CLARIDADES (1966) Concepcion

V

MERCADER

AND

FERNANDEZ

Doctrine: As plaintiff’s complaint merely seeks the liquidation of his partnership with the defendants, it is to be considered a personal action which may be brought in the place of residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant. The fact that the plaintiff prayed for the sale of the assets of the partnership, did not change the nature or character of action, such sale being merely a necessary incident of the liquidation of the partnership, which should precede and/or is part of its process of dissolution. Plaintiff-Appellant: Dr. Simeon S. Claridades Defendants-Appellees: Vicente Mercader and Perfecto Fernandez Intervenors: Guillermo Reyes, Armando Asuncion, Alfredo Zulueta, Yap Leding Facts: Claridades brought the present action against Mercader and Fernandez for the dissolution of a partnership allegedly existing between them and an accounting of the operation of the partnership, particularly a fishpond located in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, which was the main asset of the partnership, from September 1954, as well as to recover moral and exemplary damages, in addition to attorney's fees and costs. On the other hand, defendants admit the existence of the partnership and that it had been so far unproductive, averring further that there is an impending auction sale of said fishpond due to delinquency in the payment of taxes owing to lack of funds and plaintiff's failure to contribute what is due from him. Subsequently, Reyes was allowed to intervene for the purpose of recovering a sum of money allegedly due him for services rendered as foreman of said fishpond, plus damages. Later, Asuncion succeeded in intervening as the alleged assignee of the interest of Mercader in said partnership and fishpond. Thereafter, the lower court appointed a receiver of the fishpond. Upon the other hand, Alfredo Zulueta and his wife Yap Leding sought permission to intervene, still later, alleging that they are the owners of said fishpond, having bought ½ of it from Regencia, who, in turn, had acquired it from Asuncion, who had purchased the fishpond from defendant Mercader, and the other half having been assigned to him directly by Asuncion. Despite plaintiff's opposition thereto, said permission was granted in an order dated Feb. 8, 1962, which, likewise gave the Zuluetas ten days within which to file such pleading as they may deem necessary for the protection of their rights. On Feb. 12, 1962, the Zuluetas filed a

motion to dismiss upon the ground that the complaint states no cause of action; that venue has been improperly laid; and that plaintiff complaint is moot and academic. Acting upon the motion, on March 2, 1962, the lower court granted the same upon the ground of improper venue ratiocinating that that the subject matter of this case is the possession of said fishpond, because plaintiff prays in the complaint that the assets of the partnership, including said fishpond be sold, that the proceeds of the sale be applied to the payment of the debts of the partnership, and that the residue be distributed equally among the partners and since the fishpond is located in Marinduque, the complaint should have been lodged there. Issue: WON the present action should have been instituted, not in the CFI of Bulacan, but in that of Marinduque, where the disputed fishpond is located Held/Ratio: No, the present action was correctly instituted in the CFI of Bulacan. Plaintiff's complaint merely seeks the liquidation of his partnership with defendants Fernandez and Mercader. This is obviously a personal action, which may be brought in the place of residence of either the plaintiff or the defendants. Since plaintiff is a resident of Bulacan, he had the right to bring the action in the court of first instance of that province. What is more, although defendants Fernandez and Mercader reside in Marinduque, they did not object to the venue. In other words, they waived whatever rights they had, if any, to question it. The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of the partnership, including the fishpond in question, did not change the nature or character of action, such sale being merely a necessary incident of the liquidation of the partnership, which should precede and/or is part of its process of dissolution. Neither plaintiff's complaint nor the answer filed by defendants Fernandez and Mercader questioned the title to said property or the possession thereof. The situation was not changed materially by the Intervention either of Asuncion or of the Zuluetas, for, as alleged successors to the interest Mercader in the fishpond, they, at best, stepped into his shoes. Uniwide Holdings Inc v Alexander M Cruz Ponente: Carpio Morales QF: In the Franchise Agreement executed between Uniwide and Cruz, there was an exclusive venue stipulation that QC courts would be the venue. Uniwide filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before RTC Paranaque—but 2nd and 3rd COA

