal management in developing countries. "Fiscal volatility of commodity prices may also weaken fiscal positions of commodity‐exporting countries because adjusting fiscal expenditures to changes in external environment is inflexible in general," it said, while stating commodity funds may offer a solution. When it comes to the drivers of prices in financial markets, however, the Study Group found the results of empirical studies regarding the impact of financial investors on the level, volatility and correlation of commodity prices, "inconclusive," though admitting that "a growing body of research supports the view that financial investors have affected price dynamics over short time horizons." Looking at the question of whether increased levels of financial investment in commodities futures affect spot prices, it stated that "(i) effects that the behavior of financial investors may have on (near‐term) futures markets are also transmitted to spot prices; and (ii) that large and persistent deviations of futures prices above fundamentals can be expected to lead to rising inventories." In the light of the limited backing that the reports offered for intervention measures, one could almost commend that the G20 in Cannes went as far as calling for market regulators and authorities to be "granted effective intervention powers to address disorderly markets and prevent market abuses." There was, further, a decision to call for market regulators to "have, and use formal position management powers, including the power to set ex‐ante position limits, ... among other powers of intervention." However, the key jurisdictions (US and Europe) could be said to have formally complied with the requirement to introduce position limits. Yet, the weakness of the agreed limits is unlikely to significantly affect harmful speculation, proving the limited value that the G20 agreement may have. The G20 also endorsed a set of principles for the regulation and supervision of commodity derivatives markets, issued by IOSCO last September. These principles follow on a previous report developed by a Task Force on Commodity Futures of IOSCO last year which focused actually on enhancing transparency in commodity markets. That report, in its own words, believed that "price discovery in the financial commodity markets, as well as analysis of the interactions between the financial and cash commodity markets, should be improved by promoting greater transparency across futures, over‐the‐
counter (OTC) derivative and cash commodity markets." So it departed from the assumption that well‐functioning markets would lead to less volatility if only greater transparency was achieved. On top of that it also acknowledged a lack of jurisdiction by IOSCO (concerned with securities markets) regarding physical commodity markets. The G20 Agriculture Ministers earlier this year attempted to launch an initiative that would plug this physical markets gap. The Agricultural Markets Information System (AMIS) follows on the footsteps of the Joint Operational Data Initiative (JODI) for oil markets. Observers are, however, skeptical about the feasibility of obtaining such data given the reluctance to be faced from some countries and, in particular, some large corporations, in addition to the low likelihood that just increased transparency will stop market behaviors that lead to volatility. JODI, in fact, has ten years of implementation already and little to show for it. In a statement prepared before the G20 Summit, the International Working Group on Trade‐Finance Linkages said that such initiatives, in order to work, will "will need additional authorities to ensure that corporate owners of stocks supply accurate and complete information whose anonymity as to corporate information source can be guaranteed by JODI and AMIS officials." The infrastructure agenda Within the Development Action Plan, the workstream on infrastructure is distinctly the one that received most attention. A High Level Panel, chaired by Mr. Tidjane Thiam, was set up to provide recommendations to it, and reports were requested from the Multilateral Development Banks. Given the infrastructure gap faced by developing countries, concentrating efforts on how to fill out that gap was not a bad idea. But as one checks the recommendations ultimately endorsed by Leaders in Cannes, it is hard to contain a sense of unease about the direction being taken. There are, firstly, two concerns not justly covered in this article but that need to be noted. One is the high level of secrecy and limited or non‐existent consultation that characterized the work of the High Level Panel and the Multilateral Development Banks. The other has to do with the limited ambition with regards to public funding commitments that the G20 showed. The measures agreed mostly deal with facilitating information sharing, preparation, capacity‐building in regards to the preparation of projects. Effective utilization of resources within the existing multilateral and bilateral aid envelope is also mentioned, but pledges of new public funding coming to support work on infrastructure are nowhere to be seen. This article, however, focuses on concerns around the trade‐finance dimension of the infrastructure measures, many oriented to promote exports in low income countries. While the infrastructure gap is a reality, the debt sustainability pressures that developing countries face are also a reality. In this context, when the overriding concern is to create "bankable" projects that will attract investors, the fear emerges that making the project a profitable one for the investors may trump considerations about the financial
