Empirical Study of Growth and Poverty Reduction in Indonesian Farms

:
The Role of Space, Infrastructure and Human Capital and Impact of the
Financial Crisis

Has Decentralization in Indonesia Led to
Elite Capture or Reflection of Majority
Preference?
No. 14
March 2010
Shyamal Chowdhury and Futoshi Yamauchi

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1
Has Decentralization in Indonesia Led to Elite Capture or Reflection of
Majority Preference?

Shyamal Chowdhury- and Futoshi Yamauchi--

Abstract
Elite capture in the context of decentralization and democratization is a general concern in
public good provision in developing countries. In this paper, we have empirically examined this
hypothesis using a large rural household survey conducted in Indonesia concerning access of
households to road and electricity services. In Indonesia, prior to decentralization, local
infrastructure was supplied by a centralized authority that had the potential to provide
infrastructures that did not match heterogeneous local preferences. After the introduction of the
decentralization, local infrastructure decision is taken by elected local authorities. It, however,
runs the risks of elite capture. We have examined if access to infrastructure reflects’ majority’s
preference or results in elite capture in the decentralized period taking the allocation under the
centralized regime duly into account.
Keywords: Decentralization, rural infrastructure, elite capture, Indonesia

- University of Sydney, Australia (shyamal chowdhury@sydney.edu.au)
-- International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C.

We would like to thank Megumi Muto and Yasuo Fujita for useful comments. The research findings of
this paper are based on the IMDG 2007 survey jointly conducted by the Japan International Cooperation
Agency, the International Food Policy Research, and the Indonesian Center for Agriculture and Socio
Economic Policy Studies. Any errors are our own. We would like to thank the Indonesian National
Statistic Office for discussion on PODES village data. Remaining errors are ours.
2
Introduction
Elite capture in the decentralization context refers to the possibility of captures of public
resources by local elites and local power groups. Both in theoretical literature (Bardhan and
Mookherjee 2000) and in policy discussions, elite capture in the context of decentralization is
now a widely discussed issue (Platteau 2004). Though the debate of local government and elite
capture is not entirely new (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1787), it has taken the center stage in
policy discussions following the recent wave of decentralization and democratization in
developing countries (World Bank 1999). While the decentralization has been viewed as an
improved way of delivering services to the poor (World Bank 2003), the possibility of elite
capture at local level diminishes its benefits over a centralized delivery of services. In this paper,
we empirically examine the extent of elite capture in the context of Indonesian decentralization.
We ask the following question: has decentralization in Indonesia resulted in elite capture or
reflection of majority preferences?
The need for answering this question arises from two reasons: first and foremost, in the
theoretical literature, the possibility of elite capture depends on more than one crucial parameter
and hence the link between decentralization and elite capture is not unambiguous. The
theoretical mechanisms of elite capture in democratic systems are described in Grossman and
Helpman (1996) in the context of special-interest groups and in Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2000) in the context of decentralized and centralized system of governments. However, capture
depends crucially on the size of elite groups, political accountability of local government leaders
and the financing mechanisms of local public goods among others. Second, to our knowledge,
the systematic empirical evidence is either nonexistent or very limited. Hence, answering this
question has important research and policy implications.
In this paper, we answer this question and test the theory of elite capture in several ways.
First, we look at the priorities set in desa
1
’s annual plan and ask the following question: do the

1
Desa is the lowest level of decentralized unit in Indonesia
3
priorities that a desa sets in its annual plan have any connection with the voters’ need? For this,
we look at the association between priority set of a desa and voters’ state to those priority areas.
Imagine that in its annual plan in 2007 desa d has set drinking water as its first priority. Given
this information, we look at the state of access of voters to drinking water for the desa d. If
majority of the voters did not have access to drinking water, the priority would reflect the
preference of the majority.
Second, though the above exercise seems to be indicative, priorities set at a desa level
need to be realized at its voters’ level. Imagine that our desa d connects itself to the local
electricity grid since electricity was set as a priority in its annual plan. However, instead of
majority of the voters getting connected to the grid, only few elites of the desa d can get
connected. For this, we look at the access of voters to different public goods. Since we want to
test if elites of a desa disproportionately capture the benefits of public goods in a decentralized
regime, we examine if wealth (land, human capital) of voters influence their access to public
goods.
2

We draw the conceptual framework based on the mechanisms that have been used in
Indonesia where desa uses a combination of its own resources and government subsidy to
finance local public goods. While the information on local resource availability is known, the
information on government subsidy is imperfect. For example, the total amount available to a
district authority might be known but its allocation to different public goods is not. Compared to
median voters, elite might have more information on it and use the informational advantage in
its favor. Alternatively, it can be seen as determined by inter-village bargaining within a district
where village leaders play an important role. Hence, village leader’s characteristics may be
important.

2
This is similar to Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1950). Unlike in dictatorship, democracies
need to solve this preference aggregation problem and one outcome that may arise is elite capture.
4
Given resources, the allocation among competing local public goods can be seen as
determined by a political process where citizen voters participate in the decision making process
and bargaining power
3
of citizens play important roles in the process. While low intra-village
inequality in access to public goods makes consensus on public goods decision relatively easy,
the opposite happens in the case of high inequality in access. Similarly, the higher the
bargaining power of a particular class, e.g., farmers versus non-farm self employees within a
village, the greater the likelihood of allocation towards that group.
Two testable hypotheses that can be drawn from here are: first, intra-desa allocation
decision of public goods depends on past inequality in access and voter’s bargaining power;
second, voters’ bargaining power, leadership’s ability, local governance determine actual
allocation.
Most existing empirical works on the link between decentralization and elite capture are
limited to anecdotal evidence and case studies. The empirical work that bears most resemblance
to our work is Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006). They have examined the elite capture
hypothesis in the context of the West Bengal state of India and found it to hold for the local
public good programs but not for the private good programs.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description
of the decentralization process in Indonesia. Section 3 describes the empirical approach
followed in this paper; Section 4 describes the data used; Section 5 describes the empirical
results; and Section 6 concludes the paper with some possible policy implications.

