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RIGHT TO DIE

Table of Cases 1. 1. A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27. 2. Baseswara Nath v. CIT , 1959 (1) SCR 528. 3. Chenna Jagdeeswara v. State of A.P., 1988 Cri. L.J. 549. 4. Court on its Motion v. Yogesh Kumar, Crl. Revision No. 230 of 1985. 5. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1987 SC 746. 6. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648. 7. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1360 8. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P, AIR 1963 SC 1295. 9. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1897 SC 597. 10. Maruti Sripati Dubal v. State of Maharshtra, 1987 Cri L.J. 743. 11. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545. 12. P. Rathinam v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 394. 13. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1318. 14. Satwant Singh Sawhney v. A.P.O., New Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 1836. 15. State v. Sanjay Kumar Bhatia, 1985 Cri. L.J. 931. 16. Sunil Batra v. Dehi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1579. 17. Unnikrishnan v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 649. y Table of Statues 1. Indian Penal Code, 1860. 2. Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. y Introduction Death is our Friend, the best of Friends. It delivers us from agony. I do not want to die of a creeping paralysis of my faculties a defeated man.

Mahatma Gandhi. Suicide is an act of intentional killing of oneself. There was a time when suicide was considered to be a purely individual act. It is still no doubt an individual act, but it also reflects to a great extent the state of society, wherein when one takes his own life by killing oneself, the societal balance is disturbed. Therefore, the paradigm of the problem shifts from the Private Domain to the Public Domain. The study of suicide depicts that though it is an individual human action, yet social relationship plays an important role in its causation and it has a profound social impact. Suicide is punishable under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which provides that: An attempt to commit suicide is punishable with imprisonment of either description upto one year or fine or both. Should the act be successful, the same is not punishable as the perpetrator is beyond the realm and jurisdiction of the law. With the growing popularity of the philosophy of liberalism and the concept of minimal state interference there has been a growing debate as to whether there exists a right to die or not. The debate as to whether there should be a right to die or not revolves around the following two philosophical basis. The individual has the right to take away his own life and since this does not cause any harm to society, the State should not interfere; and The state esteems the lives of its members and suicide causes tremendous harm to society. It therefore claims the right to prevent persons from taking their own lives, as much as it prevents them from taking the life of others. According to J.S. Mill, ..The only purpose for which power can be rightfully be exercised over any other member of society, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, whether

physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrantto justify any sanction, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produced evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.[1] Thus, on a purely theoretical level the growing debate regarding the right to die, which has come into prominence with the concept of euthanasia, is essentially about and individuals right to absolute freedom and liberty in private affairs and his obligations towards the society and the State. This project, in a deviation from the philosophical and theoretical plains, looks at the Right to Die from the point of its Constitutional validity and tries to assess whether a Right to Die exists under the Indian Legal System, while going into the questions of its desirability and its consequences. Research Methodology

Aims and Objectives The primary aim and purpose of this project is to analyse the constitutional validity of the Right to Die. This project discusses the constitutional furore caused by the various decisions of the Courts in India and analyses these various judgements threadbare using the judicial reasoning and rationale as the basis of the critique of the Right itself. Research Questions The Research Questions dealt with in the project are: I. II. III. Whether there exists a Right to Die under the Indian Constitution? Whether Section 309 of the IPC is in conformity to the Constitutional provisions? Whether Right to Die and Section 309 of the IPC are desirable,justified and legitimate ?

Style of Writing The style of writing is Descriptive, as all the judicial developments in this area have been outlined, andAnalytical, as the researcher has delved deep into the aforementioned case law to derive the principles of the legal regime. Materials Used The researcher has made extensive use of Case Law in this project, so as to discern a trend in the judicial pronouncements. The researcher has also utilised commentaries, treatises, articles, notes, comments and other writings to incorporate the various views of the multitude of jurists, with the intention of presenting a holistic view. Mode of Citation A uniform mode of citation has been used throughout this project.

y Right to Die Constitutional Provisions The Constitutional Provision relating to the Right to Die is Article 21, which reads as under:
Article 21. Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Scope of Article 21 Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects the life and liberty of a person. In the case of A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras[2], the Supreme Court held that Article 21 conferred protection only against unlawful imprisonment, arrests and other forms of physical restrain and coercion. While arriving at this decision the Supreme Court was aware of the fact that the framers of the Constitution had deliberately inserted the word personal to qualify the word liberty in diversion from the 5th and the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