justifications for undertaking the project or the sustainability of the debt. After all, it is not so long ago that the IMF Staff was saying in a note that "LICs that resort to debt‐financed investment need to strengthen their capacity for "safe borrowing" ‐‐so that the scaling up of public investment does not jeopardize debt sustainability." Indeed, the determinations on debt sustainability are governed by the Debt Sustainability Framework, a tool adopted in 2005 by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In the report accompanying the Declaration, the Development Working Group expressed support to the ongoing work by the MDBs and the IMF about "the extent to which the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) retains inappropriate constraints to finance infrastructure projects." To understand what this can lead to it is important to keep in mind that, unlike its preceding framework (the debt sustainability metrics of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative), a central feature of the Debt Sustainability Framework is its flexibility. The idea of a country‐by‐country approach to debt sustainability was a sound one, but it could be seen early on that the larger space given to staff judgments in implementation of the DSF guidelines risked easily accommodating the passing of unsustainable debt as sustainable.  Further, holding the framework accountable for failures to prevent unsustainable debts was to become nearly impossible. This was confirmed when, in 2009, after the onset of the crisis, revisions were introduced to the Debt Sustainability Framework. The revisions were all in the direction of enabling countries to take more debt on. This is not to say that certain changes made in 2009 are not, in the theory behind them, desirable. One of the reforms of 2009 sought to better take into account the investment growth effects when debt is undertaken for investment purposes, as would be the case in infrastructure projects. And, to the extent that this would enable a better factoring in of the actual improvements in repayment capabilities that a project can generate, the change would actually be positive. The skeptical view expressed above stems rather from empirical observation of the record of the international financial institutions. Their debt sustainability projections have systematically shown excess optimism. Adding to that the pressure and the political signal given by the G20 to promote big infrastructure lending leaves those who would like to see a realistic, objective implementation of the investment‐growth consideration in assessing sustainability with almost nothing to go on. An interesting parallel can be drawn between the current situation and the birth of the Debt Sustainability Framework. Analysis by the staff of the World Bank at the time showed that lower debt thresholds would have been desirable, but they would have required concessional funding commitments that the donors were not ready to make. So the DSF's flexibility was functional to the need to provide a cover of "sustainability" to situations where debt was unsustainable but there was no political will to make the commitments
that true sustainability would demand. That was then. Now, again, there is a risk that the DSF built‐in flexibilities (stretched through the "further work" that the G20 entrusted to MDBs and the IMF) could become functional to provide this same cover of "sustainability." The difference this time is that, rather than accommodating the limited grant resource envelope (or in addition to that), the imperative would be to ensure private creditors or investors can preserve a certain level of return on their projects. The same IMF staff note quoted above says that "To ensure repayment for public debt‐ financed investment, LIC governments must also have the capacity to capture the fiscal dividends, which depends primarily on the quality of revenue policy and administration." But it is precisely this aspect that enters into stark conflict with the agenda of private investors scrutinizing the profitability of the projects. This is because the need for investors to get repaid also enters into conflict with other legitimate objectives of fiscal policy such as a progressive income distribution. In extreme situations, there are cases where the investor or creditors' priorities might lead to a government ringfencing of fiscal revenue. The cases of countries that mortgaged natural resources for debt payments are a case in point. Not only the capability to attract investors might depend on lower fiscal dividends, but governments (especially in impoverished countries) have often found that the only way to attract private investors is to saddle themselves with the bitter part of the deal. So they offer contingent liabilities and other guarantees. These kick in, by definition, in situations of low growth or recession, thus building a procyclical component into any shock the borrowing country might go through. One of the measures that the High Level Panel suggests for "diversifying the sources of finance for infrastructure" is the development of local currency debt markets. This is a superior form of financing over borrowing in foreign currency because it suppresses currency mismatches that can be the source of expanded debt risks. The question is whether investors will be interested in such instruments without additional guarantees or higher interest rates to compensate for the extra risk. Besides that, domestic currency debt, if the creditors are domestic, is not exempt of problems. To quote economist Matthias Rau, "If you issue domestic debt chiefly to domestic recipients, this issue is mainly an internal resource transfer and there is no additionality as in the case with external financing. Thus, even if you do not have a currency mismatch, you could still have a "material mismatch", i.e. domestic debt could crowd out domestic resources. There is some empirical research that suggests that the positive impacts of market creation that I just mentioned before are about the same size as the crowding out effect." Equity‐type forms of financing might be preferable from the perspective of the borrowing
