Supreme Court Petition Versus RA 9495

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
City of Manila
FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR and
HOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR.,
Petitioners,
SC G.R SP. No. ________

-versus-
FOR: CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION,
AND INJUNCTION, WITH
APPLICATION FOR TE MPO-
RARY RESTRAINING ORDER
SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,

in his capacity as the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------x
PETITION
PETITIONERS, by counsel, most respectfully state, THAT:
THE PARTIES
Petitioner FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, is of legal age, married,
with residence and postal address at Sitio Paang Bundok, Brgy. 5,
Calauag, Quezon; whereas petitioner HOBART DEVEZA DATOR,
JR., is of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at
Lucban, Quezon. Petitioners can be served with orders,
resolutions, pleadings, writs and other processes through the
undersigned counsel.
Page1
On the other hand, respondents: a) HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, is being sued in
his capacity as Executive Secretary and as implementor of
Republic Act No. 9495. He may be served with writs, summons,
pleadings, orders, decision and other court processes at his office
at Room 234, Mabini Hall, Malacañang Palace, Manila; b)
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, is of legal age, married, with principal office
address at Department of Budget and Management, Malacañang
Palace, Manila; c) COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS holds office at
Intramuros, Manila, where all of them, in their indicated
respective principal offices, may be served with summons, writs
and other processes of this Honorable Court.
II
NATURE OF THE PETITION
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to declare the
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9495, and COMELEC
Resolutions Nos. 8533, 8534, 8535, 8537, 8538 and 8539, all
dated November 12, 2008;
This is also a special civil action for Prohibition to enjoin,
forbid, and prohibit the above-named respondents from
implementing, enforcing, and effecting Republic Act No. 9495 and
the questioned COMELEC Resolutions, particularly:

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i. the respondent Executive Secretary from
processing the appointment of the interim
governor, vice governor and members of the
Sanguniang Panglalawigan of the de facto
Quezon del Sur; and
ii. the Secretary of Budget from disbursing public
monies necessary for:
a. the conduct of the plebiscite;
b. disbursing the salaries, allowances and other
emoluments of the interim local government officials
of the de facto Quezon del Sur; and the
iii Commission on Elections from initiating and
conducting the plebiscite pursuant to Section 49 of
R.A. 9495.
Lastly, the provisional remedy of PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
and/or TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER is respectfully
applied for under the same tenor of the prayer for Writ of
Prohibition.
III
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On 6 February 1901, the Philippine Commission enacted Act
No. 83, otherwise known as the Provincial Government Act. It
sought to present a template of provincial administration and

Page6
granted these entities with corporate powers1. Thereafter, on 12
March 1901, by virtue of Act No. 103, the provision of Act No. 83
was extended to the Province of Tayabas.
On 1 July 1916, the Philippine Commission enacted the
Administrative Code, which expressly repealed Act Nos. 83 and
103, among other laws. The Revised Administrative Code of 1917
(Act No. 2711) recognized Tayabas as one of then 42 provinces of
the Philippine Islands (under Section 37).
On 7 September 1946, the Province of Tayabas was renamed
as Quezon Province through Republic Act No. 14. Later, the sub-
province of Aurora was created through Republic Act No. 648
(1951) until it was separated from the province by the enactment
of Batas Pambansa No. 7 (1979).
In the meantime, Republic Act No. 1205 was enacted in
1955, converting all specially organized provinces into regularly
organized provinces.
On 1 January 1992, the Local Government Code of 1991 took
effect, among the pertinent effects thereof was an implied repeal
of “[a]ll general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or
part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code…2”
1
Act No. 83, Section 2 – Every provincial government established under this Act shall be a
body corporate, with power to sue and be sued, to have and use a corporate seal, to hold
property real or personal, to make contracts for labor and material needed in the
construction of duly authorized public works and to incur any such other obligations as are
Page6
expressly authorized by law.

2
Section 534 (f), R.A. No. 7160.
Relevant to the instant case is the passage of Republic Act
No. 9495, “An Act Creating the Province of Quezon del Sur,”
which lapsed into law on 7 September 2007. It was published in
the Official Gazette in Volume 104, No. 16, on April 21, 2008.
Republic Act No. 9495 originated from House Bill 2862 (later
H.B. 5970) and was authored principally by Representatives
Lorenzo Tañada III and Danilo Suarez of the 3rd and 4th
Congressional Districts of Quezon Province. It was referred to the
Committee on Local Government, which met on 15 February 2006
and approved the passage of the bill for second reading of the
plenary session. On 7 December 2006, H.B. 5970, through an
omnibus motion to approve all other local bills, passed the second
reading without debate3. On 20 December 2006, H.B. 5970 was
approved by the House for third reading4. It passed the Senate on
7 June 2007.
Implementing RA 9495, respondent COMELEC issued the
following Resolutions (please go to
http://comelec.wordpress.com/category/plebiscite/):
Resolution No. 8533 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “RULES

AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE
PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR,
PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 07,
2007, WHICH SHALL BE COMPOSED OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF:
AGDANGAN, BUENAVISTA, CATANAUAN, GENERAL LUNA,
MACALELON, MULANAY, PADRE BURGOS, PITOGO, SAN ANDRES,
SAN FRANCISCO, SAN NARCISO, UNISAN, ALABAT, ATIMONAN,
CALAUAG, GUINYANGAN, GUMACA, LOPEZ, PEREZ, PLARIDEL,
QUEZON AND TAGKAWAYAN; AND THE REMAINING OF THE
MOTHER PROVINCE OF QUEZON TO KNOWN AS QUEZON DEL
3
Uncatalogued transcript of the Journal of the House of Representatives, 12/07/06, page
240.
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4
Uncatalogued transcript of the Journal of the House of Representatives, 12/20/06, page
109.
NORTE, WHICH SHALL BE COMPOSED OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
BURDEOS, GENERAL NAKAR, INFANTA, JOMALIG, LUCBAN,
MAUBAN, PAGBILAO, PANUKULAN, PATNANUNGAN, POLILIO,
REAL, SAMPALOC, CANDELARIA, DOLORES, SAN ANTONIO,
SARIAYA, TIAONG AND THE CITIES OF LUCENA AND TAYABAS, TO
BE CONDUCTED ON DECEMBER 13, 2008.”
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
Resolution No. 8534 dated November 12, 2008 entitled

“CALENDAR OF ACTIVITIES AND PERIODS OF PROHIBITED ACTS
IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO
RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING
OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE
2007.”
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
Resolution No. 8535 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “IN THE
MATTER OF DEPUTIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING FREE,
ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE CONDUCT OF THE
DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF
QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER
PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 2007.”
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

AND REGULATIONS ON : (A) BEARING, CARRYING OR
TRANSPORTING FIREARMS OR OTHER DEADLY WEAPONS; (B)
SECURITY PERSONNEL OR BODYGUARDS; (C) BEARING ARMS BY
ANY MEMBER OF SECURITY OR POLICE ORGANIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATION
(D) ORGANIZATION OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTION FORCES
DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIOD IN CONNECTION WITH THE
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