1. Decentralization in Indonesia
Indonesia embarked on fiscal and political decentralization in 1999 immediately after
the economic and financial crisis that swept Indonesia and most other East Asian nations in the

3
Measuring bargaining power could be tricky – we have tried two alternative proxies – land ownership at
the initial period and household head’s years of schooling.
5
mid-nineties. In 1999, the then government boarded on a drastic reform path and the
responsibility for much of the government expenditures was devolved to district governments
through fiscal and political decentralization. It endowed local governments with additional fiscal
and human resources, authorities and responsibilities. The transition was implemented in 2001
under strict deadlines. By law, within a year from approval, all implementing regulations were
to be prepared, and by May 2001, the laws had to be implemented (Hofman and Kaiser 2006).
Prior to the current decentralization process, for most of its modern history, Indonesia
was governed by a centralized system where the local governments mostly functioned as
implementing agencies of policies and programs designed by the central government. Through
the enactment of Law 22/1999 on regional governance, responsibility for much of the
government expenditures has been decentralized to local (district) governments. The Law 22
has devolved all governance functions from the centre to the regions with the exceptions of
national defense, international relations, justice, police, monetary policy, development planning,
religion and finance. It has made local governments responsible for the provision of health,
education, environmental and infrastructure services. The local governments can also perform
any other function not explicitly reserved for the centre.
Similar to the law on governance, the Law 25/1999 on fiscal relations has significantly
strengthened the local governments share in government spending. For example, the
expenditure share of regional governments in overall public expenditures increased from about
17 percent in 2000 to over 30 percent after 2001. In addition, the decentralization has also
reassigned some two-thirds of central civil servants to the regional governments, and regional
governments are now responsible for employing over three-quarters of the civil servants.
The sweeping legislative and administrative changes in local governments introduced in
1999 have brought momentous changes on what local public infrastructures/goods will be
financed and how they will be financed. Though all major tax bases, e.g., value added taxes,
personal and corporate income tax, are still controlled by the central government, the local
6
governments receive a united transfer over which they have full discretion. Following the
decentralization decision, the central government quickly delegated virtually complete
responsibility for urban and rural infrastructure services to the local governments (Peterson and
Muzzini 2005). In 2002, the local governments financed 44.3% of transportation development,
21% of health and social services, and 16% of education development (Eckardt and Shah 2006).

At community level (desa), the focus of our empirical analysis, the planning and
provision of local public goods works as follows. Each desa has an elected local government
body, known as BPD (Badan Perwakilan Desa – village representative council), that prepares an
annual allocation plan of expenditures on local public goods subject to approval at a general
meeting attended by all members of the desa. For financing of such a plan, it must raise at least
30% of the proposed expenditures from the desa residents through user fee or similar
mechanisms. Once the plan and the financing method are approved, the desa governing body
proposes it to the sub-district/district local governments. Given everything equal, the higher the
financial contribution from a desa, and more the resources a district/sub-district possesses, the
higher the likelihood of financing a local public good. At this stage, even though the central
government distributes grant subsidies to the local governments, fiscal equalization remains
incomplete in large part because the equalization formula to distribute resources is still driven
by historical allocations including wages, and local governments are subject to significant
disparities in per capita expenditures (Hofman and Kaiser 2006).

2. Empirical approach
The empirical approach followed in this paper is a parametric one which focuses on the
relationship between voter (household) specific access to public goods and his/her bargaining
power. Our approach can help to map the changes in access to public goods with bargaining
7
power and the effect of changes in political economy institutions at the village. The main
specification is:

(1)
id d d id id id
G Y INF INF c , o ¢ | o + + + - + - + =
' 0


Access (allocation) to public good INF for a household i living in desa d denoted as
id
INF depends on access to the public good in the pre-decentralization period
0
id
INF ,
household’s bargaining power within the desa
id
Y , a set of desa specific variables
d
G that
determines village governance (electoral competition, ability of the chairman, bargaining groups,
participation (meeting frequency, meeting attendance as a % of village population)), village
fixed effect
d
, , and residuals
id
c .
We look at allocation (priority) among competing public goods at desa level and change
in access to public goods at household level. Instead of estimating a separate equation for each
of the public goods, we assume that the equations’ errors are correlated and we estimate a
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system (Zellner 1962). SUR, by weighting the estimates
by the covariance of the residuals from the individual regression, produces more efficient
estimates than OLS. Though not reported, a Breusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan 1980) test is
conducted for independent equations; that is, the disturbance covariance matrix is diagonal, is
rejected at 1% level of significance.
The allocation decision (priority setting) - the decision to allocate desa’s resources, both
desa’s own resource and transfers from district authorities, to a particular public good j for a
desa d depends on median voters’ decision, which in turn depends on median voters’ state of
access to the particular public good in question. In the absences of a functioning democracy,
elites of the desa may decide on allocation. The allocation decision is desa-specific, not
individual voter specific in the sense that here priority among competing public goods are set
for the desa as a unit and intra-desa decision are not made at this stage. Since information on
8
desa resources that were planned for each public good was not available to us, we are assuming
that priority set in the desa predicts the subsequent planned allocation fairly well.
In terms of realization, the actual realization of a particular public good can be viewed
as having access to the public good. In the absence of elite capture, access should be
independent of bargaining power of a household. The realization of a public good can be
measured at individual voter/household level.
We are also interested in the interactions of voter specific characteristics and
governance. Heterogeneous effects of household’s bargaining power (household’s initial asset
holding), initial state of access to public goods and local democracy (participation in meeting,
decision making process) can be captured through interactions.
In terms of identification strategy, we are assuming that household bargaining power
expressed in terms of landholding is exogenous with respect to household’s public good access.
4

This requires absence of a reverse casualty of public good access on bargaining power, or of
variables omitted from the estimated equation that affect both public good access and
bargaining power.