P suffered actual damages P1. whose principal ofc is located in Paranaque. invoking Art 27. Cruz’s accounts remained unsettled. or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.669. P suffered actual damages P1.531. where he may be found. as in the one at bar.327. the complaint. before the filing of the action. P suffered actual damages P64. Cruz had outstanding obligations with UHI.based on deeds of assignment executed in its favor by its affiliates.2— called for Cruz as franchisee to pay UHI a monthly service fee of P50. may validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue BUT o Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does not arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon. Art 10. Based on the allegations in petitioner’s complaint. payable within five days after the end of each month without need of formal billing or demand from UHI. Cruz would be liable to pay an interest charge of three percent per month. the complaint may be brought before other venues provided that such other cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.061. His receipt of the letter notwithstanding.000 • Cruz filed MTD on the ground of improper venue.89. Hence. Doctrine: Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does not arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon.5 of the Agreement 27. XPN— ROC 4. Cogeo. Thus UHI filed a complaint5 for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque o 1st COA—monthly service fee. or in the case of a nonresident defendant. such that • • • • . may be brought before other venues provided that such other cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein SMC v Monasterio: o Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit relates to breach of said contract.165. The deeds bear no exclusive venue stipulation with respect to the causes of action thereunder. not based on BOC of said Agreement.000 or three percent of gross monthly purchases. entered into a Franchise Agreement granting Cruz a 5-yr franchise to adopt and use the "Uniwide Family Store System" for the establishment and operation of a "Uniwide Family Store" along Marcos Highway. FPC. at the election of the plaintiff.358.96 3rd COA—being assignee of receivable of USWCI. sec 2. Sta. 2002. FACTS: • Uniwide. • RTC—granted MTD ISSUE: WON a case based on several COAs is dismissible on the ground of improper venue where only 1 of the COAs arise from a contract with exclusive venue stipulation o HELD: No. whichever is higher.36 o 4th COA—P was constrained to file this Complaint and incurred atty’s fees P250. Cruz. o Art 10. and USWCI in the total amount of P1. sec 4—parties. Cruz had purchased goods from Uniwide’s affiliates.579.5 Venue Stipulation – The Franchisee consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Quezon City. FPC and USWCI executed Deeds of Assgt in favor of Uniwide assigning all their rights and interests over Cruz’ accounts payable to them As of August 13. the Franchisee waiving any other venue.—all other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides. Marikina City. drawing UHI to send him a letter of even date for the settlement thereof in five days. RATIO: • Venue of personal actions—GR: ROC 4. the general rule on venue applies – that the complaint may be filed in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.83 o 2nd COA—being assignee of receivable of FPC.3—in case of delay said payment. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily encompassing. the second and third causes of action are based on the deeds of assignment executed in its favor by FPC and USWCI. FPC and USWCI.

Jurisprudence shows that an action for nullification of the mortgage documents and QUICK FACTS: foreclosure of the mortgage property is a real Go contends that a case for cancellation of action that affects title to the property (Carandang mortgage is a personal action and venue was v CA). setting public auction redemption period (Commodities Storage & Ice sale for 11 April and 03 May 2000.o even those not related to the enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue. Go filed a Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in RTC of Pasig. In August 1996. UPCB question orders before CA via petition for certiorari. (2) Improper venue (3) Indispensable party not impleaded. A real action should be commenced and tried in the place where the subject property lies. CA — reversed RTC and directed it to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue ISSUE: WoN Go’s complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage is a personal or real action for the purposes of determining venue GO v UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK Chico-Nazario DOCTRINE: The cancellation of real estate mortgage is a real action because a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property in itself. VENUE is the court of the place where Go and Looyuko are co-owners of the Noah’s Ark plaintiff resides OR where the defendant resides group of companies. they applied OR at the election of plaintiff. Instead. real action. or interest therein. UCPB to erase from title of judgement or mortgage cancelled the credit line and refused to return the debtor the lien created by registration of pre-signed mortgages. Plant Corp v CA). HELD: It is a real action since it was primarily an action to compel UCPB to return to Go the (real) properties covered by the real estate mortgage over which the bank had already initiated foreclosure proceedings.—”an action to redeem by secured with real estate mortgages over 2 parcels mortgage debtor” is a real action whether it seeks of land in Mandaluyong. over the area where real property or any part thereof lies. “action to annul foreclosure . personal action. Thus. it is necessarily an action affecting title to property. it registered them mortgage or sale or to recover ownership of land before the Registry of Deeds in Mandaluyong. the stipulation designating exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. The controlling factor in determining venue is the primary objective for which said cases are filed. Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements. In July 1997. Otherwise. In since purchaser’s inchoate title to property June 1999.—brought for recovery of personal property or damages or enforcement of a FACTS: contract. VENUE for real after a proposed omnibus credit line had been actions is court which has territorial jurisdiction cancelled. UCPB filed a Motion to Dismiss based on: (1) nonpayment of proper filing and docket fees. UCPB filed an extrajudicial foreclosure becomes consolidated after expiration of of real estate mortgage.—affects title to or possession UCPB had previously foreclosed 2 parcels of land (1) of real property. the restriction should be strictly construed as relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive venue stipulation is embodied. DEF. (S2 Rule 4) for an omnibus credit line with UCPB for PhP 9M (3) JURISPRUDENCE. thus complaint states no cause of action (4) Improperly verified complaint (5) Forum shopping RTC — granted Go’s application for writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin public auction and denied UCPB’s MTD. the basic principles of freedom to contract might work to the great disadvantage of a weak party-‐ suitor who ought to be allowed free access to courts of justice. properly laid in the city where he resides (Pasig). (S1 Rule 4) NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari (1) Partition (2) Condemnation PETITIONER: Jimmy GO (3) Foreclosure of mortgage on real RESPONDENT: United Coconut Planters Bank property and its officers (2) DEF.

