WAR DEPARTMENT

DETERMINATION OF FIGHTING STRENGTH, U.S.S.R

<c»

VOLUME I - TEXT

Prepared under the direction of
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
by the
Eastern Europea\ Section, European Branch,
Intelligence Group,
Military Intelligence Service,,

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REGRADED BY AUTHORITY OF BY ON

Table of Contents
Page
A. Survey of Means Available 1
1. General Factors 1
a. National „ 1
(1) Political.. „ „. 1
(a) Introduction 1
(b) Density of Population 2
(c) Ethnic Groups 3
(1) General 3
(Z) Quantitative Ethnic Composition 3
(3) Languages 4
(? Religion 4
Ethnic Distribution of Peoples of the
" * U.S.S.R 4
Indo-Europeans 4
Finno-Ugr ians 5
Japhetides ...» 6
Turkic peoples 6
Mongol- Tungus-Manchu 6
(6) Ethnic Groups in the Caucasus 6
"" " Languages 7
Ethnic Distribution in the Caucasus 7
(d) Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R...* 8
( 1 From the Beginning to Rurik (4000
_) B.C.-860 A.D.) 9
(J2) Rurik to Genghis Khan (860-1237) 9
(3) Genghis Khan to Ivan the Great (1237­ ~ " 1462) 10
(4) Ivan the Great to Peter the Great
" " (1462-1689) .o 10
(5) Peter the Great to the Crimean War
~ (1689-1853) 11
(6) Crimean War to the Russo-Japanese War
""" (1853-1904) 12
(7) The Decay of Czarism (1904-1917) 13
(7F) The Communist Experiment (1917-1927), 13
(9) Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism
~ (1927-1942) 14
(e) Present Political Administration of the
U.S.S.R 18
(1) Actual Political Administration of the
" U.S.S.R " 18

Table of Contents (Contd.)
Page
General Organization 18
Stalin. „ 18
Political Administrations 19
The Franchise and Party Cell 20
Territorial Division 21
(2) Theoretical Political Administration
" of the U.S.S.R........... 21
State Organization 22
All Union Commissariats <>... 23
Party Organization 23
($) Administrative Divisions of the U".S*S.R* 23
(2 ) Economic Factors „ 25
(a) Availability of Strategical Materials 25
(b) Strategical and Critical Materials........ 27
(c) Production capacities. 39
Industrial production . ' 39
Industrial production by zones..... 39
Zone of combat... 39
Zone of communications 40
•Northern Region 40
Central Industrial Region.... 41
Volga Region. 45
North Caucasus and Transcaucasia 46
Zone of the interior 55
Urals 58
West Siberia. 75
Central Asia 79
Prospects for increased industrial output 86
Agricultural Production and the Food
S ituation 88
Estimate^of the present situation—
general 88
Food and agricultural production by zones 93
Zone of Combat 93
Zone of Communications 93
Zone of the interior 100
(d) Maritime Shipping 103
Tonnage and Disposition. ...» 103
Types of ships 106
General operating conditions............ 106

Table of Contents (Contd.)
Page
(3) Psychological Factors 107
(a) Morale 107
(b) Training 108
Training Organization 108
(c) Capacity for United Effort. Ill
(d) Inventiveness. Ill
(e) Versatility Ill
(4) Information and Counter Information Facilities. 112
Factors directly applicable to the armed forces 114
j*. Strength and Characteristics ,. 114
(1) Army. . 114
(a) Strength. 114
(b) Organization 117
(o) Efficiency. 119
(2) Navy 120
(a) Strength.... .......... 120
(b) Organization. 122
(c) Efficiency. 122
(3) Air Forces. 123
(a) Strength 123
(b) Organization 123
(c) Aircraft production. 124
(d) Naval aviation 127
(e) Organization of Naval air forces... 128
(f) Sea plane production... 130
(4) Home Guard Troops 131
b. Characteristics of Personnel 131
"" " (1) Basiq doctrines and command psychology of
military and naval leaders 131
(a) Basic doctrines 131
(b) Command psychology of military and naval
leaders 133
(2) Morale 135
(3) Stamina » 135
c. Characteristics of Materiel. 136
~" (1) General......... 136
(2) The quality of design 136
(3) Armament (Ground Forces)........ 137
(a) Infantry. 137
(b) Cavalry.. 137

(o) (d) Artillery Antiaircraft a r t i l l e r y 138
138

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Table of Contents (Contd.)
Page
(e) Coast artillery „ 138
(f) Engineer 138
(g) Chemical materiel 138
(h) Tanks „ 138
(4) Speed and radius of action (Ground Forces) 139
(5) Operating conditions (Ground Forces) 139
(6) Armament (Air Forces)... ..... 144
(7) Speed and radius of action (Air Forces) 144
(8) Operating conditions (Air Forces )...„ 144
Facilities for logistical support...... .. 147
(1) Facilities for logistical support - general..,. 147
(2) Logistical and strategic importance of the
Soviet and Persian Gulf ports 149
(a) Vital supply ports 149
(b) Ports for local supply. 151
(c) Naval and operational bases............... 151
(3) Port facilities: Soviet ports.. 152
(4) Port facilities: Pahlevi and the Persian Gulf
ports 152
(5) Airfields......................... 152
(6) Railroads 159
(a) General...... 159
(b) Supply of the western front... 161
(7) Roads 170
(8) Shipping available for support of forces 170
(9) Commercial trucking available 171
(10) Air transport available... .... 171
(11) Local supplies available...; < > 1 7 2
(a) Zone of Combat. * 172
( l Kola Peninsula _) 172
(2) Kandalaksha- Tikhvin. 172
( 3 Tikhvin - Orel ") 172
(T) Orel - Rostov 172
(b) Zone of Communications 173
(12) Replacement of personnel. 174
(a) Military forces ..«. 174
(1) Numbers 174
(2) Training and mobilization procedures. 175
(b) industrial and agricultural mobilization.. 177
(13) Evacuation facilities. 178
(14) Communications 178

IV

Table of Contents (Contd.)
Page
B. (15) Vulnerable Objectives. .... 179
Survey of the Characteristics of the Area 182
1. Hydrography. 182
a. General 182
_b. European Russia 183
Volga River 184
Kama River 184
Don River . „ 186
c. Transcaucasia 187
£. Siberia 187
"e. Soviet Central Asia , ,. 189
2. "Topography. 200
a. General 200
V. European Russia . . 200
c. The Caucasus 203
ji. The Ural Mountains 205
e. Siberia... ... . 205
T. Soviet Central Asia... e......... 206
jg. Border Passages and Ranges of Asiatic Russia.. 209
h. The Tadzhik and Kirgiz Highlands 211
T. The Altai Mountain System. 214
3. Weather.. 216
a. Temperature , 216
b". Frozen Subsoils. ». 218
~c. Precipitation 218
£. Winds 221
4. Health factors 222
a. General 222
b". Sanitation 222
"T c . Medical Facilities 223
"d. Medical Problems• 225
5. "Distance Table 227
6. Vital Areas 227
7. Fortifications 229
Conclusions as to Fighting Strength 234
1. Strength Factors: To be considered in relation to
Weakness Factors 234
a. Ethnic, historical and political 234
"F. Economic 235
"" c . Psychological 235
"" d . Intelligence and counter-intelligence 235

C.

Table of Contents (Contd.)
Page
e. Strength and characteristics of armed forces 7. Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina.. £. Materiel... h. Logistics T. Geographic Weakness Factors: To be considered in relation to
Strength Factors a. Ethnic, historical and political.... b. Economic £. Psychological. d. Intelligence ».... e. Strength and characteristics of armed forces T. Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina.. j;. Materiel h. Logistics o T. Vulnerable objectives 3» Geographic Conclus ions 236
236
237
237
238
239
239
240
240
240
240
241
241
241
242
242
242

3.

VI

BLES
Title A. Page
1
1
3
15
29
49
54
55
56
64
66
69
72
76
81
.95
96
97
98
101
102
104
114
115
120
125
126
140
141
142
143
145
153
157
165

Survey of Means Available , 1. General Factors i e.. 0. Table I: Population totals II: Chronology of Russian history III: Critical materials IV: Pipelines in the Caucasus , Vt Black Sea ports.. „ VI: Caspian Sea ports VII: Mineral production in the zone of the interior. VIII: Ural-Volga refineries IX: Non-ferrous metals and minerals in the Urals... X: Power stations in the Urals XI: Industries in the Urals XII: Industrial resources of West Siberia.... XIII: Industrial resources of Central Asia XIV: Agriculture - Northern Region XV: Agriculture - Central Region XVI: Agriculture - Middle and Lower Volga Region.... XVII: Agriculture - North Caucasus and Transcaucasus. XVIII; Agriculture - Ural Region XIX: Agrioulture - Siberia (West of Lake Baikal).... XX: Agriculture - Central Asia 2. Factors Directly Applicable to the Armed Forces Table I: Order of battle II: Naval forces .... III: Airplane numerical strength according to type:
ju March, 1941.... .....,..., W March, 1942 IV: Infantry weapons V: Anti-tank - anti-aircraft weapons VI: Artillery VII: Motorization - mechanization VIII: Characteristics of airplanes IX: Port facilities - Soviet ports. X: Port facilities - Pahlcvi and the Persian
Gulf ports XI: Daily supply requirements (maintenance only)
of large Soviet units..

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LIST OF TABLES (Contd.)
Title Page

XII: XIII: B. Survey of the Table I: II: III:

Rail shipping weights and spaces, initial
equipment, of large Soviet units < , List of vulnerable objectives, Western Front,
U.S.S.R Characteristics of the Area Principal irrigated areas Rivers and lakes at present exploited for
electric power U.S.S.R. Coast and Port Defenses

166
180
182
195
198
231

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List of Maps (Volume II)
1. Density of Population in the U.S.S.R.
2. Ethnic Distribution in the U.S.S.R.
3. Ethnio Distribution in the Caucasus.
4. Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R.
5. Political Divisions of the U.S.S.R. as of April, 1941.
6. Industrial Centers of the U.S.S.R.
7. a. Agricultural Areas of European Russia.
"F. Agricultural Areas of Asiatic Russia.
8. Armed Forces U.S.S.R.
9. a. Northern Routes into Soviet Russia.
"F. Southern Routes into Soviet Russia.
10. a. Air Fields Supporting the Western Front,
"b. Sketch Map of Tenth Kilometer Airdrome.
Is. Sketch Map of Kego Island Airdrome.
d. Sketch Map of Yagonik Airdrome.
11. "Probable Railroad Supply Network, Western Front, May 1942.
12. Vital Areas and Vulnerable Objectives.
13. Physical Map of the Soviet Union.
14. Natural Regions of the Caucasus.
15. The Kirgiz-Tadzhik Highlands (T'ien Shan Range and Pamirs),
16. The Altai Mountains and Kuznetsk Basin.
17. Defenses of Murman Bay and Kola Inlet.
18. Defenses of Archangel Bay and the Mouth of the North Dvina,

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IV..,

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A.

Survey of Means Available.
1. General Factors.
a.

National.
(1) Political.
(a) Introduction. The people of the U.S.S.R. in
their numbers and distribution, in their ethnic divisions, in their
historical development, and in their present political administration,
exhibit major strengths and some weaknesses.
The population of the U.S.S.R. in 1939 was
exceeded only by India and China; losses have reduced it by 30$. Two-
thirds of the remaining population live west of the Volga River.
The multiplicity of ethnic groups in the U.S.S.Rf
16 major nationalities (represented in constituent republics) and in­ numerable minorities--renders uniform government policy difficult.
Separatism is not, howevef, an important problem. Great Russians
(58y£) and other Indo-Europeans comprise B0% of the population; Turkic
tribes, 14$; and the rest, 6%. The Russians are still largely Greek
Orthodox in religion; most of the Turkic peoples are Sunnite Moslems.
The Russians live largely in the cultivable areas of European Russia
and Western Siberia; scattered near rivers and railroads elsewhere.
The Finno-Ugrians live in the forests and tundras of Northern Russia
and Siberia west of the Yenisei River- The Turkic groups predominate
everywhere in Central Asia except the Ferghana Valley, which is Tadzhik
(Indo-European) territory. The Mongol-Tungus-Manchu are found primarily
in the Far East; west of Lake Baikal, the principal groups are the
Kalmyk along the Volga and near Biisk, the Buriat north of Irkutsk, and
the Tungus along the Yenisei River. The Japhetides are indigenous to
the Caucasus. In general, one-third of the population of that area is
Russian; the rest, including the Japhetides, are quite heterogeneous,
the result of the crossroads location of the Caucasus since time
immemorial.
Russian history is the record of centralized
authority--Czarist or Communist--uniting a confusion of peoples and
environments. Russia's strength has been proportional to the firmness
of its ruler. The government was strong during the successful repulses
of Charles XII and Napoleon; weak, before the Mongol conquest and the
defeat by the Central Powers in World War j. Russia's outstanding

^-J^wi'«^uV]iriiH!l

weakness has been its technological backwardness. Nevertheless, its
record of territorial expansion has only been equaled by the colonial
expansion of the British Empire.
Nine periods may be noted in the historical
development of Russia. An obscure early history from about 4000 B.C.
was climaxed by the formation of a Slavic state at Novgorod under Rurik,
about 860 A.D. However, Kiev was the dominant Russian principality
until the Mongol conquest in 1237. The Mongol period, with its strong
oriental influences, lasted for more than two centuries. Russia's
growing nationalism after the overthrow of the Mongols was influenced
by orientation to the west, with Polish, English and Dutch contacts.
Siberia was conquered at this time; but internal dissension was great.
From Peter the Great to the Crimean War, great territorial expansion
and westernization stabilized Russia externally, internally and
diplomatically as a European power. Between the Crimean and the Russo-
Japanese Wars, Russia was on the defensive in Europe, weakened by
internal corruption. Expansion in the Far East and Central Asia con­ tinued, however. The decay of Czarism progressed until Russian defeat
and revolution in 1917. The Communist Party assumed power and began
the formation of the U.S.S.R. After 1927, Stalin emerged as sole
leader of the U.S.S.R. Gradually, he orientated Russia toward nation­ alism. On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked Russia.
Theoretically, the Soviet Union is a socialist
state operating with minimal central control for the good of the
proletariat, whose will is expressed through a hierarchy of elective
Soviets.
The present government of the U.S.S.R. is
actually the dictatorship of Stalin, head of the Communist Party which
•shapes basic policies. This dictatorship is guaranteed by the police
activities of the N.K.V.D. Government leaders are prominent in ratio
to their Party status; the most important state offices are invariably
occupied by Party leaders. All phases of life in the U.S.S.R. are
centrally governed; franchise as such is farcical. All votes are
determined by party will; oppositionists are liquidated. Territorial
administrative divisions, based on nationality and economic efficiency,
are unimportant in themselves.
(b) Density of Population. (See Map 1 and Table I ) .
The U.S.S.R. in 1939 had a population of 170,000,000, exceeded only by
India and China; conquests the next year gained 20,000,000 more. Russia's
most densely populated areas, however, containing 30$ of the population,
were lost at the outset of tho war. Of the total remaining population,
over two-thirds is west of the Volga, including the Caucasus. The Ural

2 ­

industrial areas, Western Siberia south of the Vasyuganye (or Great
Siberian Marshland) and north of Kazakhstan, and the oases of Central
Asia contain most of the remainder. Other Siberian and Central Asian
regions are sparsely settled, mostly by nomadic tribes untutored in the
needs of modern warfare and industry necessary to support the Soviet
army. The high birth and death rates result in an unusually large
proportion of children. Fifty-two per cent of the population is female;
forty-eight per cent, male. Total manpower between 15 and 49 years is
40,000,000. Most of the U.S.S.R. is rural; Moscow (4,137,000) and
Leningrad (3,194,000) are the only cities with a population over one
million. Concentration of the population between the front line and the
Volga allows massive resistance and construction of dense fortifications
Loss of this area, however, would deplete Russia's manpower.
Table I. Political Division. Population Totals.
Population. Density of Population.
(2.59 Sq. Kil. = 1 Sq. Mi
Sq. Kil (Sq. Mi.)

6.7 170,000,000 ( 2.6) 6.5 108,809,469 ( 2.5) 66.0 (25.5) 31,850,307 3,209,727 37.2 (14.4) (19.7) 3,542,289 50.9 1,281,599 42.7 (16.5) 1,253,985 2.8 ( LI) 16.9 6,282,445 ( 6.5) 10.3 1,485,091 ( 4.0) 2.2 6,145,937 ( .8) 7.4 1,459,301 ( 2.9) (c) Ethnic Groups. (1) General. The multiplicity of ethnic groups
in the U.S.S.R. renders any uniform government policy difficult. The
Soviet government controls these numerous peoples by exercising strict
rule from Moscow administered through policing and espionage—the
N.K.V.D. and the Communist Party—and by creating territorial-administra­ tive divisions according to racial differences, thus fostering limited
local autonomy. Each of the 16 constituent republics represents a
national majority; political subdivisions, national minorities. The
long historical intermingling of these peoples has reduced separatism
somewhat. The melting-pot tradition illustrates great assimilative
powers and facilitates further expansion and absorption.
(2) Quantitative Ethnic Composition. Great
U.S.S.R. R.S.F.S.R. Ukrainian S.S.R. Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. Georgian S.S.R. Armenian S.S.R. Turkmen S.S.R. Uzbek S.S.R. Tadzhik S.S.R. Kazakh S.S.R. Kirghiz S.S.R.

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Russians form 58% of the population, Ukrainians 17$, White Russians 3$,
Uzbeks 3$, Tatars 3$, Kazakhs 2$, Jews 2$, Azerbaidzhans 1$, Georgians
1$, and Armenians 1$. No other nationality listed in the 1939 census
numbers 1$. Russians and other Indo-Europeans comprise about 80$ of
the population, Turkic tribes 14$, and the rest 6$.
(Z) Languages. Each nationality speaks its
native tongue, but Russian~is the secondary language in all U.S.S.U.
republics. Russian is taught in all schools, and since the Soviets
simplified Czarist forms its use has become much more widespread.
The four general language groups in the
U.S.S.R. comprise the following percentages of the population*
Indo-Europeans, 80$; Russians 78$, Armenians
1%, Poles and Germans 1$.
Altaic peoples, 16$; Turkic branch 14$,
Manchu-Tungus-Mongol branch 1$.
Finno-Ugrians, 1$.
Japhetides, peoples living exclusively in
the Caucasus, 3%; Georgians 1%, Abkhaz-Cherkess group, Chechen, and
Lesghin tribes, 2$.
Semites, mainly Jews, 1$.
(4) Religion. Russians primarily are believers
of the Greek Orthodox faith, the official State religion of Czarist
Russia. There are some Roman Catholics and Protestants. Most of the
Turkic tribes are Sunnite Moslems. Mongols as a rule are Buddhists.
Russian political domination has had little influence on the native
religions of nationalities, except for the present younger generation of
Russians who have been versed in Communism and may be generally anti­ religious.
(5) Ethnic Distribution of Peoples in the
U.S.S.R. (See Map 2). Indo-Europeans, mainly Russians, live all over
the U.S.S.R., largely in cultivable areas of European Russia and Western
Siberia; scattered near rivers and railroads elsewhere. The portage
system had great influence on Russian expansion and settlement- Russians
are overwhelmingly Slav, but near ethnic boundaries show marked admixture
with neighboring nationalities. Great Russians, forming tho bulk of the
entire population, live mostly in the R.S.F.S.R. in European Russia
around Moscow. They were known as Muscovite Russians, having settled
around Moscow after the Mongol invasion forced them from Kiev. They were

4 ­

modified somewhat by association with Finno-Ugrians, mainly Finns and
Estonians. In Asiatic Russia, Great Russians have spread in a dense
belt along the cultivable prairie land lying between the 50th and 60th
parallels as far as the Yenisei River, along which a ribbon of Russian
penetration has reached the Arctic. Russian settlements are scattered
like islands in the Turkic republics. Ukrainians, known also as Little
Russians, live mostly in the Ukrainian "373TE. in "the heart of old Russia
around Kiev. They have been modified by their association with the
Germans, Austrians, Poles, and Jews. Since the war Poles and Germans,
formerly concentrated along the Volga in European Russia in R.S.F.S.R.,
Ukrainian S.S.R., and White Russian S.S.R., have been moved to Central
Asia and Siberia. Tadzhik, an Indo-European tribe of Turkestan, occupies
the Tadzhik S.S.R. The Tadzhik speak New Persian, but have been in­ fluenced greatly by Turkic culture. In the Tadzhik S.S.R. are numerous
Iranians, the original inhabitants of southern Turkestan who were either
driven out or physically modified by numerous invasions.*
Finno-Ugrians are located in the Kola
peninsula and in northern Russia east of "bhe 40th meridian between the
60th and 65th parallels in a belt lying north of Slavic preponderance
* The following peoples of the U.S.S.R. live in territory now under
German occupation:
"White Russians are concentrated mostly in the White Russian S.S.R.,
in the regions occupied after the Mongolian invasion. Though their
association primarily with the Poles and Lithuanians has influenced
them somewhat, they have probably retained more distinctive character­ istics of their race than the Great Russians or Ukrainians.
Baltic peoples—Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians—are a mixture
of old Indo-European and Finno-Ugrian groups and live on the Baltic Sea
in their respective republics. Racial identity of the Lithuanians is
controversial; it is probably more closely related to the Slav than the
Finno-Ugrian, although there is some admixture of both. Their language
is Balto-Slavic. Latvians are a branch of Lithuanians, though the
Latvian S.S.R. is populated partly by Estonians. Livonians, former
inhabitants of the present Latvia and now practically extinct, were
more closely related linguistically to Estonians than Lithuanians.
Estonians are Finno-Ugrians, and havo the strongest ethnic distinctiveness
"of the Baltic peoples.

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and extending to the Yenisei, especially along the Ob River. The Finns
have intermingled with the incoming Slav population. Their culture is
most evident among the forests and marshes south of the tundra zone,
and along the central course of the Volga* Karelians inhabit the
Karelian-Finnish S.S.R.; Samoyeds, ancient inhabitants of Northern
Siberia, live in the tundras north of the 65th parallel to the north­ east of the Finns; and Mari (Chuvash) and Komi (Permians), the Ifoscow
and Molotov areas respectively. Other Finno-Ugrians, numerically small,
are scattered over northern Russia.
Japhetides. (See (6)).

Turkic peoples, members of the Altaic
family and second in number to the Russians, live mostly in Turkestan
and among Russians in southern Siberia and Tungus in northern Siberia.
The Sarts, Iranian Turks, live in the Uzbek and Turkmen republics. The
Kazakh, known originally as Kirghiz-Kazakh, live in the Kazakh S.S.R.
and in the Bashkir Oblast of the R.S.F.S.R. The Kirghiz, a branch of
the Kirghiz known originally as Kara-Kirghiz, inhabit the Kirghiz S.S.R.
near the Tyan-Shan Mountains. The Uzbek, a conglomerate of Turkic
tribes, with a mixture of Mongolic and Iranian elements, and speaking
the Turkic language, occupy the Uzbek S.S.R. Uzbek is related to
Kirghiz, and together form the bulk of the population of Turkestan.
The Turkmen, a Turkic tribe closely related to the Kirghiz, particularly
the Uzbek, influenced more by the Iranians than by any other Turkestan
tribe, live in the Turkmen S,S,R. The Yakut live in northern Siberia
south of the Khatanga Gulf. The Kara-Kalpak live in the Uzbek S.S.R,
Lesser Turkic groups are scattered among the Russians in the Altaic Krai,
Mongol-Tungus-Manchu, members of the Altaic
family, are thinly scattered over most of the Eastern Siberian Krai.
The principal Mongols are the Kalmyk (Oirot), who live in the Kalmyk
A.S.S.R. near the Volga mouth and in the southern part of the Altaic
Krai near Biisk, and the Buriat, in the Krasnoyarsk Krai north of
Irkutsk near Lake Baikal. The Tungus live in the northern part of
Krasnoyarsk Krai, as well as over an enormous territory to the
east,
(6) Ethnic Groups in the Caucasus. The peoples
of the Caucasus are divided into three general groups. Russian conquer­ ors and other Indo-Europeans, including the Iranian Ossetes, comprise
about six of the ten millions; aborigines classified as Japhetides,
having no recognizable racial or linguistic connection with any people
outside the Caucasus, number less than a million; aborigines having
racial affilitations outside the Caucasus comprise the rest. The only
nationalities including mare than 1% of the population are: Russians
30$; Azerbaidzhans 15$, Armenians 13$, Georgians 11$, the Leaghian
tribes 5$, the Chechen 2$, and tho Abkhas-Cherkess group Z%.

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Languages* The languages of the Caucasus,
like the physical anthropology, are very mixed. Most of these peoples
use their native dialect for ordinary conversation and the ancient lan­ guage of their nationality for church and literary use. There are five
language groups in the Caucasus: Japhetides, 20$ — Georgians 11$,
Abkhaz 1$, Cherkess 1$, Chechen 2$, Lesghian tribes 5%; Japhetized
Indo-Europeans 3$ — Kurd 1$, Ossete 1$, Tate 1$; Indo-Europeans 46$ ~
Russians 30%, Armenians 13$, Greeks 1$, Germans 1$, others 1$; Semitic
peoples, Jews, 1$; Turkic peoples 18$ — Azerbaidzhan 15$, Kumyk l T j J
Nogais 1$, Kirghiz 1$; Manchu-Tungus-Mongol, Kalmyk, 1$.

Ethnic Distribution in the Caucasus.
(See Map 3). The ethnic groups live mostly in the localities cited;
however, since many of them are nomads, small bands of various affilia­ tions may be scattered throughout the Caucasus. Georgians, Japhetides
of the southern Caucasus, live in the Georgian (Gruzian) S.S.R. Abkha­ zians, Japhetides of the west Caucasus, of the Abkhaz-Cherkess group,
inhabit the Abkhazian A.S.S.R. Cherkess, also called Adygei, Japhe­ tides of the Abkhaz-Cherkess group consisting of many differently
named tribes living in the west Caucasus, occupy the Cherkess Autono­ mous Oblast and the Adygei Autonomous Oblast. Kabardin, the chief
tribe of the Cherkess, live in the Kabardino-Balkarian A.S.S.R. The
Chechen group, Japhetides of the east Caucasus, dwell in the Checheno-
Ingushian A.S.S.R. The Lesghian group, also east Caucasian Japhetides,
are Dagestan tribes comprising the population of the Dagestan A.S.S.R.
and living' in the Agerbaidzhan S<S.R. Kurds, Japhetized Indo-Euro­ peans, are found in the Armenian S.S.R. Ossetes, Japhetized Indo-
Europeans, live in central Caucasus in the North and South Osetian
Autonomous Oblasts. Tates, Japhetized Indo-Europeans, live in the
Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. Russians comprise the majority of the population
in the north Caucasus, particularly in the Krasnodar Krai. Great
Russians live all over the Caucasus, evidently in regions sparsely
settled, and Little Russians live in Krasnodar Krai and Ukrainian
S.S.R. Armenians, Indo-Europeans, live in the Armenian S.S.R.
Greeks, Indo-Europeans, are located mostly in the region of the Sea
of Azov. Germans, Indo-Europeans, are located in the region of the
Sea of Azov, and in the North Caucasus in the Krasnodar Krai and
Ordzhonikidze Krai. Jews, the leading Semitic peoples in the Cauca­ sus, though there are some Aissor and Arabs, live in colonies in the
Dnepropetrovsk Oblast of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and on the southern
shores of the eastern arm of the Sea of Azov in the Krasnodar Krai.
Those dwelling generally in the region of the 42nd parallel are
mostly Georgian and Gorsky or Mountain Jews, and differ somewhat from
the Armenian Jews. The Jews are ancient dwellers of the country, hav­ ing mixed with the Caucasian population and adopted the speech and

- 7 ­

customs of those peoples with whom they came .in contact. Azerbaid­ zhani, belonging to the Turkic branch of the Altaic peoples occupy
the Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. and are found in the Dagestan A.S.S.R. They
are scattered through the Armenian S.S.R., especially in the Nakhi­ chevan A.S.S.R,, an Azerbaidzhan province in the southern part of the
Armenian S.S.R. Kumyk belong to the Turkic Branch of Altaic peoples
and live in northeastern part of Dagestan A.S.S.R. Nogais belong to
the Turkic Branch of the Altaic peoples and inhabit the Steppes
between the Kuma and Terek Rivers, in the Northern Dagestan A.S.S.R.
and eastern part of the Ordzhonikidze Krai on the Caspian Sea. The
Kirghiz of the Caucasus are a branch of the Kazakh (formerly called
Kirghiz-Kaisak) a Turkic tribe inhabiting the Kazakh S.S.R.
(d) Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R. (See Map
4 and Table II). Russian history is the record of a centralized
authority—Czarist or Communist—uniting a confusion of peoples and
environments. Russia has been strong if controlled by iron-clad
rule, weak otherwise. Itsfetoryis one of alternating influences
from the East and I V s thrusting modern progress onto a country
/et characteristically backward, yet constantly expanding and growing in
power. Its present outstanding weakness, technological dependence
on the West, was lessened by Stalin*s forced industrialization; in
the past, Peter's westernization and Genghis Khan's orientalization
similarly raised Russia's cultural level#
The people of Russia have been restless
pioneers. Peasant families and half-wild Cossacks, fighting and
mixing with native tribes, expanded Russia. Their stamina in
war and peace has been incredible. Ignorant yet avidly eager for
knowledge, stolid yet stubborn and undisciplined, compassionate
and callous, submissive and rebellious, the Russians have been
an enigmatic people.
Historically, Russia's strength has been pro­ portionate to that of its ruler. With stable government Russia has
resisted tremendous onslaughts as those by Charles XII and Napoleon;
with internal weakness it fell to the Mongols and collapsed in World
War I. Dictators, organizers,, realists desirous of personal aggran­ dizement and sovereign control have done most for Russia. Her innum­ erable factions have demanded a firm, even ruthless, rule. Fear and
terror have been determining factors; liberty and justice according to
western standards have been unknown. Rather, revolutionary tendencies,
always latent in Russia, have been used by strong rulers for the co­

ordinated development and expansion of the country, and cultivated Siberia.

Exiles conquered

Loyal opposition to the government and demo­ cratic processes have never been a constructive influence in Russia.
Many leaders had liberalistic aspirations, but mild liberalism co­ existing with secret terrorism simply resulted in internal corruption
and finally disaster.
(1) From the Beginning to Rurik. (4000 B.C. ­ 860 A.D.). Russia's history begins in Central Asia at Anau where
domesticated horses and camels were found about 4000 B.C. and in the
North Caucasus where a pastoral and metal-working civilization connected
with Mesopotamia existed about 3500 B.C. The political unit of Russia,
however, did not appear until the tenth century A.D. Slavic culture
appeared about 3000 B.C. Eastern Slavs were not in Russia until
400 A.D.; they settled in the Ukraine near the Pripet Marshes, a region
which became the melting pot for three groups of peoples; hunters and
fishermen from Scandinavia, probably Finno-Ugrians; peasant farmers
from the Ukraine and Balkans, probably Indo-Europeans; and nomads from
Central Asia and the North Caucasus, probably Altaic peoples, mainly
Turks, Huns, and Scyths.
The numerous cultures of these peoples
were leavened by influence from the West, primarily by Greek colonists
in the Crimea about the fifth century B.C., the Romans and Persians
following the Macedonian Wars by the second century B.C., and Teutons
and Huns migrating from the north and south respectively between the
fourth and sixth centuries A.D. Byzantine culture exerted the greatest
influence on Russia. Trade routes between Scandinavia and Constantinople
crossed Russia. Merchants, particularly from Byzantium, did not
attempt to conquer Russia, but their culture strongly influenced
Russian life, religion and art. Scandinavian Vikings called Varangians
or Rus penetrated northern Russia, and gradually established political
domination over the Slav communities. According to tradition the Scandi­ navian Rurik ruled in Novgorod, the largest and northernmost of the
Russian principalities, in the ninth century. He is recognized as the
founder of the Russian dynasty.
(860-1237).
(Z) From Rurik to Genghis Khan Several Slavic states ruled by Grand Dukes developed. Having no
central ruler encouraged rivalry and internal warfare. Disunity made
Russia an easy prey to the invading Golden Horde. Kiev, the heart of
old Russia, was the most powerful and centrally located of the 12
Russian principalities of the Middle Ages. Trade with the Byzantine
Empire continued; its influence predominated during the reigns of

iUbh

Russia's first rulers of consequence, Vladimir and Yaroslav. Shifting
trade routes and internal dissension, together with the Mongol in­ vasion, caused the downfall of Kiev and, with" it, Russia.
(£) Genghis Khan to Ivan the Great. (1237 ­ 1462. The invasion of the Mongols and allied Turks or Tatars resulted
in a great physical movement of Eastern and Western peoples converging
on Russia. The Tatars settled particularly around Kazan, their capital;
introduced Oriental culture and Islam; and extended their influence to
the Arctic. Western influence resulted primarily from emissaries sent
from foreign courts to Genghis Khan, the most important being Friar
Rubruk, a Franciscan monk, whose medieval travels did much to westernize
Russians of that day.
Under the Mongols Russia was centralized
and unified. Superior to their conquerors, the Russians were never
absorbed by them, although the mingling of Oriental and Occidental
cultures was profoundly felt. Traces of Mongol culture are evident
in Russia today. Under the Tatars Russian leaders were responsible
to a higher authority; they united against the common foe, and built
a protective system based on conciliation and submission. Technical
advances resulted. The development of horsemanship bore particular
relation to the growth of Cossacks, free men who ran away from the crown
and colonized on Russian borders. Culturally, the Turks brought in a
strong sophisticating influence, particularly through luxuries and
literature, from Persia and eventually from India. Oriental governmental
methods emphasizing centralized authority weakened the western feu­ dalistic system then extant in Russia; and with the rising absolutism
of rulers, Grand Dukes and their Imperial Guards became supreme.
Oriental influence was gradually weakened
of a national center at Moscow and a national leader, Ivan
The political unit of Russia emerged, the Tatars were over­ Hanseatic League was broken, and Russian influence was
the Urals. Russia became a Western power.
(4) Ivan the Great to Peter the Great (1462­ 1689. Russia's growing naTionalism was influenced by orientation to
the west primarily through contact with the Poles in the Ukraine, and
English and Dutch traders in Northern Russia and Siberia. Polish
dominance in the Ukraine, responsible for present differences between
Great Russia and the Ukraine, Cossack territory at that time, increased
until Russia defeated Poland in battle. Trade with England and Holland
resulted from the opening of the Archangel route, spurred the develop­ ment of trading cities in Northern Russia, and stimulated Siberian ex­ ploration where fur trade attracted Russians and Europeans. Colonization
by the rise the Great. thrown, the extended to

wai^J

t(%

in Siberia began, especially by Cossack pioneers under Yermak; Cossack
power increased. Internal government was strengthened somewhat by the
"Zemski sobor", a representative assembly created mainly to oppose the
boyars. The church became independent of Constantinople. Printing
was introduced.
After the death of Ivan the Terrible no
national sovereign until Peter the Great was able to control the con­ flicts between boyars and lower classes, principally Cossacks. A
period of utter confusion resulted, until the rise of the Romanov
dynasty gradually restored order.
(5) Peter the Great to the Crimean War (1689­ 1853). Great territorial expansion and westernization stabilized Russia
internally and diplomatically as a European power. Fear of her in­ creasing strength finally brought on the Crimean War- The search for
technological equality with the West was accompanied by industriali­ zation and revolutionary uprisings.
Russia's contact with the West increased
during the reign of Peter the Great; and her position as a European
power was established when Peter defeated Charles XII of Sweden at
Poltava, thereby gaining an outlet to the Baltic Sea. Peter stimulated
scientific exploration in Russia, founded the Russian Academy of Sciences
after the model of the London Royal Society, and introduced many other
ideas to Russia after his tour of Europe. In addition he founded the
city of St. Petersburg as Russia's first industrial and shipping center,
the capital and gateway to the west.
Russia under Catherine the Great continued
to expand mainly in Poland—annexed after three partitions—the Caucasus,
and the Balkans. A Pan-Slavic movement was started. Internally,
Catherine was responsible for building up Cossack and German influence.
She integrated the Cossacks into the Russian imperial system by giving
them a recognized political status and by transplanting their leaders
on various estates. She fostered the settlement of the Volga Germans
whose later influence became tremendous. Many reforms initiated by
Peter matured during her time.
Territorial expansion continued under
Alexander I. By 1812 the Russians reached California, after exploring
and claiming Alaska. Russia proved her strength against Napoleon, and
Alexander became known as the "Savior" of Europe. England and Franco
began to fear Russia's increasing strength; finally, they joined Turkey
in the Crimean War against Russia.

-11 ­

Russia's defeat was probably due to a
weakened internal condition which had been developing since the Congress
of Vienna. An intellectual class arose in 1830 which threatened the
stability of the crown. Revolutionary ideas, entering Russia first
through soldiers who had come in contact with the West as they drove
Napoleon to Paris, were fostered by the nobility—intellectuals who
were to become the backbone of revolution in Russia. A minor uprising
in December 1825, though unimportant in itself, indicated the coming
democratic movement. Industrialization entered Russia. Railroads began
in 1838, and the increasing influx of Western capital led to various
concessions to foreigners, and to the formation of industrial cities,
capitalists and proletariat. Labor troubles arose. An intense Russi­ fication of Poland followed revolution there.
After the Crimean War, Russia was forced
back within her boundaries, and excluded from European power politics.
The crown came face to face with internal dissension formerly avertible
by external activity.
(6) Crimean War to the Russo-Japanese War
(1853-1904). This period, during which Russia was on the defensive in
Europe is marked by internal corruption which weakened the state and
encouraged the growth of disruptive elements within it. In the central
government, the crown, unable to control its subjects, enforced its
rule by terror and espionage. Court corruption was heightened by
foreign financial entanglements which increased constantly. Within
the government two opposition factors, liberals and reactionaries,
gained strength. The leading revolutionaries, mainly intellectuals,
men like Tolstoy, Prince Kropotkin, and Lenin (Ulianov), were members
of the upper class; reactionaries were mostly members of jingoistic
groups activating war primarily with Japan, and later with Germany.
Corruption existed in the church. Territorial expansion continued,
mainly in the North Caucasus and Turkistan, principally under the
leadership of Von Kaufmann. Przywalski led military-scientific
expeditions into Central Asia which aroused great English anxiety.
Muraviev consolidated the Par East and began Russian expansion into
Manchuria. The Trans-Siberian Railroad, a major construction project,
was startedo
Industrialization continued. The pro­ letariat became a major revolutionary force„ Liberation of the serfs
only disturbed an already precarious internal situation. Agricultural
conditions grew steadily worse, and resulted in a great famine toward
the turn of the century. Growing conflicts between the aristocracy
and intelligentsia increased internal dissension. Revolutionary

- 12 ­

societies became powerful forces; the principal ones were the Social
Democrats, industrial workers (the Bolsheviks led by Lenin were the
extreme left wing of this group); Social Revolutionaries, jingoists
and terroists inspired by earlier Populist movements; and Liberal
Unionists, intelligentsia, desiring a liberal constitution (the most
important group at the time).
{]) The Decay of Czar ism (190.4-1917).
Russia's foreign policy and internal corruption caused the decay and
final collapse of Czarism. Her Far Eastern policy provoked the war in
which Japan at last defeated Russia overwhelmingly. Internally the
crown was wracked by graft and corruption. It sought to quell internal
disturbances on the one hand by increasing terrorism--the Black Hundreds
were created to augment the Okhrana--and on the other by attempting to
reform autocratic methods, but efforts were insufficient. A constitution,
granted after strikes by industrial workers in 1905, failed to solve
ever increasing problems.
Germany's strengthening position was a
constant threat to Russia, and resulted in a series of pacts with
England and France prior to Germany's attack on Russia in August 1914.
During the war Russian troops suffered devastating defeats. Corruption
was revealed within the army as well as in the court. General
Sukhomlinov was proved traitorous. The aristocracy's corruption was
particularly evident in the Czarina's involvements with Rasputin and
other powerful groups of mystics and magic healers. Dissatisfaction
increased in other circles; the condition of industrial workers and
peasants continually grew worse. Elements of revolution reached the
boiling point after continupd defeats on the battle front and at home.
In March 1917 the aristocracy revolted.
The Duma refused to obey imperial orders and set up its own Provisional
Government headed by Alexander Kerensky, a Socialist and Minister of
Justice. This band of intellectuals failed, too, because they refused
to be realistic in their dealings with the fundamental revolutionaries-­ workers and peasants--whose strength was increased by the continual
defeats of their enemies at home and abroad, and who finally seized the
government by force in November. They were Bolsheviks headed by Lenin
and Trotsky, who had been sent from Switzerland via Germany in a sealed
car to foment revolt. They made peace with Germany in March 1918.
Much territory was lost including Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Baltic
provinces, Finland and Transcaucasia. German occupation attempts, how­ ever, renewed bitter resistance particularly in the Ukraine.
(8) The Communist Experiment (1917-1927).
This period is marked by the assumption of power by the Communist Party

and subsequent formation of the U.S.S.R.; the intervention and growth'
of the Party as the nucleus of Russian nationalism; the foundation of
the Third International and spread of Communism abroad; and reconquest
of former Russian territory. After Brest-Litovsk, Russia was the scene
of allied intervention, under the guise of quelling the revolution.
Civil war between the White and Red Armies resulted in even greater
turmoil than existed before, and demanded over-all control to restore
order. The German occupation of the Ukraine and the famine of 1921 added
to need for a change in policy.
The Communist Party of Bolsheviks,
victorious in the Civil War, seized control and with the Red Army,
the only nationalistic movement in Russia at that time, became the
strongest force in the country. It took the name of Council of People's
Commissars and drew up a constitution. Lenin became dictator of the
party; Trotsky, Commissar of Foreign Affairs; and Stalin, Commissar of
National Minorities. To protect itself and crush opposition, the
Communist Party organized the Cheka, later the N.K.V.D., which served
the same purpose as the Czarist Okhrana. The strength of the Party
continued to grow, and the Third International (Communist organization
founded in 1919 for world revolution) dominated Soviet Russian politics.
Through the Party Russian nationalism found expression. Economic
failure resulted in formation of the New Economic Policy, a drastic
economic revision resulting from economic failure, due primarily to
Allied blockade and continual uprisings. The U.S.S.R. sought economic
cooperation with other countries, especially Germany. Communism was
felt abroad. Revolutions in border countries were fostered, especially
in Hungary and Poland until stopped by the French; and in China and
Mongolia until stopped by Japanese pressure on China and by Sun Yat Sen's
anti-Communistic successor, Chiang-Kai-Shek. Russian territorial ex­ pansion revived under Communism or Bolshevik imperialism. The recon­ quest of Russian territory proceeded, particularly in the Caucasus and
Turkistan.
(9) Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism
(1927-1942). Stalin entrenched himself as dictator of the U.S.S.R. He
stabilized Russia internally by eliminating all Party irrelevancies and
strengthening economic and scientific development; externally, by re­ establishing world recognition. He inculcated in the people the spirit
of nationalism. In June 1941 Russia was a stronger nation than she had
been before.
By 1937 Stalin was the unchallenged leader
of the U.S.S.R. Appointed Secretary-General of the Communist Party by
Lenin in 1921, he gradually rose to power through Lenin's death and
Trotsky's defeat. Trotsky maintained, according to Lenin, that Communism

- 14 ­

in one country was anomalous. Stalin, formulating his policy afterward,
accused Trotsky of deviating from the Party line, and had him expelled
from the Union. Bukharin and other "Rightists" were also expelled, and
from 1936 a series of purges liquidated other oppositionists. Stalin
strengthened the economic policy of the country by a series of five-
year plans to collectivize and socialize industry and agriculture, and
to equalize the U.S.S.R. technologically with other world powers.
Scientific development and efforts to raise literacy were promoted; the
continual Russian search for knowledge was turned into military and
national channels. The University of Tashkent was founded five years
after Turkistan was conquered; the double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad was completed. The Urals became an industrial center. Stalin
established the U.S.S.R. in world politics. Nonaggression pacts with
bordering countries, recognition from leading world powers, and member­ ship in the League of Nations followed. A Democratic Constitution in­ corporated all Soviet possessions into one state. The U.S.S.R. was
established as a nationalistic and imperialistic power.
Prior to 1937, Soviet imperialism had been
idealistic, accomplished mainly by revolution; after 1937, realistic,
accomplished by military growth and territorial exploitation. The U.S.S.R,
proved its military ability against Japan in 1938, and further secured
its internal position by territorial conquest, always dormant in Russian
policy, and protection against foreign attack, particularly against
Germany whose power was steadily increasing. In September 1939, the
U.S.S.R. occupied part of Poland, attacked Finland two months later, and
occupied the Baltic States and Moldavia in June 1940. In April 1941,
the U.S.S.R. and Japan signed a nonaggression pact. The increasing
strength of Germany and Russia was mutually insurmountable. The non­ aggression pact of August 1939 which had witfi&dA actual conflict for two
years was abrogated by Germany's attack, on the U.S.S.R., June 22, 1941.
Table II: Chronology of Russian History.
1. From the Beginning to Rurik. 4000 B.C. 400-700 A.D. 2. (4Q00 B.C.-860 A.D.)

First signs of ancient Slavic culture.
Eastern Slavs settled in Russia.
(860 A.D.-1237)

From Rurik to Genghis Khan. 860 A.D. 978-1015

First recorded appearance of Russians at Constanti­ nople. Rurik in Novgorod.
Vladimir the Saint. Russians converted to Christi­ anity.

:

, Hi .

Table II; Chronology of Russian History. 1019-1054 3. Yaroslav.

(Contd.)

Greatest Russian ruler of Kievan period,
(1237-1462).

Genghis Khan to Ivan the Great 1237-1240 1250

Mongol conquest.
Friar Rubruk, Franciscan monk, emissary to Genghis
Khan.
(1462-1689).

4.

Ivan the Great to Peter the Great 1462-1505 1533-1584 1555 1589 1598-1613 1613-1645

Ivan the Great. First sovereign of Russia.
Ivan IV, the Terrible. Assumed title of Czar.
Trade with England opened.
Russian church independent of Constantinople.
Boris Godunov. Time of Troubles.
Michael Romanov elected Czar.
(1689-1853).

5.

Peter the Great to the Crimean War 1689-1725 1709, July 8 1728 1762-1796 1768-1792 1772-1795 1798

Peter I, the Great.
Battle of Poltava: Peter against Charles XII.
Bering began Russian exploration of Alaska.
Catherine II (The Great).
Turkish wars.
Partitions of Poland.
Great Britain and Russian alliance, Second Coalition
against France.
1801-25 Alexander I. Defeat of Napoleon- - 1814.
1825, Dec. 26 Decembrist Uprising.
1827 Erivan captured from Persia.
1830-31 Polish Revolution.
1847 Nicholas Muraviev became Governor General of Siberia,
6. Crimean War to the Russo-Japanese War 1853-1856 Crimean War.
1855-1881 Alexander II.
1860 Vladivostok founded.
1861, March 3 Emancipation Edict.
1863-1864 Second Polish Revolution.
1867, March 30 Cession of Alaska to U.S.
1877-78 Turkish War.
1881-94 Alexander III.
(1853-1904).

Table II: Chronology of Russian History. 1885 1891 92 1894-1917 7. Merv taken.
Great famine.
Nicholas II.
(1904-1917).

(Contd.)

The Decay of Czarism 1904-05 1913 1914, Aug. 1

Russian-Japanese War.
China recognized autonomy of Outer Mongolia.
Germany declared war on Russia.
(1917-1927).

8.

The Communist Experiment

1917, Feb. 27
Revolution began.
Provisional Government formed.
1917, March
Bolshevik Revolution.
1917, Nov. 6
(Oct. 24)
Gregorian calendar introduced.
1918
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Peace with Central Powers.
1918, Mar. 3
1918-20
Civil War.
1918, July 10
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic formed.
1918, Dec. 30
Ukraine became part of Soviet Russia.
1919, March 2
Foundation of III International.
Hungarian Revolution.
1919
1919, Dec. 11
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic formed.
1920, April 28
Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. formed.
Polish War.
1920
1920, Aug. 11
White Russian S.S.R. formed.
Armenian S.S.R. formed.
1920, Dec. 2
1921, Feb. 25
Georgian S.S.R. formed.
1921, March 17
New Economic Policy adopted.
1922, Apr. 16
Russian-German Treaty of Rapallo. (Economic Agreement)
Stalin appointed Secretary General of Communist Party.
1922
U.S.S.R. organized. Russia, Y T i e Russia, Ukraine,
iht 1922, Dec. 30
Transcaucasia incorporated into U.S.S.R,
Russia supported revolution in China.
1924-26
1924, Jan. 21
Lenin's death.
1925, May 12
Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz S.S.R.!s
formed.
9. Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism, 1928-32 1932-33 First Five-Year Plan.
Famine.
(1927-1942).

»

•••? ; ; , . '

.7 ­

"jr.1 Wi
• ' / " '

I!

Table II; Chronology of Russian History. 1933-37 1934 1934, Dec. 18 1936, Nov. 26 1936, Dec. 5 1938, July-Aug, 1938-42
1939, Aug. 23 1939, Sept. 22 1939, Nov. 30Mar. 31
1940, Mar. 31 1940, June 27 1940, July 21 1940, Aug. 2 1940, Aug. 3 1940, Aug. 5 1940, Aug. 6 1941, Apr. 13 1941, May 6 1941, June 20 1941, June 22

(Contd.)

Second Five-Year Plan.
Assassination of Kirov.
U.S.S.R. joined League of Nations.
German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.
Adoption of New "Democratic" Constitution.
Japanese-Russian incidents.
Third Five-Year Plan.
Russo-German nonaggression pact.
Partition of Poland.
Russian-Finnish War.
Karelo-Finnish S.S.R. formed.
Rumania ceded Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.
Baltic States into Union.
Moldavian S.S.R. formed.
Lithuanian S.S.R. formed.
Latvian S.S.R. formed.
Estonian. S.S.R. formed.
Russian-Japanese nonaggression pact.
Stalin became Premier.
Stalin became Commissar of Defense.
Germany attacked Russia.

(e) Present Political Administration of the U.S.S.R.
(1) The Actual Political Administration of the
U.S.S.R. General Organization. Government in the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics is a dictatorship of Stalin, the leader of the All-
Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the only political party in the
U.S.S.R., which shapes basic policies. The N.K.V.D. enforces Party
policies, checks all attempts at revolt and is the government's most
powerful weapon. Government leaders are the most outstanding members
of the Communist Party, and their prominence in State affairs is pro­ portionate to their Party status. Communist Party Secretaries are the
real rulers of the Soviet Union. Every territorial subdivision in the
U.S.S.R. has Party and N.K.V.D. organizations which actually control all
activities in that particular political unit.
Stalin. Stalin has been dictator of the
Soviet Union since Lenin's death, and a Party and State leader since the
Bolsheviks came into power. The only official title Stalin held until
shortly before the German invasion was Secretary-General of the Communist

Party; he now has official titles in all key positions. He is Premier
of the Soviet Union; Commissar for Defense; Chairman of the two major
bureaus of the Party's Central Committee which formulates all govern­ ment policy. (The Politburo is the smaller and more powerful of the
two, the governing board of the Central Committee and composed of the
self-perpetuating inner group which rules the Party. The Orgburo is
the organizing board composed of candidates to the Politburo.) He is
Chairman of both the Party Secretariat and Revision Commission, and a
member of both the Supreme Military Council and the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
Political Administrations. All government
administrations, controlled primarily by the Party and secondarily by
the State, are centralized under Stalin. In the U.S.S.R., every phase
of life is socialized. The central organizations are commissariats,
councils, and commissions; they control national economy, politics,
society, and culture. Government administration stems from the Central
Committee of the Communist Party and its state equivalent, the Council
of Peoples' Commissars (Sovnarkom). State administrators are responsible
to their respective Party superiors. Usually, the top administrator is
a Party leader; if he is not, the Party leader is the higher authority.
The government controls all organizations
in the U.S.S.R. through Party and State agencies. Two primary ideals
inculcated in the mind of every child in the Soviet Union are the spirit
of Communism and the need for defending it—major principles of all
U.S.S.R. organizations. Functioning primarily for the protection and
maintenance of the Soviet Union, these organizations provide a reserve
of trained personnel for the military forces. The Party's first pro­ tection is military organizations, therefore, not essentially part of
the Red Army, are of primary importance. Organizations exist for every­ one; their programs cover every conceivable subject supplementing
regular school curricula. Participation in some, however, is permissible
only to members of the Communist Party and their families. Like all
U.S.S.R. systems, these organizations are patterned after the Communist
Party, and are highly centralized. Every person in the U.S.S.R., if he
expects to receive any individual recognition, belongs to one or more
of these organizations; his personal security and well-being are pro­ portionate to his Party affiliation.
The Central government manages all phases
of life in the U.S.S.R. Minor authorities have power just so long as
they comply with orders from above. Subordinate officers often are not
local citizens, but sent from Moscow; when local authorities qualify for
leadership, however, they are appointed to office or allowed to be

elected.

National administration is the model for political subdivisions.