ON THE LIQUOR BAN IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13,
2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR
AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON
DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED
SEPTEMBER 7, 2007.”
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xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

“AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO APPOINT,
FILL-UP POSITIONS AND TRANSFER OR REASSIGN ITS PERSONNEL
PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495.”
IV
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
R.A. 9495 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM BECAUSE

NO SUFFICIENT STANDARD WAS LAID DOWN FOR
THE POWERS THAT THE INTERIM APPOINTEES MAY
EXERCISE.
R.A. 9495 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM BECAUSE

OF ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
OF R.A. 7160.
R.A. 9495 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

PRECEPT THAT NO MORE THAN ONE (1) SUBJECT
SHALL EMBRACE A STATUTE:
A. THE LAW CREATES ANOTHER LOCAL

GOVERNMENT UNIT OTHER THAN QUEZON DEL
SUR;
B. THE LAW RENAMES QUEZON

PROVINCE AS QUEZON DEL NORTE;
C. R.A. 9495 DEVISES AN EXCEPTION TO

THE REQUIREMENT OF SITUS IN THE
ASSESSMENT, EXACTION, AND COLLECTION OF
REAL PROPERTY TAXES AND THEREFORE NOT
GERMANE TO THE INTENDMENT OF THE
STATUTE;
THE PLEBISCITE CAN NO LONGER BE CONDUCTED

ON DECEMBER 13, 2008 AS THE PERIOD FIXED BY
THE SAID LAW HAS LAPSED;
RESPONDENT COMELEC’S QUESTIONED

RSOLUTIONS ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 12, 2008 CAN
NOT BE ENFORCED FOR LACK OF PUBLICATION
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THRU THE UP LAW CENTER.

V
DISCUSSION
Requisites of Judicial Inquiry Are

Present In the Case at Bar.
-------------------------------------------------
-
In Dumlao v. Commission on Elections5, the Honorable
Supreme Court ruled that no constitutional question will be heard
unless there is compliance with what are known as requisites of a
judicial inquiry. These requisites are the following:
a. There must be an actual case or controversy;
b. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party;
c. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and
d. The decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
It is submitted that the above requisites are applicable in the
case at bar.
There must be an Actual Case or

Controversy.
-------------------------------------------------
-
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It
is “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
5
95 SCRA 392, 401-404 [1980]. Also in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, [Supreme Court] G.R.
Page6
Nos. 171396, 171400, 171409, 171424, 171483, 171485, and 171489, 5/3/06,
<www.supremecourt.gov.ph> page 21
having adverse legal interest6;” a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief.
In the case at bar, the petitioners are seeking to restrain:
a. the illegal disbursement of funds that would
result in the appointment of interim officers;
b. the illegal disbursement of funds to execute a
defective law; and
c. the illegal disbursement of funds to conduct
a plebiscite on December 13, 2008 in view of
the lapse of time provided by law for its
execution.
The Question of Constitutionality

must be raised by the Proper
Party.
-------------------------------------------------
-
“Locus standi” is defined as “a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question7.” In private suits, standing is
governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Accordingly,
the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
6
Cruz, Isagani A., “Philippine Political Law” 1993 ed., p. 238. Cited in David, v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, page 22.
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7
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1991, p.94, cited in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra,
page 24.
entitled to the avails of the suit8.” Succinctly put, the petitioner’s
standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
In the instant case, the petitioners are real-parties-in-interest
as they are residents of Quezon Province and are registered
voters thereof, where they own real properties and pay the
corresponding real property taxes. Petitioner Pulgar is a
registered voter of Calauag, Quezon and exercises his right to
vote therein, copy of a Certification from the Calauag, Quezon
Commission on Elections is hereto attached as ANNEX “A” and
made part hereof. Petitioner Dator, Jr. is likewise a real property
owner in Lucban, Quezon, copy of the Certification from the
Lucban, Quezon Assessor’s Office is hereto attached as ANNEX
“B” and his Voter Certification as ANNEX “C” made parts hereof.
In fine, petitioners are suing as taxpayers of and as
registered voters in the Province of Quezon.
The Constitutional Question must

be raised at the Earliest Possible
Opportunity.
-------------------------------------------------
-
It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines
whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest
opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue
is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can
resolve the same, such that, “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it
Page6
8
Salonga v. Warner Barnes Co., 88 Phil 125, also cited in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra,
page 25.
cannot be considered at trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it
cannot be considered on appeal9.”
The petitioner is constrained to raise the issue of the
constitutionality of RA 9495 before this Honorable Court because
there is no plain, adequate nor speedy remedy available to them
other than the filing of this case.
R.A. 9495 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY

INFIRM BECAUSE NO SUFFICIENT
STANDARD WAS LAID DOWN FOR
THE POWERS THAT THE
INTERIM APPOINTEES MAY
EXERCISE.
-------------------------------------------------
-
As previously stated, R.A. 9495 lapsed into law on 7
September 2007. In accordance with Section 58 thereof, the law
is to become effective upon its actual publication in a newspapers
of general circulation. This was not done. As provided in its
Section 49, a plebiscite was scheduled within 60 days from the
effectivity of the law.
Thereafter, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 52
(a), the President shall appoint interim officials to their positions
as interim governor, vice governor and interim members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Here lies the crux of the
controversy.
What powers can the interim appointees exercise?
Section 52 (a), R.A. 9495 provides:

Page6
9
Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, 65, citing People v. Vera 65 Phil 56.
“xxx The President of the Philippines shall appoint in the
province herein created an interim governor, vice-governor and
members of the sangguiniang panlalawigan who shall serve only
until a new set of provincial officials have been elected and
qualified.”
The law does not say anything about the powers that the
interim appointees can exercise. Neither would the application of
the provisions of R.A. 7160 prove adequate to supply such
powers, as would be discussed below.
The Local Government Code provides for political and
corporate powers of a local government unit (LGU) (Section 15,
R.A. 7160). This “dual personality” means that as political units of
government, the LGUs have governmental powers as agents of
the national government. As corporate units, they have powers
which are proprietary, not necessarily governmental, but which
they may perform for the benefit of their constitutencies10.
It is submitted that the respondents could not exercise any
of these aforecited powers. The interim appointees cannot
exercise the province’s political power because R.A. 9495 did not
expressly give them such powers. Neither could these appointees
appoint any person to work with them and could therefore “not
act on anything or transact any business.” This is so since the
organization of the provincial government of Quezon del Sur can
only be filled “within sixty (60) days after the commencement of
the corporate existence of the province…” (Section 53). This

