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Agenda Item 10.

3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 INDONESIA - ANNEX 3

1.

Introduction
This Annex sets out our findings in relation to the current status of implementation of the IPP Principles in Indonesia. In relation to each Principle the current status of implementation is described. Where possible and appropriate, we have identified potential barriers or impediments to improved implementation of the Principles. These findings reflect research carried out in the period January – April 2000. The sensitive nature of IPPs in Indonesia at present created significant difficulties in obtaining information regarding the terms and conditions of either existing or proposed IPPs in Indonesia.

2.

Background
2.1 Recent developments in the Indonesian electricity sector After many years of strong economic growth and expansion, Indonesia has suffered substantial losses as a result of the Asian economic crisis. From 19911995, the country’s GDP growth rate rose an average of 8% per year. But in 1998, Indonesia’s GDP rate became negative at –13.5%. The IMF has recommended that Indonesia implement economic reform including the creation of greater transparency in the issuing of government loans and subsidies, and enforcing laws and regulations in the area of government procurement. The government has announced several reform initiatives since receiving IMF assistance, including the planned privatisation of several sectors of the economy. Indonesia has an installed capacity estimated at 21.3 GW, with 82% coming from thermal sources, 15% from hydro sources, and 3% from geothermal sources. Electricity is supplied by the vertically integrated monopoly Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), the state owned energy corporation. PLN is responsible for the majority of Indonesia’s generation, and is the monopoly provider of transmission, distribution and supply of electricity. It is the sole buyer and seller of electricity in the power market, currently purchasing approximately 80% of the power produced by IPPs. The sharp decline in the GDP of Indonesia and devaluation of the Rupiah has significantly affected the financial standing of PLN. The fact that 60% of the PLN’s costs (ie. fuel purchases and debt payments) are denominated in US dollars while revenues (subsidised tariffs) are earned in Rupiah has increased PLN’s debt significantly. The Rupiah has been significantly devalued due to the financial crisis. Additionally, the inclusion of take-or-pay provisions in PPAs has meant payment obligations to IPPs (in US dollars) remain even though demand has decreased significantly. 1 EWG20/10.3-Att A-Ann 3

Agenda Item 10.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 2.2 The role of IPPs in Indonesia Prior to the occurrence of the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia had plans for rapid expansion of power generation, to be achieved through opening up its power market to IPPs. IPPs provided a solution to the serious shortage of electricity experienced in Indonesia between 1989 and 1991 due to the rapid growth of industry. The bulk of the parties in large IPPs projects were international energy companies (foreign investors) partnered with family and associates of former President Suharto. In early 1997, there were 39 IPP projects (totalling 30,072 MW) under way. A number of these projects had successfully secured debt financing and in the case of one project, capital markets refinancing. As a result of the Asian financial crisis, a number of IPP projects have been cancelled or “put on hold” and those projects which have secured debt financing or have been constructed or partly constructed are perceived to be in difficulty. Given the over-capacity in the Indonesian power sector, further investment in new IPPs is unlikely in the near future. There are now approximately 26 IPP projects that have been signed, involving about US$18 billion in investments and totalling 24,751 MW. A list of operational IPPs in Indonesia is provided in Appendix A. A table of the keys risks associated with IPP projects is provided in Appendix B. All 26 IPPs have entered into Power Production Agreements (PPAs). PLN is counter party to all the PPAs. Characteristics of the PPAs include:
• • •

tariff structure and tariff paths; denomination of prices in $US (prices range from 5.7 cents to 8.4 cents per kWh); take or pay obligations on PLN (For example under Paiton Energy’s PPA, PLN is obliged to pay Paiton $598 million per year if it does not use power supplies); applicable law - generally governed by Indonesian law; arbitration clauses for disputes - dispute resolution clauses may refer parties to an international arbitration; and force majeure provisions.

• • •

As a result of PLN’s losses in 1998 and 1999 it has been incapable of making payments to IPPs. Initially the government failed to support PLN, forcing PLN to fail in meeting its payment obligations to some IPPs. This resulted in some IPPs resorting to arbitration in an attempt to recover payments. While the government has now ensured that payments are being made it is generally accepted by industry sources that a renegotiation of nearly all of the PPAs will take place as this is essential for the successful restructure of PLN, the government credibility with foreign investors and the resolution of budgetary shortfalls of the Government (arising from these and other subsidies in the energy sector). This issue is currently an extremely sensitive political issue. 2 EWG20/10.3-Att A-Ann 3

Agenda Item 10.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3

Case Study on Indonesian PPAs: The CalEnergy Dispute Himpurna California Energy (HCE) in conjunction with Patuha Power (PPL) brought an action against PLN for a breach of the Energy Sales Contract in 1999. The breach involved PLN failing to fulfil their obligations under the contract to pay the IPP for electricity supplied and for breach under the PPA over two 400MW projects. The initial arbitration between the parties was conducted in Jakarta, under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. Chairing the arbitration was an international attorney, and the panel included an Australian business person and an Indonesian judge. In a unanimous decision by the panel HCE was awarded $391,711,652 and PPL $180,570,322. PLN failed to make the repayment resulting in HCE and PPL demanding repayment pursuant to the sovereign performance undertakings issued by the Minister of Finance on behalf of the Republic of Indonesia. When the Indonesian government refused to make the repayment HCE and PPL took further international action in September 1999. As a result the panel made the following interim awards:
• •

the Republic of Indonesia defaulted under the Terms of Appointment and the UNCITRAL rules that the parties agreed would govern the arbitration; the tribunal continues to have jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding Indonesian court orders purporting to enjoin the arbitration and has jurisdiction to issue final awards in this matter; and certain Indonesian court orders purporting to prevent the arbitration constitute a denial of justice in violation of generally recognised principles of international law.

An international arbitration panel ruled that PLN had to pay MidAmerican Energy, formally CalEnergy, US$572.3 million for breaching the PPA over two 400 MW projects.

One of the major challenges facing the promotion of private sector development in Indonesia is the perception that transactions in the past have not resulted from arm’s length dealings or had due regard to the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and fair competition.

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Agenda Item 10.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3

3.

Institutional and Regulatory Structures
3.1 Principle 1 – Energy sector policies
3.1.1 Energy sector policies formulated to create a stable framework for power sector development (a) Clear, published and consistent energy sector policies

Indonesian energy sector policies have been set out in a number of laws, Presidential Decrees, regulations and policy documents. Many of the energy sector policies were introduced as part of the Indonesian government’s initiative to promote IPP projects. Each is clearly stated and published, but never in a completely formal way (other than by means of formal decree). The main documents setting out the government’s broad approach to energy sector development are described in Appendix C. The objectives of energy sector policies in Indonesia are clear: to attract private sector investment in power production. At a micro level there is little clear consistency with other sector policies. While there have been attempts to encourage investment in all sectors, the electricity industry is the most advanced.
(b) Environmental policy objectives

Publication and clarity of environmental policies Current government policy suggests that environmental issues will be given greater priority in the future. Indonesia has made significant progress in energy conservation in the past 20 years, both in the area of institutional development and in program implementation. Indonesia launched its first national energy conservation program in early 1980 with a national awareness campaign. In 1982, under Presidential Instruction No. 9, all government ministries and agencies were directed to undertake energy conservation measures. At the end of 1983, the second phase of Indonesia’s energy conservation program was initiated with in-depth audits of energy-intensive industries. In 1987, with financial assistance from the World Bank, PT. Konservasi Energi Abadi (KOMEBA), Indonesia’s National Energy Conservation Company was established. KONEBA made significant accomplishments, including detailed energy audits of over 30 large industrial facilities, energy conservation planning activities, data base development, training, information dissemination, and the procurement and installation of energy saving equipment. By 1990, KONEBA was operating at a profit on a cashflow basis. However, during the mid-90s KONEBA was unable to maintain self-financing operation. In September, 1991, President Soeharto issued a Presidential Decree on Energy Conservation (Decree No. 43), directing that a broad program in 4 EWG20/10.3-Att A-Ann 3