Principal political administrations aree
N.K.V.D. (Commissariat of Internal Affairs), the all-powerful, ubiquitous,
and omnipresent police system responsible only to the highest authorities;
Osoviakhim, "leisure time" military organization; Komsomols, Pioneers,
Ootobrists, youth organizations, primarily for civilian defense training;
Trade Unions and the Chief Administration of Labor Reserves, organization,'
to supply and control labor; and Gosplan, planning commission for
government economy.
The Franchise and the Party Cell. Indi­ viduals at the head of Party and government organizations are selected
by the district party leaders, through party cells.* Cells carry out
party policies and decisions, recruit and educate new members, assist
local party committees in propaganda work, and participate actively in
the political and economic life of the community. The elections, when
they are held, are farcical and their results negligible. Military,
naval, and even athletic heroes are frequently delegates. Election pro­ cedure as it is managed by the Party is arranged so that the percentage
of Communists increases in the higher Soviets. The Supreme Soviet is
composed entirely of Party leaders.
Candidates are usually selected from Party
leaders prominent in the local organizations. In elections, the pro­ letariat has distinct advantage over other "voters." Suffrage is on on
occupational, not territorial, basis. Delegates of workers are pro­ portionate to the number of voters, not population; workers elect five
delegates to every one for peasants. Town and factory Soviets are
directly represented in Ail-Union Congress, whereas village Soviets
have only indirect representation.
All Party oppositionists are disfranchised,
entailing deprivation of civil rights, social ostracism, and gradual
class extinction. Political prisoners, mostly Poles, at present, consti­ tute the principal disfranchised group; before the war, most dis­ franchised were former "exploiters"; i.e., bourgeoisie, private traders,
•Party cells are found in all units where there are enough people to be
of any importance. They are found in towns, villages, Soviet farms,
tractor stations, collective farms, factories, plants, schools, offices,
army units, navy units, N.K.V.D. units, and railroad units. Delegates
from these cells are appointed to district Party committees in all the
city raions, cities, districts, areas, territories, regions, republican
Party Congress, and, finally, All-Union Party Congress,

priests, and kulaks. Prisoners (usually kept in concentration camps in
Siberia) are classified as either political, criminal, or civil.
Territorial Division. Territorial-adminis­ trative divisions in the U.S.S.R. are unimportant. All power comes from
the central government; the medium is of small consequence. Continual
changing of internal boundaries in compliance with economic demands,
necessitates fluidity of state administration. Since the Soviets are
continually experimenting with their boundaries, economic statistics
are obscure and inexact.
In Czarist Russia, fiscal and military
needs determined administrative units. The Soviets, however, re-
regionalized the country on the basis of economic geography with the
"raion" as the keystone. National boundaries, regional limitations,
and new industrial techniques resulted in territorial-administrative
divisions based on nationality and economic geography.
The classifications of national units,
depending on the individual degree of autonomy, beginning with the
highest unit, are: constituent republic (theoretically able to secede
from the Union), autonomous soviet socialist republic, the autonomous
oblast, and the nationaiT'okrugT As autonomy increases, the political
unit is promoted to the next higher level. National boundaries based
on population are changed less frequently than non-national.
The classifications based on economic
efficiency, also ranging from highest to lowest, are: krais and oblasts,
large units roughly corresponding to our states (they are coordinate
terms, the krai having a larger area and a more heterogeneous popu­ lation) and raion, the fundamental economic planning unit, a region
within the radius of some industrial or agricultural center with no
particular administrative boundaries. Smaller units are rarely divided
or changed. The city raion is in some large cities, where subordinate
units are wards. In larger krais and oblasts where an intermediate
link between them and the raions seems advisable, the okrug is used*
It is composed of raions with unimportant racial minorities. (The
economic okrug should not be confused with the lowest grade in the
national classification.)
(2) The Theoretical Political Administration
of the U.S.S.R. Theoretically, the government of the U.S.S.R. is a
dictatorship of the proletariat with minimal state control, existing
for the benefit of the individual factory worker and farm laborer. A
hierarchy of soviets--councils of workers' elected representatives—

combining executive, legislative, and judicial powers, operates govern­ ment administration. The soviet with authority vested in the individual
worker is the basis of U.S.S.R. administration, all of which is
pyramidally organized.
State Organization. Government leaders
are elected; any citizen of the U.S.S.R. is eligible. Suffrage is
universal and unrestricted for every citizen of the U.S.S»R., 18 years
of age and over, engaged either in "productive work useful to society"
or enlisted in the Soviet army. The primary electoral unit is the cell,
composed of at least three members who are represented in the village,
town, and factory Soviets; then in raion Soviets. Delegates to krai
and oblast Soviets, elected directly by village, town, and factory
Soviets as well as through raion Soviets, elect delegates both to the
constituent republic in which they are situated and to the All-Union
Congress of Soviets to which delegates also come directly from village,
town, and factory Soviets. Subordinate administrative units within the
U.S.S.R. usually have theuhicameral system of-representation with supreme
local authority vested in the Executive Committees of their Supreme
Councils of Peoples1 Commissars or Deputies.
The highest representative council in the
U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Soviet, composed of five main departments which
handle state administrationT~~Of these departments,two--Soviet of the
Union and Soviet of Nationalities,--comprise the Council of Peoples'
Commissars (Sovnarkom). The system of representation is bicameral.
The five main departments of the Supreme Soviet are: Soviet of the Union
(representation according to population, with one for every 300,000
persons in the U.S.S.R.); Soviet of Nationalities (representation accord­ ing to subordinate administrative units on the following basis: 25
representatives from each constituent republic, 11 from each autonomous
republic, five from each constituent oblast, and one from each national
region); Supreme Court (elected by the Supreme Soviet); Prosecutor
(elected by the Supreme Soviet); Presidium, of the Supreme Soviet (the
governing board of the Supreme Soviet, composed of one President, 16
Vice-Presidents, one from each constituent republic, one Secretary, and
24 members),
The U.S.S.R. is a federation of 16 consti­ tuent republics. The Supreme Soviet delegates legislative power to a
Central Executive Committee (elected by Supreme Soviet) and executive
power to the Council of Peoples' Commissars, whose members arc appointed
by the Central Executive Committee. The Sovnarkom is composed of a
President, 14 Vice"Presidents, 41 Peoples' Commissars, and many Chairmen
of important government commissions. Commissars are directors of the

25 All-Union Commissariats and the 16, Union-Republic Commissariats ­ Ail-Union Commissariats (primarily
national administrations) direct activities such as defense, foreign
affairs, foreign trade, industrial projects (Five Year Plans), and
communications. Administration in these commissariats is controlled
directly from the central government of the U.S.S.R. through inter­ mediate political units. Union-Republican Commissariats (primarily
local administrations with national control) direct activities such as
internal affairs, internal trade, and local industrial projects. Local
authorities direct activities according to the central government's
orders.
Party Organization. The only difference
between Party and state organizations is that the former is more
thorough, larger and stronger in every respect. The supreme organ of
the Communist Party, the All-Union Party Congress, is supposed to meet
every three years and elect a Revision Commission, Auditing Commission,
and Central Committee. The Central Committee forms the Party policies,
convenes the Ail-Union Party Conference annually and is organized as
follows: Secretariat (four members; Stalin, Secretary-General);
Politburo (nine members, most powerful men in the U.S.S.R.) and Qrgburo
(alternates and candidates to Politburo); Commission of Party Control;
Administrations (Cadres, Propaganda, and Agitation); Departments
(Mili'bary, N.K.V.D., Navy, Railroad Commissariat, Agriculture, Schools,
Organization, and Instruction).
(3) Administrative Divisions of the U.S.S.R.
(See Map 5 ) . In April 1941 the only consequential political subdivisions
in addition to the 16 constituent republics were those within the-
R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., and White Russian S.S.R. They are
listed as follows, with parentheses indicating capitals, and asterisks
indicating German-occupied territory within political boundaries (see
Map 1 for front line as of May 1942):
R.S.F.S.R. (Moscow)*—Kraist Altai
(Barnaul), Krasnoyarsk (Krasnoyarsk), Krasnodar (Krasnodar), Ordzhonikidze
(Voroshilovsk), Primorski (Vladivostok), Khabarovsk (Kharbarovsk);
Oblasts: Arkhangelsk (Arkhangelsk), Vologda (Vologda), Gorki (Gorki),
Ivanovo (Ivanovo), Irkutsk (Irkutsk), Kalinin (Kalinin), Kirov (Kirov),
Kuibyshev (Kuibyshev), Kursk (Kursk), Leningrad (Leningrad), Molotov
(Molotov), Moscow (Moscow), Murmansk (Murmansk), Novosibirsk (Novosibirsk),
Omsk (Omsk), Orel (Orel), Penza (Penza), Rostov (Rostov-on-Don), Voronezh
(Voronezh), Ryazan (Ryazan), Saratov (Saratov), Sverdlovsk (Sverdlovsk),
Smolensk (Smolensk), Stalingrad (Stalingrad), Tambov (Tambov), Tula

(Tula), Chelyabinsk (Chelyabinsk), Chita (Chita), Chkalov (Chkalov),
Yaroslavl (Yaroslavl); A.S.S.R's; Bashkir (Ufa), Buryat-Mongolian (Ulan-
Ude), Dagestan (Makhach-KalaJ, Kabardino-Balkar (Nalchik), Kalmyk
(Elista), Komi (Syktyvkar), Crimean (Simferopol), Mari (Ioshkar-Ola),
Mordvin (Saransk), German Volga (Engels), North-Osetian (Ordzhonikidze),
Tatar (Kazan), Udmurt (Izhevsk), Checheno-Ingush (Grozny), Chuvash
(Cheboksary), Yakut (Yakutsk).
Ukrainian S.S.R. (Kiev)*—Qblasts; Vinnitsa
(Vinnitsa), Voroshilovgrad (Voroshilovgrad), Dnepropetrovsk (Dneprope­ trovsk), Zhitomir (Zhitomir), Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamenets-Podolsk), Kiev
(Kiev), Nikolayev (Nikolayev), Odessa (Odessa), Poltava (Poltava), Stalino
(Stalino), Kharkov (Kharkov), Chernigov (Chernigov), Volynian (Lutsk),
Drogobych (Drogobych), Lvov (Lvov), Rovno (Rovno), Stanislav (Stanislav),
Tarnopol (Tarnopol), Chernovitsy (Chernovitsy); A.S.S.R.: Moldavian
(Tiraspol).
White Russian S.S.R. (Minsk)*--Oblasts:
Vitebsk (Vitebsk), Gomel (Gomel), Minsk (Minsk), Mogilev (Mogilev),
Polesian (Mozyr), Brest (Brest), Belostok (Belostok), Baranovichi
(Baranovichi), Vileika (Vileika), Pinsk (Pinsk).
Other constituent republics of the U.S.S.R.
(Moscow)—Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. (Baku), Georgian S.S.R. (Tiflis), Armenian
S..S.R. (Erevan), Turkmen S.S.R. (Askhkabad), Uzbek S.S.R, (Tashkent),
Tadzhik S.S.R. (Stalinabad), Kazakh S.S.R. (Alma~Ata), Kirghiz S.S.R.
(Frunze), Karelian-Finnish S.S.R. (Petrozavodsk)*, Estonian S.S.R.
(Tallinn)*, Latvian S.S.R. (Riga)*, Lithuanian S.S.R. (Kaunas)*,
Moldavian S.S.R. (Kishinev)*.

(2) Economic Factors.
Ta) Availability of Strategical Materials. The
following "basic materials are strategic for the Soviet Union, i.e.,
those of which it has sufficient resources within its own "boundaries:
Coal Iron ore Crude petroleum Manganese Chromite Magnesite Cotton Timber Platinum
Mica
As"bestos
Potash
Boron
Phosphates
Salt'
Sulfur
Pyrites

The following are the most important critical
materials, i.e., those which must "be wholly or partially supplied from
outside sources:
Aluminum Mercury Nickel Tungsten Tin Molybdenum Antimony Copper Lead Zinc Ferroalloys Rubber Aviation gas; lubricating oil Machine tools; machin-
ery
Wheat
Sugar
Hides and leather
Scientific and
professional
instruments
Fats and oils
Electrodes and
abrasives.
Wool and woolen goods
Chemicals,, medicines
and dr*Ugs

To date the most important shipments from
Great Britain, Canada, and the United States have consisted of air­ craft and arms. During recent months shipments of food, metals, and
chemicals in particular have increased substantially. Food shipments
are of vital importance duo to the present severe shortage in the Soviet
Union, and even if a good harvest is obtained, food will have to "be in­ cluded in estimates of aid given to Russia during the coming year.
Although Russian industrial and agricultural
losses have "been severe, particularly in the Ukraine, the "bulk of the
country's productive capacity is still intact. Approximately 65-75^
of the country's industrial capacity remains in the hands of the

M.-irf"' nl'r ?

fltfl-.JJ..

.

"jj.. • ' .

n

" A " f' J

5t" r<

Russians, and potential grain production not counting increased
plantings is "between 60-70$ of normal.
Efforts are "being made to increase the output
of food and manufactured goods in various ways, and these methods are
discussed "below under the appropriate headings. Most important are the
increase in the acreage sown to grain and other crops in the unoccupied
regions, and the maintenance of the production of strictly military
supplies which, if Lend-lease aid is included, may " e estimated at
b approximately equal to pre-war output. In addition, the country is now
producing large quantities of gasoline of a"bout 85 octane at its Cauca­ sian refineries, and small increases have "been made in the output of
coal, ferrous metals, electrical equipment and some other goods in the
factories of the unoccupied areas.
It is impossible to predict whether the coun­ try can continue effective production indefinitely, since a number of
factors seriously limit both industrial and agricultural output.* In
addition, there are four situations whose aggravation or potential exist­ ence would gravely threaten the country's present agricultural and
industrial capacities. These situations are discussed below:
Possible loss of the Caucasus. Loss of the
Caucasus would mean the loss of 70-80$ of Russia's oil resources and
most of its refineries. The North Caucasus also produces a food sur­ plus even taking into account food shipments to Transcaucasia. In
addition, the Caucasus contains most of the country's remaining man­ ganese deposits, large power resources, deposits of lead, zinc, copper,
and some other metals. Moreover, it manufactures textiles, synthetic
rubber, and most of the country's cement, and contains a large number
of fish canneries.
Breakdown of the railroad system. Transporta­ tion in the Soviet Union is primarily geared to its railroads although
some goods are moved over the inland waterways during, the ice-free
season, and some overland transportation is possible in spite of the
lack of roads. At present the Russian railroads must supply the armed
forces and move troops, transport Lend-Lease goods from Murmansk,
Archangel, and Iran, and haul raw materials, finished goods, and
grain over the country's enormous distances. Railroad transportation
is very inefficient at the present time, and a complete breakdown of
the rail system would cause the collapse of the country's war effort.
*See pages 88 and 92

Possible drought. The Volga region, the east
part of the North Caucasus, the Urals, and Kazakhstan are arid regions
subject to drought. In case of severe and widespread drought in these
areas on which the Soviet Union depends for much of its grain, famine
would result. Up to now, weather conditions have been generally favor­ able but it is impossible to draw definite conclusions as yet about
this year's crops.
Labor shortage. A labor shortage exists at .
the present time, especially in the field of skilled labor. This situ­ ation will seriously reduce the country's productive capacities partic­ ularly in the highly important fields of machinery, and machine tool
building, arms, chemicals, etc.
The Russian merchant marine contains at the
present time an estimated 3^2 ships of 1,103,6jk gross tons. Of these
only 2k are in the Atlantic Convoy Route and 49 in the Siberia-United
States West Coast Route, plus about 20 additional ships in other trans­ oceanic routes. The procurement of outside supplies, therefore, depends
primarily on the shipping facilities of Great Britain and the United
States. Within the Soviet Union communications must, of course, be
maintained between Murmansk, Archangel, and Caspian ports and the inte­ rior of the country; emphasizing again the vital importance of the rail­ road system.
(b) Strategical and Critical Materials. For the
purposes of this Study, strategic materials are defined as those essen­ tial materials of which the Soviet Union has sufficient or nearly
sufficient resources. Critical materials are those essential items
which are wholly or partially lacking, and which must be supplied from
outside sources, mainly the United States, Great Britain and Canada.*
*The above definitions differ from those used by the Commodities
Division of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The definitions of the
Army and Navy Munitions Board for strategic, critical and essential
materials as applying to the United States are as follows:
Strategical materials are those materials essential to the national
defense for the supply of which in war dependence muBt be placed in
whole, or in part, on sources outside the continental limits of the
United States and for which strict conservation and distribution control
measures will be necessary.
Critical materials are those materials essential to the national
defense, the procurement problems of which in war, while difficult, are

The materials classified as strategic and
critical are listed in the introduction.
Strategical materials. Coal -- In spite of
the loss of the Don Basin, the Soviet Union still has large coal re­ sources located in the Moscow area, the Urals, the Kuznetsk, Cheremkhovo
and Chernogorsk mines in Siberia, and the Karaganda mines in Central
Asia.
Iron ore. The chief remaining iron ore de­ posits are those of the Urals, and the Gornaya Shoriya mines in Siberia,
near Stalinsk. Certain ferroalloys and iron and steel manu£p.ctures
are, however, critical.
Crude Petroleum. From 70 to of Soviet
crude petroleum comes from the Caucasus and most of the remainder from
the Emba fields in Central Asia, and -y^e Urals - Volga fields. The
Soviet Union is the world's third largest producer of crude petroleum,
ranking after the United States and Venezuela.
Manganese. The Soviet Union possesses a
large deposit of high grade manganese at the Chiatura mines in Georgia,
Trans Caucasus. There are also small deposits of manganese in the Urals
and Siberia.*
Phosphates. The "bulk of Russian phosphates
come from the huge nepheline deposits on the Kola Peninsula. Large
stockpiles are also reported to exist at the present time.

*The country's other large manganese deposits at Nikopol in the
Ukraine are in possession of the Germans.
(Footnote continued from preceding page:)
less serious than those of strategic materials because they can be
either domestically produced or obtained in more adequate quantities
or have a lesser degree of essentiality, and for which some degree of
conservation and distribution control will be necessary.
Essential materials neither strategic nor critical - In this classi­ fication are included those materials., essential to the national
defense for which no procurement problems in war are anticipated, but
whose status is such as to require constant surveillance because future
developments may necessitate reclassification as strategic or critical.

MATERIAL

Copper

TABLE III
CRITICAL MATERIALS
PRODUCTION REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT AS CRITICAL 100,000 tons Possibly Insufficient pro1936 includ150,000 tons. duction for waring copper time needs* extracted both from ore and reclaimed
metal.
58,000 tons in 1936 Probably about the same or slightly higher Insufficient production

SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLY United States South America

REMARKS

i

27,000 tons of]
copper reques-!
ted from the j
Harriman
Mission,

I

Lead

United States Australia (?) United Kingdom United States

84,000 tons ofj
lead requested!
from the
Harriman
Mission,
72,000 tons ofj
zinc requested
from the
Harriman Mis­ sion.

i

Zinc

63,000 tons in 1936

Probably about the s ame

Insufficient production partly due to loss of a zinc distillation plant in the Ukraine, Insufficient production of rare
metals ­

Ferro! alloys i (Vanai dium,
: tungsten,
etc.)

?

9

United States

TABLE I I I

MATERIAL
CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)
PRODUCTION REASON FOR SOURCE OF
CLASSIFICATION OUTSIDE SUPPLY
NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT AS CRITICAL ? ? Insufficient domestic production United States

REMARKS
U.S. exports
(1941)
Electrodes ­ 568,000 lbs.
Abrasives ­ 660,000 lbs.
114,000 tons
of aluminum
requested
from the
Harriman
Mission.

Electrodes
and Abra­ sives

Aluminum

55,000 tons (1940 est.)

10,000 tons; possibly 20-30,000 tons depending on functioning of Urals plant and extent Zaporozhe plant was evacuated. Nil

Conquest of main production facili­ ties.

United States
Canada

• •

(Mercury

300-500 tons

Conquest of Nikitovka mines, Ukraine

Mexico via
United States

i

Reported
deposit
at Khai­ darkan,
Kirghiz
SSR produc­ tion, if
any, un­ known.

-&'••

"

'

"

-

-

"

±~ • "~'V
*=- ~

1-;
" . -<••

>^Siv

'.->

CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont. )

mTERIAL
PRODUCTION NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT 2,500-3,000 tons (1939 est.)
About the same REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION AS CRITICAL
Insufficient resources SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLY

TABLE I I I

REMARKS

Nickel

Canada
New Caledonia

I !

i

9,600 tons of
nickel reques­ ted from the
Harriman
Mission;
Canada is fur­ nishing 900
tons monthly;
yearly re­ quirements
estimated at
15-20,000 tons

Tungsten

Negligible 12,000 tons (1937 est.)

Negligible About the s ame

Insufficient resources Insuf f ic ient resources

India
China
Bolivia via
the United
States
48,000 tons of
tin requested
from the
Harriman Mis­ sion. Imports
from China via
Sinkiang.
1941 exports
of ore and
concentrates
(gross weight)
2,312 short
tons.

Tin

»r.^--2&

Molybdenum

Negligible

Negligible

Insufficient resources

United States

r^i

MATERIAL

TABLE III
CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont. )
PRODUCTION
REASON FOR
SOURCE OF
NORMAL ESTIMATED
OUTSIDE SUPPLY
CLASSIFI CATION
AS CRITICAL
PRESENT OUTPUT
Exact data not available:
up to 1940 production was
only about .01 - .05 of
domestic demand.
9,000 guns 6,000 tanks Reduced by at least 35^, i.e., present output would equal 5850 guns and 3900 tanks. See "Remarks." Insufficient
resources
Mexico
Bolivia

REMARKS

Antimony

Ammuni­ tion and
Materiel

Insufficient pro­ duction due to
loss of factories.

United States
Britain
Canada

1
^
^ '

Includes
tanks, Bren
carriers guns,
ammunition,
jeups, trucks,
parts and re­ placements.
(About 1,000
British
tanks have
been shipped.)
It is esti­ mated that
with Lend-
Lease aid
pre-war
Russian pro­ duction of
purely mili­ tary supplies
has been
maintained.

i
*•,-:.

MATERIAL

Aircraft

TABLE I I I CRITICAL T^TERIALS (Cont.) PRODUCTION REASON FOR NORL1AL ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION PRESENT OUTPUT AS CRITICAL 372 planes About 175 per See above5 also per month month; 78$ of chronic lack of (first half factories still efficiency. 1941) in Russian hands but 15% of these are within bombing range of the Germans. Insufficient production and loss of at least a half-dozen important machine tool plants•

SOURCE OF OUTSIDE SUPPLY

REIIARKS

United States Pursuit and Britain bomber planes. Lend-Lease Canada shipments (U.S. and Britain) more than 2,000.

Cfll

Machine Machine tools 3 Present capacity tools 53j900 units reduced because machinery in 1938. of loss of big semi-manu­ industrial factures centers in of iron, the Ukraine steel such as and other Kharkov. metals. 270,000 units planned for period 1938­ 1942.

United States

From Oct. 1, 1941-May 31, 1942, export arrivals of machine tools totaled 1,412 pieces, valued at about $7,400,000.

TABLE I I I

MATERIAL

CRITICAL PRODUCTION NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT Aviation
12,000 tons
Estimated
gas and
of high
possible capac­ octane gas
ity of high
lubricat­ ing oil,
(1940)
octane plants;
tetra ethyl,
1,275,000
40-50,000 tons
etc.
tons of
per year.
lubricating
Lubricating
oil (1937)
oil produc­ tion probably
not greatly
increased over
1937.
Rubber
(Natural)
50,000 tons
(approx.) of
synthetic
rubber
annually
About the same,
as the largest
Russian rubber
factories have
not been cap­ tured.

MATERIALS (Cont.) REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION AS CRITICAL Backward refining
industry

SOURCE OF OUTSIDE SUPPLYr

REMARKS

United States
Large amounts
of high oc­ Dutch West
Indies
tane gas and
high grade
petroleum
products
shipped since
June 22, 1941.

Lack of natural
rubber and in­ sufficient syn­ thetic produc­ tion; loss of
factories in
occupied terri­ tory.

— _—
~
_ ! : • • ­

United States
72,000 tons
of rubber re­ Ceylon
quested from
the Harriman
Mission; 1942
requirements
estimated
by the Brit­ ish at
20,000 tons.

TABLE III
CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)

MATERIAL
PRODUCTION NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT

REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION AS CRITICAL

SOURCE OF OUTSIDE SUPPLYr

REMARKS

Wheat and

other cereal grains

1940 barn production of wheat estimated at 30,000,000^ skeo^t tons.

An estimated* 5 million additional acres have been sown to grains, but even with good yields, the harvest will probably not be sufficient to feed adequately the population of un­ occupied Russia,
(?)

Loss of the United States Size of grain Ukraine and Cenreserves un­ t r a l Russian a g r i c u l known. Ext u r a l area. port a r r i ­

vals Oct. 1, 1941-May 31, 1942: wheat ­ 26,®D0 tons wheat flour -33,900 tons.
70-80$ of the country's output has been l o s t through conquest. United States Export a r r i - ti

Sugar

2,360,000 short tons of granulated sugar in 1938

vals Oct. 1, 1 1941-May 31, 1 1942 amounted! to about 1 35,000 tons. I

TABLE III CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.) MATERIAL PRODUCTION NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT Vegetable oil (1938) 570,000 metric tons. ? REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION AS CRITICAL Insufficient production of edible fats and lacking resources of tropical oils. SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLY
West Coast
Africa (palm
oil)
United States
(lard and
coconut oil)
REMARKS

Fats and oils

U. S. Exports
(1941): Coco­ nut oil-12,500
short tons;
Shipments of
lard and butter
Oct. 1, 1941­ May 31, 1942
equaled 29,000
tons*

Hides and. leather

Footwear 1939 US,300,000 pairs.

Footwear production reduced 35-45$ by war losses.

Insufficient domestic production*

United States
Export arrivals
Mongolia
Oct. 1, 1941­ South America
May 31, 1942:
Sole leather;
3,766 metric
tons; Army
boots:
846,000 pairs;
British ship­ ments very
large.

'/> ^« ­ '.
*"""*^' i . r t

TABLE III
CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont*)
MATERIAL
PRODUCTION
NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT 1938-1939 wool output -300 million pounds; 1939 woolen cloth -110,000,000 yards. Wool at approxi­ mately the 1938­ 39 level; all
textile pro-
duction re­ duced 35-40$
by losses.
REASON FOR
CLASSIFICATION
AS CRITICAL
Insufficient
domestic pro­ duction*
SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLY
United States
Mongolia
South America
REMARKS

Wool and
woolen
goods

Large amounts .
of wool and
hair requested
from the
Harriman Mis­ sion; U.S.
export
arrivals of
army cloth
for Oct., 1,
1941-May 31,
1942 amounted
to 993,000
yards.
U.Sw exports
(1941)
valued at
$1,659,000.

t>

. . . ^

Scientific
and pro­ fessional
instru­ ments.

Insufficient
domestic
production

United States

MATERIAL

TABLE I I I CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont. )
REASON FOR
PRODUCTION
SOURCE OF
NORMAL ESTIMATED OUTSIDE SUPPLY
CLASSIFICATION
AS CRITICAL
PRESENT OUTPUT ? ? Insuf£Lcient
domestic
production for
wartime needs
United States
(quinine,
serums, etc.)
Turkey
(opium)
United States
Toluol,
Phenol, etc.

REMARKS

Chemicals,
medicines,
and drugs
(opium,
quinine,
serums,
etc.)

Export arrivals
of medical
items, Oct. 1,
1941-May 31,
1942 valued at
$1,750,000;
large amounts
of chemicals,
blending
agents, ex­ plosives ,
etc•, also
shipped
during same
period.

Cotton. Most of Soviet cotton is grown in
Central Asia under irrigation, and in spite of the current reduction
of the cotton acreage to provide for food production, Russian cotton
output and stocks will " e sufficient for the country's needs.
b Timber. The Soviet Union possesses enormous
quantities of timber in the northern part of unoccupied European Russia
and in Siberia.
• . Chromite, Magnesite, Platinum, Asbestos,
Pyrites, Potash, and Salt. All of these metals and minerals come
largely from the Urals.
Sulfur. Sulfur is mined in Central Asia and
Urals, and also extracted from the pyrites deposits of the Urals.
Boron. Boron comes from Central Asia.
Critical materials. Critical materials are
discussed in Table III. Wherever possible, the sources of outside
supply are indicated. Under "Remarks," the amounts of material re­ quested from the Harriman Mission are given, and although in some cases
such requests may be excessive, they may be regarded as a gauge of the
country's needs. Some data on shipments are also given.
(c) Production capacities. Industrial production
by zones (see maps 6 and 11). Zone of combat. Industrial production
in the zone of combat is inconsequential, except in the case of Lenin­ grad. Normally Leningrad is a center for the production of special
steel, electrical and transport machinery, ships, rubber goods, boats,
and shoes, textiles, chemicals, food, and ammunition and materiel,
accounting for 10-15$ by value of Soviet large-scale industry in 1939­ The capacity of its factories, however, has now been reduced by at
least 6<yfo due to evacuation, bomb destruction and so forth. In addition,
power is no longer available from the Svir and Volkhov hydroelectric
stations, and rail communications have been cut off. During the winter
months some supplies were brought in over a narrow gauge railroad laid
on the frozen surface of Lake Ladoga, and in summer, supplies can be
shipped by'boat across the same lake. Leningrad, therefore, is chiefly
important as a source of local supply, furnishing a portion of the arms
and ammunition, boats, uniforms, blankets, packaged food, etc. needed
by the troops in the immediate area.
The majority of the remaining cities in the
zone of combat, especially Tula and Kalinin, suffered severe damage,

either through fighting or deliberate destruction. In addition, indus­ tries, personnel and stocks were evacuated from many of these cities.
The Russians now claim to have put some industrial establishments in
recaptured towns back into operation. Most of these claims cannot be
confirmed, and on the whole seem hardly credible, except perhaps in the
case of the Donets Basin where several coal mines are said to have been
reopened.
Zone of Communications> The zone of communi­ cation is divided into four general regions from north to south.
The Northern Region includes Murmansk and
Archangel and extends south to the vicinity of Yaroslavl. The chief
importance of this area lies in the fact that it contains the ports of
Murmansk and Archangel, through which supplies reach the Soviet Union.-*
The Murmansk and Archangel-Vologda Railroads
connect these ports with cities in the interior industrial region.
There is an important rail connection between Belomorsk-Obozerskaya-
Kotlas, and supplies reaching Kotlas by way of this connection can be
transported up the Northern Dvina River to the interior of the country
during the ice-free season.
This region is not highly industrialized and
parts of it are only very sparsely settled. Its chief natural resources
are timber, fisheries, and the apatite deposits of the Kola Peninsula.
The locations of the main industries'and power stations are listed
below. Chief industries. Murmansk Kandalaksha Kirovsk Archangel ArchangelVologda Railroad Mezen Fisheries Sawmills Sawmills Canneries Apatite mines Sawmills Fisheries Sawmills Sawmills Fisheries

^Facilities at Murmansk and Archangel are discussed in detail
under 2-d.

(Chief industries continued)
Onega Vicinity of Vologda Sawmi 1 Is
Sawmills and woodworking
Synthetic rubber - 20,000
tons of divinyl a year
Sawmi 11s

Cherepovets (65 mi. west of
Vologda)
Main -power stations.

Murmansk Coal-1 Tuloma Sta. Hydroelectric 3 (5 mi. south of
Murmansk; under­ going enlargement)
Archangel Mixed fuel 5 Niva Sta., at
Kandalaksha Hydroelectric-—25 Kadnikov, near
Vologda Mixed fuel 10 Vologda Oil - 1 Kirov (a) -Wood and mixed--10 fuel
(Vyatka) (b)Peat -10 Total

- 3,000 KW
- 5,000 KW

- 10,000 KW
- 50,000 KW
- 25,000 KW
- 3,000 KW
- 25,000 KW
- 25,000 KW

65 -1^6,000 KW

The Central Industrial Region includes the
cities of Kolomna, Moscow, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo and Gorki. It is one of
the most important manufacturing centers of the Soviet Union and the
cities of the region are located on a railroad net leading westward,
similar to the spokes of a half wheel with Moscow as its hub.
This region contains the Moscow coal "basin
which produced 7,500,000 metric tons of coal in 1937, amounting to
7-8$ of the total output of the Soviet Union.
The important industrial establishments are
listed under the following headings: steel making, machinery and ma­ chine tools, locomotives, car "building and automobiles, chemicals,
refineries, textiles, power plants, and ammunition and materiel.

- 41 -

; - • ; *

Steel Makingt in this region are:
Location Moscow--

The most important steel mills
Production
285,5^6 m.t. (1938)
362,097 m.t. (1938)
- 1 8 ^ 3 8 m.t. (1938)
832,081 metric tons
output of the Central
of steel in 193?. Steel
west of Moscow such as
destroyed or captured,

Type of steel Sickle and Hammer special steel mill
Liebknecht pipe steel
mill

Vyksum,
near Gorki---Pipe steel mill Total These plants account for about one-half the Region which produced 1,1+35,000 metric tons mills in the central industrial area to the those at Tula, have, of course, either "been or partially evacuated.

Machinery: Important machinery and machine
tool, and electrical equipment factories are located as follows:
Location Type of product

Remarks

Moscow

Ball "bearings (Kaganovich plant)
Precision instruments
Railroad equipment
Electro-technical products
Agricultural machinery
Textile machinery
Machine tools, Diesel engines
Radio apparatus
Sewing machines
Locomotives. car "building, automobiles, ships

Lyut ?rtsy Ivanovo Gorki Podolsk

Mytishchi Railroad and streetcar
(outside Moscow) "building
Moscow Automobiles (Stalin plant)-- --Produced about
of the Soviet
Union's auto­ mobiles in 1937

Vlfrtu
•!! , • I

th

.
V , s '.'•/. J 1.1 ••-?>
' • • - • •••"

' / M \

- 42 ­

(Locomotives, car "building, automobiles, ships
continued) Location Kolomna Gorki Yaros lavl Type of product Remarks

Steam, electric, condenser locomotives. Automobile plant (Molotov),-130,000 machines (1937)
Ships
AutomoM le works 2153 trucks and heavy
"busses (1937)
One truck factory reported capacity
100,000 trucks
Chemical and related industries:

Moscow Rubber reclamation
Bobriki One ammonia plant
(near Stalinogorsk)
Yaroslavl Synthetic rubber and asbestos
"combine"
Gorki Chemicals, paper
Stalinogorsk Chemicals, including
manufacture of hydro­ cyanic acid and sodium
Vasilkov Synthetic rubber Capacity believed to
(near Gorki) be 5,000 tons of
divinyl annually
Refineries:
Moscow Four refineries-Capacity for boosting
aviation gas by
use of tetra-ethyl
lead.
-Refining and cracking
plant. Nitro-
benzol extracting
plant

Sormovo (near Gorki)
Yaroslavl

Two refineries
Two refineries-

IP

ft .-V3 =I-J

m

«• i^gj y

Texfriles;
Location Moscow— IvanoveNoginskProduct -Textiles including one
silk mill
-Textile s -Textiles
Power stations in the Moscow Central Region:
Location Source of power Capacity
-300 - 400,000 KV7"
50 200 25 10 50 100,000 KW
300,000 KW
50,000 KfT
St 25,000 KW
100,000 M
Remarks

•One of the largest
textile centers in
Soviet Union.

Rybinsk Ifydroeleetrie under construction
Yaroslavl —Peat Moscow Coal Kostroma -Peat IvanovoPeat Shurukha Peat (near Ivanovo;
undergoing en­ largement in 1938)
Shatura Peat Gorki Peat i t Oil i i Coal Penza Oil Total

100 200 25 25 10 -

200,000 KW
300,000 KW
50,000 KW
50,000 KVY
25,000 KW

995-1, 600,000 KW
Ammunition and Materiel;

Location Stalinogorsk Moscow Podolsk (near Moscow)

Type of product Poison gas 12 munitions plants 2 ammunition factories

Remarks Probably same a s chemi­ c a l plant above Some of these have doubtless been evacuated Evacuated?

- 44 ­
V
•;

/.

Location Vladimir

Type of product 1 chemical warfare factory 1 powder factory

Remarks Evacuated ?

KovroY 2 arms factories Yaroslavl 1 tank factory Gorki 1 1 1 1 arms factory, 1 munitions factory tank factory airplane factory airplane factory

Penza

Volga Region. The Volga Region is here con­ sidered to include the region below the Moscow district as far south as
Rostov and as far east as Kuibyshev and the Ural River. The Volga River
and the railroad connections with the Caucasus are the important trans­ portation links. The principle industrial establishments may be listed
as follows:
Steel: 1,232,000 metric tons (1937). The bulk
of this production is accounted for by the Red October special steel
plant in Stalingrad which produced 7^.* 652 metric tons of steel in 1938.
Vehicles:
Location Stalingrad Type of products Tractor factory Heavy truck factory
Miscellaneous Industries
Saratov 2 oil refineries One Universal
refining and
cracking plant,
one "Polymerization
plant producirg
85 octane gas.
Remarks
U,000 tractors­ (1933)

Ball bearing plant,
Flour mill

Location Kazan

Type of products Synthetic rubber

Remarks Annual capacity of 15,000 tons of divinyl

Power plants: Location Ulyanovsk Saratov Stalingrad Astrakhan Total Source of power Oil Coal Coal Oil Capacity 3 ­ 25 ­ 5,000 KW 50,000 KW

100 - 200,000 KW 5 ­ 10,000 KW

135 ­ 265,000 KW Ammunition and Materiel:

Ulyanovsk Stalingrad

Ammunition factory
Poison gas factory Tank factory Possibly identical
with the chlorine
plant listed
above

Saratov

Part of an airplane
factory which was dismantled
and shipped from Moscow.

North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Although a
portion of the Caucasus is included in the zone of the interior, for
convenience the economic capacities.of the entire region are discussed
under this section.
The outstanding economic importance of this
area lies in its production of 80 - 90$ of the Soviet Union's crude oil
and the bulk of its refined products. In addition, the Georgian Republic
contains the Chiatura manganese mines, producing the bulk of the country's
manganese since the loss of the Nikopol mines in the Ukraine. This
region also has' extensive power resources, and accounts for a small pro­ duction of coal, non-ferrous metals and steel. Its factories produce
synthetic rubber, cement, textiles, and process metals.

- 46 ­

^SfFi l!

Petroleum. Fields: The principal fields are
as follows:
Location
Crude Oil and Natural Gas Metric Tons - 1938
2,763,600 2,250,600 231980,000 28,99^,200 32,230,800 Percentage of
Country1s Output
Grozny, Ordzhonikidzho Krai Maikop, Krasnodar Krai Baku, Azerbaijan Republic Total Total U.S.S.R. - 1938

A

8.5 7.0 7k.k 89.9
100.0

Petroleum. Refineries: At present the percent­ age of total crude oil processed " y the Caucasian refineries is between
b 70 and 80$. The Caucasian refineries are listed as follows:
Location Number of refineries Percentage of refined products Remarks

Baku

Ik *

63.8 (193*0

Baku leads in output
of lubricating oils.
Includes ono acetone­ dewaxing plant.
Receives oil from
Grozny by pipe line.

Makhach Kala Grozny

31.1 (193*0

Leads in production
of gasoline; ^hird in
production of lubri­ cating oil.
k Foster-wheeler
6 Alco
3 Winkler Koch
1 Miller dewaxing
plant producing an
estimated ^3-53,0 0
tons of high grsde

*Recent reports indicate considerable expansion at Baku.

>tfrm

refineries

Percentage of refined
products

Eemarks

aviation motor oil
annually. 1
Universal polymeri ­ zation plant pro­ ducing 85 octane
gasoline under con­ struction in 19^0,
and now evidently
completed.
Batumi Capable of handling
2,000,000 tons a year,
fed " y two pipe lines
b from Baku.
1
2 Receives oil by pipe­ line from Neftegorsk.

Tuapse Krasnodar Total

55

Quality of gnsoline. The yield of gasoline at
Soviet refineries is low (about 20$) compared to American refineries,
but during the past two or three years gasoline fractions have risen
due to the addition of cracking plants and improved refining methods
Output of gasoline. In 1958* the Caucasian
refineries processed 88$ of the total gasoline produced, with the refiner­ ies of the Grozny district leading in output. Although this percentage
has now decreased to perhaps 75-80$> "the Caucasian refineries still ac­ count for the great bulk of the country's output of gasoline and refined
products. According to recent reliable reports, the Caucasian refiner­ ies are producing large amounts of 85 octane gas. A large part of this
gasoline probably comes from the Universal polymerization plant at Grozny,
which is evidently now finished and has an estimated annual capacity
of around 55,000 tons of 85 octane gas.
Condition of fields and refineries. In 19^0,
an observer reported that the refining plants and storage tanks at
Grozny were very close together, and the entire area was easily inflam­ mable since the railroad sidings were soaked with oil. The equipment,
although old, appeared serviceable. The fields at Baku were reported

- 48 ­

1'ffin t.

Ml i.

in even worse condition at about the same time, and Soviet officials had
asked the advice of American experts on avoiding widespread fires in the
fields and town in case of bombing.
Petroleum pipelines. The Caucasus in 19^0 con­ tained about 70$ of the total length of pipeline in the country. Gener­ ally the pipelines parallel the railroads. The most important ones are
listed below:
Table IVt From - To Annual traffic Pipelines in the Caucasus.
Length No. pumping Date of Type of stations completion oil carried

Diameter

TONS Baku ­ Batumi 1,670,000

10"

MILES 51+8 510 11*

13 16

1930
1906 192U 1928 1930 193^

Crude oil Kerosene Crude oil Crude oil Crude oil
-

885,000
Grozny Makhach Kala
600,000

8" 8"
10"

Grozny - Tuapse 770,000 Maikop Krasnodar Armavir Trudovaya
905,000 1, 500,000

38^

8"
12".

67
303

Mangane s e : Next in importance to the Caucasian oil fields are the manganese mines at Chiatura in the Georgian Republic.
The mines, containing some of the world's finest manganese, are modern
and are equipped with concentrating machinery. In 1937, 1,650,000
metric tons of Mi-52$ are were produced by the Chiatura deposits. At
present, the location of the mines is a great disadvantage because of
the long railroad haul from the deposits in the southwestern Caucasus
to the steel mills of the Urals and west Siberia.
Copper: In 1937, the Alaverdi mines in north­ west Armenia and the Zangezur mines at Kafan in southeast Armenia pro­ duced about &fo of the copper mined in the Soviet Union, with a combined
output of around ^,000 tons.

'•i.H.

Coal fields; The Caucasian coal fields pro­ duced slightly over ^,000,000 tons of coal in 1938, or about 0.3$ of
the country's total output. These fields are located as follows
North Caucasus
Khumara - Ordzhonikidze Krai
Mikoyan Shakhar - "
Akhmara - Georgian Republic
Transcaucasus
Akhmara - Georgian Republic
Tkvikbuli - " "
Steel: The steel production of the Caucasus
is very small. Official figures for 1937 for the "Southern Raiony"
which do not separate the North Caucasus and Crimea are 826,200 metric
tons, plus 600 metric tons for the Georgian Republic making a total of
826,800 metric tons. There are iron ore deposits at Chiragidzor near
Yukhary-Dashkesan, 180 mi. west of Baku, Azerbaidzhan Republic, and
17,900 metric tons of steel were produced in this region in 1937 The
grand total, therefore, is something over 8^0,000 tons. A large part
of this production, however, was accounted for by the Crimean steel
plants. Small ferrous metallurgy plants are located as follows:
Krasnodar, North Caucasus
Novorossisk, " " Tuapse, " " Sochi, There is also a ferro-alloy plant at Zestafoni
in Georgia, with a capacity of 60,000 tons annually.
Lead and zinc, mines: The Sadon mines, one
of the oldest lead-zinc districts in Russia, are located in the North
Caucasus, 25 miles southwest of Ordzhonikidzet Ore from the mines is
shipped to the Ordzhonikidze plant for treatment, listed under Indus­ tries. These mines produce an estimated 20$ of the Soviet Union's lead
and zinc« Exact figures on lead production at the Sadon mines during
recent years are not available. The capacity of the Ordzhonikidze
zinc plant is 15,000 tons, but it is doubtful if it is working at this
level.
Other minerals: The North Caucasus contains
•scattered deposits of platinum, molybdenum, chromite, and gold. Pro­ duction, if any, at ouch deposits is very small and figures on output
are not available.

- 50 ­

Power rosources; The Caucasus contains a
large number of power stations working either on oil or water power,
Caucasian water power rosources have been developed quite extensively
during the past few years.
The main power stations of the North Caucasus
and Caucasus District
Location Krasnodar Novorossisk Tuapse Sochi Armavir Apsheronskaya (75 mi.
southwest of Armavir)
Tikhoretsk (75 mi.
northwest of Armavir)
Kyzburun, Baksan Hydroelectric
Sta. (80 mi. north­ west of Ordzhonikidze)
Verkhni Koban, "
Gizeldon Sta. (12 mi.
southwest of Ordzhonikidze)
Ardon Sta. (kO mi. "
southwest of Ordzhonikidze)
Grozny Ordzhonikidze
Baku (a) (D) Oil Source of power Oil Capacity 10-25,000 kw 10-25,000 kw 5-10,000 kw 5-10,000 kw 5-10,000 kw 5-10,000 kw 5-10,000 kw 25-50,000 kw Remarks

10-25,000 kw

10-25,000 kw 50-100,000 kw 3-5,000 lew

Under construe­ t i o n in 1938.

200-300,000 kw Under construe­ 50-100,000 kw t i o n in 1938.

- I

Location Art em Island (30 mi, east of Baku)
Sukhum, Georgia Batumi, Ge orgi a

Source of power

Capacity 1-3,000 kw

Remarks

Oil
Hydroelectric Oil

10-25,000 l w Under construc­ e tion in 1938.
1-3,000 kw
22,000 kw

Matsunkheti, Atsges* Hydroelectric (15 mi. east of Batumi)
Vartsikhe, Rionges (70 mi. northeast of
Batumi)
Rosenberg, Khramges (kO mi. west-southwest of Tbilisi)
Tbilisi Zages (North of Tbilisi)
Hydroelectric

Hydroelectric

5-10,000 kw Under construc­ tion in 1938.
1-3,000 kw 10-20,000 kw
1+2,000 kw
Undergoing en­ largement in 1938.

Oil
Hydroelectric

Kanaker I (on Zanga Hydroelectric River "between Lake Sevan
and Yerevan)
Kanaker II (id.)
Gyumush (id.)
Hydroelectric Hydroelectric

1+6,000 kw
100-200,000 kw Under construc-
tion in 1938.
10-25,000 kw

Kalageran, Dzorages Hydroelectric (kO mi. 3outh of Tbilisi
in Armenia)
Kaps, Leninakanges (8 mi. northwest of
Leninakan, Armenia)
Total Hydroelectric

5-10,000 kw

531,000-1,10^,000

Industries. The leading industries of the
Caucasus, outside of oil refining treated under petroleum, are the
manufacture of synthetic rubber, textiles, and cement, as listed below.
*The ending "gos" means "hydroelectric station."

- 52 ­
'4 W -'!';' ' '•, ; ii,
;*/

The fish canneries at Chapayev (Guryev) and
Astrakhan as well as those along the Caspian coast of the Caucasus are
also included; they process the Caspian fish catch, which represents
about one-third to one-half of the Russian total. The principal
species are the vobla, a kind of carp, pike, carp, sturgeon, and herring,
Location
Ordzhonikidze
Novorossisk
Type of establishment Remarks

Lead smelter Capacity unknown
Electrolytic zinc plant 15,000 tons of zinc
Cement
Novorossisk and vicin­ ity produce nearly
100$ of country's
cement. 1937 pro­ duction of Soviet Union
5,800,000 tons.
Present capacity
about 5,000 tons; under
construction in ^
Capacity 12,000 tons
in 1939.

Grain elevators
Krasnodar
Synthetic rubber

Kutaisi
Baku

Lithapone plant*
Textiles
Iodine and "bromine
extraction.
Helium extraction.
Fish canneries

Baku, Vicinity of

Caspian seacoast

The Caspian accounts
for one-third to one-half
of the total Russian
fish catch.
Factory with planned
capacity of over k
million yards annually
under construction in
19^0.

Astrakhan

Fish canneries
Cotton textiles

Chapayev (Guryev)
Yerevan

Fish canneries
Synthetic rubber
Output 10,000 tons

(1935)

*An inorganic filler for pigments, linoleum, rubber tires, etc.

- 53 ­

Location Sungait (20 mi. north­ west of Baku)

Type of establishment Synthetic rubber

Remarks Experimental plant for the use of "by-products of oil, coal, and natural gas. Under construction. 70,500 spindles in

Kirovakan Leninakan Kirovabad (Gandzha) Nukha (60 mi. northeast of Kirovabad)
Tbilisi

Chemical works Textiles Textiles
Silk mill
Machine tools

Output about 700 per
year.

Ports. Information of the number and tonnage
of vessels calling at Black Sea ports, and freight turnover in 1935 is
listed below. The most important cargo on both the Caspian and Black
Seas is oil, followed by grain and lumber.*
Table V: BLACK SEA PORTS

PORT Batumi Poti Sukhumi Tuapse Novorossisk

NUMBER OF VESSELS CALLING IN 1955 1,371 1,916 2,592 3,319

REGISTERED TONS 2,7^8,000 1,365,000 1,11*6,000 2,1^3,000 2,2^9,000

FREIGHT
TURNOVER, 1935
5,062,000** 1,21*1,000 1,507,000 2,502,000

*The Black Sea and Caspian merchant fleets are discussed under (2Xd).
**Normally the chief freight handled is oil.

Table VI: CASPIAN SEA PORTS
NUMBER OF VESSELS CALLING IN 1955 7,91^
2,887 REGISTERED TONS 15,869,000 1,550,000 958,000 MflELGHT
TURNOVER, 1955
10,^5,000*
5,759,000
1,658,000
6,609,000

PORT Baku Makhach Kala Krasnovodsk Astrakhan

Zone of the interior. The zone of the interior
is an enormous area comprising three regions -- the Urals, including
Kazan and Kuibyshev, West Siberia, and Central Asia* All three of these
regions contain valuable mineral deposits, many of them capable of ex­ pansion, as shown in the attached table. The Urals lead industrially,
producing steel, heavy machinery, ammunition and materiel, vehicles,
chemicals, and refined petroleum. West Siberia has a ferrous metal­ lurgical center at Stalinsk and also manufactures arms, chemicals,
non-ferrous metals and textiles, while Central Asia accounts for a
large output of copper, lead and other non-ferrous metals, and produces
coal, cotton and silk textiles, nitrates and explosives.
The isolation of the zone of the interior is
both an advantage and a disadvantage. While out of the reach of enemy
bombers, it must rely on sparse rail networks covering a vast area to
haul its raw materials and transport its finished goods to the European
portion of the country. The dangers inherent in a breakdown of the
rail system have already been pointed out.

^Largest turnover of any port in the Soviet Union; the freight, how­ ever, consists mainly of oil; oil also is the most important item in
the trad© of Makhach Kala and Astrakhan.

Table VII: Mineral Production in
the Zone of the Interior^
The following tat>le gives the percentages of
various metals and minerals normally produced in the Urals, West
Siberia, and Central Asia.
Metals in which the Soviet Union is seriously
deficient are starred.
Metal or Mineral Approximate $ produced in zone of the interior Chief sources in order of importance Urals 10-11 Urals, Central Asia Capable of expansion yes; no; ? Yes Yes From present indi­ cations it does not seem likely that the Urals-Volga and Central Asiatic fields can produce sufficient petrole­ um to make up for the possible loss of the Caucasas, Large expansion planned for , Central Asiatic mines.

Remarks

Iron and Steel Petroleum

Copper

95

Urals, Central Asia

Yes

Lead and zinc Bauxite

95 - 100

Siberia, Central Asia

Yes

7 0 - 8 0 (?) Urals

Yes

Urals bauxite de­ posits are higher grade than the Tikhvin deposits near Leningrad. Urals manganese needs elaborate treatment "because of the high phosphe­ roid content.

Manganese

10 (1)

Urals, Siberia

Yes

LIABLE VII Continued, Metal or
Mineral
Approximate ^fo Chief aources produced in in order of zone of the importance interior.­ Capable of
expansion yes; no; ? Remarks

Chromite

100

Urals

Yes

Russia one of
world's greatest
producers.

Coal

25 - 30

Siberia; Centr
Urals
Urals

Magnesite

100

Yes

Russia one of
world's greatest
producers«

Platinum

100

Urals, Siberia
Most of the Russian
tin production comes
from eastern Siberia

*Nickel
Mercury

90 (7)

1

Central Asiatic de­ posits can pro"ba"bly
he developed; "bulk
of Russian mercury
normally comes from
the Ukraine.

*Molybdenum

50 (?

Urals; Central Asia

?

Soviet molybdenum
resources insuf­ ficient.
Soviet tungsten
resources small.
Soviet vanadium
mostly imported.

*Tungsten

Central Asia; Siberia

?

*Vanadium

60 ? 60 ?

Urals
Siberia

Mica

- 57 ­

TABLE VII Continued,
Metal or Mineral Approximate $ produced in zone of the interior 50 ? 100 100 100 Chief Sources in order of importance Capable of expansion yes; no; ? Remarks

(Sold Sulphur Pyrites Potaoh

TJraloJ Siberia Central Asia; Urals Urals Urals

?
1
?
Yes Other deposits
occur in
Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan

Boron Asbestos Phosphates

100 100

Central Asia Urals

Yes
Yes
Kola Peninsula
nepheline de­ posits furnish
the "bulk of
Russian phos­ phate production;
deposits of phos­ phate reported in
Central Asia.

Salt

Urals

Yes

URALS, Iron and Steel. The iron and steel
industry of the Urals takes second place after that of the Ukraine.
In 1937 the Ural steel mills produced about 17$ of the Soviet Union's
pig iron and 19$ of its steel.

- 58 ­

Iron Ore.
Iron ore production in 1937 was as follows:
Chelyabinsk Ob last (including Magnitogorsk)
Sverdlovsk Oblast Chkalov Oblast Total - Urals Bashkir Republic Total - Urals and Bashkir Republic
7,152,200 metric tons
1,2^7,500
8^,600
,300
176,UOO
8,661,-700 metric tons

The most important mines " y far are those at Magnitogorsk
b ("Magnetic Mountain"), southern Urals, with reserves estimated at hk6
million tons, of which one-fourth is high quality ore. There are also
deposits of iron ore at Bakal, in the Chelyabinsk Oblast, at Mounts
Vysokaya and Blagodat north of Nizhni Tagil, Sverdlovsk Oblast, and at
Khalilovo, northwest of Orsk in the southern Urals.
Pig Iron and Steel Production.
Production of pig iron and steel in the Urals in 1937 was
as follows:
Pig iron Steel 2,633,000 metric tons 3,^87,900 io of country's
output
17
19

Although exact data are not available, present steel
production in the Urals plants may be estimated at around 5,000,000 ­ 6,000,000 tons.
Important iron and steel plants are located as follows:
Location Type of products Cast iron Steel Rolled steel Remarks Annual planned capacity: Cast iron - 1,700,000 tons Steel ­ 1,500,000 " Rolled Steel-1,100,000 "

Nizhni Tagil (Novo Tagil Plant)

- 59 ­

Location

Type of
products
Cast iron
Rolled iron
Steel

Remarks

Magnitogorsk

Ultimate planned capacity:
Cast iron - ^,000,000 tons
Blooming mill steel ­ 3,000,000 tons
Actual production:
Pig iron 1,253,000 tons
(1935)
Rolled iron 608,000 tons
(1935)
2,500,000 tons
Cast iron (19M)
Steel 816,000 tons
(1935)
Open hearth 1,^90,05^ tons
steel (1938)

Chusovoi
(near Molotov)
Sverdlovsk

Iron
Iron alloys
Iron
Steel

New charcoal iron smelter;
production unknown.
This is reported to " e a
b "gigantic" plant; details of
production unknown.
1938 production 290,051 tons.

Nadezhdinsk

Special
steel
Special
steel
Steel
Iron
Steel
Ferro-alloys

Zlatoust
(Zlatoustovsk plant)
Bakal
Orsk,
southern Urals

1938 production - l88,U88 tons,

Details of production unknown.
Large plant under construction
in 19^0; works on the KhaliA
lovo deposits of iron ore with
nickel, chromium and other
metals usually added to steel.
Details of production unknownf

Belorets,
Bashkir Republic

Ferrous
metallurgy

IMP? AWSH­
- 60

' Coal, The Ural coal mines produced 8,081,000
metric tone of coal in 1937. The most important fields are listed as
follows:
Location South of Solikamsk Chelyabinsk fields Short distance east of the city of Chelyabinsk Type of Coal Lignite Lignite Production 3,600,000 metric tons (1936)

Rezh River deposits (Egorshino)

On the Rezh River a short distance northeast of Sverdlovsk

Planned pro­ duction 1,000,000 metric tons

Vorkuta River fields

On a tributary of the Bituminous About 300,000
Usa River in the northern metric tons
extremity of the Urals (1939)

At present, the Kizel and Chelyabinsk mines
are the leading producers in the Urals, with a planned combined pro­ duction of 9,500,000 metric tons by I9U2, Coal from these mines is used
by the Ural metallurgical plants, by the power stations and industries,
and for local use in general. Expanded production of the Ural coal mines
has relieved the railways of some of the burden of transporting coal from
Kuznetsk and Karaganda.
Urals and Volga Petroleum Fields Output. The
oilfields of the Ural and Volga region, referred to as the "Second Baku,u
produced 6.5$ of the country's total oil output in 1939 > amounting to
1,986,000 metric tons. This percentage was scheduled to grow to 21.&f>
by 19^-2, with a planned production for that year of 11,772,000 tons.
These fields have not come up to expectations,
however, and output for the first nine months of 19^0 fell short of the
plan, 19^0 production, therefore may be estimated at about 2,000,000
tons. Later figures on production are not available.

> $

- 61 ­

The fields are located as follows:
Syzran
Stavropol
Sergievsk
Buguruslan
Ishimbayevo Tuimazy and adjacent fields Krasnokainek and adjacent fields On the great tend of the Volga,
near Kuibyshev, and "between
the Volga and Belaya Rivers.
On the Belaya River, near
Sterlitamak, a short distance
south of Ufa.
On the Kama River, near
Molotov (Perm).

Refineries. Information on the Ural-Volga
refineries, which mostly dates from 19A0, is very incomplete as to
actual output. It is evident, however, that the Soviets have planned
to develop the" Ural-Volga refineries as the center of their high
octane gas production. Two-thirds of the 85 octane gas to " e boosted
b to 95 octane " y the Universal Hydrogenation plant at Ufa was to come from
b the Saratov and Ufa polymerization plants, and the other one-third from
Grozny.
The total output of gasoline at the refineries
listed on Tafcle VHI ia unknown. An estimate of gasoline production at
the Alco, Lummus, and Universal plants at Ufa is given "below:
Plant Alco ) Lummus) Alco ) Lummus) Universal Hydrogenati on Total Octane Metric tons 360,000 238,000 70,000 of which about 21,000 is 90-95 668,000

65 75
Varying 3O/o ­ 90-95

In 19^0, however, actual production of 85-90
gas at the Universal Hydrogenation plant at Ufa was estimated at only
12,000 tons. This plant's theoretical production is U0-50,000 tons of
90-95 octane gas; an output of this size depends on whether the Ufa,
Saratov, and Grozny polymerization plants are furnishing their quota of
85 octane, and whether the hydrogenation plant is working at capacity.

• t'i"';'

American engineers who installed these plants
reported in 1938-IJ-O that their operation, due mainly to the failings of
the personnel, was most unsatisfactory. In addition, early in 19^0, salt
and sulphur were appearing in the oil at one of the Ufa refineries, doing
great damage to the equipment. Mud also appeared in oil from one of the
fields near Ufa, possibly indicating the exhaustion of the well in question,
Information on the output of other fractions at
the Urals-Volga refineries is not available, "but presumably an equal
amount of planning has gone into the production of lubricating oils.
Pipelines. Orsk is the terminus of the
pipeline from the Emba fields on the Caspian. There is also a 102-mile
pipeline between Ishimbai and Ufa, and another of approximately equal
length, between these two cities was reported to be half completed in
19^0. In addition, a 12-inch pipeline about 93 miles long runs from
Tuimazy to Ufa.
Non-ferrous Metals and Minerals. The Urals ac­ count for a large part of the Soviet Union's production of non-ferrous
metals.
Aluminum. This region contains the country's
best deposits of bauxite, utilized by the Kamensk Uralski aluminum plant.
The Kamensk plant produced an estimated 10,000 tons of metallic aluminum
in 19^0, with a theoretical capacity of 25,000 tons, to be raised later
to 80,000 tons by the addition of new units. According to Soviet reports,
a portion of the Zaparozhe aluminum plant was evacuated to Kamensk. In
this case, if sufficient building space and power are available, the
Kamensk plant may be producing at the rate of 30-i(-0,000 tons of metallic
aluminum a year.
Copper. From 70 to oQfp of the Soviet Union's
copper comes from the Urals. The Kirovgrad and Pyshma smelters together
produced about 70,000 tons of the nearly 100,000 metric tons of copper
turned out by the Soviet Union in 1937. Other copper smelters of un­ known capacity are located at Krasnouralsk, Nizhni Tagil, Sverdlovsk,
Revda, and Blyava.
Other Metals and Minerals. The Soviet Union is
one of the world's leading producers of chromite and magnesite, and the
country's deposits of these minerals are found in the Urals. Unlimited
quantities of metallic magnesium, extremely valuable for light alloys, can
be obtained from magnesite. A portion of the Zaparozhe magnesium plant
was reportedly evacuated and presumably the transported units are function­ ing at the Solikamsk plant.