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10
Pimentel, Jr., A.Q., “The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to National
Development,” 1993 ed., p. 45.
could possibly occur sometime between 10 May 2010 but not
later than 30 August 2010.
With respect to its corporate powers (Section 4, R.A. 9495/
Section 22, R.A. 7160) the interim appointees cannot exercise the
same because the period when the Province of Quezon del Sur
can commence its corporate existence was set “upon the election
and qualification of the governor, vice governor and the majority
of the members of the sangguniang panlalawigan.” (Section 52,
R.A. 9495/Section 14, R.A. 7160). This could occur sometime
between 10 May 2010 until 30 June 2010, and at such time, the
term of interim appointees ends.
In Mejia, et al., v. Balolong, et al11., the Supreme Court ruled,
thus:
“…But as a city is a public corporation or a juridical entity,

and as such can not operate or transact business by itself but
through its agents or officers, it was necessary that the
government of the city be organized, that is, that the officials
thereof be appointed or elected in order that it may act or
transact business as such public corporation or entity.”
Any doubt as to the nature of the powers that the interim
appointees may exercise is negated by the express powers that
the law grants to the Ad-hoc Committee composed of
incumbent officials and representatives of the Province of
Quezon (Section 50, R.A. 9495). As matter cannot exist in the
same space and time, neither could the exercise of delegated
powers exist in the Ad-hoc Committee and the interim

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11
81 Phil 468.
appointees. In essence, the appointed interim officials are a
bureaucratic surplusage.
With the aforecited defects, R.A. 9495 could not stand the
tests of delegation of powers as enunciated in the seminal case of
Pelaez v. Auditor General12
R.A. 9495 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY

INFIRM BECAUSE OF ITS
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF R.A. 7160.
-------------------------------------------------
-
Section 6 of R.A. 7160 provides that;

“Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. A
local government unit may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundaries substantiall altered either by law
enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality,
or any other political subdivision, ..... subject to such limitations
and requirements prescribed in this Code.”
The limitations and requirements are found in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (hereinafter, IRR).
Section 533 of the same law directed the formulation of the
IRR. Article 9 (b) of the IRR provides, to wit:
“Article 9. Provinces.
(a) xxx
(b)Procedure for creation. –
(1) Petition – Interested municipalities or component cities

shall submit the petition in the form of a resolution, of their
respective sanggunians requesting the creation of a new
province to the Congress, and furnish copies thereof to the
sangguniang panlalawigan of the original province or
provinces.
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12
15 SCRA 569.
(2) Comments on petition – The sangguiang panlalawigan of
the original province or provinces shall submit to the
Congress its comments and recommendations on the
petition for the creation of the proposed province.”
(Emphasis supplied)
A perusal of the Committee on Local Government public
hearing conducted on 15 February 2006 would show serious
defects in the compliance of its proponents with the mandatory
requirements of the law. Attached as ANNEX “D” is a copy of the
transcript of the public hearing conducted by the Committee on
Local Government.
Mention was made by the sponsor of the bill, Rep. Lorenzo
Tañada III of their compliance with the statutory requisites for the
creation of a LGU13. However, the Committee displayed a cavalier
attitude towards the compliance of the proponents with the
mandatory requirement of the IRR on the resolutions of interested
municipalities and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quezon, to
wit:
“REP. EDUARDO V. ROQUERO, M.D. Mr. Chairman.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Honorable Roquero
REP. ROQUERO. Thank you.

Maari din po ba nating malaman kung ano po ang pleasure o
stand ng provincial board, the governor?
REP. TAÑADA. Yeah, Mr. Chairman, the resolution signed by the

Board Members are comprised by Board Member Roderick Magbuhos,
Board Member Gerald Ortiz, Board Member Icias Ubana and Board
Member Rommel Edaño. This has not yet been voted upon by the
Provincial Board, so it is hard for me to speculate on how the
13
a. 2000 Census – 746,883 for “Quezon del Sur” and 736,072 for “Quezon del
Norte.” Minimum is 250,000.
b. Department of Finance 2002-2003 reported earnings of “Quezon del Sur” as 198.3
Million and “Quezon del Norte” – 276.1 Million. Minimum is 20 Million per 1991
constant price.
c. Land Area - “Quezon del Sur” 4,033 sq.km. and 4,892 sq. km. for “Quezon del Norte.”
Page6
Minimum is 2,000 sq.km. Source: Transcript of the public hearing of the Committee
on Local Government, 2/25/06, p. 4
Provincial Board will vote on the matter but there is a resolution that
was filed.
REP. VIRADOR. Just a follow-up on that, Mr. Chairman.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Honorable Virador.
REP. VIRADOR. I noticed that the Governor is not mentioned in

this resolution. What is really his stand on this proposal Mr. Chairman?
REP. TAÑADA. Again, Mr. Chairman, this would be mere

speculation on my part, but when this bill has been filed (sic) as early
as the 11th Congress, this was sponsored then by my father, the former
Senator Bobby Tañada,and Congressman Raffy Nantes. It passed the
House in the 11th Congress but due to the impeachment case of then
President Erap Estrada in 2001, it was not tackled in the Senate.
The position of Governor Enverga the (sic) time was to let the
people decide. So I am not sure if the Governor would still
maintain the same position today. In the 12th Congress, this bill
creating the Province of Quezon del Sur was, again, filed by
Congressman Nantes and former Congresswoman Aleta Suarez, but
this was not passed in the Committee nor in the Plenary of the House.
So this will be the third attempt. Hopefully, we will see the light of day
and get it pass through the Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
REP. VIRADOR. Mr. Chairman, while I recognize that the approval

of the governor or other members of the sangguiniang panlalawigan is
not necessary for the creation of a new province, I just want to
manifest that, maybe, I can interpret this that this is also the
sentiment of other governors that they don’t want that their allocation,
their IRA will be divided. I hope that is not the reason. But at any rate,
Mr. Chairman, I do support this bill for the betterment of the lives of
the people from Quezon.
REP. TAÑADA. Mr. Chairman.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Okay. The Honorable Tañada.
REP. TAÑADA. Yeah, just to clarify what Congressman Virador

mentioned. It is not stated in Republic Act 7160 or the Local
Government Code that the approval of the governor or the
sangguniang panlalawigan is a condition precedent for this
Committee to tackle House Bill 2861….” (Emphasis supplied)
As can be culled from this discussion, the proponent of the
bill did not possess any resolution from the sangguniang bayan
and sangguniang panlalawigan of the affected LGUs; the
Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Quezon was not given a chance to

Page6
officially file its comments and recommendation on the petition;
and the prevailing view of the committee was that it was not
necessary to obtain these matters as a condition precedent for
the passage of the bill into law. Please refer to the Certification
dated April 11, 2008 executed by the Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quezon attesting the absence of
any affirmative resolution endorsing for approval the proposed bill
on the division of Quezon as ANNEX “E” hereof.
The constitutional question is: can Congress ignore the
provision of the IRR in the creation of a LGU?
R.A. 9495 EMBRACES MULTIPLE

SUBJECTS.
-------------------------------------------------
-
The subject law is violative of the general principle that
every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
1.15. Title of statute.
The Constitution provides that “every bill passed by

Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.” This provision is mandatory,
and a law enacted in violation thereof is unconstitutional. The
constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon the
legislature. First, the legislature is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statue, of heterogeneous subjects.
Second, the title of the Bill is to be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
1.16. Purposes of Requirement.
The principal purpose of the constitutional requirement

that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
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expressed in its title is to apprise the legislators of the object,

nature and scope of the provisions of the bill, and to prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have not received the
notice, action and study of the legislators. It is to prohibit
duplicity in legislation, the title of which completely fails to
apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the law or its provisions. In other words, the
aims of the constitutional requirement are: “First, to prevent
hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise
or fraud upon the legislature, by means of provisions in bills of
which the title gave no information, and which might therefore
be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of the
legislation that are being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise,
if they shall so desire.
A fourth purpose may be added. The title of a statue is

used as a guide in ascertaining legislative intent when the
language of the act does not clearly express its purpose. The
title may clarify doubt or ambiguity in the meaning and scope
of a statue, and limiting a statue to only one subject and
expressing it in its title will strengthen its function as an
intrinsic aid to statutory construction.14
In the subject law, another province is being created,
Quezon Del Norte, which is an entirely new province, carved out
from the Province of Quezon.
The creation of Province of Quezon as shown elsewhere is
embodied in Republic Act No. 14 which was approved on
September 7, 1946.
What Republic Act 9495 seeks to accomplish, among its
many subjects, is to rename Quezon Province as Quezon del
Norte which is totally not germane to the purpose of the law.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
1.23. Purview of statute.
The purview or body of a statue is that part which tells

what the law is all about. The body of a statue should embrace
only one subject matter. The constitutional requirement
that a bill should have only one subject matter which
should be expressed in its title is complied with where
the provisions thereof, no matter how diverse that may
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14
Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Fifth Edition, pp. 11-12 (Emphasis ours)
be, are allied and germane to the subject and purpose of
the bill or, negatively stated, where the provisions are not
inconsistent with, but in furtherance of, the single subject
matter.
The legislative practice in writing a statue is to divide an

act into sections, each of which is numbered and contains a
single proposition. A complex and comprehensive piece of
legislation usually contains, in this sequence, a short title, a
policy section, definition section, administrative section, sections
prescribing standards of conduct, section imposing sanctions for
violation of its provisions, transitory provision, separability
clause, repealing clause, and effectivity clause.15
This case is on all fours with the case of Baralidasan vs.
Commission on Elections16, where this Honorable Court struck
down Republic Act 4790 entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional.
This Honorable Court ruled as follows:
The question initially presented to the Commission on

Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province —
Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the
affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari
and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law

House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute.
The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong,

Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung,
in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao
del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted
into a distinct and independent municipality of the same
province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of
Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall
be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the

new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-
seven general elections for local officials.
Page6
15
Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Fifth Edition, pp. 15-16 (emphasis ours).
16
GR No. L-28089, October 25, 1967
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just

mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not
of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its

resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which
are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of

voters and for other election purposes, the Commission
RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of
Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan,
Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum
situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of
Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the
municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two

municipalities in the province of Cotabato — are transferred to
the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the

Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive
Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the
statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its

own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and

prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for
the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared
unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15,
1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for
electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement

aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill."2
Page6
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the
constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under
one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the
bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of
the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of

the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its
deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of
House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title
was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of
Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application,
originated.5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to

employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire
into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators.6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a

statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the
following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is

misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and
the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is
clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication
of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance

rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the
constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons
interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look

at the disputed statute. The title — "An Act Creating the
Page6
Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 —

projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur
is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The
phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety
or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the
known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose
combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of
Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of
Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and
(2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province
different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is

not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the
members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did
not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of
their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur;
it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic
Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of

the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of
territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental
legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality
of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that
portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in
the title of the law." This posture — we must say — but
emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing
down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory
from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of
area, population and income of the first and the corresponding
increase of those of the other. This is as important as the
creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this
fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511,

October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not in
focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads:
"An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as
unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law
(Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the
provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the bill.
We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely,
an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide for
the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" — which is
"manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set
forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a
different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but
separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor
Page6
logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of

Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be
made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice
versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is

drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There,
the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate
the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute,
however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of
Michigan enact, that the following described territory in the
counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and
the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name
of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by
plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the
Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing
his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the
Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace
more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The
Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of
nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of

Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and that the words,
"in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not
agree with appellant that the words last quoted may, for that
reason, be disregarded as surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court

cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose of
saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to

"challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its
provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316,
200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the

act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the restriction. As
was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in
the worst degree, for it is misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political

subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the
title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still

be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the
municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the
mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the
twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the
other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the
limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the
Page6
province of Lanao del Sur.

We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and
of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is rendered
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be
separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however,
gives the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually

dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if
all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass
the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected, must fall with them,
In substantially similar language, the same exception is

recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as

repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the
valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that
the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had
supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . .
Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid
statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language
used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or
efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must
express the legislative will independently of the void part, since
the court has no power to legislate, . . . .
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still

intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine barrios
in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the
town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and
Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer
must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They

serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the
functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the
community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter
character that they are a separate entity acting for their own
purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the

consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these
are population, territory, and income. It was apparently these
same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247
creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-
one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the
explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790,
Page6
reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the
aggregate population is large; and the collective income is
sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants

concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of
municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress,

unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios — not nine
barrios — was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is
so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter
enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in
Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in
Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of
questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive
community, large aggregate population, collective income
sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to
a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it
fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios
would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what
with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent
municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with
the income to be derived in their community? How about the
peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations?
This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing
questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to
answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on
separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an
undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was
created upon the basic considerations of progressive community,
large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not
now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only
nine — of the original twenty-one — barrios, with a seat of
government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches
judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility
point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes
the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due
respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now
melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of
nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really,
if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the
function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that
congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly

null and void in its totality.14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by

respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal
interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic
Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner
is not the real party in interest.
Page6
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground
that it violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of
the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore,
hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are
impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in
Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a
different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a

community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain
that the law so created is not dismembering his place of
residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in
this jurisdiction.15
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the

1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was
annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the
case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence.
He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different
communities which are fanned into the new town; he may prefer
to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and
continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He
may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may
express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel
that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before
dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of
a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of
the community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say
that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any
citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act