The Ministerial Energy Coordination Board (Bakoren) issues general policy guidelines on energy matters. energy conservation and renewable energy. a permanent National Committee on Energy Conservation which also reports to PTE was established with the responsibilities of formulating energy efficiency-related laws. The requirements deal with air emissions.Agenda Item 10. This regime clearly establishes the respective roles and functions of the government. and prepares technical reports for PTE. implementing campaigns and taking other actions to promote energy efficiency. DGENE worked with the US AID-funded ASEAN Building Energy Conservation Program to conduct energy audits and surveys. combined cycle and nuclear. Fair application of environmental policies The environmental policies are applied fairly to all sector participants. In the late 1980’s. Additionally the PPA sets out the environmental procedures that IPPs are required to follow for the development of power generators. Within the Ministry of Mines and Energy. The Permanent Working Group on Energy (PWGE) conducts analysis of energy supply and use on a quarterly basis.3-Att A-Ann 3 .3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 energy conservation be undertaken aimed at efficient use of energy and environmental sustainability. 5 EWG20/10. The Technical Committee on Energy (PTE) reports to Bakoren and provides an active forum for consideration of energy-related policy and technical issues. the Directorate General for Electric Power and New Energy (DGENE) has developed substantial capability to conduct energy planning and analysis in electricity. To some extent there has been a move to more environmental friendly forms of energy: geothermal. such as through all-source bidding programs PLN’s efforts to limit captive power production have been unsuccessful due to Indonesian government fuel subsidies that encourage the use of dieselgenerated power. Placing energy efficiency and conservation options on an equal basis with supply-side options. It is stated that the AMDAL is the responsible body along with the Ministry of Mines and Energy (See Appendix E for an outline of the environmental approvals required). regulations and guidelines. the development of environmentally sensitive generation has been tempered against the need for large load generation that is perceived to be dependent upon domestic coal. the industry (principally PLN) and the private sector. as they are required under the PPA to follow a number of environmental requirements and procedures. serves as a forum for exchange of data and information. water discharges and noise. However. In June 1990. (c) Established legislative framework There is an extensive legislative regime governing the electricity industry in Indonesia.

Appendices D and E provide a detailed description of all permits and approvals required for IPPs.g. Material approvals and regulation are dealt with at the central government level. in practice. Local approvals are required in respect of e. PLN remains vertically integrated. PLN is significantly influenced by the government. generally forthcoming once the central government has allowed the project. (g) Equal regulatory treatment of utilities and business sector While regulated under the same regime. e) Internal consistency among regulatory structures The process for obtaining a PPA is predominantly coordinated by the Indonesian Ministry for Energy. and 6 EWG20/10. The approvals required at the local level are. The Indonesian electricity industry is regulated principally by the Ministry of Mines and Energy. PLN). nor is it subject to independent review. as set out in the individual PPAs. As a consequence IPPs have no choice but to sell electricity to PLN.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 The primary laws and regulations applicable to the electricity industry and defining the role of the government in the sector are set out in Appendix C. (d) Regulatory bodies There is no independent regulatory body in Indonesia. is not independent from government owned business (ie. the government appoints the members of the PLN board. This may change as a result of the recent passage of the Decentralisation Law pursuant to which local governments are to receive a greater degree of fiscal authority and independence. Important issues affecting the relative regulatory treatment of PLN and the business sector are: • at present there is no competitive electricity market operating in Indonesia. there has been a significant degree of coordination between central and local approvals. Amongst other things. notwithstanding the internal separation of certain generation and transmission functions of PLN (see below). PLN also exercises a number of regulatory functions. and heavily subsidises the activities of PLN. construction licenses. The Ministry is not independent of direct government control and while a separate entity. PLN and IPPs are treated differently. The process for making regulations is neither clear nor transparent. (f) Transparency of regulations Regulations are made by Presidential Decree. Traditionally. but there are also a number of permits required from other ministries.Agenda Item 10.3-Att A-Ann 3 • .

(h) Conclusions It appears that the main difficulties being encountered in Indonesia with the implementation of this aspect of Principle 1 are: • • • overcoming lack of transparency in the system of government and lawmaking. is to assist the establishment of a competitive electricity market in the Java-Bali region (market will include multiple buyers and multiple sellers).Agenda Item 10. and the commencement of the restructuring process pursuant to Presidential Decree 139/1998 (see Appendix C). and improvement of PLN’s operational efficiency. Establishment of competitive market The government has also obtained two loans from the Asian Development Bank to assist with establishing a competitive market for electricity. is for US$20 million and is to assist with establishing market rules.1.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 • PLN is government-owned and heavily subsidised by the Indonesian government. the financial difficulties of PLN. renegotiation of other long-term contracts. the restructuring and privatisation process has been very slow and PLN remains essentially vertically integrated and state owned. Under this Decree the government has established a committee to advise on the restructuring and rehabilitation of PLN. granted to Directorate General of Electricity and Energy Development. PLN is to be privatised. 3. providing support for the development of regulatory capabilities and strengthening consumer participation in a competitive electricity market. financial settlement procedures. Steps towards privatisation have been taken by the Indonesian government such as the separation of PLN into PT PLN Pembangkitan Tenaga Listrik Java Bali I and II. granted to the Ministry of Finance for US$380 million. However. The first loan. 7 EWG20/10.2 Energy sector policies formulated to facilitate competition (a) Current status of policies for power sector reform and restructuring Restructuring and privatisation of PLN As part of the reform of the Indonesian electricity industry. achieving practical implementation of sector policies. The second loan. That committee has established working groups to examine the following issues: • • • • improvement of PLN’s finances.3-Att A-Ann 3 . renegotiation of the PPAs with IPPs. increase private sector participation and strengthen the regulatory environment. developing computer software.

Notwithstanding the separation of PLN into PT PLN Pembangkitan Tenaga Listrik Java Bali I and II. wholesale tariffs payable to IPPs probably do not reflect the efficient costs of production (e) Competitive market in generation and supply 8 EWG20/10. (d) Autonomy. Given the large debts it currently faces. No clear indication has been given as to the way forward. Current status of policies The reform process in Indonesia has halted due to difficulties arising from the Asian financial crisis. for example whether PLN will be restructured and individual generating companies (Genco’s) will be split off. and whether such entities will be privatised.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 As far as we are aware no concrete steps have been taken to implement the introduction of competitive markets. It appears that there is a significant subsidisation of domestic tariffs. and some internal separation has taken place between generation and transmission businesses. There is no stated or transparent policy regarding separation between transmission and generation. and thereby promote the development of transmission lines. It is not clear how this aspect of the sector will develop. The Indonesian government’s major stated concern at present is to ensure that electricity is available at a reasonable price to the public.3-Att A-Ann 3 . it is questionable whether PLN is run on commercial lines. PLN remains responsible for the production of the majority of power in Indonesia. In general. There have been proposals to allow private sector investment in the transmission sector. As electricity sector reform in Indonesia is very much in its infancy. (c) Complementary development of transmission grids No development of the transmission grid and distribution system is currently being undertaken. Further. and in particular the financial difficulties faced by PLN. PLN holds a monopoly over transmission and distribution of electricity.Agenda Item 10. This is difficult to verify as PLN does not publish accounts. This is a major issue because power stations are being built while no transmission lines are being constructed. it is difficult to determine the policy approach that the Indonesian government will take in allowing the private sector to be involved in the transmission sector. accountability and commercial operation of public utilities PLN has been corporatised. However it seems that none of these proposals have been progressed. There is thus no effective separation of generation from transmission. (b) Separation between generation and transmission functions Currently. PLN’s financial operations remain largely a matter of government policy. and the existence of the IPPs.