However, in the case of Satwant Singh Sawhney v. A.P.O., New Delhi[3], while relying upon the observations of Justice Ayyangar in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.[4], the Supreme Court virtually tried to amend Article 21 of the Constitution by holding that Kharak Singh[5] is a clear authority for the proposition that liberty, in our Constitution bears the same comprehensive meaning as is given to the expression liberty by the 5th and the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the expression personal liberty in Article 21 only excludes the ingredients of liberty enshrined in Article 19 of the Constitution. The same view was reiterated by Justice Bhagwati in the majority Judgement in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[6], wherein it was opined that the expression personal liberty in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct Fundamental Rights and given additional protection under Article 19. Thus, a proposition which emerges from the various decisions of the Apex Court is that all the different Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1) would have come within the Right to Personal Liberty had they not been expressly and separately enumerated in other Articles of the Constitution. The proposition, as detailed in Maneka Gandhi[7], appears to be that all the four Articles, namely, Articles 19, 20, 21 and 22, deal with our right to freedoms and personal liberty. Article 19 and Article 21 cover, in between them, and deal with all personal freedoms and personal liberties. While Article 19 deals with six of such freedoms and liberties, Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue.[8] Meaning of Right to Life under Article 21 With the increasing trend of the Apex Court to enlarge the scope of Article 21, which had been narrowly construed in A.K. Gopalan[9] to mean mere physiological existence and physical freedom, in the case of Maneka Gandhi[10] it was opined that if a right claimed by the petitioner is an integral part of a named Fundamental Right, or partakes of the same basic nature and character as the named Fundamental Right so that the exercise of such right is in reality and substance nothing but an instance of the exercise of the named Fundamental Right then it would be comprehended to be a part of that named Fundamental Right. Thus, in the case of Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi[11]Justice Bhagwati declared that the Right to Life included the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it. This continued expansion of the rights under Article 21 has led to a belief in some peoples minds that Right to Die is a part of Right to Life, which is based on the following premises: (a) The negative aspect of Right to Life In the case of R.C. Cooper v. Union of India[12] the Supreme Court, while evolving the analogy of negative rights, had held that all fundamental rights had their positive as well as negative aspects. For example, the right to freedom of speech includes the right to remain silent. Therefore, in the case of Maruti Shripati Dubal v. State of Maharashtra [13], the Bombay High Court held that if this is so, logically it must follow that right to live as recognised by Article 21 will include right not to live or not to be forced to live. To put it positively it will include also a right die, or to terminate ones life. Nevertheless, as noted by the two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Rathinam v.Union of India[14]this view is based on a misplaced analogy as the negative aspect of right to life would mean the end or the existence of the positive aspect, unlike the suspension of the right as is the case with negative aspects of right to speech etc. (b) Waiver of Fundamental Rights In the case of P. Rathinam v. Union of India[15] the Supreme Court drew a distinction between waiver by estoppel and waiver by non-exercise of the right of life under Article 21, thus, holding that while the former cannot be done as held in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal

Corporation[16]

but the latter can be allowed. Thus, essentially ruling that right to die could essentially mean a constitutionally valid waiver of right to life. Nevertheless, in the case of Basheshar Nath v. C.I.T.[17] a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court had held that under the Indian Constitution no form of waiver of Fundamental Rights is allowed as

allowing such a practice could lead to the watering down of the obligation imposed upon the State to provide for the welfare of the people. Thus, it is clear that there is no provision in the Constitution of India, which positively provides for the right to die, thus leading to a situation in which the various Courts in India have expressed different views regarding the constitutionality of this right, all of which have been discussed later in the project.