3. Data
The data for this paper has come from two sources. First, the 1994/1995 PATANAS
survey – a periodic survey conducted by ICASEPS (a full description of the survey can be
found in Yamauchi et al. (2008). The PATANAS survey focused on agricultural production
activities in 48 villages chosen from different agro-climatic zones in seven provinces. Second is
the JICA’s survey 2007, which was conducted as part of a study, titled Study of Effects of
Infrastructure on Millennium Development Goals in Indonesia (IMDG). It had a community

4
Household head’s education can be another important measure of the bargaining power, since education
significantly contributed to income growth in the period of 1995 to 2007. It is well known that especially
in Java where population density is high and land has been segmented, returns to land are diminished, and
therefore the role of land may be overestimated. However, we have examined the education effect with
and without landownership.
9
module that captured governance and decision making processes followed by BPD and other
village level institutions that have evolved following the decentralization. The survey also
included modules that accounted for access of individual households to various public goods.
The JICA survey was designed to overlap with villages in the 1994/95 PATANAS
survey conducted by ICASEPS to build a household panel data. The 1994/95 PATANAS survey
focused on agricultural production activities in 48 villages chosen from different agro-climatic
zones in 7 provinces (Central Java, East Java, Lumpong, NTB, North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi,
and South Kalimantan). In 2007, JICA’s survey revisited those villages to expand the scope of
research under the IMDG survey. In the 2007 round, 51 new villages were added in the 7
provinces. In the revisited villages, 20 households per village from the 1994/95 sample we re-
sampled and the split households were followed up. In the new villages, 24 households from
two main hamlets in each village were sampled. Since one of the 48 villages in the 1994/95
PATANAS was not accessible for security reasons in the 2007 survey (NTB province), a total
of 98 villages were available for analysis.
5

Two public goods that are chosen for this study include (intra) village road and
electricity.
6
Following the decentralization, these goods are often planned and financed (partly)
by desa. We have measured the access of each household to these two public goods; for
instance, if a household has electricity at home or not. For road, it is the access of household to
desa office. The access takes the value one if access is through paved/asphalt road and zero
otherwise.
7


5
However, due to survey problems regarding the governance module, our actual estimation includes a
subset of 62 villages. To see if there are any systematic differences between excluded 36 villages and
included 62 villages in regards of public goods availability, we examined the mean differences in access
and found no differences.
6
For both road and electricity, the access at household level found in our sample is higher than the
country average that we calculated in a companion paper (Chowdhury et al. 2007), where we have
utilized village census data (PODES 2006).
7
In calculating change in access, we did not consider deterioration, from positive access to negative
access, since such cases were negligible (4 out of 1936 valid observations in the case of road).
10
For each public good, we have looked at two ways: first, if it was set as a first priority
in the BPD’s annual plan; second, change in access to it at household level. The priorities are set
at desa level and accesses are realized at household level.
Turning to the explanatory variables, the amount of land that a household owns is used
as a measure of bargaining power. Since PATANAS households and villages are by definition
agrarian households, this should be a reasonable proxy for bargaining power. It is taken at 1995
in order to avoid any possible endogeneity issue. Land transaction is not very often in Indonesia
and land possession does not change much over time.
8
For the village governance, variables that
are taken include age of the BPD chairman
9
, education and years of experience, if BPD
members are elected or not, meeting frequency, and decision making mechanism (voting) at
BPD.
Table 1 provide summary statistics of all the above and other variables utilized in the
estimation.


8
Inheritance to the next generation through household split process is not taken into account, since we
focus on the original households in this analysis. The unit of observations in the analysis of public good
access dynamics is the original household in 1995, from which some members had split in 1995-2007.
However, in the analysis of village-level priority setting, we used the 2007 survey households, which
include those split from the 1995 original households (who probably inherited land) and households in
new sample villages included in the 2007 survey but not in the 1995 survey.
9
In addition, gender of the BPD chair can have significant influence on the public goods and services
composition. However, the number of female BPD chair was very small in our sample (only 2 out of 62)
and we did not include it as a separate regressor as a result.
11
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Road as the first priority 0.53 0.50 0 1
Electricity as the first priority 0.02 0.12 0 1
Change in access to road between 1995 and 2007 0.18 0.39 0 1
Change in access to electricity between 1995 and 2007 0.27 0.45 0 1
Access to Road in 2007 0.81 0.39 0 1
Access to Electricity in 2007 0.86 0.35 0 1
Access to Road in 1995 0.64 0.48 0 1
Access to Electricity in 1995 0.59 0.31 0 1
Amount of Land owned in 1995 0.75 1.52 0 20
Gender of the BPD Chair 0.03 0.17 0 1
Age of the BPD Chair 46.58 11.57 26 84
Years of Schooling of the BPD Chair 12.88 3.20 6 16
Years of Experience of the BPD Chair 3.79 2.37 0.1 8
If BPD is Elected (0,1) 0.61 0.49 0 1
Frequency of Meeting (High -1, Low-0) 0.33 0.47 0 1
Voting on BPD decision (High -1, Low-0) 0.67 0.47 0 1
Sample size is limited to 62 villages utilized in the current estimation.

Though the local governance law in Indonesia requires each desa to have an elected
local government body, according to the survey findings, about 42% of the surveyed villages
did not have an elected BPD head. In such villages, the BPD heads were made not through any
majority voting process.
Meeting provides the opportunity for participation for voters, express their opinions and
raise their voices. Therefore, the frequency of meeting has been taken as a proxy for the
participation of voters - the higher the frequency the more the participation. If meetings take
place weekly, biweekly or monthly, it takes a value of 1 and zero otherwise.
Voting is taken as a proxy for decision making mechanism at BPD. If likelihood of
decision making through voting is high, it takes a value 1, and zero otherwise. Note that, unlike
majority voting and participation, the role of voting in decision making is not obvious and high
frequency of voting in fact may also signal a lack of consensus on village priorities.

12
5. Results
The empirical findings related to our first question, whether the priority setting at desa
level reflects the household/voter’s need within the desa, have been presented in Table 2. For
electricity
10
, the priority setting reflects the need of the majority of the voters. There is a
negative correlation between average access to electricity within the desa and desa-level priority
for this good. For road, average road access in the desa has positive impact on the desa-level
priority for road. One plausible explanation is that between two public goods considered here,
road is the less exclusive and average access at village level may leverage connectivity at
household through network effect. The same logic does not apply for the electricity; average
access at village level does not imply leveraging benefit at household level.
In terms of the interaction between BPD head characteristics and voters’ access to
public goods, results show a negative effect of age and a positive effect of experience on
allocation to roads and electricity. One plausible explanation is that more experienced a leader is,
the more likely s/he is to realize the role that roads, electricity and water play in voters’
wellbeing and re-election possibility.
In terms of the interaction between voter’s access to public goods and village
governance (BPD elected or not), in electricity, households with access are putting priority to
enhance access where BPD heads are elected instead of appointed.