It is understood that this proposal has not been implemented and that there are no concrete plans for its implementation in the near future. there does not appear to be any significant competition at the generation level. For example. there is no competition between the IPPs in their supply and delivery of electricity to PLN. Further. it can be concluded that there is no policy in place to facilitate the development of a competitive market for electricity supply. Whether it is feasible to develop interconnection will depend on the sources of fuel and electricity market (ie. all electricity is supplied to consumers by the PLN. as occurs for example with autogeneration facilities. through opening up the power market to IPPs. (g) Conclusions The major difficulties in achieving a competitive electricity market in Indonesia are twofold: (i) the financial position of the PLN. (f) Cross-border interconnection Discussion has occurred about whether to progress the development of interconnection projects. on the islands) may be more cost-effective and less complicated than an interconnection project. Accordingly. However. All of the IPPs have been executed pursuant to unsolicited tenders. However. Interconnection projects that have previously been considered are set out in Appendix F. thus the prices and other terms and conditions of PPAs are not the result of an effective competitive tendering process. demand).3-Att A-Ann 3 . As a consequence. (ii) the perception that in the past decisions have been made on the basis of discrimatory criteria that do not reflect transparent pro-competitive policies. Prior to the Asian financial crisis Indonesia had planned to expand the power generation industry. as IPPs are not entitled to access the PLN transmission and distribution grids.Agenda Item 10. since that point the state owned utility PLN has had difficulty paying for the electricity it agreed to purchase under the PPAs. 9 EWG20/10.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 Generation Notwithstanding the existence of the IPPs. land acquisition is a major problem for interconnection project because there are no compulsory acquisition laws in Indonesia. Some argue that small IPPs (eg. further expansion has been delayed or halted until the situation can be resolved. The current policy on this issue is unclear. It is noted that in September 1998 the government had announced that it proposed to allow IPPs to be able to sell directly to customers. Supply IPPs are entitled to supply local industry.

Agenda Item 10. Access to fuel markets IPPs may determine from which market they obtain their fuel. under the Presidential Decree No. These are set out in the PPAs and are denominated in $US. However.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 3. (d) Foreign ownership and control of IPPs 10 EWG20/10. PLN purchases coal for its own plants from domestic mines under medium term Rupiah denominated contracts) and is adjusted annually or by the Ministry of Mines and Energy. The price agreed to is generally denominated in US dollars (cf.7 cents to 8. 16/1994 there is emphasis on local content which is twofold: 1) a requirement to use “domestic products to the maximum”. The prices paid by IPPs for fuel inputs (generally coal or gas) are determined by commercial negotiation. as set out in the PPAs. However. (b) Fuel supply market The PPAs provide that fuel supply is the responsibility of the IPP.2 Principle 2: Commercial viability of electricity utilities (a) Commercial wholesale tariffs Prices received by IPPs for electricity they generate are determined by negotiation between the IPP and PLN. 2) a requirement that contracts within specific value bands must be tendered to local suppliers or contractors. These prices are intended to reflect the cost of capital at the time the PPAs were entered into. However. or failing negotiation by a ‘basket’ price. and it must be doubtful whether they reflect truly arm’s length negotiations or the efficient costs of supply. as noted above. (c) Access issues and treatment under tax regime Access to Sites We understand that PLN is able to gain access to sites for the development of generation facilities on more favourable terms that IPPs. for example. when compared. These would appear to apply to both PLN and IPPs indiscriminately.3-Att A-Ann 3 . Treatment under Tax regime IPPs’ treatment under the tax regime is different to PLN’s as PLN is a state owned utility. there are certain local content requirements with which all sector participants must comply.4 cents per kWh. As far as we are aware there are no restrictions in the PPAs on the scope of the IPP to source its fuel competitively. It is understood that prices range from 5. with the rates applicable in Thailand (around US2 cents per kWh) they appear to be very high.

It is therefore necessary for each IPP to secure regulatory approvals at various levels. all IPPs have local partners. 11/1970 – the “FCIL”). the approval process has been characterised by degrees of delay. As a result. foreign investment approval by the Investment Coordinating Board. transmission and distribution of electric power to the public may not be fully controlled by a foreign entity. however there are certain regulations that prohibit foreign interests from investing in designated sectors of the economy without securing the participation of Indonesian investors as joint venture partners. the New Share Ownership Regulation (20/1994 – “Regulation 20”) and its implementing regulation (Decree No. generally with around a 10-15% interest in the IPP project. The effect of this legislation is to create a partially-regulated investment environment. 11 EWG20/10. the production. published and transparent approvals process There are many difficulties with the approval processes in Indonesia.3-Att A-Ann 3 . 1 of 1967). in the past the vast majority of approvals for power projects have been unsolicited and appear to have been based upon personal interests rather than objective. (e) Conclusions Major difficulties experienced with the implementation of this Principle include: • • the lack of real transparency. 1/1967 amended by Act No.Agenda Item 10. decrees of the President and Chairman of the Capital Investment Coordinating Board (the “BKPM”). Pursuant to Article 6 of the Foreign Investment Act (Law No. In the past.3 Principle 3: Regulatory framework and process for IPP approvals (a) Consistent regulations and approval processes Appendices D and E outline the various permits and approvals required under Indonesian law. and approval by the Ministry of Mines and Energy of the Tariff and PPA. Foreign interests are permitted throughout Indonesia. lack of industry restructuring to ensure that the private sector can have access to the transmission and distribution sector.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 Foreign investment in Indonesia is regulated by the Foreign Investment Law (Act No. (b) Clear. non-discriminatory criteria. There is no central coordinating body in Indonesia to assist IPPs with the obtaining the necessary regulatory approvals for IPP projects. The most significant approvals required in Indonesia are as follows: • • • approval by PKLN/Bank Indonesia of foreign currency loans and the documentation. 15/SK/94). • 3.

12 EWG20/10. the setting up of criteria required for successful financing. Thus. most being “unsolicited”. there has not been a great deal of “tendering” of IPPs in Indonesia. there was development of “ad hoc” assistance and. 5. As a result there has been large duplication of effort and large administrative and development costs. as opposed to a competitive basis. and implementation of the PPA requires approval from the Off-shore Commercial Borrowing team (PKLN). Instead. there has never been any formal development of mechanisms to assist IPP developers in facilitating projects.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 uncertainty and lack of transparency.1 Principles 4. Consideration has not been given to incorporating in the tender processes mechanisms for granting pre-approvals of projects put out to bid because the bulk of projects in Indonesia have been done on an unsolicited basis as opposed to a tender/competitive basis. In summary: • • a PPA is negotiated between the State Owned Electricity Corporation (PLN) and the project sponsor. a set list of approval requirements is contained in the standard form PPA that has unofficially become the form of permit/approvals required for the financing of projects in that jurisdiction. However. 6 and & Tender/Bid processes and evaluation criteria (a) Tendering approach and evaluation The process for the establishment of a private power development project is set out in Appendix G. a PPA must obtain approval for investment from the Board of Investment and price approval from the Minister of Mines and Energy prior to being signed by the PLN and Project sponsor. (c) Conclusions The main difficulties in achieving the objective of a streamlined approval mechanism in Indonesia largely derive from the development of the IPP process in Indonesia. • All but one of the 26 IPP power projects signed by the Indonesian government have been awarded on an unsolicited bid basis. by the financing of these projects. There are no published guidelines as to the permits required for a power project. The approval and decision making process for an IPP (as at April 1997) has been divided between unsolicited and solicited bids.3-Att A-Ann 3 . Given that it is largely developed on an unsolicited basis. rather than a solicited basis (See: Appendix A for a discussion of solicited and unsolicited projects). Tender/Bid Processes and Evaluation Criteria 4.Agenda Item 10. 4.

It can be adjusted every 3 months for changes in the: • • • • • price of electricity purchased by PLN. CPI. there is little evidence of the details of bid processes in Indonesia. 68/1994 and based on the recommendation of the Minister of Mines and Energy.calculated using financial model and 13 EWG20/10.1 Principle 9: Retail tariffs (a) Nature and structure of retail tariffs The price of electricity in Indonesia is set in Rupiahs and controlled by the government. 5. Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Associated Tariff Structures 5. (ii) Periodic Electricity Tariff This is determined by the Minister of Mines and Energy. A pre-qualification process is only in place for solicited (competitive tender) projects. (b) Conclusions Given that most IPPs have been awarded on an unsolicited basis.3-Att A-Ann 3 . Two separate tariffs are used to determine the selling price of electricity: (i) Basic/Uniform Electricity Tariff This is determined pursuant to Presidential Decree No. both for foreign and local currencies.Agenda Item 10.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 It is unclear what information is given to prospective bidders of IPP projects as there have been a limited number of solicited projects. fuel price. US dollar exchange rate to Rupiah. but a complete framework is not in place and therefore current procedures fall short of the requirements of this Principle. The calculation of prices can be broken down into the following components: (i) Capacity charge component . There are no published evaluation criteria.environmental provision). however there is a list of permits and approvals required under Indonesian law in relation to power plant projects (see Appendices D and E). all but one of the projects to date have been placed on an unsolicited tender basis. and tax regime and other government regulation (eg. Aspects of the assessment process have been drawn up. As stated.