y Judicial Decisions The question whether the Right to Die exists in the Indian Constitution has been a source of great legal debate. This question has been posed before the Courts on several occasions during the past decade. y State v. Sanjay Kumar[18] The first case on the point was the decision of a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in State v. Sanjay Kumar [19] in which the Court was seized with the question as to whether the investigation of the case under Section 309 should be allowed to continue beyond the period prescribed under Section 368 of the IPC. Some loud (though uncalled for) thinking was done by the Bench on the rationale of Section 309, wherein Justice Sachar observed: It is ironic that Section 309 of the IPC still continues to be in our Penal Code. Strange paradox that in the age of votaries of Euthanasia, suicide should be criminally punishable. The continuance of Section 309 IPC is an anachronism unworthy of human society like ours. y Maruti Sripati Dubal v. State of Mahrashtra[20] Thereafter, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Maruti Sripati Dubal v. State of Mahrashtra[21] speaking through Justice Sawant, held that Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was ultra vires being violative of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution and therefore struck it down as being unconstitutional. The Court gave three principal reasons why Section 309 was violative of Article 21. 1. Article 21 has conferred a positive right to live, which carries with it the negative right not to live. To arrive at this conclusion the Court relied on R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [22], where it was first stated those Fundamental Rights are to be read together. On this basis, the Court drew an analogy with freedom of speech, which carried with it the right to be silent. 2. Since the people committing suicide usually suffer from disorders, diseases and problems, punishment is cruel and unjust. 3. The Court felt that there are several types of suicide like Johar [23], Sati [24], Samadhi[25] and Prayopaveshan [26], which have social and religious legitimacy in India. Furthermore, the Bombay High Court held that Section 309 is violative of Article 14 because of the following reasons:
The acts or the series of acts, which will constitute suicide, are undefined and ambiguous and the want of a plausible definition made it arbitrary. 2. Section 309 treats all attempts to commit suicide by the same measure without referring to the circumstances, and therefore unlike cases are treated alike. However, the decision of the High Court is based on a misplaced analogy as the Court ignored the inherent difference between one Fundamental Right and the other as the negative aspect of the right to live would essentially mean the end or extinction of the positive aspect and not a mere suspension of the right as in the case of silence etc. Furthermore, no one can be said to have a right to do an act prohibited by law simply because the act is otherwise religious or moral, unless the prohibition itself is illegal and invalid. 1.

y Cheena Jagdeeswara v. State of Andhra Pradesh[27] Soon after the decision of the Bombay High Court came the decision of a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cheena Jagdeeswara v. State of Andhra Pradesh [28] in which the High Court held that the Section was valid and did not violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, thus turning a blind eye to the decision of the Bombay High Court. y Court on Its Motion v. Yogesh Kumar[29]

The Delhi High Court also rendered a decision in a Suo Muto proceeding titled as Court on Its Motion v. Yogesh Kumar [30], wherein Justice Sachar pointed out the futility of creating criminal liability in criminal cases, but instead of striking down Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as being unconstitutional, what the Court did was to quash as all the 119 proceedings pending in Trial Courts on the ground that dragging of the prosecutions for years when the victims have had enough of misery, would be an abuse of the process of the Court. y P. Rathinam / Nagabhushan Patnaik v. Union of India[31] Then came the decisions of the Supreme Court, wherein an attempt was made to settle the controversy surrounding Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In P. Rathinam / Nagabhushan Patnaik v. Union of India [32], the Supreme Court in a landmark judgement struck down Section 309 of the IPC as being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in what it described as an attempt to humanise our penal laws took this bold step and the reasons given in support of such a step were: i. Scope of Article 21 The Supreme Court in the same case recognised the Right to Die as a part of Right to Life in Article 21. The judges cited a number of cases to show the expansion of the scope of Article 21 over the years by the judiciary.[33] Thus, the judges observed that : The right to life embraces not only physical existence but the quality of life as understood in its richness and fullness by the ambit of the Constitution.It therefore logically follows that if a person is not satisfied with the quality of life as granted under Article 21 then he has the right to terminate it. However, sequencing the Right to Die immediately after an elaborate discussion of the Supreme Courts expansion of the Right to Life was illogical as most of the rights attempted to enhance the enjoyment of life itself. In contrast, the Right to Die extinguishes life itself and has nothing in common with the other rights. Thus, the expansion of right to life over the past four decades has mainly been understood in terms of all those conditions that are in some way or the other conducive to a free flow and enhancement of life. The recognition of a Right to Die was a movement in the reverse direction as it would have not only created confusion in the Right to Life movement but also could have ultimately absolved the state of any obligation to provide the life enhancing conditions.[34] ii. Doctrine of Negative Rights Furthermore, while the case itself did not articulate any clear stand on the negative aspect of the right to life provided under Article 21, but it clearly upheld the logic used by Justice Sawant, in his decision in Maruti Sripati Dubal v. State of Maharashtra [35], where it was held for the first time that Section 309 is violative of Article 14 and 21. The Court had held that on a reading of the R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [36] that all Fundamental Rights had their positive and negative aspects, for example the right to speech would include the right to remain silent and so logically it must follow that the Right to Live as envisaged in Article 21 will also include a right not to live. iii. Doctrine of Waiver of Rights Another question which came up for consideration before the Court in the same case was whether or not the granting of the right to die to an individual would result in a waiver of an individuals fundamental right to life under Article 21. Though it has been clearly established that a person does not have the right to waive his fundamental rights[37], the Judges failed to articulate a coherent stand on the issue. However, a conclusion may be inferred using the logic of the positive and negative aspect of life, to say that Court believed that the act of suicide would not result in the waiver of the fundamental right but a non- practice of the right. For example, keeping quiet does not imply the waiver of the fundamental right to speech, but merely non- practice of the right. Nonetheless, in effect the attempt of suicide would result in the waiver of ones right to life, which is clearly not allowed under the Indian Constitution. Furthermore, the argument advanced by Justice S.K. Das, who dissented in the Baseswara Nath[38]case, that where a right or privilege is guaranteed by the Constitution, it rests in the