10
Note that only two villages set electricity as first priority. So results should be interpreted with cautions.
13
Table 2. Access to public goods and priority setting for public goods at Desa level, probit
model
Road as the first
priority
Electricity as the
first priority~
Average road access in the desa (0,1) 1.013***
(0.337)
Road access X Education of the BPD head 0.00362
(0.0142)
Road access X Age of the BPD head -0.0356***
(0.0041)
Road access X experience of the BPD head 0.170***
(0.0176)
Road access X BPP elected -0.121
(0.0867)
Average electricity access in the desa (0,1) -9.235***
(1.66)
Electricity access X Education of the BPD head 0.264***
(0.0864)
Electricity access X Age of the BPD head -0.0980***
(0.0251)
Electricity access X Experience of the BPD head 0.0187
(0.0671)
Electricity access X BPD elected 7.36***
(0.00)
Constant 0.0647 -0.439*
(0.108) (0.245)
Observations 61 62
R-squared 0.09 0.34
~ Only two villages set electricity as first priority. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; *,
**, ***, significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.

Table 3 presents the findings related to the central question of elite capture or majority
preferences. According to the findings, elites are not disproportionately getting access to public
goods after decentralization. Change in access to public goods considered here has not
disproportionately benefited the local elites proxied by landownership.
However, if the elite (the landholding class) already had access to infrastructure and the
poor did not have access, these two sets of variables (landholding size, access to public goods)
mean the same. We have examined the correlation between landholding size and access to
public goods in pre-decentralized period. The correlation between access to electricity and land
holding is 0.05, and between access to road and landholding is -0.04, and they are not
statistically significant. Given this, and the empirical finding, the bargaining power represented
14
by the landholding size is not statistically significant in ensuring access to public goods in the
decentralized regime.
Table 3 also presents the results of the interactions between households that did not
have initial access to public goods and decentralization. It shows if and how the democracy at
village level (BPD election, participation, voting) has affected such households. The results
show that such households have been benefited from democracy. The likelihood of having
access to public goods for such household is higher in an elected regime than in a non-elected
regime. Similarly, there is an interaction effect of participation in meeting and access to public
goods for households that did not have access in centralized regime.

Table 3. Households bargaining power and the realization of access to public goods and
decentralization
Variables Change in access to road Change in access to
electricity
Land ownership 1995 -0.0301 0.0624 -0.00519 0.101
(0.052) (0.062) (0.059) (0.088)
Initial access to road -2.491*** -1.878***
(0.29) (0.36)
Initial access to electricity -3.094*** -4.784***
(0.27) (0.56)
No initial access to road X BPD elected 0.502*** 0.754***
(0.19) (0.25)
No initial access to road X Participation 0.423* 0.889***
(0.22) (0.3)
No initial access to road X Voting 0.550** 1.144***
(0.22) (0.23)
No initial access to electricity X BPD elected 0.744*** 0.921***
(0.17) (0.3)
No initial access to electricity X Participation 0.432** 0.559*
(0.18) (0.32)
No initial access to electricity X Voting -0.0632 0.928***
(0.19) (0.3)
Constant -1.635*** -2.055*** -0.750*** 0.081
(0.21) (0.61) (0.16) (0.52)
Fixed effects Province Village Province Village
Observations 738 701 727 727
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; *, **, ***, significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.

15
To see if the results are robust to a change in the proxy used to measure household
bargaining power, we have used household head’s education instead of land ownership. As
reported in Table A1 in Appendix, this does not change our basic findings – the bargaining
power proxied by household head’s education is not statistically significant in ensuring access
to public goods in the decentralized regime.

Conclusions
Elite capture in the context of decentralized delivery of public goods has been a long
held concern which has been rekindled with the decentralization and democratization
experiments of developing countries. Based on Indonesian experience, our findings show that
decentralization has not led to elite capture in public good provisions. Public goods that are
provided under the decentralized regime rather reflect the preferences of the voters who did not
have access to such public goods under the centralized provision.
Local governance seems to be important and it has been functioning. The interactions
between voter’s access to public goods and election, participation and voting seem to be
significantly affecting actual realization of public goods at citizen level.
However, as seen, there are differences in the governing process – villages differ in
terms of voting, election and other important aspects. Why the same institutional change has
brought different changes in governance at village level and how the best practices can be
replicated across Indonesia are important questions not answered here and may warrant further
research.
16
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17
Table A1. Robustness check – bargaining power
Variables Change in access to
road

Change in access to
electricity

Land ownership 1995 -0.059 0.008
(0.049) (0.061)
Schooling of household head 0.0002 0.0002 0.03 0.0211
(0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022)
Initial access to road -2.365*** -
2.354***

(0.29) (0.3)
Initial access to electricity -3.071*** -
3.092***
(0.27) (0.28)
No initial access to road X BPD elected 0.603*** 0.650***
(0.2) (0.21)
No initial access to road X Participation 0.482** 0.404*
(0.23) (0.24)
No initial access to road X Voting 0.508** 0.602***
(0.22) (0.23)
No initial access to electricity X BPD
elected
0.803*** 0.798***
(0.17) (0.18)
No initial access to electricity X
Participation
0.498*** 0.455**
(0.19) (0.19)
No initial access to electricity X Voting -0.0363 -0.0359
(0.19) (0.19)
Constant -1.642*** -
1.601***
-1.005*** -
0.938***
(0.25) (0.26) (0.22) (0.22)
Fixed effects Province Province Province Province
Observations 710 691 702 682
*, **, ***, significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
18
Abstract (in Japanese)

要約

地方分権や民主化の過程にある開発途上国では、公共財の供給の決定において権力
者層による恣意的な選択(elite capture)が行われていないかという点が懸念される。
本稿では、道路や電化に着目し、インドネシアにおいて上記の懸念が成り立つかどう
かを確認する。インドネシアでは地方分権の前までは農村のインフラ整備は中央主導
で行われており、インフラ優先順位に関する農村内の選好の多様性を反映できていな
かった可能性がある。地方分権が進んだ現在においては、農村のインフラ整備は地方
自治体毎に選挙で選ばれたメンバーが意思決定を行っているが、権力者層による恣意
的な選択の可能性は依然として残されている。本稿は地方分権の前と後のインフラア
クセスデータと家計データを組み合わせた分析を行い、権力者層による恣意的な選択
は確認されないとの示唆を導いている。



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Use and dissemination of these working papers are encouraged; however, the JICA Research Institute requests due acknowledgement and a copy of any publication for which these working papers have provided input. The views expressed in these papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official positions of either the JICA Research Institute or JICA.