country, and it is unclear why, if the projects are really considered "transformational" and are expected to produce extraordinary high growth, investors should reject such forms of financing (or, for instance, Growth‐linked bonds, a proposal not mentioned by the High Level Panel, either). The High Level Panel also mentions the use of infrastructure bonds as repo funding by central banks. But if what it has in mind here is the repo funding with the local central bank of the borrowing country, then it is not clear why a similar arrangement could not be in place for direct public investment by the government in question, rather than subsidizing borrowing from private sources with it. Private investment and domestic resource mobilization One of the tasks undertaken by the G20 Development Working Group in Seoul was to develop guidelines to determine the economic value ‐added of private investments. The Working Group (there is no reference to this in the Leaders' Declaration itself), welcomed the set of preliminary indicators developed by International Organizations to measure the economic value‐added and job creation of private investment and decided it would "field test these indicators in at least six self‐selected countries on a voluntary basis, leveraging possible synergies with the piloting of the human resource development indicators." Combatting the transfer pricing practices that so much revenue cost to developing countries was among the issues covered in the Development Working Group's Action Plan adopted last year. But the Cannes Summit failed to bring anything new on the matter. The Leaders urged multinational companies to "improve transparency and full compliance with applicable tax laws" and welcomed "the recently launched coordinated programme by international and regional organisations to assist developing countries in the drafting and application of their transfer pricing legislation, on a demand‐led basis." For an assessment of other aspects of the G20 Cannes Summit outcomes visit https://www.coc.org/rbw/come‐bang‐gone‐whimper‐g20‐cannes‐summit‐part‐i‐ november‐2011 and https://www.coc.org/rbw/come‐bang‐gone‐whimper‐g20‐cannes‐summit‐part‐ii‐ december‐2011
 Action Aid International and Public Citizen 2006. The WTO's Empty hong Kong "Development Package": How the World Trade Organization's 97 % Duty ‐Free Proposal Could Leave Poor Countries Worse Off.  Berensmann, Kathrin 2011. Trade policy after the financial crisis, in D+C, 2011/04, Tribune, Page 166‐167.  Ib.  International Working Group on Trade‐Finance Linkages 2010. Statement on Trade‐Finance Linkages for Seoul G20 Summit. November.
 See, for instance, Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition 2011. Evidence on the Impact of Commodity Speculation By Academics, Analysts and Public Institutions. February 23.  FAO, IFAD, IMF,OECD, UNCTAD, and other agencies 2011. Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses. Policy Report. June 2.  Ib.  G20 Study Group on Commodities 2011. Report. November.  Ib.  Ib.  Ib.  Ib.  Ib.  Ib.  Ib.  Even the weak position limits adopted by the CFTC in the US face serious threats in litigation that is being carried out to leave them without effect.  IOSCO 2011. Principles for the Regulation and Supervision of Commodity Derivatives Markets. Final Report. September.  IOSCO Technical Committee 2010. Task Force on Commodity Markets Futures Report to the G20. November.  Ib.  Ib., noting that "Although the Task Force is constrained in its ability to advance greater transparency of underlying physical market transaction data due to lack of jurisdiction, the Task Force reiterates that information about the underlying commodity is key ‐ indeed critical ‐ for the satisfactory functioning of financial markets and reliable price discovery."  Clapp, Jennifer and Sarah Martin 2011. The G20 Agricultural Action Plan: Changing the Course of Capitalism? TripleCrisis Blog, at http://triplecrisis.com/g20‐agricultural‐action‐plan  International Working Group on Trade‐Finance Linkages 2011. Trade‐Finance Linkages ‐An Assessment of Selected Issues on G20 Summit Agenda (available at https://www.coc.org/rbw/trade‐finance‐linkages‐ demands‐g20‐leaders‐meeting‐cannes‐october‐2011)  IMF Staff 2010. Reaching the MDGs: Macroeconomic Prospects and Challenges in Low‐Income Countries. Background Note by IMF Staff for the United Nations MDG Summit .September.  Under the HIPC Initiative, provided some general eligibility requirements were met, countries found above a certain debt‐to‐exports ratio or debt ‐to‐GDP and debt‐to‐revenue ratio were automatically deemed to be in a situation of unsustainable debt.  For further development on the differences between the HIPC and the DSF and the wide space for case‐ by‐case judgments in the latter see Caliari, Aldo 2006. The New IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework: A Human Development Assessment. CIDSE. April.  IMF 2009. Executive Board Reviews the Low‐Income Country Debt Sustainability Framework and Adopts a More Flexible Policy on Debt Limits in IMF‐Supported Programs. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 09/113. September 9.  See IMF/ IDA (2006). Review of Low‐Income Countries Debt Sustainability Framework and Implications of the MDRI. Prepared by the Staff of the World Bank and the IMF. Approved by Danny Leipziger and Mark Allen, March ("lowering thresholds could risk depriving countries of financing (...). Non‐MDRI countries in particular would need additional grant to avoid a sharp reduction in aid flows. This would be costly for donors, incuding IDA")  IMF Staff 2010.  Rau, Matthias 2010. Intervention in Caliari, Aldo (Ed.), Debt and Trade: Making Linkages for the Promotion of Development. Center of Concern and South Center.