individual and is primarily intended for his benefit, as distinguished from the interest of the public, and therefore it can be waived cannot be invoked as such waiver can only be allowed if such waiver is not forbidden by law and does not contravene public policies or public morals, as is clearly the case with an attempt to suicide. y Smt. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab[39] The entire question of the validity of Section 309 was reopened in Smt. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab[40], wherein the appellants, who had been convicted under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1960, contended in their appeal that abatement of suicide cannot be a crime as it amounts to assisting another person to assert a fundamental right. Thus, the contention was that Section 306 was equally violative of Article 21. The entire question, including the validity of Rathinam, was referred to a Constitution Bench.[41] The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the same two issues that the Division Bench had addressed, namely, a) b) IV. Whether there is a right to die under Article 21? And whether S.309, I.P.C. is arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14? Is there a Right to Die ?

The contention that was taken in this case that if there is a right to die, the abatement of suicide cannot be criminal, exposed the infirmity of recognising a positive right to die. If a right to die is recognised, it automatically means that both S.306 and S.305, which punish abatement of suicide, are invalid. In P.Rathinam v. Union of India[42] it was held that since Art. 21 recognised the right to live it also recognised the right to die, as fundamental rights have both positive and negative aspects. The Division Bench held that the view that the right to live is on different footing as the negative of the right to live will mean extinction of the positive aspect, was unfounded. Thus, holding that the right to live under Article 21 has in its trial the right not to live a forced life. The Constitution Bench disagreed with the Division Bench on this ground. It held that the decisions which hold that a right to associate includes the right not to do that act. Protection from intrusion does not mean a right to discontinue the exercise of the right to life. Further, when rights like the right not to associate was exercised, there was no positive or overt act; when a person commits suicide there is certainly an overt and positive act.[43] Therefore, the Constitution Bench held, Right to Life is a natural right embodied in Art.21 but suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of life and therefore, incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of right to life.[44] V. Is Section 309 Violative of Article 14?

Despite the principle of judicial restraint, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court chose to consider the question of validity of Article 309, as tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. This question did not arise in the case as the validity of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was questioned only on the basis of the right to die and once the court had come to the conclusion that there is no right to die it could have disposed of the matter. Furthermore, the contention that Section 309 is violative of Article 14 had already been rejected in the case ofRathinam[45] and invalidity on the anvil of Article 14 would not have rendered Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 unconstitutional as no positive right is created. Nonetheless, it may be that the court felt constrained to answer the question given the contentions which had been raised by the appellants. It was contended that both Sections 309 & 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 were monstrous and barbaric and violated the equality clause because of their being discriminatory and arbitrary. It was also contended that the wide amplitude of Article 14 read with the dignity of life guaranteed under Article 21 renders Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 unconstitutional.

The Constitutional Bench, repeating the decision in Rathinam[46], held that Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is not violative of Article 14 because: 1. The definition of suicide is capable of broad definition and there is no real ambiguity in determining what acts constitute suicide. Hence, Section 309 of the Penal Code is not arbitrary. There is sentencing discretion and hence all suicides are not treated alike, therefore Section 309 of the Penal Code is not violative of Article 14. Thus, the law of the land is now clear that there does not exist a Right to Die, except in certain specific circumstances and the offences of attempt to suicide and abetment of suicide are punishable under the Constitutionally valid provisions of the Penal Code. 1.