Development Cost. Disbursement Schedule of Loan and Equity. and fuel price. Availability Factor. consumers paying approximately 2 cents per kW/h. Debt/Equity Ratio. They are used to support the high electricity prices payable (in $US) to IPPs pursuant to their PPAs (see above). Working Capital and Land Procurement. Term and Condition of Loan. The resolution of this issue depends on how the government decides to resolve the restructuring of PLN and the renegotiations with IPPs. Financing Sources. Owing to the lack of financial information about PLN there is little transparency regarding these subsidies. Retail tariffs probably do not reflect the economic costs of supply. Return on Equity. (b) Conclusions The major difficulty at present is influence on retail prices of the structure and implementation of the wholesale prices pursuant to PPAs.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 based on the following factors: • • • • • • • • • Capital cost consisting of cost for Engineering Construction. 14 EWG20/10. Taxes and Depreciation based on current regulation. (ii) Fixed operation and maintenance charge (iii)Energy charge component . 5. and Contract Capacity and Contract Term.2 Principle 10: Transition to competitive markets (a) PPA tariff structures that promote competition The “standard form” Indonesian PPA does not provide a mechanism for a transition to a more competitive market structure. Interest and other Financial Cost.3-Att A-Ann 3 .The extent of pass-through of this component depends on: • • • quantity and type of fuel. Testing and Commissioning test. specific heat rate (for coal fired).Agenda Item 10. The price for the supply of electricity to domestic consumers is heavily subsidised by the government to ensure that it is at an affordable level for the community. (iv)Variable operation and maintenance charge.

the high electricity prices may make it prohibitive to enter the market). Thus.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 The tariff structure used is a two-part tariffs system: (i) Capacity Payment This payment represents payment for net dependable capacity of the Power Station and consists of Component A and B. Component B Fixed O&M Cost Recovery Charge An agreed Rp/kW for Part 1 (Rupiah costs) An agreed Rp/kW for Part 2 (non-rupiah Costs). Component D Variable O&M Cost Recovery Charge This is a fee designed to cover Project variable operating and maintenance costs. The fee is a capacity cost recovery charge designed to cover fixed costs for the transmission line. In addition. (ii) Energy Payment This fee represents payment for kWhs of electrical energy generated by the Power Station and consists of Component C and D. Component C Energy Component Rate This fee covers the cost of fuel required by the Company to generate units of electrical energy.Agenda Item 10. it will be extremely difficult to privatise the PLN because of the high electricity prices it is required to pay to IPPs under the PPAs.3-Att A-Ann 3 . (b) Conclusions None of the existing Indonesian PPAs contain mechanisms allowing for a 15 EWG20/10. the charge includes: • Supplemental Payments These payments shall be payable for fuel if a minimum off-take is not achieved. and provide a return on investment to Shareholders. it is essential to the development of a competitive market for prices under current PPAs to be renegotiated. If the traditional PPAs remain in their current form. • Transmission line charges The electricity price will also include Component E being the capacity payment for the transmission line. It will also make it difficult for privately owned transmission and/or generation companies to enter the market (ie. Component A Capital Cost Recovery Charge A fee designed to cover Project fixed costs including debt service.

In summary. However. changes in the law. IPPs also assume some of the risk of changes in fuel prices. 6. changes in fuel prices (ie. foreign exchange risk (IPPs paid in $US). As a consequence. These risks are dealt with by initially adjusting the tariff and if more extreme measures are required (and available) by claiming force majeure (Note: claiming force majeure for a failure breach of contract by PLN (ie.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 transition to a more competitive market structure. the following risks are borne by the government/PLN: • • • • • market risk (ie. However. taxation and foreign exchange regimes (a) Transparency of taxation regime A complicated. Essentially. 5.3 Principle 11: Allocation of risks (a) Risk allocation under PPAs An indicative table summarising the allocation of the various risks associated with an IPP project between the parties is provided in Appendix B. but well defined. due to the political and financial situation in Indonesia the government and PLN have not been able to fulfil their obligations.3-Att A-Ann 3 .1 Principle 12: Regulatory. and political risk. the IPPs have been forced to absorb some of the risk as PLN and the government cannot pay the negotiated price. taxation regime has been developed to encourage and assist with IPP projects. (b) Conclusions At present the government and PLN bear the predominant risks through take-or-pay provisions in the PPA and payment being in US dollars. Financing and its implications 6. the law and the political situation. price shifts due to changes in market structure). There do not appear to be any policies to facilitate the inclusion of such mechanisms.Agenda Item 10. . Certain double tax treaties can be utilised for projects to minimise taxation liability and certain exemptions are 16 EWG20/10. as the CalEnergy example highlights arbitration does not necessarily result in a satisfactory outcome. failure to make payments) may result in a buy-out of the IPP). The other alternative to renegotiation is arbitration. PLN is also a generator). the IPPs have been forced to renegotiate their PPAs to ensure that they receive payment and can continue their operations.

there is very little information publically available regarding the finances of PLN. As can be seen by the recent move by PLN to renegotiate all PPAs and the recent arbitration between parties to PPA. IPPs are not subject to any formal financial disclosure requirements. Payments to IPPs pursuant to a PPA are denominated in US dollars. Protection is also provided through the adjustment of the relevant portions of the tariff that are denominated in US dollars. However. 17 EWG20/10. PLN. (c) Availability and transferability of foreign exchange There are no foreign exchange restrictions as such in Indonesia. Indonesia controls foreign exchange through Presidential Decree No. set an exchange rate which did not reflect the actual exchange rate at the time of negotiating the PPAs. 59 of 1972 which states that any transaction creating any liability in foreign currency is required to be reported to Bank Indonesia and to the Ministry of Finance. there are structural restrictions (such as the approval of US dollar currency loans by the Indonesia Central Bank). In this way. then entering into the relevant FX contract is supported by PLN.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 granted to IPPs from customs duty and import tax in particular. Whilst there are no restrictions upon the ability to transfer such amounts overseas. in practice.450 Rupiah/to US$1 when the actual rate of conversion was something more akin to 8. in particular. this process does not work particularly well given the currency difficulties in Indonesia. If this is not possible. it is incumbent upon the IPP to seek to convert the currency. No prior approvals of the Ministry of Finance are required for offshore credit for foreign investment companies unless the state owns a percentage of the company. there have been large restrictions on the availability of foreign exchange. in Indonesia. (d) Financial information on power purchasers and other parties As discussed above. the rate of exchange was set at approximately 2. However. (b) Conversion of local currency to foreign currency The PPA provides for assistance in the conversion of local currency to foreign currency. they do issue annual reports. the amounts payable under the PPAs are protected from exchange rate changes.Agenda Item 10. However. For instance.3-Att A-Ann 3 • . the major difficulty is the provision for payment in US dollars. there has been great difficulty in the recent Asian currency crisis in the mechanism provided for in the PPA as amounts payable have been in US dollars.000/to US$1. purely due to a scarcity of US dollars. as the region is facing financial hardship. (e) Conclusions The main difficulties with implementation of this Principle in Indonesia are: • In practice. Essentially. in particular.