2) Developing country issues in transfer pricing ‐ Report from workshop now available On June 7‐8, 2011, Center of Concern co‐sponsored, together with FES New York Office, UN‐DESA Financing for Development Office and Christian Aid, a meeting called Informal Discussion on "Practical Transfer Pricing Issues for Developing Countries. Among others, the meetings were attended by delegates from UN Missions, officials from tax authorities of developing countries, experts and practitioners. The report from this two‐day conference can now be downloaded at www.coc.org/node/6714 3) Sovereign debt restructuring and trade and investment treaties See below abstract and link to a paper by Kevin Gallagher: "The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign debt restructuring and trade and investment treaties" (issued as No. 02/2011 of the IDEAS Working Paper Series). Abstract The global community still lacks a regime for sovereign debt restructuring. But it has been often overlooked that the definition of a covered investment within international trade and investment agreements often includes sovereign debt. There is thus increasing concern that international investment agreements may become a "court" for sovereign workouts by default. In this context, this paper analyes the extent to which investment provisions in various treaties may hinder the ability of nations and private creditors to comprehensively negotiate sovereign debt restructurings when a debtor nation has defaulted or is close to default on its government debt. It is found that the treatment of sovereign debt varies considerably in terms of strength and applicability across the spectrum of the thousands of trade and investment treaties in the world economy. It is also found that most treaties may restrict the ability to restructure debt in the wake of a financial crisis. It is therefore concluded that these treaties could undermine the ability of nations to recover from financial crises and thus broaden the impact of such crises. Full paper is available at http://ideaswebsite.org/working/jul2011/wp04_07_2011.htm
4) Index investment and financialization of commodities Please find below abstract and link to a paper "Index investment and financialization of commodities" by Ke Tang and Wei Xiong. Abstract
This paper finds that concurrent with the rapid growing index investment in commodities arkets since early 2000s, futures prices of non‐energy commodities in the US became increasingly correlated with oil and this trend was significantly more pronounced for commodities in the two popular SP‐GSCI and DJ‐UBS commodity indices. This finding reflects a financialization process of commodities markets and helps explain the largely increased price volatility of non‐energy commodities around 2008. Full paper is available at http://www.princeton.edu/~wxiong/papers/commodity.pdf 5) UNCTAD XIII Conference Accreditation now open Accreditation to the UNCTAD XIII Conference, to be held in Doha, Qatar, April 21‐ 26, 2012, is now open. Please note that only CSOs with observer status and those who will be accredited to UNCTAD XIII will be able to contribute and participate to the preparatory hearings, the Civil Society Forum and the other events at the Conference itself in Doha. To apply for accreditation to UNCTAD XIII and its preparatory activities, please write to Pasquale.Madonna@unctad.org, to request a questionnaire. The complete questionnaire, with a copy of the requested supporting documentation, should be received by the CSO Unit as soon as possible and no later than 15 January 2012.
More information on the UNCTAD XIII Conference can be found at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Meeting.asp?intItemID=6084&lang=1
Aldo Caliari Director Rethinking Bretton Woods Project Center of Concern
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