December 1. From the terms of the complaint. The above letter surprised DAPCO because it was a total reversal of the DOLE’s previous position PRAYER: DAPCO prayed for a TRO to restrain DOLE from (a) continuing any contractual arrangement over the properties leased (b) exercising possession over the improvements belonging to DAPCO (c) using and enjoying DAPCO’s land.sale” affects title of property sold and is therefore a real action (Fortune Motors v CA) (1) An action to compel mortgagee bank to accept payment of mortgage debt and to release mortgage does not involve titles to lots. Hence this petition by DAPCO Issue/Held: What is the proper venue for the trial? (Subquestion – what is this action?) – Venue is up to DAPCO’s discretion (where plaintiff or defendant resides) – this is a personal action being one for specific performance or rescission of contract. (3) the DAR proceeding between DAPCO and another party cannot prejudice the rights of DOLE under the Lease Renewal because DOLE is not a party thereto DOLE wrote DAPCO asking for its intentions regarding the lease. If no agreement is reached by the parties on the lease at the end of the original period. Furthermore. CARL precludes early coverage of private land leased. Since DOLE had rights under the Lease Renewal w/c had to be protected in the DAR proceeding. pay costs of suit. for DOLE to pay annual rental for 1995 amounting to 14m.(Hernandez v Rural Bank of Lucena) Davao Abaca Plantation Company. the main objective being to assert ownership and recover possession” – such being the case. v Dole Philippines Inc. for DOLE to pay exemplary damages in the amount of 10m. DOLE answered DAPCO claiming that “the Gov’t (in implementing RA 6657) took over the leased premises and the distribution of thel nad made it impossible for DAPCO to perform its obligation to maintain the lessee in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land. proper venue is not Manila. 12/9/92 – DOLE renewed the lease up to 12/31/2000. Rule 4 of ROC. DAPCO replied to DOLE that it would defend the lease agreement. 2 – 165 hectares (totalling 1004 hectares) were executed. this caused DOLE to file with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition under R65 of ROC questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court 3/13/98 – CA dismissed the complaint on grounds of wrong venue. irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim. 1 – 839 hectares. DAR deferred subjecting the land to CARL coverage but later reversed itself. Manila DOLE is a corporation w/ principal office at Paseo de Roxas. that the rental obligation has ceased. After notice and hearing. Pertinent portions of the complaint: DAPCO is a corporation w/ principal office at Roxas Boulevard. DAPCO formally requested DOLE to intervene in the said proceeding thru a letter DOLE replied saying that it chose not to intervene because (1) intervention is necessary because the CARL itself grants DOLE a 10 year deferment by providing that DOLE’s lease w/ DAPCO shall be respected until termination (2) DOLE’s right to defer is protected by the CARL – Sec 72. DOLE shall be granted a grace period of 2 years until 2/7/96 to wind up operations on the land CARL took effect on 1988. And further. Davao DOLE (or its predecessor) has been lessee of the property since 1969 and has used the property for growing bananas 11/28/85 – 2 lease agreements. for DOLE to surrender the land along with the improvements. but South Cotabato where the property is located pursuant to Sec 1. DAPCO prayed for actual damages (32M). It is a personal action and not real action since mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage yet so title is not in question. The lease periods were for 10 years from 2/7/94. Inc. renewable for another 6 years at DOLE’s sole option. DAPCO demanded that DOLE abide with the lease contracts. DAPCO is enforcing the lease contract against DOLE. a breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission. Hearing thus ensued. 2000 Ponente: Buena Facts: 3/15/95 – Davao Abaca (DAPCO) brought complaint in the RTC of Manila against DOLE. DOLE argues that the complaint is a . Ratio: Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by allegation in the complaint. CA held that DAPCO’s complaint “is actually a real action. pay rental and make an accounting of the production to compute for the rental. a preliminary injunction restraining DOLE from doing the above acts. Makati DAPCO is the owner of land located in Carmen.

to secure the written conformity of Ayala Corporation to the said sale. On the other hand. No longer owns the subject property so that it has no more obligation to pay petitioner for the rent. 1994 and it decreed. AS far as DOLE’s argument that pet. then it must be filed with the court of the place where the real property is located. ARAN BUILDERS. Infante filed MTD for venue improperly laid. RTC Makati. to execute the deed of sale of Lot No. . BUT considering that the complaint is a PERSONAL ACTION.918. Inc. Ponente: Austria-Martinez. this time w/ RTC Muntinlupa. as lessee.e. The relief demanded by DAPCO is best threshed out in trial proper Granting that the complaint is a real action. then it may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides. DOEL is stopped from denying lessor’s title. if it is a personal action.000 as attorney’s fees Infante filed a motion to dismiss the action for revival of judgment on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that the venue was improperly laid. The judgment sought to be revived was based on an action for specific performance and damages which was rendered by the RTC of Makati City. 2007 Facts: June 6. (no courts yet in Muntinlupa) RTCruled in favor of Aran Builders but judgment not executed w/n 5 year period.Aran Builders. INFANTE V. INC. It cannot be said that the main objective is to recover land because DAPCO itself did not deny that the lands were subject to DOLE. (2) Upon compliance of Infante with the court’s directives. Aran Builders. so petition for revival. filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City an action for revival of judgment against Adelaida Infante. at the election of the plaintiff. J. the venue is not South Cotabato but is in Davao del Norte where the property is situated. subject of the lease. No claim of ownership can be properly raised by DAPCO from DOLE considering that DOLE is not the owner of the property. the complete plans and other documents relating to the property. Sec 2(b) applies to DOLE and estoppels does not depend on the validity of the landlord’s title. Since DAPCO has its principal office in Manila. its selection of venue is justified. what is being asserted is the rental payment for 1995 and the succeeding rentals until the lease expires. to pay the capital gains tax and documentary stamp taxes. and DAR. COURT says. When the complaint was filed on 3/15/95 – venue for personal actions is in the place where the plaintiff of wehre any of the defendants resides. (3) Infante is ordered to pay Aran Builders Php10. Doctrine: The proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action. and to register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds.. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA Date: August 24. must immediately pay the defendant Php321. Inc. 2001 . 11 Block 9 Phase 3-A1 (located at Ayala Alabang Subdivision) in favor of Aran Builders.claim of ownership over the land. The Makati RTC judgment became final and executory on November 16. among others. If it is a real action (i. Inc. that: (1) Adelaida Infante is ordered to: deliver to Aran Builders. being merely a lessee. Quick Facts: Aran Bldrs filed complaint for specific performance for Infante to issue deed of sale in lot in Ayala Alabang. the rules on venue at the time the complaint was filed governs. suffice it to say that the issue of ownership is subject to another litigation between petitioner and the farmer-beneficiaries. The conclusive presumption in Rule 1341.25. action affects title to or possession of real property or interest therein).