y The Case of Euthanasia and Physician Aided Suicide Due to the observations of the Constitution Bench in the case of Gian Kaur[47], where it was held that: ..The right to life including the right to live with human dignity would mean the existence of such a right upto the end of natural life. This also includes the right to a dignified life upto a point of death. In other words this may include the right to dying man to die with dignity..
And that: ..A question may arise in the context of dying man, who is, terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state that he may be permitted to terminate it by a premature extinction of his life, in these circumstances. This category of cases may fall within the ambit of the right to die with dignity as part of right to live with dignity The debate even in such cases to permit physician assisted termination of life is inconclusive..[48] a limited right to die, under certain circumstances , has been recognised. It has been seen that the right to die has been recognised in a limited circumstance as part of the right to live with dignity. The court has held that the right to live with dignity allows a terminally ill person in a persistent vegetative state to kill himself. When death is certain, the process can be accelerated without attracting censure.[49] However, even in such cases the problem of physician assisted termination was left unresolved. The Court made a distinction between active interference in the process of dying, and allowing a person to die. The Court cited various decisions from other jurisprudence to show that even physician-assisted suicide may be illegal and opined that since there are so many limitations on physician assisted suicide, suicides assisted by lay-persons have no rational basis to claim exclusion from the principle of sanctity of life. Thus, in sum the position, that seems to be existing in India, is that a terminally ill patient can attempt to commit suicide without fear of penal consequences if he/she fails to succeed. Nevertheless, there can be no active assistance from the physician. A question arises that an abatement to commit suicide can only be an offence if an attempt to commit suicide is an offence. Therefore if S.309 is held invalid, abatement of an attempt to commit suicide is not punishable. As a result the recognition of a limited right to die as part of the right to live with dignity is not reconcilable with the dicta that abatement of suicide by a terminally ill patient is an offence. Therefore, it can be argued that Physician Assisted Suicide has been allowed in India. However, this argument cannot be accepted as Section 306 of the Penal Code is clear in its wording and it would not be possible to exclude those people who abet the suicide by terminally ill patients from its ambit. People abetting the attempt to commit suicide by a terminally ill patient would also liable to be punished as Section 308 which is the general provision making abatement of an offence, will operate even if the main offender is not guilty.

Conclusion

Yet I, too, believe that gods are our guardians, and that we men are a posession of theirs If we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me. Socrates The problem of suicide is of controvertible nature, the question whether a person is free to choose the manner and time of his own death has generated though provoking debate for a long time. As the latest decision of the Supreme Court on the point, Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab[50], lays down, life is considered the most precious commodity and every effort has to be made to preserve it. The Court, in the instant case, made it clear that the right to life, including the right to live with human dignity would mean the existence of such right upto the end of natural life. This also includes the right to a dignified life upto the point of death including a dignified procedure of death. The Supreme Court also reversed its earlier judgement in the Rathinam Case[51] and held that the right to life does not include a right to die. As far as the desirability of recognising the Right to Die and the effacing of Section 309 from the Indian Penal Code are concerned, the Right should not be recognised and the Section should remain intact because recognition of the Right and the effacement of the Section will cause and create many problems. For example in the cases of hunger strike till death, irrespective of the achievements of a noble or purposeful object or for greater service of society, which is definitely an attempt to commit suicide as defined under Section 309 of the Penal Code no action can be taken against the people resorting to these practices, on the ground that they have the right to dispose themselves, in case the right to die is recognised. Furthermore, practices like Sati would be legalised and the removal of Section 309 from the Penal Code will create hurdles in eradicating the social and shameful evil of Sati, which is a criminal phenomenon, and against the conscience of humanity. In fact Justice Krishna Iyer has observed that the Indian Penal Code in Sections 306 and 307 go to the extent of dealing with the Sati system effectively and make it a crime. Everyone who is party directly or indirectly to the operation of Sati is guilty of abatement of murder. In addition, if a right to die is recognised, there would be, in the Hohfeldian scheme, a corresponding duty imposed upon the state to provide adequate facilities for suicide [52] and it would also negate the obligation of the State to make efforts to ensure that the citizens lead a happy and contended life. Moreover, an attempt to constitutionally kill the attempt to suicide provision in view of the argument that it is monstrous and barbaric is not warranted as the Courts are free to decide each case on its merits, with special emphasis on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Since the punishment under Section 309 is upto one year and not compulsory one year, the Courts may use the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, to dispense justice as per the peculiar facts of different cases and may provide the Courts with an opportunity to provide for psychiatric treatment for those who are in need of it. Even the stigma of being labelled a criminal is wiped off by Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, which removes all disabilities. Thus, although it is certainly desirable to humanise our laws and understand the suicide prone victim, it would be an act of rashness to recognise the right to die. The Supreme Court decision in Gian Kaur[53] is a pragmatic one and appears to be a requiem for reason, which lost out to humanisation in the case of Rathinam[54]

y Bibliography Articles : A.M. Bhattacharjee, Article 21 and the Due Process and the Exclusionary Rule of Evidence (1983) 3 SCC (J).
B.B. Pande, Right to Life or Death ? For Bharat both cannot be Right (1994) 4 SCC (J) 1. B.D. Ahamad, Organ Transplant and the Right to Die VII Islamic L.Q. (1987).