TABLE VIII
URAL - VOLGA REFINERIES

Location

Type

Annual Capacity of crude Metric- Tons 500,000

Production

Source of crude Volga fields

Remarks

Bashkirskoe
Refinery
(near Kuibyshev)

Syzran

Refinery

Volga fields To be completed in 1940; present status unknown. Emba fields (by pipe­ lines ) Ishimbayevo fie Ids First section r e ­ ported i n opera­ tion in the early part of 194-0. Reported under construction in 1940. 1

Orsk

Cracking plant Refinery

I

>terlitamak

Ishimbayevo

Refinery

Ishimbayevo fields Krasnokamsk •fields Krasnokamsk fields Tuimazy fields

Chusovoi

Refinery Refinery Refinery

tolotov
Puimazy

TABLE VIII URAL ­ VOLGA REFINERIES (Cont.) Location
Ufa (1)

Typo

Annual Capacity of crude 400,000 (crude)

Production

Source of crude

Remarks

Alco plant

20$ yield of 75 oc- Ishimbayevo tane = 80,000 tons. fields 30$ y i e l d of 65 oc­ tane fta 120,000 tons. Unknown Possible: annual capacity i n 7O,5SO tons of gas per y.^ar of which 30$ i s 90-95 oc­ tane ­ 21,000 tons. Actual; 12,000 tons of 85-90 in 1940 (See also remarks) Ishimbayevo fields Gas to be furnished by 1. Ufa poly­ merization plant. 2. Saratov polymeriza­ tion. 3. Grozny polymeriza­ tion. Ishimbayevo fields Produces 85 octane gas Theoretically when the Grozny Saratov, and Ufa polymer ization plants furnish the planned amounts of 85 oc­ tane, this hydro­ genation plant can furnish 40-50,000 tons of 90-95 oc­ tane a year. Scheduled to open in 1940.

(2)

Universal plant (a) Catalytic Unknown polymerization (b) Hydrogenation Unknown

CD

- " * * ) * •

[

(3)

Lummus plant

1,000,000 (crude)

Estimated: a 158,000 tons of 75 octane gas annually. b 240,000 tons of 65 _ octane gas annually.

Small amounts of lead, zinc and nickel come
from the Urals. Recent Soviet writings claim that improved methods
of treating Urals manganese have "been devised, allowing for the use
of these low-grade ores in the local steel plants. The Urals also
produce part of the country's gold, and most of its platinum. There
is a large deposit of pyrites used for making sulphur and sulphuric
acid. In addition, about 2,000,000 tons of potash are produced yearly
in the Urals.
Table IX: NON-FERROUS METALS AND MINERALS IN THE UBALS.
Non-ferrous metals and various minerals prod­ ucts come from the following places in the Urals.
Metal or Mineral Aluminum Asbestos Location See Bauxite
Ashest and vicinity
86,000 tons produced in
1938 mostly coming from
these deposits.
Bauxite used by the
Kamensk Uralski plant,
opened Sept '39, with
theoretical capacity of
25,000 tons of aluminum.
Remarks

Bauxite

Krasnaya Shapochka, U5 mi. north-northwest of Serov; other deposits in Urals.

Chromite

Biser; Sverdlovsk 219,000 tons of ore
and vicinity; south- mined in 193&, about 20$
e m Urals. of the world's production.
About 87$ of USSR copper
5 deposits in production comes from
various parts of the Urals.
the Urals. Smelters at Blyava,
Kirovgrad, Kras­ nouralsk, (30 mi.
north of Nizhni
Tagil) Nizhni
Tagil, Pyshma, (7
mi. north of Sverd­ lovsk) Revda (28 mi.
west of Sverdlovsk),
and Sverdlovsk.

Copper

- 66 ­

Metal or Mineral
Cryolite
(artificial)

TABlft IX Continued»
Location
Plants at Polevskoi,
(30 mi. southwest of
Sverdlovsk); Revda
(under construction)
(28 mi. west of Sverd­ lovsk) .

Remarks
Fluorspar for arti­ ficial cryolite comes
from Amderma; capacity
4,500 tons.

Gold

Soviet gold production
Principal deposits
is very large; statist
in following dis­ t-ics on individual
tricts : Ugolny,
fields not available.
Nizhni Tagil,
Nevyansk (7 mi,
northeast of Kirovgrad),'
Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk.
Deposits south of
Chelyabinsk and be­ tween Sverdlovsk and
Krasnouralsk.
Satka (30 mi. SW of
Zlatoust).
There is a zinc con­ centrating plant at
Chelyabinsk.
1936 production roughly
500,000 metric tons
chiefly from Satka;
U.S.S.R. is worlds
largest producer.
Production very small;
Ural manganese unsatis­ factory.

Lead and Zinc

Magnesite

Manganese

Chief deposits:
Qrsk-Kalilovo,
(30 mi. W of Qrsk),
and Marsyata (35 mi.
N of Serov.)
Deposit reported in
Upper Rezh River
Valley ( 5 mi. N of
^ Sverdlovsk).
Deposits on the
Kama River
Serov

Mercury

Not being worked as
far as known.

Mica

Production, if any,
very small.
Production very small

Molybdenum

- 67 ­

Metal or Mineral
Nickel

TABLE IX Continued.
Location
Verkhne-Ufalei,
Rezh, Khalilovo,
Orsk (under con­ struction.
Deposits reported
northwest of Rezh
and in the Emba
River Valley.
Five platinum
bearing areas

Remarks
Production very small.

Phosphorites

Production, if any,
unknown.

Platinum

Production figures secret;
"but the USSR is one of
the world's leading pro­ ducers .
Production about 2 million
tons a year; Soviet Union
one of world's greatest
producers.
6l8,000 metric tons pro­ duced in 1935, most of
which came from the Urals.
Pyrites used to make
sulphur and sulphuric acid,

Potash

Solikamsk

Pyrites

Belt running from
Nizhni Tagil south
to Karabash, (55 mi. W-NW of Sverdlovsk), coinciding with a large part of the
copper zone.
None reported.

Silver
Sulphur

No important de­ posits of free sulphur
but some of the copper
mines extract as a
byproduct.
None reported.
Burannoye,
Chkalov Oblast
No figures available.
Soviet tungsten production
insufficient.

Tin
Tungsten

Vanadium

Very small; Soviet vanadium
Khalilovo iron
ores (west of Orsk)
production insufficient.

- 68 ­

TABLE X
POWER STATIONS IN-THE URALS
The most important electric power stations in the Urals (including Kazan, and Kuibyshev) are
as follows:
City Kuibyshev Kazan Berezniki Krasnokamsk
(25 mi. west of Molotov) Source of power Coal Coal Coal Coal Capacity 10 - 25,000 M (1938)
Remarks

25 - 50,000 KW (1938)
50 -100,000 KW (1938)
50 -100,000 KW (1938)
50 -100,000 KW (1938) 10 - 25,000 KW" (1938)
10 - 25,000 KW (1938)
10 - 25,000 KW (1938)
49,000 KW (1938) Unknown Undergoing enlargement
in 1939,
Station attached to
Novo«-Tagil iron and
steel plant.

JJLIJi—

G-ubakha (50 mi. southeast of Berezniki)
Kushva
(25 mi. north of Nizhni Tagil) Serov (Nadezhdinsk) Novaya Lyalya
(75 mi. south of Serov) Nizhni Tagil
(a) (b)

Coal
Coal Coal Mixed fuel Coal Unknown

i

Kirovgrad (Kalata)

Coal

10 - 25,000 KW (1938)

(Continued) City Solikamsk Molotov Sredneuralsk (15 mi. north of Sverdlovsk, "Surges," Central Urals Electric Station) Sverdlovsk Berezovski (8 mi. northeast'of Sverdlovsk) Pervouralsk (25 mi. west of Sverdlovsk)

TABLE X
POWER STATIONS IN THE URALS

Capacity 3 ­ 5,000 KW (1938) Remarks Attached to the potash plant.

Source of power Coal Coal Coal

5,- 10,000 KW (1938) 100,000 KW (1939) Largest station in Urals and one of the largest in Soviet Union.

Peat Peat Coal

25 - 50,000 KW (1938) 3 ­ 5,000 KW (1938)

5 - 10,000 KW (1938) 10 - 25,000 KW (1938) 125,000 KW (1938) Attached to the alum­ inum plant. Under­ going enlargement.

Rezh (45 mi. northeast of Sverdlovsk) Coal Kamensk Uralski Lignite

Chelyabinsk Zlatoust Satka (25 mi. southwest of Zlatoust)

Lignite Coal

100 -200,000 KW (1938) 10 - 25,000 KW (1938) Probably attached to the magnesite plant.

Coal

5 - 10,000 KW (1938)

(Continued) City Asha Magnitogorsk Orsk Chkalov (Orenburg) Ufa Ishimbai Belorotsk
i

TABLE X
POWER STATIONS IN THE URALS
Capacity 5 - 10,000 KW (1938 ) 100-200,000 KW (1938) 25,000 KW (1938) 3 ­ 5,000 KW (1938) Remarks

Source of power Coal Coal Coal Mixed fuels Petroleum Petroleum Coal

10 - 25,000 KW (1938) 5 - 10,000 KW (1938) 5 - 10,000 m (1938)

-a

TOTAL:

818,000 - 1,374,000 KW

"t"?

Industries. Under the second and third
Five-Year Plans, the Soviet authorities have concentrated on the in­ dustrial development of the Urals. This region is now a center of
heavy industry; it also refines oil, and manufactures machinery,
chemicals and munitions. Industrially, it ranks third in the Soviet
Union after the Ukraine and the Moscow area.
The list "below gives the location of important
factories known to exist in the Urals. Data are not complete since
detailed figures on production are not published, and many of the
factories have only gone into operation during the past two or three
years.
Table XI: INDUSTRIES IN THE URALS.
Machinery, machines and machine tools.­ Location Nizhni Tagil Type of product Electrical machinery Machine tools
Production or capacity
Unknown
" " Excavators,
large presses,
etc.
Remarks

Sverdlovsk Electrical machinery (Ural Machine Heavy Machinery Plant or "Ural mash") Machine tools

Ufa
Chelyabinsk

Internal combustion
motors
Machine tools
Railroad equipment, trucks, etc-

Chelyabinsk Nizhni Tagil

Tractors
Car-"building 5^,000 freight,
tank and re­ frigerator car's
of 50-ton capacity
each

Orsk Eefineries —

Steam and diesel
locomotives
See Table VIII, p. 6U<•

Miscellaneous industries -
Krasnovishersk (60 mi. N of Solikamsk)
Paper and pulp 23,600 tons
of paper

- 72 ­

Location

TABLE XI Continued. Type of
Production or product
capacity
U2,900 tons
(Planned capacity)

Remarks

Krasnokamsk
Paper mill
(30 mi W of Molotov)

Ufa

Lysva (50 mi E of
Molotov)
Orsk
Chemical plants ­ Location
Kazan

Woodworking
mills
Tinplate plant
Meat packing
Type of
product
Powder
Sulphuric acid
Nitric acid
Synthetic rubber
(divinyl)
Potash
Metallic magnesium
Fertilizers (incl.
ammonia)
War chemicals
Nitrogen fixation
Sulphuric acid
Soda
Coke-chemical plant
2,000,000 metric tons
Raw materials;
coal, salt,
30,000 metric tons potash,
57,toO " " limestone,
phosphor­ ites.
Attached to
Novo-Tagil
Iron and
Steel Plant.
50,000 metric
tons (non­ military)
Attached to
Magnitogorsk
Iron and
Steel Plant.
Production or capacity
Remarks

Solikamsk
Berezniki

Nizhni Tagil

Sverdlovsk

Hydrocyanic acid
Sodium
Coke-chemical plant

Magnitogorsk

« 73 ~

Location Chapayevsk (near Kuibyshev)

Type of product Sulphuric acid Nitric acid Poison gas

Production or
capacity

Remarks

Vavilovo Acetic acid (50 mi. east-north- Methyl alcohol
east of Ufa.) Charcoal
Ammunition and Materiel­ (Mainly data of 1937)
Kuibyshev 1 ammunition factory
2 powder factories
2 chemical warfare factories
(possibly identical with the
chemical plant at Chapayevsk)
1 ammunition factory
1 powder factory
1 chemical warfare factory
1 arms factory
1 chemical warfare factory
(probably identical with
plant listed under chemical
plants)
2 arms factories

Kazan

Berezniki

Izhevsk Serov (Nadezhdinsk)
Molotov (Perm)
Chusovskoye (E of Molotov)
Chkalov Nazhni Tagil Sverdlovsk -

1 ammunition factory
1 arms factory
1 ammunition factory
1 plane factory
1 ammunition factory
1 arms factory

- 74 ­

TABLE XI Continued.
Zlatoust Chelyabinsk ­ Z arms factories 1 tank factory; greatly expanded with machinery evacuated from Kharkov. 1 tractor factory now converted to tanks annual capacity of 40,000 tractors. 1 airplane factory

Ufa

This list does not include factories which have been evacuated since the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.
West Siberia. The industrial center of West
Siberia is the city of Stalinsk in the Kuznetsk Basin. The steel plant
at Stalinsk, working on coal from the Kuznetsk Basin and the iron ore
of the Gornaya Shoriya mines, produced 1,600,000 tons of steel in
1937, and 530,700 tons of special steel in 1938.
The Kuznetsk Basin contains coal of varied
types. Its production in 1937 amounted to 17,800,000 tons, dropping
to about 16,800,000 tons in 1938. In 1940, about 2,000,000 tons of
Kuznetsk coal were still shipped annually to the Urals. These ship­ ments are declining, due to the increasing amounts of coal now mined
in the Urals or sent from Karaganda.
The enormous deposit of anthracite at
Cheremkhovo, on the Trans-Siberian northwest of Irkutsk, supplies the
railroad. It produced more than 3,000,000 metric tons of coal in 1936,
There is also a coal field at Chernogorsk which is the chief source of
coal for the Abakan-Minusinsk region. Its production vras over half a
million metric tons in 1939.
Locomotive repair shops to serve the Trans-
Siberian Railroad are located in Omsk and Irkutsk.
• A recent industrial development is the build­ ing of textile mills to work on Central Asian cotton.
This region also contains large resources of
timber, mostly-coniferous, along the Yenisei and Angara Rivers.

- 75 ­

Table XII: INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES
OF WEST SIBERIA.
1. Metals and minerals. Metals and minerals are mined
or processed
at the following places in West Siberia.
Location Metal or Mineral Production or capacity 1,600,0.00 tons of steel in 1937; 530,700 tons of special steel in Remarks
Comprises:
(a)
several blast
furnaces.
(b)
10 open hearth
furnaces•
(0)
rolling mill
(d)
zinc smelter
(e)
coke-chemical
plant
(f)
steam electric
power plant.

Stalinsk (Kuznetsk) Iron and steel

1938.

Gornaya Shoriya
(150 miles
south of
Stalinsk)
Novosibirsk

Iron ore

Metal working

Unknown

Prokopyevsk (25 mi. Iron and steel
west of Stalinsk)
Kemerovo Lead Exact capacity unknown; Electrolytic zinc reportedly "largest in the world" Zinc smelter Capacity unknown

Stalinsk

Belovo (75 mi. north
of Stalinsk) Zinc plant
Salair mines (west Kuznetsk Basin) Lead 17,800,000 tons (1937)
Furnishes coal for
the Stalinsk and
Urals iron and
steel works;
Kuznetsk coal is
of superior quality
and reserves large.

Coal Kuznetsk Basin ("Kuzbas," with center at Stalinsk)

76 ­

Location Cheremkhovo Chernogorsk

TABLE XII Continued.
Metal or Production or Mineral capacity Coal Coal 5,000,000 tons

Remarks Supplies the rail road and local industry.

(1956)
500,000 tons

Mazul (near Achinsk)

Manganese

150,000 tons 19^0 (?)

Planned exploita­ tion to serve Kuznetsk steel plants; actual production unknown,

2. Electric Power Stations. The present combined capacity of the main West Siberian power stations may "be set at around 500,000 KW. These
stations are listed "below:
Location Novosibirsk (a) Kemerovo Stalinsk Omsk Irkutsk Combined capacity: Source of power Coal Coal Coal Coal Coal Coal Capacity
50-100,000 KW
Unknown
50-100,000 KW
100-200,000 KW
10-25,000 KW
10-25,000 KW
220-550,000 KW

5. Chemicals. Stalinsk - Coke-chemical plant attached to the metal­ lurgical plant, capacity unknown.
Kemerovo - Chemical combinat comprising:
(1) (2) (5) (k) sulphuric acid plant
fertilizer plant, including nitrogen fixation.
coal liquefaction plant
coking plant producing "benzol and hydrogen
as ly-products.

- 77 ­

TABLE XII Continued.
Railroad eauiTament, repair, etc.
Location
Omsk
Type of installation
Shop for repairing
locomotives, tractors,
"boats
Planned capacity
Locomotive works
*to go into operation in
of 5 1 0 locomotives.
1939-^0.
Locomotive repair shop
Planned capacity of
and locomotive works.
10,000 four-axle
Car works to be finished freight cars,
in
Capacity or
production

Stalinsk

Irkutsk

5. Textile plants.
These mills obtain their cotton from the Central
Asian republics.
Novosibirsk
Barnaul
Belovo
Stalinsk
Prokopyevsk
Kemerovo
Krasnoyarsk
6. Cotton prints and
satins
Spinning and weaving mill
Cotton textiles
(planned in
Cotton Textiles
Dress goods
Textiles - (cotton?)
About 28 million
yards yearly.
Capacity unknown
Planned in 19^0
Planned in 19^0

Ammunition and materiel.
1 1 1 1 1 1 arms factory
tank factory
airplane factory
arms factory
tank factory
airplane factory

Novosibirsk
Irkutsk

Omsk
Tomsk

1 airplane repair shop

™fi!

Central Asia. Central Asia comprises a huge
region including the Kazakh, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirghiz, and Tadzhik
Republics. A railroad crosses Kazakhstan from Tashkent to Chkalov, and
the "Turk-Sib" runs from Arys,' a short distance north of Tashkent by way
of Alma Ata to Semipalatinsk in Eastern Kazakhstan. A line also runs
from the Fergana Valley across the Turkmen Republic to Krasnovodsk on
the Caspian, and another, a single-track road, connects the Karaganda
fields with Sverdlovsk.
Natural Resources. This portion of the
Soviet Union contains deposits of coal, copper, lead and zinc, petroleum
and sulphur.
Coal. The coal resources of this region in­ clude the Karaganda •bituminous mines in Kazakhstan which produced nearly
k million tons in 1937. In recent years the Karaganda mines have been
developed as a leading source of coal for the metallurgical plants of
the Urals. In southern Kazakhstan, near Chimkent, the Lenger lignite
mine has "been in the process of development since 1932, and is capable
of supplying local needs. Other mines are "being developed in western
Kazakhstan, in the Fergana Valley, and on the Mangyshlyak Peninsula.
(See Table XIII), They are chiefly valuable as a source of supply for:
local industries.
Petroleum. The Fergana Valley, Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan account for a small oil production. (See Table XIII
and Map 6 ) .
The most important arc the Emba River fields
producing 652,000 metric tons of crude oil and natural gas in 1938,
and a reported 1,150,000 tons in 1939. Planned production for 1 * - was
912 2,020,000 tons.
These fields have an unfavorable location in
the Kirgiz salt steppe, and the lack of water, labor and decent living
quarters has hindered their efficient operation and development. Thoy
are connected with Orsk by a U7^-mile pipeline, and a 322-mile railroad
goes from Guryev to Kandagach, on the Chkalov-Aktyubinsk-Tashkent line
(tho Turk-Sib).
Non-ferrous Metals. • Lead; The greater part
of Russian lead production comes from Central Asia. Most of the Soviet
production of 78,300 metric tons of lead in 1938 was furnished by the
plant at Chimkent, Lead has also been produced for many years at the
Ridder mines, in the eastern corner of Kazakhstan and mines of unknown
extent are also being worked in the Kirgiz Republic.

- 79 ­

Copper* The copper deposits of Central Asia
are very large, "but are still in the stage of development. Production
in 1937 was nearly 8,000 tons; although exact data are lacking, present
output is probably about double, or in the neighborhood of 15-16,000
tons, since the first metal was produced at the BalkhaBh smelter in
1939. A "Kombinat" was under construction at Dzhezhazgan in 19^1;
data on the progress of the work are not available. Potentially the
Central Asiatic deposits can produce the bulk of the Soviet Union's
copper, but it is highly doubtful if the plan, which originally called
for production of 70$ of all Soviet copper in Kazakhstan in 19^2, is
anywhere near fulfillment.
Other non-ferrous metals and minerals. Centra}.
Asia accounts for a small production of bismuth and antimony, as well
as a large proportion of the country's output of sulphur.
Central Asia. Power Stations; In 1937* the
power stations of Central Asia contributed only approximately 2$ of the
power generated in the Soviet Union, and their average efficiency was
lower than that for the country as a whole. Most of the stations are
small ones, except for the Ulba plant near Ridder, and the big hydro­ electric project at Chirchik, Uzbekistan, which is about half finished
at present. Table XIIE gives only stations of 5,000 KW capacity and over,
Industrial establishments. The big synthetic
nitrogen and nitrate fertilizer plant at Chirchik was reported ready
for operation at the beginning of 19^1. This plant is of great impor­ tance since it is doubtless manufacturing explosives from the cotton
crop of Central Asia.
There are at least two small oil refineries in
Central Asia: one near Krasnovodsk and the other in the Fergana"Valley.
The crude refining capacity of these installations is approximately
700,000 tons, with a cracking capacity of about 300,000 tons.
Another leading industry in this region is
the manufacture of cotton textiles. Some silk is woven in factories
in Tadzhikistan, working on the small silk output of that region.

0 ­

Table XIII;

INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES OF CENTRAL ASIA.

Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, and
Turkmenistan.)
1. Metals and minerals:
Type of installation 2 antimony smelters operating on local ores Capacity or production Unknown; probably small Unknovn; probably small Remarks Antimony trisulfide and antimony pentoxide. Put into operation June

Location Turgai, Kazakhstan

Bismuth from local Andrasman, deposits Tadzhikistan (70 mi. southeast of Tashkent) Balkhash, eastern Kazakhstan (on Lake Balkhash) Dzhezkazgan, Central Kazakhstan (also desig­ nated as Kar*sal£pai plant) Almalyk (50 mi. south of Tashkent), Uzbekistan Ridder, northeastern Kazakhstan Copper; ore comes from Kounrad deposit (15 mi* north of Balkhash)

Theoretical capacity 175;000 metric tons of raw copper

Under construction for more than 10 years; exact oper­ ating status unknown; first metal produced in 1939.

Copper

Deposits at Karsakpai (a) Small works said to be the best (b) Kombinat in the Soviet Union* still under cons, in

Copper

Unknown

Uses ore from the old and rich Ridder mines

Lead and zinc

Location Chimkent, Kazakhstan

TABIE XIII Continued.
Capacity or
production
Type of installation Lead and zinc Unknovn;
furnishes
large part
of Soviet
Union's lead
5,9^0,000
metric tons
(1937)

Remarks
Works on ores from
the Takeli, Achi-Sai
and Kan-Sai mines.

Karaganda, east-central Kazakhstan

Coal
(Bituminous)

Large resources of
good quality coking
coal shipped to
Magnitogorsk and
other Ural metallur­ gical centers.
Capable of supplying
local needs.
Capable of supplying
local needs; some
mines not yet devel­ oped.
Supplies Aktyubinsk
0blast
Newly developed mine.

Lenger mine, southern Kazakhstan
Fergana Valley sev­ eral deposits
Ber-Chogur, Western
Kazakhstan
Mangyshlyak Peninsula,
Caspian Sea
Ridder lead mines, Kazakhstan

Coal
(Lignite)
Coal

11*3,000
metric tons
(1937)
Unknovn

Coal

Unknovn

Coal

100,000
metric tons
(plan) 19^0
Unknovn

Gold (contained in
lead ores.)

Petroleum
(a) Emba River fields,
Kazakhstan
Dos-sor, Makat,
Baichunas,
Iskine,
Koshchagyl

652,000 m.t.
(1938)

A pipeline, kfh miles
long, connects the
Emba fields with Orsk
Emba oil reported
very rich with about
30$ of benzine.

TABLE XII Continued.
Location Type of installation
Capacity or
production
662,000 m.t.
(1938)- 1939
output approx­ imately the
same
Remarks

(b) Central Petroleum
Asiatic fields
including
Cheleken
Island, Caspian
Sea, and adjoin­ ing mainland
around Nebit-Dag
and Nefte-Dag,
Turkmenistan
Petroleum
(c) Fergana Valley
Uzbekistan:
Chimion^ Shor-
Su, Kim, and
Khaudak fields
Petroleum
Khaudag, Surkhany and
Uch~Kyzyl,
southern
Uzbekistan
(about 30 rai«
north of Termez)
Kim, Fergana Valley,
Tadzhikistan
Petroleum

Capacity of
individual
fields un­ known

Unknown

Unknown

Changyrtash, Petroleum
Kirghizia (east
extremity of
Fergana Valley)
Kara-BogazGol Bay, Caspian Sea
Sodium and other
salts

Unknown

Unknown

Ridder mines, Silver
Kazakhstan

Unknown

- 83 ­

Location Kara-Kum desert, 155
mi. north of
Ashkhabad,
Turkmenistan
Gaurdak plant,
Uzbekistan

XIII Continued^
Capacity or
production
Type of installatiqn
Sulphur
1,000 metric
tons

Remarks

Sulphur

1,500 metric
tons
1,500 metric
tons

Shor-Su plant, Sulphur
Fergana Valley,
Uzbekistan

2.

Electric Power - Data of 1938:
Source of pover
Petroleum
Capacity
10-25,000 KW
Remarks

Location Bidder Kazakhstan
Ulba, near Ridder Chirchik, (20 mi
northeast of
Tashkent)
Uzbekistan
Komsomol Komsomol Tabak Troitski

Hydroelectric
(Ulba River)

50-100,000 KW

Coal
Hydroelectric

1 1

3-5,000 KW
168,000 KW
total capac­ ity of the
project

Undergoing enlarge^
ment in 1939
2 turbo generators
installed at Komsomol
in 19*U' other 2
stations yet to be
constructed.
Supplies power to the
bismuth concentrating
plant.

Andrasman, Tadzhikistan

Petroleum

100-300 KW

- 84 ­
w Jfl1

Location

TABLE XIII Continued,
Source of power Capacity
5-10,000 KW

Remarks

Verkhne-Varzobsk, Hydroelectric Tadzhikistan (north of Stalinabad)
Semipalat insk,
Kazakhstan
Karaganda,
Kazakhstan
Kounrad,
Kazakhstan
Alma Ata,
Kazakhstan
Tashkent,
Uzbekistan
Kadyrya,
Uzbekistan (10 mi.
northeast of
Tashkent)
Coal
Coal
Coal

10-25,000 KW
10-25,000 KW
10-25,000 KW
Undergoing enlarge­ ment - 1939.
Undergoing enlarge­ ment - 1939.

Coal
Hydroelectric
and steam
Hydroelectric

10-25.000 KW
10-25,000 KW
10-25,000 KW

Kuva - Sai,
Coal
Uzbekistan (Fergana
Valley)
Total

10-25,000 KW

138-315,000 KW

3.

Chemicals
Type of Product
Capacity or
Production
Remarks
Ready for operation
at beginning of

Location
Chirchik,
Uzbekistan
Aktyubinsk

Unknown
Synthetic
Nitrogen and
nitrate fertilizer
Chemicals Unknown

- 85 ­

\ ^ V'-F^

TABLE XIII Continued.
Refineries: Location Net) it-Dag and Shaumyan, Kazakhstan (95 and 150 mi. southeast of Krasnovodsk) Kanibadam Vannovskaya, Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan 5. Capacity Remarks

Unknown; Receive crude from Cheleken probably small Island and Nefte-Dag.

Unknown; probably small

Operate on crude from neighboring fields

Miscellaneous Industries:
Type of Installation Capacity or Production

Location Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan
Tashkent, Uzbekistan Bukhara, Uzbekistan (Unlocated) Tadzhikistan
Fergana, Eastern Uzbekistan
Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan

Meat-packing "kombinat" 25 million cans
Cotton textiles Cotton textiles Silk mills Cotton textiles Cotton textiles Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

Prospects for increased industrial output.
The evacuation of industry has increased the industrial capacity of
the unoccupied region generally by as much as 10$. Efforts to increase
output in some fields, notably iron and steel, coal, gasoline, military
supplies, and electrical equipment^have been successful. Output of
certain of the Soviet Union's natural resources, notably iron ore, coal,
petroleum and aluminum, can be further increased to a small extent.
Substitutes can be developed for some lacking materials. On the whole,
however, an increase in industrial output is limited seriously by the

- 86 ­

labor shortage, the time element, bad living conditions, and a possible
breakdown of the transport system.
Increased output due to evacuation. It is
estimated that in spite of the heavy losses due to exposure and break­ age suffered by machinery in the process of removal, industries evacu­ ated to the east by the Soviets have raised production in the unoccupied
regions generally as much as 10$. Some stocks were also removed, as
well as highly skilled personnel and their families. The general policy
was to preserve machine-building equipment, complicated dies and labor­ saving devices and other specialized equipment. Aircraft and munitions
plants were also evacuated, as well as portions of some steel plants
and the Zaparozhe aluminum and magnesium combine. Factories making
electrical equipment were sent to the Urals, and some aircraft ammuni­ tion and gasoline motor parts, sent to the Volga regions were producing
by the fall of ^
Soviet claims of increased production during
recent months. Soviet claims of increased production during recent
months tend to exaggeration and should be regarded with considerable
reserve. However, increases have been achieved in some fields during
the past winter and spring.
It is estimated that if Lend-Lease aid is
included, Eussian pre-war production of purely military supplies has
been maintained. The Caucasian refineries are now producing large
quantities of 85 octane gasoline, which with the addition of tetraethyl
lead and other agents imported from the United States, can be boosted
to higher octane for military use. In addition, efforts are being
made to open new oil and gas wells, and during 19^1 the United States
shipped $5,650,000 worth of petroleum and gas-well drilling apparatus
and parts to Russia. The Zlatoust and Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel
Works are reported to be making special steels almost exclusively, and
if any substantial increase in special steel output can be made, it.will
serve to cut down imports of this critical material. Coal output has
been stepped up to a small extent in the Urals, Central Asia, and Siberia.
Allegedly, production of electrical equipment has been stepped up kO<f>
in the Urals, due to evacuation and expansion of old factories. Efforts
have been made to increase the production of textiles and chemicals,
but information on results is not available.
The reasons for these increases are the
pressure exerted on the workers, longer hours, and perhaps improved
organization leading to greater efficiency. There have also been re­ ports that personnel in some important factories get better food, receiv­ ing hot meals at the plant. Some of the increases claimed for the

mines and metallurgical plants during the late spring were probably-
seasonal, since in winter the extreme cold interferes with their
operation.
Expansion of output of natural resources. A
moderate increase in the present output of the following minerals is
considered feasible during the next six months:
Iron and steel Copper Lead and zinc Coal Petroleum Aluminum

Output of the following can be increased
only to a slight degree, if at all, during the next six months:
Nickel Tin Tungsten Antimony
Molybdenum
Manganese
Mercury

Substitutes for lacking materials. In some
cases, there are effective substitutes for materials which are lacking or
which must be conserved. Some success has been attained in saving
coal and oil by the use of by-products gas, or generating gas from
peat or wood. Some alloying materials can be substituted, such as
chromium - manganese - silicon steel for molybdenum steel. At the
outbreak of Russo-German hostilities the Soviet Union already had a
well-developed synthetic rubber industry, and in some cases synthetic
rubber can be further employed in place of the natural product.
Limiting factors. The time element is one of
the most serious limiting factors confronting Soviet industry, since it
takes a considerable period to develop new mineral resources and indus­ trial plants. In addition, many factories, metallurgical plants, power
plants, refineries, etc. in unoccupied areas, particularly the Urals
and Siberia, have only recently been opened. There is al3o the time-
lag, already mentioned, involved in setting up and rehabilitating
evacuated industries. Other limiting factors are the labor shortage,
the general inefficiency of Soviet industry, and the possibilities of
famine and epidemics. The situation which would result from a break­ down of the transport system has already'been discussed.
Agricultural production and the food situation.
General estimate of the present situation. All reports indicate that
the present food situation in the Soviet Union, especially the large
cities of European Russia such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kuibyshev, is

- 88 ­

very grave. Refugees and evacuees, estimated at over 10 million, add
to the difficulties of the present situation. It is estimated that
the additional sown acreage will produce sufficient grain to feed
about 6 million of these refugees> provided certain limiting factors-­ labor shortage, climatic conditions, etc.--do not interfere* The
food situation in general will probably remain serious, and the
United States will have to continue food shipments.
Crops. Food- grains constitute the single
most important item in the country's ;food producing capacities, since
the caloric content of the average Rttssian diet is predominantly de­ rived from grains, mostly wheat and rye. The grain producing capaci­ ties of unoccupied Russia represent "between 60 and 70$ of the country's
normal productive potentialities. The extent of Russian grain reserves
at the present time is unknown, "but the grain deficit in this year's
crop is estimated at "between 3 and 8 million tons.
Next in importance come potatoes, with an
estimated 50$ of the total acreage still intact. The most serious
loss is in regard to sugar since the Ukraine and the central region
of European Russia grew 60-70$ of th© country's sugar beet crop, and
milled 80-90$ of its sugar. In regard to cabbage, it is estimated
that about kcrfo of the acreage is intact, and likewise 60$ of the
acreage planted to other vegetables. Both potatoes and cabbage sup­ plies on hand during the winter of 19^1-^2 are reported to have suf­ fered from late harvest and early frost. Most of the Soviet Union's
sunflower seed acreage (yielding oil) found in the lower Volga and
North Caucasus regions, is intact. In addition, Central ABia pro­ duces cottonseed oil. About 50$ of the acreage devoted to flax lies
in unoccupied regions. Most of this is fiber flax, although some
oil flax is grown in the Volga region. The cotton growing area lost
to the Germans is negligible.
Livestock. About 80$ of the sheep and 70$
of the cattle are in unoccupied regions, with the greatest livestock
raising areas in the lower Volga, North Caucasus, and Kazakhstan.
However, the number of cattle will be further reduced due to slaughter
because of lack of fodder and other causes. According to 1938
statistics,the latest available, there were approximately 9,500,000
horsea, or 55-60$ of the total in the region included in this study.
The number of horses taken over by the army may be estimated at
2,300,000 leaving a maximum of 7,200,000 horses available for agri­ cultural use. About 70$ of the fodder-producing acreage is in un­ occupied Russia.

- 89 ­

Dietary level and rationing. In general,
the diet of the average Russian is a low-level one, depending on
tread grains and potatoes for calories, and often lacking sufficient
fats and important minerals, vitamins, and proteins. Hence a drastic
lowering of the present food level will have serious consequences
in weakening resistance to disease among the civilian population.
On the other hand, Russians are accustomed to deprivation and can ad­ just themselves to food shortages better than people in countries
accustomed to a more abundant and adequate diet.
Available information indicates that pres­ ent rations are adequate for a country where the population is used
to living mainly on broad. Heavy workers receive the largest amounts
of food, non-manual workers about two-thirds as much, and dependents
and children somewhat less. The army, N.K.V.D, and Communist Party
members, of course, are much better fed than the average citizen.
Food is also better in the more important war industry factories,
where the workers are given bread and hot food twice daily.
Evacuation of machinery, livestock, crops
and skilled labor. The extent to which machinery and livestock were
removed from occupied territory by the Russians cannot be determined
exactly. Reports of the evacuation of stock and machinery are borne
out by German accounts. There are also indications that the managers
of collective and state farms, tractor operators and mechanics were
either mobilized or evacuated. It is probable that a portion of the
grain crop, particularly in the territory west of the Dnepr, was
saved; it is likely that all but a small proportion of the sugar beet
crop was lost.
Measures to increase production. Measures
taken to increase production include the evacuation of tractors and
livestock, already mentioned, labor mobilization, the extension of
the sown areas, and the substitution of food for "technical" crops
such as cotton, in the Central Astatic republics.
Labor mobilization. An estimated 17,600,000
persons in the Soviet Union are agricultural workers, plus a possible
5-6,000,000 auxiliary workers.
Recent decrees for agricultural production
apply to all males from 1^ to 55 and females 1^ to 50 of urban and
rural communities not employed in industry or transport. Children
and students are also required to work on the farms. 150 days of
labor are required of agricultural laborers in the unoccupied area

- 90 ­

around and north of Moscow, and in cotton growing districts, principal­ ly in Uzbekistan, and 120 days in other regions. Drastic penalties
are provided in case of failure to comply with these decrees.*
Extension of sown area. According to recent
reports, the sown area has "been increased " y some 6,500,000 acres of
b which about 5 million were sown to winter crops. This acreage was dis­ tributed as follows:
Urals and Volga region - 1,500,000 acres
Kazakhstan - 1,000,000 "
+ Siberia - 1 , 000,000 "
Total 6,500,000

In addition, Central Asiatic cotton acreage is
to be decreased by as much as 60$ to allow for food crops. This area
has amounted on an average to about 3 million acres: hence a reduction
by 6Cff> would mean about 1,800,000 acres released for sowing to food
crops. Thus, according to present information, the additional acreage
sown this year amounts to over 8 million acres.
Grain, On the basis of the above figures,
an estimate may be made of the size of the grain crop obtained from
the additional sown acreage for this year. It may be assumed that 75$
of the 8 million acres mentioned will be sown to grains, giving 6
million acres. A Department of Agriculture expert estimates that
"each additional million acres sown should, on a conservative estimate
and barring very adverse weather conditions, bring roughly between
200,000 and 300,000 tons of grain, exclusive of seed or enough, espe­ cially with rationing, to take care of a million or more people."
The yield from these 6 million acres sown to grain therefore should
theoretically bo able to feed about 6 million people, or between 50
and 60$ of the number of refugees mentioned** Whether this program
can succeed depends very largely on the extent certain limiting factor©,
discussed below, can be overcome.
Other crops. Potatoes and vegetables;- The
area under potatoes and vegetables in the eastern parts of the Soviet
Union has increased substantially in recent years, Fotatoes and
certain cold climate vegetables, such as cabtn^es, are also grown in
the northern grain deficit regions, and increased plantings can help
*See p. **See p.

177
89

- 91 ­

in relieving local food shortages. One feature of the government's
program is the emphasis on the planting of vegetable gardens " y city-
b workers. Evidently efforts are also "being made to plant vegetables in
reoccupied areas, as it has "been announced that the Russians have re­ quested a supply of 200 tons of carrot seed and 30 tons of onion seed
for this purpose.
Sugar. The concentration of Russian sugar
"beet production in the Ukraine has "been due mainly to soil and climatic
conditions. Some sugar beets are grown in Kirghiziaand Kazakhstan,
where acreages sown to this crop have been increased. The Russians
claim that they are developing a sugar beet which can grow in a
colder climate and poorer soil. Even if they are successful in these
experiments, however, mills must be built to take care of the crop,
and on the whole it is doubtful if much can be done in the immediate
future to alleviate the sugar shortage. Moreover, it is not probable
that there are reserves of any size, so that the country's needs will
have to be met by imports.
Limiting Factors* Three factors may serious­ ly limit the country's capacity for increased food production, and
for supplying its deficit areas. They may be listed as technical,
transport, and climatic. The presonce of one of the factors in ag­ gravated form, or a combination of all three may result in a wide­ spread and severe famine.
Technical. Even in peace time, Soviet agri­ culture suffers from a number of defects, here referred to as "tech­ nical" including frequent breakdowns and stoppages of tractors and
combines, shortage of spare parts and waste of fuel. Wartime condi­ tions have added to these dofoctm a shortage of labor, as well as
horses, tractors and fuel for sowing and harvesting operations.
Russian agriculture normally uses the bulk of the country's output of
distillate and kerosene, and if the Caucasus is conquered, the fuel
situation will be very serious. Recent reports from Russia indicate
that many tractors have not been repaired through a shortage of
mechanics and a lack of spare parts. In spite of the organization of
mobile repair units, a press campaign, and special rewards for putting
machines back into operation, it is problematical whether it will be
possible to harvest the full amount of land planted. The labor mobili­ zation and shortage of seed have already been mentioned.
Transport. Since the grain production of
the Soviet Union is not evenly distributed over the country, food
must be shipped from one region to another. The disastrous results
of a breakdown of the railroad system have already been discussed.

Climate, The climate of the eastern parts
of European Russia, the Urals, and Kazakhstan is continental, "becoming
more severe as one goes eastward. Rainfall is scanty and devastating
droughts sometimes occur. In Siberia, on the other hand, rainfall
late in the season often interferes with harvesting. Agriculture in
Central Asia can for the most part " e carried on only with irrigation.
b Although information on weather conditions
is incomplete, so far conditions appear to have been favorable. In
spite of the late spring, damage to winter crops seems to have "been
negligible. May and June are the critical months for the spring
crops of the arid regions listed above, and so far no drought has
"been reported. Information is as yet too incomplete to draw definite
conclusions about this year's crops, and the situation will be po­ tentially dangerous until the crops are actually harvested.
Food and agricultural production by zones.
(See Maps 7a, 7b and 11. ) Zone of combat. The northern part of the
zone of combat, roughly the area north of Moscow is, under normal
conditions, a grain deficit zone. Information on sown areas, principal
crops, and livestock numbers is contained in Table XIV since Murmansk
and Karelia are divided between the zone of combat and the zone of
communications.
Most of the area in the zone of combat south
of Moscow belongs normally to the black soil food surplus region,
growing grains, flax, sugar, potatoes and vegetables. Wartime condi­ tions, however, make this area a food deficit zone to which food must
be transported for the supply of the army.
Zone of communications. The zone of com­ munications is divided roughly into four regions from north to
south: (l) the northern region, (2) the Moscow region, (5) the
Middle and Lower Volga region, and (k) the North Caucasus, Trans-
Caucasus and Kalmyk ASSR. These regions as shown in the tables on
sown areas and livestock do not always correspond exactly to the
zone of communications marked on Map 11, because available statistics
are based on administrative divisions. The tables are intended to
show the extent of the planted area and the most important crops
rather than give complete data on all crops.
Northern region. For purposes of conven­ ience this area includes practically all of north European Russia,
east of Leningrad. Although not producing sufficient grain to feed
all its inhabitants, it grows some wheat, rye, barley and oats, as

- 93 ­

well as potatoes, vegetables, legumes, fiber flax, and forage crops.
A local treed of cattle furnishes dairy products. In addition, the
Archangel and Murmansk fisheries supplement the food supply of the
local population. Codfish ia perhaps the most important variety in
this region.
Table XIV gives the acreages sown to important
crops and livestock numbers in 1938.
Moscow region. As will " e seen from Table
b XV, this area has large acreages planted to grains, including both
spring and winter wheat, large amounts of potatoes and sunflower seeds.
However, due to the dense population, the region is deficient in grain.
The largest acreages planted to sunflower seeds lie in Voronezh Ob last,
a portion of which is in the zone of combat. About 150,000 acres are
also planted to sugar beets in this oblast, but as it is impossible
to judge what portion lies east of the line of combat this acreage
is not included in Table XV . Penza, Ryazan, and Tambov oblasts also
produce small amounts of sugar beets. About 25,000 acres are also
devoted to seed flax in Voronezh, Penza, Ryazan, Tambov oblasts and
the Mordovian ASSR. Table XV also shows livestock numbers as of 1938.
The Middle and Lower Volga region (See
Table XVI) • This is one of the most important food-producing regions
in the Soviet Union, with an estimated grain surplus of around 1.3
million tons in 1937 • In addition, it contains a large proportion of
the country's sunflower seed acreage. This area however is subject
to drought so that harvests are unpredictable.
The North Caucasus, TransCaucasus and Kalmyk
ASSR (Table XVII). The North Caucasus is another important grain
producing area with an estimated surplus of 1.5 million tons of grain
in 1937. The Transcaucasus (mainly Georgia) also produces consider­ able amounts of grain and other crops, and the loss of the Caucasus
would constitute a serious blow to the agricultural potential of
Soviet Russia.
In the North Caucasus, the area east and
northeast of the Don River towards the Caspian Sea is semi-arid and
grows spring wheat. In the Kuban region around Krasnodar the pre­ cipitation is very favorable and large amounts of winter wheat are
grown. This fact is of considerable importance since winter wheat
gives higher yields than spring wheat and favorable climatic condi­ tions make for stable crop production. A small amount of rice is
grown in both the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus.

TABLE XIV
AGRICULTURE - NORTHERN REGION
A. Sawn Areas, 1938 * ­ *
REGION WINTER WHEAT SPRING WHEAT WINTER RYE SPRING BARLEY OATS POTATOES VEGETABLES LEGUMES FLAX FOR FIBER FORAGE CROPS

to

74-0 4-90 Murmansk* 5,930 Karelian 1,980 7,170 31,880 15,320 39,040 21,250 2,220 4,940 490 22,490 ASSR Vologda 34,350 267,370 610,090 269,340 649,380 178,500 18,290 85,500 216,210 310,600 Arkhan­ gelsk 9,880 89,450 233,020 194,960 228,810 77,100 7,170 36,820 62,780 76,110 490 9,390 45,470 52,880 30,390 26,190 3,710 3,950 12,600 Komi ASSR

TOTAL

46,700 373,380 920,460

532,500 947,620 303,780 31,880 131,210 292,080 415,130

* In thousands of acres. • Political divisions of 1939.

B.
REGION Murmansk HORSES

Live Stock, 1938 *##
CATTLE HOGS SHEEP AND GOATS

5,100
38,900 222,200

6,900
87,900

Karelian ASSR Vologda Arkhangelsk Komi ASSR
TOTAL

139,500 54,400
460,100

629,200 375,400 122,000
1,221,400

5,700 25,500 112,000 57,300 19,800
220,300

13,600 68,300
390,200

274,600
99,900

846,600

In thousands., of-head•

TABLE XV AGRICULTURE ­ CENTRAL REGION * A. Sown Areas, 1938 *# WIN­ TER RYE 12,216 H N ­ SPRING SPRING TER V/HEAT BARLEY WHEAT 2,817 7,6U 1,143 OATS BUCK- M I L - POTA­ VEGE­ TOES TABLES WHEAT LET 674 1,693 4,014 494 LEFLAX SUNGUMES FLOWER FIBER SEED 1,559 1,083 1,078 FORAGE CROPS 5,608

1,793

#*-

I n thousands of a c r e s . B.
Live Stocky 1938
HOGS 2,867 SHEEP AND GOATS' 7,158

HORSES 2,063

CATTLE 5,323

*- In thousands of head. Includes: Moscow Yaroslavl Ivanovo Ryazan Penza Gorki

Oblast

Kirov Oblast Tambov " Voronezh " Mari ASSR Mordovian " Udmurt "

TABLE XVI
AGRICULTURE - MIDDLE AND LOWER VOLGA REGION
A. Sown Areas, 1938 *
REGION WINTER
RYE SPRING WHEAT OATS SPRING BARLEY

SUN­
FLOWER SEED

POTA­
TOES

VEGE­ TABLES

LE­ GUMES
300

OTHER CROPS

TOTAL

Kuiby­ shev

2,195

3,242 1,375 3,054 3,807 1,566 13,044

1,047 171 1,454 71 725 319 385 669 101 209 3,712 1,439

465 64 517 345
122

357
449 152
121

46 36 39 50

1,381 1,402 (1) 2,404
792

9,204 7,968 8,270 9,847 3,529 38,818

Tatar
Saratov Stalin­ grad German
Volga
1

2,494
1,732 2,052 664
9,137

623 229 14 16
1,182

45
1,124 •

U
185

TOTAL

1,513

7,432

* I n thousands of acres. (1) I n c l u d i n g 378,000 acres under mustard s e e d .

B.
REGION Kuibyshev HORSES 233 329 116 180

Live Stock, 1938 **
CATTLE 760 HOGS 273 310 SHEEP AND GOATS

Tatar SaratovStalingrad German Volga
TOTAL

657 556 1,035
220

246
310 119 258

1,361 1,338

986 1,401
291

34
892

3,228

5,377

In thousands of head.

TABLE XVII
AGRICULTURE - NORTH CAUCASUS AND TRANSCAUCASUS
A. Sown Areas, 1938 ##

REGION N o r t h Caucasus T r a n s c auca su s TOTAL WINTER SPRING WHEAT WHEAT OATS WINTER WINTER RYE BARLEY ls 489 SPRING CORN BARLEY RICE POTA­ VEGE­ MELONS LE* TOES TABLES GUMES

8,727 2,012 10,739

2,988 520

52

1,410 34

714 477

3,898 2,485 26 530 995 64 4,428 3,480
90

526 121 647

362 78 440

354 46 400

100
97 197

3,508 1, 541

1,444 1 , 1 9 1

CO

1

I

REGION

CASTOR BEAN

SUN­
FLOWER SEED 1,819 54 1,873

TOBACCO

COTTON

FORAGE AND HAY 4,592 300 4,872

OTHER CROPS 1 ,321

TOTAL

N o r t h Caucasus TransCaucasus TOTAL

391 391

67 72
139

524 530
1,054

225
1 ,546

31,785 6,213 37,998

*

The North Caucasus here embraces the Rostov Oblast, the Kalmyk ASSR, the Krasnodar and Ordzhonikidze Krais, the Kabardino-Balkar, North -Osetian,'Checheno-Ingush and Dagestan ASSR and the Karachai Autonomous Oblast, The Transcaucasus embraces the Georgian, Azerbaidzhan and Armenian S.S. Republics.

- - - In thousands of acres. xx

TABLE XVII

(Continued) REGION North Caucasus Transcaucasus TOTAL
HORSES CATTLE

HOGS

SHEEP AND GOATS

1,041 421 1,462

4,531 4,001 8,532

2,007 886 2,893

8,149 5,590 13,739

In thousands of head.

In addition, the North Caucasus is one of the
important oil seed growing areas in the Soviet Union. The Transcaucasus,
especially Goergia, grows tropical and semi tropical plants such as tea,
citrus fruits, tung oil and essential oils. There are also extensive
vineyards in the Transcaucasus. Both the Transcaucasus and the North
Caucasus grow tobacco. In Table XVII, the entire Transcaucasus and
the Kaljnyk ASSR are included.
There are important fisheries in "both the
Caspain and Black Seas, and a number of canneries are in operation.-*
Zone of the interior. Food and agricultural
production. The zone of the interior is roughly divided into 3 regions
,&) the Urals, (b) Siberia, and (c) Central Asia (including Kazakhstan
and the Central Asiatic republics). Tables XVIII,, XIX, and XX give the
acreages sown to important crops and livestock numbers in 1938.
The predominating food grain of these areas
is spring wheat, as the severity of the climate prevents the sowing of
winter wheat. Although eastern Russian spring wheat is of excellent
quality, yields are lower than those obtained from winter wheat. Like
the middle and lower Volga region, the Ural and Kazakhstan agricultural
regions are arid, and devastating droughts have occurred in the past.
These facts - dependence on a single crop and uncertain weather • con­ stitute perhaps the single greatest danger to the country's food
potential at present.
The Urals, Vest Siberia and Northern
Kazakhstan are the leading dairy regions of the Soviet Union, account­ ing in 193*+ for over a third of Russian commercial butter production.
The Urals (Table XVIII). On the basis of
interregional grain shipments, the Urals had a small grain deficit
in 1937- These shipments were doubtless needed to supply the Molotov
(Perm) and Sverdlovsk industrial regions, in view of the large acreages
devoted to spring wheat and other grains in the Bashkir ASSR, Chkalov
and Chelyabinsk oblasts.
Siberia (Table XIX). The Omsk and
Novosibirsk oblasts and Altai Krai, often referred to as "western"
Siberia, together constitute a grain surplus area (about 1.2 million
tons in 1937), while Krasnoyarsk Krai and Irkutsk Oblast in 1937 pro­ duced approximately enough grain for their needs. Grain yields in
western Siberia are fairly stable, although late rainfall often inter­ feres with harvesting.

*See p. 53
- 100 ­

TABLE XVIII
AGRICULTURE - URAL REGION
A. Sown Areas, 1938 x

REGION WINTER RYE SIRING
WHEAT
OATS SPRING BARLEY SUN POTA­ VEGE­ LEGUMES FLOWER TOES TABLES SEED OTHER CROPS TOTAL

Perm Sverdlovsk Bashkir Chkalov Chelyabinsk TOTAL

999
461
2,047
1,397
911
5,815

576 1,099 687 1,635 2,609 925 4,345 4,160 1,669

7a

246 131 79 268 246 970

186 81

187 174 368 142 236

25 26 43 24

108 119
255 29 251 762

a
159

628 298 1,356 1,163 676 4,121

3,868 2,637 8,578 8,721 8,271 32,075 |

12,431 6,015

695 1,107

o

B. REGION Molotov (Perm) HORSES 198 187 459 190 262 1,296

Live S t o c k , 1938 **
CATTLE HOGS 288 261 SHEEP AND GOATS

Sverdlovsk Bashkir Chkalov Chelyabinsk
TOTAL

503 600 1,136 858 1,120 4,217

342 191 274 1,356

535 470 1,765 1,253 1,358 5,381

-x- I n thousands of a c r e s , Ht I n thousands of head.

TABLE XIX
AGRICULTURE - SIBERIA
(West of Lake Baikal)
A, Sown Areas, 1938

REGION WINTER SHIING RYE WHEAT OATS SHIING SUN­ BARLEY FL01ER SEED 273 190 112 217 105 POTA­ TOES VEGE­ TABLES LEGUMES OTHER CROPS TOTAL

Omsk 768 N o v o s i b i r s k 1,086

Altai

Krasnoyarsk Irkutsk
o
CO

235 522 392 3,003

TOTAL

3,468 3,104 6,094 1,931 485 15,082

1,594 2,148 1,794 1,398 456 7,390

81 13 243 3

281 368 223 139 91
1,102

31 53 33 25 13 155

173 39 20 17 22 271

1,082 973 983 379 254 3,671

7,751 7,974 9,737 4,631 1,818 31,911

897 340
B.

Live Stock, 1938 ##
CATTLE HOGS SHEEP AND GOATS

I

REGION Omsk

HORSES

Novosibirsk Altai Krasnoyarsk Irkutsk
TOTAL

351 505 433 328 163
1,780

1,396 1,708 1,466 767 436 5,773

427 704 408 383 181

1,463 1,580 2,139 1,265 294 6,741

2,103

* *

*

•**•<*%

-x- In thousands of a c r e s . •H- In thousands of head. Jf

Central Asia (Table XX). (Kazakhstan,
Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik and Kirghiz Republics) - The agricultural
belt of Kazakhstan is confined to its upper part, roughly the area
above 50 north latitude. The outstanding crop is spring wheat with
over 8 million acres sown to it in 1938. Kazakhstan is also one of
the leading cattle, sheep and goat raising areas in the Soviet Union.
The Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik, and Kirghiz
Republics together had over k million acres devoted to spring and
winter wheat, divided about equally between the two, in 1938. Cotton,
however, is the staple crop in these regions, with over kcfjo of
Russian acreage in Uzbekistan. As previously mentioned, about 6of>
of this cotton acreage will be diverted to food crops. Cotton seed
oil furnishes the leading vegetable fat of eastern Russia, and oil
cake furnishes cattle feed. The use of cotton for making explosives
has been discussed under "Industrial production."* Most of the
Soviet silk crop, which is very small, is raised in Uzbekistan.
The figure for sheep and goats in Central Asia includes the caracul
sheep raised as fur-bearing animals, marketed as "caracul" and
"Persian lamb,"
(d) Maritime Shipping. Tonnage and disposition.
Tonnage: Reliable figures show that on December 31, 19^1 the Soviet
merchant marine consisted of 3^6 ships, with a total gross tonnage of
1,120,138. (This figure excludes coastal vessels of less than 2,000
gross tons). This tonnage was divided as follows: Number of ships Types, Remarks, etc. Over 2,000 gross tons, including 7
ships of more than 7*000 gross tons each
Gross tonnage

932,k9k

22 80

Coastal vessels over 2,000 gross tons
each Oceangoing ships of less than 2,000 gross tons each

67,506
120,138

Total

1,120,138

Known losses since January 1, 19^2 have
brought these figures down to 3^2 ships of 1,103,67^ gross tons.
* See p.

- 103 r

TABLE XX AGRICULTURE ­ CENTRAL ASIA A. Sown A r e a s , 1938 * REGION

WINTER RYE

SPRING WHEAT

OATS

SPRING SUN­ BARLEY YLCMER SEED

POTA­ TOES

VEGE­ TABLES

LE­ OTHER GU5.ES CROPS

TOTAL

Kazakhstan Uzbek Turkmen

495 —
1 496

8,039 x 1,403
120

1, 427
2 —— 2 207 1 , 638

o

I
sitrr^

Tadzhik Kirghiz
TOTAL 1 2 3

658
701 10,921
2

892 608 48 245 459
2,252
3

369
1 ___ 1

252 49

4
20

50 51 9
11

7 378

31 356

9 130

13 3,552 15, 089 26 4,859 6, 999 8 824 1, 013 992 47 I t 976 6 2, 524, 100 1 1 , 3 3 0 27, 6011

In addition, 383,000 a c r e s were under winter wheat. In addition , 2 , 0 4 5 , 0 0 0 a c r e s were under w i n t e r w h e a t . In addition , 277,000 a c r e s were under winter barley. B. REGION HORSES

1
SHEEP AND GOATS

Live Stock, 1938 **
CATTLE HOGS

Kazakhstan Uzbek Turkmen Tadzhik

639 381

64
102

3,095 1,411
233 500 486

368 76 23
21

5, 288 3, 980
1, 831 1, 635 1, 886 14, 620

Kirghiz
TOTAL

362 1,548

91 579

5,725

In thousands of acres.
In thousands of head.

Disposition. The known disposition of 96
Russian merchantmen, including 8 tankers, in April 19^-1 was as follows
Route Atlantic Convoy Route Siberia-U.S. West Coast Route Other routes Number of ships Tonnage

23

96
sunk since April 28.