Consequently. Infante filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the RTC. Muntinlupa City was under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati courts. therefore. Aran Builders for its part maintain that the subject action for revival of judgment is quasi in rem because it involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a real property. (2) Rule 4 Section 2 (Venue of personal actions) – “all other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides. the venue lies in Muntinlupa City where the property is situated. or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. However. Because it involves a real action. Thus. at the election of the plaintiff”. matters involving properties located in this City and cases involving its residents are now ordered to be litigated before its courts. Originally. in effect. It upheld the contention that the action for revival of judgment is an action in rem which should be filed with the RTC of the place where the real property is located. the complaint should indeed be filed with the RTC of the place where the realty is located (which in this case is Muntinlupa City). If it CA Decision: ruled in favor of Aran Builders. Infante asserts that the complaint for specific performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personal action (action in personam) and. or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found. or a portion of it. or interest therein. Infante moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision but it was denied. it is now the RTC in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City. The proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action. Section 6 Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: after the lapse of 5 years from entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of limitations. Infante then filed this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA. the venue for the revival of judgment is either in Makati City or Parañaque City where private respondent and petitioner respectively reside. The case at bar involves the enforcement of the private respondent’s rights over a piece of real property located at Ayala Alabang Subdivision. a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by action. Infante filed an instant special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. it must be emphasized that at the time it was rendered. With the creation of the RTCs of Muntinlupa City. . After which. is situated”. Issue: Where is the proper venue of the present action for revival of judgment? Held/ Ratio: The RTC of Muntinlupa is the proper venue for the present action. The lower court ratiocinated that although the judgment was rendered by the Makati RTC. shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved. there was still no RTC in Muntinlupa City and hence all cases from Muntinlupa were tried and heard at Makati. General Rules on Venue (Rules of Court): (1) Rule 4 Section 1 (Venue of real actions) – “actions affecting title to or possession of real property.Muntinlupa RTC: issued an Order which denied Infante’s Motion to Dismiss. The rule does not specify in which court the action of revival of judgment should be filed. the suit to revive the judgment therein is also personal in nature. Section 4 of RA 7154 which amended Section 14 of BP 129 provided for the creation of a branch of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

" . accounting and receivership in the RTC of Batac. instead filed a motion to dismiss alleging (1) the cases involved an intra-corporate dispute over which the Securities and Exchange Commission. Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits. In these cases. DANIEL RUBIO. Ilocos Norte. has jurisdiction. the respondents. has accepted the trust created in her favor. (2) venue was improperly laid. "the word 'principal' has been added [in the uniform procedure rule] in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue. as beneficiary of the purported trust. CA Irene demanded from respondents the reconveyance of her shares of stock allegedly being held by them in trust. Instead of giving their reply. petitioner Infante relies on statements made by the Court in the cases of Aldeguer v. the judgment sought to be revived involved judgments for a certain sum of money. it is understandable why the action for revival of judgment was categorized as a personal action in both cases. the SC explained that Infante clearly misunderstood the Court’s ruling in the said cases.. QUICK FACTS: Irene wants to recover her shares of stock from her trustees who refuse to convey them. J. Regarding improper venue. However. Jr. As such. The respondends refused. Eliminate the qualifying term "principal" and the purpose of the Rule would. proceedings or actions x x x “. "be defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in the action since the latter would not have the degree of interest in the subject of the action which would warrant and entail the desirably active participation expected of litigants in a case. BENEDICTO. Gemelo and Donnelly v. then it must be filed with the court of the place where the real property is located. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case. Her action has been stalled by a motion to dismiss for improper venue. as there was no allegation therein that plaintiff. On the other hand. and JOSE G. the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. According to the late Justice Jose Y. and (3) the complaint failed to state a cause of action.e." To support her contention that the action for revival of judgment is a personal action and should be filed in the court of the place where either the plaintiff or defendant resides. the respondents presented former household staff of Ponente: Velasco. to borrow from Justice Regalado. action affects title to or possession of real property or interest therein).is a real action (i. No title or interest in real property was involved in either case. if it is a personal action. not the RTC. thus Irene filed two complaints for conveyance of shares of stock. ORLANDO G. RESLIN.. CFI of Manila. then it may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides. Feria. JULITA C. RESLIN Section 18 BP 129: “The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. DOCTRINE: Sec. and FRANCISCA BENEDICTO-PAULINO Facts: Marcos-Araneta v. FACTS: Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 Plaintiff: IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA.

