SECTION I: INTRODUCTION Process safety emphasizes the use of appropriate technological tools to provide information for making safety decisions with respect to plant design and operation. Safety, hazard, and risk are frequently-used terms in chemical process safety. Their definitions follow: • Safety or loss prevention is the prevention of accidents by the use of appropriate technologies to identify the hazards of a chemical plant and to eliminate them before an accident occurs. • A hazard is anything with the potential for producing an accident. • Risk = [Frequency of a hazard resulting in an accident] x [Consequence of the accident]. Chemical plants contain a large variety of hazards. First, there are the usual mechanical hazards that cause worker injuries from tripping, falling, or moving equipment. Second, there are chemical hazards. These include fire and explosion hazards, reactivity hazards and toxic hazards. Nature of the Accident Process Chemical plant accidents follow typical patterns. It is important to study these patterns in order to anticipate the types of accidents that will occur. As shown in Table 1, fires are the most common, followed by explosion and toxic release. With respect to fatalities, the order reverses, with toxic release having the greatest potential for fatalities. Table 1: Three Types of Chemical Plant Accidents Type of accident Probability of Potential for Potential for occurrence fatalities economic loss Fire High Low Intermediate Explosion Intermediate Intermediate High Toxic Release Low High Low Economic loss is consistently high for accidents involving explosions. The most damaging type of explosion is an unconfined vapour cloud explosion where a large cloud of volatile and flammable vapor is released and dispersed throughout the plant site followed by ignition and explosion of the cloud. Toxic release typically results in little damage to capital equipment but personnel injuries, employee losses, legal compensation, and cleanup liabilities can be significant. The Accident Process Accidents follow a three-step process. Initiation: the event that starts the accident. Propagation: the event or events that maintain or expand the accident. • Termination: the event or events that stop the accident or diminish it in size. In the example cited above, the worker tripped to initiate the accident. The shearing of the valve and the resulting explosion and fire propagated the accident. The event was terminated by consumption of all flammable materials.
• •


Process upsets Process deviations Pressure, Temperature Flow rate, Concentration, Phase /state change, Impurities Reaction rate/ heat of reaction Spontaneous reaction Polymerization, Runaway reaction Internal explosion Decomposition Containment failures Pipes, tanks, vessels, gaskets/seals Equipment malfunctions Pumps, valves, instruments, sensors, interlock failures Loss of utilities Electricity, nitrogen, water, refrigerator, air, heat transfer fluids, steam, ventilation • • • • • •

Table 2 Accident Initiating Events Management Human errors systems failures Inadequate Design staffing Construction Insufficient training Operations Lack of administrative controls and audits Maintenance Testing and inspection

External events Extreme weather conditions Earthquakes Nearby accidents’ impacts Vandalism / sabotage

Table 3 Accident Propagating Factors Failures: Equipment failure, Safety system failure Ignition sources: Furnaces, Flares, Incinerators, Vehicles, Electrical switches, Static electricity, Hot surfaces, Cigarettes Management systems failure: Inadequate staffing, training etc Human errors: Omission, Commission, Fault diagnosis, Decision making Domino effects: Other containment failures, Other material releases External conditions: Meteorology, Visibility • • • • Table 4 Accident Phenomena Discharge: Single (liquid/vapour) or two phase flow, flash, evaporation Dispersion: Neutral or buoyant gas, Dense gas Fires: Pool fires, Jet fires, Flash fires, Fireballs Explosions: BLEVEs, Confined explosions, Unconfined vapor cloud explosions, Physical explosions, Dust explosions, Detonations, Missiles

Table 5 Accident Consequences • Effect analysis: Toxic effects, Thermal effects, Overpressure effects • Damage assessments: Community, Workforce, Environment, Company assets, Production Risk Analysis and Management Risk analysis, as used for the assessment of the hazards associated with process plant and storage installations can be summarized by three questions. - What can go wrong? - What are the effects and consequences? - How often will it happen? The first and basic step of hazard identification (the first question) is purely qualitative and is often called a safety study. Such a study may reveal aspects of the plant or installation which require more consideration. It is then necessary to answer the next two questions in order to complete the risk analysis. The results of the analysis are used for judgment about the acceptability of the risk and for decision making (see figure below). Qualitative answers are often given to the second and third questions. However, recent developments have involved the application of quantitative techniques for obtaining answers to these two questions. The use of these techniques is termed as quantitative risk analysis (QRA). The whole exercise may be called risk assessment. In earlier years, many companies did not use quantitative techniques after the identification stage. However, decisions were made and actions taken to control specific hazards considering (qualitatively) probabilities and consequences. In a sense this is an elementary form of risk analysis, but at a less sophisticated level than assessments involving quantitative consideration of probabilities and consequences. However, over the years, the use of in-depth risk assessment ranging from hazard identification to computation of individual and societal risk has increased. Risk Control and Layers of Protection Safety engineering involves eliminating the initiating step and replacing the propagation steps by termination events Table 6 presents a few ways to accomplish this. In theory, eliminating the initiating step can stop accidents. In practice this is not very effective. It is unrealistic to expect elimination of all initiation. A much more effective approach is to work on all three areas to insure that accidents, once initiated, do not propagate and will terminate as quickly as possible. Risk Measures Risk is defined as a measure of economic loss or human injury in terms of both the likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury. There are three commonly used ways of combining information on likelihood and magnitude of loss or injury: risk indices are single numbers or tabulations that yield simple presentations, individual risk measures consider the risk of an individual who may be at any point in the effect zones of incidents, and societal risk measures consider the risk to populations that are in the effect zones of incidents.


System Description Hazard Identification Scenario Identification

Accident Probability

Accident Consequence Modify Design No Accept Risk?

Risk Estimation

Yes Build System/Operate

Schema of Risk Assessment and Management Table 6: Mitigating the Accident Process Procedure Grounding and Bonding Inerting Flame proof electricals Guardrails and guards Maintenance procedures Hot-work permits Human factors design Process design Awareness of dangerous properties of chemicals Emergency material transfer Reduce inventories of flammables Equipment spacing and layout Nonflammable construction materials Firefighting equipment and procedures Relief systems Sprinkler systems Installation of check and emergency shut-off valves

Step Initiation

Desired effect Diminish






The difference between individual and societal risk may be illustrated by the following example. the societal risk is significantly higher during office hours. Process Alarms.Layers of Protection (Fig.g. industrial. than at other times when a single person is affected. The presentation may be on a relative basis (e. school). the likelihood of people being present.g. The calculation of societal risk requires the same frequency and consequence information as individual risk. Operator Supervision. y) is a type of societal risk measure. Risk Presentation The large quantity of frequency and consequence information generated by a Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) must be integrated into a presentation that is relatively easy to understand and use. societal risk estimation requires a definition of the population at risk around the facility. The number of incidents evaluated in a QRA may be very large. An office building located near a chemical plant contains 400 people during office hours and 1 guard at other times. each individual in that building is subject to a certain individual risk. Risk presentation provides a simple quantitative risk description useful for decision making. comparison with a risk target). However. 2) Community Emergency Response Plant Emergency Response Physical Protection (Dikes) Physical Protection (Relief Devices) Automatic Action SIS or ESD Critical Alarms. Additionally. Risk presentation reduces this large volume of information to a manageable form. For example. If the likelihood of an incident causing a fatality at the office building is constant throughout the day. Operator Supervision Typical Layers of Protection • Individual Risk: risk to a person in the vicinity of a hazard (probability of fatality person per year) • Societal Risk: a measure of risk to a group of people. residential. comparison of risk reduction benefits from various remedial measures) or an absolute basis (e. The end result may be a 5 . This individual risk is independent of the number of people present – it is the same for each of the 400 people in the building during office hours and for the single guard at other times.g. when 400 people are affected. This definition can include the population (e. the likelihood of 10 fatalities at a specific location (x. Manual Intervention Basic Controls. or mitigation factors. The form of presentation will vary depending on the goal of the CPQRA and the measure of risk selected.