the creditor must obtain a court order to sell the property. (iii)Fiduciary Transfer of ownership Fiduciary assignment is established by the assignment to the assignee of the legal title to the assets. The only practical problem arises in relation to registered hypothecs. This is the only information regarding assignment and security. The request should include a copy of the assignment and requests that the new bank be substituted in the hypothec for the bank selling its participation. (iv)Assignment of Rights against Indonesian Borrower In Indonesian there is no restriction on assignment. This 18 EWG20/10. Essentially. Under the scheme. in which case.3-Att A-Ann 3 . This allows the assignor to retain physical possession of such assets. The structure is largely derived from Dutch civil law and is very convoluted and inefficient. assets are commonly transferred offshore to a jurisdiction where security can be obtained. Indonesia has an established procedure dealing with bankruptcy. In the event of the assignor defaulting. the hypothecs usually contains the power of attorney to sell. the assignee is entitled to sell the assets at a public action. any assignment of a lender’s rights under the hypothec should be effected by the new lender submitting a request in notarial form to the Agrarian Office.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 6. For an outline of the Indonesian security documentation required for a power plant project see Appendix H. The types of security available for IPPs in Indonesia are as follows: (i) Hypothec (Indonesian mortgage over land) Hypothecs can cover buildings and fixtures placed on the land after creation and must be in notarial form and registered to give priority. (ii) Personal/Corporate guarantee Personal guarantees are regulated by articles 1820 to 1850 of the Indonesian Civil code and generally work in favour of the guarantor. This allows the creditor to proceed with a sale of the property upon default by the borrower. As a result. they require that the lender must first exhaust all remedies against the borrower before going against the guarantor.2 Principle 13: Security over project assets (a) Legal framework for creating security over project assets There is a legal framework for creating security over project assets in favour of lenders in Indonesia.Agenda Item 10. this procedure is not accepted by the Agrarian Office and it requires that a new hypothec be registered with the assignee being included as a party thereto rather than the assignor. Without the power of attorney. In practice.

3 Principle 14: Bankability of IPPs (a) Project structure providing a determined income stream The income stream (to be) generated by an IPP project is protected by the following aspects of the PPA: Term The PPAs are long-term fixed rate agreements that are capped for a set period and then have a step down in price. (iii)claims secured with hypothecation and pledge.Agenda Item 10. PLN showed no willingness to move away from this structure for future deals or to consider changes to this document. 6. including the Special Facilities. Business interruption insurance is taken out to protect against time delays. testing and commissioning of the Project. and is regulated separately from the Commercial Code. supply. In practice. it has also been difficult to convince the relevant State entities. and (v) unsecured creditors.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 procedure is set out under the law on bankruptcy promulgated in 1906. in particular the PLN. (ii) taxes. However. A “standard form” Direct Agreement was established under Paiton I. as to the acknowledgment of security or to grant step-in rights. (iv)claims for costs and expenses for the preservation of the assets. 19 EWG20/10. (b) Conclusions There are significant difficulties in creating an effective security package in Indonesia. engineering. construction. the acquisition of the Site for Power Station and Special Facilities. responsibility of connecting the IPP to the grid rests with the State and a capacity fee will be imposed on PLN if connection does not occur within the required time frame.3-Att A-Ann 3 • . Under the Bankruptcy Law the creditors are ranked as follows: (i) claims for judicial expenses related to enforcement and other efforts to save the assets. largely due to the inadequacy of the legal system. In addition. in accordance with the design and equipment parameters set out in the PPA. (i) Company’s Responsibilities under the PPA • arranging for the design. Responsibilities during construction Cost overruns or time delays are the biggest risks during construction.

As the Asian currency crisis illustrated. all consents and GOI authorisations required to be in the Company name contemplated by the Project Documents including the Environmental Impact Assessment.Agenda Item 10. PLN showed an inability to meet its debt obligations to the IPPs. Penalties for non-delivery of power Two forms of penalty are available under the PPA for non-delivery of power: a reduction in the capacity charge or. • • • (ii) PLN’s Responsibilities under the PPA • • • • Terms of purchase Take-or-pay provisions protect the IPP against the failure of PLN to purchase electricity from the IPP. the sole IPP power purchaser. protecting and securing the Site. and obtaining the approval of. assisting the Company to obtain all consents. and obtaining. arranging for the operation and maintenance of the special Facilities. The support provided by the State to PLN was minimal and consisted of a “letter of support” from the 20 EWG20/10.3-Att A-Ann 3 . PLN with respect to Special Facilities and the design. termination of the PPA. and consulting with. the Units and Power Plant. then PLN is still obligated to ensure the maintenance of the IPP’s income stream. and obtaining. applying for all work permits. visas and other permits required by Project personnel. Force majeure General force majeure is covered by insurance. in more extreme circumstances.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 • applying for. all consents and GOI authorisations required to be in PLN’s name for the Project. was perceived as having little or no credit worthiness at the time of the significant IPP development in Indonesia in 1994/1996. If force majeure is of a political nature. GOI authorisation and permits required for the Power Station and Special Facilities. applying for. and supplying power and energy required by the Company during the testing and commissioning of the Special Facilities. (b) Creditworthiness and track record of all parties PLN. construction and installation of the Special Facilities in accordance with the parameters set out in the PPA.

During the Paiton I Power Project. which is regarded as weak. Due to this requirement one of the following structures is used to reinsure offshore: (i) reinsurance with cut through arrangements. is utilised. there is a requirement for local participation in any project in Indonesia (which is usually around 15%). However the Decree does not contain any specific percentage(s). on the whole. This support. PLN’s track record of meeting debt obligations and showing a consistent level of profitability is poor (ie. takes the form of revision of either subsidised financing or. with the basis for it being found in Presidential Decree No.1 billion and estimated its total domestic and external debt to be approximately $US9 billion). PLN showed no willingness to move away from the letter of support approach for subsequent power projects. there are requirements to have a primary insurance policy onshore. (d) Commercial and political risk insurance The commercial insurance market available in Indonesia is very limited.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 Ministry of Finance noting that it would ensure PLN met its obligations. This said.3-Att A-Ann 3 . political risk guarantees. a letter of support (by the Indonesian Government). Generally. A local requirement does exist. PLN has failed to fulfil payment obligations to a number of IPPs and in 1998 PLN reported losses of $US1. Political risk guarantees. are. However. more importantly. To date no political risk guarantee has been called upon by any financier.Agenda Item 10. The local companies selected to participate as joint venture partners in Indonesian IPPs generally had contact with the Suharto family and their “proven track record” was on the whole related to political expediency. provide by USEXIM (the United States export credit agency) and ERG (the Swiss export credit agency). Few steps appear to have been taken in the past by the Indonesian government to ensure local companies in IPP projects have proven track records. Additional to this it is suggested that there is an informal requirement of 25% local content for government turnkey contracts (this information is dated 9/11/94). (c) Support from international lending agencies The bulk of the IPPs in Indonesia rely upon export credit agencies and multi-lateral lending agencies for financing. Instead. There are no government guarantees of PLN’s obligations under the PPA. The form of the letter as support falls far short of a full guarantee. 21 EWG20/10. (ii) identical policies onshore and offshore. 16/1994 (22 March 1994). for instance. these guarantees are in line with OECD guidelines and provide a level of support for debt on the project (approximately 85%). The bulk of IPPs reinsure offshore in either the US or European markets.

6. all financing has been utilised in US dollars. Each policy provides a provision that a claimant may only claim upon one of the two policies. Generally. because of the inherent political risk in Indonesia (even before the Asian currency crisis).4 Principle 15: Development of domestic capital (a) IPP financing techniques The bulk of the IPPs developed in Indonesia have utilised a combination of multi-lateral and bilateral financing.3-Att A-Ann 3 . It effectively means that financiers/sponsors have two policies in identical terms that they can claim against. IFC ERG there has been very little domestic debt or capital markets financing used in IPPs in Indonesia. and are likely to be experienced in the future. the following table sets out the financing sources utilised for some “landmark” IPPs in Indonesia: Project Paiton I Tanjung Jati B Sengkang The following points are worth noting: • • Sources of Debt of Financing USEXIM JEXIM. the relative lack of government support for the obligations of PLN.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 The latter requires the insurance provider to have both a domestic and an offshore office and is regarded by financiers as a preferable method. it is always intended that a claimant would only ever claim off the offshore insurances. The support granted by export credit agencies has been either in the form of subsidised financing or. By way of example. In practice. (e) Conclusions The major difficulties that are currently experienced with the implementation of this Principle. 22 EWG20/10.Agenda Item 10. in the provision of political risk guarantees supporting commercial debt financing. IPPs in Indonesia required a combination of export credit agency subsidised or guaranteed financing and/or multi-lateral agencies financing all political risk support (such as the IFC or CDC). perceived lack of transparency in the process of renegotiation of the PPAs. are: • • • the perceived lack of creditworthiness of PLN. more commonly.