357,81*9

This figure does not take into account ships
The remaining 225-250 ships of about 750,000
gross tons are in the Black, Caspian and Baltic Seas, or immobilized
in Turkish waters. In addition to the known losses already mentioned
it is estimated that 80/0 of the Baltic Fleet which totaled Qh ships
of 208,000 gross tons in 1939 has "been sunk or immobilized leaving
17 ships of IJ-5,000 tons. About korfo of the Azov-Black Sea fleet,
which was reported to consist of 160 ships totaling U65,OOO tons has
been lost leaving 96 ships of approximately 186,000 tons. About 106
ships totalling 173,257 tons, of which h% are oil tankers, are in the
Caspian fleet which is intact. Available shipping including tankers
in the Baltic, Black and Caspian SeaB therefore may be estimated as
follows:
Location Baltic Sea
Black Sea Caspian Sea Total with tankers Minus tankers
(Estimating 25$ of remaining Black Sea fleet are tankers)
In addition, an unspecified number of small
vessels from 600 to 2,000 tons are operating in the Caspian.
Tonnage

186,000 173,257
219

1^,257

- 105 ­

These figures, therefore, account for
approximately 315 ships of 762,106 tons in trans-oceanic routes,
and the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas. The disposition of the
remaining 27 ships of 3^0,000 tons is unknown; doubtless these ves­ sels represent unannounced losses.
Types of ship3. Information on types of
ships in the Soviet merchant marine is incomplete. The different
types of ships vere represented " y the following percentages, however,
b on December 31* ^
Type Tankers (over 2,000 g.t.) Coal burners Motor ships Oil burners Total Percentage

8
66
5

11

100

General operating conditions. Age; Approxi­ mately one-half of the Soviet merchant marine is obsolescent, consist­ ing of ships built before 1921. A little less than 2% of the total
number of ships was built between 1928 and 1932.
Condition. In general, the condition of
Soviet ships is poor. In 1938, only 21$ of Soviet ships met the
country's requirements for the safety of ship and cargo. Ships wear
out rapidly and often suffer from serious technical defects. Repairs
are haphazard and often take an inordinate amount of time. In addition,
ships go long periods without proper overhauling and drydocking, there­ by greatly lowering their speed and efficiency.
Operation. Operation of Soviet ships is
very inefficient. The average speed is slow, and standing time in
both the tanker and dry cargo fleets is excessive. Frequent ship­ wrecks are mostly the result of a lack of discipline and complete
disregard of navigation rules. Passenger and cargo service are both
poor. In addition, it is the regular practice to overload ships.

- 106

(3) Psychological Factors.
(a) Morale. The present Soviet-German war has im­ posed additional hardships upon a people who, even in peace,, lead dra"b
and weary lives. The strain carried by the population has been such as
to force observers to speculate on whether the Red regime would survive.
The civil population in the U.S.S.R. has "been so oppressed that outside
observers expect the civil morale to break. Civil morale in this semi-
Asiatic, semi-western country, however, does not require the attention
that the morale of western people does. The response of the civil
population is due to complete control by the government which is quick
to administer the severest punishment for the slightest act of omission.
Any act of commission, which in any way might oppose government efforts,
is rewarded by the death penalty. The counter-espionage and counter-
sabotage organizations are large and effective, and there is no hesita­ tion to prosecute even a factory worker who fails to produce as much as
the government thinks he should. One important reason, therefore, for
the continuance of the support by the civil population is fear.
Simultaneously, the Russians are intensely
nationalistic. Since the rise of Stalin to power continuous propaganda
has built up patriotic fervor. All groups were mentally set for war,
having been taught for years to hate and fear German Fascism; propa­ ganda, actual German brutality and total lack of German conciliatory
measures have fanned this hatred to great heights.
Due to evacuations the housing problem in the
unoccupied areas, never too spacious anyway, has become serious; the
food shortage is becoming more apparent and the queues arc getting
longer; all prices are soaring and taxes are being added; and there is
a scarcity of fuel. Clothing for the average person is simply unobtain­ able; working hours have been lengthened and intensified. The majority
of the population, never well cared for, is suffering more than ever.
They are not bearing it because of their good morale--it is doubtful
if they understand the meaning of the- word. The people of Russia have-
known none other than a stern, harsh rule, and they accept philosophical',
whatever conditions are imposed.
With the exception of the besieged cities, there
has been only one known instance of break in civil morale. This ex­ ception took place in Moscow the day after foreign diplomats were evacu­ ated. This evacuation could not be concealed, and the population of
MOB cow knew that the greater part of the Moscow militia was also evacu­ ated. Looting broke out all over the city and several days elapsed be­ fore order was restored. Execution was the only punishment meted out
and much publicity was given to these cases.

- 107 ­

So long as there is a Stalin or his successor
and so long as there is the Communist Party organization with its com­ plete control over the secret police and troops of the People's Com­ missariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the morale of the people of the
U.S.S.R. will never be seriously considered by the heads of the govern­ ment. Decrees will be issued and enforced without regard to effect on
the population.
Civil morale of the U.S.S.R. is not an important
factor in the present war--what is more important is a keen knowledge
of the national psychology and national capacity to withstand oppression.
The present leaders of the Soviet Union have this knowledge.
(b) Training. Training for all persons in the
U.S.S.R. has national defense as its objective, and the purposes of
every organization are invariably to further Party dictatorship and to
increase every individual's political and military knowledge and physi­ cal fitness. Education is on a somewhat higher status than under the
Czars, and more widespread.
Military training is the most important phase
of Soviet education, and all or most of the present Soviet leaders have
military educations. The objective of pre- and enlisted military train*­ ing is to develop in the soldier physical superiority, elementary school­ ing, and above all a good political foundation. Every Soviet youth's
training begins with political conditioning in Party organizations, whicfy
control every phase of life in the U.S.S.R.
Civilian training, outside the normal compulsory
schooling in elementary grades, is largely devoted to industry, agri­ culture, and military reserve instruction whose main purpose is to in­ crease national defense. Special middle schools (military), either
attached to or separated from the normal ten-year school, have been
established for seamen, and naval, artillery, and flying cadets.
Training Organization. The Soviet child
between the ages of two and four receives his first introduction to the
Communist Party and gets his first taste of military instruction. The
lessons in regimentation are, of course, only rudimentary, but as an
Octobrist he mixes with others of his own age and learns to march in a
column of twos. The estimated number of Octobriats is approximately three million. A Pioneer is a boy between the ages of five and fourteen. He may be compared to a junior boy scout. He is
taught discipline, marching, and some sport. As he grows older he is
imbued with idea that he is being prepared for the honor of membership

- 108 ­

UNCLAS

in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), Estimated number of pioneers
is about six million.
The Komsomol is a youth organization of about
ten million members "between the ages of fifteen and twenty-six. Its
organization is similar to that of the Communist Party and is subordi­ nated to it. Its purpose is to provide a training ground for future
communists even to the hardening process of Party inspired hoodlum raids
on churches in session. The Komsomols are financed by dues and have
their own newspapers and periodicals. Although the organization does
not conduct schools, it does provide moral and financial support to
organizations which do, such as the People's Commissariats for Educa­ tion and Physical Culture and the Society for Air and Chemical Defense
(Osoaviakhim). It holds competitions in all types of sport beneficial
to the military service. The power of the Komsomol has somewhat di­ minished. In the past it took too active, and many times too controlling
a part in all phases of national economy. However, as its influence
was not always beneficial to the government and as some of the young
leaders were rash and frequently abused their power, the Party curtailed
its activities and issued a series of public reprimands in the press.
Osoaviakhim is a Party controlled "voluntary"
society composed of some thirteen million members of both sexes and
various ages who devote some spare time to its activities. Its general
mission is to create a reserve of partially trained personnel for all
military forces. Its specific missions are: (a) to train pre-con­ scripts for the ranks of the Army^ Navy, and N.K.V.D.; (b) to dis­ seminate military technical knowledge of all branches; (c) to train
the populace (particularly urban) in defense measures against air and
gas attacks. The society raises about three hundred twenty-five million
rubles annually from dues, national lottery, donations, and benefit
performances. This sum is expended to purchase its own equipment and
supplies to fulfill its programs, the most expensive being airplanes.
The objectives of the society parallel those of the armed forces. It
intensifies its activities according to the needs of the national defense
program. The chairman of the committee is a Major General of Aviation.
The Party initiates instructions to the Central Committee of the Society,
the Commissariat for Defense furnishes the instructors and supervises
the program. The importance of the society lies in the following: (a)
a tremendous saving in time for the^ military forces when the personnel
enters the service; (b) provides an excellent proving ground for the
selection of the best material for the various branches of national
defense; (c) is self-supporting and is not a drain on the national
treasury, (hence its figures do not appear in the budget); (d) presents
its activities to the people in the light of the recreational, sporting,
and Belf-preservation aspects.

- 109 ­

Trade Unions. Members of these Party inspired
and Party controlled organizations may " e of all adult ages. They are
b organized according to factories, plants and shops (company union in
type) "but as is the cage of other clubs or societies, they have no place
in the Soviet Union unless they: (a) further the Party dictatorship;
(b) increase the productivity and regimentation of labor; (c) increase
the political and military knowledge and fitness of the individual.
Strikes are unknown. Drastic la"bor laws are often "suggested" " y union
b organizations. One of the primary objects of the Trade Unions is the
propagation of military knowledge " y means of rifle clubs, military
b circles, lectures, exhibitions, visits to army training camps, etc.
Dues are used to "endow" rest homes, nurseries, clinics, etc. The
membership is about twenty-three million.
State Labor Reserves. The Soviet of People's
Commissars (Sovnarkom) has a Chief Administration for the purpose of
directing, training, and distributing state labor reserves. Industrial
trade schools are divided into three classes; (a) trade schools; (b)
railroad schools; (c) factory and plant apprentice schools. The trade
schools, taking boys of fourteen and fifteen, with a two-year course,
are preparing skilled workers as metallurgists, petroleum workers,
chemical workers, and maritime transport and communications personnel.
The railroad schools also taking boys of fourteen and fifteen and giv­ ing a two-year course, are training engineers, machinists, boilermakers,
and repairmen of all types necessary to railroad maintenance. The
factory and plant apprentice schools, taking boys sixteen and seventeen,
start out with a six-months course in preparation for their final entry
into the mass occupations such as coal and ore mining and construction
jobs. The lesser skilled workmen train for metallurgical and petroleum
industries. The bulk of the conscripts come from farm areas, and chair­ men of collective farms assign yearly four young men for every hundred
collective members, counting men and women from fourteen to fifty-five
years of age. Students completing the prescribed course are considered
mobilized and obliged to work the next four successive years in some
state enterprise at the order of the Administration. Military service
is deferred until the expiration of their obligatory work period. The
first classes started December 1, 19^0, with a total enrollment of
601,378, of which trade schools received 307,962; the railroad schools,
36,589; and the factory schools, 255,827.
There is complete regimentation of labor, both'
industrial and agricultural. By ukas'e, the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in November 19^0, gave the various Commissariats
the right to transfer skilled workers, technicians, foremen, bookkeepers,
engineers, etc., from their place of employment to any enterprise that

- 110 ­

needs skilled labor. Wives wishing to join their husbands were to be
released from their jobs. Refusal to accept such transfers subjects
the employee to trial and imprisonment. Agricultural mobilization was
ordered in April 19^2 when all able-bodied men and women of rural and
urban communities not employed in industrial and transport enterprises
were mobilized for work on collective and state farms and tractor
stations. This order brought all categories of citizens in the U.S.S.R.
within all inclusive mobilization.
(c) Capacity for United Effort. The capacity for
united effort in the Soviet Union is limited only by the abilities of
its people. One word from the Party or the State can unite the efforts
of the entire economy of the country. Never in history has one man had
such complete control over the lives of so many human beings as at the
present time in Russia. Every village large and small has alread3>- been
collectivized, forcefully if necessary. Eefusal to comply means not
only loss of job, living space> and buying privileges, but can mean
prison camp or death as the authorities desire.
(d) Inventiveness. The strong inventiveness of the
Russian people dates back to the beginning of the eighteenth century
when it was stimulated by the foundation of the Akademiia Nank by Peter
the Great. It has been limited by (l) insufficient technical moans
unadapted to radical changes in mass production, especially in making
large motors, (2) grandiose planning and haphazard execution, and (3)
political interference, such as the execution of the Vavilov brothers,
geneticists, and Tupolev, aircraft designer.
The Soviets, in their efforts to make a modern
industrial country out of a backward agricultural one, have made great
strides toward the goal but shown little originality. Most of the
articles produced today are copies of foreign models or built under
foreign license. Notable exceptions are the Tupolev, Polikarpov, and
Putilov airplanes and the aircraft armament by Shpitalny and Komaritski
whose machine guns and cannon are considered not only original but among
the most efficient in the world.
The Russians are responsible for the following
inventions of military importance: the plane-carrying submarine, radio-
operated mine, rocket bomb, Molotov breadbasket, (bomb distributor), and
gyroscopically stabilized tank sight. They originated the use of para­ chute troops. In the field of medicine they contribute the blood bank
and the use of plasma for transfusion. Electroencephalography is also
a Soviet invention. Modern plant genetics and soil science owe their
foundation to pre- and post-revolutionarjr Russian scientists.
(e) Versatility. The main mass of the people have
had little education and practically no experience outside of the daily

- Ill ­

mm
Mai

( ^

necessary routine of life. They have little adaptability for mechanical
or technical work. They do not cling tenaciously to old methods from
choice, but "because they have had no alternative. They eagerly receive
new methods and thingss immediately taking them apart with a childlike
interest; and like the child they seldom get the object "back together
again. A small minority that has withstood the political upheavals
and acquired superior educations has proved to " e entirely modern and
b practical. The outstanding feature is the vast gulf "between the few
and the many. A national characteristic is the Russian's desire to cut
instruction dangerously short and to make only a superficial investiga­ tion of new techniques, methods, and materials. For this reason all
changes are accomplished with unnecessary loss of time and material.
Great achievements have "been attained in the field of technique and
economy " y audacity and carelessness of consequences.
b Stalin in his May 1, 19^2 speech states: "The
magnificent technique (of British and American pianos and tanks) avail­ able to the Soviet nation is not used to the fullest extent. Therefore,
Red Army airmen, tank crews, machine gunners and others must all learn
zeal and industry and know everything of their particular aim to "become
specialists." This warning follows reports from Scandanivia that Soviet
airmen are not handling foreign fighter pianos in a scientific manner
and that they are easy targets for German and Finnish pilots.
(^) Information and Counter Information Facilities. The
Intelligence Section of the General Staff of tho Red Army and all lower
staffs arc responsible for the organization of military intelligence
work.
The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
(NKVD) through its State Security Administration is held responsible
for espionage and counter-espionage work. The personnel of this
organization is hand-picked from special schools and other commissariats.
They combine the duties, at home and abroad, of the U.S. Secret Service;
U.S. Marshal; U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation; and State Police.,
County Sheriffs Office; and City criminal investigation departments, less
all traffic enforcement.
This super police force (old G.P.U.), has under
surveillance, secretly and otherwise, every government and Party activity
within and without the Soviet Union. The personnel of S.S. may bo found
in all government offices, institutions, enterprises, the army, tho navy,
and all foreign embassies within the U.S.S.R. Abroad, all Soviet Em­ bassies and Legations are under the constant surveillance of its personnel
in the consular sections.

The power of this secret police organization,
at home and abroad, with its own courts and the power of life, death;
or prison camp held over all its citizens, makes available nearly all
information from any of its people at any time. The member of this
organization who turns against it or the Party of Stalin can expect
death from their hands at any time, in any country on earth.
Secret police units are organized in all
countries to spy on Party members abroad and to see that Party edicts
are carried out by local communist organizations.
There is no Intelligence Corps in the Red Army;
the Intelligence Section of the General Staff of the N.K.O. and all
lower staffs being responsible for the organization of military intelli­ gence work.
The Intelligence Section of the General Staff
is subdivided into the following sub-sections:
(a) General sub-section.
(b) Military Intelligence sub-section which is
responsible for the organization and instruction of military personnel
and for counter-espionage measures in formations and units of the Red
Army.
(c) Information and statistics sub-section
which is responsible for the collection of information regarding foreign
armies.
(d) Cipher sub-section„ The duties of intelli­ gence sections of the General Staffs of Military Districts in peace and
war are:
(1) To observe the morale of the Red Army.
(2) Counter-espionage.
Q ) To collect information on armies
likely to oppose the Red Army and on possible areas of operations.
The General Staffs at headquarters of Corps and
Divisions have similar responsibilities. The duties of the political
personnel also include limited intelligence and counter-espionage work,
while the Chief Administration of State Security is the chief agency
for obtaining non-military intelligence and for counter-espionage and
security measures.

- 1X3 ­

2.

Factors directly applicable to the Armed Forces.
a. Strength and Characteristics.

IT) Army.

Xa) Strength: The Soviet Army as of June 22,
, was estimated as follows:
100 85 U0 70 Infantry divisions (17,700)
Infantry divisions (12-15,000)
Cavalry divisions
Tank brigades (some grouped into divisions)

Reserve materiel for 105 Infantry divisions.
Grand total:
35>000 guns
16,250 tanks
12,000 planes (^500 of these obsolescent)
The losses in the war up to May, 19^2, have
been extremely great. The bulk of these were suffered in June-November,
by which time the Soviets had lost 3,500,000 casualties; li+,500 guns
(h&f>); 13,000 tanks (80$) and 9,000 planes (75$). From November to
May their losses, except in casualties (750,000) and planes (1500)
were very low. However, with the renewal of fighting in the Kerch
Peninsula and near Kharkov, losses have risen by some 155,000 casualties,
1200 guns, 700 tanks, and 600 planes in May.
The present (May 31, 19^2) Russian strength on
the Western Front is estimated to be:*

*

See Map 8.

- uk ­

Table I

Order of
Battle

Sector 1.

Units

Div.*

Men

662,000
50;000
6,600
3, 500
8,000
13,000
81,100
Ul0,000
25,600
17.500
1^,000
16,000
98,200
581,300
1,370,000
8^0,000
66,000
i)-2,000
8^,000
60,000
278,000
1,370,000

Tanks

Planes . 950

Northern:
• Murmans k- R ims koye
Infantry**
Cavalry-
Tank (Brig
.)*#* Air
Overhead
Total
Pudozh-Kalinin
Infantry
Cavalry
Tank (Brig
.) Motorized
Air
Overhead
Total

62

950

5

1
i
2

150 320 150 320

8 5
.
in

k
5

2

800

k

55.5

127

6k0
800 1950

6k0
21+00

2.

Central;
Klin-Stalinogorsk
Infantry
Cavalry
Tank (Brig
.) Motorized
Air
Overhead
Total

Qk

10

12

12

1950 2^00

15

127

1950

21+00

Note: Totals of men, planes, and tanks in the various sectors and
Western Front are given in round numbers.

For purposes of computation, tank brigades are figured at two to
a tank division.
Infantry Divisions are largely of reserve 10,000 man strength.
The allocations of tank units are flexible, as tank units of
infantry divisions, as tank brigades, or as temporary tank divi­ sions, depending'on the situation.

- 115 ­

Table I (continued) Sector 3•

Order of Battle

Units

Div.*

Men
1,100,000** 200,000 52,800
^2,000 70,000
20,000 76,000 1+60,800 210,000 52,800
21,000 1+2,000 20;000 38,000 383,800

Tanks

Planes

Southern: Yelets-Chertkovo Infantry Cavalry
Tank (Brig.)
Motorized

113
20

3100*** 1760**

8
12 10

1900

Air

Overhead Total Millerovo-Rostov Infantry •Cavalry
Tank (Brig.)
Motorized

5
^9
21

800

1900

800

8 6

6 5

900
800 900 800

Air
Overhead Total
Caucasus
Infantry Cavalry
Tank (Brig.)

*
O

16

3

2 1
21

160,000
19,800
7,000
l+,000

300 160 300
6000

Air
Overhead Total h. Grand Total: Western Front Ground Air

38,000 228;800 3,000,000 128,000

160
5000

270 32

For purposes of computation, tank "brigades are figured at two to a tank division. ** Less 155,000 losses in Kerch and Kharkov.
*** Less 700 lost in Kerch and Kharkov.
**** Less 600 lost in Kerch and
•W"1
*

116 ­

Table I
Order of Battle
(continued)
Sector Units(Divs.) No, 5In training,
Communications Zone 55 Infantry,
Tank, etc.
6. Far East InfantryTank, etc.
50

Men 550,000

Tanks Planes

500,000
1*, 150,000

7.

Various supply, Home Guard and
other second-line units

6,000,000

(b) Organization. The operation of the high com­ mand and the General Staff of the U.S.S.R. is characterized by three
factors: authority through personal prestige as well as law; extreme
duplication of personnel in key positions, and fluid, temporary organi­ zations for specific purposes. The available data indicate confused,
overlapping channels of command and communication.
Since July 20, 19^1, Stalin has held all the
key civil and military positions. Simultaneously, he is the chairman of
the following party agencies: the Revision Commission, the Secretariat
of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, the Organization Bureau,
the Supreme Military Council (Red Army), the Supreme Naval Council, and
the Control Bureau (N.K.V.D.). He is also a member of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Prime Minister and Commissar for
Defense.
Below Stalin is a maze of superior councils
the Political Bureau, the Supreme Military and
of national defense: Naval Councils, the Soviet of People1s Commissars, the Committee for
Defenses, the Supreme Economic Council, etc. The great overlapping
of personnel and of functions, and the rivalry for power create indeci­ sion, confusion and unwillingness to take responsibility.
Theoretically, the Commissariat for Defense
(War Department) is only one of several equivalent administrations ­ Navy, Aviation Industry, Armament, Mortars, Shipbuilding, etc. Nor­ mally, however, although policies are formulated by the thirteen members
of the Supreme Council for the Army, the Commissariat for Defense
executes all military affairs. It consists of the Commissar, 1^ Assist­ ant Commissars, one of whom is Political Commissar and 9 are generals;
the General Staff and 20 Administrations. The General Staff includes
the Chief of Staff (Marshal Shapoahnikov), a Deputy (Political)

- 117 ­

Commissar and 9 divisions: Operations, Organization and Training,
Communications, Intelligence, Air Defense and Rear Areas, Mobilization,
Fuels, Administration and Supplies, and Topographic and Mapping. The
functions of the General Staff are theoretically advisory, "but in
many instances they actually operate as GHQ, exercising control over
the tactical air and ground units by authority of the Defense Commissar.
The 20 Administrations (Arms and Services) are not all of equal impor­ tance, since they range from Air Forces to Armament, to Political Prop­ aganda, and even to Sports.
The operational units of the Soviet Army are
grouped into five Fronts (Army Groups): Northern Front (General
K. A. Meretskov); Central Front (General G. K. Zhukov); Southwestern
Front (Marshal S. K. Timoshenko); Trans Caucasian Front (Lt. Gen.
D. T. Kozlov); and Far Eastern Front (General I. R. Apanesenko). In
the zone of the interior, the Military Districts are still operating,
largely as administrative agencies. Below the fronts, and also assigned
to a definite defensive sector, are about 55 Armies, of varying composi­ tions, with from 3 to 16 divisions.
Information concerning the Corps is uncertain.
Infantry Corps appear to be essentially administrative units which
handle supply and provide artillery and other reinforcements to the
divisions. The Cavalry Corps is a definite organization, normally of
3 divisions, with the following additional troops: 1 howitzer regiment
(114 mm. howitzer and 107 m . guns), 1 tank brigade, 1 engineer battal­ ion, 1 signal battalion, corps train. One experimental Tank Corps is
known to have been formed at Leningrad.
The regular Infantry Division of June, 1941
was a large (17,700), powerful and slow-moving organization composed
of 3 infantry and 2 artillery regiments. Its artillery component was
large: 69 AT guns (45mm); 4-6 AA guns (76mm); 32-36 guns, 76 mm;
22 howitzers, 76 mm; 28 howitzers, 122 mm; 12 howitzers, 152 mm. In
addition it had 12 large mortars (107 or 150 mm.). Its small arms
included a large number (420) of submachine guns. Motorization was
very incomplete, with only 645 trucks and 110 tractors against 6000
horses. In addition, the division normally had 1 reconnaissance
battalion, 1 tank battalion, 1 signal battalion, 1 sapper battalion,
1 division engineer park, etc.
Losses in the present war have necessitated
the introduction of a reserve Infantry Division only 10,000 men strong,
armed lightly with obsolescent materiel. The numbers of its special
troops (e.g.#l reconnaissance company) and its transport are greatly

1 f ? ^ ,

- 118 ­

reduced. This type of organization, which now predominates, is
unquestionably only an expedient.
The Motorized Division is small (7,360 men)
but hard-hitting. It consists normally of 3 infantry regiments, 1
artillery regiment, and special units; 1600 vehicles. The Cavalry
Division is likewise small (66kO), although recent information states
that an increase to 11,000 is being attempted. It has k horse, 1 tank
and 1 horse artillery regiments. In addition, it is normally supported
by one observation squadron and one or two squadrons of dive bombers.
(c) Efficiency.
TTJ Production capacity. The actual produc­ tion of the U.S.S.R. in 1939-^1 amounted to equipment for fully 90
divisions, with 9,000 guns, 6,000 tanks and 5,000 planes. The losses
in production capacity since June, 19^1 have amounted to at least 35$>;
these have been somewhat offset by complete industrial and labor
mobilization. At present, Soviet production of ammunition appears
adequate for any eventuality, the production of arms adequate to main­ tain a winning army, but the production and maintenance of trucks,
tanks and planes inadequate even under the best war conditions. Lend-
Lease aid is thus essential to keep the Soviet armies in the field. Up
to May 30, 19^2 the finished military products alone were equivalent-­ except for artillery and small arms--to equipment for h-5 infantry,
15 motorized, 10 tank and Ik air divisions. In addition, large quanti­ ties of raw and semi-finished materials, such as aluminum plate, copper
wire, armor plate, etc., have poured in.
(2) Transportation is the weakest element in
the Soviet military picture. Its inadequacies have limited the forces
at the front, and stifled their mobility (see also Railroads and Roads).
(3) The operational efficiency of the Soviet
Army is not certain. The vast majority of the regular troops were
killed or captured in the first months of the war. The reserves are
mentally and physically inferior to them. On the other hand, large
numbers of able men, both in lower and higher commands, have forced
themselves forward in the field of combat. Politicians such as
Voroshilov and Budyenny have been eliminated.
The defensive power of the Russians has
been shown on numerous occasions: their field fortifications, their
camouflage, their use of cover, all are excellent. In contrast, they
have shown little offensive skill. Only at Kaluga and Mozhaisk were
they able to take consolidated German positions. In general, a ratio
of 2:5 in relation to German efficiency seems justified. It is probable
that the forty-odd Guards Divisions are considerably better; it is cer­ tain that many of the reserve divisions are far worse.

- 119 ­

Navy.
(a) The estimated personnel strength of the Soviet
Navy as of June 1, 19^1, was 8,000 officers, 67,000 men and from 45,000
to 50,000 trained reserves.
The estimated materiel strength as of June 1,
194l, was as follows: 3 battleships, 23,000 ton, 12-12", 10-4.7",
6-4.1" E.A., 3-4" A.A., 4-3" H.A., 2-1.5" A.A.; 9 cruisers, 8,000 ton
and 7,200 ton, 9-7-1", 6-3.9", 4-1.46" A.A. or 11-5.1", 5-4.1",
7-3.1" H.A., 2 Vickers A.A., 6m A.A.; 6 destroyer leaders, 2,900 ton,
6-5.1", 6-1.81" A.A., 6-0.5m A.A., or 5-5.1" H.A.; 2-3", 2-1.1+6" A.A.;
38 destroyers, 1300-1700 ton, some I*-5.1", 2-3", 2-1.46" A.A., some
5-4" H.S., 2-3" H.A., others 4-4", 2-3" H.A.; 49 old destroyers,
800 ton, 2-4", 3-3" H.A.; 257 8ubmarines, 200-1200 ton, from 2-3.9",
2 smaller, to 1-1.46" or 1-1.81".
The following chart shows (a) the fleet organ­ ization and distribution as of June 1, 1941, with (b) losses, badly
damaged or sunk as of March 1, 1942, and (c) remaining ships:
Table II Naval Forces
Baltic Fleet Northern Fleet Black Sea Fleet Pacific Fleet remainder

(2)

a
Battleships Cruisers Leaders Destroyers Destroyers, old Destroyers, small Mine layers Mine sweepers Mine trawlers Gunboats

b 2

a

b

a 1

b

a

b

c 1

2

4 4
18

3
1

5
2

3
1

2-3

67 30rO3

5
2 2

7
4 8 4
12

10

3

3-6 3 8 5

3

7 9 14

7
60
10

30

5 96
29 12

18

7
5

7

1

' A

x.'Y^

- 120 ­

Table II
(continued)

Naval Forces

Baltic Northern
Black Sea
Fleet Fleet
Fleet

Pacific
Fleet

remain­ der

a
Torpedo cutters
Icebreakers
Depot-oilers
In all
Submarines - (Tonnage)
K L P D (1120) (1000) (1000) (1000)

b

a

b

a

b

a
100

12

b

c

23$

80
10.

5
20

50

1-2

3 "

u3*"Uu
13

6
15

1

3
7

3

2

7
2

9
5
k
3

15
14
25

h
3
1
12

1 2

7
6

17
Qk

S H

(700)

Shch (550)
B
A
M (188)

(600)

28 .

6

35

36
2

6

13

50

105

CVJ

Estonian Class unknovn

2

2

Total Submarines

88

26

40

103

257

p ^v^ii.'"'"
118«? • ­
- 121 ­

(b) Organization of the Commissariat for Navy-
indicates not only emphasis on naval defense, "but external ambitions
regarding European territories. Handicaps of landlocked or ice-bound
coast line, lack of maritime tradition, training and experience,
absence of shipyards and facilities for big ship construction, as well
as the geographical difficulty of assembling the fleets, militate
against the emergence of Russia as a first-class naval power.
The People's Commissariat for Navy was created
in January, 1938, and the Commissar (Admiral N. G. Kunetzov) is the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The Supreme Naval Council, a Party
organ, determines naval policy; and naval councils control all fleet,
naval aviation, and coast defense activities within each naval district,
Naval districts, with headquarters in cities
named, and commanders according to latest identification, are as
follows;
District Headquarters Murmansk Leningrad Sevastopol Murmansk

Commander Rear-Admiral Vice-Admiral Rear-Admiral Vice-Admiral Rear-Admiral Rear-Admiral A. G. Golovko V. F. Tributs F. S. Oktiabrsky I . S. Yumashev Abankin F. S. Sedelnikov

Northern Fleet Baltic Fleet Black Sea Fleet Pacific Fleet Amur River Flotilla Caspian Sea Flotilla

Khabarovsk Baku

Sea-based and land-based aircraft and their
respective units of the Air Force Administration are under the People's
Commissariat for Navy. Although details are not known, there is some
evidence to show that land-based units are under the command of the
Naval District Commander, while sea-based units are directly under the
control of the Fleet Commanders; e.g., Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific.
Air Forces are commanded by a senior air force officer who is subordi­ nate to his respective naval commander to whom he acts as an adviser.
(c) The efficiency of the Red Navy is fair. In
the Black Sea there has been aggressive coordination in landing
operations at Feodosia and other Crimean ports. The Navy maintained
sea channels to Odessa, and then evacuated the city; it has been the
sole supply line for Sevastopol. Only the naval aviation has shown
itself as notably bad -- the bombing of the Ploesti oil fields has
been negligible.
In the Baltic, there were large mining opera­ tions. Navigation has been poor with many losses from shipwreck. The
attempted evacuation of Tallinn failed. Yet the gunnery of the

? R.

- 122 ­

half-sunken battleships at Leningrad has been an important aid in
saving the city.
In the White Sea, Soviet submarine and de­ stroyer activity has been effective. Some landing operations have
been attempted with poor success.
As a whole, the Soviet Navy seems to be good
on small operations. Materiel and training are lacking for real control
of the sea lanes except in the Black Sea.
(3) Air Forces.
(a) Strength: The estimated strength of the
Soviet Air Force on June 1, 1941 was 6700 Army and 950 Navy craft, with
about two pursuit and attack planes to three bombardment planes. In
addition, at least 4500 obsolescent and obsolete planes were available
for auxiliary operations.
Losses during the war to May, 19^2, have
amounted to over 10,000 planes. In addition, at least k<yf> reduction
in Soviet aircraft production has resulted from the capture or destruc­ tion of factories. Finally, Lend-Lease shipments have compensated for
such losses to an increasing extent (2000 planes by May 1, 1942). Thus
the best available data indicate a total Soviet strength of 67OO planes.
(1700 in the Far East, including 400 naval craft.) This distribution
by locality is given in Table I. Approximate data on plane distribu­ tions according to type may be found in Table III.
Most of Russia's defensive air strength lies
in its fighters. Soviet bombers are obsolete for modern bombing opera­ tions except the DB2 of which there are very few.
(b) Organization. Little is known of the composi­ tion of a Russian Air division. The latest reliable information re­ ceived prior to the war (June 22, 194l) was as follows:
3 airplanes - 1 flight
.3 flights - 1 squadron (squadrons contain
from 1 - 6 planes in reserve)
4-6 squadrons - 1 regiment
4 regiments - 1 division
In the Air Forces, the Soviets make up
"divisions" to fit any given situation. Some special fighter divisions
are known to be made up of six fighter regiments. The typical regiment
appears to be made up of three bomber squadrons and one fighter squad­ ron although many are said to be in the ratio of four to one.

The Russian Air Force is closely coupled
with the ground forces. In fact, the commanding officers of different
air units are under the command of the ground unit to which they are
attached and all air operations are carried out in close collaboration
with troops and tank units.
Russian Long Range bombers are under a sepa­ rate command known as a "Special Missions" Corps. This corps acts
independent of the other armed forces.
In August, 19^1 it was estimated that the
Soviet Air Force consisted of ^5 air divisions. Four fighter divisions
were reported to be in the West, including one division for Leningrad
and one division for Moscow.
(c) Aircraft Production. Control of all aircraft
production is centralized in the Commissariat for Aviation Industry.'
This commissariat is grouped with the commissariats for Armaments,
Munitions and Shipbuilding Industry all placed under the control of the
Council for Defense Industries which in turn is directly under the
Sovnarkom.
Factories. The best available information
placed the number of factories making aircraft in the Soviet Union at
32. In October 19^1, seven (7) at least were in the hands of the
Germans, leaving a total of twenty-five (25) available to the Soviets.
Nineteen of the factories still available are within a 300-mile radius
of the German Front lines. Of the nineteen (19), approximately 16
are within a 200-mile radius including 13 of the most important, all
concentrated in the Moscow area. Only six factories out of a total of
32 are located in the east with a reasonable guarantee of security
from the Germans. Of the six factories secure from German bombers, at
least two are within range of Japanese bombers should the Soviet be
attacked in the Far East.
Prior to the German invasion Russian aircraft
production had been greatly accelerated. The factories were modeled
after those of foreign nations and were modern in relation to equip­ ment. However, aircraft production in the Soviet suffered, and con­ tinues to suffer, from numerous, serious handicaps Some of the most
critical shortcomings adversely affecting the efficient functioning
of the aircraft industry are as follows: lack of trained and competent
personnel in all branches of the industry; shortage of well equipped
laboratories engaged in necessary research; failure to create standard­ ization of machinery; e.g., mass P r
ed from United States models while la§o

- IZk ­

Airplane Numerical Strength According to Type
Table III. a. (March, 194l)
Army
Planes Pursuit
Squad.
Navy
Planes Squad.
150 500 12
24
N.K.V.D.
Planes 8quad.

I 15,155
I 16
MIG 5

Total
Attack
E 5,6,10
R 2, SSS
G-V-25 (?)
Total
Bombardment,
Light
PE 5
SB 2,5
Total
Bombardment,
Medium

800 1400 480 2680

66 116 40 222 40
110
5
155

450

56

1500

48 1548

48
1560

5

150

1608

155

160 160

14
14

DB 5

Total
Bombardment,
Heavy
TB 5,5,6
Total
Seaplanes (F.B.) »
Total
Miscellaneous
DC 5, etc.
Total
Grand Total

600 600

60
60

500 500

50
50
360 560 21
21
300 300 780
950 71
300 50

' 50

162
162
6756

50

Table III. b. (March, 19*+2)
Source "A" Army Navy 201+5 1558 516 876 51+0 10 53^3 5669 60 266 Source "B" Army Navy 612 312 108 1+8 21+ Source "C" 1200-1500 800 1500 1+00 300

Type Pursuit (fighters) Attack Observation Light Bombardment Medium Bombardment Heavy Bombardment Training Patrol Miscellaneous Totals Grand Totals (Army and Navy) Experimental Second Line Total

95^
300 1506 500 800

78
200 ' 120 578

326
5562 350

1+200-1+500

200 1800-1800 6OOO-63OO

is adopted from the Germans; and failure to bring in foreign special­ ists due to distrust and suspicion.
Generally, the industry is ridden with
excessive centralization and is characterized by its mediocrity. Its
mediocre position has been induced largely through excessive political
interference (A. N. Tupolev, the famous aircraft designer, and other
high officials in the industry have been purged), paucity of engineer­ ing skill, low productivity of labor and inefficiency in planning.
Estimated production. The estimated monthly
production of service type aircraft in series appeared to have reached
an all time high during the first six months of 19I+I. This was about
372 planes per month. The most reliable source at the time reported
the bulk of production carried by seven factories:­

- 126 ­

Location Moscow* Gorki Irkutsk Fill Moscow* Voronezh* Moscow* Komsomolsk

Type Pursuit Pursuit Pursuit Light "bombers Light and long range " Long range bombers Light bombers

Model MIG-3 1-153,1-16 1-153,1-16 SB-3 SB-3 DB-3 DB-3 SB-3

Monthly Production

78 77 77 78
21 20 21

372
It has been reliably reported that the average
time between major overhauls for Soviet military aircraft is 150 fly­ ing hours.
Engine Factories and Production. The produc­ * tion of military and civil airplane engines was carried on in 1 + or
more factories. As was the case of airplane factories, four out of il l-
carried the bulk of the production. The first six months in 19^1 the
principal factories are reported to have produced as follows:
Plant No. Name Location Motovilikhi Moscow* Rybinsk*­ Type Wright Cyclones Soviet "Liberty" Eispano-Suiza Gnome-Rhone Monthly Production

19 2k 26 29

Stalin Frunze

(?)
Baranov Bolshevik Zaporz*

300 500 700 300
1,800

Accessory Factories. Most of the accessory
factories and all of the principal ones are located near Moscow.
(d) Naval Aviation. The Naval Air Forces are
partly based on shore using army land-type planes, some fitted with
pontoons. Certain warships and auxiliary vessels are fitted for carry­ ing aircraft. In most cases aircraft are hoisted in and out of ships
by derrick, but some of the heavier ships are fitted with catapults.
There are no aircraft carriers with landing decks.

Repeatedly bombed and believed not in production.

(February

The Navy is said to have about 360 seaplanes
The planes are said to " e organized as follows:
b 3 2 3 6 seaplanes - 1 flight
flights - 1 squadron
squadrons - 1 group
groups - 1 brigade

Distribution of Naval Forces as of March
Naval Air Forces.
The Baltic Fleet (land based).
6lst Division•*# - Haapsalu*
65th Division - Tallinn*
70th Division - Leningrad
The Black Sea Fleet (sea based).
2nd Brigade Sevastopol
l+th Brigade Sevastopol
(Balaklava)
29th Group Akkerman*
32nd Group Poti
N Group (reserve) - Yeisk
N Group (reserve) - Nikolayev*
N Squadron Anopa
N Squadron Novorossisk
N Squadron Poti
The Pacific Fleet (land based).
71st Division - Vladivostok
N Squadron - Petropavlovsk
N Regiment - (Nikolayevsk)
(Soviet Harbor?)
The Pacific Fleet (sea based).
N Brigade - Vladivostok
N Group - Petropavlovsk
N Squadron - Soviet Harbor
(e) Organization of Naval Air Forces. Sea-based
naval aircraft units are directly under the control of the Fleet Com­ manders; i.e. Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific. Air Forces are commanded
by a senior air force officer who is subordinate to his respective
naval commander to whom he acts as an adviser. Land-based Naval Air
Forces are organized into units up to and including the division.

* •B 5f

Units destroyed in combat.
Since 1Q1|1 a reinforced brigade has been termed a division.

Sea-based air forces are said to be organized into units up to und
including the brigade.
The organization of a flying-boat squadron is
said to consist of three flights of six aircraft plus one for command­ ing officer, 19 in all. "Where an independent flying boat squadron has
been located, the establishment has been reported as consisting of 12
initial aircraft.
Tactical Policies: The Red Navy has no air­ craft carriers with landing decks. Naval air operations are contem­ plated close to the shore line only. Independent naval air operations
are discouraged. Naval District Commanders will use aviation to support
their fleet aims. Seaplanes and flying-boat units are said to be under
their fleet operational commands. The Naval District Commander is
responsible for coastal and port defenses, including A.A. defense.
Types and distribution of seaplanes and fly­ ing boats; There are the following imported types of aircraft in use
by the Naval Air Forces:
Savoia Flying Boat (S 62)
Consolidated P.B.Y. Flying Boat (S 55)
Sever sky Convoy Fighter and Amphibian Fjghter
(S itf)
Martin Flying Boat
Distribution:
District Baltic-Arctic Black Sea Far East Total MBR 2,5 2k 92 116 Types Unknown Total 72 92 196 360

S 55

S 62 16

32 100 132

kS
kQ 6k

Aircraft normally carried on warships: (June 1, 19M.) Fleet Arctic Ocean 1 destroyer 1 depot ship Type Warship Seaplane Each

- 129 ­

Fleet Arctic Ocean (continued)

Type Warship 7 icebreakers 1 icebreaker

Seaplane Each 1 each 2

~nr

Baltic Sea 1 h 2 1 Black Sea 1 3 1 1 1 Pacific Ocean 2 1 1 2 1 Lake Onega 1 depot ship Grand Total destroyers guard ship depot ship icebreakers icebreaker 1 each 1 battleship heavy cruisers light cruiser depot ship depot ship heavy cruiser destroyers training ships depot ship 1 1 each 1 each

k 11 2 1 each 2 12 15

~w

k 1 each 3 12

6

77
War losses have not been included in the

above list.
(f) Seaplane Production. It is extremely doubt­ ful if any seaplanes are now (March, 19^+2) being produced. Soviet
land planes are easily adaptable to wheels, skis, or pontoons. Sea­ plane production and factories have been reported as follows:

- 130 ­

Odessa (flying boats) - 12 monthly*
Taganrog (MBR 5, PBY 1) - kO monthly*
Komsomolsk (seaplanes) - unknown
Home Guard Troops.** The defense training societies
organized "by the Communist Party have proved their worth. As a result
of such training, city people and peasants were able to offer stubborn
resistance to the Germans, both before occupation and as guerrillas.
All the men and women in the U.S.S.R. not actually mobilized in the
armed services have been conscripted in time of emergency, becoming a
trememdous force in policing, cleaning up, constructing defensive works,
and even fighting.
The nuclei of most Home Guard units have been the
factories and the collective farms (Kolhoz). Usually, a military com­ mittee is set up, headed by a military commander, assisted by a politi­ cal commissar and the local leaders.
These organizations have built most of the vast
system of fortifications that now guards the front up to the Volga.
Indicative of their efficiency in occupied territories is a report by
an anti-communist near Pskov:
"In the villages there are very few people of the
type of the followers of Quisling. Everyone knows that coexistent
with the official German authorities are occult representatives
of Soviet power, forming reprisal groups composed of guerrillas, forest
troops called "Zilyonye" (Greens) and parachutists, all of whom grant
no pardon. To the same extent as the German troops advance deeper
into the country the radius of the measures of reprisal increases."
Characteristics of Personnel.
(1) Basic Doctrines and Command Psychology of Military
and Naval Leaders.
(a) Basic Doctrines. Soviet military tradition
has passed through five periods, each of which profoundly affected its
basic doctrines.'
(_1) The Red Army was formed by Trotsky from
the demobilized soldiers of the World War during the October Revolution
and the Civil Wars. Its political purpose was primary: the political
b.

**

Captured by Germans.
See also Replacement of Personnel.

- 131 ­

reliability of leaders and the free support of the masses were the
foundations. Personal leadership and even personal magnetism were
essential, with control decentralized, masses small, supply minimal.
Infiltration, sabotage, subversion and propaganda played equal roles
with formal tactics. The fronts were fluid, and wide raids and attacks
from all directions constantly took place. The principal objectives
were railroad communications and cities. Improvisation of tactics,
weapons and transport was normal.
(2) Immediately after the Civil War, the
Soviets began an intensive policy of military education, even for their
former high commanders. The artillerist Frunze dominated Russian
teachings. The doctrine of a People's1 Army was established, with em­ phasis upon territorial rather than regular troops.
(3) With the rise of Stalin, the leadership
of Tukhachevsky and the close collaboration with the Reichswehr, a
professional army spirit developed. An enormous, highly formal, and
very competitive school system was evolved. The gap between officers
and men widened and the political commissar was relegated to a secondary
role. The composition of the army changed from three-quarters terri­ torial to three-quarters regular. Major changes in materiel were intro­ duced, with great increases in artillery, tanks and planes. There were
many experiments with new weapons, such as paratroops. The Blitzkrieg
doctrine was developed, jointly with the Germans.
This period had its culmination in the
Russian successes in Manchuria in 1937-38, when mechanization crushed
the Japanese. Major weaknesses, however, were uncovered in the
Finnish War of 1939-^0: the training of junior officers was imperfect,
and small units were badly handled; the high command was demoralized
by the purges begun in 1935> and supply difficulties arose. Mechani­ zation functioned poorly in winter weather.
(k) Timoshenko began to rectify the errors
of the Finnish War in 19^0. Emphasis was placed upon initiative and
upon small group training. The construction of defensive positions
was stressed. Additions were made to artillery, particularly anti­ tank guns.
(!>) The German War caught the Red Army in
process of reorganization, with a mixture of traditions. The theories
of the Blitzkrieg failed quickly; at no time could the Russians succeed
in envelopments. Commitments of tanks in-mass simply led to rapid
annihilation. Consequently, smaller mixed teams took their place,
with artillery support for tanks, and close coordination between air
and ground. Flexibility and adaptability to new tactics replace
standard offensive theories. German encirclements forced decentrali­ zation; German occupation revived guerrilla tactics, which were closely
coordinated with the operation of organized troops. Static, localized

- 132 ­

defenses in enormous depth, with limited maneuver were necessitated by-
logistic difficulties.
In the winter campaign, deep infiltra­ tions " y small bodies of lightly equipped troops struck constantly at
b communications but were unable to assault major positions. To date,
this spring, mechanized units, with infantry riding on the tanks have
borne the brunt of the fighting. The newest tactical doctrines are not
yet fully clear.
(b) Command Psychology of Military and Naval
Leaders. Command psychology is determined by two principal factors, the
personalities of the leaders and the disciplinary methods.
(l) The high command of the Soviet Army has,
almost without exception, served since the Civil War. The origins of
these men have been various—former enlisted men, Tsarist officers, a
sprinkling of Old Bolsheviks, etc. Most of them took their advanced
military training only after having had important commands. Thus
Budyenny, who led the First Cavalry Army in the Civil War, graduated
from Frunze Military Academy at the age of fifty. At the same time,
these officers have dabbled in politics, holding positions such as
Deputy of the Supreme Soviet. But the most ambitious of these men have
long since been executed.
In general, the higher officers show a
wide range of ability, for which the Soviet Union paid dearly during
the first part of the German war. Gradually, however, the incompetents
have been eliminated. Most of the present high command—Timoshenko,
Shaposhnikov, Zhukov, Cherevichenko, etc.--are genuinely able men,
soldiers and not politicians. Their patriotism is unquestioned, but
they are certainly aware of the deficiencies of the Stalin regime.
The younger officers, trained purely
under the Soviets, are professionally more competent, although often
too specialized. They are fanatically nationalistic and accept their
government without question. They are well-disciplined and very
hard-boiled.
The political commissars serve as the
liaison men between the military and civil populations. They have
some military training, particularly in minor operations. They have
received special training in agitation, and in counter-espionage.
Ostensibly safeguarding morale, they are really even more ruthless
than the younger line officers.
Among individual leaders, the following
Stalin, Timoshenko, Voroshilov, and Shaposhnikov.

are most important:

Stalin is the greatest living genius at
organization, one who deals in people and is always accessible to them.
He possesses consummate patience and "builds slowly. He is not rigid in
his ideas, borrowing ideas even from his enemies, always experiment­ ing and pursuing another course if he fails. He is a big man, and his
ambition to prove himself the greatest living dictator spurs him on
even to greater heights of success--but also to dishonesty, ruthless­ ness and cruelty.
He never forgets anyone who has defied
His enemies are pursued to the ends of the earth.

or crossed him.

Stalin is petty in encouraging fawning
exaltation of him as infallible, indispensable, omnipotent and all-
high. He never delegates too much authority or popularity to anyone.
To enhance his own power he destroyed the Communist Party as a true
communist or socialist organ. He did not liquidate unemployment in
the Soviet Union, but the unemployed. He may destroy the Soviet
Union in his attempt to retain absolute control.
Timoshenko has always been a professional
soldier. Trained both in the Tsarist Army and subsequently, with a
long tour of various European forces to his credit, he is thoroughly
competent. His tactical ideas are simple, clear and sound. He em­ phasizes small-unit training, individual initiative and extreme atten­ tion to detail: "Nothing is unimportant in combat." He stresses the
offensive and the counter attack, which he employed with considerable
skill at Smolensk, Gomel, Bryansk-Vyazma, Rostov and Kharkov during
the present war. Unassuming, unambitious, loyal, he is a soldier's
soldier. The best generals in the Soviet Union today have been his
students or his colleagues.
Voroshilov is a political soldier, more
used to intrigues than to combat. Stalin's support alone has raised
him to a high position. His failures in war have been serious; his
Jealousies have led to the downfall of abler men. He epitomizes the
typical political commissar.
Shaposhnikov is a typical relic of the
Tsarist Army. Precise and dry, he has taught the theory of tactics to
the newer generation of officers. He hides his political feelings
most carefully, forwarding himself only as a technician in the science
of war. He is a valuable staff officer­ (2) The disciplinary methods of the Soviet
Army are rigorous. Obedience and secrecy are absolutely demanded; an
officer may even kill a man in line of duty. Beyond this, the

- 13U ­

political commissar is always the final arbiter of an officer's or a
man's loyalty. He acts ruthlessly and in secret.
On the other hand, rewards for good
service are many: the Army gets the "best of everything.*
(2) Morale. In June, 19^1> the Soviet Army was cock­ sure. Years of propaganda in regard to the ability of its crack forces
led to the belief that the Germans could not only " e held, "but that
b Germany itself could " e invaded. A series of great defeats, the easy
b penetration of the Stalin line, and the catastrophic loss of the Ukraine
staggered the high command. Many removals and some executions took
place, with abler men, particularly Timoshenko and his colleagues,
assuming command. But this did not help at first! by October 15 the
bottom had been reached, with Moscow on the verge of capture. Morale
was low.
The repulse of the Germans and the initial success
of the winter campaign raised morale to a high level. But as Stalin
said in his May Day, 19^2, speech: "The complacency and heedlessness
in the attitude toward the enemy, observed among Red Army men in the
first months of the patriotic war, have disappeared." Determination
now is great, but far more caution and battle experience are in evi­ dence. The morale of the Red Army at present is fair to good.
A number of specific means have been established to
maintain morale„ Political commissars emphasize the ideological basis
of the present war. Outstanding units are honored by designation as
"Guards," with corresponding privileges, pay, etc. Individual heroes
are greatly honored, and tho families of those killed get sizable pensions
In short, every advantage possible is provided tho army.
(3) Stamina. Dogged resistance under hopeless odds
during the first part of the war, the last-ditch defense of Moscow, the
strong repulse and constant harassment of the Germans during the winter
months testify to the amazing stamina of the Russian soldier.
The average Red soldier is capable of enduring
great hardships, of acting courageously, and of making surprising
efforts, but moody and fatalistic. He is physically hardy, accustomed
to privations, and used to the idea of sacrificing himself for his
country. Properly equipped and led the Red soldier is a good fighter,
and Red troops in defense of their country are a formidable fighting
machine.

*

See also Morale

- 135 ­

Characteristica of Materiel.
IT] General: Soviet designers attempt to achieve the
following ends:
(a) Operational dependability under continued
adverse conditions rather than maximum peak performance.
(b) Ease of mass production with an emphasis on
a few basic types, simplicity of design, interchangeability of parts,
minimal finish of accessories and parts of secondary importance.
(c) Minimal use of rare materials, especially
inflammable ones and those subject to damage by frost, etc. Thus rubber,
felt, copper, and similar products are used sparingly, and only at
essential points.
(d) Simplicity of operation and ease of repair.
Positive mechanical actions are stressed against more efficient but
more delicate hydraulic boosters, etc.
(e) The weight of the fire power rather than the
volume is most important. High muzzle velocity is stressed for all
AA and AT guns; muzzle brakes are widely used.
(f) The maximum possible thickness of armor must
be used at all essential points.
(g) All vehicles and tanks must have a maximal
horse power/weight ratio; fuel capacities must suffice for at least
90 miles.
(2) The quality of design:
{aj Soviet experimental design has been good,
although occasionally daring and impractical. The radio-operated
mine and the rocket bomb are recent inventions. The Stormovik is a
powerful attack plane. The self-propelled armored sleigh was used
during the Finnish War of 1939-^0.
(b) In actual practice, the Russians have tended
to make intensive studies of advanced foreign models, to buy the best
of these, and to produce them in mass. Minor improvements are con­ stantly being attempted. Thus the tracks, turret and other parts of
the British Valentine tank have been remodeled. On the other hand, the
inadequacy of the Soviet machine-tool industry and the lack of large-
scale experimental facilities make radical changes extremely difficult:
basically, all Russian tanks are only developments of British (Bren
carrier, Carden-Lloyd, Carden-Lloyd Amphibian and Vickers) and American
(Christie) prototypes.
(c) Lend-Lease aid from the Americans and the
British has introduced a large number of new types of materiel:
notable are Hurricane and P^O fighters, and B25 and Boston bombers;
Matilda, Valentine, M3 Light and M3 Medium tanks, Bren carriers, ban­ tams (peeps); Boys AT rifles; 2J- ton Studebaker trucks; 1^ ton Ford,
Dodge and Chevrolet trucks.

- 136­

(d) Finally, war losses have forced the Soviets
to bring into use much obsolescent or even obsolete equipment. For
example, T37 (Amphibians) and T28, and even MS (Renault) tanks have
been noted in action. Fifty-eight mm. howitzers, 37 mm. AT guns have
also been brought back in the reserve divisions.
(3) Armament (Ground Forcefl).
(a) Infantry. (See Chart IV•) The Infantry has
the following equipment: rifle, model 1891-1930, and carbine model
1891-1930 (the latter is being again modernized), caliber 7.62-mm.;
bayonets; blade, 6-7 inches long and French type, triangular 18 inches
long; hand grenades: model 191^> Mills, Novitski, 1933, Dyakonov, and
model 1917 chemical; rifle grenades: Dyakonov, model 1930 and model
1915 chemical grenade; 7.62-mm. Nagan revolvers, which are being grad­ ually superseded by 7.62-mm. Tokarev automatic pistols, model 1930­ 1933; 7.62-mm. automatic rifles: Degtyarev and Lewis (called by the
British, light machine guns); 7.62-mm. heavy machine guns: Maxim
Colt and Tokarev; 9-mm. sub-machine gun, Bergman; 50, 81, 107 and
150-mm., trench mortars, Stokes-Brandt models (the latest models
medium and heavy mortars being mounted on a fixed base and two-wheeled
rubber-tired carriage); gas masks; telescopic rifle sights; camouflage
netting. The Boys AT rifle is now being furnished by the British in
quantity as a platoon weapon. Infantry AA, AT and other cannon are
shown in Chart II.
(b) Cavalry. (See Chart V.)
Revolvers and automatic pistols. Same as
Infantry.
Carbine: 7.62-mm. model 1920. Range, 1700
meters, (ivanov.)
Lance: Used only for ceremonies.
Saber: Type 27, without guard on handle;
weight, 3«7 lbs.; a bayonet is attached to the wooden saber sheath,
Light machine gun: Degtyarev, as in the Infan­ try; or Lewis. Transported on pack animals.
Heavy machine gun: Maxim equipped for A.A.
defense; transported in a ^-horse cart. An effort is being made to
increase the number of MG's and artillery pieces with Cavalry units.
The Cavalry had no AT guns in 1937 > using its regular artillery for
this purpose. The 19^1 allowances include 10 k^-ma.. AT guns per
division.