The presentation of societal risk was originally developed for the nuclear industry.g. Societal risk representation Societal risk addresses the number of people who might be affected by hazardous incidents. The approach to risk management followed today is based on the ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) principle. a table. hospitals.g. population concentrations) may be quickly identified. From an engineering perspective. this risk may be too high since the risks due to multiple exposures are additive. Another form of societal risk presentation is a tabulation of the risk of different group sizes of people affected (e.g. and/or a risk map (e. a graph (e. 1-10. A common form of societal risk is known as an F-N (Frequency-Number) curve. individual risk contour plot). An F-N curve is a plot of cumulative frequency versus consequences (expressed as number of fatalities). 101-1000). 5 below. Risks from a process plant environment are always greater than the normal day-to-day risks taken by individuals in their non-industrial environment. Acceptable Risk One cannot eliminate risk entirely. it is necessary to make every effort to minimize risks within the economic constraints of the process as well as ensure compliance with the national regulatory (acceptable) risk standards. Risk contours (“isorisk” lines) connect points of equal risk around the facility. 11-100.single-number index. Places of particular vulnerability (e. A logarithmic plot is usually used because the frequency and number of fatalities range over several orders of magnitude. Individual risk representation Common form of presentation of Individual Risk is risk contour plots (Figure 3). which is a three tiered framework as illustrated in Fig. At some point in the design stage someone needs to decide if the risks are "acceptable".g. Every chemical process has a certain amount of risk associated with it. schools. Certainly it would require a substantial effort and considerable expense to design a process with a risk comparable to the risk of sitting at home. For a single chemical process in a plant comprised of several process. 6 . F-N plot). It is also common to show contributions of selected incidents to the total F-N curve as this is helpful for identification of major risk contributors. Figure 4 shows an F-N curve for a single liquefied flammable gas facility.

Individual Risk Contours around a Plant Fig 3 Individual Risk (Iso-risk) Contours around a Process Facility Societal Risk Profile (F – N Curve) around a Plant Accident Frequency Actual Averaged Number of Fatalities in the Community Fig. 4 Societal Risk Profile (F – N Curve) around a Plant Table 7 Risks to life from employment FAR Risk per person per year Firemen in London 1940 1000 2000 x 10-5 Policemen in Northern Ireland 1973-1992 70 140 x 10-5 Offshore oil and gas 62 125 x 10-5 Health and Safety Executive tolerable limit 50 100 x 10-5 Deep sea fishing 42 84 x 10-5 Coal mining 7.5 x 10-5 Construction 5 10 x 10-5 Sector 7 .3 14.

7 1.6 x 10-5 8 x 10-5 7.2 x 10-5 0. Table 8 Risks to life from employment (Guidelines) Risk per person per year Maximum tolerable risk: 10-3 • employees 10-4 • public 10-5 • public (nuclear) Broadly acceptable risk: 10-6 • employees and public Negligible risk: 10-7 • employees and public Fig.e.Railways All premises covered by the Factories Act (UK) Agriculture Chemical and allied industries All manufacturing industry Vehicle manufacture Clothing manufacture UK Health and Safety Executive broadly acceptable limit 4.4 x 10-5 2.1 x 10-5 FAR= number of fatalities in 108 working hours. i.1 x 10-5 0.8 4 3.2 0.3 x 10-5 1.05 0.4 x 10-5 2. 5 Framework for Risk Criteria: As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) Intolerable risk (Risk cannot be justified The ALARP region Risk is undertaken only if a benefit is desired Tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained Broadly acceptable region (no need for detailed QRA to demonstrate ALARP) 8 . in a group of 1000 people for a working lifetime..6 0.2 1.05 9.

1. M = gas molecular weight (kg/kg-mol). We define X. A = hole area (m2). vessel) containing gas under pressure • Relief valve discharge (of vapor only) • Generation of toxic combustion products as a result of fire Two-phase discharges • Hole in pressurized storage tank or pipe containing a liquid above its normal boiling point • Relief valve discharge (e.(2) ⎛ Ps ⎞ ⎛ γ +1 ⎞ If ⎜ ⎟ > ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ Pa ⎠crit ⎝ 2 ⎠ γ /( γ −1) Then the velocity if gas discharging from the leak is sonic.(3) Gas mass flow rate through an orifice is given by: . upstream pressures over ~ 1.71 to 2.SECTION II: ACCIDENT EFFECT ANALYSIS Table below shows the various accident scenarios and consequences feasible in an industrial scenario.5 9 . due to runaway reaction or foaming liquid) Liquid discharges • Hole in atmospheric storage tank or other atmospheric pressure vessel or pipe under liquid head • Hole in vessel or pipe containing pressurized liquid below its normal boiling point The following sections show the methodology of estimating their effects quantitatively.. In the above formula where ps = absolute upstream (storage pressure (N/m2). R = gas constant (8314 J/kg-mol /oK). Cd = discharge coefficient (~ 0.(4) Where GV = gas discharge rate (kg/s).. γ = gas specific heat ratio (Cp/Cv.g. which give ‘r’ values of 1. Thus for releases of most industrial gases to atmosphere. such that: X =( 2 (γ +1) /(γ −1) ) γ +1 . GV = Cd APS {(γ M / RT ) X }0.(1) . PS.8). GAS DISCHARGE γ /( γ −1) ⎛ γ +1 ⎞ We define a ratio r = ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ 2 ⎠ . pa = absolute downstream (atmospheric pressure (N/m2)..67.1 to 1.9 bar absolute will result in sonic flow.05... T = storage pressure (N/m2) and temperature (oK). dimensionless) Typical values of γ range from 1. Examples of Emission Source (Emergency Unplanned Releases) Gas discharge • Hole in equipment (pipe.

Propane vapor pressure 25oC = 8.3 barg At P = 10 barg.1 m). Data: Propane heat capacity ratio = 1. Thus.8)(2) 490 = 1.0 = 5. Therefore use the liquid discharge model..3 barg Since the total pressure is less than the vapor pressure of propane.8){π (0. Propane vapor pressure 25oC = 8. p = liquid storage pressure (N/m2 absolute).0. the discharge will initially be liquid. the discharge must be as a pure gas. sharp edged orifices is 0.81 m/s2). pipe length > 0.35 2 (γ +1) /(γ −1) ) γ +1 GV = (0.15. Here Ps /Pa = 5. LIQUID DISCHARGES Discharge of pure (i. p = pvp) and equilibrium two-phase choked flow is established during release through a severed pipeline (i.. Cd = discharge coefficient (dimensionless).5 kg/s 3.e. TWO-PHASE FLOW If the liquid is stored at saturation (i.35)]0.01) 2 / 4}(5 ×105 )[{1. Data: Propane density = 490 kg/m3.e.(6) GLV = [AΛ/(ρg-1. H = height of liquid above hole (m) The discharge coefficient for fully turbulent discharges from small.61) π (0. X =( Thus X= 0. nonflashing) liquids through a sharp-edged orifice/nozzle is given by: ⎛ 2( p − pa ) ⎞ GL = CdAρl ⎜ . pa = downstream (ambient) pressure (N/m2 absolute).(5) + 2 gH ⎟ ρl ⎝ ⎠ Where GL = liquid mass emission rate (kg/s).. which exceeds r = 1. the flow is sonic.. Example: Calculate the discharge of propane from a tank through a 10-mm hole at 10 barg. 25oC with 2 m liquid head.6 – 0.0/1. p = 10 barg = 11 x 105 N/m2 abs pa = 1 x 105 N/m2 abs GL = CdAρl 1/ 2 2( p − pa ) ρl + 2 gH = (0.e. A= discharge hole area (m2).64.5 = 0. g = acceleration of gravity (9. Therefore use a gas discharge equation.15 × 44 /(8314 × 298)}(0.01) 2 4 (490) 2(10)(10 5 ) + 2(9.Example: Calculate the discharge rate of propane through a 10-mm hole for conditions of 25oC and 4 barg (5 bara). then the following equation is recommended: ..09kg / s 2.74. ρl = liquid density (kg/m3).ρl-1)](TsCpl)-1/2 where GLV is total two-phase emission mass rate (kg/s) Λ is latent heat of vaporization (J/kg) is gas density at storage pressure (kg/m3) ρg Ts is the storage temperature (oK) Cpl is specific heat of liquid (K/kg/oK) 10 .