IPPs have generally used (foreign) assisted domestic equity investors. There are little or no domestic capital funds available for equity investment in electricity projects. However.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 (b) Policies to encourage the development of domestic capital markets The domestic capital markets in Indonesia are reasonably immature.3-Att A-Ann 3 . However. Domestic capital is tight in Indonesia and has generally had former President Suharto’s family attached to it. Domestic markets have not been used for IPP financing in Indonesia. in the case of Paiton I. offshore bond market (a 144A capital markets issue) was utilised. We are not aware of any policies explicitly designed to promote the development of domestic capital markets. One of the major obstacles facing the promotion of such markets is the development of legal institutions to support them.Agenda Item 10. (c) Conclusions Domestic capital markets are reasonably immature. offshore investment funds are used. 23 EWG20/10.

Appendix A IPP projects in Indonesia Project Paiton Energy Parties PT Paiton Energy Company.6 cents per kWH). PPA commits Paiton to buying energy at: • • • Edison Mission Energy. In October 1999.5%) PT Batu Hitam Perkasa (local firm 33. seeking to void the PPA on grounds that the PPA was corrupt and illegitimate. PLN filed suit against Paiton. Mitsui (32. but is yet to generate electricity for PLN. and US5. US8. Project cost $2. Plant came on line in May 1999 (first IPP to be completed). the Indonesian government stepped in and ordered PLN to drop the suit. PLN sold power to the public at approximately 2.5%). In December 1999.5 cents from 13th to 30th year.3 cents/kWh from 7th to 11th year. Paiton claims that PLN has failed to pay the “capacity charge” due under the take or pay clause. a daughter of the former president Suharto) (15%) US8. • • (Note As at October 1999. Consortium members: • Technology Coal fired Location Probolinggo. the brother in law of Titek Prabowo.5 cents/kWh for first 6 years. General Electric (12. East Java Capacity (MW) 1.3-Att A-Ann 3 .5 billion.3% owned by Hashim Djojohadikusumo.230 Status PPA entered into in February 1994. (The government feared general loss of investor confidence if such a large obligation was 24 EWG20/10.

3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 cancelled).Agenda Item 10. PLN suspended power purchases from Cikarang in June 1998. Australia) and El Paso Energy International Gas-fired combined cycle South Sulawesi 135 West Java West Java 165 Connected to grid. Central Java 1320 Sengkang Energy Equity Corporation (Perth.15 billion through a soft yen loan. Interim agreement reached.9 cents per kWh for following 15 years. Tariff of US 6.220 400 [Connected to grid July 1998] Tariff of over US 8 cents per Kwh 220 Owned by former President Suharto’s cousin Sudwikatmono Geothermal Steam Bekasi 204 Tanjung Jati B Hopewell Holdings (Aust) (80%) and a local firm with links to family of former President Suharto Coal-fired thermal / Jepara. to buy the plant for US$1.4 cents per Kwh for first 14 years and US 4. Interim agreement reached between PLN and shareholders of Tanjung Jati B.8 billion. West Java 1. in September 1999. 25 EWG20/10. Project company’s investment = HK$1.3-Att A-Ann 3 . Construction halted in September 1998 and force majeure declared by IPP. [Indication of foreign investors abandoning IPPs] Connected to grid.7 cents per kWh.230 1. PT Cikarang Listrindo Cikarang Listrindo Gunung Salak (Unocal) Cikang Listrindo Paiton I Paiton II Dieng Geotherma l Wayang Windu Salim Group 100% Indonesian owned Geothermal Cikampek Region. Tariff of US 8.

3-Att A-Ann 3 .Karaha Sarula Darajat 1. 2 Palembang Timur Patuha Asahan 1 Tanjung Jati A Tanjung Jati C Geothermal Geothermal Geothermal Combined cycle Geothermal Hydro Coal Coal Java North Sumatra West Java South Sumatra West Java North Sumatra Central Java Central Java 220 300 270 130 80 60 1320 1320 Postponed Postponed Postponed Postponed Reviewed Reviewed Reviewed Reviewed 26 EWG20/10.

environmental standard expropriation.e. exchange or interest rates Foreign exchange non-availability/non-convertibility Failure to make available sufficient foreign exchange Fuel Supply Failure of purchaser of power (PLN) Forced Outage/De-Rate or Temporary Short fall in Capacity. tax. Buyer payable Capacity Charge with an agreed Capacity Factor Formulated in Payment Formula OPERATION PERIOD Operating costs overrun Inflation adverse change in cost of finance.Appendix B Risk allocation for IPP projects Risk CONSTRUCTION PERIOD Cost Overrun Delay in Completion Failure of Plant to meet Performance Specifications Tests as result of fault by EPC Contractor Land acquisition Increase Financing Cost Government • • Remedy Included in the Fixed Price of Component “A” (capacity charge) of the tariff Penalties to the EPC Contractor Penalties to the TPC Contractor Government provides reference land cost for project cost estimation. nationalisation. consents withdraw Tariff adjustment based on new regulations Owner entitled to terminate as government default compensation paid for termination Penalties payable by the O&M company Formulated in the Invoicing and Payment Procedure Formulated in the Invoicing and Payment Procedure Formulated in the Invoicing and Payment Procedure Formulated in the fuel supply agreement Formulated in Payment Formula. custom. PLN) Developer changes in law. Developer Developer/Buyer Developer/Buyer Developer/Buyer Developer Buyer Developer . to be included in the Fixed Price of component “A” Formulated in the Loan Agreement with Lender Bearer Developer Developer/EPC Contractor Developer/EPC Contractor Developer Developer/Lender Buyer (i.

3-Att A-Ann 3 .Agenda Item 10.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 Determination in Heat Rate (owner’s fault) Forced outage or Temporary short fail in Capacity (Purchaser’s fault) Increase Fuel Cost (not arising from lighter Heat Rate deterioration than Base Case) Boiler Explosion Failure of the operator to Perform Obligations Environmental Incidents Caused by the Operator Formulated in Payment Formula Fuel price adjustment formulated in Fuel Price Determination Passed through component of the Tariff Formulated in the insurance policies Penalties to the O&M Company Penalties to the O&M Company Buyer Buyer Developer / Insurance Company Developer/O&M Company Developer/O&M Company 28 EWG20/10.

Relationship between the Holder of Electricity Undertaking Authorisation (PIUK) and the Holder of the Electricity Enterprise Permit for Public Use (IUKU). Basis and objectives of electricity development. General national electricity plan. operation requirements. business license. Rights and responsibility of the public in the use of electric power Power connection requirements 29 Law 15/1985 (Electric Energy) EWG20/10. and Government Regulation No 10/1989 (Supply and Use of Electric Power) Relationship between the Holder of the Proxy for power affairs and the Holder of the License for power business for public Penal provisions. use of power and power installation and standardisation.Electricity supply. which comprises: intensification. Management and supervision. Electricity undertaking.Appendix C Overview of Indonesian electricity industry regulatory framework Law / Regulation / Policy / Guideline State Policy Guidelines (GBHN) Details Electricity development as an integrated part of the national development must be conducted in a harmonious and synchronous way with the stages of development. diversification and conservation of energy utilisation. Issues covered: Energy sources for electricity. supply requirements. proxy. To achieve equitable distribution of the fruits of development. Deals with business of power supply: ie. Widest possible opportunity given to cooperatives and other enterprises (private companies) to supply electricity as a complement to the supply by PLN. electricity development must be directed for the benefit of all people. Supply and utilisation of electricity . organised by Government and carried out by State owned enterprise (PLN). particularly the rural population. business plan.3-Att A-Ann 3 . Electricity development must form a part of the National Energy Policy (KUBE).