4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from
implementing the same for electoral purposes.17 (emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, the people of Quezon Province are kept in the
dark by the title of the defective law. Technically, two provinces are
created by RA 9495. Quezon del Sur can exist independently with
Quezon Province, being the mother province thereof. Yet, the law
went out of bounds by creating another entirely new province,
Quezon del Norte, with new technical boundaries yet retaining the
Page6
17
G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967
old capital of Lucena City. Quezon del Norte whichever one looks at
it is not Quezon Province.
RA 9495 AMENDS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
Another glaring defect of Republic Act 9495 is Section 55
thereof, which states:
Equitable Division. - Upon the effectivity of this Act, the

obligations, funds, assets and other properties of the present
Province of Quezon, renamed Quezon del Norte, shall, as much
as possible, be divided equitably between Quezon del Sur and
Quezon del Norte. The President of the Philippines shall order
such division upon the recommendation of the ad hoc committee
which may avail of assistance from the Commission on Audit and
other departments concerned.
The tax revenues from business enterprises principally

located in one of the two provinces created herein but whose
facilities or structures extend to the other such as, but not
limited to, power generating plants shall be proportionally
divided between the two provinces: Provided, That such
enterprises shall not be subjected to a second tax in addition
to what is already imposed by the province where they are
principally located. (emphasis ours)
The said section is in effect a mandate that the tax revenues
from the business enterprises principally located in Quezon del
Norte particularly the power generating plants shall be
proportionally divided between the two provinces.
This Honorable Court can take judicial notice that there are
two gigantic power generators located in two municipalities in
Quezon particularly in the municipalities of Mauban and Pagbilao.
Under the law, these municipalities are included in the newly
proposed Quezon del Norte. Quezon Power Plant is located in
Mauban, Quezon while Team Energy formerly Hopewell Power

Page6
Plant is located in Pagbilao, Quezon, copies of the Certifications of

the Provincial Assessor’s Office are hereto attached as ANNEXES
“F” and “F-1” and made parts hereof. Mauban and Pagbilao are
proposed to be within the new Quezon del Norte, a second
province sought to be created under RA 9495.
Realty Tax has been defined as follows:
REALTY TAX Local Tax. The difference is that a realty tax

has always been imposed by the lawmaking body and later by
the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his lawmaking
powers, and is enforced throughout the Philippines and not
merely in a particular municipality or city, but the proceeds of
the tax accrue to the province, city, municipality and
barrio where the realty taxed is situated.
In contrast, a local tax is imposed by the municipal or city

council.18.
Under Section 201 of the Local Government Code it provides:
SEC. 201. Appraisal of Real Property. - All real property,

whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the current and
fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is
situated. The Department of Finance shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations for the classification, appraisal,
and assessment of real property pursuant to the provisions of
this Code. (emphasis ours)
In other words, Republic Act 9495 is sui generis limited to
Quezon del Norte and Quezon del Sur, seeking to amend the
effects of Section 201 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code. While in BARALIDASAN the
insertion of twelve barrios from the Province of Cotabato in the
proposed Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur, changed the boundaries of the two provinces, Section 55 is
surreptitiously added as palliative to the soon to be decimated
Quezon del Sur. It runs counter to the disposition of the real
18
Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals. L-
Page6
46245, May 31, 1982; 114 SCRA 267 (emphasis ours)

property tax and all its incidents pursuant to Art SEC. 271 of the
Local Government Code:
Distribution of Proceeds. - The proceeds of the basic real

property tax, including interest thereon, and proceeds from the
use, lease or disposition, sale or redemption of property acquired
at a public auction in accordance with the provisions of this Title
by the province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan
Manila Area shall be distributed as follows:
(a) In the case of provinces:
(1) province - Thirty-five percent (35%) shall accrue to

the general fund;
(2) municipality - Forty percent (40%) to the general

fund of the municipality where the property is located;
and
(3) barangay - Twenty-five percent (25%) shall accrue to

the barangay where the property is located.
(b) In the case of cities:
(1) city - Seventy percent (70%) shall accrue to the general

fund of the city; and
(2) Thirty percent (30%) shall be distributed among the

component barangays of the cities where the property is
located in the following manner:
(i) Fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the barangay where the
property is located;
(ii) Fifty percent (50%) shall accrue equally to all component

barangays of the city; and
(c) In the case of a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila

Area:
(1) Metropolitan Manila Authority - Thirty-five percent (35%)

shall accrue to the general fund of the authority;
(2) municipality - Thirty-five percent (35%) shall accrue to the

general fund of the municipality where the property is located;
(3) barangays - Thirty percent (30%) shall be distributed among

the component barangays of the municipality where the property
is located in the following manner:
(i) Fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the barangay where the
property is located;
Page6
(ii) Fifty percent (50%) shall accrue equally to all component

barangays of the municipality.
(d) The share of each barangay shall be released, without
need of any further action, directly to the barangay treasurer
on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each
quarter and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback for
whatever purpose. (emphasis ours)
Real Property Tax is a tax imposed, assessed and collected
where the realty is situated (and of course enjoyed by the
collecting LGU to the exclusion of other LGUs). In other words,
R.A. 9495 seeks to make an exception that a newly created
province such as Quezon del Sur shall have a participatory benefit
from the real property taxes collected from another distinct and
independent province which is Quezon del Norte. This state of
affairs is clearly absurd, illogical and therefore unconstitutional.
All realty taxes in Quezon del Norte perforce accrue only to the
LGU as envisioned by R.A. 7160 and the jurisprudence that goes
with it. There is no such thing as participatory or joint
beneficiaries in land or real property taxes except the cities,
municipalities, or barangays within the same local government
unit. The clear purpose of Section 55 is to inveigle prospective
oppositors that the author thereof is bent on the preservation of
the status quo relative to the collection of real property tax
windfalls from the power behemoths located in Mauban and
Pagbilao. Regrettably, this is nowhere near the desired objective.
The legal ploy is constitutionally infirmed. The law provides no
workable standard on how the gross real property taxes
collectible by the proposed Quezon del Norte from the power

Page6
generators located within its territory shall be proportionately
divided with its new neighbor, Quezon del Sur. Nothing was
further mentioned or specified on what administrative or
executive agency shall implement these peculiar, if not magical,
arrangements.
Non-publication for Unreasonable Period of Time
Remember that R.A. 9495 lapsed into law on September 7, 2007.
But RA 9495 has a fixed timetable. The bill lapsed into law on
September 7, 2007 without the signature of the President. The
law was already published in Volume 104, No. 16, April 21, 2008
issue of the Official Gazette, copy of the Certification issued by
the Bureau of Printing is hereto attached as ANNEX “G” hereof. In
its section 49 however, the law provides for the conduct of a
plebiscite “within sixty (60) days from the date of (its)
affectivity…or on the immediately succeeding national
elections whichever comes first.” Per Tañada v. Tuvera19, the
plebiscite should have been set on June 21, 2008, or sixty (60)
days from OG publication which of course came first because
there is no “succeeding national elections” between September 7,
2007 or April 21, 2008 and June 21, 2008. Even if RA 9495 does
not mention its publication in the Official Gazette, the Tañada
doctrine is deemed read in the statute. Eight months from
becoming a law and no publication is done yet as the final step is
by all indications already unreasonable given the importance we