e boiling point at 5 bar = 130oC) Tb = atmospheric boiling point (69oC) Hvap = latent heat of vaporization at Tb = 3. With this assumption the mass flow rate is given by Gm = ACo 2ρ f gc (P . stored at temperature above the normal boiling point).85 50 0.(6) should be multiplied by a factor. Suggested values for F are given in Table 2. that accounts for frictional losses. GLV. The equations describing incompressible fluid flow through holes apply.43 ⎝ 340000 ⎠ Flashing liquids escaping through holes and pipes require very special consideration since two-phase flow conditions may be present.. Several special cases need consideration.75 100 0. A good approximation is to assume a choked pressure equal to the saturation vapor pressure of the flashing liquid.55 400 4. Data Cp = average liquid heat capacity (range T to Tb) ~2400 J/kg/oK T = operating temperature (i.65 200 0.. f.(8) FV = CpΔT/Hvap Where Ts is process line/vessel temperature and Tb is normal boiling point temperature.4 x 105 J/kg Hence FV = 2400 ⎜ ⎛ 130 − 69 ⎞ ⎟ = 0. the fluid flashes external to the hole. equilibrium flashing conditions are achieved and the flow is choked. respectively. Hvap the heat of vapourization at normal pressure. This fraction is approximated from the thermodynamic relationship ΔT = (T ..P sat ) . in Eq. F. Table 2: Variation of Factor F with Ratio Lp/D Lp/D F 1 0 0. FRACTION FLASHED FROM LIQUID DISCHARGE For superheated liquids (i. Frictional losses for saturated liquids For long pipe lengths the mass emission rate. If this condition is not met.ρl-1)(TsCpl)/Λ2 Where x is the weight fraction of vapor after depressurizing to atmospheric pressure. where Lp and D are pipe length and diameter.Tb) oK . The result will only be valid for liquids stored at a pressure higher than the saturation vapor pressure. If the fluid path length through the release is greater than 10 cm (through a pipe or thick-walled container).(9) 11 .. nonequilibrium conditions exist. of the liquid emission is "flashed" to vapor as the pressure is reduced to ambient.e. If the fluid path length of the release is very short (through a hole in a thin-walled container). then a more complicated numerical model is necessary to calculate the emission rate. and the liquid does not have time to flash within the hole. a fraction.This equation applies only if the following condition is met: . Example: Leak of hexane from a pressurized pipeline at 5 bar.(7) x < p(ρg-1.

two-phase mass flow rate is given by: ΔH v A g c GLV = . P = Psat.0945 m) 2 / 4 x 2(603 kg/m 3 ) [1(kg m/s 2 ) / N] (1. For this case the choked.042 m 3 / kg x ( ( ) ) (2.18 x 103 J/kg K Equation 10 applies to this case. ρf is the density of the liquid (mass/volume). Example: Propylene is stored at 25oC in a tank at its saturation pressure. The saturation vapor pressure of liquid ammonia at this temperature is 0. Assume a discharge coefficient of 0.85 x 10 -5 m 2 = (3. The assumption that the quantity of droplets formed is equal to the amount of material flashed is frequently made. A 1-cm diameter hole develops in the tank. Gm = ACo 2ρ f gc (P . At these conditions. A is the area of the release. Equilibrium flashing conditions can be assumed.61) (3. vfg = 0. A leak of diameter 0. Estimate the mass flow rate through the hole.34 x 105 J/kg. Cp = 2. Co is the discharge coefficient (unitless).34 x 105 J/kg) (1 N m/J) Cp T 0..4 x 106 Pa. Equation 10 is used. for propylene.14)(0. Determine the mass flow rate through the leak.968 x 106 Pa and its density is 603 kg/m3.042 m3/kg.61. For liquids stored at their saturation vapor pressure. The area of the leak is πd 2 (3.85 x 10-5 m2 ΔH v A v fg gc 7.0945 m forms in the tank. Solution.774 kg/s 12 .968 x 10 6 ) (N / m 2 ) Gm = 97.2 m = A= 4 4 Using Equation 54. psat = 1. and Psat is the saturation vapor pressure of the flashing liquid at ambient temperature.4 x10 6 − 0. These aerosol droplets are readily entrained by the wind and transported away from the release site.Example Liquid ammonia is stored in a tank at 24oC and a pressure of 1.P sat ) = (0.(10) v fg C pT Small droplets of liquid also form in a jet of flashing vapor.18 x 10 1. P is the pressure within the tank.14 ) 1 x 10 .6 kg/s Where.0(kg m/s 2 ) / N 3 J/kg K ( 298 K) (1N m/J) ) GLV = 0. ΔHv = 3.15 x 106 Pa. GLV = ( ) 2 = 7. Equation 9 applies for the case of equilibrium flashing conditions.

For light to neutrally buoyant gases the following table allows the choice of applicable stability class (table 3) which in turn is used to choose the dispersion coefficients provided in tables 4 and 5. E. C. b Neutral and Positively Buoyant Plume and Puff Models Neutral and positively buoyant plume or puff models are used to predict concentration and time profiles of flammable or toxic materials downwind or a source based on the concept of Gaussian dispersion. The dispersion phenomenon depends on whether the gas is lighter or heavier than air. and the liquid is well mixed. SLOWLY EVAPORATING POOL In many cases the hazardous material does not evaporate before it hits the ground surface.e..(11) Where Ge is the evaporative emission rate (kg/s) A is the pool area (m2) pvp is the vapor pressure (N/m2) M is the molecular weight (kg/kg-mol) * R is the gas constant (J/mol/oK) Tp is the pool temperature (oK) The parameter kg is the mass transfer coefficient (m/s).8-15200] . Extremely unstable conditions. slightly unstable conditions.b Surface wind Daytime insolation Nighttime conditions speed (m/s) at 10m height Strong Moderate Slight Thin overcast ≤ 3/8 or ≥ low 4/8 cloudiness cloudiness B A-B A <2 F E C B A-B 2-3 E D C B-C B 3-4 D D D C-D C 4-6 D D D D C >6 A. they will be dispersed by atmospheric conditions. given by the formula Kg = DmNsh/d .(13) 2 Where km is the kinematic viscosity of the air (m /s) u is the wind speed at 10 m over the pool (m/s) DISPERSION MODELS Gases can be released either continuously (plume) or instantaneously (puff). Plumes refer to with the travel time (time for cloud to reach location of 13 . then an empirical formula for slowly evaporating pools can be applied.. moderately conditions... D. given by the correlation NSh = 0. Once released.(12) 2 Where Dm is the molecular diffusivity of the vapor I air (m /s) d is the effective pool diameter (m) Nsh is the Sherwood number.5.037(km/Dm)1/3[(ud/km)0. and it is necessary to model the evaporation from a surface pool. slightly conditions. F. TABLE 3 Pasquill Stability Meteorological Conditionsa. Ge = kgApvpM/R*Tp . the pool temperature is within a few degrees of ambient and the liquid does not boil). If the rate of evaporation is light to moderate (i. moderately unstable conditions. B. neutral conditions.