private power enterprises or cooperatives may propose power projects to be considered by PLN and the Director General of Electricity. IPP’s allowed to sell their supply or lease their activities to PLN and other parties. (ii) renegotiate PPA’s (IPP Contracts Rationalisation Group). Comprehensive policy framework to guide reform and restructuring of the power sector.based on a pre-qualification and tender procedure. a preliminary approval letter is issued and the company can then apply for an investment license. Investors are invited by the government to participate in the prequalification selection via announcements in both the national and international media.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 interest Presidential Decree No. Selling price of the privately produced power will be stated in Rupiahs must reflect most economical price (based on joint agreement) and must be approved by the Minister of Mines and Energy Priority will be given to the use of primary energy other than oil and domestic supply (in effect all IPP plants must be based on nonoil primary energy resources).) Incentives to be provided on import capital goods.04. Own and Operate (BOO)” power generating plants and transmission and/or distribution networks.P/03/M/PE/1993 jo No. 02. (b) Government Regulation 23/1994 Presidential Decree No. Once approved. Regulation No.Agenda Item 10. Own and Operate (BOO) basis. Issues stipulated: • • Private power enterprises supplying electricity for public use will be based on an Electricity Supply Enterprise Permit for Public Benefit (IUKU permit). The committee has set up 4 working groups.PE/1995 (Guidelines for Implementing Private Sector and Cooperative to Supply Electric Power for Public Use. Following Tender procedure then applied to investors who have been prequalified.P/03/M. 37/1992 (Private Power Enterprise for Electricity Supply) Selling price of electric power Development/guidance and supervision Invites private investors to “Build. and Private power enterprises supplying electricity will be prioritised on Build. who will: (i) improve PLN finances. Permits private participation in transmission and distribution of electricity. Private power development implemented in 2 ways: (a) Solicited projects . 139/1998 (Power Sector Restructuring) Unsolicited proposals . Deals with establishment of a committee to restructure and rehabilitate PLN. 30 EWG20/10. Investors are permitted to wholly finance projects and operate them independently for 30 years (from date production commences).3-Att A-Ann 3 . PLN status converted from PERUM (Public) to PERSERO (limited liability).

3-Att A-Ann 3 . and (iv) improve the PLN’s operational efficiency. 31 EWG20/10.(iii) renegotiate other long term contracts.

as amended from time to time. Commissioning certificate issued by Director General of Electricity and Energy Development for the Commissioning Plant following commissioning tests.3-Att A-Ann 3 . and Work permits for foreign personnel employed by Seller issued by the Chairman of the BKPM. List of permits required by Agency Federal Investment License under the Foreign Investment Law No. 6 of 1968. in the form of Presidential Approval Notification Letter (the SPPP) or Capital Investment Agreement Letter (the SPPM) on the basis of Domestic Investment Law No. 1 of 1967. issued by the Chairman of the BKPM on terms consistent with the material provisions of the PPA and the results of 32 EWG20/10. Construction licenses required for the contractors to engage in the construction of the Project issued by Governor of respective Province. Other (eg. based on approved Manpower Plan (Rencana Penggunaan Tenaga Kerja).Appendix D Permits required by IPPs Type of Permit Sitting Permits Environmental Permits Design Construct Permits Details Business Location Permit (Izin Tempat Usaha) by Regent of respective Regency (Bupati Kepala Daerah TK11) Approval of the Minister of Mines and Energy on Environment Analysis (Analisa Dampak Lingkungan) including the Environmental Management Plan (Upaya Pengelolaan Lingkungan) and the Environmental Monitoring Plan (Upaya Pemantauan Lingkungan) for the Project conducted by the AMDAL Central Commission of the Ministry of Mines and Energy to be issued to Seller pursuant to Regulation of the Minister of Mines and Energy No. O&M) Electricity Supply Enterprise Permit for Public Benefit (IUKU permit) issued by the Chairman of the BKPM as an operation license following commissioning of Plant. 2 of 1993.

39/1991 Foreign Loan Team (Tim Koordinasl Pinjaman Komersial Luar Negeri . Building Permit (Izin Mendirikan Bangunan .3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 the negotiations between the Sponsors and the GOI. Registration of Seller with Department of Trade pursuant to Law No. Provincial/State • • Local • 33 EWG20/10.IMB) issued by Regent of respective Regency. Issuance by Presidential Decree No.3-Att A-Ann 3 . Permit from Governor of respective Province to Seller to utilise sea water for purposes of Project.PKLN) of permit to obtain foreign loans. 3 of 1982 (Wajib Daftar Perusahaan) at relevant Department of Trade office at location of Seller’s offices. Directorate General of Customs and Excise for temporary import of equipment and other materials to be utilised in connection with the construction of the Project. Permit from Minister of Finance. • • • Approval of the Justice to the notarial deed of establishment of the Project Company.Agenda Item 10.

to obtain Value Added Taxpayer Number Consent of the Department of Finance. H. C. to the centralisation of income tax and value added tax administration in the relevant Jakarta tax office Registration with the Department of Finance. Directorate General of 34 Investment Procedure A. B. D. D. Directorate General of Taxation. Financial A. B. E. to the centralisation of income tax and value added tax administration in the relevant Jakarta tax office Approval from the Department of Finance. Directorate General of Taxation. II. F.Appendix E Permits and Approvals Required under Indonesian law in relation to Power Plant Projects I. D. I. B.3-Att A-Ann 3 . C. C. Directorate General of Taxation. Company Formation A. EWG20/10. G. Deed of Establishment (Articles of Association) executed before a notary Approval of the Deed of Establishment from the Minister of Justice Registration of the approved Deed of Establishment at the Local District Court in the domicile of company Publication of the Deed of Establishment in the State Gazette (Berita Negara) by the State Printing Office Letter of Preliminary Approval Feasibility Study Approval from the President as stated in the Letter of Notification of the President Approval (“SPPP”) issued by the Chairman of BKPM Registration at the Regency Office of Department of Trade to obtain a Company Registration Number (TDP) Issue of the Commission Certificate by the Director General of Electricity and Power Development for the Plant following the Commissioning Test Issue of the licence to a private business company in order that it may undertake the business of electric power supply in the interest of the public (the IUKU) by the Chairman of BKPM Business Location License (Ijin Tempat Usaha) Permanent/Fixed Business Licence (IUT) Issue of Final Operation License by Chairman of the BKPM (Izin Usaha Ketenagalistrikan untuk Kepentingan Umum – IUKU) following the commissioning of the plant Registration with the Department of Finance. III.

F. EWG20/10.Agenda Item 10. Environment A. to utilise sea water for purpose of the project (cooling water & desalination plant) Permit from the Minister of Communication. Land A. D. Issue of the Advance Building Permit (presentation delegated by Governor to Regency level) Issue of the Building Construction Permit (Izin Mendirikan Bangunan – IMB) by the Regent of Jepara Regency. Governor /Head of the Province of Central Java. B. V.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 Taxation for Book-Keeping in English and in US dollar currency IV.3-Att A-Ann 3 . B. Construction A. VI. G. Director General of Sea Transportation for construction and operation of a temporary jetty for Project Site during the construction and operation period or. E. E. C. B. store and utilise hazardous waste Issue of a Nuisance Act Permit Permit from the Team for the Coordination of Offshore Commercial Loans (Tim Koordinasi Pinjaman Komersial Luar Negeri or PKLN) to obtain foreign loan Approval from Bank Indonesia of documentation for a foreign loan within the intended investment as set forth in the SPPP Issue of the Location Licence by the Regent of Jepara Regency. Loan A. the Province of Central Java (presentation delegated by Governor to Regency level) Permit from the Minister of Communication. Permit from the Director General of Sea Transportation. B. Directorate General of Sea Communication for discharge of waste water into the sea Permit from the Central Java Transportation Office for dredging Permit from the Director General of Sea Transportation to carry out reclamation with dredged material Approval from the Minister of Mines and Energy of the environment Impact analysis (Analisa Dampak Lingkungan) conducted by the AMDAL Central Committee of the Department of Mines and Energy Approval from the Minister of Mines and Energy of the Environment Management Plan (Rencana Kelola Lingkungan or RKL) Approval from the Minister of Mines and Energy for the Environment Monitoring Plan (Rencana Pemantauan Lingkungan or RPL) Permit from the Minister of Health to possess. D. the Province of Central Java Execution of Sale and Purchase/land relinquishment documents relating to land acquisition 35 C. VII.