i. like an answer. none of the principal parties are residents of Ilocos Norte? DECISION: HELD: CA decision affirmed but for different reasons. The RTC dismissed the case. WON the amended complaints in the lower court should be dismissed because. Ilocos Norte. 2 of Rule 10. 2 of Rule 10. there was no more original complaint to amend? 4.the Marcos mansion who testified that Irene only visited there twice in 1999. the RTC did not err in admitting petitioners' amended complaint. by force of said Sec. In the case at bench. as Francisca is in this case. While the MR was pending.e. Irene filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. Benedicto and Francisca raised at the earliest time possible. would constitute a substantial compliance with the rule on verification and certification of non-forum shopping.. Where the defendant failed to either file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue or include the same as an affirmative defense. . it did not confine itself to determining whether or not lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tainted the issuance of the assailed RTC orders. meaning "within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint. at the time it was filed. as a matter of right. had. Clearly then.33 Assayed against the foregoing perspective. stating that the action was partly a real action and that Irene did not really reside in Ilocos Norte therefore venue was improperly laid. 2. As aptly observed by the RTC. The certificate for non-forum shopping was only signed by one of the respondents in the CA appeal. processes not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court? 3." the matter of improper venue. and who are residents of Batac. Julita and Francisca not having yet answered the original complaints when the amended complaint was filed. Ilocos Norte and that 1. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses. At that precise moment. The plaintiff may amend his complaint once as a matter of right. in disposing of private respondents' petition for certiorari. (reasoning not in decision) ISSUE: 1. In her defence Irene presented a CTC (community tax certificate) issued in Ilocos Norte. Irene. The RTC denied the MR but later on admitted the Amended Complaint and ordered the respondents to give their answer. before any responsive pleading is filed or served. Irene's motion to admit amended complaint was not even necessary. he is deemed to have waived his right to object to improper venue. 4. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Sec. Respondents gave their answer to the amended complaint but also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. 3. CA Issued a TRO for the RTC from conducting further proceedings and later on granted the petition and dismissed Irene’s complaint altogether.Irene filed an MR. WON the petitioner Irene was not a resident of Batac. where the names of her new trustees. WON allowing the submission of an affidavit by Julita as sufficient compliance with the requirement on verification and certification of non-forum shopping? 2. WON the CA erred in ruling on the merits of the trust issue which involves factual and evidentiary determination. the signature of any of the principal petitioners or principal parties. the option of amending her underlying reconveyance complaints. appeared as additional plaintiffs. without leave of court. The CA only required a written authority from the other respondents. but proceeded to pass on the factual issue of the existence and enforceability of the asserted trust. WON the venue respondents waive improper 5. As has been ruled by the Court. the CA overstepped its boundaries when.

Lacub. or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. According to the late Justice Jose Y. TEVES .5. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules." Eliminate the qualifying term "principal" and the purpose of the Rule would. although jurisprudence has it that one can have several residences. Ilocos Norte.Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity. Batac. -. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust. Feria. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case. his heirs. -. Venue of personal actions. "the word 'principal' has been added [in the uniform procedure rule] in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue. assigns. three new personalities were added to the complaint doubtless to insure. Rule 3 PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS SEC. preferred that her case be heard and decided by the RTC in Batac. She was not a resident of Brgy. if such were the established fact. a guardian. an executor or administrator. virtually rendering the impleading of the trustees unnecessary. the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. 2. makes sense kasi) Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes Park. 2. Obiter (baka itanong. every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. to borrow from Justice Regalado. Sec. The Court will not speculate on the reason why petitioner Irene. for all the inconvenience and expenses she and her adversaries would have to endure by a Batac trial.A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. or a party authorized by law or these Rules. it being a suit against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now represented by Julita and Francisca). Rule 4 VENUE OF ACTIONS SEC. but in vain as it turned out. Makati City. SWEET LINES V. the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. on the basis of their alleged personal liability to Irene upon an alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. Representatives as parties. The amended complaint is an action in personam. or associates. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal." SEC. In the final analysis. This conclusion becomes all the more forceful considering that Irene herself initiated and was actively prosecuting her claim against Benedicto. On the heels of the dismissal of the original complaints on the ground of improper venue. 3. "be defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in the action since the latter would not have the degree of interest in the subject of the action which would warrant and entail the desirably active participation expected of litigants in a case. They are not actions in rem where the actions are against the real properties instead of against persons. at the election of the plaintiff. the residences of Irene's coplaintiffs cannot be made the basis in determining the venue of the subject suit.All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides. or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found. that the case stays with the RTC in Batac. or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Parties in interest. -.

14 is void since it subverts public policy on transfer of venue. Further. they were forced to hide in the cargo section to avoid inspection of the Philippine Coastguard. During the trip. ISSUE: Plaintiff: Sweet Lines.Ponente: Santos. J. Petitioner files MTD based on Condition No. 14 states: “It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket. Town but since it was already filled to capacity. Tandog and Tiro were exposed to extreme heat and dust. 14 printed behind all of its issued tickets. pointing to Condition No. Inc. irrespective of where it was issued. petitioner filed an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Judge Teves from proceeding further with the case. but upon learning that this vessel would instead be bound for Surigao. 14 is void – YES Tandog and Private Respondent: Rogelio Tiro Leovigildo DECISION: SC dismisses petitioner’s action for prohibition and preliminary injunction FACTS: HELD: Private respondents Tandog and Tiro were to board petitioner’s vessel M/S Sweet Hope bound for Tagbilaran City. they went to the branch office and asked to be transferred. 14 written on the back of its tickets limiting any action against them to be filed only in CFI Cebu. but this requires written agreement by the parties and cannot be unilaterally imposed. They instead boarded M/S Sweet Condition No. the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for other tickets. Contesting this. QUICK FACTS: Private respondents Tandog and Tiro file an action for damages and breach of contract of carriage in CFI Misamis Oriental against petitioner Sweet Lines. Petitioner filed a MTD based on improver venue. Nature: Original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Judge Teves from proceeding further with the CFI case after he denied petitioner’s MTD and a subsequent MR. and so was the subsequent MR.” FACTS: The MTD was denied. Condition No. WoN the case was filed in the wrong venue – NO Respondent: Judge Bernardo Teves WoN Condition No. since this prejudices rights and interests of innumerable passengers in . This led to their filing an action for damages and breach of contract of carriage in CFI Misamis Oriental. shall be filed in the competent courts of the City of Cebu. DOCTRINE: Parties can agree to transfer venue from one province to another.