15x0.067x0. z.92 0.71 0. z = vertical) c = concentration (kg/m3) at location x.90 0.91 D 0.10x 0.95 0. σz).093x0. Also because of a lack of data.75 B 0. Use of such formulas allow for easier computerization of the method. σz = dispersion coefficients (m).09x 0.135x0.04x0.10 0.73 0.92 0. y.88 0.06x 0.057x0.z = distance from source.337x 0.90 C 0.53x0.18x0.087x1.92 D 0.195x 0.60x0.92 C 0. σy.082x0.. it is often assumed σx = σy. FORMULA FOR INSTANTANEOUS PUFF EMISSIONS: ⎡ M y2 −( x − ut ) 2 −( z − H ) 2 −( z + H ) 2 ⎤ C ( x.90 0. t = time elapsed after release (s) Puff emissions have different spreading characteristics from continuous plumes and different dispersion coefficients (σy. y = crosswind.02x 0.10x0.interest) or sampling (or averaging) time (normally 10 min). Table 4 Equations for Pasquill – Gifford Dispersion Coefficients for Plume Dispersion (x = distance downwind from source) Pasquill-Gifford Stability class σz(m) σy (m) or σx (m) 0.65 0.14x0.128x0.(14) Where x. u = wind velocity (m/s) Dispersion coefficients σy and σz for diffusion of Gaussian plumes are available aa predictive formulas for these are also available.80 Table 5 Equations for Pasquill – Gifford Dispersion Coefficients for Puff Dispersion (x = distance downwind from source) Pasquill-Gifford Stability class σz(m) σy (m) or σx (m) 0.34x0.112x0.92 A 0.89 F 0.70 E 0. these differ slightly. GV = vapour emission rate (kg/s).05x0.91 E 0. The basis for the PasquillGifford model is Gaussian dispersion in both the horizontal and vertical axes. M = amount released instantaneously (kg). H = height of source above ground level plus plume rise (m).82 F 0. z . m (x = downwind. FORMULA FOR CONTINUOUS PLUME DISPERSION: ⎡ GV − y2 ⎤ ⎡ −( z − H ) 2 −( z + H ) 2 ⎤ exp{ 2 }⎥ ⎢exp{ } + exp{ }⎥ C= ⎢ 2πσ yσ z u ⎢ 2σ y ⎥ ⎣ 2σ z2 2σ z2 ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ .63 14 .y. y . t ) = exp{ ]}⎥ − 2 }{[ exp + exp ⎢ 2 (2π )3/ 2 σ xσ yσ z ⎢ 2σ x 2σ y 2σ z2 2σ z2 ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . function of distance downwind.493x A 0.88 B 0.85 0.(15) Where.

Cppm =C ⎡ − y2 ⎤ ⎡ −( z − H ) 2 −( z + H ) 2 ⎤ exp 2 ⎥ ⎢exp + exp ⎢ ⎥ 2πσ yσ z u ⎢ 2σ y ⎥ ⎣ 2σ z2 2σ z2 ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎡ −102 ⎤ ⎡ −(2 − 1) 2 −(2 + 1) 2 ⎤ 0. EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES The objective of this section is to review the types of models available for estimation of accidental explosion and fire incident outcomes.e. σz = 0. The following accident scenarios are considered: • Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosions and Flash Fires • BLEVE and Fireball • Pool Fire and Jet Fires 15 ..85 = 5. Ta = 20oC (293oK).5)(5. Mo = 71. Ambient temperature. These latter reactions can occur both in a confined state (i. assume that the plume is at near ambient temperature (Ta). The consequences of concern for explosions in general are shock wave overpressure effects and projectile effects. Stability class = D. The release occurs at 2 m.128x0.4 m Concentration in kg/m3 can be found from Equation (14): C= = 2. and 2 m height. An explosion can be thought of as a rapid equilibrium of a high-pressure gas with the environment. within buildings or vessels) or an unconfined state (i.25 = 3.4) 2 2(5. Gas constant.e. Explosions can arise from strictly physical phenomena such as the catastrophic rupture of a pressurized gas container or from a chemical reaction such as the combustion of a flammable gas in air.3 = + exp exp exp ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ 2π (9. unconfined vapor cloud explosions or UVCE).5 m.4)(3.5) 2 ⎦ ⎣ 2(5. so the mean height for wind estimation is selected as 2 m.90 = 9.093x0.082 m3 atm/kg-mol/oK The following equation is used to estimate the wind speed at a height of 2 m can be determined: uz = u10 (z/10)p = 5(2/10)0.4) 2 ⎦ G RTa (0. Weather conditions correspond to D stability.72 x 10-4) x 106 = 92 ppm PM o (1)(71) 2.3 m/s Dispersion coefficients for D stability evaluated at x = 120 m (using table above) σy = 0.Example on Plume Discharge: Calculate the concentration of chlorine from a source of 0. When explosions arise from a combustion reaction usually the thermal radiation effects are ignored because the shock wave effects will predominate. 10 m crosswind. for fires the consequences of concern are thermal radiation effects. the plume is constrained by ground level.72 x 10-4 kg/m3 To convert this into ppm (vol).082)(293) x 106 = (2. This equilibrium must be rapid enough that the energy contained in the high-pressure gas is dissipated as a shock wave. thus dispersion will rapidly ensure that the dense gas behaviour zone is negligible and a Gaussian model is adequate. Data: Assume ground roughness is equivalent to urban conditions. 5 m/s wind (at 10 m height). Then. Chlorine molecular weight. pressure p = 1 atm abs.3) ⎣ 2(9. R = 0. The leak rate is small.3 kg/s located 2 m above ground level at a place 120 m downwind..

If this cloud is ignited before the cloud is diluted below its LFL. thus if many pieces of process equipment and many structures are present.01 to 0. Figure 1. Ec = lower heat of combustion of flammable gas (kJ/kg or Btu/lb).10). The TNT model is easy to use and has been applied for many CPQRAs. factored by an explosion yield term: ηME c W= .. a vapor cloud forms and disperses. it is likely that a flash fire will make the transition a UVCE. η = empirical explosion yield (or efficiency) (ranges from 0. These estimates range from 1 ton to 15 tons. a UVCE or flash fire will occur. The main consequence in a UVCE is the shock wave that results while the main consequence in a flash fire is the thermal radiation. Two important mechanisms for flame acceleration are thermal expansion and turbulence. • Peak overpressures of UVCEs are much less than with detonations. typically 1 bar (15 psi) or less.Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosions and Flash Fires When a large amount of a volatile flammable material is rapidly dispersed to the atmosphere. Process structures contribute to partial confinement and turbulence. A model of UVCEs is the TNT model. • Materials with higher fundamental burning velocities can produce easier transition to UVCE for a given release quantity. Scaled overpressure as a function of scaled distance 16 . and positive phase durations of 20-100 ms. M = mass of flammable material released. EcTNT = heat of combustion of TNT (44374765 kJ/kg or 1943-2049 Btu/lb. It is based on the assumption of equivalence between the flammable material and TNT.(16) E cTNT where W = equivalent mass of TNT (kg or lb). • The presence of some confinement/obstacles may be necessary for transition to UVCE. Various researchers have concluded that • There may be some minimum mass of flammable material that is required to allow transition from a flash fire to UVCE.