VIII. 36 EWG20/10.3-Att A-Ann 3 . Directorate General of Customs and Excise to establish and operate a customs clearance office and bonded area at the Project Site during the period of construction and operation Approval of the Plan on the Employment of Expatriates (‘Manpower Plan’) (RPTKA) from the Chairman of BKPM* Issue of Work Permit (IKTA) for individual expatriates by the Chairman of BKPM based on approved RPTKA C. E. B. B. F.C. Employees A. IX. 22) Application for suspension of Value Added Tax (PPn) and /or Value Added Tax on luxury goods (PPnBN)* Order 23 Procedure Permit from the Department of Finance. D. Grant of Hak Guan Bangunan (HGB) title for the Project Site by the Head of the National Land Agency Registration of the HGB title Issue of Limited Importer Registration Number (APIT) from Chairman of the BKPM for importation of goods for project during operational period Approval from the Chairman of BKPM of the Master List of imported capital goods (covers import duty and PPN) and issue of decision on tax facilities for such capital goods* Application for exemption from income tax on imports (PPh. Tax A. D.

MOU has been signed by both parties for the development of a mine power Malaysia (submarine cable) plant in Sumatra. Indonesia. Indonesia (150 MW. Indonesia .Singapore . Funding is the constraints for project implementation (private participation as an alternative) Batam.Johore.Appendix F Interconnection Projects Project Status Sumatra.3-Att A-Ann 3 . Malaysia West Implementation being prepared with options for private participation Kalimantan. 250 kV overhead line) 37 EWG20/10. [Seeking sponsors for financing the study] Indonesia . Indonesia Bintan. Malaysia Sarawak.Peninsula Project aimed for bi-directional electricity flow.

.ff C P r e -b id o n C A n d S ite V is it A n d S ite V is it S u b m is s io n o ff S u b m is s io n o P ro p o s a ll P ro p o s a E v a lu a tio n E v a lu a tio n E v a lu a ttion E v a lu a io n B id D o c u m e n ts B id D o c u m e n ts R e p o rt to M M E R e p o rt to M M E Is s u e d b y P L N th ro u g h D G E E D Is s u e d b y P L N th r o u g h D G E E D B id E v a lu a tio n B id E v a lu a tio n R e p o rtt to R e p o r to D G E E D fo rr D G E E D fo V a lid a tio n V a lid a tio n U n s o lic ite d U n s o lic ite d P rroje c tt P o je c S u b m is s io n o ff S u b m is s io n o P rrop o s a ll to P o p o s a to DGEED DGEED PLN PLN C o n s id e rratio n C o n s id e a tio n o n U n s o lic ite d o n U n s o lic ite d P ro p o s a ll P ro p o s a S u b m is s io n o ff S u b m is s io n o B id s b y P re -B id s b y P r e q u a lif ie d q u a lifie d D e v e lo p e rs D e v e lo p e r s B id B id E v a lu a tio n E v a lu a tio n DGEED DGEED R e c e iv e d R e c e iv e d R e s p o n s e fro m R e s p o n s e fr o m PLN PLN ? ? DGEED DGEED R e c e iv e d R e c e iv e d R e s p o n s e fro m R e s p o n s e fr o m P LN PLN In fo rm e d In fo r m e d P ro p o s a ll P ro p o s a n o tt no A c c e p te d A c c e p te d EWG20/10.Appendix G Private Power Development Scheme S o lic ite d S o lic ite d P rroje c tt P o je c P rre P e q u a lific a tio n q u a lific a tio n A n n o u n c e m e n tt A nn ouncem en by DGEED by DG EE D F e a s ib ility F e a s ib ility S tu d y b y P L N S tud y by P L N M M E D e c is io n M M E D e c is io n fo rr P re q u a lifie d fo P re q u a lifie d D e v e lo p e rr D e v e lo p e T e n d e rr Tende A n n o u n c e m e n tt Announcem en by PLN by PLN P re -P re q u a lific a tio n q u a lific a tio n D o c u m e n tt fr o m D o c u m e n fro m PLN PLN P re -b id o n.3-Att A-Ann 3 .

3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 F o rrm a tiio n o ff F o m at o n o P rro je c tt P o je c Com pany C om pany U n s o l ic i t e d F e a s ib ili t y F e a s ib ilit y S ttu d y & S udy & D e tta il e d D e a ile d P rro p o s a ll P o posa E v a lu a tti on E v a lu a io n R e p o rrtt tto R ep o o M iin is tte rr o ff M .3-Att A-Ann 3 .Agenda Item 10..E M M E D e c is io n M M E D e c is i o n D e v e lo p e rr D e v e lo p e N e g o tiiattio n N e g o t a io n D rra fftt o ff P o w e rr D a o Powe P u rrc h a s e Pu chase A g rre e m e n tt Ag eem en D ir e c tto rr D ire c o G e n e rra ll G ene a V a li d a ttio n V a lid a io n Land Land A c q u is ittio n & A c q u is i io n & E n v A n a llys tt .E . M n is e o M ... by Co o d In v e s ttm e n tt In v e s m e n B o a rrd Boa d O ffffs h o rre O sho e C o m m e rrc ia ll C o m m e c ia B o rrro w in g B o r o w in g A p p rro v a ll App o va C o m m is s iio n & C o m m is s o n & T e s tt C e rrttifiica te T e s C e if c a t e S tta rrtt S a C o n s trru c tiio n Con st uct o n F iin a n c ia ll F n a n c ia ?????? ?????? O ffffs h o rre O sho e C o m m e rrc ia ll C o m m e c ia B o rrro w in g B o r o w in g A p p rro v a ll App o va S P P P o rr S P P M SPPP o SPPM ((I nv e s to rr In v e s t o A p p rro v a l) A p p o v a l) M M E A p p rro v a ll M M E A pp ova o n T a rrif ff o n T a if EWG20/10.v A n a y s En L iice n c e P e rrm it L c e n c e P e m it b y C o --o rrd .

The shares pledges and powers must be executed in Indonesia in notarial deed form. authorising the lenders to (i) vote in the event of default and (ii) sell shares at a private sale.1. These are required to allow step-in by the lenders at shareholder’s level as an alternative to enforcing the pledges at 1. (3) Security in Tangible Movables Tangible movables should be secured as follows: (a) A fiduciary transfer agreement should be used to secure all tangible movables. The Fiduciary Assignments must be executed in Indonesia in notarial deed form.3-Micro Eco Reform-Att A-Ann 3 Appendix H Indonesian Security Documentation The following security will be required to be granted in favour of the lenders: (1) Share Pledges (a) Pledges by current shareholders. (5) Security over Project Documents under Indonesian law the core project documents cannot be assigned to the lenders by way of security.Agenda Item 10. with the right for lenders to receive declared and liquidation dividends in the event of default.3-Att A-Ann 3 . Bother the Fiduciary Transfer Agreement and the power of attorney over sale must be executed in Indonesia in notarial deed form. and (b) Power of Attorney over Sale. and (c) Power of attorney over the shares. lenders will require authority pursuant to an irrevocable power of attorney to exercise the rights of the IPP under those project documents. and (b) all amounts owed to the IPP in respect of insurance claims and proceeds. (6) Other Security The lender will also require an Acknowledgment of Indebtedness from the IPP 40 EWG20/10. (b) Pledges of the shares. (2) Security over Receivable It is suggested that a number of fiduciary assignments be entered into: (a) over all PPA receivable. including bank accounts. (4) Security in Immovable Property Security over land should be taken at the outset by way of Hypothec. Accordingly.

in notarial deed form.3-Att A-Ann 3 . 41 EWG20/10.