14 were followed. If Condition No. More so. where stricter vigilance on the part of the courts must be taken to protect the weaker party from abuses and imposition and prevent traps that the unwary may fall victim to. he can be sued in Masantol. Passengers rarely read the fine print. 14 must file suits against petitioner only in Cebu. In this case. The stipulation in question is at best a contract of adhesion. 3 of Rule 4 provides that "by written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another". a court may justify the laying of venue in a place fixed by the rules instead of the written stipulation of the parties. Bonifacio resided at Masantol. Given the sometimes gruesome conditions involving travel by sea. Shipping companies like petitioner have a virtual monopoly of the business and may thus dictate their terms of passage. there is actually no written agreement as to venue in the sense of Rule 4. Inc. VILLANUEVA V JUDGE MOSQUEDA and HEIRDS OF BASILIO BONIFACIO (1982) Aquino Doctrine: The rule in Sec. Pampanga. such as in this case. the heirs of Bonifacio filed an ejectment suit against Villanueva in the municipal court of Masantol. 19. In June.different parts of the country who under Condition No. At bar. Sec. Neither did the private respondents have a chance to take into account the stipulations on their tickets prior to their purchase of the same. agreements regarding change of venue are enforceable but there may be instances where . passengers’ immediate concern is just to get to their destinations. especially if there are a number of conditions in fine print. 1980. Further. Petitioner: Eduardo Villanueva Respondents: Judge Lorenzo Mosqueda and the Heirs of Basilio Bonifacio Facts: Basilio Bonifacio (lessor) and Eduardo Villanueva (lessee) executed between them a supplementary lease agreement on Aug. leaving passengers often with no choice but to buy their tickets and avail of their service. 2(a). and are merely concerned with the ticket price and destination. It is hardly just to expect passengers to examine their tickets from congested counters. The bulk of these passengers is also of low-income groups and less literate and cannot be expected to scrutinize their tickets. his contention being that the venue of the action is Manila where the property is located and that the stipulation that the action can be filed in Masantol is void for being contrary to Sec. Venue is governed by the philosophy that actions must be instituted at the convenience of the plaintiffs and witnesses to promote the ends of justice. such an agreement was formalized between the lessor and the lessee. the tickets are printed solely by the petitioner. private respondents would possibly not even file the case at all. 3. not one where parties deliberate its terms but rather one where private respondents took no part at all in preparing. Rule 4 of Although venue may be changed and transferred from one province to another by agreement of parties in writing (Rule 4. 1(a). such agreement is not valid when it practically negates action by the private respondents. In the said agreement. Sec. binding and enforceable. Barredo. Section 3). Manila. Filing of the case at bar in Misamis will not prejudice nor inconvenience the Sweet Lines. This is a contract of adhesion. it was stipulated that if the lessor (Bonifacio) violates the contract. under equitable consideration and in the better in interest of justice. Villanueva resided in Tondo. he can be sued in Manila and if the lessee (Villanueva) violates the contract. 1970 regarding Bonifacio's house located at 329-31 Lakandula Street Extension. The agreement is valid. Concurring Generally. Rule 4 of the ROC that "forcible entry and detainer actions regarding real property shall be brought in the municipality or city in which the subject matter thereof is situated" does not refer to the jurisdiction over the subject matter but only to the place where the ejectment suit may be brought. Tondo. petitioner has branches in all its ports and can therefore afford to litigate in any of these places. leaving passengers with no say in its preparation. Villanueva filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain ejectment suits. Rule of the Revised Rules of Court. such an agreement was formalized between the lessor and the lessee. Pampanga Held: NO. Al that the proper court of Manila is the venue for an action upon a document stipulating such "in case of any litigation herefrom. Doctrine: In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. ISSUE: WON respondent court erred in holding that the venue of action was improperly laid HELD: Yes. as would have been done had the parties intended to retain such right of election. the present petition for certiorari assailing the said court’s ruling. any legal action which may arise out of this promissory note”. the municipal court of Masantol. The rule in Sec. instead of suing the other party in that court. 3 of Rule 4 provides that "by written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another". They did not waive their right to choose the venue provided for in section 2(b). like other inferior courts. Pampanga. Issue: WON the venue was improperly laid in the municipal court of Masantol. Pampanga was the proper venue for the ejectment suit. In this case. Sec. a motion to dismiss an . RTC Makati granted the MTD. They likewise object to the venue claiming that the plaintiffs complaint is based on two promissory notes which commonly declare. The agreement is valid. Petition dismissed. hence. 1(a). Rule 4 of the ROC that "forcible entry and detainer actions regarding real property shall be brought in the municipality or city in which the subject matter thereof is situated" does not refer to the jurisdiction over the subject matter but only to the place where the ejectment suit may be brought. CFI: dismissed the petition ratiocinating that the venue was properly laid in Masantol pursuant to the agreement of the parties who had validly waived the legal venue. • TC granted MTD on the ground of improper venue • PBC filed MR on the ground that in view of the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that Manila alone is the venue agreed upon by the parties. They claim that summons was served on defendant corporation's customer who was not authorized to receive the same for and in behalf of the corporation. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (Capati vs. They are not exclusive but. et. Villanueva answered the complaint. FACTS: Philippine Banking Corp filed a complaint w/ prayer of prelim attachment against Brinell Metal Works Corp and Sps Ang for collection of a loan evidenced by 2 IOUs w/ RTC Makati • TC issued prelim attachment • Rs filed MTD on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. and (b) improper venue. they should be considered merely as an agreement on additional forum. • • Under Section 1(c). Sps Ang Ponente: Nocon QF: On the strength of the provision in IOUs sued upon that “I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Manila. citing Bautista v Hon Borja.the ROC. Ratio: The municipal court of Masantol. The present case should be distinguished from a case where the parties stipulated that actions on a construction contract may be instituted in the CFI of Naga City and the Contractor. sued him in the CFI of Pampanga. among others: I/WE HEREBY EXPRESSLY SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF MANILA. He also filed a certiorari petition in the CFI of Pampanga wherein he assailed the municipal court's order denying his motion to dismiss. rather permissive. a resident of Bacolor. binding and enforceable. not as limiting venue to the specified place. Brinell Metal Works Corp. The municipal court denied the motion. Ocampo). ANY LEGAL ACTION WHICH MAY ARISE OUT OF THIS PROMISSORY NOTE. or in connection herewith. It was held that the suit was properly filed in Pampanga because the agreement of the parties on the venue of the actions between them was "simply permissive". citing Polytrade Corp v Blanco • TC denied MR. Philippine Banking Corporation v Hon Tensuan (Judge of RTC Makati)." on a rationale that neither party reserved the right to choose venue as provided for in Section 2(b).