JICA Research Institute 10-5 Ichigaya Honmura-cho Shinjuku-ku Tokyo 162-8433 JAPAN TEL: +81-3-3269-3372 FAX: +81-3-3269-2054 Copyright ©2010 by Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute All rights reserved.

we have empirically examined this hypothesis using a large rural household survey conducted in Indonesia concerning access of households to road and electricity services. We would like to thank the Indonesian National Statistic Office for discussion on PODES village data.C. rural infrastructure. We would like to thank Megumi Muto and Yasuo Fujita for useful comments. After the introduction of the decentralization. elite capture. Any errors are our own. Remaining errors are ours. In this paper. the International Food Policy Research. Indonesia  University of Sydney. runs the risks of elite capture. however. prior to decentralization. local infrastructure decision is taken by elected local authorities. We have examined if access to infrastructure reflects’ majority’s preference or results in elite capture in the decentralized period taking the allocation under the centralized regime duly into account. It. Keywords: Decentralization.Has Decentralization in Indonesia Led to Elite Capture or Reflection of Majority Preference? Shyamal Chowdhury and Futoshi Yamauchi Abstract Elite capture in the context of decentralization and democratization is a general concern in public good provision in developing countries. The research findings of this paper are based on the IMDG 2007 survey jointly conducted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency. Washington D. 1 . In Indonesia. Australia (shyamal chowdhury@sydney. local infrastructure was supplied by a centralized authority that had the potential to provide infrastructures that did not match heterogeneous local preferences.au)  International Food Policy Research Institute.edu. and the Indonesian Center for Agriculture and Socio Economic Policy Studies.

elite capture in the context of decentralization is now a widely discussed issue (Platteau 2004). we look at the priorities set in desa1’s annual plan and ask the following question: do the 1 Desa is the lowest level of decentralized unit in Indonesia 2 . the possibility of elite capture depends on more than one crucial parameter and hence the link between decentralization and elite capture is not unambiguous. We ask the following question: has decentralization in Indonesia resulted in elite capture or reflection of majority preferences? The need for answering this question arises from two reasons: first and foremost. and Jay 1787). The theoretical mechanisms of elite capture in democratic systems are described in Grossman and Helpman (1996) in the context of special-interest groups and in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) in the context of decentralized and centralized system of governments. In this paper. we empirically examine the extent of elite capture in the context of Indonesian decentralization. political accountability of local government leaders and the financing mechanisms of local public goods among others. the possibility of elite capture at local level diminishes its benefits over a centralized delivery of services. Madison. capture depends crucially on the size of elite groups.Introduction Elite capture in the decentralization context refers to the possibility of captures of public resources by local elites and local power groups. to our knowledge. In this paper. While the decentralization has been viewed as an improved way of delivering services to the poor (World Bank 2003). Hence. However. Though the debate of local government and elite capture is not entirely new (Hamilton. it has taken the center stage in policy discussions following the recent wave of decentralization and democratization in developing countries (World Bank 1999). First. we answer this question and test the theory of elite capture in several ways. the systematic empirical evidence is either nonexistent or very limited. Both in theoretical literature (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000) and in policy discussions. Second. answering this question has important research and policy implications. in the theoretical literature.

Alternatively. For example. Given this information. only few elites of the desa d can get connected. instead of majority of the voters getting connected to the grid. it can be seen as determined by inter-village bargaining within a district where village leaders play an important role. Unlike in dictatorship.2 We draw the conceptual framework based on the mechanisms that have been used in Indonesia where desa uses a combination of its own resources and government subsidy to finance local public goods. we look at the association between priority set of a desa and voters’ state to those priority areas. the priority would reflect the preference of the majority. Since we want to test if elites of a desa disproportionately capture the benefits of public goods in a decentralized regime. Hence. village leader’s characteristics may be important. 2 This is similar to Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1950). Second. the total amount available to a district authority might be known but its allocation to different public goods is not. the information on government subsidy is imperfect. Compared to median voters. Imagine that our desa d connects itself to the local electricity grid since electricity was set as a priority in its annual plan. If majority of the voters did not have access to drinking water. human capital) of voters influence their access to public goods. we examine if wealth (land. 3 . though the above exercise seems to be indicative. elite might have more information on it and use the informational advantage in its favor. Imagine that in its annual plan in 2007 desa d has set drinking water as its first priority. While the information on local resource availability is known. For this. democracies need to solve this preference aggregation problem and one outcome that may arise is elite capture.priorities that a desa sets in its annual plan have any connection with the voters’ need? For this. However. we look at the access of voters to different public goods. we look at the state of access of voters to drinking water for the desa d. priorities set at a desa level need to be realized at its voters’ level.

voters’ bargaining power. the higher the bargaining power of a particular class. Section 3 describes the empirical approach followed in this paper. leadership’s ability. 1. the greater the likelihood of allocation towards that group. Similarly. intra-desa allocation decision of public goods depends on past inequality in access and voter’s bargaining power. second. 4 . They have examined the elite capture hypothesis in the context of the West Bengal state of India and found it to hold for the local public good programs but not for the private good programs. farmers versus non-farm self employees within a village.. Section 4 describes the data used. e. Two testable hypotheses that can be drawn from here are: first. local governance determine actual allocation. the allocation among competing local public goods can be seen as determined by a political process where citizen voters participate in the decision making process and bargaining power3 of citizens play important roles in the process.g. While low intra-village inequality in access to public goods makes consensus on public goods decision relatively easy. Most existing empirical works on the link between decentralization and elite capture are limited to anecdotal evidence and case studies. Decentralization in Indonesia Indonesia embarked on fiscal and political decentralization in 1999 immediately after the economic and financial crisis that swept Indonesia and most other East Asian nations in the 3 Measuring bargaining power could be tricky – we have tried two alternative proxies – land ownership at the initial period and household head’s years of schooling. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of the decentralization process in Indonesia. The empirical work that bears most resemblance to our work is Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006). Section 5 describes the empirical results. and Section 6 concludes the paper with some possible policy implications.Given resources. the opposite happens in the case of high inequality in access.