Separate Cavalry brigades usually have 76-mm.
mountain guns; Cavalry divisions have 76-mm. guns, model 1902-30,
122-mm. and ll^-mm. howitzers; Cavalry corps have 11^-mm. howitzers
and 107-mm. guns. The 19^1 organization includes ^5~mm. AT guns, 76-mm.
guns and 122-mm. howitzers.
(c) Artillery. (See Chart VI.) The GHQ (ARGK)
Artillery has about 20 calibers ranging from 20-mm. to ^06-mm. (includ­ ing many obsolete models). It has both Schneider and Vickers 152-mm.
howitzers; French 155-BHH. guns; 76-nmu guns3 107-mm. guns; French 2U0-nm.
mortars; ii-0-mm. automatic guns; 76-mm. AA guns; etc.
(d) Antiaircraft Artillery. (See Chart V.) The
Red Army has both 76-mm. and 85-mm. AA guns, some of which are perma­ nently mounted in trucks, some truck-drawn and some tractor-drawn.
The standard AA defense weapon for troops is
the 1909-10, 7-62-mm. Maxim MG mounted coaxially in groups of three or
four. These MG f s are attached to a fixed base and permanently mounted,
one group per 2-ton truck.
(e) Coast artillery: guns, 3-inch, model 1900;
120-mm. (Vickers); 120-mm. (Obukhov); 130-mm. (?); 152-mm. (Canet);
200-mm. (?); 9-inch, model 1877; 10-inch, model 1900; 25^-mm. railway;
11-inch, model 1877; 305-mm. immobile (52 calibers) and 12-inch {k5 or
52 calibers). Mortars: 9-inch and 11-inch, both model 1877. Most of
the above guns and mortars are of obsolescent types. Searchlights:
90 cm., 110 cm., 150 cm., 220 cm., and 320 cm.
(f) Engineer. Arms and equipment. Pioneers are
armed with 7.62-mm. infantry rifle, model 1691-1930, of the 7.62-mm.
carbine, model 1910 (mounted units only); intrenching tools; camouflage
equipment; explosives; hydrotechnical materiel (pumps, filters, etc.);
motor saws; bridge equipage; and road building machines (trench dredgers,
rollers, pile drivers, etc.). Each type of pioneer regiment has its
particular type of equipment.
(g) Chemical materiel. During the Finnish War it
was at first reported that the Reds employed asphyxiating gas shells,
sprayed chlorpicrin gas from planes, and presumably occasionally re­ leased gas from cylinders in tanks of armored cars. Later information
denied this report. Prior to this war, it was planned to spread
asphyxiating gas from projectors, to employ gas and smoke candles, and
to use gas shells in 107-mm. Stokes-Brandt mortars. Gas was to have
been disseminated from airplanes either by using 22-220 lb. gas bombs
(usually containing mustard, but sometimes asphyxiating or irritating
gas) or by spraying persistent gas (mustard or chlorpicrin) from
21-gallon containers.
(h) Tanks (see C&art VII) are limited to four
basic groups, i.e.

mm

- 138 ­

(1) Two-ton tanks (T-27) and armored cars
for reconnaissance and liaison; nine to twelve-ton tanks (T-26 and BT)
for infantry support and mobile tank operations; twenty-eight to thirty-
nine ton tanks (T-28, T-32 and T-35) for attack and penetration; fifty-
two to seventy-two ton self-propelled armored guns, (experimental) for
close, heavy fire support;
(2) Armor is thick, up to 70 mm.;
(3) Accurate moving and stationary fire are
emphasized, with long bases and stable firing platforms, low silhou­ ettes and dual periscopes;
(k) Dependable performance under bad condi­ tions and extremely low temperatures is ensured by wide shoes, heaters,
manually operated turrets, etc.;
{3) Long range is more important than speed
because of the size of the country and paucity of good roads.
Flame projectors have been installed on
some of the T-26, Vickers 6-ton tanks. The length of the flame project­ ed is about 20 meters and the height about 5 meters.
A confusing feature in the study of
Soviet tanks is the fact that one type of tank may contain any one of
three or four standard gasoline motors or a Diesel. This is offset
somewhat by the fact that one type of motor, the Soviet M-3U V-twelve
for instance, may be found in an airplane, a torpedo boat or a tank.
(^) Speed and radius of action (Ground Forces).
(a) Infantry divisions operate at 2g- miles per
hour (20 miles per day); higher speeds are impractical since three-
fourths of the transport is horse-drawn. The normal radius of action
is 16 to 18 miles from the zone of communications with horse-drawn
transport; 25-31 miles with motorized transport.
(b) Cavalry operates at k^ milea per hour (kO
miles per day); its transport is entirely horse-drawn. The radius of
action is up to 100 miles.
(c) Tank units operate at 7i to 12| miles per hour
(100 miles per day); the transport is entirely motorized. The radius
of action is up to 100 miles.
(d) Motorized units operate at 12§- to 20 miles
per hour (125 miles per day); their radius is up to 200 miles.
(5) Operating conditions (Ground Forces). In general,
Soviet materiel is designed to operate under all climatic and soil
conditions. Actually, however, snow over 18 inches in depth restricts
motor vehicles, artillery and light tanks entirely to roads, and marked­ ly affects the performance of medium and heavy tanks. All vehicles are
adapted for ready perfomance in extreme cold; nevertheless gasoline and
oil consumption are 2% to 3 times the normal rate at such times.

- 139 ­

Table

Infantry Weapons
Caliber
Weight
lbs.

Max. Rn.

yds.

Article
Rifle,
Rifle, auto
Rifle, auto
(LMG)-x-

i l- 1

Make-Type

Year

MM.
7.62
7*62
7*62
7,62
7.62

M.V
f.p.s.

Feed
Rds.

Mossin-Nagant

1891/30
1936
1938

9.35
8.69

20.7

2,200

2,820
2,770

Clip 5

AVS

Degtyarev

3,025

2,025

Drum 47

o
i

I

Carbine
MG, heavy

Wtf sub.
Mortars, trench
Mortars, trench
Mortars, trench
Stokes-Brandt
Stokes-Brandt
Maxim
Bergman

1910
1909/10

7,26
39,6
1. 0 1
25.3

2,200
5,500

2,640
Mag 5

2,840
Belt 250
Drum 70

I

9

1940

1,650
880

1,100
3,300

924

50
81
81

990

•* British designation

flntijtank — Antiaircraft Weapons

Caliber Article Rifle - AT Boys 3 or 4 Maxims Make-Type Year 1940 1909/10

MM*
13*77 7^62 12*7 13-2 20

Weight lbs. 34*75 200 4 73*7

Maximum Range (yards) Horizontal Vertical
500* 5,500 7,590 7,150 3,300 4,070 3,025

M/V

2,540
2,840
2,805
2,840 !
2,740
2*640

[MG-AA
MG-AT or AA MG-AT or AA

DK
Hotchkiss

i

Cannon,-AT or AA Oerlikon Auto Cannon, AT Cannon, AT Gun, AA Gun, AA Gun, AA "Leningrad" Rheinmetall Zik-5 Degtyarev 1930 1932/? 1933/36 1938 1934

572 737
990

5,500 7,700 7,150 15,950 19,300

37

45
76.2

8,000 9,570 13,000

2,500
2,560
3,070

k

85
105 23,000

19,80022,500

14,300- 3,100­ 16,000 3,300

Infantry and Cavalry Artillery
Howitzer, Inf, Howitzer, Cav, Howitzer, Pack< -- Effective x PA-27, Soviet Vickers "Mountain" 1909 1927/36 76.2 114.3 76*2 1,390 1,600 3,000 1,200 1,375 6,550 7,650 8,200 7,660 Trail Split Box Box 1,180 1,020 1,250

ft

,\\ MV.I \\\>r\

\

Table VI

Artillery

Article

Make-Type

Year

Caliber F.P. Weight lbs. MM.

Yds. Range

M/V
f.p.s. Trail

IV)

I

Gun (a) Howitzer Howitzer Long rifle

Soviet Schneider Schneider Soviet

1902/30 1910/30 1910/30 1909/30

76.2

1,840 2,790 6,270 11,500

9,300­ 14,000 10,500 12,600 13,200

1,930
1,100 1,250 2,180

Box Box
Split

122 152 152

(a)

Until recently this gun has

been the standard.

' >1

MOTORIZATION - MECHANIZATION

...LtSWP
or M.G.

Table VII

raok

,0'
\ Av\'vV.i-.i..t.
Orew

Lght

Troops Carr:

8.

g* 6

C

*
Ton

1
1

Miles

§

i'„ s.
CO

O

I

Inohes

1

«
i

r- 0 1 AR
1 AR
1 - 2
1 - 2
2
1 AR
1 AB

ro <

Axles

Inohes

MC, motoroyole IE, with side oar SC, armored oar SC, " " SC, Amphibian armored oar S l e i g h s , armored S l e i g h s , armored M-l, oar M-U15, piok-up M-75, piok-up ZIS-101, oar GA2-A, truok AMD-3 ZIS-5, 6 truok TAG-5, 6, 10 truok Tanks T^27, "Tankette" ArmstrmpeUdetoy T-26, Tank Ford V-8, Meadow VI T-37, amphibian Soviet M-3U BT, Tank T-28, Tank - Annstrong-Siddeley T-32, 35 Tank T-50, armored gun

12-18
1 2

2-3

U U
2 1

3.2 7 9
1.U3

U7 U3 Uo 30

50 85 85 •
100

2

3 (£ tr.)
3
2
2 2 2

15.7 23.6

•35
J*3-*55
10-20

1 1

Bouy.

Harley Davidson n • Kord Ford r'ord
T

2 2 1 2 2 2 2

2.6 6.1

Uo Uo U5 55
30 15
12

50 50 60
100

6

u
16

20

U o
Uo

Uo
60

2| 3(i T»)
2-3
2-3

6
6 6

9.75
2 10-12

75 Uo
90 350-500 U5O-75O 500-750
800

30
18

Tord Ford ( i ton) Chevrolet ( j ton) Buiok ?ord ( l £ ton) Eeroules (3-5 ton) leroules (5-10 ton) .16-.39 .19-.55 .25—39 .79 1.37 1.37-2.3U 2.73 3.000 M B 6,000 MGj 50-Gun 3,000 M B 2,700 IKj 92-Gun U.OOO M3j 85-Gun
T T 1
1 - 2
1 - 2
1 - 2
-

3
2

3 5-7
T

6-9.5 3

U*

29
20-UO 20

56

U*
6*

36

F.T.»«)r 1
1 2

Bouy.

7-10

25-33 33-39 52-72

7

10-12* 8*

5-6

39 U2 U7

3-U
3-5

1-76^ 1-76.2 1-105 or 1-152

Lend-Lease Valentine, British ( I n f . Mk. I l l ) Matilda, British (Inf. Mk. I I ) Amerioan Light U-3 Amerioan ifed. U-3 Churcnill, British - A-22
( I n f . Mk. IV)

3 U U 6 5

16.0 Light Med. 35-UO

25.2

15 15

37
25
1

135 95
265

36 36 Uo

_ -

Uoo
350

.78-2.92 2 J47 1.5 2.25 2.26

6,000 MG) 60-Gun 6,000 UG| 93-Gun 8,270 MG|103-Oun 7.I4DO U5 |1200gub|fQ Ul-75 mm.jl37-37iDji U.725 M5jl5O-Gunj 25 Smoke ^jOsab UO

1 (.33)

3 (1 Sub IE) U (2 Sub MG)
( 1 Sub MG)

l (7.92)

1
1
1
1

1-75 ma.
1-3" how.
Bedford Ford-12 oyl. or l-2"pounder;
(58 now)
1 amis proj.2"

1-2 (7.92)

Pro. of Bogies In SODS oases has been oonverted to a flame-thrower.

JB

Type Motor j
Pay 1oad (1

Fordlabill-

ition

-

•s

i

a _S

(6) Armament (Air Forces). (See Table VIII.) Accord­ ing to the information available on individual planes it is evident
that all fighters are armed with four MGs (usually 7. 62 nm.cal.). New
types of fighters usually have two 7-62 mm. MGs and one 12.7 mm. MG.
The "Stormovik", a recent fighter model, carries
two wing MGs and 2-20 mm. wing cannon. The latest model of the
"Stormovik" is supposed to be armed with two MGs and two cannon of
either 37 mm. or ho mm. caliber. Its power plant is an in-line
2000 h.p. motor. It is supposed to carry one pilot and one observer.
This new "Stormovik" is reported to be heavily armored as far as pro­ tection of the crew and is ruggedly built. Its normal operating
height is 500 ft. - 1000 ft. It is quite fast as compared to modern-
day planes of similar design and power but is slightly handicapped
because of its heavy construction and armor plate. This plane was
designed solely as an attack-bomber to be used in direct support of
ground troops. The armament is located in the wings and is fixed.
The light and medium bombers have about the same
armament as the fighters except the guns are not fixed. On some new
models the 20 mm. cannon replaces the heavy MG.
The long-range bombers are armed, with three MGs.
Bombers large enough to carry a crew of six to eight men are equipped
with six MGs (7.62 mm.).
(7) Speed and radius of action (Air Forces). These
figures are estimated from the information available on the performance
of individual planes.
Type Old-type New-type Old-type New-type Old-type New-type fighters fighters (191+1) medium bombers medium bombers (19^1) L.R. bombers L.R. bombers (19^1) Speed
Top : Cruising Radius of Action 180 mi. 200 mi. 575 mi. 1500 mi. 1000 mi. 2000 mi.

2^5

355

225 330 165
230 160 210

The manufacture of a great number of these plane
models has been discontinued. The new models now under construction on
a mass-production basis undoubtedly possess better performance figures
than those listed above.
(8) Operating conditions (Air Forces). One feature
that is evident in the Soviet Air Force and its associated departments

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIRFLABBS
Table Till

Obsolescent Obsolesoent Standard Standard Standard Obaolesoent-Attaoki
R-5
R-ZET
R-SSS
R-1O
DI-6
FE-2
SB-2
SB-3
liodium Bombers i
DB-3
Heavy Bombers i
IB-3
TB-5
TB-6
Miscellaneousi
MBR-5
U-2
UT-1,2
Standard Standard Obsolescent Obsolesoent Standard Obsolesoant Obsolesoent Obsolesoent Obsolesoent Obsolesoent Standard Obsolesoent Standard

]f-22j M-62-Aj 1-800
M-62-Bj 1-850
M-62-Bi 1-650
H-35-FJ 1-1200
U..100

172
166-235
215-250
2l»6-260
390

19,700 26,000 32,600 31,500 38,000

372
14O8
1.1 h r s . 1.5 h r s . 1.5 h r s .

2-7-62 U-7-62 U-7.62 2-7.62 2-7.62J 1-12.7

110
110
330

M-17; 1-700

M-3UJ K-17J 1-850

H+5
170-180

19,000
27,860
16,000

620
500

2-7.62 3-7.62

560

1-700
220
22U
300
15,700 16,200 2f|8
260

M-62-Aj 1-800

U-25J 1-750

25,000
31,800
11,600
28,000
30,250

600
500

U-7.62 U-7.62 3-7.62

660

If-105-Ai 2-1200
M-103» 2-860
U-105i 2-960

600 - 750
500 - 1.00C

' • —* * • "w

1,300 - 1,100
2,200 - 1,320

M-87-B) 2-950

16,500

270

28,000

1,750 - 2,000

lW-62

2,200

M-3U» 2-850
M-3Ul lt-850 M-35»

150
169
250

21,300
16,000

1,250 875 - 1,875 6-10 h r s .

U-7.62
W-62
5-7.62

8,800
6,600

6,800 93
120

14,760

250

is the fact that all technical and research experts are entirely
separated from the flying personnel and conduct few, if any, flights
under the authority of the Army or Navy. Consequently these technical
experts are not in a position to advise flying personnel and influence
them to further develop the technical knowledge of the Air Forces.
This is true of manipulating bomb sights and even true of navigation.
Compared to the other world powers the educational
standard in Russia is very low. This is true of officers as well as
enlisted men. Elementary arithmetical tables have been found in
Russian planes shot down over Finland and there are numerous reports
of Russian pilots being lost and failing to find their objectives due
to their lack of navigational knowledge. Russian pilots make great
use of railroads, rivers, etc as guides when flying cross-country.
Soviet pilots have undergone intensive training
under their customary winter conditions and they were able to keep a
much greater percentage of their equipment operating when temperatures
were very low than were their enemies.
The Russians have made considerable experiments
in keeping flying fields in condition for operation when the fields
are covered with snow. They have special tractor-drawn scrapers and
rollers and manage to keep their landing areas in fairly good condition
despite severe winter weather. The Russians have made wide use of a
motorized oil-heating unit that, during cold weather, keeps the lubri­ cating oil at a certain temperature and is equipped vith a pump to
quickly replace this oil in the planes when they are needed.
The Russians were successful in destroying numerous
German planes on the ground during winter surprise raids as the Germans
had insufficient time to fill their planes with hot oil and get them
into the air.
Generally speaking,Russian Air Force maintenance
is not excellent. Although it is reported that Soviet mechanics are
very clever at making replacement parts> etc. for planes, it is said
their combat planes are not kept in first-class operating condition.

d.

Facilities for logistical support.
(1) Facilities for logistical support - general„

Facilities for the logistical support of the Vv'estcrn Front are weak.
Although the initial disposition and organization of ports, railroads,
airfields, roads and communications viere strategically souna, the
enormous extent and the poverty of the country prevented adequate
development. Improvements have been rushed during the war, particularly
in the Arctic and Persian Gulf supply routes, but the present effort
still is greatly handicapped by logistical difficulties. The meager
shipping, rolling stock, commercial trucking and air transports have
been markedly reduced by war losses. Even manpower has been seriously
affected. Only the most universal and stringent mobilization of man,
woman and child power has allowed maintenance of the needed armed forces
without a collapse in the labor supply.
The northern route of supplies into the U.S.S.R.
is severely hampered by ice, German air and naval operations, lack of
bottoms and limited interior transportation. During the winter of
1941-42, the port of Murmansk maintained a trickle of 80-90,000 tons
per month. With the opening of Archangel at the end of May, this flow
should be at least tripled.
The Caspian Sea is the center of Soviet water­ borne commerce, carrying fully half of the present total. Three of
its ports—Baku, Astrakhan and Makhach Kala—are the greatest in the
U.S.S.R. The flow of supplies on its waters—oil, ores, materiel,
grain--is crucial for the Russian war effort.
The southern route of supplies has steadily grown
in importance. Carrying only 30,000 tons in the fall of 1941, it has
doubled its load. By the winter of 1942 it will carry far more than
Murmansk, providing major relief from the freezing of Archangel.
Airdromes and landing fields arc concentrated in
the Murmansk—Kandalaksha, Leningrad, Moscow, Rostov, Tbilisi and Baku
areas; they also parallel all the principal railroads. Many airdromes
are large and quite good. However, although large scale airdrome
construction is in progress, airdromes and even landing fields are very
sparse. The problem of adequate air support of the front is critical.
The Soviet railroads haul an enormous load of freight,
238 billion ton-miles in 1938, or four times the average ton-mile haul of
the United States. But war losses of trackage and rolling stock have been
severe. This has been aggravated by poor maintenance caused by a lack of

"'tis

- 147 ­

trained men and materials. Consequently, the railroads are incapable of
supplying much more than the present concentration of troops in the
combat zone. Full simultaneous use of Russia's military manpower is
impossibleo Transportation likewise limits major Soviet operations to
the front from Tikhvin to Tula with its center at Moscow, and to the
Rostov sector- Improved roads exist on the front only in the sectors
between Novgorod and Orel, which intensifies the limitations imposed by
the deficiencies of the rail net.
Sea-borne transport and maintenance of troops are
important in the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland, less important in
the Barents Sea. The amount of commercial trucking or of air transports is negligible. Local supplies of natural forage, grain, and live­ stock in the combat zone are most abundant between Tikhvin and Orel,
almost exclusively between May and September. Manufactures, particularly
materiel, are produced in significant quantities at Leningrad and Moscow.
In June, 1941, the regular and first-line reserve
forces of the U.S.S.R. numbered 11.5 million; war losses reduced this to
7 million. About 5 million men and possibly 500,000 women have been
trained as replacements. Pre-military training of 110 hours over five
months is compulsory for all men between 16 and 50. Induction into the
active army is apparently on the age-class system, although in some cases
pre-military training units have fought as separate organizations in
the front lines.
Industrial and agricultural mobilization is complete
All able-bodied men and women not employed in industrial and transport
enterprises are mobilized for work on farms. School children and old
people (from 12 to 55) are being utilized whenever possible. In spite
of these measures a serious labor shortage exists $ losses and military
mobilization have reduced the labor pool to 28 million plus 10 million
auxiliary workers--but two-thirds of the maximal labor pool of the
United States.
Planned evacuation of territory threatened by the
Germans has yielded an increment of about 10% to the military-industrial
potential of unoccupied Russia.
The- telegraph, telephone and radio systems are
strategically disposed in relation to the transportation system. The
networks, however, are far too thin. The efficiency of communications
is low.

- 148 ­

(2) Logistical and strategic importance of the Soviet and
Persian Gulf ports . Soviet ports may be divided into"'throe categories:
those vital for the supply of the country (Murmansk and Archangel, the
Caspian Sea ports and the non-Russian Persian Gulf ports), those needed
for local supply (the secondary Arctic ports and the Caucasian Black Sea
ports), and naval or combined operational bs.ses (Leningrad, Novorossisk,
Sevastopol, Rostov and Yeisk).
(a) Vital supply ports.
(1) The significance of the Arctic ports (See
Map 9a) is definitely limited by four factors. All the ports, other than
Murmansk, are closed by ice for at least five months of the year.
Secondly, the active air and sea operations of the Germans from Northern
Norway have forced the reduction of the number of ships in each convoy
to about 25. Moreover, despite strong escorts, losses are high. Thirdly,
operational needs in other theaters make procurement of the needed
bottoms difficult. Fourthly, the interior transportation facilities,
railroads and rivers, are restricted. The secondary ports on the Kola
Peninsula and along the -western shore of the uhite Sea cannot be used
for oth^r than local traffic because the capacity of the one railway is
barely sufficient to carry the traffic from Murmansk alone, especially
during the spring and summer thaw. The ports on the Ob, Yenisei and
Lena Rivers are not only difficult of access both from the west and the
east, but they also have negligible internal communications. Consequently,
only Murmansk and Archangel (including Molotovsk, Ekonomia and Bakaritsa)
are of vital importance to the supply of the U.S.S.R.
In all, the intake capacity of Murmansk is
limited by the railroad to 80,000 tons a month. Improvements on the
railroad may not only increase this considerably but allow use of the
subsidiary ports from June to November. However, the regular bombard­ ment to which the line is subjected makes this improbable.
The capacity of Archangel and its ports—
open from June to December--is at least 220,000 tons per month, probably
considerably more. The railroad to Vologda has ample capacity for this
traffio--330,000 tons per month. This will be doubled once the double
tracking, which extends now probably to Plesetsk, is completed. In
addition, the newly finished line from Obozerskaya to Kotlas can take some
90,000 tons a month. Finally, the Northern Dvina river can carry nearly
100,000 tons per month. It is clear therefore that Archangel and its
system of interior supply are adequate for any traffic that can reach it
from June to December ­

a

- 149 ­

'It,/ r f,

(£) The Caspian Sea ports play four vital
roles. Baku, Astrakhan, and Makhachkala are the three busiest ports
in the U.S.S.R. They carry two-thirds (12,000,000 tons) of the oil
from the Caucasus, manganese, fish and other products to the north
and Central Asia. They carry munitions and finished industrial goods
from the Central Industrial region to the Caucasus and Central Asia.
They carry cotton, copper, and other raw materials from Central Asia
to the north and to the Caucasus. Finally, Baku takes in a flow of
Lend-Lease supplies from the Iranian ports of Bandar Shah and Pahlevi.
In all, the Caspian, with 27 million tons turnover in 1935, accounts
for at least half the total present shipping traffic of the U.S.S.R.
It is essential for the Russian war effort.
The capacity of the Caspian Sea ports
is reduced by serious siltage which has accompanied the steady drop
of the sea level. As a result, even the main ports of Baku, Makhach
Kala, Astrakhan, Guryev, Krasnovodsk and Pahlevi can be maintained
only through constant dredging. Numerous other ports, such as Bandar
Shah* have become almost unusable, with lighterage needed 5 to 10
miles out. In addition, the connecting railroads, especially on the
northern and eastern shores, have low capacities. The railroad from
Astrakhan to Urbakh can carry no more than 4000 tons per day each way,
or barely 21$ of the traffic at that port. The traffic at Krasnovodsk
is kept down by the railroad to a maximum turnover of 420,000 tons a
month. The port facilities at Guryev are unknown; the rail limit is
220,000 tons each way, or a turnover of 440,000 tons monthly.
(3) The Iranian and Iraqi ports on the Persian
Gulf, Bandar Shahpur, Khorramshahr, Basra, and Bushire, have a total
capacity of about 230,000 - 250,000 tons per month, with a massive in­ crease under way. Khorramshahr alone is scheduled to attain a capacity
of 300,000 tons in November, 1942. The principal limitations have been
threefold. Until recently, shipping on an important scale was not
available for this route. Secondly, the entire capacity of Basra is
devoted at present to the needs of the British Tenth Army and the Turks.
In case of dire necessity, however, the rail facilities from Basra to
Baghdad to Khanaquin, and the excellent military highway from Khanaquin
to Kermanshah to Hamadan to Kazvin would allow major diversion of this
traffic to Russian needs. The extent of this diversion depends on the
possible increases in traffic capacity between Kazvin and Dzhulfa.
Thirdly, the railroad from Bandar Shahpur and Khorramshahr to Andimeshk
can take over 60,000 tons per month, the total present capacity of these
* Extensive dredging, clearing a 13' channel, has just been reported.

- 150 ­

ports. Between Andimeshk and Kazvin, however, the railroad is limited
to 39,000 tons a month, with trucks hauling 21,000 tons. In Northern
Iran, the routes break up: a part of the traffic goes by a combination
of rail and truck from Tehran, Kazvin and Zinjan to Tabriz and probably ;
Wwa2fa; a part, by truck from Kazvin to Pahlevi; by rail to Bandar.
Shah; minor quantities by truck to Meshed and Ashkhabad. Additions
to rolling stock and trucks, and intensive work on railroads and roads
will double the capacity of these routes by November, 1942. The
combined transit capacities of Dzhulfa (126,000 tons by rail, 15,000
by truck) and Pahlevi (15,000 tons) - 156,000 tons per month - are
more than adequate.
In general, the southern routes carry
somewhat less than Murmansk; by the winter of 1942, however, they will
carry far more, providing major relief from the freezing of Archangel.
Diversion of supplies from the Turks and the British 10th Army in
case of extreme necessity can probably double this capacity.
(b) Ports for local supply.
(1) The subsidiary ports of the Kola Peninsula
and the western shore of the White Sea, Kandalaksha, Kem and Belomorsk
(Soroka), give important support to the Murmansk sector of the front
from June to November. The ports, and the spurs loading from them to
the front,* have a total capacity of some 1500 tons a day, or at least
250,000 tons for the year. This is an addition of 21$ to the logistical
support of that area,** which may be exploited either by the building
up of reserve depots for winter use or by increases in troop strength
of up to 3 divisions for active summer or fall operations.
(2) Loss of the foreign, Ukrainian and
Crimean, markets and a 40^1oss in shipping have greatly diminished
the importance of the Caucasian Black Sea ports. At present their
principal task is to augment the Trans-Caucasian railroad by the
movement of troops and local supplies especially between Batumi and
Novorossisk. The capacities of Novorossisk, Tuapse, Poti and Batumi
far surpass those needed for this task.
(c) Naval and operational bases.*** Soviet
base facilities are not large; however, the navy is so small and
scattered and merchant shipping so badly decimated, that facilities
are more than sufficient in all theaters. The greatest Soviet base
is Leningrad with its island fortress of Kronstadt. The second
most important base, Sevastopol, has been abandoned by the fleet
for six months, and many of the installations have probably been
* See Map 9a.
** See p. 162.
*** See also pp. 329~f33; p. 120

- 151 ­

removed to the present headquarters at Novorossisk. Rostov and Yeisk,
deprived of all commercial traffic, are free to serve as bases for the
landing operations which have taken place in the Sea of Azov. Murmansk
and Llolotovsk, and Baku are bases for small squadrons in Arctic and
Caspian waters, respectively.
(3) Por"fc facilities; Soviet ports. (Table IX). The
analysis of Soviet ports embraces the following points: number and/or
length of berths (wharfage), depth alongside berths in feet, railroad
facilities, storage capacity and fuel stores, lifting equipment,
conveying equipment, monthly capacity of port in tons, electric power
available in kilowatts, shipbuilding and repair facilities, principal
exports, and miscellaneous facilities.
Information is fullest and most accurate on the ports
of Archangel and Murmansk; poorest, on the Black and Caspian Sea ports.
No details at all are available concerning the Caspian port of Guryev.
The port of Archangel is treated in detail according
to its three component ports: Molotovsk, Ekonomia, and Bakaritsa. How­ ever, in regard to lifting equipment only a statement for the port as a
whole is available. This information (1940), although not reliable, is
submitted as an indication of available equipment: (l) floating cranes:
1-150 tons, 1-100 tons, 6-30 to 50 tons, 5-6 to 10 tons; stationary
cranes: 4-8 to 20 tons, 8-3 tons; portable cranes: 10-8 to 15 tons;
movable cranes: 10-3 to 8 tons.
(4) Port facilities: Pahlevi and the Persian Gulf
Ports (Table X ) . The analysis of Pahlevi and the""Tranian and Iraqi
ports on the Persian Gulf follows that for the Soviet ports. It must
be emphasized that these ports are undergoing rapid and large-scale
expansion with which reports have not been able to keep up. As a
result, the data tabulated, some of which are as early as November,
1941, are obsolescent, and useful merely to give a general orientation.
Available data on Bandar Shah are obsolete; latest reports indicate a
major development by the Russians. A 13' channel has been dredged,
2 cranes installed and other improvements are in progress to effect
a monthly capacity of 30,000 tons.
(5) Airfields. (See Map 10a). Available in­ formation indicates that pre-war European Russia had about 1,000
airfields, about half of which were emergency landing fields.
The great bulk of these fields, however, supported the western
fortifications which were quickly overrun. The following

V

- 152 ­

In
1 . Namo of Fort
ABCTIC WATERS i

M5?
TABLE DC! pr>7T FACIIll

:l
3 . Depth alongside Berths (feet)­ Railroad faoilitie 5. Storage oapeol ty and fuel stores . fa. Lilting equipment. 7. Convoking equipment. Vonthly capacity'of port in tons 9. Lleotrio power availa Die in kll< watts • '"hipbuiiding and repair facilities. 11. 1-rinoipal exports• . lcce.ltu.eoua ieoilities; remarks.

KmnDer and/or length of berths (wharfage).

1. Murmansk

IS i n o l . 1 fuel 3-17' o i l tanker berth (Notei Soviet claim of 11+ oerths not confirmed oy : : , i . , Murmansk.)

Sails on a l l piers 20,000 sq. I t . at Yurntnsk covered storage for dry cargo. Unknown amount of fuel o i l , gasoline and cool storage for orthem Fleet use.

3u ton l i t . crane 1 coal conveyor, (sunk); otherwioe opt. J O ton/)-; O aerious s ho rtage. Sli transporter; 10 other con- 6 ton traveling veyors. orane; 9 non- plurcbing r . r . cranesi 1-U5 ton; B-7 ton.

clear only ' 0,000.

5-lo,uuu plus 5u,ooo from Tuloma station

en

Floating dock (built in England), c p t . 250 tons, in two seotions of 155 and 950 tons ; length 2UO'. "hipouiloing an repairing yard with traverser s l i p taking up to I'd trawlers 160' long. Ship. repairing yard, with 1600 ton floating dock. Taval port with HlOO ton f l o a t ing dock, 262' long. 2 modern dry­ dooks, 656' ana 328' long, max. draft 29.5 1 . 6 slips haul­ ing" up 700 ton ships.

Tinier, a pat it t fartiliier.

uergency aiiBrves now used for pur­ poses other than un­ loading convoys i £ Derths (!.os. lt> and 17) at the Fishing Port; 19' depth alongside. 2 Derths at Yaenga Bay. 1 oertn at the Timber Lock, 1 berth at the Coastal Fatrol Dock. Tumarouna for convoy of 12 ships is 10-12 days from Iceland waters. An expansion of port f a c i l i t i e s ia in progress .

2 . Kandalaksha

2 berths where 2 loi at Shore ships can unload retro 1 dook. s imiltaneous ly • 3 berths whioh can acoonsr.odate 3 ships simultaneously. >-20'; 1-16'

^O mi. spur connects port with ' urman rr.; rail to end of pier. 2 mi. spur connects port with Kern on Vurman rri 18,000-30,000.

150,000 fron liiva III static

IceDound i.ov.-U inol.

3 . Ken

500-1,000.

Icebound ;.ov. 3^­ :.ay 15. Sawoills, U. mi. below town, have own wharves and shops for small repairs. Icebound Dec. 1-IJay 15. Port recently developed 10r timber. Feasible 6UEaarine oase. Fort for assembly and loading of sown limber, fecause of shal low bar 5 nii. from Onega, usual to unload ships partial ly ay Darges to re­ duce dralt to lU1 . barges unloaded at nega. Dredging operations planned, sunmer of 19U2,

Belomorsk (Soroka)

Accommodations fa All berths 2 0 ' . 3 ships i 2 general cargo, 1 tank-

l.uuo-j, 000.

5. Onega

3 berths.

All berths 1 6 ' .

On or near spur of 3elon<orsk-0bozerskaya rr.

1 Electrified; extent unknovrr..

y

XABLE H i

PORT FACILITIES - SOVIET FORTS

Name o f For t

Railroa d faoilities.

5. Storage oapaoi­ 6. Lifting ty and fuel equipment. stores .

7. Conveying equipment.

8. Monthly oa­ paoity of port In tons.

9. Eleotrio power avail­ able In kilowatts.

10. Shipbuilding and repair facilities.

6 . Arohangel a. Uolotovsk

5 ships ( i . e . , 1 tanker, U general oargo ships) oaa unload simultan­ eously. (Notei Joining 2 now separate wharves w i l l enable 6 to 7 ships to unload simultaneously by Sept., 19H2).

Low water (all berths?) 25.5'S ships drawing 26.5' oan use aoeeas oanal at flood. Ships dra ing 26' at low water oan be ao­ oommodated by Sept. 1, 19142.

30 ml. single­ traok r r . line to Arohangel­ Vologda rr.

3 steel storage fuel tanks—2,000 ton opt.} 1 tank hulk of 4,000 ton opt.; 1 other nearly oomplete. U oonorete fuel o i l tanks (2 underground and 2 hulks )—30,000 ton total opt. Soviets olaim 100,000 tons ooal in Arohangel area, mostly at Uolo­ tovsk. Many sawmills oloae by; covered storage spaoe probably avail­ able.

50,000 tons with­ Eleotrioity prob­ out improvements ably laid on listed in columns wharves. #2 and $12.

Im. V. Molotova Shipbuilding Yard (No. 402). Large naval base under oonstruotion 1 machine shops, foundries, oovered building ways completed. 2 destitp era nearly finished. Fall, 19U1. Large yard and building slip under oonstruo­ tion.

Naval port.

Pipe lines laid to •11 fliel storage teaks. Pipe lines to 2 wterTM paralleled by sttan heat pipes. Fuel pumps 18 tana opt./hr. Into 12 tank oars simil­ taneous ly at wharves.

5 berths.

All berths 1 23-2V Current dredging operations expeoted to allow 2o' draft ships to berth here by Nov 1942.

Only trammy to nainland. Solom­ balakaya Island­ Arohangel Town rr. bridge under oonstruotion (Notei when ioe oonditions on the N. Dvina H. permit, a rr. ii laid in winter from Arohangel to Solombal­ skaya I s . ) 1 line on quay; 5 traok sorting yard between quay and Bakar­ itsa Station.

Electricity in !>0,000 (est.). Ekononla Town; (Soviets nay use port for bunker­ probably on ing only.) wharves.

See general state­ ment in ret Arch­ angel.

Sown lumber logs.

Amount of looal ooal reserves not known.

o. Bakaritsa

All bertha: 22' 12-15 Berths. (Hotel quay 1800 24' over bar. yards long ae­ oommodates 13-1; ships simul­ taneous ly} •

Bulk of total Arohangel storage opt.; no figures available.

1-10 to 12 ton traveling orane. (Notet Soviets plan to add transporter oranes up to 15 tons; 2 tractor oranes up to 3 tons; 7«5 ton rr oranes by Fall,

Some eleotrioally driven portable conveyors, reach­ ing only 14' above water level. Goodi removed by ships' derrioks oan be off-loaded from truoks to barges at several shallow loading wharves near rr. station.

120,000 (est.)

Eleotrioity laid on all wharves.

None reported.

Timber.

Quay 2230 yards long; about 1800 yard* suitable for dis­ charging oargo. 3 parts 1 1. Ho. seotion B O yards long; 19* O deep at s o . end, 22' 6" at no. end. One 10-12 ton traveling orane with' 150 yard range, 20' max. reach above water level at no. end. 2 . Central seotion, 430 yards long; for timber only. 3* So. section, 1000 yards long; 16' deep at so end, 23' at no. erd. Not a l l suitable for unloading.

7. Fort Dikson

Coal wharf under Depth off port going extension 7-10'. to 650'. 1 pile wharf, 380 x 65' Trans-Siberian rr. at Krasno­ yarsk 400 mi. upstream.

lew warehouses re­ .Tiarfside "mech­ anized" . ported, 1937.

Fixed conveyor, 210" long, for bunkering.

Station of un­ known opt.

Bunkering and sub­ sidiary port. Power­ ful W/T for oommuni­ oation with a l l polar stations . Ioefree only 90 days per year.

6. Igarka

6 berths for simultaneous un­ loading of 6 ships.

100,000 for navi­ gation season; 000_per month.

500-1000

TABiE H i

PORT FACILITIES - SOVIET PORTS

Has* of Port

Number and/or 3* Depth along­ length o f side berths bertha (wharf­ (

U. Bailroad faollities.

5. Storage oapaoi ty and fuel stores.

6. Lifting equipment.

7. Conveying equipment.

8 . Monthly oa­ paoity of port in tons.

Elaotrlo powar avail­ able in kilo­ watts.

10. Shipbuilding and repair faollitiea.

Prinoipal aiporti .

12. Misoallanaoui faoilitiosj ranarka.

. BALTIC SEA I 1 . Leningrad 10 wharves totalling 8 mi., about 125 bertha for vessels inol. 70 oeean-going 10-M1 wharves. 183,000 tons. 7 floating oranea— 35, 40, 50, 70, 100, 150, and 200 tons. I'oohanioal load­ ings WX), 000-1(50,000 depending on ice conditions. 206,000 plus 96,000 from Svir s t a . , 56,000 from Volkhov Sta. 7 shipbuilding works for 2 oapi­ tal ships, U destroyers, sub­ marines, e t e . largest in U.S.". Timber, grain, ores, ooal, e t e . Ioebreakera 1 3-9,000 ton) 4-2,000 ton; 3-600 ton. Port loe­ bound Feb.-Apr. e' witt> ioebreakers.

I I I . BUCK SEA I BztenaiTe naval 1. Sevastopol (Facilities wharfage. now large­ l y evacu­ ated or destroyed Rails on wharves. 6 large o i l and gas tanks. Floating oranes 2-100 ton; 1-50 ton; 1-tiO ton; 1-25 ton; '2-20 ton; 1-5 ton. 25,500 (3 sta­ tions ) . U relnf. oonoiete No oonmeroei naval only. building s l i p s , max. 328'; 6 wooden s l i p s , nax 230'. 3 drydooks: 500', 680', T. 3 floating dooksi 1-300'. 2 marine railways, Grain, timber, o i l . lifting 700 and 350 tons . Second largest naval port in U.S.S.H.

2 . Hostov-onDon

2.5 mi.

Average 1 IV

Rails on wharves.

cn
1O-1U1 17-30*

120,000 tons, ovei 2 floating oranes 3 srato loaders, 15 and 50 ton. 5u t / i j 2 float­ 100 warehouses. ing grain loacBrs 50 t/h; 1 float­ ing elevator, 125 t/ii. 33,500 tons, 26 warehouses . i2,800 cons, 20 warehouses; 50,OOU ton o i l depot; 50,000 ton grain elevator. 2,000 tons; I4I tanks, 1600-i|200 tons eaoh, for crude o i l , kero­ sene, gasoline; 21 tanks, U,000-6,000 tons. 20,000 sq. yds. cold storage plant. 3 steam shovels for orej 2-l60 t/h; 1-80 t / h . 2 electric ore cranes ­ 12.5 tan, with 66' radius. 2 electric port­ able cranes—3 ton, with 50' radius. Floating oranes, 40 and 25 tons. 2 floating oranesj kO-50 ton; 6 portable cranes, ?-15 tons; 2 portable oranes, 2 ton. Several grain and s a l t loaders.

120,000 tons; large oapaoity of river transport

lu-25,000.

Ioebreaker; port severely handioappe by ioe oonditioni, Nov.-Apr.

3 . Yeiak U« Kovorossis'

920 yards. 36 berths.

Hails on -aharves.
Sails on all wnarves.

30,000 subjeot to ioe oonditions

3,000-5,000. 10,000-25,000.

Repair yards.

Closed by ioe Deo. 15-aar. 3 1 .

Conveyors 1 2^0,000 1 floating ooal, 100 t/h; 2 grain, 100 t/h; 1 oeEPTit barrels; pipeliie to o i l pier. nil pipeline; 2 grain conveyors, 50 t/h; various other conveyors. U5,OOO-6o,00O without o i l •erths; o i l oertha, 100,000 to 150,000.

"mil repair yard Grain, o i l , oemant. Sinoe siege of Sevastopol," main with U small naval base of Blaok slips.

•y. Tuapse

2,300 yards; 11* wharves.

16-30*

!p.ils on wharvei except oil berths.

5,000-10.000.

Yard and workshops for repairing o i l tankers; employs up to 1,000 men.

Handles QQ.0 pass angers/ye Terminus of pipeline from Groiny

6. Poti

2,255 berths

15

20-23'

.ails on all wharves .

Transporters, eleetrio trucks, eto.

120,000-150,000.

Bion Sta., 1&0U0; Fort repair work­ Abasha Sta., 1­ ;hops with s l i p 3,000. lifting 500 tons.

Manganese from Chiatura.

10,000 ton vessels can berth alongside wharves; 22,000­ volt ourrent from Rion stepped down in port by 2EO/38O volt transformers.

TABLE D i C 1 . Nina of Fort.

PORT FACILITIES - SOVIET PORT1?

2 . Number and/or 3 . Depth along­ length of side berths berths (wharf­ (feet). age).

4* Railroad faoilities .

5. storage oapaoi ty and fuel stores.

6. Lifting equipment.

7. Conveying equipment.

Monthly oa­ paoity of port in tons

9. Eleotrio powor avail­ able in kilo' watts. Adzharis-Tskali Sta., 22,000.

10. Shipbuildin and repair faoilltiea.

11. >rinolpal exports.

Miscellaneous faoilities) remarks.

7 . Batumi

2.253

berths.

13

23-32'.

Rails on a l l wharves.

20,000 sq. yds.

40 ton floating orane; f-8 ton traveling oranes with 50' radius

Pumps and pipe­ lines at all berths; several traveling oon­ voyors for grain

100,000 without o i l ; oil berths, 100,000; small vessels and barges, 2^0,000

Ship-repairing shop with small slip.

Oil, manganese.

8 and 10 i n . pipe­ lines from Baku; seoondary submarine base; 9 J of turn­ O4 over la o i l .

17. CASPIAN SEA I 1 . Astrakhan Pipeline. 800,000 tons during navigatio season; mostly tankers and barges . 450,000-500,000
tons; mostly tanke rs and barges.

5,000-10,000» being enlarged.

Shipbuilding yan with slip of 565'i floating dock 1,700 ton opt. Ship-repairing shop with float­ ing dook for ships of medium tonnage. Navy yard and ship-repairing yards, one having 1 single and 1 double dook, both taking largest Caspian ships. Steamers up to 5,000 tans can be constructed.

Transit of o i l , grain, mnufaetura between Caspian Sea and Volga R Transit of o i l .

Volga froien Deo. Apr.

2 . MakhaohKala

Several liiarves; over 1100 yaras.

3 large o i l reservoirs, 14 smaller, total opt. 2.5-3 mi 13 ion tons• . aria, ble i oon­ stant dredging. Rails on dry goods pier. Numerous o l l storage tanks and reservoirs up to 10,000 ton opt. 50-ton floating orane; 2-ton oranes on dry goods pier, e t c .

Fixed conveyors i 2-410' long; 2­ 328' long, for loading cotton.

3,000-4,1X50.

New o i l harbor opened in 1938; 2 pipelines to Grozny refineries. Ioe nay stop navigation for short period In Jai By far the largest port In the U.S.s.R Base of the Caspian Sea f l o t i l l a .

3 . Baku

t

80 piers, mostly for o i l , along c mi. of water front} 3,720 yds for o i l j 2,too yds . f o r dry goods.

8" and 10" pipe­ lines to Batum; annual cpt. l,U60,000 tons, l,6l42,OOO tons res p.

1,000,000

200,000-300,000.

4 . Kr&snovodsk

15 piers on pile (of whioh 5 de­ oayed) in ..est­ em Harborj 21 wooden piers (of whioh 15 at oayed in VI"ra Harbor).

iioatern Harbor 5-a'i ufra Hartcri 10-12'j 16' along 2 bertas of o i l piers.

2-3 ton Hwny good ware­ houses; oil tanls, oranes. total opt. 12,000 tons.

Grabs and con­ veyors with opt of 50 t/hj float­ ing grain transshipper, 50 t / n .

140,000

500-1,000.

Cotton, grain, alabaster.

Oil from Cheleken Island, stored in tanks at s t a . , used by rr.; mny oil reservoirs at land­ ing plaoe 5.25 mi east of Krasnovodak

i !

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I
Vi l [yrv (O.V»i ii
. N'ame o f P o r t . • Number and/or length of berths (wharf­ age). 1. Depth along­ side berths
( f e e t ) .
k- Railroad facilities. I . PAHLKVI U berths I Customs and s l i p customs quay, 669' way quays; LI'5". long, min. widtn 0 2 ' , aooommodates 3-500 ton s h i p s ; slipway quay i n Naval Yard, 160' Long, a d j . terrain 197' wide. 1 mole-1600 1 long; 1 mole-1000' long —insufficient depth or unloading facilities.

i1 n i! I

IVi! '; >
il !L TAl'Lii X - PAi LEVI A D T E F U IAN G L PORTS. N H ES UF ^^^•^•^•^•^•^•^•W^^^^^^^^^ V. Eleotrio power available in k i l o ­ watts . 10. Shipbuilding and repair faollitiee. 11. Prinoipal exports•

5. Storage capacit . equipment. Lifting ty and fuel stores •

1 7.

Conveying equipment.

c. !:onthly oa­ paoity of port in tons•

12. Miscellaneous facilities 1 remarks.

None; port oleared oy truoks. toad to Kaiuin takes 500 tons daily in dry weather; 250 in wet.

V.'arehouse cpt.i Closed sheds 6H56 sq. f t . Open sheds 7iil6 sq. f t . Closed sheds (damaged but largely useable )VldU sq. I t . Closed sheds (under oonstruotioo) - 1312 sq.
I t .

•lono ; discharging 15,000-14,000.
1-30 ton floating orane, steam by ships' derricks
engine; 2 cater- or hand.
pillar oranos.
diesel, opt. 10
tons at lo.5*
free space; 5
tons, at 26' free
spaoe.
1 ;an t r y- t yp e
crane at "aval
Yard; cpt. 7 tons

Several small power plants for lifhting pur­ poses .

Maval Yard.

Transiti
U.S. '.E. -Iran.

present operation! • Deepening of channel and eocstruotion of wooden j e t t i e s planne d .

Water level varia­ tions up to 3^5' • Sufficient labor available for

9

'heda for inllamm-
Roles - (under
construction) ­ 157U sq. f t .
Fuel stores 1 no
ooal stooks. 3
large o i l tanks
beh ind i avy Ya rd .

en
SI

(-•

I I . PEHSIAU GULF PORTSt 1 . Basra a. ~ _b. £. ~ 1-J0001 wharf with 6 berths. 1-600' wharf. U deep-water berths finlshe or nearly finished. _d. 9 lighterage ~ berths. a. b. o. d. 26' . 20'. Deep water. "shallow water. lighterage. Karun Hiver bar water in low 19-21' et October. a_. 3 rr. spurs on wharl'. ii30,000 sq. f t . of transit sheds; 150,000 sq. f t . warehouses; limited adjaoent ing. !!o coal ordinarily. Fuel o i l at Aoadan» plpel^-ie to he built. Vater laid on wharves; avail aftle from 600-ton self-propelled barge. Rr. to Anwar to oe completed July '1|2. Customs sheds 5,000 tons opt. Fuel at Abadan. 1-55 ton, 1-25 ton floating oranes; i-» ton eleotrio; 1^> ton steam; U-3 2-3 ton steam; 5-1 ton eleotrio. probably 5-2 ton (liotei shortage of trained crane orews). 129,000 (l.'Ay 'Ji2); Ample eleotricitj 170,000 (July 'Ufd); for a l l purposes. with limited inoreasss thereafter Port Directorate and Gray, Mackentie marina vnrkshops. No dry dook or large slipway. Lighters, diving equipment. 1 salvage steamer. Main supply base of British 10th Army; port of entry. Land Lease to Turkey. Longest vessel swing­ ing safely in river­ 650'. Good anchor­ age for 22 vessels between outer bar and "'jargit wharves.

t

2 . Khorram­ shahr

a. ~ b. ~

Concrete whar: 11+00' . 2 deep water Berths and 2 "I" shaped lighterage berths to be completed by Aug. 1, 'Ij2; other work ir progress. o. 5-liEhter ~ jetties on so bank of Karun at Persian yaval Base.

a. 2 0 ' .
T>. Deep water.
o". Shallow water
~ for lighters
only.

2-10 ton oaterpillar oranes for plumbing lighters.

90,000 tons, June 'U2; 300,000 tons.

Ueager repair shops. barraoki and jetties of Persian Navy. Tremendous port ex­ pansion underway.

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p
1 . Name of Fort 2. Number and/or length of berths (whtrf-

ifl 3. Depth along­
side bertha (feet). 30'} heavy s i l t ­ ing nay ohoke berths.

TABLE • - PAKLEVI A U T E PERSIAN GULF PORT':. N H . Railroad faoilitis 5 . Storage oapaait y and fliel stores. 6 . Lifting equipment. 7. Conveying equipment. Monthly capacity of port in ton Eleotrio power a' able in k i l o ­ watts.

Aba dan

General oargo wharf 150' long. 10 deep water s t e e l and oon­ orete J e t t i e s } 9 of then for o i l .

Concrete deok with narrow iuge rr. ana road alongside at wha rves.

Tank farm for refined petroleum produots, 3 million barrels opt] same for orude, 10 million barrels opt. 9 open-sided ware, houses 1 some open-storage.

b-3 ton eleotrio nes} 1 dumb 200-210 ton floating orane, unaDie to slew, requiring } tugs to maneuver. No oranes on jetty; 12 ton Diesel rr. wreoklng orane (radius U5') in yard.

10" pipeline.

Oil only1 90,000 tons ?

2 small slipways} Crude and refined oil including 100 floating dook ­ octane gasoline. 730 too opt.} Fueling ships. maohine shop. Ssell craft main­ tenance and con­ struction. 3,000 ton float­ ing dock} lifting apt. 6,000 tons) length U7T I i n ­ ternal breadth 65.6'.

iiat a supply port of the C S . ' . S . ; fuels ships in Persian Culf traffio

U« Bandar Snahpur

Jetty - 800' long 30' 1 bar at Khor 300' wide. Cause­ Eusa, 21+'} deep way 900 1 long ohezinel. oonneota with solid f i l l . (3 deep water and lighterage Berths to be oompleted by NOT. 'l£.) One quay} oargo disoharged by lighters. Inner an oho rag 9
fo r T»SS el 3 up to

letty - 3 rr. ;r»okai siding all ware­ lOuses.

30,000 (to oe expanded).

All supplies includ­ ing water sent by rail.

5 . Bus hire

20'.

lone; road to Isfahan.

Several ware­ houses} open storage.

2-10 ton cranes trawler truoks; 5-ton hand crane.

5,000-10,000.

Eleotric lignt plant.

N repair or o fueling facili­ ties.

Auxiliary port for truck route to Isfahan and Teheran.

CD i

concentration areas for airdromes have remained: Iv;urmansk--Kandalaksha
(5 airdromes, 3 seaplane bases, at least 24 landing fields); Leningrad
(20 airdromes, 3 seaplane bases); Moscow (28 airdromes); Rostov (5 air­ dromes, 3 landing fields); Tbilisi (5 airdromes); and Baku (6 airdromes,
1 seaplane base, 2 landing fields). Beyona this, airdromes or landing
fielas parallel all the principal railroads, even in the deep zono of
the interior. Those noted by a reliable observer along the Trans-Siberian
Railroad were numerous and much larger than American fields. They appeared
to be in excellent condition, and difficult to sight from the air since
the runways were unmarked. In addition, recent reports indicate large
scale airdrome construction in the Archangel area, in the North Caucasus
and along the Lower Volga from Stalingrad to Astrakhan. In relation to
the enormous extent of the front, however, airdromes and even landing
fields are very sparse. The problem of adequate air support, particularly
by heavy bombers or fighters with fast landing speeds, is therefore serious
Some ©f the principal airdromes of European Russia
have the following characteristics. There are three airports near
Archangel (Sec Maps 10b, 10c, lOd). One of these, Tenth Kilometer air­ drome, has two runways at right angles in an L-shape. The north-south
runway is gravel, 5280' x 350'; the -oast-west runway is wooden, made of
logs, laid crosswise eight feet deep, and is also 5280' x 360'- It has
been reliably reported that the wooden runway will take heavy bombers
of any size. Only the runways are usablo. This airdrome is of great
importance since British and U.S. Lcnd-Lease aircraft are assembled
there preliminary to service on the front.
Khodinka airport, n > . koscow, consists of two large
ter crossed hard-surface runways, 3800• txnd 34001 (450' wide). Shohelkovo
airport, fifteen miles north of Moscow, has two 3000' concrete runways
constructed in a V-shape. Airports at Engels, Borisoglcbsk, Stclingrad,
flala., and Baku have runways 3000' in length, surfaced with fine
sand and clay.
The Russians have two methools of dealing with their
frequent winter snows, scraping and rolling. Scraping is less effectual
than rolling. If the temperature is not very low fields must be scraped,
otherwise rollers s r used. Snow sticks to metal rollers and wooden
.e rollers are used exclusively. The Soviet rollers used arc six feet wide
and four feet in diameter and filled with sand. Fields packed by heavy
rollers (4 tons) ere smooth, hard enough to support heavy bombers, and
ecsily camouflaged.
(6) Railroads.
7a) General. In 1938, the U.S.S.R.- had 70,500

- 159 ­

miles of railroads, as well as 26,200 miles of station, yard and siding
trackage. Territorial losses in the war up to May, 1942 reduced this
trackage by 35%. On the other hand, verified information has recorded
about 1100 miles of new track, principally in Northern Russia. Virtually
all the trackage is 5-foot gauge. The Caucasus and the Kola Peninsula
have the great bulk of the electrified sections.
By 1941, possibly 23,000 locomotives were
available for use (annual production, less than 1600); more than two-
thirds of these, however, are obsolescent types. Furthermore, lack of
ballast prevents use of the newer, heavier, more powerful FD and IS
locomotives on over 60% of all trackage. About 700,000 freight and
passenger cars are serviceable; 19,000 are tank cars. Automatic block
signals protect barely 5^ of the track (principally near Moscow). The
total railroad personnel is large, 1,500,000, but the shortage of skilled
workers has been so acute that since 1940 large numbers of 14 to 17
year-old boys have been drafted as compulsory railroad apprentices.
The geographical distribution of railroads is
very uneven; 61% of the mileage being west of the Volga. Examination of
the system from the viewpoint of economics and strategy, however, lessens
its apparent vulnerability and disbalance. Six functional divisions exist.
(1) The basic industrial and agricultural net­ work enclosed by the great crescent of Baku-Rostov-Krivoi Rog-Kharkov-
Mo scow-Leningrad-Vologda-Mo lo to v-Novosibirsk-Achinsk-Minus insk-Semipala­ tinsk-Chkalov-Astrakhan. Most of the war losses in this net were
balanced by loss of the areas being served, such as the Kharkov-Stalino-
Krivoi Rog industrial center. The most serious loss affecting unoccupied
Russia was destruction of the bridge at Rostov which forced the diversion
of vital oil traffic to the Stalingrad railroad, with its much lower
capacity (8000 tons a day against 18,000 tons).
(2) The West Russian strategic and Black Sea
grain export network: virtually all in German hands but little of it
essential for Russian internal economy.
(3) The Transcaucasian economic end Turkish
and Persian strategic network. The economic importance of this line will
be greatly increased with the completion of the link to the Trans-Iranian,
between Tabriz and Kazvin, not earlier than the winter of 1942.
(4) The Central Asiatic strategic network, which
has assumed increasing economic importance with the agricultural and
industrial development of that area.
(5) The Trans-Siberian line: purely strategic
since its agricultural anofcommercial significance virtually vanished
with Japanese seizure of Manchuria.