Nasser v. the parties do not lose the option of choosing the venue (stipulation: the parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila) o Polytrade made reference to Engel v Shubert Theatrical Co. he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. and to those courts only. GR: all personal actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. Lagamon. v. Central Azucarrera v De Leon—an agreement in a contract fixing a venue of actions arising therefrom is a valid waiver of the venue as fixed by law TC Judge used: Bautista v De Borja— parties must reserve their right of election if they want to file in a place other than the venue agreed upon (stipulation: in case of any litigation arising (t)herefrom or in connection (t)herewith. Intermediate AppellateCourt. It is intended to provide convenience to the parties. o Venue is waivable— when improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss it is deemed waived. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu. and just recently. rather than restrict their access to the courts. R cites: Hoechst Philippines.—stipulation: “In case of dispute. not a jurisdictional matter. Philippines) Ps used: Polytrade Corporation v Blanco— as long as the stipulation does not set forth qualifying or restrictive words to indicate that the agreed place alone and none other is the venue of the action.g. the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another. shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu" was held subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. It is procedural. and not only to the courts either of Rizal. Western Minolco v. XPN: by written agreement of the parties. the venue of any action shall be in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal" was interpreted therein that any action by either of the parties would have to be filed only in the competent courts of Rizal province exclusively” HOWEVER. Inc v Torres— stipulation: “In case of litigation arising out of this agreement. Sherman. there is nothing in the language used in the aforecited stipulation which clearly shows that the intention of the parties was to limit the venue of the action to the City of Manila only. the Court said. so that the choice of venue is not left to the caprices of plaintiff. There is nothing exclusive in the language used. both contracting parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Vienna courts" was interpreted as follows: "By the clause in question the parties do not agree to submit their dispute to the jurisdiction of the Viennese court. the day ff the promulgation of Hoechst. Court of . Moles v. Court of Appeals. Surigao Century Sawmill Co. The later cases of Lamis Ents. which provides "that any and all actions arising out of the condition and provisions of this ticket. Venue relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. Ocampo. the venue of action shall be in the City of Manila. or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides. o Polytrade was reiterated in Nicolas v Reparations Commission: While the • • • parties have agreed to submit their dispute to the jurisdiction of the Manila courts. Court of Appeals. Such agreements should be construed reasonably and should not be applied in such a manner that it would work more to the inconvenience of the parties without promoting the ends of justice o Tantoco v CA enunciated the same doctrine: the parties agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort in the event of suit. of which private respondent is a resident. or of Bulacan. where petitioner resides.• • • action may be made within the time for pleading on the ground that venue is improperly laid. SC interpreted a similar provision on venue as unenforceable in Sweet Lines Inc v Teves o Condition 14 of the shipping ticket issued by Sweet Lines. The matter of venue is regulated by the Rules of Court. (e. irrespective of where it is issued. pursuant to Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. at the election of the plaintiff. Inc. v. Capati v.