and by May 2001. within a year from approval.. responsibility for much of the government expenditures has been decentralized to local (district) governments. development planning. The sweeping legislative and administrative changes in local governments introduced in 1999 have brought momentous changes on what local public infrastructures/goods will be financed and how they will be financed. the local 5 . It has made local governments responsible for the provision of health. and regional governments are now responsible for employing over three-quarters of the civil servants. education. the Law 25/1999 on fiscal relations has significantly strengthened the local governments share in government spending. the laws had to be implemented (Hofman and Kaiser 2006). The transition was implemented in 2001 under strict deadlines. For example. the then government boarded on a drastic reform path and the responsibility for much of the government expenditures was devolved to district governments through fiscal and political decentralization. all implementing regulations were to be prepared. religion and finance. Similar to the law on governance. Though all major tax bases. environmental and infrastructure services. value added taxes. justice. Indonesia was governed by a centralized system where the local governments mostly functioned as implementing agencies of policies and programs designed by the central government. the decentralization has also reassigned some two-thirds of central civil servants to the regional governments. the expenditure share of regional governments in overall public expenditures increased from about 17 percent in 2000 to over 30 percent after 2001. The local governments can also perform any other function not explicitly reserved for the centre. The Law 22 has devolved all governance functions from the centre to the regions with the exceptions of national defense. e. international relations. It endowed local governments with additional fiscal and human resources. Through the enactment of Law 22/1999 on regional governance. By law. personal and corporate income tax. for most of its modern history.g. monetary policy. authorities and responsibilities. In addition. are still controlled by the central government.mid-nineties. In 1999. Prior to the current decentralization process. police.

the higher the financial contribution from a desa. even though the central government distributes grant subsidies to the local governments. In 2002. fiscal equalization remains incomplete in large part because the equalization formula to distribute resources is still driven by historical allocations including wages. the planning and provision of local public goods works as follows. Empirical approach The empirical approach followed in this paper is a parametric one which focuses on the relationship between voter (household) specific access to public goods and his/her bargaining power. At this stage.3% of transportation development. and more the resources a district/sub-district possesses. the focus of our empirical analysis. the desa governing body proposes it to the sub-district/district local governments. it must raise at least 30% of the proposed expenditures from the desa residents through user fee or similar mechanisms. the central government quickly delegated virtually complete responsibility for urban and rural infrastructure services to the local governments (Peterson and Muzzini 2005). 21% of health and social services.governments receive a united transfer over which they have full discretion. the higher the likelihood of financing a local public good. and local governments are subject to significant disparities in per capita expenditures (Hofman and Kaiser 2006). Once the plan and the financing method are approved. that prepares an annual allocation plan of expenditures on local public goods subject to approval at a general meeting attended by all members of the desa. Given everything equal. known as BPD (Badan Perwakilan Desa – village representative council). 2. Following the decentralization decision. the local governments financed 44. and 16% of education development (Eckardt and Shah 2006). For financing of such a plan. At community level (desa). Each desa has an elected local government body. Our approach can help to map the changes in access to public goods with bargaining 6 .

which in turn depends on median voters’ state of access to the particular public good in question. and residuals  id . SUR. both desa’s own resource and transfers from district authorities. that is. Instead of estimating a separate equation for each of the public goods. not individual voter specific in the sense that here priority among competing public goods are set for the desa as a unit and intra-desa decision are not made at this stage. The allocation decision (priority setting) . we assume that the equations’ errors are correlated and we estimate a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system (Zellner 1962). household’s bargaining power within the desa Yid . a set of desa specific variables Gd that determines village governance (electoral competition. the disturbance covariance matrix is diagonal. meeting attendance as a % of village population)). produces more efficient estimates than OLS. to a particular public good j for a desa d depends on median voters’ decision. participation (meeting frequency. a Breusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan 1980) test is conducted for independent equations.the decision to allocate desa’s resources. ability of the chairman. We look at allocation (priority) among competing public goods at desa level and change in access to public goods at household level. Though not reported. The allocation decision is desa-specific. village fixed effect  d .power and the effect of changes in political economy institutions at the village. In the absences of a functioning democracy. bargaining groups. is rejected at 1% level of significance. Since information on 7 . The main specification is: (1) 0 ' INFid      INFid    Yid  Gd   d   id Access (allocation) to public good INF for a household i living in desa d denoted as 0 INFid depends on access to the public good in the pre-decentralization period INFid . by weighting the estimates by the covariance of the residuals from the individual regression. elites of the desa may decide on allocation.

we are assuming that household bargaining power expressed in terms of landholding is exogenous with respect to household’s public good access. decision making process) can be captured through interactions. In terms of realization. initial state of access to public goods and local democracy (participation in meeting. Second is the JICA’s survey 2007. In terms of identification strategy. It had a community 4 Household head’s education can be another important measure of the bargaining power. We are also interested in the interactions of voter specific characteristics and governance. 8 . Data The data for this paper has come from two sources. However. we have examined the education effect with and without landownership. In the absence of elite capture. Heterogeneous effects of household’s bargaining power (household’s initial asset holding). since education significantly contributed to income growth in the period of 1995 to 2007. the 1994/1995 PATANAS survey – a periodic survey conducted by ICASEPS (a full description of the survey can be found in Yamauchi et al. and therefore the role of land may be overestimated. the actual realization of a particular public good can be viewed as having access to the public good. returns to land are diminished. titled Study of Effects of Infrastructure on Millennium Development Goals in Indonesia (IMDG). First. or of variables omitted from the estimated equation that affect both public good access and bargaining power. which was conducted as part of a study. 3.desa resources that were planned for each public good was not available to us. we are assuming that priority set in the desa predicts the subsequent planned allocation fairly well. (2008). It is well known that especially in Java where population density is high and land has been segmented. The PATANAS survey focused on agricultural production activities in 48 villages chosen from different agro-climatic zones in seven provinces. The realization of a public good can be measured at individual voter/household level. access should be independent of bargaining power of a household.4 This requires absence of a reverse casualty of public good access on bargaining power.