. The correlation formula that accounts for humidity is: τ = 2. x = path length.825 M0.. A BLEVE is a sudden release of a large mass of pressurized superheated liquid to the atmosphere The primary cause is usually an external flame impinging on the shell of a vessel above the liquid level.325 . The initial diameter is used to describe the short duration initial ground level hemispherical flaming-volume before buoyancy forces lift it to a semisteady height.. Data: Mass = 10 tons. a fireball may result.(21) where M = initial mass of flammable liquid (kg). It should be noted.. Converting scaled distance to real distance: RG = ZG W1/3 = 7 m/kg1/3 x (4530 kg)1/3 = 113 m 0. W = ηME c E cTNT = 0.75 Dmax .(19) Center height of fireball (m) HBLEVE = 0. Assume an explosion yield (η) = 0.3 Dmax .(23) where τ = atmospheric transmissivity (fraction energy transmitted: 0 to 1). E = surface emitted flux (kW/m2) F21= view factor (dimensionless) The atmospheric transmissivity τ.05 x 10. that a BLEVE can occur due to any mechanism that results in the sudden failure of containment allowing a superheated liquid to flash.000 x 46350 4650 = = 4530 kg From Figure above. This is sufficient to generate a pressure wave and fragments..(22) where QR = radiation received by a black body target (kW/m2) τ = transmissivity (dimensionless). Useful formulas for BLEVE physical parameters are Peak fireball diameter (m) Dmax = 6.(20) Initial ground level hemisphere diameter (m) Dinitial = 1.09 . typically increasing its volume over 200 times. The radiation received by a target (for the duration of the BLEVE incident) is given by QR = τEF21 .26 . Pw = water partial pressure (Pascals.48 M0. the scaled distance (ZG) to 5 psi (Pso m/kg1/3.(18) Fireball duration (s) tBLEVE = 0. distance from flame surface to target (m) 17 . Assume EcTNT = 4650 kJ/kg From Equation (16). This section describes the methods used to calculate the effects of the vessel rupture and the fireball that results if the released liquid is flammable and is ignited. If the released liquid is flammable.. N/m2).Example Using the TNT equivalent model. is an important factor. weakening the container and leading to sudden shell rupture. Thermal radiation is absorbed and scattered by the atmosphere. Lower heat of combustion of propane (Ec) = 46350 kJ/kg. calculate the distance to 5 psi overpressure (equivalent to heavy building damage) of an UVCE of 10 short tons of propane. This causes a reduction in radiation received at target locations. however. A pressure relief valve does not protect against this mode of the failure.33 atm) = 7 BLEVE and Fireball A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) occurs when there is a sudden loss of containment of a pressure vessel containing a superheated liquid or liquefied gas.05.02(Pwx)-0.

. unlike those for dispersion and UVCE.. dikes. For a continuous leak.40. rather than for community risk. Dmax = peak fireball diameter (m). D = sphere diameter (m) r = distance from sphere center to target along the ground (m) BLEVE Schematic Dmax HBLEVE X Target r Pool Fires and Jet Fires Pool fires and jet fires are common fire types resulting from fires over pools of liquid or from pressurized releases of gas and/or liquid. Hc = heat of combustion (kJ/kg). Pool and jet fire models. characteristic for the material.(25) F21 = 2 4r where F21 = view factor between sphere and target surface. Frad MH c . sloped drainage areas). TBLEVE= fireball duration (s) As the effects of a BLEVE mainly relate to human injury.25-0. They tend to be localized in effect and are mainly of concern in establishing the potential for domino effects and employee safety zones. on an infinite flat plane. pool size is fixed by the size of release and by local physical barriers (e. D2 . Typical heat fluxes in BLEVEs (200-350 kW/m2) are much higher than in pool fires as the flame is not smoky.25-0. rather than the Stefan-Boltzmann equation. Pool Size: In most cases. as the latter requires the flame temperature.05 kg/m2s (gasoline) to 0.4. typically 0. The most common application of jet fire models is the specification of exclusion zones around flares.Thermal radiation is usually calculated using surface emitted flux. Pool fire models have been applied to LNG spills as well as more common flammable materials.12 (LPG). are made up of a range of independent submodels and the best pool fire model will be based on the selection of the most appropriate submodels.. Typical values for hydrocarbons are in the range 0. Frad = radiation fraction. M = mass of LPG in BLEVE (kg). Pool Fire Models Burning Rate: Large pool fires burn at a constant vertical rate. E. This fraction is typically 0. The surface heat flux is based on the radiative fraction of the total heat of combustion. the maximum diameter is reached when the product of burning rate and surface area equals the 18 .g. a geometric view factor for a sphere to a surface normal to the sphere (not the horizontal or vertical components) should be used.(24) E= π ( Dmax ) 2 t BLEVE where E = surface emitted flux (kW/m2).

QR = 0. The simplest shape factor is the point source that assumes all radiation arises in a single point and is received by an object oriented perpendicular to this: .700 kJ/kg.98 x 106 Kw x 8. Flame Height: Many observations of pool fires show that there is an approximate ratio of flame height to diameter. vapor pressure of water at 50% relative humidity and 20oC = 232 Pa Procedure: (1) Ignore flame tilt as there is no wind (2) Estimate total heat released Q = MbEcA where Mb = burning rate. Upper values for other hydrocarbon pool fires lie in the range 110-170 kW/m2. Geometric View Factor: The thermal radiation received at a target location is determined by the geometric view factor (ignoring atmospheric absorption).8 x 106 kJ/s = 2.Example: Determine the thermal flux received at a distance of 100 m from a pool fire contained in a 25-m-diameter tank dike.13 kg/m2s x 43. where dikes lead to square or rectangular shapes.09 = 0. The surface emitted power unit per area can be estimated using the radiation fraction method as follows: (i) Calculate total combustion power (based on burning rate and pool area) (ii) Multiply by radiation fraction to determine total power radiated (iii) Determine flame surface area (commonly use only the cylinder side area) (iv) Divide radiated power by flame surface area.0 x 106 m-2 2 2 4πx 4π 100 Using Equation (23) for a distance of 100 m: τ = 2. This must be applied to the total heat output.. A = pool area.8 x 105 kW.02(2320x100)-0. Ec = heat of combustion. QR = total heat radiated (kW).66 The received thermal flux at 100 m is then calculated using Equation (27) Qx = τQRFp = 0. The radiation fraction of total combustion power is often quoted in the range 0. kg/m2s. m2 Q = 0. kJ/kg. heat of combustion = 43. Data: burning rate = 013 kg/m2s.35 (conservative.. more rigorous formulas or tables are used. The point source view factor provides a reasonable estimate of received flux at distance far from the flame. x = distance from point source to target (m).(26) Fp = 1/ 4π x 2 -2 Where Fp = point source view factor (m ).8 x 106 kW = 9. as this radiant fraction is high for smoky pool fires) then the radiant heat.15-0. Fp = point source view factor (m-2) 19 . Weather conditions are no wind. Surface Emitted Power: LPG and LNG fires radiate up to 250 kW/m2.02(Pwx)-0. Received Thermal Flux: The received thermal flux (on a target) from a pool fire is given by Qx = τQRFp . 20oC and 50% relative humidity. τ = atmospheric transmissivity (dimensionless). not to the flux per unit area.(27) 2 Where Qx = thermal radiation received at distance x (kW/m ).0 x 106 = 5.35 x 2. QR can be estimated. FP = 1 1 = = 8. Circular pools are normally assumed./5 x 25)2 m2 = 2.2 kW/m2 leakage rate. but smoke obscuration often reduces this to 20-60 kW/m2. an equivalent diameter may be used. View factors are discussed in texts on thermal radiation. Typical values of H/D are in the range 2-3.35.8 x 106 kW Assume radiant fraction for hydrocarbon fires = 0.66 x 0.09 = 2.700 kJ/kg x π (0. At closer distances.