Since the issues of whether mortgages should be properly discharged arose out of said loan documents. (3) Re: exclusive venue stipulation would be tantamount to a prejudgement on validity of loan documents. For. before the filing of the action. QUICK FACTS: Spouses Lantin defaulted on their loans from Planters Development Bank. Restating the rule. Also. should be liberally construed. the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum. so the bank foreclosed on the lots. NATURE: Petition for certiorari to assail orders issued by RTC Lipa Judge Lantion PETITIONER: Renato & Angelina LANTIN RESPONDENT: Judge LANTION & Development Bank Planters FACTS: Mr and Mrs Lantin took several peso and dollar loans from Planters Development Bank. all treaded the path blazed by Polytrade. do not as rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere stipulation on venue of action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues unless proven to be clearly exclusive. have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. Acocunting. Batangas. They filed a complaint in Lipa City but Judge Lantion dismissed the case for improper venue based on Planters’ argument that loan agreements restricted the venue to courts in Metro Manila. rather permissive. RTC prejudged validity of loan document when it based dismissal on venue stipulation provided in the loan agreement. not as limiting venue to the specified place. not as limiting venue to the specified place. Permanent injunction. Mr and Mrs Lantin filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. the stipulation on venue is also applicable thereto. Planters Development Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on ground of improper venue since loan agreements restricted the venue to courts in Metro Manila. executing real estate mortgages and promissory notes to cover the loans. Metro Manila or at such venue chosen by the Mortgagee. to restrict venue only to that place stipulated in the agreement is a construction purely based on technicality. Planters Development Bank won the lots at the public auction. Discharge of Mortgage. which. Judge LANTION dismissed the case and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. which foreclosed on their mortgaged lots. they should be considered merely as an agreement on additional forum. (1) “The parties hereto agree to bring their causes of action exclusively in the proper court of Makati. They defaulted on the payments. while considered valid and enforceable. They are not exclusive but. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: Only peso loans covered by mortgages and they were fully paid. complaint involves several causes of action that do not arise from loan agreement so venue stipulation should not apply. venue stipulations in a contract. on the contrary. Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation v Hon. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. and Damages with the RTC of Lipa City. The venue stipulation employs categorical and suitably limiting language to the effect that the parties agree that the venue of actions between them should be laid only and exclusively at a definite place.—Mr and Mrs Lantin never assailed validity of mortgage contracts. mortgages should have been discharged.• Appeals. The more recent jurisprudence shall properly be deemed modificatory of the old ones. the Mortgagor waiving for this purpose any other venue.” (2) S4(b) Rule 4 states that parties may stipulate exclusive venue. only terms and coverage of the contracts. Cui 1981 Ponente: Abad Santos . Petition is DISMISSED. Emeterio C. ISSUE: WoN Judge LANTION committed grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed the case for improper venue HELD: No. LANTIN v LANTION Quisumbing DOCTRINE: The general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties. Reconveyance. thus.

Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation filed a motion to file a third-party complaint against Loreta B.” PETITION GRANTED . a situation obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. This must be so because jurisdiction over the main case embraces all incidental matters arising therefrom and connected therewith. But the third-party complaint is an ancillary suit which depends on the jurisdiction of the court over the main action. Pan] hereby agree that any question whichmay arise between the Company and the undersigned by reason of this document and which has to be submitted to the court of justice. Pan. Trading and Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation for the full payment of merchandise delivered in the amount of P 10. Central Surety & Insurance Co: “It is true that the third-party complaint was filed after the effectivity date of Republic Act 3828.000. Loreta B. Trading had to file a P 20. it does not necessarily follow that it is applicable to the present situation A third-party complaint is but ancillary to the main action and is a procedural device to avoid multiplicity of suits. therefore. Because of its nature the prescriptions on jurisdiction and venue applicable to ordinary suits may not apply. waiving for this purpose any other proper venue. Pan and Loreta B. Pan. shall be brought before the court of competent jurisdiction of Quezon City.000 surety bond and it complied by presenting a surety bond of Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation. Trading entered into a dealership agreement for the sale of merchandise. but in Manila – there was no sanctity of contract to hold Facts: 1977: Transunion Corporation and Rey M. not in Quezon City. wife of Rey M. Manila) against Rey M. is not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance if it were an independent action. Since the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Respondent judge granted Eastern’s motion. Pan doing business under the name of Pan Phil. Thus a third-party complaint has to yield to the jurisdiction and venue of the main action spouses by the petitioner surety company for its benefit and convenience and therefore the latter could waive the provision by filing its complaint. Pan Phil. 1978: Transunion filed a complaint (CFI. and in multiplicity of suits.841.Doctrine: A third-party complaint is but ancillary to the main action and is a procedural device to avoid multiplicity of suits. It is likewise true that the demand therein made does not exceed P 10. Thus a third-party complaint has to yield to the jurisdiction and venue of the main action Republic vs. Pan. A contrary rule would result in 'split jurisdiction which is not favored. it necessarily follows that it likewise had jurisdiction over the third-party complaint which is but an incident thereof. Pan filed a motion to dismiss the thirdparty complaint on the ground that venue was improperly laid citing paragraph 7 of the Indemnity Agreement: We [meaning Rey M. the Pan spouses executed an Indemnity Agreement in favor of Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation. Because of its nature the prescriptions on jurisdiction and venue applicable to ordinary suits may not apply. It appears that in consideration of the surety bond. Respondent judge granted Pan’s MTD saying he had to uphold the policy of upholding the sanctity of contracts in preference to the policy against multiplicity of suits Issue: WON venue for the third-party complaint was improperly laid Held: NO Ratio: What the respondent judge and even petitioner's counsel failed to perceive is that paragraph 7 of the Indemnity Agreement was imposed on the Pan But even if we assume that paragraph 7 of the Indemnity Agreement created a reciprocal obligation.54. Pursuant thereto Pan Phil.Its reason: movant has a legal right against Loreta B. and. Pan.