we did not consider deterioration. East Java. NTB. JICA’s survey revisited those villages to expand the scope of research under the IMDG survey. 24 households from two main hamlets in each village were sampled. it is the access of household to desa office. The access takes the value one if access is through paved/asphalt road and zero otherwise. In the 2007 round. Since one of the 48 villages in the 1994/95 PATANAS was not accessible for security reasons in the 2007 survey (NTB province). for instance.5 Two public goods that are chosen for this study include (intra) village road and electricity. the access at household level found in our sample is higher than the country average that we calculated in a companion paper (Chowdhury et al. a total of 98 villages were available for analysis.7 5 However. and South Kalimantan). In 2007. 2007). Lumpong. since such cases were negligible (4 out of 1936 valid observations in the case of road). South Sulawesi.6 Following the decentralization. 51 new villages were added in the 7 provinces. these goods are often planned and financed (partly) by desa. The survey also included modules that accounted for access of individual households to various public goods. from positive access to negative access. due to survey problems regarding the governance module. our actual estimation includes a subset of 62 villages. In the revisited villages. In the new villages. 9 .module that captured governance and decision making processes followed by BPD and other village level institutions that have evolved following the decentralization. 7 In calculating change in access. For road. if a household has electricity at home or not. we examined the mean differences in access and found no differences. The 1994/95 PATANAS survey focused on agricultural production activities in 48 villages chosen from different agro-climatic zones in 7 provinces (Central Java. North Sulawesi. where we have utilized village census data (PODES 2006). We have measured the access of each household to these two public goods. 6 For both road and electricity. 20 households per village from the 1994/95 sample we resampled and the split households were followed up. To see if there are any systematic differences between excluded 36 villages and included 62 villages in regards of public goods availability. The JICA survey was designed to overlap with villages in the 1994/95 PATANAS survey conducted by ICASEPS to build a household panel data.

However. meeting frequency.For each public good. we used the 2007 survey households. the number of female BPD chair was very small in our sample (only 2 out of 62) and we did not include it as a separate regressor as a result. if it was set as a first priority in the BPD’s annual plan. gender of the BPD chair can have significant influence on the public goods and services composition. Table 1 provide summary statistics of all the above and other variables utilized in the estimation. since we focus on the original households in this analysis. However. if BPD members are elected or not. from which some members had split in 1995-2007.8 For the village governance. second. Since PATANAS households and villages are by definition agrarian households. change in access to it at household level. 8 Inheritance to the next generation through household split process is not taken into account. 9 In addition. The priorities are set at desa level and accesses are realized at household level. we have looked at two ways: first. variables that are taken include age of the BPD chairman 9 . 10 . It is taken at 1995 in order to avoid any possible endogeneity issue. and decision making mechanism (voting) at BPD. Land transaction is not very often in Indonesia and land possession does not change much over time. in the analysis of village-level priority setting. Turning to the explanatory variables. this should be a reasonable proxy for bargaining power. education and years of experience. the amount of land that a household owns is used as a measure of bargaining power. which include those split from the 1995 original households (who probably inherited land) and households in new sample villages included in the 2007 survey but not in the 1995 survey. The unit of observations in the analysis of public good access dynamics is the original household in 1995.

88 3. If meetings take place weekly. Summary statistics Variable Road as the first priority Electricity as the first priority Change in access to road between 1995 and 2007 Change in access to electricity between 1995 and 2007 Access to Road in 2007 Access to Electricity in 2007 Access to Road in 1995 Access to Electricity in 1995 Amount of Land owned in 1995 Gender of the BPD Chair Age of the BPD Chair Years of Schooling of the BPD Chair Years of Experience of the BPD Chair If BPD is Elected (0. the BPD heads were made not through any majority voting process. according to the survey findings. Voting is taken as a proxy for decision making mechanism at BPD.27 0. Low-0) Voting on BPD decision (High -1. Low-0) Mean 0. express their opinions and raise their voices.59 0.Table 1.45 0.1 0 0 0 Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 1 84 16 8 1 1 1 Sample size is limited to 62 villages utilized in the current estimation.50 0.1) Frequency of Meeting (High -1.64 0. Note that.79 0. 0. If likelihood of decision making through voting is high.33 0.75 0.03 46. the role of voting in decision making is not obvious and high frequency of voting in fact may also signal a lack of consensus on village priorities.86 0. In such villages.39 0.47 0. about 42% of the surveyed villages did not have an elected BPD head.48 0.81 0.57 3.67 Std. 11 .02 0.35 0.58 12.18 0. Though the local governance law in Indonesia requires each desa to have an elected local government body.49 0. the frequency of meeting has been taken as a proxy for the participation of voters .47 Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 6 0.52 0. Meeting provides the opportunity for participation for voters.20 2. it takes a value of 1 and zero otherwise.61 0. unlike majority voting and participation.37 0.39 0. biweekly or monthly.53 0. and zero otherwise.17 11.12 0.the higher the frequency the more the participation.31 1. Therefore. it takes a value 1. Dev.

the priority setting reflects the need of the majority of the voters. For electricity 10 . In terms of the interaction between BPD head characteristics and voters’ access to public goods. results show a negative effect of age and a positive effect of experience on allocation to roads and electricity. Results The empirical findings related to our first question. whether the priority setting at desa level reflects the household/voter’s need within the desa. One plausible explanation is that between two public goods considered here. households with access are putting priority to enhance access where BPD heads are elected instead of appointed. So results should be interpreted with cautions. The same logic does not apply for the electricity. electricity and water play in voters’ wellbeing and re-election possibility. 10 Note that only two villages set electricity as first priority. average access at village level does not imply leveraging benefit at household level. One plausible explanation is that more experienced a leader is. in electricity. the more likely s/he is to realize the role that roads. average road access in the desa has positive impact on the desa-level priority for road. There is a negative correlation between average access to electricity within the desa and desa-level priority for this good. In terms of the interaction between voter’s access to public goods and village governance (BPD elected or not). For road.5. have been presented in Table 2. 12 . road is the less exclusive and average access at village level may leverage connectivity at household through network effect.

0867) Electricity as the first priority~ Average road access in the desa (0. *.00362 (0.235*** (1.34 ~ Only two villages set electricity as first priority.0251) Electricity access X Experience of the BPD head 0.0041) 0. these two sets of variables (landholding size.170*** (0.0671) Electricity access X BPD elected 7. Change in access to public goods considered here has not disproportionately benefited the local elites proxied by landownership. significant at 1%. According to the findings. Access to public goods and priority setting for public goods at Desa level.0176) -0. Given this.121 (0.1) Road access X Education of the BPD head Road access X Age of the BPD head Road access X experience of the BPD head Road access X BPP elected Average electricity access in the desa (0. and between access to road and landholding is -0. probit model Road as the first priority 1. and they are not statistically significant.245) Observations 61 62 R-squared 0.0356*** (0. However.66) Electricity access X Education of the BPD head 0.0187 (0. ***. and the empirical finding.013*** (0. and 10%.0980*** (0. We have examined the correlation between landholding size and access to public goods in pre-decentralized period. if the elite (the landholding class) already had access to infrastructure and the poor did not have access. 5%.04.0142) -0. **. elites are not disproportionately getting access to public goods after decentralization.Table 2. Table 3 presents the findings related to the central question of elite capture or majority preferences. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.05.337) 0.439* (0.264*** (0.09 0.00) Constant 0. The correlation between access to electricity and land holding is 0. the bargaining power represented 13 .1) -9. access to public goods) mean the same.36*** (0.0647 -0.0864) Electricity access X Age of the BPD head -0.108) (0.