The probit variable Y is related to the probability P (of a specified level of response) by: Y −5 ⎛ u2 ⎞ 1 .53 4. This relationship is tabulated in Table 6.95 3.92 4.48 4.36 3.. but subject to 10<t<300s)The end-on hazard zone is 85% of the side-on hazard zone.5 W = 0. rs.1 m0.12 3. The causative factor represents the dose.75 4.50 = 1.72 3.59 3.67 4. are given by (for LPG): . while response implies the human/property damage caused by the accident.26 4.77 4.82 3.. the probit (probit = probability unit) method is particularly suited.67 2.(30) Rs.12 4.9 t0.96 4.95 .4 m0..69 4.19 4. From Equations (28)-(30) the jet flame dimensions are determined: L = 9.36 4.05 4. Example: Determine the 50% lethality range for a pressurized release of LPG @ 25 kg/s lasting for 100s.42 4.39 4. The dimensions of the torch flame which is assumed to be conical. overpressure due to an explosion or radiation intensity due to a fire). V. The probit variable Y is computed from the following equation: Probit = Y = k1 + k2 ln V % 0 10 20 30 40 .9 t0.85 4.(28) L = 9.4 x 250.47 = 54 m Thus.77 3.80 4.4 m0. but subject to r>W). Standard curve fitting techniques are used to determine the best fit straight line.87 4.64 4. t = exposure time (s..33 4. M = LPG release rate (kg/sec. For single exposures.97 20 Table 6: The Transformation from Percentages to Probits 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 -2.23 4.01 4. The probit relationship of Equation 31 transforms the typical sigmoid shape of the normal response versus does curve into a straight line when plotted using a linear probit scale.82 4.16 4..72 4.50 = side-on hazard range to 50% lethality (m.45 4.5 = 91 x 250. ESTIMATION OF EFFECTS OF ACCIDENTS: PROBIT ANALYSIS Many methods exist for representing the response-dose curve.47 = 1.25 3.25L = 11 m (half width) rs. but several reviews have been published.50 = 1. but subject to 1< m< 3000 kg/s).08 4.Jet Fire Models: Jet fire modeling is not as well developed as for pool fires.61 4.9x1000.(31) P= exp ⎜ − ⎟du ∫ ⎝ 2⎠ 2π −∞ Equation A provides a relationship between the probability P and the probit variable Y.90 4.5 = 45 m W = 0. Here dose refers to the intensity of accident outcome (air-borne concentration of a toxic material.(29) .45 3.50 4.47 where L = length of torch flame (m).25L .1 m0.29 4.59 4.52 3.( 32) 9 3. the side-on hazard zone for 50% lenthality is 54 m from the jet flame centerline. W = jet flame conical half-width at flame tip (m).87 3.92 3.56 4.66 4. Table 7 shows a variety of probit equations for a number of different types of exposures.

23 7.10 5.8 7. For a probit less than 2.1 6.88 6. Ie= effective radiation intensity received by target (W/m2) Explosion: Deaths from lung hemorrhage po -77.77 6.48 (or 48%) 6.95 6.92 ln (C2t) = – 8. the probability is 100%.05 (or 5%) 5.84 3.41 5.92 C2T C= concentration (ppm).29 + 0.13 5.08 6. the probit is 5.995 (or 99.71 6.65 5.1 2.36 the probability is 0.1 (or 10%) .33 0.99 6.37 5. the probability is 0.67 6.Using table 3.8 2.9 2.00 5. Table 7: Probit correlations for exposures.28 0.72 2.51 5.1 7.9 8. Type of injury or damage Causative Probit variable Parameters V k1 k2 Fire: Burn deaths from fire -14.04 6. 21 .20 5. Ychlorine = – 8.18 7.91 po Eardrum ruptures -15.92 6.48 0.33 5.50 5.7 7.5%). For a probability of 0.2 7.47 5.55 5.6 1.36 the probability is 0. For a probability of 0.05 5.13 6.64 0.92 ln (602 x 60) = 5.0 7.992 (or 99. T= time interval (min) Example: What is the chance of human fatality for a 60 min exposure to 60 ppm chlorine? Ans: From table 5.36 5.93 o p Structural damage -23.2%) 7.09 Examples: 1. For a probit of 3.95 the probability is 0.01 . For a probit of 4.58 4. the probability of fatality is 50%.75 0. For a probit of 7.3 7. the probit is 3.34 0.05 0. For a probit more than 8.88 0.92 po Glass breakage -18.41 0.61 5.56 teIe4/3/104 te= effective time of exposure (s).15 5.88 5. 8.29 0.52 5.84 6.6 7.29 + 0.18 5. the probit is 7.74 6. For a probability of 0.44 5.5 7.03 5.64 5.28 5.58 5.23 5.09.79 o 2 p = peak overpressure (N/m ) Toxic release: Chlorine deaths -8.81 6.58 5. the causative variable V is representative of the magnitude of the exposure.75 5.39 5.31 5.33 5.4 7.46 5.67.50 60 70 80 90 % 99 5.25 5.08 5.55 0.8 (or 80%).41 5.

68 The probability of fatality is ~ 1%.91 ln 34455 = – 4. The probit method has found less use for thermal injury than it has for toxic effects.91 ln (103365) = 2. complete demolition of houses Relatively high blast overpressures (>15 psig) are necessary to produce fatality (primarily due to lung hemorrhage). also.9 + 2. 5. A probit model to estimate injury levels for a given thermal dose from pool and flash fires. No fatality 140 mbar (2 psi) • House uninhabitable and badly cracked 210 mbar (3 psi) • Reinforced structures distort • Storage tanks fail • 20% chance of fatality to a person in a building 350 mbar (5 psi) • House uninhabitable • Wagons and plant items overturned • Threshold of eardrum damage • 50% chance of fatality for a person in a building and 15% chance of fatality for a person in the open 700 mbar (10 psi) • Threshold of lung damage • 100% chance of fatality for a person in a building or in the open.91 ln p0 Now p0 = 5 psi = (5/14.1 + 6. Incapacitation. Example: What is chance of death from lung hemorrhage for an exposure to 5 psi blast pressure? From Table 7 Yfatality from hemorrhage = – 77.(33) nuclear explosion data. Extreme pain within 20 seconds and movement to shelter is instinctive. based on . t = duration of exposure (sec). leading to fatality unless rescue is effected quickly. 15psi overpressure is the approximate threshold for fatality. Limiting flux for secondary fires.1 Threshold value below which escape should always be possible.56 ln tI 4/ 3 /10000 Where Pr = probit. but can be repaired • Probability of injury is 10%.5 Likely Effects at Criterion Level Immediate fatality..1 + 6.5 psi) 90% glass breakage No fatality and very low probability of injury 70 mbar (1 psi) • Internal partitions & joinery damaged.7) x 101300 N/m2 = 34455 N/m2 Hence Y = – 77. I = thermal radiation intensity (W/m2) Table 8 Explosion Impact Criteria Explosion Overpressure Effect • • 35 m bar (0.Table 9 Thermal Radiation Impact Criteria Criterion Level (kW/m2) 40 20 12.1 + 6. Thus. is: Yburn deaths = – 14.9 (From table 6. the chance is negligible) If overpressure is 15 psi (1 atm): Y = – 77. 22 .

Using the probit method. For t = 100 s.9 + 2.9) / 2.. when t the reliability goes to 0. What is the chance of human fatality for 20s exposure to 20kW/m2? Using Eq 33 (or table 7).(4) Equations 1through 5 are only valid for a constant failure rate.R(t) = 1 . SECTION III: RELIABILITY THEORY Equipment failures or faults in a process occur as a result of a complex interaction and failures of the individual components. Between these two periods.e.0 (Table 4).e-λt The failure density function f(t) is defined as: f(t) = dP(t) = λ e−λ t dt ∞ .(1) R(t) = e-λt where. I = ⎡104 e[(Pr + 14.(3) The area under the plot of complete failure density function is unity. P.00 ⎣ ⎦ Hence using table 6 the chance of fatality is ~ 2 % 2. especially for short duration incidents such as BLEVEs (on the order of 10-20s).. t) is given by: . the component fails after a certain period of time. may be inappropriate for such incidents. I = 11 kW/m2 This example demonstrates the importance of duration of exposure. A fixed criterion. Equation 1 assumes a constant failure rate. . Determine the thermal flux necessary to cause 50% fatalities for 10 and 100 seconds of exposure. The failure rate is highest when the component is new (due to defects in manufacturing/assembly) and when it is old (due to wear and tear in aging). For 50% fatality. With adequate data it can be shown that.(2) P(t) = 1 .56 ln ⎡ 20(20. The overall probability of a failure in a process is dependent on the nature of this interaction.9 + 2. and is given by . 0 The time interval between two failures of the same component is called the mean time to failures (MTTF) and is given by the first moment of the failure density function: E(t) = MTTF = ∫ f(t)dt = λ 0 ∞ 1 . ∫ f(t)dt = 1 . i. I = 61 kW/m . This is called the average failure rate and is represented by λ with units of faults/time. 000) 4 / 3 /10000 ⎤ = 3.Example 1. Equation (33) can be rearranged to solve for the thermal radiation intensity I: For t = 10 s.. The complement of the reliability is called the failure probability (or sometimes the unreliability).. λ. R is the reliability. Yburn deaths = –14. The probability the component will not fail during the time interval (0. Pr = 5.56 ln tI 4 / 3 /10000 = – 14. Data is collected on the failure rate of a particular hardware component. 23 .56] / t ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ 2 3/ 4 . the failure rate is reasonably constant and Equation 2 through 4 are valid. Many components exhibit a typical "bathtub" failure rates. suitable for prolonged exposures. on the average.