Page6
19
G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986
must accord on the final bilateral act of Congress and the
Executive. This Honorable Court is justified in striking the law as
unconstitutional on the strength of the doctrinal instructions of
TAÑADA.
RESOLUTIONS NOS. 8533, 8534, 8535, 8537, 8538 and

8539(ANNEXES “H”, “I”, “J”, “K”, “L”, and “M” hereof), ALL
DATED NOVEMBER 12, 2008 WERE NOT PUBLISHED UNDER
THE AEGIS OF THE UP LAW CENTER
Under Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 of the Administrative Code of
1987:
Filing. --- (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copes of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date
shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent

functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section
under pain or disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing

agency and shall be open to public inspection.
Resolution No 8537 declares and penalizes the following acts:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions. - During the plebiscite period

commencing November 19, 2008 up to December 16, 2008.
(a) No person, including those possessing a permit to carry

firearms outside of residence or place of business, shall
bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons
in public places including all public buildings, streets, parks
and private vehicle or public conveyances.
For this purpose, “firearm” includes airgun, while “deadly
weapons” includes hand grenade or other explosives,
except pyrotechnics; while “deadly weapon” includes
bladed instruments;
The issuance of firearms licenses shall be suspended
during the election period;
(b)No member or officer of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), or any
other law enforcement agency of the government, shall
bear firearms outside of their respective barracks,
Page6
garrisons, camps, offices or such other military or police
installations;
(c) No candidate for public office, including incumbent officials

seeking election to any public office or who are not seeking
election, to employ, avail himself/herself/themselves of or
engage the services of security personnel or bodyguards,
whether or not such bodyguards is/are members or officers
of the PNP, the AFP or any other law enforcement agency
of the government, unless duly authorized by his/their
commanders and granted exemption of the commission;
(d)No person shall act as security personnel or bodyguard of

any candidate or to authorize or order such assignment;
(e) No member of security or police organization of

government agencies, commissions, councils, bureaus,
offices or government-owned or controlled corporations or
privately-owned or operated security, investigate,
protective or intelligence agencies, to bear firearms
outside the immediate vicinity of his place of work; and
(f) No person to organize or maintain reaction forces strikes

forces or any other similar forces.
Admittedly, these questioned Resolutions of the respondent
COMELEC were not yet filed with the UP Law Center much less
published in the National Administrative Register. In the case of
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON.
RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor &
Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION20, this
Honorable Supreme Court ruled:
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and

unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and
Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is
otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Page6
20
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992 (emphasis ours)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and
other government agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general
circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making

requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book,
each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date
of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law,
or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public
health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency
shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known
to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied,
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146

SCRA 446 that:
. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if

their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,

that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued
by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to
be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. (p. 448.)
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication

at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content
of the laws. (p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in

question may not be enforced and implemented.
ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER

FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
Page6
RESTRAINING ORDER AND WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Petitioners replead, by reference, the foregoing allegations.
In Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals21, the Honorable
Supreme Court enumerated the requisites for an application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the writ of
preliminary injunction, to wit:
“To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the

enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the
party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate
that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the
balance of hardship tips directly in its favor. The higher
standard reflects judicial deference toward “legislation or
regulations developed through presumptively reasoned
democratic processes.” Moreover, an injunction will alter,
rather than maintain, status quo, or will provide the movant
with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot
be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the
merits. Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable
relief and authority, in assessing whether to issue a
preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all
the equities of the situation, including the public interest. In
litigations between governmental and private parties, courts
go much further both to give and withhold relief in
furtherance of public interests than they are accustomed to
go when only private interests are involved. Before the
plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future
enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial
hardship.”
As clearly shown from the foregoing, the petitioners have an
actual and substantial interest over the resolution of this issue
because public monies are poised to be spent on clearly unlawful
purposes.
21
429 SCRA 81, 102-103 (Emphasis supplied)
Page6
Moreover, the continuance of the Republic Act No. 9495 as a
law necessarily affect and will continue to affect the right of the
petitioners over public funds and cause irremediable injury and
injustice to the petitioners, unless its implementation is enjoined
by the Honorable Court (Section 3 (a) and (b), Rule 58, Revised
Rules of Court). There is an urgent necessity for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to prevent serious damage that is
caused and will be caused by Republic Act No. 9495. Unless
enjoined, the respondents will continue to enforce and implement
Republic Act No. 9495 - the constitutionality of which is in serious
question, conduct a costly plebiscite and render the outcome of
this case moot as any judgment that will be rendered herein will
be ineffectual (Section 3 (c), Rule 58).
As one Blogger aptly observed:
IMPLICATION OF DIVISION
Now that the bill cutting Quezon has finally become a law (GMA
failed to sign it within the reglamentary period), we are now
faced with the last hurdle of its implementation: the plebiscite.
Once the people blindly vote for the division, we perpetually lose
the physical, cultural, and psychological connect with the rest of
Quezon. We lose the crown jewels including the head that adorns
them.
Truth to tell, the proponents of this law failed to exert the

minimum effort of notifying the sizeable sectors of the province.
What was heard for the most part was the upside for the division.
Nothing was heard for the downside. The proponent, while the
bill was being railroaded in the Committee, was busy imagining
the short haul political benefit for him and his family. What was
heard was the litany of motherhood exhortations that the South
must stand by its own feet, rely and develop its own resources,
and enjoy the magnanimity of the Central government by way of
the Internal Revenue Allotment. How about the local sources of
revenue?
Page6
What can we boast in the South as its crown jewels?

Gumaca, with its century old water problem, is a transient town.
It is the site of commercial banks and government agencies in
the area. Despite the reign of an old political family there,
nothing was done in the development of Gumaca, touted to be
the Capital of Quezon del Sur. Its water system is the worst in the
province. There was even an ordinance that proscribes taking
care of pigeons. The reason is obvious. Doves with their
droppings dirty the roofs that collect rain water! While Hondagua
in Lopez is host to the Puyat Philippine Flour Mills, it has for the
last twenty years operating in reduced capacity. PFM pays
minuscule property tax to Lopez and provides employment to
about 200 natives of the town. Catanauan in the Bondoc remains
sleepy thanks to its sleepy and corrupt leadership.
Moreover, the proponent failed to see that the half of the IRA is
for salaries and wages of a new bureaucracy for the new
province. Assuming that one half of the P900M IRA goes to the
South, or P450M, P225M of it goes to employees’ pay. Its 20%
development fund is pegged at P90M or P45M for each district.
We lose our availments from the RPT from the crown jewels,
estimated at P1.25B annually, not to mention priority in landing a
job where employment opportunities loom in the North. Why
should we rely on the palliative Countrywide Development Fund
of the Congressmen when we know that 50% of it goes where it
shouldn’t go? Someone is looking at the multimillion peso budget
for the construction of the new South Capitol Complex housing
the new center for the newly minted province.
Most of us found ourselves holding a fait accompli for a law.
The act of division shall do injustice to South Quezon. There was

no clinical or scientific neither an academic study made prior to
floating the proposal. South Quezon needs North Quezon for
unity of purpose. The North nourishes the South. South Quezon
loses its physical and psychological connection with the North.
By legislating territorial division it spells the economic
petrifaction of its half.22
Republic Act No. 9495, and the accompanying Resolutions of
the respondent COMELEC, should be stricken down as
unconstitutional, capricious, and whimsical, and issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
There is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed for and part of
such relief consists in enjoining and restraining the respondents