- 160 ­

(6) The Vologda-Archangel-Murmansk lumber and
fertilizer export, and emergency supply line: This has been strengthened
by the new Obozerskoya-Kotlas link which completes a net of 14,000 tons
daily capacity, or more.
Moscow is the principal railroad center.
Its radiating lines, aided by two concentric belt railroads, have a
capacity of over 200,000 tons daily.
In 1938, the Soviet railroads carried a
total of 515 million tons of freight, for a total performance of 238
billion ton-miles; thus the average haul was 6.8 million tons per mile,
or over four times as much as in the United States. Yet seasonal
variation is marked: January to April have only 61% of their proportional
share in the yearly turnover. The extreme load of these railroads is
achieved through the use of large trains (1200 tons average gross weight;
730 tons net) and minimal spacing. The long distance practical capacity
is 29 trains daily each way on double track main lines; 13-16 pairs, on
single track main lines. But speeds are slow-12 m.p.h., loading is slow­ 16 hours; and the turn-around is long-7 days for each freight car.
War has imposed a serious strain on Soviet
railroads. Despite the great paucity of locomotives, many are lying
idle through the lack of minor repairs for which men and materials are
not available. All equipment is in very bad shape; thus 50% of all brake
shoes are out of order; in freight trains only every other car has any
brakes at all. Twenty-five miles per hour was the maximum speed in early
-pring ?42, At that time it took 7g days to travel from Kuibyshev to
Moscow.
(b) Supply of the western front. During the course
of the war, Soviet railro'ads have had two essential tasks: the trans­ portation of heavy freight for the maintenance of war industries in the
zone of the interior, and the transportation of troops and supplies
through the communications zone to army and corps railheads.
(1) Supply in the zone of the interior has
simply magnified the peacetime job. Normally even, railroad traffic
consisted of coal and coke, 25%; timber, 14% (largely for export and now
eliminated); petroleum, 10% (halved with the loss of the Ukraine); grain,
8%; iron and steel, 7%; ores, 5%; all other goods and passengers, 31%.
(2) The supply of the railheads is shown by
Map 11, which charts the p7obable network as of May, 1942. This map is
basecfon actual Russian experience, with modifications for improvements
and alterations of railways.
(a) The daily capacity (each way) of the
lines from the principal supply""depots in the zone of communications to

- 161

3L.

the railheads is as follows:
Sector
1. Northern Mur man sk-R imsko ye Pudozh-Kalinin Central (Klin-Stalinogorsk) Southern Yelets-Chertkovo Mi llerovo-Rostov Daily tonnage

29 ,200
2,600
26,600
2. 51 ,000
3. 46 ,700
20,300
26,400
126,900 tons/day
(b) The daily supply requirements of
various types of major Russian units are analyzed in Table XI. To
summarize:
'Unit 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Daily supply

Infantry Division (Regular Strength)* 379 tons
Cavalry Division 165 tons
Tank Brigade 194 tons
Motorized Division 246 tons
Tank Division 327 tons
(c) In general, an allotment of 300 tons
daily for the average division Ts adequate. On that basis, the various
sectors of the front can maintain--without allowance for necessary troop
movements—the following maximal numbers of divisions:
Sector 1. 2. 3. Max. No. Divisions Maintained
(No Allowance for Troop Movement).
Northern 85
8**
Murmansk-Rimskoye Pudozh-Kalinin 77***
170
Central (Klin-Stalinogorsk) 155
Southern 67
Ye 1 e ts - Cher tko vo 88
Millerovo-Rostov 410 divisions

*The 10,000 man Reserve Division would require about 250 tons.
**Use of the auxiliary Arctic ports and the spurs to the Finnish frontier
can increase this capacity by 2\%.
***Deductions have been made for the minimal support of the Leningrad
factory workers.

f ^

- 162 ­

(d) Troop movements require extremely
large tonnages. The rail shipping weights and spaces of the initial
equipment of various types of large Russian units are studied in detail
in Table XII. Briefly.
Unit Wt. (Equivalent)* of Initial
Equipment

Infantry Division (Reg. strength) 27,600 tons**
Cavalry Division 14,100 tons**
Tank Brigade 23,900 tons**
Motorized Division 23,000 tons**
Tank Division 40,200 tons**
(e _ ) Thus a figure of 25,000 tons for
the movement of an average Soviet division is tenable. On that basis,
the maximal troop movement per day—without allowance for the maintenance
of other troops—is as follows for each sector of the front:
Sector Maximal Troop Movement per Day
(No. of Divisions)

1. Northern 2. 3.
Murmansk-Rimskoye Pudozh-Kalinin Central (Klin - Stalinogorsk) Southern Yelets - Chertkovo Millerovo - Rostov

1 .0
0.1 0.9

2.0
1.9

0.9
1.0

4.9 divisions per day.
(f) Increase of troop mobility by rail
depends on the type of organization and the capacity of the line. For
Russian organizations and railroads, rail capacities of more than 10,000
tons daily give infantry and cavalry mobility equal to that of tank and
motorized units. It is in conjunction with such rail facilities, there­ fore, that infantry and cavalry operate best against mechanization. The
factors are summarized below.

*Space-weight equation for men and horses at 40 men or 8 horses per
car of 29.3 sq. m. floor space.
**In all figures, 5 days' initial supplies are included.

a r •:­

'I i;U
'dr*.".^Jr~fit'''-1' ' •

- 163 ­

flnit
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Day of march Daily movement by railroad of (miles) capacities listed below in tons;*

2500 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 Infantry Div. (regular strength)20 40 Cavalry Div. Tank Brigade 100 Motorized Div. 125 Tank Div. 100
22 44 25 25 15

45**
50 31

90

135

180

225
•2*5*0*

W 36" TUo"
100 62

ITS

"2~BU

TSo"
150* 93

"25ft "2150" "200 T"?4

250

"250

(jO The general significance of these
factors in terms of Soviet miliTary operations seems to be the following:
The present concentration of approxi­ mately 270 divisions in the combat zone absorbs two-thirds of the absolute
capacity of the front, even without allowance for the present critical
state of railroad equipment. Major increases in personnel or materiel ­ say, over 300 full divisions - could be achieved only by virtual im­ mobilization of units in their sectors of the combat zone. Consequently,
full simultaneous use of Russia's large edge in manpower cannot be
achieved. Transportation difficulties impose a localized, static de­ fensive organization in great depth on the USSR, depriving it of the
possibility of more than localized offensive operations.
Troop concentrations or shifts by rail
at a significant rate arc possible only on the front from Tikhvin to Tula
with its center at Moscow, and in the Rostov sector. These, therefore,
must be the foci of all major Russian attacks or counter attacks.
The relative mobility of infantry and
cavalry in the Moscow and Rostov sectors makes probable their maximal
concentration there. On the other hand, the practical limitations of
infantry movement to 40 miles per day. on the southwestern front from
Yelets to Chertkovo impose the necessity of a high motorized and
mechanized concentration in that sector.
The distribution of improved roads on
the front, supplying only the sector from Novgorod to Orel and centered
at Moscow, intensifies the peculiarities of the rail network. The
strength of the Moscow sector and the weakness of the Yelets - Chertkovo
sector are fundamental.
•Assuming a daily run of 250 miles including loading and unloading.
••Underscored figures denote a significant increase over the day of march
of the unit with its organic transport. Thus, a railroad of 5,000 tons
capacity can move 2 battalions 250 miles per day, or a whole division
in 5 days. This is over twice as fast as a division could march.

rrt

Table XI. Daily Supply Requirements (Maintenance only) of large
Soviet units.

a. ~

Regular Infantry Division.
1. Food: 4 lbs. x 17,750 = 70,000 lbs.
2. Clothing: 0.5 lbs. x 17,750 = 8,750 lbs.
3. Medical: .27 lbs. x 17,750 = 4,800 lbs.
4. Ordnance materiel (less
ammunition): 0.3 lbs. x 17,750 = 5,300 lbs.
5. Ammunition = 143,300 lbs. (Day of Supply).
6. Horse fodder: 8 lbs. x 6,000 = 48,000 lbs.
7. Gas and oil: 880 tanks and vehicles x 13 gallons =
11,440 gallons (per 6.84 lbs.) = 39 tons (1.4 tank cars)
8. Fuel - negligible.
9.- Construction materials: 200 tons.
10. Total supply in lbs. per day: 758,400, or 379 tons.
b. Motorized_Infantry Division.
"" " 1. Food? " 4 lbs. x 7,360 = 29,440.
2. Clothing: 0.5 lbs. x 7,360 - 3,680.
3. Medical: .27 lbs. x 7,360 = 1,990.
4. Ordnance materiel (less ammunition): 0.6 lbs. x
7,360 = 4,400.
5. Ammunition = 57,300 lbs. (Day of Supply).
6. Horse fodder: none.
7. Gas and oil: 1574 tanks and vehicles x 18 gallons =
(per 6.84 lbs.) = 97 tons (3.5 tank cars).
8. Fuel: 35 lbs. per 200 men = 1330 lbs.
9. Construction materials: 100 tons.
10. Total supply in lbs. per day: 491,740, or 246 tons.
c. Tank Brigade.
~" 1. Food: 4 lbs. x 3500 = 14,000 lbs.
2. Clothing: 0.5 lbs. x 3500 = 1,750 lbs.
3. Medical: .27 lbs. x 3500 = 945 lbs.
4. Ordnance materiel (less ammunition): 0.6 lbs. x
3500 = 2100 lbs.
5. Ammunition: 50,000 lbs. (Day of Supply).
6. Horse fodder: none.
7o Gas and oil: 33 medium heavy tanks, plus 1450 tanks
and vehicles x 20 gallons (per 6.84 lbs.) - 99 tons
(3,7 tank cars).
8. Fuel: 35 lbs. per 200 men = 630 lbs.
9. Construction materials: 60 tons.
10. Total supply in lbs. per day: 388,000, or 194 tons.

- 165 ­

Table XI. (Contdo)
£ . Tank Division.
1. Food: 4 lbs. x 7000 = 28,000 lbs.
2. Clothing: 0.5 x 7000 = 3,500 lbs.
3. Medical: .27 x 7000 = 1,890 lbs.
4. Ordnance materiel (less ammunition): 0.6 lbs. x
7000 = 4200 lbs.
5. Ammunition: 100,000 lbs. (Day of Supply).
6. Horse fodder: none.
7. Gas and oil: 66 medium heavy tanks plus 2500 tanks
and vehicles x 20 gallons (per 6.84 lbs.) = 158 tons
or 6 tank cars.
8. Fuel: 35 lbs. per 200 men = 1,225 lbs.
9. Construction materials: 100 tons.
10. Total supply in lbs. per day: 654,800, or 327 tons.
je. Cavalry Division.
1. Food: 4 lbs. x 6600 = 26,400 lbs.
2. Clothing: .5 lbs. x 6600 = 3,300 lbs;
3. Medicine: .4 lbs. (includes veterinary) x 6600 =
2,640 lbs.
4. Ordnance materiel (less ammunition): 0.3 lbs. x
6600 = 1,980 lbs.
5. Ammunition: 71,600 lbs. (Day of Supply).
6. Horse fodder: 8 lbs. x 6640 = 53,120 lbs.
7. Gas and oil: 120 tanks and vehicles x 15 gallons (per
6.84 lbs.) = 6.1 tons or 0.8 small tank cars.
8. Fuel: negligible.
9. Construction materials: 80 tons.
10. Total supply in lbs. per day: 331,300, or 165 tons..
Table XII. Rail shipping weights and space, initial equipment, of
large Soviet units.

a.

Regular Infantry Division.
No. " 17750 Wt./ltem (lbs.) Total Wt. (Tons) 2217 Shipping No. of
Wt. (Tons) cars.

Item

1.

2.

Men, packs individual; rifles Horses, packs

250 900

444 750

6000

2700

1194 or 21 trains.* (14,700 ton-equivalents)
^Observed troop trains in the Kuibyshev uree, had 70 cars with 40 men each.

- 166 ­

ll 1 , / H

Table XII. Item 3.
4.
5.

(Contd.) No.. Wt./ltem (lbs.) 18,000 12,200 19,500 2860 14,000 19,000 6,000 550 2,790 6,270 1,840 1,390 990 Total Wt. (Tons). 990 3660 438 36 175 209 54 412 39 37 39 15 35 Shipping No. of Wt. (Tons.) o a r s . 1485 5490 657 54 262 313 81 618 59 56 49

Tractors 110
Trucks, plain, 2-|T600
Trucks,' special 45
3 axle
6.
Autos, (Fords) 25
7.
Armored Cars (Fords)25
8.
Tanks T26 22
9.
Tanks T37 18
10.
Wagons 1500
IX.
Howitzer, 122 mm. 28
12.
Howitzer," 152 mm. 12
13.
Guns, 76.2 mm 42
(AA & FA)
14.
Howitzer," 76.2 mm. 22
15.
Guns, 37 or 45 im» 69
AT

19 44 9187 Plus 20% foroverhead: 1837
Plus 5 days' supplies: 1895
12,919 tons
Plus ton-equivalents: 14,700
27,619

b.

Motorized ^Infantry Division. No. "" Wt./ltem (lbs.) 250 Total Tvt. (Tons) 920 Shipping No. of Wt. (Tons) cars... 184
or 3 trains

Item 1.

7360
Men; packs, individual;
rifles
Tanks T26 35
Armored Cars (Ford) 9
Trucks, plain, (800)
2JL.T
Trucks, heavy (400)
trucks, special (200)
Autos (130)
Howitzer, 122 mm. 18

19,000 14,000 12,200 19,500 16,000 2860 2790

(2100 ton-equivalents)
332 518
94
63 4600 7200
3900 1600 185 25 5850
2400
277
37

- 167 -'

y
Table XII. Item (Contd.)

" "J

No.

Wt./ltem (lbs.) 1840 1390 990

Total Wt (Tons) 20 25 11

Wt. (Tons) cars. 25 31 15 16,447 3,289
19,736
1,230
20,966 tons
2,100
23,066 tons

9. Guns, 76 .2 mm. 22 10. Howitzer , 76.2 mm. 18 11. Guns, 45 mm. AT 21

Plus 20$ for overhead: Plus 5 days' supplies Plus ton-equivalents: c. Tank Brigade.
, No Wt./ltem (lbs.) 250

Item 1.

Total Wt, Shipping , (Tons) Wt. (Tons) 438

No. of
cars.

Men; packs, 3500 individual; rifles 2. Tanks, T35 33 100 3. Tanks, BT 4. Tanks, T26 50 5. Trucks, plain, 2-|T(600) 6. Trucks, heavy (300) 7. Trucks, special (300) 8. Autos (100) 9. Guns, 76.2 mm. (12) 10. Guns, 45 mm. AT (6)

78,000 24,000 19,000 12,200 19,500 16,000 2,860 1,840 990

88
or 1g trains
-(1050 ton-equivalents)
1287 1930
1800
1200 712
475 5490
3660 4462
2975 3600
2400 219
146 15
11 4
3 18,232
3,656
21,888
970
22,858 tons
1,050
23,908 tons

Plus 20$ for overhead: Plus 5 days' supplies: Plus ton-equivalents:

- 168 y­

,

Table XII (Contd.) jd. .Tank Division. Item
1. Men, packs,
individual; rifles Tanks, T35 Tanks, BT Tanks, T26 Trucks, plain Trucks, heavy Trucks, special Auto s Guns, 76.2 mm. Guns, 45 mm. AT

No.
7000

Wt./ltem (lbs.)
250

Total Wt. (Tons)
438

Shipping No. of Wt. (Tons) c a r s .
175
or 3 trains

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

66 200 100
(1000) (500) (500) (200) (24) (12)

78,000 24,000 19,000 12,200 19,500 16,000 2,860 1,840

(2100 ton-equivalents) 2574 3860 2400 3600

950
6100 4875 4000 9150 7312
6000

990

286 22 6

429
30
8

30,389
Plus 20$ for overhead: 6,074
36,463
Plus 5 days' supplies; 1,655
Plus ton-equivalent; e. Cavalry Division.
No. Fb./ltem (lbs.) Total Wt. (Tons) Shipping No. of
Wt. (Tons) cars.
38,098 tons
2,100
40,198 tons

Item

Men; packs, individual;
rifles
Horses, packs

6600

250

825

160
830

990
or 17 trains

6640

900

2988

6. 7.

Tanks, T37 16 32 Tanks, T26 Armored cars, Ford 10 12 Trucks, 2^1
680 Wagons

6 ,000 19 ,000 18,000 12 ,200 550

(11,900 ton-equivalents)
48 72
304 456
90 135
73 110
187 281

mi m

- 169

/ i ' . ^

( l1 .! ' '

In- T^

Table XII. (Contd.) e. Cavalry Division. Item 8. 9. 10. 11. Howitzer, 122 mm. Guns, 76 mm. Guns, 45 mm. AT Guns, 37 mm.
0.

(Contd.) Wt./ltem (lbs.) 2,790 1,840
990 737

Total Wt. Shipping No. of (Tons) Wt. (Tons) cars.
17 22 5 24 25 28 6 30

12 24 10 64

1,143 Plus 20$ for overhead: 229
1,372
Plus 5 days1 supplies: 825
2,197 tons
Plus ton-equivalents:11,900
14,097 tons.
(7) Roads. The thinness of the Soviet rail net and the
damage caused by scorched-earth policies and the fighting of last fall
have necessitated dependence upon truck and wagon transport in the combat
zone. Although about 150,000 trucks (mostly 2^ ton) and over 400,000
wagons (mostly |r ton) are available, the paucity of decent roads renders
front-line supply extremely difficult. As may be seen from Map 12,
improved roads to the front exist only in the sectors between Novgorod
and Orel, less than one-third of the line. On other sectors, supply is
greatly dependent on the weather, and must usually be carried on by
heavy duty trucks (extremely scarce) or slow tractors and wagons.
In the zone of communications, two important
nets are found. A number of roads radiate as feeders or laterals for
the front from Moscow, while others connect Moscow with Yaroslavl, Gorki
and Ryazan in the rear. Another net exists in the Caucasus, one road
leading from Maikop, to the coast at Tuapse thence along to the coast to
Sukhumi, and then gradually inland to Tbilisi. Connecting with this
road is the famous Georgian military highway to Ordzhonikidze in the
north. Finally, a number of feeders run south to Yerevan and other
strategic points in the south.
(8) Shipping Available for support of forces. Sea-borne
transport and maintenance of troops are important in the Black Sea and
the Gulf of Finland, less important in the Barents Sea.
(a) Black, Sea. In 1939, the Soviet Union had about
150 ships, totaling 420,0*0*0 gross tons in the Black Sea. A considerable
proportion of these—probably 25$—are tankers; many vessels are of less
than 2000 tons displacement. Accurate data on shipping losses are not

- 170 ­

available. In view of the rapid German seizure of the ports of Nikolayev
and Kherson, and the severe continuous landing, maintenance, and evacu­ ation operations at Odessa, Sevastopol, Kerch and other ports, total
losses of 4:0% are a conservative estimate. Thus it is improbable that
over 180,000 tons of shipping (other than tankers) arc available for
troop support.
Before the recent German conquest of Kerch, two
isolated garrisons had to be maintained in the Crimea. Included in the
garrison at Sevastopol is c civil population of about 70,000 persons
(reduced from 112,000). In view of the stringency of shipping and the
normal supply requirements particularly for air, anti-aircraft and coast
artillery units, it is improbable that more than 8 divisions could have
been supplied on the whole peninsula. Of these, probably half have been
lost at Kerch. Limited reinforcement of Sevastopol is thus possible.
(b) Gulf of Finland. In 1959, the Soviet Union had
over 84 ships, totaling 208,000 gross tons, in the Baltic Sea. Extreme
losses were suffered by this shipping particularly in the fall of
Tallinn. It is unlikely that more than 20%, or 45,000 tons are oper­ ational at present.
Russian supply requirements in the Baltic are
now limited to three small but important groups of islands in the Gulf
of Finland: Kronstadt, Seiskari and Lavonsaari. The maximum total
garrison that con be maintained in these islands is not over 3 divisions.
Landing operations are virtually barred by lack of shipping.
(c) Barents Sea. In the Barents Sea, the Soviet
Union has available to it not only its own craft but those of other United
Nations. The main operational problem is the maintenance of the isolated
garrison on Fisherman's Peninsula. Some landing operations have been
attempted near Pets-jono and Kirkenes. On the whole, however, this sector
has been very inactive in relation to its strategic importance and
logistical opportunities for aggressive landing operations.
(9) Commercial trucking available. The amount of com­ mercial trucking now available is almost negligibTe. (See Roads). The
relatively very small quantity of trucks which operated on the extremely
few good roads in peacetime have long since been impressed into military
service, and a good part of those must be considered as lost.
(10) Air transports available* It may be assumed that
all types of commercial aircraft have been converted to purposes of
attack or defense. Neither passenger nor freight airplane service had
attained important proportions before the war, except in the remote region
of Northeastern Russia and Northern Siberia, which could be ruached by
no other moans. Planes for the transportation of wounded and medical
personnel can be spared only in extraordinary cases. Not a single report

-171.

ii'^ijj iu%%p}'-^-­

has been received regarding any large-scale transportation of troops or
military supplies by air-
It was planned to haul 33,000,000 ton-kilometers,
including 7,700,000 of air mail, ana 250,000 passengers in 1939. The
state of Soviet commercial aviation is well illustrated by the fact that
irregular lines, operating chiefly in the most remote and sparsely
populated regions according to need, accounted for about three-fourths
of the total air transportation in 1938, and only about one-fourth was
performed by the most important regular air lines.
(11) Local supplies available.
(IT) Zone of Combat* With respect to supplies avail­ able locally, the zone of combat may be divided into the following sectors
(1) Kola Peninsula. Only important sources of
food are the fisheries and the large reindeer herds (53,000 head in 1935),
which may have beon considerably reduced in view of the length of
military operations in this region
(2) Kandalaksha-Tikhvin. A vast expanse of
forest, swamp and tundra aTfording practically no manufactured goods
and little food except game and fish from the numerous large lakes.
The Shlisselburg salient cuts it off from its only important source of
manufactures , Leningrad.
(3) Tikhvin-Orel. Devoted mainly to the
growing of flax and hemp. ""The rye crop increases in size from north to
south. Relatively small amounts of potatoes and wheat are raised on
scattered dairy farms. Their limited live stock, insofar as not driven
out of the zone, has doubtless been largely, if not entirely, consumed
by the armed forces. Natural forage is more plentiful during the summer
months (May-September) than in other sectors, owing to the smaller extent
of the forests than in the north, and to the more abundant rainfall than
farther south. Neither here nor in the other sectors of the combat zone
can the farmers be presumed to have been able to plant much in the way
of grain, vegetables or forage during the last fall and spring, especial!,
since large parts of the present combat zone wore hold by the Germans
until the late fall. With Moscow still on the rear edge of the combat
zone, this sector is more favorably situated than others with respect
to locally available manufactures.
(4) Orel-Rostov. Wheat, sugar boots and sun­ flower seed (for oil) are "all very important crops in this sector, but
at best only a small part of the normal crops can be expected this year,
since military operations may be expected to have prevented plantings
in a large portion of the sector. Natural forage becomes less and less
abundant from north to south. Crop-raising is linked to a large extent
with dairying and live-stock raising, but it is not likely that much of
{he live stock still remains.

- 172 ­

Normally, nearly all the spring wheat is
sown by May 1. In 1935, 9% of the grain crop throughout the Soviet
Union had been harvested by July 10, 58% by August 10, and nearly 100^
by September 25.
Important Food Crops Raised by Qblasts Located in the Combat Zone
(Figures for 1935 in round numbers)
Oblast (largest
subdivision of a
constituent republic).
Wheat Name Percentage
of oblast not occupied by Germans in May, 1942. 1935 % from crop unoccupied part.
1 bons ,'° Leningrad 70 Kalinin 70 Moscow 100 50 Kursk Kharkov 30 Donets (now 50 Stalino and
Voroshilov­ grad).
Totals
of
MNMW

Rye
1935 crop % from unoccupied part.

Sugar Beets
1935 crop % from un­ occupied
part.

tons

tons

tons

tons

tons

100
,000 144, 415, ,000 ,000 536, ,000 1,287, ,000 697,

0

100,000 415,000 1,016 ,000 268,000 1,089 ,000 386,000 842 ,000 348,000 300 ,000

18 ,000 395 ,000

___ ___ 13,000 276,000 1,015,000 124,000 724,oor 544,000 2,216,000 1,108,0 253,000 3,264,000 979,00L 16,000 8,000 15,000

3,079,100 1,517,000 3,660,000 2,116,000 5,620,000 2,819,00C
(b) Zone of Communications. The central and southern
parts of the zone of communications and the adjoining section of the zone
of the interior are among the most productive regions in the unoccupied
portion of the Soviet Union, both agriculturally and industrially. The
amount and variety of supplies available to the fighting forces is greater
than it would be in most other localities of the Soviet Union. Even in
this area, practically nothing is now available in anything like adequate
quantities, but whatever is available is likely to be nearer at hand and
consequently to require less hauling than would be the case with military
operations almost anywhere else in^ ^he,.country. This .advantage,
however,
advantage ythe .country ** \
"-

,

\

- 173 ­

is more or less offset by the fact that the military and civil population
is much denser than it is in almost all regions which afford a more
limited amount and variety of supplies. For figures on agricultural
production in this aone see under "Production Capacities".
(12) Replacement of personnel.
(a) Military Forces.
{!) Numbers, ""in June, 1941, the military forces
of the U.S.S.R. totaled the following:
Active Forces
Red Army 4,060,000
Air Force 150,000
N.K.V.D. 200,000
Red Navy 75,000
4,485,000
In addition, the first line reserves (with
conscript training) of the first (up to 35 years) and second classes
(up to 45 years), as well as reserve N.K.V.D. units, were immediately
mobilized!
Reserve Forces
1st Line Reserves — — — — — — — —
(trained)
1st Class (18-35) 3,900,000
2nd Class (36-45) 2,600,000
485,000 N.K.V.D. Reserves Plus regular forces
6,985,000
4,485,000
11,470,000

Losses in combat up to May 1942, reduced
this force by 4,500,000, or to approximately 7,000,000. Thus a need for
massive replacement arose. The forces available for this purpose in
January, 1941, were the following:
1st Line 3rd 2nd Line trained 1st 2nd 3rd Reserves (trained)
Class (46-50) Reserves (partially
or untrained)
Class (18-35) Class (36-45) Class (46-50) 1,300,000

5,200,000
2,600,000
1,300,000
10,400,000

i ij. rJ(.•;;• w t ,..

- 174 ­

'"••fc­

This number was reduced by population loss
(30-35%), physical disabilities, and the maintenance of a minimal number
of workers in essential industry, to about 5,000,000. In all, 12,000,000
men are under arms or in training at the present time; major increases
will probably be impossible.
At the same time, however, women have been
used in military service, especially as doctors and nurses, radio
operators, telegraph operators, chauffeurs, and members of anti-aircraft
units. Inasmuch as these combat duties are open only to females between
the ages of 14 and 25, and on a voluntary basis, it is improbable that
such auxiliary forces number over 500,000.
(2) Training and mobilization procedures. On '
October 1, 1941, a law was proclaimed for the training of all able-
bodied male citizens between the ages of 16 and 50. The law provides
for the training of all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of
16 and 50. The training course requires one hundred and ten (110) hours
and not more than five months. Approximately six hours of training or
study are completed each week and the law requires that the classes meet
at least twice a week. In order not to interfere with war production,
all universal military training must be carried on outside working hours.
The training methods and subjects taught
are taken directly from the Osoaviakhim.* Under the new law, however,
the specialists trained appear to include only riflemen, machine gunners,
trench mortarists, snipers, ski troops and tank destroyers.
The subjects covered by all trainees include
tactics, marksmanship, drill, physical training, engineering (pioneering)
chemical warfare, sanitation and Red Army regulations. If a unit or
group is being trained in one of the other specialties time for this
specialist training is taken from the other1 subjects.
The machine gunner, in addition to the basic
subjects, is taught the nomenclature and operation of the machine gun.
He is taught the duties of a machine gunner and the tactical use of
machine guns against personnel, light tanks and armored cars.
The trench mortarists receive special
instruction in their weapon, similar to that of machine gunners. Snipers
are given special instructions in the use of optical instruments and
camouflage. Tank destroyers are given practice in throwing grenades and
bottles of inflammable liquid from various positions.
*See pp. 20, 106-109.

'1

[ •*[''.•,]• ! v l ! ' l

- 175 ­

Most of the equipment for training is
obtained from the Osoaviakhim.
All trade unions, societies and sports
olubs are required to lend whatever aid is necessary in the way of
equipment and instruction. Ski equipment and ski instruction are included
when available.
The instruction is given on Osoaviakhim
premises, sports fields, squares, skiing stations, physical culture and
sports clubs, institutes and schools.
The organization of the units is exactly
the same as in the Red Army, i.e., squads, companies, battalions, etc.,
depending on the number of men available. Units are organized on a
production or what might be called an occupational basis. For instance,
the men in a kolkhoz will be organized into a rifle company, or if the
number of eligible males in one kolkhoz is not sufficient, two adjacent
kolkhozs will furnish the men. Similarly, workers in a large factory
would be organized as a battalion or larger unit. Territorial organiza­ tion is very seldom used.
Instructors for the pre-military training
groups are selected from among army and political reservists and from
among older men who have seen active servioe. Instructors also receive
short refresher courses before beginning the course. The final selection
and designation of instructors is made and approved by the Regional
Military Councils and the Regional or District Military Commissars.
So far in the war, the pre-military training
is reported by the Soviets as being immensely valuable. In many cases,
before being inducted into the army, pre-military training units have
fought as separate organizations in the front lines, particularly in
defending cities. The Soviets appear to be satisfied with the system
and its results. The peace-time method, based on the geographical
principle, is less advantageous than that based on the occupational
principle, duo to the fact that the latter more readily solved the
problem of control, training and use of equipment.
The first five months period has just been
completed. Although it is not definitely known, it is believed that men
not yet conscripted will continue this training until such time as they
are called into actual service.

- 176 ­

It is uncertain to what extent newly-
trained groups of men are used as filler or unit replacements. However,
in many cases, new tank brigades and infantry divisions have been
organized, although existing units were at 50$ strength. On the other
hand, several mauled organizations, e.g. the Ninth Army, have been
reconstituted. Men are called into service by age classes, at least to
some extent. On May 15, 1942, the 18-year-olds registered for military duty. (b) Industrial and Agricultural Mobilization, Private enterprise as known in'the West does not exist in the Soviet
Union. All industry and agriculture are owned and operated by the
government in both war and peace, therefore conscription of industry is
unnecessary. The yearly turnover of one-third to one-half of the factory
workers was finally stopped in 1940 by the most drastic and severe labor
laws believed to be in existence today. The new laws prescribed trial
and imprisonment for persons who voluntarily change jobs or are late to
work. The eight-hour day and seven-day week replaced the six-hour day
and six-day week. Youths from 14 to 17 were conscripted as apprentices
in industries and on the railroads for 4 years. In February 1942, man
and woman power for war industries was mobilized, and the agricultural
labor laws passed in April 1942 completed the all-inclusive mobilization
of labor in the Soviet Union. All able-bodied men and women of urban
and rural communities not employed in industrial and transport enter­ prises were mobilized for work on collective and state farms and tractor
stations. The only exceptions are for persons working elsewhere, women
with young children, and persons physically unfit. School children,
and old people (from 12 to 55) are being utilized wherever possible.
Forced labor is the penalty for refusal to comply with these laws. The
necessity for such drastic measures is evident from the following figures.
The total U.S.S.R. labor pool, as of January
1941, between the ages of 15 and 59 was 110,600,000. Geographic losses
reduced this figure about 30$, to 77,400,000. Out of this number 48$
or 37,152,000 are males, of whom 80$ or 29,721,600 are employable, and
52$ or 40,248,000 are females of whom 3 7 ^ or 15,093,000 are employable.
Out of the 44,814,600 employables in the labor pool, 16,500,000 have
been mobilized and 4,500,000 of these have been killed, or wounded, or
are prisoners of war. The total labor available at present is about
21$ or 28,314,600 of the total population. Of these 40$ or 11,600,000
are industrial workers, and 60$ or 17,600,000 are agricultural. There
are possibly 10,000,000 auxiliary workers including children, pregnant
women, and the "halt, lame and blind." This total, when compared to
the maximal labor pool of 55 million in the United States, clearly records
the severe labor shortage of the U.S.S.R.

- 177 ­

(13) Evacuation Facilities. The evacuation of personnel
and machinery from threatened or occupied areas has been an important
factor in the resistance of the U.S.S.R.
In contrast to the refugee movements in France,
Russian evacuation was, for the most part, a planned and orderly process.
Men of military age were marched to the rear. Administrators, and
technical and scientific personnel were the first civilians to be moved.
Machinery was unbolted, maintained in operation until the last moment,
and then sent off on flat cars. The workmen operating these machines
rode in boxcars on the very same trains. Only in a few instances—
Leningrad, Odessa, Kharkov, etc.--was the ordinary civilian population
evacuated. In most cases, movement was forbidden, to keep the railroads
and roads clear for military traffic.
The effectiveness of this program differed in variou;
sectors of the front. It was greatest in the Donets Basin, the Leningrad
area and at Odessa. It was negligible in the Baltic States and the
western Ukraine, notably at Kiev. In all, not over 5,000,000 people were
evacuated from the occupied area, with an equal number leaving the present
combat zone. Possibly one-third of the machinery for light and mediun
industries in the occupied areas was evacuated. Of this, not over half
has been rehabilitated r.nd put in operation in factories in the east.
As a whole, planned evacuation has yielded an increment of about 10^ to
the military - industrial potential of unoccupied Russia.
(14) Communi cations. The entire telegraph and telephone
system is under military control. Its lines arc built with strategic
orientation, and it is subject to immediate mobilization. In 1940,
there were one million miles of interurban telegraph and telephone lines,
with 25,000 telegraph offices. Eight million messages were sent. The
lines parallel all the railroads, and also run from Krasnoyarsk to
Dudinka, and from Irkutsk to Okhotsk. Before German occupation foreign
lines ran from Leningrad to Libau, Latvia and other European points;
from Alma Ata to Hand to Shanghai; from Ulan Udo to Peiping; and from
Vladivostok to Nagasaki.
The radio network is built up on a strategic
division of the U.S.S.R. and is almost entirely for official use. Moscow
has one 500 kw. and eight 100 lew. stations, and Leningrad, one 100 lew.
station. Stations of more than 1 kw. capacity are located at all im­ portant railroad points, within 200-250 miles of each other; intervening
at regular distances are stations of 0.1 - 0.9 kw. capacity. The smallest
stations serve isolated hinterlands.

- 178 ­

In 1938, there were 85 main broadcasting stations,
largely with propaganda programs. Weather information is broadcast
irregularly, in secret code.
(15) Vulnerable Objectives4 (See Map 12). In order to
determine the vulnerability of the different industrial areas in Russia
the first consideration is the range of the enemy's heavy: bombardment
units. The following table can b© used to determine the range of German
bombers under normal load and flying conditions.
Model Focke-Wulf 200 Heinkel 117 Ju. 89 Do. 217 Ju. 88 (4 (4 (4 (4 (2 engine) engine) engine) engine) engine) Radius of action 1030 miles 1080 miles 800 miles 400 miles 220-800 mi.

Considering the Russo-German front as a base, Axis
bombers could operate approximately one thousand miles eastward into
Russian territory. This, of course, would make the Moscow area even
vulnerable to the attack of short-range bombers plus the fact that large
bombers could attack this region with a heavier-than-normal bomb load.
If Germany is able to advance southeast from the
Crimea towards the Caucasus, she will rapidly bring the oil region around
Baku well within bombing range. Bombers could fly to Baku and back from1
the Kerch Peninsula but the distance (1100 mi.) is quite far and bomb
loads would have to be curtailed. Astrakhan, the important port on the
Caspian Sea, has been bombed by German aircraft. Batum, an important
port on the Black Sea, is within range of enemy bombers.
On the broad front from Rostov to Leningrad the
western sector of the Russian belt of communications, as shown on
Map 11, is vulnerable to German light, medium and heavy bombardment.
Leningrad continues to resist German air attacks, although the majority
of demolition is caused by heavy artillery.
The Murmansk railroad, for its entire length, is
vulnerable to air-raids from Axis aircraft based in Finland. It has
been attacked several times. The port of Murmansk has been recently
attacked by bombers.
Archangel has not been reported bombed to date, but
it is certainly an enemy capability and probably an imminent one now that
this port is ice-free.

- 179 ­

The Ural Mountain region is beyond present Axis
range and the industrial plants there are widely dispersed.
Table XIII 1. List of Vulnerable Objectives, Western Front, USSR.

Zone of Combat.
Leningrad -- Port facilities; railroad communications; ships;
special steel; electrical and transport machinery;
rubber goods; boots and shoes; chemicals; textiles,
ammunition and materiel.

2.

Zone of Communications.
a. Northern Region.
Murmansk—Port facilities; railroad connections.
Archangel—Port facilities; Dvina River shipping; railroad
connections; lumber yards (?).
Vologda—Rail connections; synthetic rubber factory.
Central Industrial Region. (Electric power stations not
.' listed but power facilities
may be assumed for all cities.].
Yaroslavl--Refineries; synthetic rubber; automobile works
and trucks; tank factory.
Ivanovo—Textile machinery, textiles.
Moscow—Special steel and pipe steel mills; ball bearings;
and and Moscow defense area precision instruments;
Moscow railroad equipment; electro-technical products;
defense Stalin automobile plant; refineries (including gas
area. boosting by tetra-ethyl lead); chemicals; munition,
(a portion of these plants, particularly munitions,
have probably been evacuated); power stations;
railroad network leading to Moscow; Moscow Defense
Area: Podolsk, sewing machines; Mytishchi, rail­ road and street car building; Lyubertsy, agri­ cultural machinery; Kolomna, locomotives; Podolsk,
ammunition factories (probably evacuated).
Noginsk--Textiles.
Stalinogorsk—Chemicals (including poison gas).
Chemicals (at Bobriki).
Gorki—Pipe steel mill; machine tools; Diesel engines;
radio apparatus; Molotov automobile plant, ship­ building; chemicals, paper, arms, tank, and air­ plane factories; two refineries (at Sormovo).
j.;fcj?;\ | • - •

b.

- 180 ­

Table XIII.

(Contd.)

Vladimir—Powder and chemical warfare factories—possibly­ evacuated.
Kovrov—Arms factories.
Penza—Airplanes.
Volga District.
Saratov—Ball bearings, refineries (including a poly­ merization plant producing 85 octane gas), part
of airplane factory shipped from Moscow, flour
mill.
Stalingrad—Special steel, tractors, heavy trucks,
ch.enfi.cals, tanks.
Ulyanovsk—Ammunition.
North Caucasus and Transcaucasia.
Maikop—Oil wells.
Grozny—Oil wells; 15 refineries (fields reported in
bad condition).
Baku—Oil wells; 14 pipeline refineries (reportedly in
very bad condition in 1940, with the danger of
widespread fires if the fields are bombed.)* port
facilities; helium; power plants; iodine and bromide,
Batumi--Refinery, port facilities.
Tuapse--Refinery, pipeline terminus.
Krasnodar--2 refineries; pipeline terminus.
Makhach Kala—Refinery; pipeline terminus.
Armavir—Pipeline from Maikop.
Novorossisk—Port facilities.
Tuapse-­ " " ; pipeline terminus. Sukhumi— " " ; hydroelectric power. Poti— " " Astrakhan—Port facilities; river shipping; canneries;
fishing fleet.
Ordzhonikidzhe--Lead smelter; electrolytic zinc plant.
Yereven—Synthetic rubber; electric power.
Sumgait—Synthetic rubber. (Northwest of Baku).
Tbilisi—Machine tools; hydroelectric power.
Kirovakan—Chemicals.
Leninakan--Textiles; electric power; railroad connections
with Turkey.
Chiatura—Manganese mine and concentrating plant; Rion
River hydroelectric plant (vicinity).
3. Zone of the Interior.
Kazan—Synthetic rubber; electric power; chemicals; powder;
river shipping.
Kuibyshev—Munitions; river shipping; electric power;
chemicals (Chapayevsk); refineries (Syzran and
Bashkirskol).
Stalingrad—Tractors; trucks; tanks; chemicals.

- 181 ­

B.

SURVEY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AEEA.
1. HYDROGRAPHY.*

a. General. The principal rivers of European Russia lie
mainly athwart the path of an invader from the west. But they present
a formidable military obstacle only during the few weeks of the spring
floods, and the spring and fall ice passages. The fall ice passage is
due to the circumstance that in the larger rivers the ice usually forms
and breaks up several times before becoming consolidated. At other times,
large parts of the rivers are so sluggish and shallow that their width
is of relatively little strategic importance. The swamps and lakes in
which the northern half of European Russia abounds are considerably more
serious impediments. The southern half, more attractive in every respect
for an invader, becomes increasingly dry from north to south.
A large part of the West Siberian Lowland is a malaria-
infested swamp area of such vast dimensions as to appear practically
impenetrable for a large army, regardless of equipment. The Trans-
Siberian Railroad zone, though keeping south of the worst part of the
swamp area, passes amid thousands of fresh or salt-water lakes, and even
here the swamps hinder traffic in many places and make it difficult to
obtain good water. East-west motor travel on a large scale is practi­ cable only along the highway running parallel to the railroad. The
solid grain-growing section of Vest Siberia lies almost entirely south
of the railroad, in the salt-lake steppe zone extending from the southern
Urals to the Altai Mountains. This is the only part suited for military
operations. North of the railroad, great expanses of forest alternate
with equally great expanses of swamp or tundra. Throughout the West
Siberian Lowland, the spring floods necessarily inundate proportionately
much greater areas than the rivers of European Russia owing to the ex­ treme lowness of the country, and, for the same reason, a much larger
part of the waters is unable to drain off after the recession of the
floods.
The hydrography of Soviet Central Asia as a whole presents
a forbidding aspect to an invader at nearly all seasons of the year. In
the summer, large parts of the lowland are practically waterless. The
late winter rains fill the depressions between the sand ridges, thus
covering immense areas with a gigantic network of small lakes. The most
practicable approach to the interior is along the Kuibyshev--Chkalov
(South Urals)--Aralsk-Tashkent railroad, which, beyond the north tip of
the Aral Sea, follows the Syr-Darya River valley, largely planted to rice.
* See Map 13.

- 182 —

)

I •

f

• •

The Turkistan-Siberian ("Turksib") Railroad from Novosibirsk via Barnaul,
Semipalatinsk, and Alma-Ata to Tashkent traverses a 175-mile stretch of
desert (the Sary-Ishik-Otrau Sands) east of Lake Balkhash, but nearly
everywhere else it skirts or crosses fairly high foothills.
All the larger rivers of European Russia and West Siberia
are navigable to various degrees, but their generally north-south direc­ tion renders nearly all of them useless to both sides for transportation
to a north-south front, though either side could make very considerable
use of them for parallel communication behind the lines. The Amu-Darya
is navigable from the Afghan Border to the Aral Sea. Otherwise, the
rivers of Soviet Central Asia are negligible as waterways. For three to
seven months of the year, the solidly frozen rivers of North and Central
European Russia and of Siberia (not including Central Asia) constitute a
network of motor highways far superior to most of the man-made roads.
b. European Russia. In European Russia there are two major
watersheds. The one lies roughly along the parallel of Leningrad (6cP N)
and forms a tenuous line of demarcation between the rivers of north
Russia and those of central and south Russia:
(1) the Northern Dvina and Pechora Rivers, flowing into
the Arctic Ocean; and
(2) (a) the Dnepr and Don Rivers, which empty into the
Black Sea, and
(b) the Volga and Ural Rivers, which empty into the
Caspian Sea.
The other watershed, formed by the Volga Hills, occupying
the area between the kk° meridian (Gorki--Stalingrad line) and the Volga
River, separates the Black Sea and Caspian Sea drainage basins.
The Central Russian Hills, extending from the vicinity of
Leningrad to the Sea of Azov, form a secondary watershed between the
Dnepr and the Don. Their northern part, known as the Valdai Hills and
the Smolensk-Moscow Ridge, separates the Volga system from the Western
Dvina and other comparatively short streams which drain into the Baltic
Sea.
The headwaters of the Volga, the Dnepr, the Don, the
Western Dvina and the Northern Dvina all lie within a radius of 200 miles
from Moscow, which largely owes its origin and importance to this fact.
The Western Dvina, Northern Dvina and Pechora basins are
dotted with countless lakes and swamps, few of which can be shown on
any but very small-scale maps. In the northern parts of the Dnepr,

- 185 ­

Don and Volga basins there is also a considerable number of lakes and
swamps.
The Northern Dvina and Pechora basins are subject to
yearly spring and summer floods of normally devastating proportions.
Extensive floods are also common in the other basins, but they are usu­ ally much less destructive. The spring thaw for a few weeks causes high
water and dangerously swift current in otherwise sluggish streams like
the Don and the Volga, Ice blocks traveling at high velocity render the
rivers impassable for weeks after the ice breaks up.
The Volga is 2,590 miles long and is navigable to within
65 miles of its source, in the Valdai Hills near Kalinin, only 750 feet
above sea level. At a distance of 1,500 miles from its mouth, the Volga
is only 190 feet above sea level and 280 feet above the surface of the
Caspian Sea. The average fall of the Volga is only 1:600,000, or one-
tenth of an inch per mile, as compared with 1:17,000, or 3,7 inches per
mile for the Amu-Darya River of Soviet Central Asia. At the latitude
of Stalingrad (49° N), where the Volga-Don canal has been projected, the
two rivers are only 48 miles apart. The Volga starts to thaw around
March 18 at Astrakhan, April 5 at Stalingrad, and April 9 at Kalinin on
its upper course, but only around April 14 at Gorki in its middle course.
The freeze, however, commences at the head and proceeds gradually down­ stream. The average navigation period is 205 days at Kalinin, 195 at
Gorki, 196 at Kuibyshev (formerly Samara), 210 at Stalingrad and 260 at
Astrakhan, The ice passage, during which navigation is practically im­ possible, lasts 3-8 days at Kalinin, 4-18 days at Gorki, 6-30 at Saratov,
3-17 at Stalingrad and 2-5 at Astrakhan. In the lower Volga, constantly
shifting sand bars and alluvial islands make it necessary to rechart the
fairway each year after the spring floods. The spring rains raise the
level of the rivur at many points as much as 40 or 50 feet. They are
followed by a period of dry weather, during which the shallowness of the
Volga and most of its tributaries, except the Kama (main eastern tribu­ tary from the Urals), causes extraordinary difficulties to navigation.
The Kama River rises at an altitude of 910 feet, about
100 miles west of Molotov (Perm), in a marshy area of the Ural foot­ hills, and describes a loop about 170 miles long, reaching northward
between 52° and 54° E and southward between 56° and 57° E along the
western side of the Ural Mountains to Molotov. Thence it pursues a wind­ ing course south-southwostward to 56° N (mouthof the Belaya River) and
then in a west-southwesterly direction to the Volga, which it joins about
50 miles south of Kazan. It is 1,170 miles long, and is navigable
throughout up to the mouth of the Vishera, 185 miles above Molotov, be­ yond which it is used only for log floating. The Kama is considered the
most navigable river in European Russia. The width of the channel and
the depth of the fairway are almost everywhere sufficient for free

- 184 ­

navigation, and the shallows and bars appearing at mean water level are
far from "being so obstructive as those of the Volga. The mean fall of
the Kama is nearly k inches between the mouths of the Vishera and
Chusovaya (at Molotov), 3.6 inches between the mouths of the Vishera and
the Belaya (at the big southeastern bend) and nearly 3.5 inches between
the latter and the Volga. The Vishera, Chusovaya and Belaya, with a
dense network of short tributaries, drain the west slope of the Ural
Mountains. Along the whole section from the Vishera to the Chusovaya, a
distance of iQk miles, the right (weBt) bank of the Kama is flat and the
left is high, witji cliffs of hard limestone. Above Berezniki (midway
point), the mean channel is 700 to 1,^00 feet wide; below that point, it
widens suddenly and in places reaches 2,800 feet or more, but the width
of the fairway in some places, especially where the channel is divided
by islands, is inconsiderable and causes many difficulties to navigation.
The section from the Chusovaya to the Belaya, a distance of 33^ miles, is
flanked on both sides by a chain of sandy hills, the left bank remaining,
in general, higher than the right (west). The width of the channel
varies from 1,125 to 3>5OO feet, while the whole river bed may reach a
breadth of 2 miles or more, especially where there are numerous islands.
The minimum depth, even over the sand bars, is 6 to 7 feet. In the sec­ tion from the Belaya to the Volga, a distance of 237 miles, the right
(north) bank is the higher, but the hills, which reach a maximum eleva­ tion of 200 feet, recede some distance from the channel in places.
Most of the left (south) bank is low, quite flat and at many places
marshy. The channel in stretches free from islands is 1,1(00 to 3>5OO
feet wide, and in places as much as 3 miles. The depth in the straight
and free stretches reaches 60 feet or more and the fairway is wide. Be­ fore the Revolution, the steamers of the Kama basin comprised about
one-fourth of the entire Volga fleet, 75$ being tugs. The navigation
season lasts from 170 days at Berezniki to 192 days near the mouth. In
some years the Kama freezes after the first break-up, and a second ice
passage and flood period follow. Where the banks are low, wide areas
are flooded and the rise of the water level is small. In the lower sec­ tion, where the south bank is flat, the floods extend 7 or 10 miles, and
at the mouth 13 miles or more. The high-water level is generally in the
second half of May and lasts for two or three days; thereafter the water
falls until the middle of June, when the Kama reaches its mean level.
In view of the fact that the Kama runs from tho
industrialized section of the Ural Mountains toward the present theater
of war and is crossed by two main railroad lines coming across the Urals
from Siberia, this river acquires considerable strategic importance. In
addition to the two points of direct railroad contact, namely at Molotov
(Perm), where the lines from Nizhni Tagil and Sverdlovsk converge, and
at Sarapul, about 300 miles farther downstream, where the main Trans-
Siberian line crosses, the Kama has indirect contact with the line from

- 185 ­

Chelyabinsk, which crosses the navigable Belaya at Ufa. As on many other
Russian rivers, much of the transportation is effected by means of towed
rafts, built of lumber from the extensive forests in the vdcinity of the
point of departure and used as fuel or construction material at or beyond
their destination.
The Don River_ rises in Lake Ivan-Ozero at 580 feet above
sea level, north of the town of Donskoi, east of Stalinogorsk and about
120 miles south of Moscow. It is 1,325 miles long and drains an area
of some 166,000 square miles. Its upper course, above the mouth of the
Voronezh (about 35 miles below the town of Voronezh), passes mostly
through a low-lying, fertile region, though the section traversing the
southwest corner of the Ryazan Oblast has steep, rocky banks, at some
places even precipitous. From the mouth of the Voronezh to its nearest
approach to the Volga, west of Stalingrad, it cuts its way for the most
part through limestone rock, which in many places rises on either side
in steep, high banks, and at intervals encroaches on the river bed.
Above the mouth of the Voronezh it is 500 to 700 feet broad, at a few-
places 1,000 feet, and from 4 to 20 feet deep. Toward its easternmost
point, its ordinary breadth increases to 700-1,000 feet, with an occa­ sional maximum of 1,400 feet, and its depth to 8-50 feet. As in the
Volga, the right bank is, as a rule, high and the left bank flat and
low. The average fall is about 5^ inches per mile. Shallow stretches
are not uncommon, and there are at least seven considerable shoals in
the southwest part of its course. Partly for this reason, the Don is
little used for navigation above Kalach, terminus of a branch railroad
115 miles southeast of Voronezh in a straight line, although it is navi­ gable as far up as the mouth of the Voronezh. The Don begins to subside
with great rapidity about the beginning of June. In August, the water
is very low and navigation almost ceases, but traffic with small craft
occasionally becomes practicable after the September rains. The river
is usually frozen from November or December to March or April; at rare
intervals it freezes in October- Even Rostov, only 27 miles from the
mouth, is severely handicapped by ice conditions in the winter, and by
the silting up of the mouth, which confine it primarily to the status
of a river port.
(4) Most of the streams from the north slope of the
Crimean mountains are intermittent, especially in their lowland courses.
The larger part of the Crimean Peninsula suffers from chronic drought,
particularly the regions around Kerch, in the east, and Yevpatoriya, in
the west. There are several large salt lakes near the coast in the Kerch
Peninsula, on the Perekop Isthmus and southeast and northwest of Yev­ patoriya.

- 186 ­

£. Transcaucasia.* In hydrographically isolated Transcau­ casia, the Surami Ridge (north-south transverse spur uniting the Major
and Minor Caucasus) separates the Rioni River, flowing westward to the
Black Sea, from the Kura River, flowing eastward through the Azerbaid­ zhan Lowland to the Caspian Sea. The Araks River, separating mountain­ ous Soviet Armenia from the Ararat Range in Turkey, joins the Kura in
the center of Azerbaidzhan Lowland.
In the midst of the Armenian Highland and the Araks .by the Zanga River is Lake Sevan (in Armenian) Turkish), situated 6,230 feet above sea level and framed rocky mountain walls. Its maximum length is h-5 miles, 23 miles. Only k percent of the water entering the lake remainder evaporates. ,
connected with
or Gokcha (in
in by high,
its maximum width,
flows out; the

As the Surami watershed is situated only about one-fifth
of the distance from the Black Sea to the Caspian, the Black Sea tribu­ taries are much shorter and swifter. The number of torrential brooks
and rivers of all sizes rushing toward the Black Sea is enormous, and
they are fed by heavy rains during most of the year, especially in
Adzharistan, which is traversed by the independent Adzhar is-Tskali River,
called Chorokh in its lower course. Since the Armenian mountains, with
the exception of a few peaks, do not reach the snowline, the rivers be­ come very shallow in summer, necessitating artificial irrigation, partic­ ularly on the south slope of the Minor Caucasus and the adjoining Plain
of Ararat (Armenian Plateau).
§:• Siberia. East of the Urals, conventional boundary be­ tween European and Asiatic Russia, the vast and largely swampy West
Siberian Lowland stretches one thousand miles eastward to the Yenisei
River and the Central Siberian Tableland, not far beyond the Yenisei,
and 1,300-1,500 miles southward from the Yamal and Gydan Peninsulas to
the Altai Mountains, the Tarbagatai Range, the Kazakh Fold-Land, the
Turgai Gates and the South Ural Steppe, which together form the water­ shed line between Western Siberia on the .one hand and Soviet Central
Asia and China on the other.
The greater part of the West Siberian Lowland is drained
northward by the Ob River, with its major tributary, the Irtysh, both
of which rise in the Altai Mountains. Only its eastern edge is drained
northward by the Yenisei, rising south of the Western Sayan Mountains
in the Tuva People's Republic. The watershed between the Ob and the
Yenisei is not much over 200 feet high, and the west bank of the Yenisei
See Map

- 187 ­

is only 1*0-50 feet above the river. The slope of the entire West
Siberian Lowland is extraordinarily gentle. At the railroad crossing
over the Ob near Novosibirsk, 1,700 miles from its mouth (Ob Bay), the
mean water level is only about 300 feet above sea level. The low-water
level in the Irtysh at Omsk is about 230 feet above sea level.
(1) The area known as the Vasyuganye, enclosed between
the Ob and the Irtysh as far south as Novosibirsk and Omsk (both on
55°N, on the Trans-Siberian Railroad), is one vast expanse of almost
solid moss swampland, save for scattered areas which have been reclaimed
in recent decades. Only the narrow river zones between the swamps are
covered with trees, principally conifers and birch. Around 59°, latitude
of the Vasyugan River, east tributary of the Ob, the maximum elevation
of the Vasyuganye Swamp above sea level is from 325 to 1*50 feet. In the
summer the hunters' trails along the rivers are the only means of pas­ sage. In the winter the whole area can be crossed by sled. In 1925,
the population was little over 1,000 or 0.02 person per square kilometer,
and preponderantly aboriginal.
Lakes of all sizes abound throughout the West
Siberian Lowland. By far the largest is the shallow Lake Chany, 335
feet above sea level and 60 by 35 miles in width, situated 25 miles
south of the railroad between 77° and 78°E. Like many other large and
small lakes in the belt between 56° and 50° N, Lake Chany has various
short tributaries but no outflow. Its water contains about one-sixth
ounce of cooking salt and sulfuric acid salts per quart. The salt con­ tent of these lakes increases toward the mouth, but even to the north
of Lake Chany there are dead lakes containing considerable quantities
of various kinds of salts and acids.
A peculiar phenomenon, found nowhere else in the
world on such a maesive scale as in the middle and lower courses of the
Ob-Irtysh and tributaries is the starvation of fish caused by the pres­ ence of iron salts, the immense acidity of the water due to the decay
of organic substances; and the reduction of the quantity of free oxygen
through evaporation and fermentation of•the organic substances, in sum­ mer and through isolation from the atmosphere by ice during the winter.
Even in the 0b itself, the saturation of the water with free oxygen is
25 percent below normal.
(2) The larger western part of the Central Siberian
Tableland is drained by the eastern tributaries of the Yenisei, of which
the most important are, from south to north, the Angara or Upper
(Verkhnyaya) Tunguska, the Podkamennaya or Middle (Srednaya) Tunguska
and the Monastyrskaya or Lower (Nizhnyaya) Tunguska. Since the watershed
between the 0b and the Yenisei lies comparatively very close to the
Yenisei, all the western tributaries of the latter are short and small.

- 188 ­

The Yenisei is about 2,520 miles long, but the
Angara, together with its true upper course, the navigable Selenga,
emptying into the east side of Lake Baikal, is over 30 percent longer
and their sources lie considerably higher. The configuration .of the
confluence of the Yenisei and Angara and other hydrographic facts show
that the Yenisei is in reality a tributary of the Angara. The upper
course of the Yenisei, above Abakan, is suited only for timber floating
because of its swift current and the series of rapids along the stretch
where it breaks through the Yie stern Sayan Range. The mean fall between
Abakan-Minusinsk and Krasnoyarsk is about 16 inches per mile; between
Krasnoyarsk and Yeniseisk, below the mouth of the Angara, about 10
inches per mile. The volume fluctuates from a few hundred cubic yards
per second to tens of thousands of cubic yards, during the June high-
water season. The Yenisei at Yeniseisk is frozen over for an average
of 173 days.
The Angara is navigable from the outlet of Lake
Baikal except for a middle stretch of 180 miles below Bratoskoye
(102° E, 56° N ) , on which only small sailboats and rowboats can be
used because of the large number of rapids. It is so swift that it
freezes over completely only 2g months after the beginning of frost.
-Ice blocks float down the river for a long time without forming a solid
cover.
North of 71° N the West Siberian Lowland extends
about 1,000 miles beyond the Yenisei between the Central Siberian Table­ land and the Byrranga Mountains to the delta of the Yena. This expanse
of low Arctic tundra, measuring 200-300 milts from north to south, is
drained into the Arctic by four great rivers, the Pyasina, the Khatanga
or Lyama, the Anabar and the Olenek (from west to east), which attain a
width of many miles in their lowland section. The first three are well
over 500 miles in length; the Olenek about 1,000 miles. All four reach
deep into the northern part of the Central Siberian Tableland.
e. Soviet Central Asia (formerly called "Russian Turkiston")
"" JT) This vast area of over 1,500,000 square miles (about
one-half that of the United States, exclusive of Alaska) is without any
drainage outlet to the ocean except for that part of the Kazakh Republic
which extends north of the natural northern boundary of Soviet Central
Asia. This boundary, the watershed between the Irtysh system of the
West Siberian Lowland and the Central Asia systems, runs from the south­ ern end of the Ural Mountains along 15° 30' N, across the Turgai Gates,
then south«-southeastward to the Kazakh Fold-Land, and through the middle
of the latter, approximately along 49° N, to the Chingiz-Tau and
Tarbagatai Mountain Ranges, which divide the head tributaries of the
Irtysh from the basins of Lakes Balkhash and Ala-Kul.