Rsys = 1 - ∏ (1 .14 Solenoid valve 0. the physico-chemical environment in which the component functions etc. Rsys. Process components also interact in series. or top event. a process failure requires the simultaneous failure of a number of components operating in a "parallel" mode.. in that. These are average values determined at a typical chemical process facility.13 Alarm Indicator lamp 0.(6) Where Ri is the reliability of an individual process component.. and works backwards towards the various scenarios or events that can cause the accident.022 Pressure switch 0. Process components interact in two different ways.. In some cases. is: Rsys = ∏R i =1 n i =1 n i .41 Pressure relief valve 0.Pi ) Failure rate data for a number of typical process components are provided in Table 1.22 Thermocouple 0. The approach starts with a well-defined accident. These values depend on manufacturing practices employed by manufacturer.(7) ..(8) Psys = 1. For series components the overall system process reliability.52 Thermometer 0.44 FAULT TREES Fault trees are a deductive method for identifying ways in which hazards can lead to accidents.027 Valve positioner 0.044 Strip chart recorder 0.70 Pressure gauge 1.29 Control valve 0. design of the component. materials of construction.044 Level measurement meter (liquids) 1. Events in fault 24 .Interaction between Process Units Accidents in chemical plants are usually the result of a complicated interaction between a number of process components. they are connected in a "Series" structure within a system.(5) where n is the total number of components and Pi is the failure probability of each. Table 1 Failure Rate Data for various selected process components Instrument Faults/year Controller 0.R ) i i =1 n .60 Hand valve 0.∏ (1 . In such a case the system unreliability is: Psys = ∏P i =1 n i . In such cases the overall process failure probability is computed from the individual component failure probabilities.42 Stepper motor 0.

human error. Below is an example of a fault tree for a reactor system for which 2 safety systems are available (i) an alarm system and (ii) a shutdown system. Exothermic Reactor System 25 . a number of additional logic functions are needed to construct a fault tree. and environmental abnormities. For reasonably complex chemical processes. It can also include software failure. The AND logic gate is used for describing processes that interact in parallel.tree are not restricted to hardware failures. OR gate is used for describing events that need occur alone to result in output event.

In constructing the event tree these safety functions are written across the page in the order in which they logically occur. The first safety function is the high temperature alarm. The event tree for a loss of coolant initiating event is shown in the next figure. The event tee approach includes the effects of an event initiation followed by the impact of the safety systems on the propagation of the accident based on the performance of the safety systems. various safety systems come into operation in order to prevent the accident from propagating. These safety systems may in turn either fail or succeed in their operation. Four safety functions are identified. The final safety feature is invoked by the operator performing an emergency shutdown of the reactor. When an accident occurs in a plant. The third safety function is the operator re-establishing the coolant flow by correcting the problem within time. The second safety function is the operator noticing the high reactor temperature during normal inspection. Example: Consider the chemical reactor system shown in Figure below.Fault Tree for Exothermic Reactor System EVENT TREES An event tree begins with an initiating event and works towards a final result or consequence through steps. This system features a high temperature alarm that has been installed to warn the operator of a high temperature within the reactor. The operator may also notice the high temperature on his own during normal inspection. 26 .

the horizontal line is continued through the safety function without branching. 27 . The sequence description and consequences are indicated on the extreme right hand side of the event tree. The open circles indicate safe conditions and the circles with the crosses represent unsafe conditions.Exothermic Reactor System If in a certain situation a safety function does not apply or is not relevant.

Event Tree for the Exothermic Reactor System 28 .

and half of the time it blows from the southwest. Using industry-wide historical data. where most phenomena occur as simple step functions. depending on the sequence of events which follows the original incident. A release of a flammable. The specific population distribution will be described later in the example. and is used primarily to illustrate the QRA methodology. allow easy hand calculation of various risk measures. II. For example. a leak of volatile. • Only two weather conditions occur. flammable liquid from a pipe might catch fire immediately (jet fire). The probability of fatality from a hazardous incident at a particular location is either 0 or 1. In the company X the following apply: • All hazards originate at a single point. when the information is needed. as well as HAZID techniques. These models include: 1. Half of the time the wind blows from the northeast. toxic gas resulting from failure of a vessel. and the description of the impact zones of incidents as simple geometric areas. the following realistic scenarios are identified for X: I. Estimation of Accident frequency: reliability. fault and event tree models Define QRA objectives and describe system Identify hazards and incident scenarios Estimate incident consequences Estimate incident frequency Estimate risk Use results to manage and reduce risk QRA Procedure Incident Identification It is important to choose the correct set of representative accident scenarios for QRA. • There are people located around the site. Estimation of accident consequence: source and dispersion models 2. Incident Outcomes The identified incidents may have one or more outcomes. The atmospheric stability class and wind speed are always the same. • Incident consequences are simple step functions.QRA: A CASE STUDY The chemical plant X considered is a very simple one. An explosion resulting from detonation of an unstable chemical. These simple conditions. The concepts and techniques used to derive the risk measures from the underlying incident frequency and consequence information are the same as would be used for a more complex QRA study (steps shown in Fig below ) which use a variety of models. Estimation of effects of accident effects on human and property: probit Analysis 3. might form a flammable cloud which 29 .

all persons within 200 meters of the explosion center are killed (probability of fatality = 1. The application of consequence and impact models to facility X yields simple impact zone estimates for the identified incident outcome cases: • Incident Outcome Case I (explosion) – the explosion is centered at the center point of the facility.could ignite and burn (flash fire) or explode (vapor cloud explosion). all persons beyond this distance are unaffected (probability of fatality = 0). • Incident Outcome Case IIA (explosion) – the explosion is centered at the center point of the facility. toxic cloud) and its event tree is also shown in fig 2. vapor cloud fire. for Incident I there is only one incident outcome and one incident outcome case. the environment. Therefore. (Note that for simplicity only two wind directions are assumed for the outcomes cases). differentiated by the weather conditions and wind direction. These are referred to as potential accident scenarios or as incident outcomes. concentration of a toxic material in the atmosphere 2. and the consequence and effects are unaffected by the weather. Consequence and Impact Analysis Incident impact estimation requires two steps. all persons within 100 meters of the explosion center are 30 . 1. toxic material dose-response relationships (probit equations). the release of flammable. Event tree logic may be used to identify the incident outcomes and outcome cases. toxic gas. Event Trees for the Incidents I and II The Incident II. this is represented by an event tree with no branches (Fig 2). has several possible outcomes (jet fire. resulting in a toxic vapor cloud. vapor cloud explosion. Estimation of a physical concentration of material or energy at each location starting from the point of origin of the incident: radiant heat from a fire. The material also might not ignite at all.0). Some incident outcomes are further subdivided into incident outcome cases. if these conditions influence the potential damage resulting from the incident. Incident I. overpressure from an explosion. Incident Event Tree for Incident I I – Explosion Incident Outcomes Incident Outcome Cases II – Explosion Event Tree for Incident II IIA – Ignition IIA – Ignition (Explosion) IIB1 – Toxic Cloud to Southwest IIB – No Ignition Toxic Cloud IIB2 – Toxic Cloud to Northeast II – Flammable Toxic Gas Release Fig 2. Estimation of the effects (impact) that this physical concentration of material or energy has on people. or property – for example. the explosion has only one possible outcome (the explosion).