Page6
22
katataspulong ng Quezon Province, http://www.sonnypulgar.com/no-to-quezon-division/
from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 9495 and from
conducting any further proceedings on the execution of the said
law.
Petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed for and part of
such relief consists in ordering the respondents, their attorneys,
representatives, agents and any other person assisting them or
acting for and on their behalf;
a. to refrain or desist from enforcing or implementing the
Republic Act No. 9495 and Resolution Nos. 8533, 8534, 8535,
8537, 8538 and 8539; and
b. to refrain from conducting any further proceedings with
respect to the allotment, disbursement, and disposition of funds
relative to the conduct of an alleged plebiscite soon after the
statutes’ effectivity, pending the resolution of this case.
These manifestly capricious and whimsical acts, unless
enjoined during the pendency of the instant petition, will certainly
work injustice to petitioners, and will render any decision herein
moot and ineffective.
Petitioners shall suffer grave and irreparable injury unless
this Honorable Court enjoins, through a restraining order, and
thereafter, through a writ of preliminary injunction, the
respondents, their attorneys, representatives, agents and any
other person assisting them or acting for and on their behalf, from
proceeding with the implementation of Republic Act No. 9495 that

Page6
would cause injustice to them.
Petitioners are ready, willing and able to post a bond in favor
of the respondents in such amount as the Honorable Court may
fix to answer for any and all damages which the respondents may
suffer or sustain by reason of the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, should the
Honorable Court remotely finally decide that petitioners are not
entitled thereto.
MOTION TO SET CASE FOR EN BANC
Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
“(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases
which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en
banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.”
Section 4 of the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-
89, as amended, provides, viz:
“4. At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a

case and before a judgment or resolution therein rendered
becomes final and executory, the Division may refer the case
en consulta to the Court en banc which, after consideration of
the reasons of the Division for such referral, may return the
case to the Division or accept the case for decision or
resolution.”
The instant case involves the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9495 and the issues involved are novel and pure
Page6
questions of law. Petitioners moves for the elevation of this case
to the Court en banc.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed
that the instant petition be given due course, and pending
consideration thereof, for reasons of extreme urgency, this
Honorable Court immediately issue a temporary restraining order,
on such bond as this Honorable Court may require, ordering the
respondents, their attorneys, representatives, agents and any
other person assisting them or acting for and on their behalf to
ENJOIN, FORBID, AND RESTRAIN the respondents from
conducting the plebiscite in Quezon Province for the ratification of
the creation of the Province of Quezon del Sur on December 13,
2008, and to:
a. refrain or desist from enforcing or implementing
Republic Act No. 9495 and the following Resolutions illegally
issued by the respondent COMELEC, to wit:

AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE
PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR,
2007, WHICH SHALL BE COMPOSED OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF:
AGDANGAN, BUENAVISTA, CATANAUAN, GENERAL LUNA,
MACALELON, MULANAY, PADRE BURGOS, PITOGO, SAN ANDRES,
SAN FRANCISCO, SAN NARCISO, UNISAN, ALABAT, ATIMONAN,
CALAUAG, GUINYANGAN, GUMACA, LOPEZ, PEREZ, PLARIDEL,
QUEZON AND TAGKAWAYAN; AND THE REMAINING OF THE
MOTHER PROVINCE OF QUEZON TO KNOWN AS QUEZON DEL
NORTE, WHICH SHALL BE COMPOSED OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
BURDEOS, GENERAL NAKAR, INFANTA, JOMALIG, LUCBAN,
MAUBAN, PAGBILAO, PANUKULAN, PATNANUNGAN, POLILIO,
REAL, SAMPALOC, CANDELARIA, DOLORES, SAN ANTONIO,
Page6
SARIAYA, TIAONG AND THE CITIES OF LUCENA AND TAYABAS, TO

BE CONDUCTED ON DECEMBER 13, 2008.”
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

“CALENDAR OF ACTIVITIES AND PERIODS OF PROHIBITED ACTS
2007.”
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
Resolution No. 8535 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “IN THE
MATTER OF DEPUTIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING FREE,
ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE CONDUCT OF THE
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

AND REGULATIONS ON : (A) BEARING, CARRYING OR
TRANSPORTING FIREARMS OR OTHER DEADLY WEAPONS; (B)
SECURITY PERSONNEL OR BODYGUARDS; (C) BEARING ARMS BY
ANY MEMBER OF SECURITY OR POLICE ORGANIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATION
(D) ORGANIZATION OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTION FORCES
DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIOD IN CONNECTION WITH THE
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

ON THE LIQUOR BAN IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13,
2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR
AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON
DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED
SEPTEMBER 7, 2007.”
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

“AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO APPOINT,
FILL-UP POSITIONS AND TRANSFER OR REASSIGN ITS PERSONNEL
Page6

PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495.”; and
b. refrain from conducting any further proceedings with
respect to the actual and substantial interest over the resolution
of this issue because public monies are poised to be spent on
clearly unlawful purposes pending the resolution of this case.
After due consideration of petitioners’ application for a writ
of preliminary injunction, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued on such bond as this Honorable
Court may require, ordering the respondents, their attorneys,
representatives, agents and any other person assisting them or
acting for and on their behalf: to refrain or desist from enforcing
or implementing Republic Act No. 9495; and to refrain from
conducting any further proceedings with respect to proceedings
with respect to the actual and substantial interest over the
resolution of this issue because public monies are poised to be
spent on clearly unlawful purposes pending the resolution of this
case pending the resolution of this case. After due consideration
of the instant petition, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of
certiorari be issued setting aside as unconstitutional, null and void
Republic Act No. 9495, and making final the writ of preliminary
injunction perpetually restraining the respondents, their
attorneys, representatives, agents and any other person assisting
them or acting for and on their behalf, to refrain or desist from
enforcing or implementing Republic Act No. 9495; and to refrain

Page6
from conducting any further proceedings with respect to
disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners likewise pray that after deliberation, the Division
taking cognizance of this case, refer the same en consulta to the
Court en banc.
Other reliefs, just and equitable are likewise prayed for.
Makati City for Manila City. November 14, 2008.
ESCOBIDO AND PULGAR LAW OFFICES