- 189

s

(2) The streams of the Central Asia systems empty into
a number of lakes or seas, or dry up in the sands of the desert. The
principal drainage systems are as follows:*
(a) (Lake) Ala-Kul, 1,000 feet above s.l., kO by
25 miles, and (Lake) Sassyk-Kul, about one-third as large; situated be­ tween the Tarbagatai Range on the north, the Dzhungar-Ala-Tau Range on
the south, and the Barlyk Range of Chinese Turkistan and the Dzhungar
Gates (low pass to (Lake) Ebi-Nur in China) on the east. Both are salt
lakes, and the region round about is partly swampy, partly covered with
desert sand.
(b) Lake Balkhash, 1,120 feet above s.l., 300 by
6-^5 miles, maximum depth in west 35 feet, in east 65 feet. It is the
lowest point in a drainage basin enclosed on the north by the Kazakh
Fold-Land, on the west by the Golodnaya Step (Hunger Steppe) and on
the south by the high ridges of the T'ien Shan Range marking the border
between the Kazakh and Kirgiz Republics. On the east it is bounded by
the Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range. Between the latter and the T'ien Shan
Range lies the valley of the H i , the only large tributary of Lake
Balkhash, which comes westward from the Chinese part of the T'ien Shan
Range and enters the lake on its southeastern side. North of the
Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range only a low rise in the sandy wastes, traversed
by the Turkistan-Siberian ("Turksib") Railroad, separates Lake Balkhash
from Lakes Ala-Kul and Sassyk-Kul. The greater part of Lake Balkhash
is fresh water, but its southern tip and the long eastern arm contain
a considerable amount of salt. The northern banks of the lake are
rocky, at places high and precipitous, culminating in the Targyz quartz­ ite mountain, rising 1,000 feet above the level of the lake. The west­ ern shore, of porphyry, quartzite and limestone, rises on an average to
not more than 50-U00 feet above the lake, though the Burun-Baikal
quartzite chain along the west side of the southern tip reaches 700
feet. The eastern shore is much lower, and large parts of the southern
shore are swampy and covered with an impenetrable growth of reeds.
(c) The Aral Sea, l6k feet above ocean level, 2^9
feet above the level of the Caspian in 1901,* maximum length 250 miles;
width 150 miles; maximum depth 220 feet; average depth 52 feet. It
receives the very scant drainage of the Turanian Lowland and the Kyzyl-
Kum Desert to the east, the eastern part of the Ust-Urt Plateau on the
west and the Kara-Kum Desert on the south, as well as the two largest
rivers of Soviet Central Asia:
(l) The Syr-Darya, which crosses the Kyzyl-
Kum Desert from the Fergana Valley (outlined approximately by the
* See Map 15.

- 190 ­

boundary of the eastern panhandle of the Uzbek Republic), the only
large recess in the otherwise solid mass of mountains covering the
Kirgiz Republic. The Naryn River, the only large tributary of the
Syr-Darya, rises near 78° E at an altitude of over 10,000 feet and
flows westward through the heart of the Kirgiz Republic, draining a
zone of the T'ien Shan Mountains included roughly between kl° and ^2° N,
After describing a bend around the northwest end of the Fergana Range,
it enters the northeast side of the Fergana Valley and joins the Kara-
Darya, coming westward from the head of the Fergana Valley, to form the
Syr-Darya. The aggregate length of the Naryn and Syr-Darya is about
1,800 miles.
(£) The Amu-Darya (the ancient Oxus, still
so called on some maps), which marks the border between the Soviet
Union and Afghanistan from the confluence of the Pyandzh and Vakhah
Rivers to 65° U0f E, where it turns northwestward and passes between
the Kyzyl-Kum and Kara-Kum Deserts to the south end of the Aral Sea.
Some 250 miles before reaching the sea, the Amu-Darya begins to break
up into a number of arms, which are constantly changing. The Kank-
Uzyak, one of the three main channels, is navigable.
The Pamir River marks the border between
Afghanistan and the Tadzhik Republic from (Lake) Zor-Kul (73° U01 E,
elevation 13,390 feet, also called Sary-Kul or Viktoria), its source,
to the point (72° kO' E) where it joins the Vakhan-Darya, flowing be­ tween the Vakhan Range and the Hindukush (both in Afghanistan), to form
the Pyandzh, which continues to mark the border to its junction with
the Vakhsh (68° 20 ! E), where it becomes the Amu-Darya. The aggregate
length of the Pamir, Pyandzh and Amu-Darya is around 1, U00 miles. The
Pamir and the Pyandzh drain all the Pamir Highland covering the eastern
half of the Tadzhik Republic, except those areas in the northeast that
drain into lakes without outlets.
The Vakhsh, whose valley is now under­ going intensive development as an irrigated cotton-growing area, drains
the greater part of the western half of the Tadzhik Republic. It is
formed by the junction of the Obi-Khingoi, flowing between the Darvaz
Range on the south and the Peter the Great Range on the north, with the
Surkhob, flowing along the north side of the Peter the Great Range,
westward through the neck between eastern and western Tadzhikistan.
The Surkhob, in turn, is formed by the confluence of the Muk-Su, flow­ ing westward along the south side, and the Kyzyl-Su, flowing along the
north side, of the Trans-Alai Range, which marks the boundary between
the Kirgiz Republic and eastern Takzhikistan. The valley of the Kyzyl-
Su, known as the Alai Valley, is 70 miles long and as much as 12 miles
broad, and is famous for its pastures. Its upper part is 11,000 feet
high, its lower part 7>8OO feet high (at Daraut-Kurgan).

' V

- 191 ­

The east shore of the Aral Sea is low
and sandy; the west shore, which is the eastern edge of the Ust-Urt
Plateau, is precipitous, reaching 625 feet above the Aral Sea at places;
the north shore (Turgai Tableland) reaches k^O feet above the Aral Sea.
The 50-mile long Malyye Barsuki Sands reach the sea at its northwest
corner.
(d) Chelkar-Tengiz, a salt lake of about the
same size as Ala-Kul and situated north-northeast of the Aral Sea,
midway "between the latter and the Turgai Gates. It receives the Turgai
River from the north and the Irgiz River from the northwest. It is
approximately level with the Aral Sea and separated from it by a low
sand waste.
(e) The Caspian Sea, 8^ feet "below ocean level,
which receives the extremely small amount of drainage from the west
slopes of the Kara-Kum Desert and Ust-tJrt Plateau and from the southern
slopes of the Southern Urals.
(f) (Lake) Issyk-Kul, 5, 1^5 feet a"bove sea level
at normal water level, 100 "by 37 miles, maximum depth over 2,200 feet.
It is a highland collecting "basin for a large number of short glacier
streams of the Kungei Ala-Tau Range (to the north) and the Terskei Ala-
Tau Eange (to the south) in the northeast part of the Kirgiz Republic
eastward from 76 0 E and northward from 1+2° N. Although without an
outlet, Lake Issyk-Kul contains fresh water and several varieties of
fresh-water fish.
(g) The Chu River, rising around the west end of
the Terskei Ala-Tau Range southwest of Lake Issyk-Kul. It runs in a
generally northward direction for a"bout 100 miles, passes through the
Buam Gorge between the Kungei Ala-Tau Range (on the east) and the
Kirgiz Range (on the west), runs thence in a generally northwest direc­ tion for about ^-00 miles through the Muyun-Kum Sand Desert, then an
equal distance westward between the latter and the Hunger Steppe, and
finally loses itself in the sands of the Kyzyl-Kum Desert somewhat
beyond 68° E. The Chu River passes within four miles of the west end
of Lake Issyk-Kul, and a part of its spring flood water overflows into
the lake through the Kutemaldy Channel. Through the Chu Valley runs
the only highway connecting the interior of northern Kirgizia (north
of k2° N) with the capital of the Republic, Frunze, and the plains of
Kazakhstan.
(h) Lake Chatyr-Kul, on 75° 20' E, ^0° 20' N,
11,300 feet above s.l., 13 by 7 miles, depth insignificant. It re­ ceives 20 small streams from the inner slopes of an amphitheater of
mountains formed by the convergence of several high ranges near the
border between Kirgizia and China: the Fergana Range to the west, the
At-Bashi Range to the north, and the main border ranges, the Kok­ Shaal-Tau, to the east, and the Kashgar Range, to the south. This
fresh-water lake is also without an outlet.

(i) The Tarim River, which loses itself in the
desert of Chinese Turkistan when it does not reach Lake Shor-Kul or
Lob-Nor. It is formed " y the junction of the Yarkend and the Ak-Su,
b which latter is in turn formed " y the junction of the Kum-Aryk and the
b Taushkan-Darya, "both intermittent streams situated on the Chinese side.
The Kok-Shaal, running along the Chinese side of the "border range of
the same name, joins the Bedel (south of the east end of Lake Issyk-Kul),
to form the Taushkan-Darya. The Ak-Sai, rising only 10 miles east of
Lake Chatyr-Kul, runs eastward and joins the Myudyuryum, coming south­ ward along the Kirgiz side of the Kok-Shaal range, to form the Kok-Shaal
River, which breaks through the range just below kl° N. The Sary-Dzhaz
River describes an arc around the west side of the great glacier region
in the eastern extremity of the Kirgiz Republic and breaks through the
border range at kl° 1+5f N to join the Kum-Aryk on the Chinese side. It
is separated from Lako Issyk-K&l, to the west, by the northeastward
curve of the Terskei Ala-Tau Range.
(j) (Lake) Kara-Kul, 12,970 feet above s.l., 15
miles long, up to 790 feet deep in its western part. This collecting
basin, situated in the High Pamirs of the northeastern corner of the
Tadzhik Republic, is enclosed on the north by the Trans-Alai Range, on
the east by the Sary-Kol border range, on the south by the Muz-Kol
Range, and on the west by the vast glacier region in which the Peter
the Great Range terminates at its eastern end. Several tributaries of
the Muk-Su (see under No. 2) rise not more than 25-*+O miles west of
(Lake) Kara-Kul around the northeast side of this glacier area. Lake
Kara-Kul, one of the highest lakes in the world, has no outlet but its
water is only slightly brackish.
(3) The upper courses of the rivers of Central Asia
are swift mountain torrents carrying enormous quantities of alluvium
and entirely unsuited for any kind of navigation. They retain their
swiftness long after leaving the mountains, and only in their lowest
stretches are they comparable with the rivers of European Russia. Even
in the lowlands, they are little suited for navigation, since the mud
and sand carried down from the mountains make them shallow and constantly
change their channels. The only river on which any navigation worth
mentioning has been conducted is the Amu-Darya between Termez, on the
Afghan border, and the Aral Sea. Here, both the Tsarist and the Soviet
Governments have operated a fleet of steamers over very poorly remuner­ ated routes with Turtkul (formerly Petroaleksandrovsk), in the Khorezm
Oasic ubcut 250 miles from the Aral Sea, and Urgench, 30 miles farther*
downstream* as ports of call.
(k) The rivers of Central Asia have from time immemorial
been PTPIsited for irrigation, and both the Tsarist and Soviet Govern- •
ments have devoted considerable attention to its development, especially
for cotton growing. Their swiftness and high silt content render them

- 193

« &

especially favorable for this purpose. Furthermore, the summer thaws
in the high T'ien Shan and Pamir Ranges generally svell their volume
precisely at the time when the rainless irrigated areas are most in
need of water, and the highland precipitation is stored up in the form
of ice and snow during the period of maximum lowland precipitation,
whereas the rivers of southern European Russia swell from floods in
the spring, when the rains alone are excessive, hut dwindle precisely
in the driest, summer months, when irrigation could in many placeB he
otherwise applied to great advantage.

- 194 ­

TABLE I
Principal Irrigated Areas
Ukraine
1. Dnestr Valley northwest of Odessa.
North Caucasus
2. Malokabardinski Irrigation System, enclosed by the great loop of
the North Caucasian railroad between Prokhladny and Grozny.
3» Irrigation District of the Terek and Kuma Rivers (Tersko-Kumski),
which flow into the Caspian Sea north of the Caucasus.
Transcaucasia
4. Mugan Steppe, southwest of Baku, between the Araks River on the
northwest and the Kura River on the northeast, with the large Lake Akh-
Chala in its eastern part.
5. Milskaya Steppe, west of the Mugan Steppe (see No. 4) and the
confluence of the Araks and the Kura. More than half the cultivated
land of the Azerbaidzhan Republic is irrigated, and the greater part
of the cultivated land lies in the central part of the republic. Ir­ rigation on an extensive scale has been practiced in Azerbaidzhan
from very ancient times, and remains of large canals and reservoirs
are found in areas which are now entirely waterless and uninhabited,
6. Maly Sardarabad Canal, irrigating more than 60,000 acres west of
Yerivan, capital of Soviet Armenia, with water from the Araks River.
The Araks and some of its tributaries are also used to irrigate various
other areas of different sizes in the southern half of Armenia. The
Zanga, passing through Yerivan, irrigates more than k^>, 000 acres south
of Yerivan along the Yerivan-Dzhulfa railroad. The Garni-Chai and
Debeda-Chai irrigate an equal area adjoining the former on the south­ east, likewise along the railroad. The Zapadnaya (Western) Arpa-Chai,
a parent stream of the Araks, irrigates 30>000 acres around Leninakan,
on the railroad northwest of Yerivan. Some of the canals and other
works date from ancient times, but many of them have been reconstructed,
enlarged and mechanized since the Revolution.

- 195 ­

TABLE I
Principal Irrigated Areas
(Continued)
Western Siberia
7. Alei Steppe, along the Alei River and the railroad "between
Barnaul and Semipalatinsk, with its center at Aleisk, 180 miles due
south of Novosibirsk, 226 miles by rail.1
8. Irrigation system of the Uibat River, west of Abakan, branch • •
railroad terminus on the Yenisei River 170 miles south-southwest
of Krasnoyarsk.
Soviet Central Asia
9. Irrigation system of the Chu River, between Lake Balkhash and the
Kirgiz Highland, in southeast Kazakhstan; begun before World War I and
expanded since the Revolution.
10. Irrigation District of the Chirchik, Keles and Angren Rivers, east
tributaries of the Syr-Darya; the Keles passes northwest of Tashkent,
the Chirchik southeast of it, and the Angren farther south. Modern
irrigation was instituted here before the First World War.
11. Hunger (Golodnaya) Steppe--not to be confused with the much larger
Hunger Steppe west of Lake Balkhash--, 50 miles southwest of Tashkent,
between the southwest bank of the Syr-Darya, the Tashkent-Bukhara rail­ road and the Kyzyl-Kum Desert. The beginning of this project dates
back before the First World War.
12. Dalverzinskaya Steppe, along the Syr-Darya south-southwest of
Tashkent; an eastward extension of the old Hunger Steppe development
(No. 11 above) east of the railroad toward the mouth of the Fergana
Valley.
13. Irrigation systems of the Fergana Valley, using water from the
Syr-Darya, and both its parent streams, the Naryn and the Kara-Darya,
in the eastern panhandle of the Uzbek Republic and the northern pan­ handle of the Tadzhik Republic. Most of the canals date back before
the Revolution and some are of remote antiquity, but it is reported
that the whole system has boon undergoing a thorough overhauling and
important expansion during the last 15 years.
Ik. Surkhan-Shirabad Irrigation District, along the Shirabad River
from Shirabad south to Termez (on the Tashkent-Stalinabad railroad) in
the southern extremity of the Uzbek Republic.

- 196 ­

TABLE I
Principal irrigated Areas
(Continued)
15. Valley of the Vakhsh (east of 68°), a parent stream of the Amu-
Darya, in the southwest corner of the Tadzhik Republic.
16. The Oasis of Mary (formerly Merv) and Bairam-Ali (site of the
ancient Merv) in which terminates the Murgab River, coming northward
from Afghanistan; on the Tashkent-Krasnovodsk railroad west of 620 E.
Important modern irrigation works in this ancient irrigation area were
completed "before the Revolution,
Other areas of Russian Central Asia in which irrigation works of
considerable extent were in operation "before the First World War are:
17. The H i River Valley around Dzharkent and Alma-Ata (formerly
Verny).
18. Kopal and Abakumovskoye, on the north side of the Dzhungar Ala-Tau
Range, exploiting the upper courses of some of the seven tributaries of
Lake Balkhash from which the district east of Lake Balkhash was formerly
called the Seven-River (Semirechenskaya) Cblast, now named Alma-Ata
Oblast.
19. The Arys River around Chimkent; works reaching southward toward
the irrigated area around Tashkent.
20. The Zeravshan River, around Samarkand; works extended westward
since the Revolution. The Zeravshan, rising at the east end of the
Turkestan Range and flowing along its south side to Samarkand, does
not reach the Amu-Darya, pro"ba"bly "because all of its water is consumed
in irrigation.
21. The Amu-Darya Valley from the Afghan Border to Chardzhou, on the
latitude of Bukhara, with an irrigated zone reaching eastward along the
railroad to Bukhara (considerably expanded since the Revolution); also
a large part of the Amu-Darya Delta, east and north of Khiva.
22. The Tedzhen River, in the Tedzhen Oasis, west of the Mary Oasis
(see Wo. 16), on the Bukhara-Ashkhabad railroad,
23. A zone along the Bukhara-Ashkhabad-Krasnovodsk railroad to a dis­ tance of 170 miles north from Ashkhabad and 125 miles south from
Ashkhabad; exploiting short streams from the northeast slope of the
Kopet-Dag.

TABLE II
Rivers and Lakes at Present Exploited for Electric Power
European Russia
1. Tuloma, at Kola, on the railroad 7 miles south of Murmansk.

2. Niva, north of Kandalaksha (Kola Peninsula), on the railroad l66
miles south of Murmansk.
3. Lake Sandal, above Kondopoga, on Lake Onega and the railroad 623
miles south of Murmansk.
k. Svir, at Svirstroi, on Murmansk Railroad 190 miles northeast of
Leningrad.*
5. Volkhov, at Volkhovstroi, on Murmansk Railroad 77 miles east of
Leningrad.
6. Dnepr, at Dnepropetrovsk.*

7. Baksan, at Kyzburun, in North Caucasus (U30 25' E, ^3° 35' N ) ,
i- miles south-southeast of Mineralnyye Vody and 80 miles northwest of
»0 Ordzhonikidze.
8. Gizeldon, at Verkhni Koban, in the North Caucasus 12 miles south-
vest of Ordzhonikidze.
Transcaucasia
9. Rioni, at Vartsikhe below Kutaisi near the TransCaucasian Railroad,
about 85 miles from Batum and 55 miles from the Black Sea.
10. 11. Aragva, north of Tiflis.
Khrami, at Rosenberg, ^0 miles southwest of Tiflis.

12. Alazan, near Kardanakhi, 55 miles east of Tiflis, on a branch
railroad.
13. Adzharis-Tskali, at Makhuntseti, 20 miles east-southeast of Batum.
Now in German hands.

- 198 ­

TABLE II
Rivers and Lakes at Present Exploited for Electric Power
(Continued)
1^. Dzoraget, near Kalageran on Tiflis--Yerivan railroad, about kO
miles " y rail south of Tiflis, in Soviet Armenia.
b 15. Zapadnaya (Western) Arpa-Chai, at Kaps, 8 miles northwest of
Leninakan, which is 137 miles by rail southwest of Tiflis, in Soviet
Armenia.
16. Zanga, "between Lake Sevan and Yerivan, capital of Soviet Armenia;
project provides eventually for 9 stations aggregating 570,000 kw., or
12,000 more than the Dnepr Dam. According to latest available infor­ mation (19^2) two units are in operation: Kanaker I with ^2,000 kw.
and Kanaker II with ij-6,000 kw. The Gyumyush station, with 1^,000 kw.,
is under construction,
17. Okhchi-Sai, at Kafan, the terminus of a railroad running southwest
from Baku along the Araks River into the southeastern extremity of
Soviet Armenia.
Central Asia
18. urba, at Ulba, on the railroad spur of the Turksi"b Railroad from
Semipalatinsk to Ridder, about 10 miles southwest of the latter, in
the northeast extremity of the Kazakh Republic.
19. Chirchik, at Chirchik, 20 mileB northeast of Tashkent, on a rail­ road spur from Tashkent. There are four other hydroelectric stations
in the vicinity of Tashkent on tributaries of the Chirchik. The largest
one (10,000-25,000 kw.) known to be completed is at Kadyrya, 10 miles
northeast of Tashkent.
20. Varzob, 8 miles north of Stalinabad, capital of the Tadzhik
Republic.

- 199 ­

2.

TOPOGRAPHY,*

a. General. From the western "border of the Soviet Union
to the Yenisei River, 27° to 90° E, or more than one-sixth of the dis­ tance around the globe "between the Arctic Circle and latitude 55° N,
there is no elevation sufficiently great, steep or rugged to present
a really serious military obstacle from any direction. Even the Ural
Mountains, though twice as high as the Central Russian and Volga Hills,
resemble these two hill chains in that the forests which cover them
with increasing density northward from 55° N represent more consider­ able impediments to military movements than do their topographic fea­ tures. South of 55° (1 degree south of Moscow) the forest land shades
off gradually into treeless steppe.
Irom north to south there is an open sweep varying from
1,500 miles, between the Barents Sea and the Caspian, to 2,TOO miles,
between the Kara Sea and the Afghan border, across the Turgeti Gates
and the Kyzyl-Kum and Kara-Kum Deserts.
If the Soviet Union west of the Yenisei has little inter­ nal protection through natural features, all its borders except the
western are exceptionally well protected by seas and high mountains.
To the south of European Russia are the Black Sea, the Major and Minor
Caucasus (backed by the high mountains of eastern Turkey), and the
Caspian Sea, bordered on the south by the high ranges of Iran. The
mountain ranges marking the southern border of Asiatic Russia, together
with the principal passages across them, are described in detail below.
Some of these passages are broad enough to facilitate a large-scale
invasion, but all of them lead in from areas which are themselves very
difficult of access. As the parts of the border ranges which overlap
upon the territory of the Soviet Union mostly occupy large recesses
in the border, they cannot greatly interfere with military movements
within the Soviet Union. Lake Baikal and the Central Siberial Table­ land, backed by the Yablonovy, Stanovoi and other high ranges, afford
an excellent natural defense on the east side of the West Siberian
Lowland.
European Russia.
(1) The Central Russian Hills extend from a point 90
miles southeast of Leningrad in a south-southeast direction 500 miles
to the Northern Donets River, and are resumed beyond the 55-^ilo broad
valley of the latter by the Donets Ridge, which slopes off gently
toward the Gulf of Taganrog. The broadest part of this chain, known
See Map
b.

- £00

as the Smolensk-Moscow Ridge, is about 225 miles wide, reaching from
Smolensk to Moscow. It tapers off gradually "both northward and south­ ward. North of the Smolensk-Moscow Ridge, the chain is indented only
lightly "by the headwaters of the Volga, Dnepr and Western Dvina, and
is here called the Valdai Hills. South of the Smolensk-Moscow Ridge,
"between Bryansk and Kaluga (southwest of Moscow), the chain is almost
cut in two by a depression extending from the head of the Desna, a
tributary of the Dnepr, to the head of the Oka, a tributary of the
Volga. South of this gap the chain attains its greatest altitude,
1,007 feet. Its average elevation is not over 500 or 600 feet. It is
undulating throughout and heavily forested north of the Bryansk-Kaluga
gap. Southward from this line, the forest gradually gives way to tree­ less steppe and the chain becomes more and more disrupted by the many
tributaries of the Dnepr on the west and the Don on the east.
(2) The Volga Hills extend 1*50 miles southward from
the Gorki-Kazan section of the Volga along the west side of this river
to Stalingrad, whence they are continued southward to the Kumo-Manych
Sink (between the Sea of Azov and the Caspian Sea) by the lower
Yergeni Range. Their northern half is over 200 miles broad, while
their southern half (south of Saratov) rapidly breaks up into a narrow
chain of more or less scattered heights. The highest point, l,2lj-8 feet,
is in the Khvalynsk Mountains, near the town of Khvalynsk on the Volga,
just below 53° N. The average altitude of the northern half is between
700 and 900 feet. In general, the elevation decreases toward the south,
but altitudes of 6OO-7OO feet are found even at the southern end of the
Yergeni chain. Large stretches of the Volga Hills fall off in precipi­ tous cliffs toward the Volga, whereas the east shore is almost every­ where low, level and marshy and is covered "by the spring floods almost
to the limit of the valley, which is from 1 to 13 miles wide. South
of the Kumo-Manych Sink, the Yergeni chain is resumed by the Stavropol
Hills, between kl° and k5° E, which incline southward into the foothills
of the Caucasus.
(3) The Kalach Hills, included between the Don on the
west and its main tributary, the Khoper, on the east, form an imperfect
transverse connection between the southern ends of the Central Russian
and Volga Hills, to which it is similar in altitude and general
character•
(k) The three hill chains described above, together
with the Oka (Volga tributary) on the north, enclose the Oka-Don Lowland
(southeast of Moscow), the very heart of European Russia and one of
its most fertile and populous areas. They are almost the only eleva­ tions rising above the general level of the great East European Plain,
which otherwise occupies the whole of European Russia from its western
border to the foothills of the Urals and from the Arctic Sea to the

T

201 ­

foothills of the Caucasus. They divide this plain into the following
distinct lowland areas.
(a) The Dnepr Lowland, with large swamp areas
north of Kiev and dry, treeless steppe land south of that city.
(b) The Black Sea Lowland ("between the Dnepr and
the Crimean Peninsula), into which intrude the Volhynian-Podolsk Hills,
which extend eastward from Poland as far as 32° E and have a consider­ ably greater general elevation than the Central Russian Hills.
(c) The Oka-Don Lowland, continued north of the
Oka "by the swampy Moshchorskaya Lowland.
(d) The Kumo-Manych Sink, already mentioned.
(e) The arid and partly sandy Caspian Lowland,
extending in the form of a crescent with a maximum width of 2^0 miles
from the east end of the Caucasus around the northern third of the
Caspian Sea to the Ust-Urt Plateau west of the Aral Sea and south of
the Urals.
(5) A "branch of the Scandinavian mountain system
stretches over most of the Kola Peninsula except its south shore.
Average heights in different parts range from 500 to 2,000 feet. The
highest points are situated amid the group of extensive and highly
ramified lakes in the southwestern part of the peninsula, where Mount
Lyavachorr, "between Lakes Imandra and Umbozero, attains an elevation
of 3,893 feet.
(6) The foothills of the Urals protrude at many points
as much as 200 miles or more into the East European Plain, "but they
are much "broken up, and at a number of places more or less completely
severed from the Ural Ridge, by the numerous tributaries of the Volga
(especially the Kama) and of the Pechora. Their general height and
character are similar to those of the Volga Hills.
(7) The Crimean Mountains, geologically a spur of the
Caucasus cut off "by the Kerch Strait, extend along the southeast coast
of the peninsula from Sevastopol to the region of Feodosiya and reach
inland as much as 25 miles, the distance of Simferopol, capital of the
Crimea, from the coast. The main ridge (so-called "Yaila", meaning
"pasture" in Crimean Tatar) extends from Balaklava, southeast of
Sevastopol, to Stary Krym, west of Feodosiya, rising from both extremi­ ties to its highest point, Mt. Roman-Kosh, 5>O15 feet. It has a flat
surface with isolated summits. It slopes gently into the northern
valley, but drops off in rocky cliffs toward the south shore, a narrow
zone of health resorts and most highly developed agriculture.
The remaining three-fourths of the peninsula is
more or less arid lowland. Some elevations under 600 feet occur in the

hwm MHMHMHHUJL

V

Kerch Peninsula, the east projection of the Crimea, and northwest of
Yevpatoriya, in its west projection.
The Caucasus.*
(1) The main ridge of the Major Caucasus is about
1,000 miles long, and has a large number of northward and southward
spurs. The highest peak is the Elbrus (^2° 30' E, U3 0 20' N), l8,VfO
feet high. The Kazbek (kk° 30' E, h2° kV N), the sixth peak in the
Caucasus, is 16,390 feet high and is situated about 10 miles west of the
191-mile long Georgian Military Highway between Ordzhonikidze (formerly
Vladikavkaz, meaning "Control-Caucasus") and Tiflis, the only motor
road leading across the main ridge of the Major Caucasus. The section
between the Elbrus and the Kazbek is the highest part of the range, and
has a very heavy covering of eternal snow and glaciers. The average
altitude of the eastern part of the range, between Dagestan on the
north and the Azerbaidzhan Republic on the south, is between 5>8OO and
9,700 feet. The two highest peaks are the Bazar-Dyuzi, 1^,590 feet,
and the Shakh-Dag, 13,8l6 feet (U8° E, northeast of the Bazar-Dyuzi),
both covered with eternal snow.
The only easily accessible pass in the entire range
is the Gudaur Pass (formerly called Krestovy or Cross Pass), 7,700 feet
high, on the Georgian Military Highway. The only known pass between
Dagestan and Azerbaidzhan is the Salavat Pass, 9>19*»- feet high, just
east of hQ° E.
The slope of the Major Caucasus, as a rule, is
much steeper toward the south than toward the north. Toward the Kura
Valley, the mountains fall away very abruptly, as much as 2,000 feet
in a single drop. The eastern end of the range inclines more gradually
toward the east and southeast to the Apsheron Peninsula, a hilly
plateau with heights up to 160 feet above ocean level, or 2 Mi- feet
above the level of the Caspian. Along the Caspian, the Caucasus every­ where leaves a low coastal strip, ranging in width from one mile,
around Ul° N, to 20 miles. Along the Black Sea, between Sochi and
Sukhum, it drops sharply to the coast line at many points and leaves
only a narrow margin at many others.
The whole area of the east and southeast slope of
the Major Caucasus from the Apsheron Peninsula to Larich (^8° 25' E,
k0° 50' N ) , 85 miles west-northwest of Baku, abounds in mud volcanoes,
active from time to time. They are also found farther to the south
in the steppe zone, and on the coastal islands of the Caspian Sea.
* Map Ik.
c.

iih\ !<[:>!

/'•: -<\ '! ' v v . ' • i.v^j^j ' ;.»i •' '
'

- 203 ­

(2) The Major and Minor Caucasus are connected by the
north-south transverse Surami Range, which the Transcaucasian railroad
and highway cross by means of the 3,08^-foot high Surami Pass (U3 0 20»E),
situated about one-fourth as far from the Black Sea as from the Caspian.
(3) The Minor Caucasus occupies most of the area between
the Rioni-Kura river line and the Turkish and Iranian borders, as far
east as h'J0 E. The Georgian part of the system, consisting of two east-
west ranges, the Telereti and the Adzharo-Imareti (the latter touching
the coast at Batum), merges with the mountains of northeastern Turkey.
The highest points are over 10,000 feet. The eastern half of the Minor
Caucasus, separated from Turkey and Iran by the Araks River and the
Armenian Plateau (about il-,000 feet high), occupies the greater part of
the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and reaches over into Azerbaid­ zhan in the Karabakh Highland, embraced by the Nagorno-Karabakh (High­ land Karabakh) Autonomous 0blast of the Azerbaidzhan Republic. The
highest peak in the Minor Caucasus is Alagoz (in Azerbaidzhani) or
Aragats (in Armenian), 13,310 feet, 35 miles west of Lake Sevan, on
kk° 12» E, *K)O'32! N, rising like an isolated volcano cone from the
Armenian Plateau, or Plain of Ararat. Various ranges encircle Lake
Sevan, 6,230 feet above sea level. Along its northeast side runs the
Shakh-Dag Range, continued eastward to the Azerbaidzhan (Kura) Lowland
by the Murov-Dag or Gyandzha Range, 5,800 to 9,700 feet high.
The principal highway pass over the Armenian
Highland is the Semyonovski Pass, 7>O6o feet high, across the Pambak
Range, a few miles beyond the northwest end of Lake Sevan, on the route
from Yerevan, capital of Soviet Armenia, to Delidzhan and Kirovakan
(formerly Karaklis) in northern Armenia.
(h) The Talysh Range, along the southeast part of the
Azerbaidzhan border and without direct connection with the Soviet part
of the Minor Caucasus, is the northwest extremity of the Elborus Moun­ tains of Iran skirting the south shore of the Caspian Sea. It declines
toward the sea and ends 3 "to 12 miles from the shore in low hills and
spurs. The coastal zone is very humid lowland, separated from the sea
by a small ridge of sand and pebbles, formed by the surf, and is dotted
with shallow lakes and estuaries.
(5) In general, the western part of Transcaucasia is
thickly wooded, owing to the heavy rainfall. The forest covering
dwindles eastward from the Suram Ridge, is scant in the western part
of Azerbaidzhan and entirely lacking in the lowland parts of eastern
Azerbaidzhan, Over 50 percent of Abkhazia, in northwestern Georgia,
and of Adzharistan, in southwestern Georgia, is covered with forest.
The northern slopes and foothills of the Major Caucasus are semiarid
and nearly treeless. The northern slopes of the Minor Caucasus north­ west of Lake Sevan are covered with fine

- 204'

remainder of the range ig more or less "barren and devoid of trees and
other large-size natural vegetation. The frequency of earthquakes in
Armenia indicates the recent geologic origin of the Minor Caucasus.
The Ural Mountains.
(1) The Urals are a very old mountain fold chain which
has "been much worn down " y long cycles of erosion, but still represents
b a fairly sharp dividing line "between the drainage systems of European
Bussia and Western Siberia from near the Arctic Sea as far south as
the Ural River, at 51° N. Beyond the Ural River it is continued toward
the Ust-Urt Plateau and the Aral Sea by the less distinct Mugodzhary
Range, also the remnant of a fold formation, having a maximum altitude
of 2,. 100 feet. Konstantinov Kamen, at the northern extremity of the
Urals, is 1,466 feet high, and is still covered with snow in July,
being only about 25 miles from the Kara Sea. The highest point in the
entire chain is Telpos-Iz, 5,505 feet high, on 63 0 55« N. North of
this point there are a number of peaks between 3,000 and 5,000 feet
high. South of it, they become lower: Mount Isherim (6l° U» N), con­ sidered as dividing the North from the Central Urals, is 4,325 feet
high. In the populated and industrialized part, from Nizhni Tagil
southward to the Ural River, the altitudes range between 1,500 and
3,500 feet. On the west side of the Urals, the foothills are well
developed, but on their east slope they are almost totally absent.
The slope to the pass leading over to Sverdlovsk is so gradual that
the summit is imperceptible to a traveler on the Trans-Siberian line,
which crosses at this point.
The northern and central parts of the Urals are
covered with a rich growth of many varieties of trees. Southward from
Sverdlovsk the forest covering thins out more and more though far more
rapidly on the east slope. The region around Magnitogorsk, (on the
east slope), the new metallurgical center created in the midst of a
wilderness, is almost treeless. The Central and Southern Urals are
extremely rich in a majority of the most important minerals, many of
which have been exploited for more than a century.
Siberia.
JT) The West Siberian Lowland has been more fully
described under "Hydrography", since water occupies an exceptionally
large part of it. However, in the salt-lake zone along its southern
side there are extensive areas of more or less dry steppe land. The
largest of these are:
(a) the Ishim Steppe, situated between the upper
Tobol (southwest Irtysh tributary) and the Upper Irtysh, and traversed
by the Ishim River (also a southwest Irtysh tributary);
<e. d.

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(b) the Baraba Steppe, enclosed "between the Irtysh
and the upper Ob, and surrounding Lake Chany. In its northern part,
expanses of steppe land alternate with scattered patches of "birch, the
number of which decreases toward the south. Extensive drainage work
has "been done here since "before the Revolution, and has even reached
northward into the Vasyuganye Swamp.
These steppes contain long, gently sloping
elevations alternating with sinks. The elevations run mainly north­ east, rise 10-1+0 feet, rarely 65 feet, above the general level of the
steppe, and are hundreds of yards "broad and sometimes several miles
long. The Ural Steppe, which continues these steppes westward, is 700
feet high at Chelyabinsk, but the average relative height of its
elevations is less than in the steppes to the east.
Even in these steppes, the vales between the
elevations are not infrequently the beds of swamps, salt marshes, small
lakes and streams. The Baraba Steppe adjoins the swampy Vasyuganye
on the north and the dry Kulunda Steppe on the south. The latter (west
of Barnaul) contains many salt lakes, of which the largest is Lake
Kulunda, 20 miles long by 15 miles wide.
(2) The Central Siberian Tableland occupies most of
the area between the Yenisei, the Lena and Lake Baikal as far north
as the 200-300 mile broad northeastern arm of the West Siberian Lowland.
This tableland, measuring 1,000-1,300 miles from north to south and
some 1,000 miles from east to west, is a region of very old horizontal
strata largely characterized by mesa formations, produced by the ero­ sive action of countless rivers of all sizes. It is consequently one
of the most rugged areas in the Soviet Union. The average elevation
varies in different sections from 1,000 to 5*000 feet, the greater
part being nearer the lower limit.
f_. Soviet Central Asia.
JT) The Kazakh (or Kirgiz) Fold-Land (Skladchataya
Strana) forms the larger part of the natural boundary between Siberia
and Soviet Central Asia, though it is overlapped some 100-200 miles by
the Kazakh Republic in its present boundaries. From the Chingiz-Tau
Mountains (780 E), northeast of Lake Balkhash, it extends some 600
miles westward and northwestward to the Turgai River and Turgai Gates
(650 E ) , north-northeast of the Aral Sea. It widens from about 100
miles at its east end to over 350 miles at its west end. Nowhere does
it reach an altitude of 5,000 feet. The highest points are in the
eastern part, to the north and south of Karkaralinsk, a road center
north of Lake Balkhash. The geologic folds, from which the chain
receives its scientific name, run partly northeast, partly northwest.

- 206 ­

Low, short ranges, unconnected with each other, alternate rapidly with
areas of small, low, isolated hillocks having rounded contours. Entirely
level sections are rare, though the Kazakh Fold-Land resembles a steppe
in the character of its vegetation and the lack of forest.
(2) The Turgai Gates (Turgaiskiye Vorota), 20-100
miles wide and over 250 miles long, are a gap "between the Kazakh Fold-
Land and the Southern Ural Steppe. They connect the head of the Ubagan
River, a tributary of the Tobol, and the salt lake of the same name
(50 by 5-10 miles) with the head of the Turgai, a tributary of the salt
lake Chelkar-Tengiz• The Turgai Gates themselves contain a large number
of small salt lakes, and a few large ones. The highest part of the gap
is "barely U00 feet above sea level, while the plateau to the west, form­ ing the watershed between the Turgai and the Ishim (irtysh tributary),
attains 1,000 feet above sea level. The tableland on both sides of the
gap is also known as the Turgai Mesa Land, as it consists of low, iso­ lated plateaus or mesas, between and around which lie steppe plains,
sandy areas or lakes.
(3) The Tarbagatai Range, marking in its eastern half
an east-west section of the Kazakh-Chinese border along hj° N, extends
along the south side of the basin of Lake Zaisan, official source of
the Irtysh, toward the Turkistan-Siberian Eailroad ("Turksib"). Its
average elevation is 5*000-7,000 feet, its maximum point (Tas-Tau),
9,600 feet. Its most used pass, Khabar-Asu, 8,200 feet high, leads
over to the Chinese-Turkic town of Chuguchak, an important point on an
ancient trade route. West of the railroad, the Tarbagatai Range is
continued northwestward by the lower and more sprawling Chingiz-Tau
Mountains, which merge with the Kazakh Fold-Land around 78 0 E, thus
completing the physical dividing line between Siberia and Soviet Central
Asia.
{k) The Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range, marking in its eastern
half another east-west section of the Kazakh-Chinese border along ^5° N,
curves southwestward to the railroad and the valley of the H i , tribu­ tary to Lake Balkhash. On the Chinese side it reaches through the
area between Lake Ebi-Nur and the H i to join the northeast extremity
of the T'ien Shan Range around the headwaters of this river. It reaches
elevations of 15*000-16,500 feet and is covered with small glaciers,
1-3 miles long.
(5) With the exception of the Fergana Valley, and a
few smaller irrigated areas, oases and very restricted river valleys,
the lowland interior of Soviet Central Asia is one vast area of more or
less sandy wasteland, measuring about 1,^00 miles from the Tarbagatai
and Dzhungar Ala-Tau Ranges in the east to the Caspian Sea in the west,
200 to 300 miles from north to south in its eastern half, between the
Kazakh Fold-Land and th© Kirgiz Highland (T'ien Shan Range), and 700
to 1,000 miles in its western half, between the Southern Urals and the

- 207 ­

"border with Afghanistan and Iran. The following are its most important
divisions, from east to west:
(a) The Sary-Ishik-Otrau Sands, "between Lakes Ala-
Kul and Balkhash.
(b) The Hunger Steppe (Golodnaya Step, or Betpak-
Dala), extending west from Lake Balkhash to the Sary-Su Eiver (6j°-6Q°
E) and south to the Chu Eiver (roughly along V?° W ) ; a desert plateau,
800-950 feet above s.l., dropping from a 12-20 foot ledge toward the
Sary-Su and sloping rather gently toward the Chu.
(c) The Muyun-Kum Sands, south of the Hunger Steppe
and enclosed "between the Chu River, the Talas Ala-Tau Range and its
northwest spur, the Kara-Tau Range; average elevation 350 feet.
(d) The Kyzyl-Kum ("Red Sand") Desert, enclosed by
the Hunger Steppe, Muyun-Kum Sands and Kara-Tau Range on the east, the
highlands of Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan on the southeast, the Amu-Darya
River on the southwest, and the Aral Sea on the west; covered almost
entirely with stationary eand and sandhills. Throughout the Kyzyl-Kum,
areas of sandhills alternate with takyrs, smooth, hard, clayey areas
like a par^uetted floor, in the depressions "between the sandhill ridges.
In the early spring these fill with water, forming lakes, sometimes a
dozen or more miles long, which dry out "by the end of April or May. In
other seasons, the Kyzyl-Kum is almost inaccessible "because of the
nearly total lack of water, though it contains ancient irrigation sys­ tems and fortifications of "burnt "brick. The southeast corner of this
desert, southwest of Tashkent and the Syr-Darya River and west of the
mouth of the Fergana Valley, is also known as the Hunger Steppe, --to
"be distinguished from the much larger Hunger Steppe described above
under No. 2. In this arid forest plain, extensive irrigation works
had "been completed and were partly under construction even "before the
First World War; under the Soviet regime they have "been considerably
expanded. The Kyzyl-Kum as a whole declines toward the •Turanian Low­ land, which extends from the Aral Sea to a distance of 50-100 miles
and is included in the desert.
(e) The Kara-Kum ("Black Sand") Desert, covering
most of the area "between the Amu-Darya on the northeast, the Afghan
border, the Caspian Sea and the Ust-Urt Plateau on the northwest, and
extending some 600 miles from southeast to northwest and 200-300 miles
from northeast to southwest. Most of it is lower than the Kyzyl-Kum
Desert. The sands alternate between dunes and sand steppe. The hills
vary from a few feet to 25-35 feet, the usual height being 20-25 feet.
They are irregular in shape, but all their slopes are gentle and rein­ forced with vegetation. Parallel sand ridges, with slightly undulating
crests usually 50-70 feet high, are scattered throughout the northwest
part of the desert as far east as 59° E (east of Ashkhabad). The

- 208 ­

distance "between them is usually 200-280 feet, "but ranges from 150 to
700 feet. The depressions are characterized by the formation of takyrs,
as in the Kyzyl-Kum Desert.
(f) The Ust-Urt Plateau, occupying most of the
area "between the Aral Sea, the Amu-Darya Delta, the Kara-Kum Desert
(on the south), the Mangyshlak Peninsula of the Caspian Sea and the
North Caspian Lowland; a monotonous plain of horizontal strata of clay
and stone, covered with sand or salt lakes, and surrounded on all four
sides "by precipices, which are 88 feet a"bove the level of the Aral Sea,
up to 1,000 feet above the level of the Caspian Sea, and are almost
everywhere clearly defined.
(g) The Bolshiye Barsuki ("Big Badger") Sands,
6-27 miles wide and about 125 miles long, extending northward from the
northwest side of the Aral Sea, and the 50-mile long Malyye Barsuki
("Little Badger") Sands, to the east of the former.
£. Border Passages and Ranges of Asiatic Russia. The
border between Asiatic Russia on the one hand and Iran, Afghanistan,
China and Mongolia on the other is for the most part marked by high
mountain ridges. The only important gaps in these border chains are:
(l) Border Passages.
(a) The 60-mile broad Southeast Caspian Lowland,
which extends 1+0-50 miles over into Iran. A strip of lowland shore at
least one mile broad reaches westward along the south shore of the
Caspian and is followed by the railroad from the Caspian port of
Bender-Shah, in the southwestern extremity of the Southeast Caspian
Lowland, to Teheran.
(b) The 100-mile broad sand-desert valley of the
Amu-Darya, nearly all of which lies in Afghanistan, since a number of
north-south spurs of the Tadzhik Highland abut on the north side of
the river. But to the south and east of the valley lies the mighty
barrier of the Hindukush, watershed between the Amu-Darya and the
basins of the Indus and the Tarim (in Chinese Turkestan), reaching
altitudes of more than 25,000 feet.
(c) The gap of the Kok-Shaal River through the
Kok-Shaal-Tau Range at ^0° 55' N, 76° k^ E, connecting southeast
Kirgizia with the Kashgar basin.
(d; The 111 Valley, leading over to Kuldzha (in
Chinese Turkestan), beyond which it is shut in by the convergence of
the Dzhungar Ala-Tau and T'ien Shan Ranges, which extend along the
north and south of the valley from Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, respec­ tively. From Sary-Ozek, on the railroad 10^ miles north of Alma-Ata,
a highway runs along the north side of the 111 Valley into the Chinese
province of Sinkiang, where it turns northeastward across the 5 8 9 9

- 209 ­

feet high Talki Pass in the Dzhungar Range to Lake Ebi-Nur, whence it
rims eastward to Hami, and on to Lanchow and Chungking.
(e) The Dzhungar Gates (Dzhungarskiye Vorota), a
waterless gap 5 to 10 miles wide, extending south-southeastward from
Lake Ala-Kul across the Kazakh-Chinese border to the region of Lake
Ebi-Nur and separating the east end of the Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range from
the Barlyk Range in China.
(f) The 30-mile "broad valley of the Chyorny (Black)
Irtysh, which rises in the Mongolian Desert southwest of the Mongolian
part of the Altai Mountains, crosses the "border at kQ° N and empties
into Lake Zaisan, considered the source of the Irtysh.
(2) Border Ranges, Between the Southeast Caspian Low­ land and the Kara-Kum Desert the Iranian border range of Kopet-Dag
protrudes some 75 miles into Soviet territory. The western edge of
this spur lies approximately on 55° E. Its northeastern edge is delim­ ited by the Ashkhabad railroad. It reaches a maximum elevation of
9*685 feet on Soviet territory, in Mt. Vazarash, southwest of Ashkhabad.
It has only a few small streams and scant forest.
From this spur to the Amu-Darya Valley the boundary
skirts the foothills of the great mountain systems of Iran and
Afghanistan. Thence eastward to Lake Zor-Kul (source of the Pamir),
it is marked by the Amu-Darya, Pyandzh and Pamir Rivers. The remainder
of the Soviet border, from Lake Zor-Kul to Transbaikalia, follows in
general the crests of some of the highest ridges in the Pamirs of
Tadzhikistan, the T'ien Shan Ranges of Kirgizia, and the Altai and
Sayan Ranges of south central Siberia. The following are the principal
ridges forming this boundary line:
(a) The Vakhan Range, between Lake Zor-Kul and
the southwest extremity of the Tadzhik Republic. The Bender Pass, 25
miles east of Lake Zor-Kul, is around 15,000 feet high.
(b) The Sary-Kol Range, forming the eastern
boundary of Tadzhikistan and the watershed between the Ak-Su, indirect
tributary of the Pyandzh, and the Yarkend-Darya basin in Chinese
Turkistan. The few passes over it exceed 1^,000 feet. The important
Beik Pass, near its southern end, where it merges with the Vakhan
Range and the Hindukush, is 15*3^0 feet high.
(c) The Kok-Shaal-Tau Range, marking the eastern
boundary of the Kirgiz Republic with the Kashgar Basin. The Kugart
Pass (7U 0 30' E. kO6 20' N) is about 12,000 feet high; the Bedel Pass,
in the middle of the range southeast of Lake Issyk-Kul, over 13,000
feet high. There are many glaciers throughout the range, and an espe­ cially heavy concentration in a 15-mile section on either side of
Dankov Peak, 17,700 feet high, about 70 miles south of Bedel Pass,

> r^i
:

The eastern extremity of the Kirgiz Republic, embracing a roughly cir­ cular area 55-65 miles in diameter, is occupied "by a solid nucleus of
glacier-covered mountains, the Khan-Tengri, with Khan-Tengri Peak,
22,735 feet high, and others over 20,000 feet.
(d) The Sailyugem-Shapshal Range of the Altai
Mountains (see "below), "between the Chyorny Irtysh Valley and 89° E.
(e) The Western Sayan Range, winding from 89° to
96° E in a generally northeast or east-northeast direction along the
Mongolian Border, from the Altai Mountains to the east "boundary of the
Krasnoyarsk Krai. The altitudes of the main ridge are from 5,000 to
9,200 feet, those of the passes from 6,000 to 7,000 feet. It rises
"beyond the timber line (5,700-6,200 feet) throughout, and the crest is
mostly jagged with sharp peaks, and has numerous small lakes and tarns
on "both slopes. The Shabin-Daban Pass (91° 35' E ) , leading from the
Abakan "basin into Mongolia, is 6,700 feet high. A main thoroughfare
from Abakan -Minusinsk crosses the main ridge from the Us Valley (paral­ lel to the main ridge) to Kyzyl on the Mongolian part of the Yenisei
in the Tuva People's Republic, over an unnamed pass 5,655 feet high.
North of the main ridge there are a number of secondary ranges.
(f) The Eastern Sayan Range, very sparcely popu­ lated and one of the least known areas in Siberia, runs southeastward
from a point not far southwest of Krasnoyarsk, unites with the north­ east end of the Western Sayan Range and continues southeast along the
Mongolian "border to the Dzhida and Selenga Rivers, south of the south­ west end of Lake Baikal. Its highest point, Mount Munku-Sardyk, on the
"border north of the Mongolian Lake Kosogol or Khubsugul-Dalai, has an
elevation of 11,210 feet, and is the source of several of the large
glaciers of the range. The few passes are 6,000 to 8,000 feet high.
The Eastern Sayan as a rule slopes gently toward the north and east
(toward the Irkutsk amphitheater) and steeply toward the upper Yenisei
and Lake Kosogol (101° 30f E, in Mongolia). The prevalent forms are
massive and rounded, with "broad, level or slightly undulating crests,
over which sometimes rise level summits. On the upper parts there are
small glaciers and snowfields, "but scattered rocks predominate. The
snowline is at 9,^00 feet on the north slope, at 10,000 on the south
slope; the timber line, at 6,500-7,100 feet. The Eastern Sayan Range
sends out a large number of spurs, 5,000 to 9,500 feet high, northwest­ ward or northward toward the Trans-Siberian Railroad.
The Tadzhik and Kirgiz Highlands.*
(l) The general direction of the ridges within this
highland area is from east to west. Those of the Kirgiz Republic abut
on the border range (Kok-Shaal-Tau), as the principal rivers here cut
* Map 15.
h.

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across the "border. Those of the Tadzhik Republic are largely separated
from the "border range (Saryk-Kol) by rivers (Ak-Su, Ak-Baital, Muz-Kol,
Kara-Dzhilga) running parallel to the "border range, and "by Lake Kara-Kol.
in the northeast corner of the Republic. However, the valleys them­ selves lie at elevations of 10,000 to 1^,000 feet, so that the entire
territory of the MountainouB Badakhshan (Gorno-Badakhshanskaya) Autono­ mous Ob last, occupying the eastern half of the Tadzhik Republic, is a
single, unbroken mass of highland, the Pamir Highland, measuring some
180-200 miles east to west and 90-110 miles from north to south. A
zone with a maximum width of 30 miles on either side of the "border be­ tween the Oblast and the western half of Tadzhikistan J.s a vast glacier
area, culminating in Stalin Peak (72° E, 59° N ) , 2^,359 feet high, at
the eastern end of the Peter the Great Range (maximum altitude over
20,000, passes 11,000-12,000 feet). It is separated from the Trans-
Alai Range by the Muk-Su, indirect tributary of the Amu-Darya. The
Darvaz Range, paralleling the Peter the Great Range on the south, is
equally high and contains many glaciers.
(2) The eastern half of Tadzhikistan is separated from
the Kirgiz Republic by the Trans-Alai (Zaalaiski) Range; the western
half by the Alai and Turkestan Ranges. All three have large glacier
areas. Lenin (formerly Kaufman) Peak (73° E ) , 23,162 feet high, is
one of the highest points in the Soviet Union. To the west of Lenin
Peak is the Ters-Agar Pass, 12,^92 feet high; to the east of it, the
Kyzyl-Art Pass, 13>9l6 feet high. The Alai Range, extending along the
north side of the Alai Valley (valley of the Kyzyl-Su, Amu-Darya
tributary) into Kirgizia as far as the southeast end of the Fergana
Range, is the main watershed between the basins of the Syr-Darya and
the Amu-Darya. Its principal pass is the Taldyk Pass, 11,860 feet
high, which is crossed by an old cart road, now converted into a motor
road, leading from Osh, at the head of the Fergana Valley, to the Alai
Valley. From the Alai Valley this road continues southward across the
Trans-Alai Range by the 13,920-foot high Kyzyl-Art Pass, then along
the east side of Lake Kara-Kol, across the 15,315-foot high Ak-Baital
Pass, down the Ak-Baital River to the Murgab and across the Naiza-Tash
Pass, then westward through the southern part of the High Pamirs
through the Alichur Valley, across the 13,600-foot high Tagarkaty Pass
and the 1^, 100-foot high Koi-Tezek Pass and finally down the valleys
of the Tokuz-Bulak and Gunt Rivers to Khorog (37° 30f W ) , on the
Pyandzh River and the Afghan border. From Murgab, on the Murgab River,
a cart road runs up the Ak-Su River valley into the southeast corner
of Tadzhikistan.
(3) The Fergana Range, 120 miles long, extends north­ westward from the junction of the Alai and Kok-Shaal-Tau Ranges along
the northeast side of the Fergana Valley to the Naryn River. It has
an average elevation of 1^,000 to 15,000 feet and contains a number of

glaciers. Its northeastern slope is steep, while its southwestern
slope descends to the Fergana Valley in broad foothills. The main
pass, the 10,800-foot high Kugart Pass, leads from the Kugart Valley
above Dzhalalabad, at the head of the Fergana Valley, to the inner
Kirgizia course of the Naryn Eiver. Beyond the Naryn River, the Fergana
Range is continued northwestward by the 40-mile long Uzun-Akhmat-Tau to
the converging point of two other ranges situated in the northwest cor­ ner of the Kirgiz Republic: (l) the Chatkal Range (maximum altitude
over 15,000 feet), coming from the southwest along the northwest side
of the Fergana Valley; (2) the Talas Ala-Tau Range (maximum altitude
over 15,000 feet, with many small glaciers), winding in a general east
and west direction from the converging point between 71° to 7^° E.
This cluster of mountains and the Fergana Range represent the only im­ portant exception to the general east-west direction of the principal
ridges of Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia. The Kara-Mazar Mountains, a
southwestern spur of the Chatkal Range, reach to within a few miles of
the Turkestan Ran^e (western continuation of the Alai Range), leaving
only a comparatively narrow outlet from the Fergana Valley to the desert
plain of Kazakhstan. This fertile and agriculturally developed valley
has the form of a roughly oval amphitheater, about 220 miles from east
to west and 1^0 miles from north to south, enclosed by the ranges men­ tioned in this paragraph.
{k) Beyond the railroad, the northwestward direction
of the Fergana chain is resumed by the Kara-Tau ("Black Mountain")
Range, which protrudes some 250 miles into the sandy desert lowland of
Kazakhstan between the Syr-Darya and Chu Rivers, attaining an elevation
of 7,000 feet.
(5) The northern boundary of the Kirgiz Republic is .
roughly marked by the Kirgiz or Aleksandrovski Range to the west of the
Buam Gorge of the Chu River, and by the Kungei Ala-Tau Range to the
east of that gorge. The average height of the Kungei Ala-Tau is 9>000
feet, the maximum over 1^,000 feet. East of Lake Issyk-Kul it sends
a spur (the Ketmen Range) northeastward along the south side of the
H i River into Chinese Turkestan, while the main ridge curves south­ eastward along the Kirgiz-Kazakh border to the glacier area in the
northeast corner of Kirgizia. Lake Issyk-Kul is enclosed on the south
by the Terskei Ala-Tau, in which the highest peak is 18,000 feet.
Several passes 12,000-15,000 feet high lead over into the Issyk-Kul
basin from the north, across the Kungei Ala-Tau, and from the south,
across the Terskei Ala-Tau.
(6) The Trans-Ili (Zailiiski) Ala-Tau Range, together
with its northwestward extension, the Chu-Ili Mountains, describes a
flat curve along the south of the lowland region of Alma-Ata (capital
of the Kazakh Republic, formerly Verny), with its center touching the
Kungei Ala-Tau in the vicinity of 77° E. It culminates in the 15,900­ foot high Talgar Peak, southeast of Alma-Ata. An area 20-30 miles

broad around the tangent between these two ranges is covered with
numerous glaciers, up to 6 miles in length.
(7) Both the Kirgiz Range and the Trans-Ili Ala-Tau
drop steeply to the northern plain and their upper parts are traversed
"by a "broad "belt of fir forest, usually wreathed in rain or snow clouds.
i . The Altai Mountain SyBtem.* The Altai Mountains extend
. from the northeastern extremity of the Kazakh Republic through the
Altai Krai (District) to the western end of the Western Sayan Range
(89 0 E). Their snow covering is heavy and they have numerous glaciers.
The snow line is between 10,000 and 7,800 feet.** The Altai ranges
become gradually lower toward the north and west where they merge into
the steppe land.
(1) The so-called Inner Altai occupies the southern
part of the Altai Krai, along and north of the Kazakh border. Its
southernmost range, the Kholzun Belki, is 90 miles long, 6,000-9,000
feet high, only a little above the snow line, with small snow fields
and hanging glaciers. The summits and watersheds are flat and often
swampy. The Kazakh border is continued southeastward by the Listvyaga
Range, having a maximum elevation of 8,320 feet and rising little above
the timberline.
(2) North of the Listvyaga Range and almost completely
encircled by the Katun, Argut and Kok-Su Rivers lie the Katun Belki,
the highest mountains in the Russian part of the Altai (as distinguished
from the Mongolian part). The average altitude is about 10,000 feet
and they are covered with eternal snow throughout their entire length,
down to 8,500-7,800 feet on the north slope and to 10,000-8,700 feet
on the south slope. In the central and eastern parts there are solid
ice caps up to 25 miles in breadth. The Belukha, about 1^,800 feet
high on its east summit, 1^,700 feet on its west summit and 13,300 ° n
its saddle, is the tallest peak in the entire Altai. It is located ap­ proximately in the middle of the Katun Belki, at the tip of a northward
loop in the Kazakh border. The total area of its glaciers is about
23 square miles.
(3) East of the Argut River, the Southern Chuya Belki
reach eastward to the Sailyugem border range. They attain their highest
point in Mount Dzhan-Iiktu, around 13,000 feet high, and have 5 large
See Map l6.
Because of their more or less extensive covering of perpetual snow,
the main ranges are known as "Belki" or "Whites", plural of belok,
"the white of an egg or the eye", sometimes also rendered by

U
T!