29) 0.784*** (0. The likelihood of having access to public goods for such household is higher in an elected regime than in a non-elected regime.18) -0.081 (0.0301 (0.744*** (0.878*** (0. voting) has affected such households.062) -1. ***.22) 0.3) 1.36) Change in access to electricity -0.23) 0.928*** (0.889*** (0.52) Village 727 Change in access to road -0.by the landholding size is not statistically significant in ensuring access to public goods in the decentralized regime.0632 (0.0624 (0.144*** (0. Similarly.559* (0.00519 0. The results show that such households have been benefited from democracy.502*** (0.423* (0.635*** (0.17) 0.088) -3.750*** (0.56) Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.16) Province 727 0. there is an interaction effect of participation in meeting and access to public goods for households that did not have access in centralized regime. Table 3 also presents the results of the interactions between households that did not have initial access to public goods and decentralization. *. Households bargaining power and the realization of access to public goods and decentralization Variables Land ownership 1995 Initial access to road Initial access to electricity No initial access to road X BPD elected No initial access to road X Participation No initial access to road X Voting No initial access to electricity X BPD elected No initial access to electricity X Participation No initial access to electricity X Voting Constant Fixed effects Observations -1. 5%. and 10%.19) 0.21) Province 738 -2.055*** (0.550** (0.432** (0.3) 0.101 (0.094*** (0.19) -0.059) (0.22) 0.491*** (0.754*** (0. significant at 1%.921*** (0. Table 3. It shows if and how the democracy at village level (BPD election. 14 .32) 0. participation.27) -4.052) -2.3) 0.61) Village 701 0.25) 0. **.

However. there are differences in the governing process – villages differ in terms of voting. we have used household head’s education instead of land ownership. 15 . Why the same institutional change has brought different changes in governance at village level and how the best practices can be replicated across Indonesia are important questions not answered here and may warrant further research. our findings show that decentralization has not led to elite capture in public good provisions. Public goods that are provided under the decentralized regime rather reflect the preferences of the voters who did not have access to such public goods under the centralized provision. As reported in Table A1 in Appendix. Local governance seems to be important and it has been functioning. The interactions between voter’s access to public goods and election.To see if the results are robust to a change in the proxy used to measure household bargaining power. Based on Indonesian experience. participation and voting seem to be significantly affecting actual realization of public goods at citizen level. Conclusions Elite capture in the context of decentralized delivery of public goods has been a long held concern which has been rekindled with the decentralization and democratization experiments of developing countries. as seen. this does not change our basic findings – the bargaining power proxied by household head’s education is not statistically significant in ensuring access to public goods in the decentralized regime. election and other important aspects.

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601*** (0.18) 0.03 (0.0359 (0. and 10%.22) 0.603*** (0.602*** (0.049) 0.19) -1.25) Province 710 Fixed effects Observations *.23) 0.798*** (0.354*** (0.21) 0.0363 (0.938*** (0.19) 0.19) -0.0211 (0.2) 0.17) 0.29) Initial access to electricity -0.803*** (0.061) 0.027) 2.Table A1.28) No initial access to road X BPD elected No initial access to road X Participation No initial access to road X Voting No initial access to electricity X BPD elected No initial access to electricity X Participation No initial access to electricity X Voting Constant 0.27) 3.455** (0.0002 (0.498*** (0. ***.059 (0.071*** (0.22) Province 682 -1.650*** (0.23) 0. **. Robustness check – bargaining power Variables Change in access to road Land ownership 1995 Schooling of household head Initial access to road 0.008 (0. 1.404* (0.26) Province 691 17 . significant at 1%.092*** (0.642*** (0.022) -3.3) Change in access to electricity 0.24) 0.005*** (0. 5%.026) -2.482** (0.365*** (0.508** (0.22) Province 702 0.0002 (0.022) 0.19) -0.

Abstract (in Japanese) 要約 地方分権や民主化の過程にある開発途上国では、公共財の供給の決定において権力 者層による恣意的な選択(elite capture)が行われていないかという点が懸念される。 本稿では、道路や電化に着目し、インドネシアにおいて上記の懸念が成り立つかどう かを確認する。インドネシアでは地方分権の前までは農村のインフラ整備は中央主導 で行われており、インフラ優先順位に関する農村内の選好の多様性を反映できていな かった可能性がある。地方分権が進んだ現在においては、農村のインフラ整備は地方 自治体毎に選挙で選ばれたメンバーが意思決定を行っているが、権力者層による恣意 的な選択の可能性は依然として残されている。本稿は地方分権の前と後のインフラア クセスデータと家計データを組み合わせた分析を行い、権力者層による恣意的な選択 は確認されないとの示唆を導いている。 18 .

Mobility. 10 Are Schooling and Roads Complementary? Evidence from Rural Indonesia Futoshi Yamauchi. and Income Dynamics Evidence from Indonesia Reno Dewina and Futoshi Yamauchi JICA-RI Working Paper No. Perceptions and the Heterogeneity of Adaptation and Rice Productivity: Evidence from Indonesian Villages Futoshi Yamauchi. 11 Human Capital. Infrastructure and Human Capital and Impact of the Financial Crisis” JICA-RI Working Paper No. Katsuhiko Higuchi and Rita Nur Suhaeti JICA-RI Working Paper No. 13 Climate Change.Working Papers from the same research project “Empirical Study of Growth and Poverty Reduction in Indonesian Farms: The Role of Space. Reno Dewina and Sony Sumaryanto JICA-RI Working Paper No. Megumi Muto. 12 Impacts of Prenatal and Environmental Factors on Child Growth Evidence from Indonesia Futoshi Yamauchi. Shyamal Chowdhury. Sony Sumaryanto and Reno Dewina .