2nd Floor, Africa Bldg.,
#2041 Edison cor. Aragon Sts., Brgy. San
Isidro,
Makati City, Metro Manila
Telefax Nos.: 887-3120/887-3121
Website : katataspulong.blogspot.com
E-mail : feplaw@yahoo.com
By :
CELSO O. ESCOBIDO
Roll of Attorneys No. 23974
IBP No.: 738978/01-17-2008/Quezon City
PTR No.: 9878790/01-17-2008/Quezon City
VERIFICATION / CERTIFICATION
WE, FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, of legal age, Filipino, with

postal address at Sitio Paang Bundok, Brgy. 5, Calauag, Quezon
and HOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR., of legal age, Filipino, postal
address at Lucban, Quezon, subscribing under oath, hereby
depose and state, THAT:
1. We are the Petitioners in the above-entitled case;
2. We have caused the preparation of the foregoing

Petition, read the contents thereof, and the allegations whereof
are true and correct of our knowledge and belief;
3. We have not commenced any other petition or

proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof or any other
Page6
tribunal or agency;
4. To the best of my knowledge, no similar Petition is
pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal agency;
5. If we should thereafter learn that a similar action or

proceeding has been filed or is pending before said courts or
tribunal, we hereby undertake to promptly inform this Honorable
Court of that fact within five (5) days therefrom.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have affixed our signature this

___ day of ___________, 2008 in ___________________.
FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR HOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR.

Affiant Affiant
Comm. Tax Cert. No. _________________ Comm. Tax Cert. No. _________________
Issued on _________________ Issued on _________________
Issued at _________________ Issued at _________________
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___ day of

May, 2008 at the City of Makati, Metro Manila, affiant:
is personally known to the notary public;
identified by notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by

Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, thru the ff:
Driver’s License No. TIN ID No. _________________ Com. Tax Cert. No.
____________ Passport No. _______________ __________ issued on
SSS ID No. _________________ ___________ issued at
Company I.D.
_______________.
GSIS ID No. _________________
________________
Doc. No. _______;

Page No. _______;
Book No._______;
Series of 2008.
cc:
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
134 Amorsolo St. Legaspi Village, Makati City
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Hon. Eduardo R. Ermita
Room 234, Mabini Hall,
Malacañang Palace, Manila.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)

Page6
Intramuros, Manila
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
Malacañang Palace
JP Laurel Street, San Miguel, Manila NCR 1005
Republic of the Philippines )

City of Makati ) s.s.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I, JOMEL A. VALLES, as Liaison Officer of Escobido and Pulgar Law
Offices with office address at 2/F, Africa Building, #2041 Edison corner
Aragon Streets, San Isidro, Makati City, Metro Manila, subscribing under oath
hereby depose and state, THAT:
That on _____________________, I served a copy of the following

pleading/paper.
Nature of Pleading
PETITION
in SC G.R SP. No. ____________ entitled FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR and HOBART

DATOR, JR. -versus- SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as the
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, and
the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, pursuant to section 3, 4, 5 and 10, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court, as follows:
By Personal Service Mail to: By Registered Mail Service

SUPREME COURT under Registry Receipt No. ____________
City of Manila On ______________ at ____________ To :
By Registered Mail Service By Registered Mail Service

under Registry Receipt No. ____________ under Registry Receipt No. ____________
On ______________ at ____________ To : On ______________ at ____________ To :
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
Hon. Eduardo R. Ermita 134 Amorsolo St. Legaspi Village,
Makati City
Room 234, Mabini Hall,
Malacañang Palace, Manila.
By Registered Mail Service By Registered Mail Service

under Registry Receipt No. ____________ under Registry Receipt No. ____________
On ______________ at ____________ To : On ______________ at ____________ To :
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
Intramuros, Manila MANAGEMENT
Malacañang Palace
JP Laurel Street, San Miguel, Manila NCR
1005
Page6
____________________. Makati City, Philippines.

JOMEL A. VALLES
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___th day of ___________, 2008

at the City of Makati, Metro Manila, affiant:
is personally known to the notary public;
was identified by notary public through Competent Evidence of Identity as

defined by Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, thru the presentation/production of
the ff:
Driver’s License No. TIN ID No. _________________ Com. Tax Cert. No.
_____________ Passport No. _______________ 13774922 issued on January
SSS ID No. 33-4522830-8 4, 2008 issued at Del
Company I.D.
Gallego, Camarines Sur.
GSIS ID No. _________________
________________
Doc. No. _______; FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR

Notary Public
Page No. _______; Until December 31, 2008
Book No._______; PTR No. 0997846
issued on January 10, 2008
Series of 2008. at Makati City Metro Manila
TIN No. 106201485
Page6

Supreme Court Petition Versus RA 9495

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Supreme Court Petition Versus RA 9495

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SC G.R SP. No. ________

SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,

Petitioner FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, is of legal age, married,

with residence and postal address at Sitio Paang Bundok, Brgy. 5,

Calauag, Quezon; whereas petitioner HOBART DEVEZA DATOR,

JR., is of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at

Lucban, Quezon. Petitioners can be served with orders,

resolutions, pleadings, writs and other processes through the

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, is being sued in

his capacity as Executive Secretary and as implementor of

Republic Act No. 9495. He may be served with writs, summons,

pleadings, orders, decision and other court processes at his office

at Room 234, Mabini Hall, Malacañang Palace, Manila; b)

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND

MANAGEMENT, is of legal age, married, with principal office

address at Department of Budget and Management, Malacañang

Palace, Manila; c) COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS holds office at

Intramuros, Manila, where all of them, in their indicated

respective principal offices, may be served with summons, writs

and other processes of this Honorable Court.

NATURE OF THE PETITION

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to declare the

unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9495, and COMELEC

dated November 12, 2008;

This is also a special civil action for Prohibition to enjoin,

forbid, and prohibit the above-named respondents from

implementing, enforcing, and effecting Republic Act No. 9495 and

the questioned COMELEC Resolutions, particularly:

processing the appointment of the interim

governor, vice governor and members of the

Sanguniang Panglalawigan of the de facto

Quezon del Sur; and

ii. the Secretary of Budget from disbursing public

monies necessary for:

a. the conduct of the plebiscite;

b. disbursing the salaries, allowances and other

emoluments of the interim local government officials

of the de facto Quezon del Sur; and the

iii Commission on Elections from initiating and

conducting the plebiscite pursuant to Section 49 of

Lastly, the provisional remedy of PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

and/or TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER is respectfully

On 6 February 1901, the Philippine Commission enacted Act

No. 83, otherwise known as the Provincial Government Act. It

sought to present a template of provincial administration and

was extended to the Province of Tayabas.

On 1 July 1916, the Philippine Commission enacted the

Administrative Code, which expressly repealed Act Nos. 83 and

103, among other laws. The Revised Administrative Code of 1917

(Act No. 2711) recognized Tayabas as one of then 42 provinces of

the Philippine Islands (under Section 37).

On 7 September 1946, the Province of Tayabas was renamed

province of Aurora was created through Republic Act No. 648

(1951) until it was separated from the province by the enactment

of Batas Pambansa No. 7 (1979).

In the meantime, Republic Act No. 1205 was enacted in

1955, converting all specially organized provinces into regularly

On 1 January 1992, the Local Government Code of 1991 took