Lawrence Liang and Bhavna Tahakur, P. Rathinam v. Union of India : A Case Comment 7 Stud. Ad. 126 (1995). Rajeev Dhavan, The Right to Die, The Hindu (April 12, 1996). Sheeraz Latif Ali Khan, Right to Die or not to Die : A Note on the Supreme Court Judgement (1993) 1 SCJ (J.S.). V. S. Deshpande, To Be or Not to Be (1984) 3 SCC (J). Books : A.M. Bhattacharjee, Equality, Liberty and Property under the Indian Constitution (Calcutta: Eastern Law House, 1997). George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (New York: Sweet and Maxwell, 1978). Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (London: University of London Press, 1969). Jethro Brown, The Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation (London: Oxford Press, 1971). y H. M. Seervai , Constitutional Law Of India (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., 1991). [1] As cited in V.S. Deshpande, To Be or Not to Be (1984) 3 SCC (J) 10. [2] AIR 1950 SC 27. [3] AIR 1967 SC 1836. [4] AIR 1963 SC 1295. [5] AIR 1963 SC 1295. [6] AIR 1978 SC 597. [7] AIR 1978 SC 597. [8] A.M. Bhattacharjee, Equality, Liberty and Property under the Constitution of India (Calcutta: Eastern Law House, 1997) at 58. [9] AIR 1950 SC 27. [10] AIR 1978 SC 597. [11] AIR 1981 SC 746. [12] AIR 1970 SC 1318. [13] 1987 Cri.L.J. 743. [14] (1994) 3 SCC 394. [15] (1994) 3 SCC 394. [16] (1985) 3 SCC 545. [17] 1959 (1) SCR 528. [18] 1985 Cri. L.J. 931. [19] 1985 Cri. L.J. 931. [20] 1987 Cri L.J. 743. [21] 1987 Cri L.J. 743. [22](1970) 2 SCC 298. [23] Mass suicide by self-immolation.

[24] Self Immolation by the widow on the pyre of the husband. [25] Termination of ones life by self restraint on breathing. [26] Starving unto death. [27] 1988 Cri. L.J. 549. [28] 1988 Cri. L.J. 549. [29] Registered as Crl. Revision No. 230 of 1985. [30] Registered as Crl. Revision No. 230 of 1985. [31] (1994) 3 SCC 394. [32] (1994) 3 SCC 394. [33] See Unnikrishnan v. State of A.P. (1993) 1 SCC 649 ( Right to Education); Sunil Batra v. Dehi Administration AIR 1980 SC 1579 ( Right against Solitary Confinement); Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1360 ( Right to Speedy Trial). [34] B.B. Pande, Right to Life or Death ? For Bharat both cannot be Right (1994) 4 SCC (J) 1. [35] 1987 Cri. L. J. 748. [36] AIR 1970 SC 1318. [37] Baseswara Nath v. CIT , 1959 (1) SCR 528. [38] 1959 (1) SCR 528. [39] (1996) 2 SCC 648. [40] (1996) 2 SCC 648. [41] It is the contention of eminent jurists like Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee that the law laid down byRathinam is not good law as the dictum was laid down by a 3 Judge Bench whereas only a 5 Judge Bench (Constitution Bench ) has the prerogative to comment on Constitutional matters. [42] (1994) 3 SCC 394. [43] (1996) 2 SCC 658. [44] (1996) 2 SCC 659. [45] (1994) 3 SCC 394. [46] (1994) 3 SCC 394. [47] (1996) 2 SCC 648. [48] (1996) 2 SCC 721. [49] Gian Kaur v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 648. [50] (1996) 2 SCC 648. [51] (1994) 3 SCC 394. [52] Lawrence Liang and Bhavna Tahakur, P. Rathinam v. Union of India : A Case Comment 7 Stud. Ad.(1995) at 126. [53] (1996) 2 SCC 648.

[54] (1994) 3 SCC 394.

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