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glaciers. The Northern Chuya Belki, parallel to the Southern Chuya
Belki and south of the Chuya River, reach a maximum elevation of 8,000
feet.
(k) The Sailyugem Range, marking the •border between
the Altai Krai and Mongolia, extends from the junction of the Kazakh
and Mongolian "borders to the Shapshal-Daba Pass, 9,770 feet high, north
of Lake Khindiktig (9-0° E, 50° 25' N ) . Its maximum altitude is 11,800
feet in its east-west section, and 13>800 feet in its north-south sec­ tion, also called the Chikhachev Range. The post road from the Chuya
Valley to the Khobdo "basin runs across the 8,260-foot high Tashentu
Pass. On both slopes there are valley glaciers over a mile long and
a square mile in area. The main Sailyugem Range is 150 miles long, 9
to 12 miles wide and 10,000 feet high on the average.
(5) North of the Shapshal-Daba Pass, the Sailyugem
Range is continued northward by the Shapshal Range, 100 miles long and
up to 10,500 feet in height, as far as the northern border of the
Altai Krai, where it meets the Western Sayan and Abakan Ranges. It is
covered with snow fields. Between the Shapshal Range and the Chulyshman
River is the State Altai Preserve or protected area, occupying some
3,800 miles. The Chulyshman River flows through the wild Chulyshman
Plateau, J,800-7*90° feet high, covered with erratic blocks, numerous
banks and moraine ridges, which have formed many lakes.
(6) From a westward protrusion of the Soviet-Tuva
border west of Lake Khindiktig the Sailyugem Range sends westward two
arms:
(a) The Kurai Range, 90 miles long and up to
10,700 feet high, continued over 100 miles westward by other ranges
having summits above 8,000, with flat tops covered with abundant snow
fields;
(b) The Chulyshman Range, (south of the Chulyshman
River), 75 miles long, with a maximum elevation of 8,610 feet, reaching
to the head of long, narrow Lake Teletskoye (west of 88° E, south of
52° N ) . This lake is 1,535 feet above sea level, 1*8 by 2-2.5 miles,
has a maximum depth of over 1,000 feet, and is surrounded by precipitous
mountains, which reach 5,500 feet on the southeastern shore (the
Teletski Range).
(7) South of the Kurai Range, in the Chuya Valley, lie
arid highland steppes (called Chuya Steppe in the upper part, Kurai
Steppe in the lower part, separated by a small spur of the Kurai Range),
35-1*5 miles long, up to 10 miles wide, with dry, sandy and stony soil
covered with moraines and river and glacier deposits.
(8) The Abakan Range, over 120 miles long and reaching
over 8,000 feet in its southern part, but little over 5,000 feet in the

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north, curves northward "between the east side of Lake Teletskoye and
the left shore of the Bolshoi ("Big") Abakan River and forms the water­ shed between the headwaters of the Yenisei and the Biya, a tributary of
the Ob.
(9) The west and east boundaries of the southeastern
panhandle of the Novosibirsk Oblast mark the crests of the two north­ ward continuations of the Abakan Range which enclose the Kuznetsk Valley,
containing the "Kuzbas" (Kuznetsk Basin) mining and industrial area;
(a) on the west, the gold-bearing Salair Ridge,
beginning northeast of Lake Teletskoye. It is 150 miles long, but not
high: Mount Kopna, in the north, is less than 2,000 feet high;
(b) on the east, the Kuznetski Ala-Tau (scientific
name), known to the natives only under various other names. It reaches
elevations of 7^000 feet in its southern part, east of Stalinsfc , but
does not exceed 5>000 in its middle, east of Leninsk-Kuznetski, and
toward the Trans-Siberian Railroad it gradually passes over into undu­ lating plains. The peaks of the southern part of the Kuznetski Ala-Tau
are covered with snow nearly all summer.
3. WEATHER o

a. Temperature. Heat and cold in the entire Soviet Union,
except the Black Sea region, are extreme by comparison with most other
areas of the world in the same latitudes. This extremeness becomes
more pronounced with increasing distance from the tempering influence
of the Baltic, North, White and Barents Seas, the Black and Mediter­ ranean Seas, and, to a lesser extent, the Caspian Sea. The Arctic
Ocean exercises no such influence because in the winter it is largely
insulated from the atmosphere by ice, which further chills the air.
In the spring and summer, on the other hand, the melting of the ice
covering and ice flows absorbs a considerable amount of the heat gen­ erated by the sun in the area above the Arctic Circle or brought into
it by the winds. Nevertheless, the winter temperature along the
Siberian north coast, even in the mountains, is somewhat warmer than
inland, despite cold winds from the continent.
The zones of equal summer temperatures run relatively
straight in an easterly direction from the western border of the Soviet
Union to the Yenisei, with only one sharp southward dip enclosing the
main ridge of the Urals. Only in the Caucasian and Kirgiz-Tadzhik
highlands (T'ien Shan and Pamir ranges) do they lose all semblance of
symmetry. The zones of equal winter temperatures, on the contrary,
describe a distinct curve from the Baltic, White and Barents Seas
southeastward toward the Chinese and Mongolian borders, so that

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Leningrad, Moscow and Voronezh lie roughly in the same belt as the Aral
Sea and Lake Balkhash, with a mean daily temperature "below freezing for
120-150 days, and Arkhangelsk and Sverdlovsk lie in the same "belt as
Karaganda and northeast Kazakhstan, with a mean daily temperature "below
freezing for 150-180 days. The region of Lake Peipus, only some 125
miles southwest of Leningrad, has as few days of mean daily temperature
below freezing as the north shore of the Caspian Sea and Alma-Ata,
namely 110 to 120. These phenomena are due mainly to the fact that the
ice-free North and Barents Seas exert an absolutely greater tempering
influence in winter than in summer, when their moderating efficiency is
reduced by the great masses of icebergs passing into them from the
Arctic.
In the larger part of Siberia, average January tempera­ tures are below -k° F, while July temperatures, even in the northern
half, sometimes considerably exceed the mean temperatures of the hottest
parts of Soviet Central Asia. At Verkhoyansk (in the upper Yana Valley,
east of the Lena, only 1° within the Artie Circle), where the lowest
temperatures (-9U0 F) in the world, not excluding the polar regions,
have been recorded, temperatures as high as 9^° F have been recorded
in June-August; and the mean temperature during the same period is 56 0
(60.3 in July), though the thermometer has been known to sink to 18° F
during that period. At Tomsk the mean June-August temperature is 62°,
the maximum 96 0 , the minimum 28°; at Krasnoyarsk, 63.1°, 103° and 2k°,
respectively; at Yeniseisk, 62.9°j» 96° and 30°, respectively; at
Ashkhabad, in the Kara-Kum Desert, 83.7°> 113° and 53°> respectively;
and at Termez, on the Afghan border, 87.3° average and 118° maximum;
at Astrakhan, 7^-6°, 110° and U30, respectively. The remarkably hot
though short summers throughout Siberia make agriculture possible even
beyond the Arctic Circle.
No part of the Soviet Union is absolutely free from
frost. Even in Tashkent and the Fergana Valley freezing weather is
frequent enough to exclude the profitable raising of citrus fruits,
though they are much better protected from the north winds than are
the cotton-growing Amu-Darya lowlands. Even the middle course of the
Syr-Darya River freezes. In the whole northern hemisphere, the only
other rivers that freeze farther south are those of Northern China.
On the Caspian shore, the winters are warmer than in the plains and
valleys of Soviet Central Asia, since the middle and southern parts of
this great inland sea do not freeze, and warm winds are not v&re.
Krasnovodsk has a mean January temperature of yj ,h°, as compared with
32.9° at Ashkhabad, and its December-February minimum is 1°, as compared
with -lh° at Ashkhabad. The mean summer temperature in the Transcaspian
area is above 86° F, considerably higher than at the equator.

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The daily range of temperature in all seasons also
"becomes more pronounced in the direction from the tempering seas of the
west, and is most extreme in the interior of Siberia and Central Asia.
In Western Siberia the influence of the ice in Ob Bay and the Kara Sea
on the north and the hot steppes on the south produces rapid fluctua­ tions in temperature over level expanses, and the great areas of swamp
increase the danger of night frosts at the 'beginning and end of summer.
b. Frozen Subsoils. West of the Yenisei the line of totally
and eternally frozen subsoil runs well above the Arctic Circle (66°
30' N ) , and there is no area of perpetually frozen subsoil south of
62° N. The southern limit of the zone containing areas of perpetually
frozen subsoil curves sharply northwestward from the west side of the
Urals and meets the Arctic Circle over 200 miles northeast of
Arkhangelsk. But almost immediately east of the Yenisei it drops to
the southern border of Siberia, so that no part of the remainder of
Siberia, except the Maritime Province, Sakhalin and southern Kamchatka,
is without more or less extensive patches of perpetually frozen subsoil,
and the line of totally frozen subsoil dips far south of the Arctic
Circle to 60° N north of the Okhot Sea. The permanently frozen condi­ tion of the subsoil at many places favors agriculture by preventing
the draining away of the scant rainfall, but presents the disadvantage
that the surface soil is often marshy and acid when not frozen.*
c. Precipitation. A line drawn through Arkhangelsk,
Kandalaksha (south side of the Kola Peninsula), Leningrad, the western
border of the Soviet Union, Kharkov, Kazan, Molotov (Perm), thence
northward to the latitude of Arkhangelsk (650 N) and westward along it,
roughly encloses an area in which the yearly precipitation amounts to
5OO-65O millimeters (about 20-25 inches), the greater part of which
occurs in the spring and early summer, especially in the central part,
containing Leningrad, Moscow, Minsk and Kiev. An approximately equal
area, with a yearly precipitation of 400-500 millimeters (15.7-20
inches), extends eastward from the first area to a short distance be­ yond the Yenisei, northward more or less to the Arctic Circle and
southward to the railroad line between Sverdlovsk and Novosibirsk, and,
in addition, embraces the foothills of the Altai and the Sayan Mountains
as far as Lake Baikal. The Altai Mountains themselves and parts of the
Sayan Mountains receive 700-800 mm. (27.5-31-5 inches), and some parts
of the Western Sayans receive as much as 1,000 mm. (39-4 inches). The
^00-500 mm. zone also extends westward in belts varying in width from

For details of freezes and thaws in the Volga, Yenisei, etc., see
under "Hydrography."

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kO to 2^0 miles along the north and south side of the 5OO-56O mm. zone,
and reaches down along the east side of the Sea of Azov, the south shore
of the Crimea (see belov) and around the foothills of the Northern and
Southeastern Major Caucasus.
On the Crimean Peninsula, an anomaly with respect to
rainfall, the precipitation increases from less than 300 mm. (11.8
inches) in the north to ^00-500 mm. (15.7-19-9 inches) in the south
part of the steppe and in the foothills, and even more in their forested
parts. The maximum, about 1,000 mm. (39. *- inches) falls on the southern
4 mountain ridge (Yaila). In the main, the Crimea is poor in rainfall.
Many places suffer from water shortage, sometimes water must be carried
from one village to another. The regions of Kerch and Yevpatoriya are
particularly dry, but in the latter there is a vast supply of ground
water at a depth of 15-30 feet, which is pumped up by large plants.
Elsewhere great reservoirs have been built or were under construction
before the present war.
The main ridges of the Major Caucasus, save for its
eastern extremity, lie in the 500-1*000 m . zone, together with western
Transcaucasia (west of the Surami Range). Sukhum has an annual precip­ itation of 1,000 mm., and the region of Batum (Adzharistan) has 2,^00 mm.
(9^-5 inches), the rainfall here being by far the heaviest in the
Soviet Union throughout the year and very favorable for the growing of
tea. The region of Lenkoran, on the southwest side of the Caspian Sea,
receives 1,000 mm., also distributed more or less equally throughout
the year. The Armenian plateau, eastern Azerbaidzhan and Dagestan
(eastern end of the Caucasus), on the other hand, receive only 250-300
mm. (about 10-12 inches) a year, and require irrigation. The south
slope of the Minor Caucasus belongs mostly to this zone, the north
slope to the ^00-500 mm. zone.
The Kirgiz, Eungei Ala-Tau and Trans-Ili Eanges of
northern Kirgizia, together with the basin of Lake Issyk-Kul and the
region around Alma-Ata, are covered by an isolated 500 mm. zone, where
300 mm. of rain fall during the summer half of the year.
Outside the main 1+00-500 mm. zone described above, the
amount of precipitation in general diminishes progressively toward the
Arctic, Black, Caspian and Aral Seas, and the Lena River valley.
Odessa, the northern part of the Crimea, Saratov, Chkalov (Orenburg)
and Omsk are in the 300-i<-00 mm. (about 12-16 in.) belt, likewise the
Kola Peninsula, Igarka on the lower Yenisei and the greater part of
the basins of the Yenisei tributaries, the Upper (Angara), Middle and
Lower Tunguska Rivers. The rainfall in Siberia is usually sufficient

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f«r grain and fodder, but there have been occasional catastrophic
droughts in the so-called "Siberian Granary", around Tobolsk and Tomsk.
The driest area in the Soviet Union is a 100-mile wide
strip extending over 400 miles along the southeast side of the Aral Sea
and at a distance of 20-25 miles from it, through the Kyzyl-Kum Desert
and across the Amu-Darya River into the Kara-Kum Desert. Here the
yearly rainfall amounts to less than 4 inches. In the irrigated
Fergana Valley the yearly rainfall is scarcely double that amount, but
Tashkent and Stalinabod lie in the 200-300 mm. (about 8-12 in.) belt.
The proportion of precipitation occurring in the summer
half of the year increases in general toward the east both in European
Russia and in Siberia, though the relative humidity and cloudiness are
smaller in Siberia during the summer than in other seasons. In contrast
to this general rule, the summer is the dry season in most of Soviet
Central Asia. The heaviest.rains in the valleys and foothills of the
Central Asian mountains occur in March, April and December. In the
mountains themselves it rains above 10,000 feet in summer, and snows
heavily throughout the winter. The zone of transition between Siberia
and Central Asia is the very dry salt-lake steppe land south of 53° N,
embracing the Kazakh Fold-Land and the: Turgai Gates.
Snow Cover. In general, the amount of snowfall de­ creases from north to south. The north coast of the Kola Peninsula,
(with Murmansk), the greater eastern part of Karelia, Leningrad, Moscow,
Gorki, Chkalov, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Barnaul, the Altai Mountains,
Krasnoyarsk and the Lena, Indigirka and Kolyma basins lie in a zone
covered by snow to a maximum depth of 40-60 centimeters (15.7-23.6
inches). Pskov (with Lake Peipus), Minsk, Kiev, Kharkov, Voronezh,
Saratov, Karaganda, the northern (east-west) part of Lake Balkhash,
Lake Zaisan (source of the Irtysh), and the Eastern and Western Sayan
Mountains have a maximum cover of 20-40 cm. (7.9-15.7 in.), as do also
Irkutsk, Lake Baikal, the Stanovoi range in northern Transbaikalia,
Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.
The Kirgiz highland, together with Alma-Ata, and
the Major and Minor Caucasus are isolated areas receiving a maximum
cover of 20-30 cm. (7.S-11.3 in.), while the remaining southern region
receives less than 20 cm. In western Karelia, and in the area enclosed
by the roughly semicircular northern limit of the 40-60 cm. zone, the
maximum snow cover ranges from 60 to at least 80 cm. (51.5 in.); in
the Central Urals and in most of the area between the lower 0b and the
Khatanga River (east of the Yenisei) north of 60° N, it reaches 90 cm.
(35.4 inches), and even more in the greater part of the interior of
this latter area, being the deepest snow cover recorded in the Soviet

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Union outside of Kamchatka, which receives up to 120 cm. (47.2 in.).
The Yana River "basin, with Verkhoyansk, is an isolated 30-^0 cm. area.
In large sections of the populated railroad zone
of Siberia, the snowfall is unexpectedly scant, "being sometimes insuf­ ficient to cover the ground. In the steppe parts of Central Siberia
wagons must sometimes " e used all winter instead of sleds. Except for
b the part of Kazakhstan which extends over the Kazakh Fold-Land into the
West Siberian Lowland, Soviet Central Asia has little or no snow cover
except in the mountains.
0±' Winds. In general, the winds in the western part of
European Russia "blow in from the White and Black Seas and the Atlantic
Ocean during the summer months. In early fall they reverse their di­ rection, except in the center. Thus, in the north the prevailing winds
are northerly or northeasterly during the summer, southwesterly during
the fall. In the center, westerlies prevail both in summer and fall.
In the south, westerly or southerly winds are dominant during the sum­ mer, while northerly or northeasterly winds prevail in the fall. In
the main, the winds are fairly brisk, averaging 8 to 10 miles per hour.
The extreme seasonal (and even daily) fluctuations of
temperature resulting from the remoteness of most of Asia from the
tempering influence of great bodies of water contribute considerably
to a wide seasonal difference in air pressure. In winter, pressure is
high over the interior of Asia, averaging highest south of Lake Baikal
over Mongolia, from which center the winds tend outward in a clockwise
direction* In summer, pressure is generally low over the continent
and winds are mostly variable but tend inland.
Most of the cyclones passing from the west along the
north of Siberia cannot overcome the resistance of the dense masses of
air of the Siberian anticyclone, and upon reaching the area of the
lower Yenisei, they turn northeastward along the borders of the anti­ cyclone. Those storms which enter Asiatic Russia from a more southerly
quarter either move toward the northeast track or disintegrate. Summer
cyclonic storms are relatively infrequent in Western Siberia. The
cyclones move usually hO to ^5 miles per hour, and in late winter and
spring maintain their identity eastward to the Pacific Coast. The
snowfall which accompanies them in winter seldom exceeds four hours,
but the strong winds, which sometimes reach hurricane force, churn up
clouds of stinging sand and sand-like particles of snow for much longer
periods, often continuing for days and involving real dangers for any
who venture out in them. These storms, locally called buran or purga,
have been compared with the blizzards of the United States prairies,
but one experienced American eyewitness declares them to be much worse.

Most of the storms that reach Soviet Central Asia are
either offshoots of storms centered much farther north, or else come
from the Mediterranean across the Black Sea. Thunderstorms occur in
summer, "being most frequent in the mountains. The prevailing high-
altitude winds from the Caspian, Black and Mediterranean Seas "bring
heavy snowfalls to the Alai, Trans-Alai and other ranges along the
Kirgiz-Tadzhik "border.
k. HEALTH FACTOKS.

^General. The enormous number of wounded and the severe
losses of medical personnel in action have strained every military
medical facility to the utmost. The public health organization in the
zone of the interior has "been disrupted " y the drafting of essential
b personnel into the armed forces and by the migration of refugees. Even
under normal conditions, the facilities for the preservation and resto­ ration of health have "been far from adequate to the needs of the civil­ ian population, and every civilian need was treated as strictly second­ ary to the requirements of the Army. Under present conditions, practi­ cally all of the existing facilities have "been diverted to the use of
the armed forces, and little, if any, attention can be given to those
parts of the population which are not directly engaged in combating
the enemy. Deliberately depriving the laboring population of desper­ ately needed food and medical attention has become a bitter military
necessity. Not onlj old people and young children, but also industrial
workers must be largely left to shift for themselves. However appalling
may be the losses to industry through disease and malnutrition, they
cannot be so serious as such losses would be to the fighting forces.
Although no comprehensive information is available regarding present
health conditions among the civilian population, isolated details from
first-hand and thoroughly reliable sources are of such an alarming
nature as to suggest that the death rate among noncombatants may well
be at least as high as it has been among the men in the front lines.
t). Sanitation. Although there are water purification
plants in the larger cities, the high rate of enteric diseases indicates
either that the facilities are inadequate or that they are poorly
operated and supervised. In the combat area, due to the breakdown or
demolition of treatment facilities, or to the contamination of streams,
lakes and ground-water by human and animal wastes, drinking water is
not easily obtainable.
Modern sewage carrying and treatment facilities are
lacking in all but a few of the larger cities. In the combat zone con­ tamination of the soil by human excrement is common. Disposal of human

excrement during the winter often proves difficult, and conditions this
spring have been unusually bad. The spring thaws disseminate sewage
over large areas and contaminate supplies of drinking water.
Eussian troops are required to "bathe at least three
times a month, except during the winter months, when they bathe only
as the opportunity occurs. Shower trucks, disinfecting stations, etc.,
are said to be at their disposal, but it is extremely doubtful that
they are sufficiently numerous or well organized to serve the entire
army adequately.
It is the established policy of the Red Army to billet
troops in private houses wherever possible, but its regulations pre­ scribe that they bivouac outside a community if contagious diseases
are found in it or if it is within easy reach of enemy fire. When the
community is small, first choice of quarters is given to the hospital
unit, cavalry needing shed cover, and the staff.
Special attention is paid in the Red Army to the care
of the feet and the trimming of toenails. The regulations prescribe
that the hair should be cut short, but not shaven (as is done by many
Russians in the summer). During the march, soldiers are advised to
put white handkerchiefs under their hats, but never to remove their
hats. In cold weather, they are advised to wrap paper over their socks
and, if possible, to cover their faces with vaseline or grease. They
are warned not to sit or lie on the snow during halts. Before a march,
especially on a hot day, the troops are directed to drink their fill of
water, eat bread well sprinkled with 8 grams of salt ( a little less
than a teaspoonful), then drink more water until their thirst is fully
quenched. On the march and during the first two short halts no water
at all is drunk. On the third short halt, after resting for 5 minutes,
1 to 2 glasses of water are drunk in small swallows, the water being
kept in the mouth a long time. During the long halt and also after
a rest of 15 to 20 minutes, not more than 2 glasses of water are drunk.
The meal during the long halt includes not less than 10 grams (l tea­ spoon) of salt with bread. After eating and before starting after the
long halt, the men drink their fill of water.
Medical Facilities.
(1) Personnel"! Red Army doctors working at the front
must have military knowledge as well as medical training, and must
understand complex military operations. Seven percent of the wounded
officers are doctors. More than 50 percent of the Red Army doctors,
75 percent of the dentists and 50 percent of the nurses are women. Al­ most all the auxiliaries are women. The women who go to the actual
£•

- 223 ­

front are volunteers who are put in special medical brigades. They
are expected to endure the same hardships as the men at the front.
Every group of 200 men has k men-nurses for first aid. One man in
charge of 25 soldiers always remains near them, bandages wounds and
also tries to assure protection against a second wound by temporarily
sheltering the wounded man in a less exposed place, such as a small
trench, until he can be removed to the rear. He must also take immedi­ ate measures to protect the wounded against the cold with blankets,
sheepskins and chemical warmers.
In 1938, an official Soviet journal gave the total
number of physicians in the Soviet Union as around 110,000, compared
with 19,785 in 1913.
(2) Hospitals and Beds. Russian authorities assert
that there are between 600 and 1,000 large sanitary bases distributed
in the rear of the divisions. They regard the following disposition
of beds as a necessary minimum, though it is not known to what extent
it is being filled: 15 beds per 100 men in action, 30 percent being
in the rear of each army, U5 percent further back from the front and
the rest in the hinterland. They claim to have thousands of hospitals
averaging 500 beds, and often with as many as 2,000. All treatment
is guided by the one aim of sending the men back to the front as soon
as possible. Six or eight hospitals are attached to each Army, one
or two specializing in radiology, orthopedics, etc. Only those
casualties who may be made fit for further service are given special
treatment. There is a vast radiological organization, with mobile
posts at the front and large centers in the rear. The wounded, after
first aid, are picked up on the battlefield as soon as possible and
taken to the battalion first aid post, about 500 yards behind, then
further back to the regimental post, where they get tea, food, and
alcohol. Ambulances for transportation to the rear are heated with
coal and contain padded sleeping bags, furs, etc.
In 1938, an official Soviet journal gave the total
number of hospital beds in the Soviet Union as 672,000, compared with
175,500 in 1913. But hospital service has doubtless been preempted
by the Army to such an extent that little or none is available to the
civilian population.
(3) Medical Supplies. Before the war, medical supplies
and equipment were on hand in limited quantities only. It is known
that there have been acute shortages in certain medicines and essential
laboratory supplies in recent months. Among the supplies most urgently
requested from the United States are sulfidine, antitetanic serum,
antitoxin serum, novocaine, chlorethyl for narcotic use, and surgical
instruments of small dimensions, which have to be renewed very often,
such as scalpels, Kocher pincers, etc. ;

- 224 ­

(h) Blood Transfusion. Blood transfusion is very
extensively practised. The "blood is collected from "both volunteer and
paid donors (60 kopeks per cubic centimeter) in the towns and trans­ ported either "by plane or by train in isothermic cases. Ten percent
of the wounded need "blood transfusions, "but, owing to transportation
difficulties> only 6 or 7 percent receive them. There are "blood donors
among the doctors and nurses themselves, who move near the "battlefields
with the armies. Blood plasma is often used for transfusions, especi­ ally for the purpose of hemostasia. Red Army men are not classified
"by type before going to the combat area.
Medical Problems.
(1) Military Sick and Wounded. The number of sick and
wounded among the Soviet military forces to date is estimated at between
1.5 and 2 million.
(2) Prevalent Diseases. Soviet medical authorities
assert that epidemic louse-borne typhus is practically nonexistent on
the Russian side, though they state that there are typhus and dysentery
in the German Army. Nevertheless, there are reports that epidemics of
typhus are occurring in scattered localities in various parts of the
Soviet Union. Specifically, it has been observed at Murmansk,
Arkhangelsk, Moscow (1,000 cases around the beginning of April, 19^2),
in the area between Kuibyshev and Chkalov (Orenburg) and at Bukhara
(30 deaths a day in April, 19^2). The prevalence of scabies and
louse infestation in practically all parts of the Soviet Union and
the presence of louse-borne relapsing fever throughout the country
indicate that the vector of typhus fever has a universal distribution
in Russia and, if the disease has not at present reached epidemic
proportions, there is always danger of its doing so.
With few exceptions, the most important disease
problems are common to the entire country. Malaria is more or less
prevalent in many large areas throughout the Soviet Union, but it is
the principal disease problem along the Black Sea coast, parts of the
Caspian Sea coast and in the vast and swampy West Siberian Lowland.
When serving in highly malarial areas, Soviet troops are given pro­ phylactic anti-malarial drugs. It is not known to what extent these
are now available.
In the fall of 193** an experienced American eye­ witness found typhus raging in the Altai Mountains of northeastern
Kazakhstan and hundreds of people were suffering from malaria. The
authorities had not provided quinine, either there or in other parts
of Russia at the time, and chronic malaria was setting in.
d.

- 225 ­

The Soviet authorities affirm that venereal
diseases have been practically eliminated, though they admit that it
is still necessary to maintain numerous venereal disease clinics and
hospitals. Gonorrhea and Syphilis have been listed in Soviet statisti­ cal tables as the principal venereal diseases, along with some cases
of chancroid, lymphogranuloma inguinale and granuloma venereum.
Of the enteric diseases, typhoid fever, paratyphoid
fever and bacillary dysentery occur throughout the country, "but amebic
dysentery, except for occasional scattered cases, is confined essen­ tially to the south of European Russia and to Soviet Central Asia.
The acute infectious and respiratory diseases,
mainly pneumonia, influenza, measles, scarlet fever, whooping cough,
diphtheria, epidemic encephalitis and cerebrospinal meningitis, are
more prevalent than in the United States.
There are no recent reports of cholera from Russia,
though there have been many violent epidemics in the past.
A tick-borne encephalitis is found in the swamps
of Central Siberia. Dengue fever, oriental sore and kala-azar occur
in the southern part of West Siberia; undulant fever, anthrax, intesti­ nal parasitism, trachoma and echinococous, in the central and
southern parts.
Of common occurrence in Soviet Central Asia are
kala-azar, oriental sore, dengue fever, sandfly fever, undulant fever,
anthrax and echinococcus. A large focus of rodent plague is found
along the Afghan border, but no human cases have been reported from
this area in recent years.
(3) Climatic Influences.
(a) Frostbite, The extreme coldness of the winter
in Northern and Central European Russia and throughout Siberia makes
freezing and frostbite an ever present danger for at least four months
of the year and adds greatly to the difficulties of caring for the
wounded and providing for the water supply, waste disposal and other
sanitary measures among large bodies of troops. Among the Polish
troops now in training in the southwestern foothills of the Urals,
there was an average of 100 cases of second and third degree frostbite
in each regiment (3,000 men) per week during the past winter.
(b) Heat Prostration. The summers in Soviet
Central Asia are very hot, and troops are subject to heat prostration
unless well acclimated.

- 226 ­

5.

DISTANCE TABLE.
Air Line Distances from Moscow to

Miles Alma-Ata Ankara Armavir Baku Basra Berlin Cairo Chelyabinsk Dnepropetrovsk Gorki Irkutsk Kabul Karaganda Kharkov Kiev Krasnoyarsk Krivoi Rog Leningrad 1,925 1,200 London Magnitogorsk Molotov (formerely Perm) Nizhni Tagil Novosibirsk Omsk Reykjavik Rome Rostov Sevastopol Stalingrad Stalino Stalinsk-Kuznetski Sverdlovsk Tula

Miles
1,550

870
720
81J-5 1,750 1,590 1,900 1,1*90

510
1,210

1,950
1,010

1,925

950

565
250
2,600 2,1^-0 1,520 lj-15 1*80 2,090

600 810

570 550
1,955

890
120

585
580

Ufa
Yaroslavl

750
180

6.

VITAL AREAS.

(See Map 12.)

a. The vital centers of the U.S.S.R., in their approximate
order of importance, are the following:
(1) Moscow - Yaroslavl - Ivanovo - Gorki - Tula. The
political, population, industrial, commercial, transportation and
communications center of the country.
(2) Leningrad. A great population, industrial and
commercial center.
(5) Kharkov - Voroshilovgrad - Rostov - Tanganrog ­ Stalino - Mariupol - Zaporozhye - Krivoi Rog - Dnepropetrovsk. Heavy
industry, coal, iron, aluminum, electric power, dense population.
(k) Sverdlovsk - Chelyabinsk - Magnitogorsk - Beloretsk
Ishimbai - Ufa - Molotov (Perm) - Solikamsk - Serov - Nizhni Tagil,

- 227 ­

Heavy industry, supplied with coal from Karaganda in northeastern
Kazakhstan and from the Kuznetsk Basin; ferrous and nonferrous metals,
(5) Armavir - Krasnodar - Novorossisk - Tuapse ­ Maikop. Oil, agriculture, transportation.
(6) Baku -
Makhach - Kala - Grozny.
(7) Batumi - Poti - Chiatura - Kutaisi.
(8) Tbilisi - Erevan - Leninakan - Kirovakan.
(9) Kazan - Kuibyshev - Syzran, transportation,
agriculture, industry.
(10) Stalingrad.
(11) Novosibirsk - Kemerovo - Stalinsk.* Heavy industry,
agriculture, iron.
(12) Tashkent. Textiles, nonferrous metals, agriculture.

Not shown on map.

- 228 ­

Fortifications.
a. The large system of forts constructed by the Soviets in
Western Russia, the so-called Stalin Line, was overrun by the Germans
by early July, 19lil, None of these fortifications are in Russian hands
at the present time. However, since September, 19hl, literally mil­ lions of people have been put to work building field fortifications
and trenches along the entire front, as far back as the Volga River,
After reaching the Volga this line extends in a general southerly di­ rection along the line of that river. The line has been extended clear
into the North Caucasus, Log and earth bunkers, portable concrete pill­ boxes, barbed wire and mines have been extensively used. Inhabited
points—villages, towns and cities—form the centers of resistance.
The local population provides the necessary garrison. Thus a defen­ sive zone 500 miles deep has been created.
b. In Northwest Russia the ports of Archangel and Murmansk
(and the coast and land areas in their vicinities) are protected by
extensive land and sea fortifications (the kinds and extent of these
fortifications are indicated by Maps 17 and 18). It may be concluded
that the coastal fortifications protecting both ports are too exten­ sive to permit a successful attack from the sea. However, from recent
evidence, it may be concluded that the defenses from air attack are
inadequate, at least in the case of Murmansk. The vulnerability to
air attack arises from the generally poor quality of Soviet antiair­ craft defenses, an apparent paucity of interceptor aircraft and lack
of heavy bombers for operations against nearby hostile airdromes and
installations. Because of the latter deficiencies German land based
bombers and long range fighter planes have bombed constantly, heavily
and successfully British and United States convoys during the approach
to Murmansk and after arrival at the port.
£. The Caucasus Mountain range, arising from the foothills
of the North Caucasus and running in a southeast direction about 700
miles from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, forms a tremendous natural
barrier against an invasion of Transcaucasia from the north. There
are only three passes over the Caucasus, all of which could easily be
made inaccessible to an enemy force. The only land routes for by­ passing the Caucasus Mountains are the Black Sea coast road or the nar­ row strip of passable but difficult terrain between the Caucasus Moun­ tains and the Caspian Sea coast. Both of these routes, especially the
former, are hard for any type of force to traverse and are easily
defensible because of their narrowness and the high ground which over­ looks them from the land side.

- 229 ­

There is little or no danger that the Caucasus v i l be
r.l attacked from the Caspian Sea side, while an invasion from the di­ rection of the Black Sea would be met by the extensive fortifica­ tions of the Black Sea coast. The Black Sea coast from Batumi to
Novorossiisk is fortified with field and coast artillery guns in
concealed emplacements. These coastal defenses are concentrated in
the vicinities of the principal Black Sea ports and are generally
situated at short distances in back of, and parallel to the railroad
which runs along most of the Caucasian Blac> 3ea coast. The guns
cover the sea approach to the ports as well as landing beaches.
d. The Turkestan frontier, especially near Termez, is pro­ tected by a series of forts, mostly two-story concrete block houses.
In addition, as is the case with the rest of the USSR, all vulnerable
points, such as bridges, are provided with local protection in the
form of barbed wire and concrete fortifications, and are constantly
guarded. Along the frontier with Turkey there is a wide "no-man's
land," backed by extensive land defense installations heavily garri­ soned by Soviet troops.
e. Generally speaking, the land fortifications of the USSR
are extensive enough to seriously hold up enemy operations and to
allow a heavy toll to be taken of the attacking forces. The USSR
coast defense installations and fortifications appear to be strong
enough to resist any invasion from the sea.

- 230 ­

Table III- USSR Coast and Port Defenses
Name of Place Number of Pieces Caliber of Armament (inches)
Kind of Armament Range
Yards

NORTHERN WATERS
1. 2. Murmansk Polyarnoye
3.
Kandalaksha
U.
Kern
(See Map 17)

6

5.
Belomorsk
6. Solovets
7. Archangel: a.Modyngski Island

(See Map

k k k
batteries k k
h h h

2

6
3 3

?

3 3
7.1?

>cuns (uncertain)
gun*.
guns
A.A. guns
guns
guns
guns
guns
guns
guns
A .A. guns

18)

b.Yagri Island
c.2j mi. VJ. of
Nikolski Monastery d.Modyngski Island, Nikolski Island,
Hanni Island, Kego
Island, Yagri Island,
Molotovsk.
BALTIC SEA
Leningrad:
a.Kronstadt (figures do
not include
practically
useless 6, 9
and 11 in.
guns, model

S.I? 6
6

h k

21

2

3

8 3U 58

12
10
6
U.7
3
3

guns
i i

i i

u
I I

32,000
2U,000
16,000
16,000

field guns A .A. guns

9,300

9,800-12,000

1877)

b.Gulf of Finland
" northeast of
~ Kronstadt:
(1) on islands

h

10

10

guns
it

6

1 *

U.7

2U,00C
l6,00C
15,OQC

- 231 ­

Name of Place

Number of Pieces

Caliber o
Armament
(inches)

md of
Armament
field guns
A.A. guns
guns

it
it
it
tt

Range
Yards
9,300-10,900
9,800-10,900
27,000
16,000
16,UOO
15,000
9,800
9,300
9,800

27-31 22 (2) on main- land

U U

12

3
3
8
6

h.l
3
3
3

6

1U 8
2U
BIACK SEA
9.
Sevastopol:
a.Cape Ulukul
(10 miles
north of Sevastopol) b.Sevastopol (from Kacha River to Cape Khersonesski)

field guns
A.A. guns

h h

2

12

3
lU
12
8-12

guns
A.A. guns
guns
i t

8

U

u
i t i i i t

8 8 8 8 8
8

10

8 6 5.1

I I

U.7

8 3 6
12

n

I I

t i

i8
; 37 32
c.Cape Feolent
h d.Balaklava
h
(15 miles south8
east of Sevastopol)
h
no coast defense
10 Rostov-on-Don batteries

CVI

h h

howitzers

t i

h

A.A. guns

i t
i t

3 15 . 3
8

k

A.A. guns
guns
A.A. guns

i t

3

- 232 "

NameJ of Place

Number of Pieces

Caliber of Armament s (inches)

Kind of Armament guns

i t
i t

Range Yards

11.
Novorossisk

(Hqrs. Uth
Black Sea
Defense
Zone)
Tuapse

h h h

2 (?)
8 (?)

unknown

12

8
5.1
6

12.

t i

3

unknown

A.A. guns on
railway mountings
guns

i t
t i
i t
t i

13. Poti
liu Batumi

(Hqrs. 6th Black
Sea Defense Zone)

h (?)

2 (8?)
8 (12?)

12
10

2

(12?)
CASPIAN SEA

6
5.1

U.7

15.

Baku

9 batteries

i
8 (1 bat t rest unknown

- 233 ­

C

Coneluaions as to Fighting Strength.
Strength Factors: To be considered in relation to Weakness

1Factors.

a. Ethnic, historical and political. The distribution of
the bulk of the Soviet Union's population west of the Volga allows
the development of a solid band of resistance along the entire front.
The character of the population, with its extreme linguistic and cul­ tural diversity, is not completely a weakness. Long contacts and
intimate admixture, tolerance of regional traditions, limited local
autonomy and absence of economic stratification have eliminated signif­ icant minority problems. On the contrary, Russian success in ethnic
assimilation has been an important aid in the advance of the Soviet
Union in Sinkiang, Mongolia and Northwest China.
Emphasis on historical tradition has been a major
weapon for the unification of the U.S.S.R. under the Stalin regime.
For the past decade, Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Catherine
the Great have been stressed as national heroes almost to the degree
of Lenin and Stalin. The great historical role of Russia, with its
constant expansion and grandiose achievements of planning and develop­ ment, is brought out. The vital importance of powerful personal
leadership, national unity and strong--even ruthless--centralized
authority in the history of Russia is clear. With them, Russia has
been victorious; without them, Russia has crumpled.
The recent history of the U.S.S.R. is especially
important. Since Stalin1 s rise to power in 1927 the country has been
unified; all dissident elements have been eliminated. All efforts
have been directed toward maximum national strength. Propaganda
constantly has pounded in the minds of the people the danger of
foreign attack. Military conscription has been supplemented by volun­ teer training which embraced the whole population. The Five-Year
Plans--two completed and one in progress at the beginning of the war-­ attempted to create maximum economic backing for military effort.
Although failing to achieve the desired performances and costing
enormously in lives and effort, these Plans did succeed in raising
the country's war potential to a major extent.
The present government of the U.S.S.R., ostensibly
democratic and constitutional, is controlled completely by Stalin.
His main instruments of control are the Communist Party and the
N.K.V.D.; elected office indicates public approval--as for military
heroes--but has little to do with actual administration. The Communist
Party, through propaganda, and the N.K.V.D., through fear, execute

- 234-­

Stalin's will efficiently. Local government in the U.S.S.R. is
fluid; units and techniques vary according to current economic and
strategic needs.
b. Economic. Despite its losses, the U.S.S.R. is still
largely self-sufficient from an economic standpoint. Production of
the following essential materials is adequate for minimal military
needs: coal, iron ore, crude petroleum, manganese, chromite, magnesite,
cotton, timber, platinum, mica, asbestos, potash, boron, phosphates,
salt, sulphur and pyrites. Within the next six months, moderate in­ creases in the production of the following materials are possible and
probable: iron and steel, copper, lead and zinc, coal, petroleum and
aluminum. Potato, cabbage, and oil-producing seed acreages may also
be enlarged. Lend-Lease help has diminished shortages especially in
nickel, aluminum, ferro-alloys, copper, cloth, and machine tools.
Shipping on the Caspian Sea-Volga River route which accounts for at
least half the present water traffic of the U.S.S.R., carries over
two-thirds of the oil and is thus absolutely vital, has up to now been
free from German attacks.
£. Psychological. Two factors maintain the morale of the
civilian population of the U.S.S.R. On the one hand, the people are
intensely nationalistic and imbued with hatred for the German invaders.
On the other, they are used to deprivation and accept extreme hardships
with philosophical resignation.
Education and training in the U.S.S.R. have been almost
exclusively along lines of practical and military value. In addition
to conscription and the compulsory training of the labor reserves,
strenuous efforts were being made some time before the war to encourage
volunteer participation in defense activities. Popular subscription
supported the Osoaviakhim, a society which enabled everyone to learn
shooting, flying, skiing, etc., at nominal cost. The technical train­ ing of a very small part of the military and civilian population is of
a high order. This minority has been responsible for virtually all
the technological advancements of the U.S.S.R. Soviet inventions-­ the Molotov breadbasket (bomb distributor), the rocket bomb, etc.-­ have been fairly numerous and of decided military significance.
d. Intelligence and counter-intelligence. Soviet counter­ intelligence work has been outstanding. All incipient fifth-column
activity has been vigorously suppressed. The obtaining of information
of military importance even by allied and friendly powers is exceeding­ ly difficult.

£• Strength and characteristics of armed forces. Mobili­ zation of reserves and induction of newly trained men have raised the
Army in the western front to 270 divisions, with 55 more in training.
About 12 million men are in action or in training in various echelons.
Production of strictly military supplies plus Lend-Lease aid are
sufficient to provide minimal equipment, although inadequate to replace
additional heavy losses or to sustain major offensive operations. The
efficiency of the small units is good, particularly in defense, although
vast differences exist between crack Guard units and mediocre reserves.
The engineers and artillery have been excellent; infantry and cavalry,
good; tanks, good in close support missions.
The Navy maintains significant combat units only in
the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland. Its performance in combined
operations--landing, artillery support of coastal defenses, supply
and evacuations--has been outstanding.
The Air Forces on the western front number about
5000 airplanes, about 60$ of which are attack planes or light or
medium bombers. They are organized into some 30 Air divisions, with
total personnel strength of about 120,000. Their missions, which have
been performed fairly well, are the close support of ground troops with
the destruction of personnel and materiel in the field and the inter­ ception of enemy bombers. The purely defensive role of the Air Forces,
however, must be stressed.
The home guards have performed essential and heroic
services. Men, women and children have rapidly dug and erected large
systems of fortification. They have trained in spare hours to serve
as army replacements. They have fought tenaciously by the sides of
regular troops. After German occupation, they have carried on an
active and exhausting guerrilla war.
f. Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina.
The greatest strength of Soviet tactical doctrines has been their
fluidity and openness to experimentation. New ideas--parachutists,
tank-riding infantry men, etc.--are always being attempted. At present
the following principles appear to be stressed: thorough training of
small units, extensive infiltration and careful reconnaissance, coordi­ nation of all arms in small combat teams, preparation of deep perpendic­ ular defenses with strong points at inhabited centers.
Stalin's leadership is genuine. His mastery of
practical psychology, his intense nationalism, his knowledge of
Russia's problems, and his harsh and relentless will place him in the
tradition of previous great Russian rulers. Among military men,

--236­
^ " • . ' ; . • ! , * .:

Timoshenko is excellent. A thoroughly trained, capable and unassum­ ing soldier, he was given a leading role in the reorganization of the
Army after the Finnish War. He has "been Russia's best commander in
the present war. His colleagues and students--Zhukov, Cherevichenko,
etc.,--hold other major commands.
The commanders of small units are generally well trained,
stern disciplinarians and good leaders. The political commissars are
fanatically determined to maintain the resistance of their units. The
private soldier is stolid, able to endure extreme hardships, and willing
to fight to the finish.
g. Materiel. The major advantageous trends in Soviet
materiel design have been the following: ability to operate under
adverse conditions; ease of mass production; simplicity of design; ease
of operation, maintenance and repair; and minimal use of critical ma­ terials. The caliber of guns is as large as possible; mortars, howitzers
and guns are sharply distinguished. Within each category, however, each
should be multi-purpose, e.g., AA and AT. In vehicles and planes, long
operating range and maximum armor are stressed. Maintenance is note­ worthy for its improvisation and field repair of major assemblies; fine
tooling and delicate work, on the other hand, must always be sent back
to the factories. Cold weather maintenance is ingenious and relatively
efficient.
h. Logistics. The system of ports, railroads, air fields,
roads and communications, although far too thin, was developed (even
in Tsarist times) in accordance with strategic and basic economic needs.
The Arctic supply route, limited to 80 - 90,000 tons per month during
the winter, can handle all the traffic reaching it during the summer.
The capacity of the Southern route has been considerably expanded this
year, and by the coming winter it should be able to offset the freezing
of Archangel. Soviet railroads, despite extreme deficiencies in roll­ ing stock, shortage of trained personnel and severe climatic conditions,
carry four times as many tons of goods per mile annually as do the
railroads of the United States. Relatively good railroad and support­ ing road nets exist in the Moscow and--to a lesser degree-Worth
Caucasian sectors.
Local supplies of fodder and grain are available to
some extent on the front from Tikhvin to Orel from May to September.
Manufactures within the combat zone are provided by Leningrad and
Moacow. Shipping for the support of forces is available in the Gulf
of Finland and the Black Sea.

- 237- ­

All able-bodied men from 16 to 50 are required to under­ go 110 hours of basic military training over a five months' period.
The period of training in troops is thus definitely shortened. On
occasion pre-military training units have even engaged in combat. At
least five million men, compensating for the war losses to date, have
been added to the Soviet Army in this way.
Men, forces, nor engaged impressed into duty The mobilization of women and children (12 to 55) not in the armed
in essential industry or agriculture, have been
on state or collective farms or tractor stations.
human power in the U.S.S.R. is absolutely complete,

Systematic evacuation of personnel and equipment in the
face of German advances has raised the potential of unoccupied Russia
by about
jl. Geographic. The waters of the U.S.S.R., particularly
the Caspian Sea and the Volga and Kama Rivers, are of primary economic
importance during the summer months. They relieve the railroads of the
transport of much bulk cargo, particularly in lateral transportation.
Their importance as barriers, however, is limited to short flood periods;
at other times they are very sluggish and often easy to ford. In winter,
they may even serve as excellent ice roads. A railroad laid on the ice
of Lake Ladoga maintained Leningrad during the winter of 19^1-^2.
The Caucasus Mountains are an important barrier protect­ ing the oil, manganese and other resources of the Trans-Caucasian
area. Except for narrow strips along the Black and Caspian Sea coasts,
they are proof against major troop movement for most of the year. The
Georgian Military Highway, even when free from snow, is easily defended.
No other portion of Russia or Siberia has comparable
protection. Nevertheless, the combination of bogs, forests and rolling
hills that stretches from Kharkov to the Arctic Sea is an excellent
foundation for defensive positions. The Kalinin and Murmansk sectors
are particularly difficult for operations.
The principal advantage of Russian weather is tactical.
From December to May, mechanized forces are virtually unusable; all
heavy traffic must move by roads. Operations off the roads are possible
only by ski troops, or specially trained infantry or cavalry. New
barriers are created, but many normal barriers--rivers, swamps, etc.-­ are obliterated. Winter fighting is thus a special art, which the
Russians have mastered since the Finnish War. During the thaw, fight­ ing is impossible: troops observed on the Mozhaisk aeotor even at the
end of June were up to their waists in mud.

liffil

--238—

Over a third of the basic rWf&SFce'a and vital areas
of the Soviet Union are east of the Volga and vest of the Yenisei,
impenetrable either to German or to Japanese attack. Consequently, so
long as the government and the people retain their will to fight, Soviet
resistance on a significant scale is possible. The Russians are masters
at fortifications: Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Sevastopol bear
witness to this fact. The new system of fortifications stretching
along the entire front for a depth of 300 miles and more insures the
protection of the core of Soviet resistance.
2. Weakness Factors: To be considered in relation to Strength Factors. a. Ethnic, historical and political. The sparseness of population in the areas of Siberia and Central Asia away from the rail­ roads prevents the full exploitation of the agricultural and mineral
resources in those areas. Linguistic diversity in the U.S.S.R. has
imposed major educational and administrative problems, since millions
of people have only sketchy knowledge of the Russian language.
The extreme centralization of government in Russian
history has been a weakness as well as a strength. Grandiose plans
have been begun without due consideration. Grave mistakes have been
continued because criticism might cause displeasure. Able men have
been replaced by sycophants. Power without responsibility has encour­ aged harsh control or even brutal terrorism. As a result, disruptive
influences have always been potentially present in Russian history.
When leadership has been capable these influences have been harnessed
to national aims--Yermak, an exile, conquered Siberia and presented it
to Ivan the Terrible. But when the government is weak and undivided,
and alternates from liberalism to terror--as in the days of Nicho­ las II--then revolution and anarchy arise. No peaceful mechanism for
major changes in policy or personnel exists.
The present regime is strong, although even it wavered
at the worst of the siege of Moscow. Its mistakes have been costly;
the Finnish War is an example. The purges of 1935-37 removed many
able officers; the incompetency of such court favorites as Voroshilov
and Budyenny before their removal nearly caused Russia's collapse.
The executions and famines connected with the forced movements of
population for the Five Year and other strategic plans of the U.S.S.R.
killed millions of innocent Kulaks, Poles, etc., as well as creating
untold misery. Stalin has seen to it that no other man in the U.S.S.R.
can replace him.

~ 239 ­

b. Economic. Losses in the present war have amounted to
about 35$ of the total productive capacity of the U.S. S.R. The food
situation especially is critical: even with maximal expansion of
acreage and favorable weather a grain shortage of 2,000,000 tons is
probable. Lend-Lease shipments of food have lagged. Marked shortages
of the following materials are found: mercury, nickel, tungsten, tin,
molybdenum, antimony, lead, zinc, rubber, aviation gasoline, lubricating
oil, machine tools, machinery, trucks, tractors, wheat, sugar, hides
end leather, electrodes and abrasives; chemicals and medicines. The
number of horses is considerably below army, agricultural and transport
needs. Increases in the production of tin, tungsten, antimony, molyb-.
denum, manganese and mercury are highly improbable. Russian shipping
for the Arctic and Southern supply routes is trifling; almost all
supplies must be brought in foreign bottoms.
£. Psychological. The morale of the Soviet civil popula­ tion has endured severe shocks: disillusionment in the initial perform
ance of the Red Army; dismay at the loss of prize Soviet achievements—
Dnieprstroi, the Kharkov industrial works—and cherished historical
centers—Kiev, Novgorod; extreme suffering in the course of evacuation—
exposure, disease, starvation. The grim determination of the Russians
despite these shocks is astounding; how many more can be withstood is
unknown.
The general level of education in the U.S.S.R. is still
very low; barely 20$ are more than semi-literate. While strenuous
efforts have been made to increase the number of technicians, particu­ larly on the railroads and in industry, the shortage remains critical.
Beyond this, the national habit of ambitious planning and haphazard
execution makes real grasp of new techniques or inventions difficult.
Invention generally has been held back by the lack of experimental
means and a real machine tool industry, and by political interference.
d. Intelligence. While Soviet intelligence abroad, both
through military channels and the Communist Party, has been able to
gain an enormous amount of detailed information, e.g., concerning U.S.
materiel, the conclusions drawn have often been erroneous. The strength
of the Communist Party in Germany and in Finland was over-estimated,
and the unity of the two countries was badly misjudged. The German
attack on June 22, 1941, caught the Soviet Air Force particularly un­ prepared, so that many planes were destroyed on the ground.
e. Strength and characteristics of armed forces. On
June 23, 1942, the Soviet Information Bureau admitted 4,500,000 casual­ ties and 22,000 guns, 15,000 tanks and 9,000 (too low) planes lost

1

- 240 ­

since the beginning of the war- This loss was equivalent to the
entire first-line strength of the U.S.S.R. a year ago.
In operations, staff work, liaison and communications
have been poor. Bombardment aviation, both land and naval, has
been negligible.
L' Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina.
The blitzkrieg doctrine popular in the U.S.S.R, before the war nearly
proved its undoing. The Russian units massed on the western front
for offensive operations, unprepared for defense, were readily en­ circled. Hasty commitment of tank and air reserves--as at Sianlai-­ resulted in enormous losses. The blitzkrieg doctrine had to be dis­ carded.
Far too many politicians dominated the Red Army in
June, 19^1. Budyenny's reliance upon river barriers, his rudimentary
ideas of flank security, and his lack of appreciation of the capabil­ ities of tanks and combat engineers led to disaster in the Ukraine.
Voroshilov was considerably more competent; lack of aggressiveness
was his principal defect. Fortunately, these and other politicians
have been replaced by abler leaders.
g. Materiel. The development of Soviet materiel has been
seriously retarded by dependence upon foreign prototypes, and the lack
of taps and dies. As a result, most models are obsolescent; changes
in motors and frames have been particularly slow. As a whole the peak
performances of Soviet materiel are below those of other nations.
Losses and Lend-Lease aid have thoroughly complicated
materiel. By October, 19^1, even Renault tanks were being pressed
into service. The United States and Britain have added five new
types of tanks alone. A crowning touch has been the use of German
vehicles captured during the winter campaign. Consequently, the
problems of organization, supply, maintenance and replacement are
virtually inseparable.
Soviet mechanics are interested only in keeping their
materiel in action; the quality of performance is incidental.
h. Logistics. The capacity of railroads and roads to the
front strains to maintain the present forces; full simultaneous use
of Russia's manpower is logistically impossible. In fact, only in the
Moscow and Rostov sectors can rapid troop movements on a major scale
take place. Elsewhere a static defense in great depth is forced on
the Russians. This condition is aggravated for tanks, artillery

-..241

and other heavy materiel in the winter when railroad traffic is
reduced by
The number of commercial trucks or of air transports
available is negligible. Communications are poor.
The present armed strength in the army approaches the
maximum available. Labor shortage is already acute: the total labor
pool--28 million plus 10 million auxiliary works--is only two-thirds
of the United States maximum.
A* Vulnerable objectives, A number of vital objectives
are open to heavy German air attacks, The Arctic supply route passes
close to the northern coast of Norway, Murmansk and the Murman rail­ road are subject to constant raids.
Air and artillery bombardment did important damage to
aircraft and armaments factories in Moscow and Leningrad. While
damage at Stalingrad and in the Worth Caucasus has been scattered to
date, even small German advances would place this area, and the con­ necting Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk railroad within deadly operational range.
A' Geographic. The climate of the U.S.S.R. is a serious
economic handicap. The severe winters cut off river transport except
over the ice, reduce railroad traffic by hO^o, and choke hydroelectric
power. The spring thaws and floods cause immense damage to transporta­ tion above all; serious health hazards also arise. Both insufficient
and excessive precipitation are dangers; the granary of West Siberia
is subject both to devastating droughts and to rot in the fields.
Health conditions in the U.S.S.R. are incredibly bad.
It is probable that civilian deaths in this war have equaled the
number lost in action. Nutrition has been barely over the starvation
level, quantitatively and qualitatively. The severe housing shortage
has been aggravated by large scale movements of population. Typhus
on a large scale has been reported from Moscow to Tashkent, Cholera
epidemics are expected this summer.
5. Conclusions. Potentially, the U.S.S.R. is the strongest
military power in the world. At the present time, despite grave
losses, Soviet manpower, materiel and productive resources are still
considerable. Even more: ,the military strength of Russia has been
historically determined by the leadership, strength and stability of
the government. Today, under Stalin, these are at a high level of
forcefulness. Consequently, while the Soviet Union may well be
forced to yield additional territory to Germany before the end of

the year, and while a Japanese attack would be a major blow, Russian
resistance should " e adequate to maintain a vigorous fight and to
b protect its vital centers. On the other hand, the U,S.S.R., without
great amounts of material and considerable numbers of first-rate
troops from the U.S. and Britain, does not have the power either to
expel the Germans from its territory or to open up effectively a
Pacific theater­

- 243 ~

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