Individual Risk Contours Individual risk at any point is given by: IRx. IRx. the likelihood of the injury occurring. For example. Incident Frequency Analysis Reliability. Therefore. 31 .y = the total individual risk of fatality at geographical location x.0). and the time period over which the injury might occur. • Incident Outcome Cases IIBI. all persons outside this area are unaffected (probability of fatality = 0). The four impact zones from the four incidents are superimposed on a map of the region of the plant and its surroundings as shown in Figure 5. within the impact zone for each incident outcome case.y from incident outcome case i (probability of fatality per year) n = the total number of incident outcome cases considered in the analysis = frequency of incident outcome case i.i = probability that incident outcome case I will result in a fatality at location x. or exposure to toxic vapors. in the area labeled “C” in Figure 5. and from the Southwest 50% of the time.y.y.I . (per year) fi pf. Figure 3 illustrates these impact zone.. the nature of the injury for both individual and societal risk calculations will be immediate fatality resulting from fire.y. Figure 5 is an individual risk contour plot for this example problem. IIB2 (toxic gas clouds) – all persons in a pie shaped segment of radius 400 meters downwind and 22. the individual risk from that incident outcome case IRx.i is equal to the frequency of that incident outcome case (Equation 2).I = fi pf.y (probability of fatality per year) IRx. explosion.i = the individual risk of fatality at geographical location x.50 width are killed (probability of fatality = 1. Similar calculations for the other areas in Figure 5 give the results summarized in Table 2.i is zero..i IRx. The above considerations give the frequency estimates for the four incident outcome cases (shown in the event trees of Figure 4). application of Equation 1 gives the results listed in Table 1.y = where. fault and event tree methods are used for accident frequency estimation.(2) IRx. This includes the nature of the injury to the individual. The total individual risk of fatality at each geographical location is then determined by adding the individual risk from all incident outcome case impact zones that impact that location (using Equation 1).(1) . Individual Risk Estimation Individual risk is defined as “The risk to a person in the vicinity of a hazard. the wind blows from the Northeast 50% of the time.y.i = 1) throughout its geographical impact zone.killed (probability of fatality = 1.0). y. y Each incident outcome case has an equal impact (probability of fatality pf. ∑ IR i =1 n x. We assume that the following values obtain for the 2 potential incidents on X: • Incident I – Frequency = 1 x 10-6 events per year • Incident II – Frequency = 3 x 10-6 events per year (for Incident II – Ignition Probability = 0.33) We further assume that annually. with the individual risk values for each area listed in Table 2.” In this example. Outside the impact zone. all persons beyond this distance are unaffected (probability of fatality = 0).

50 Prob. For drawing this transect the necessary numbers are shown in tables 2 and 3. Impact zones for Incident Outcome Cases Individual Risk Profile (Risk Transect) The individual risk profile (risk transect) is a graph showing the individual risk as a function of distance from the source of the risk in a particular direction.0 Triangle Height = 400m. of fatality = 1.Circle Diameter = 200m Prob. Table 1 Individual Risk Calculation for Area “C” In Figure 5 Incident Outcome Case fi (per year) Pf. For the example problem.i IRi (per year) -6 I 10 1 10-6 IIB2 10-5 1 10-5 1. Figure 6 is the individual risk profile in the northeast direction.0 Circle Diameter = 100m Prob. Angle = 22. of fatality = 1.1 x 10-5 IR = ∑ IRi = 32 .0 N E Prob. of fatality = 0 Incident Outcome Case IIB1 Incident Outcome Case IIB2 Fig 3.0 Prob. Angle = 22. of fatality = 1. of fatality = 0 Incident Outcome Case I Incident Outcome Case IIA Triangle Height = 400m. of fatality = 0 Prob. of fatality = 1. of fatality = 0 Prob.50 Prob.

f = 3x10 .5 IIB2 – Toxic Cloud to Northeast. f = 10 – 6/yr Prob.5 Figure 4.Incident Event Tree for Incident I I – Explosion f = 10 – 6/yr Incident Outcomes Incident Outcome Cases II – Explosion f = 10 – 6/yr Event Tree for Incident II IIA – Ignition Prob.33 II – Flammable Toxic Gas Release.6/yr IIB – No Ignition Toxic Cloud Prob. Frequency (f) of Incident (final) Outcome Cases Incident Outcome Case IIB2 Effect Zone N E I E C G A Incident Outcome Case IIA Effect Zone Incident Outcome Case IIB1 Effect Zone B D F H J Incident Outcome Case I Effect Zone K Figure 5.67 Prob. Individual Risk Contour Map 33 . = 0. f = 10 – 6/yr IIA – Ignition (Explosion) f = 10 – 6/yr IIB1 – Toxic Cloud to Southwest. = 0. = 0. = 0.

7 100 200 300 400 500 Distance from the Plant in the Northeast (m) Figure 6.6 10 .1 x 10-5 > 400 200 – 400 100 – 200 0 – 100 10 .1 x 10-5 I. Individual Risk Transect in the Northeast direction 34 .0 x 10-6 Table 3 Individual Risks in the Northeast Direction Region Incidents Impacting Total Individual Risk of Region Fatality (per year) Beyond E None 0 E IIB2 1.Region (see Figure 5) A B C D E F G H I Distance (m) Table 2 Individual Risk Results Incidents Impacting Region Total Individual Risk of Fatality (per year) I. IIA. IIA 1.1 x 10-5 I. IIA. IIA 1.0 x 10-5 C I.1 x 10-5 I.1 x 10-5 A I.0 x 10-5 I. IIA.1 x 10-5 I. IIB2 2.1 x 105 IIB2 1. IIB. B1 1. IIB2 1.4 Individual Risk per year 10 .5 10 .1 x 10-5 I 1.0 x 10-5 IIB1 1. IIB2 2. IIB1 2. IIB2 1.

Fi = frequency of incident outcome case i. Incident Outcome Case IIB2 Effect Zone N E 6 3 10 Incident Outcome Case IIA Effect Zone Incident Outcome Case IIB1 Effect Zone 2** 4** X 1** Incident Outcome Case I Effect Zone K Indicates X people at specified location ** Employees in on-site buildings Figure 7. y Pf . as determined by: Ni = Px . The data in Table 4 must then be put into cumulative frequency form to plot the F-N .. per year . For the example. In this example. Societal risk measures are important for managing risk in a situation where there is a potential for accidents impacting more than one person. Table 4 summarizes the estimated number of fatalities for the four incident outcome cases. 35 .. for all outcome cases i for which Ni ≥ N ∑ i where: FN = frequency of all incident outcome cases affecting N or more people. the adverse outcome considered is immediate fatality resulting from fire. The data in Table 5 can be plotted to give the societal risk F-N Curve in Figure 8.i . Societal risk measures estimate both the potential size and likelihood of incidents with multiple adverse outcomes.Figure 7 shows the location of people in the area surrounding the CP facility.i in Equation 5 equals 1. this calculation can be done graphically by superimposing the impact zones from Figure 3 onto the population distribution in Figure 7. explosion. F-N Curve A common measure of societal risk is the Frequency-Number (F-N) curve. The first step in generating an F-N Curve for the example problem is to calculate the number of fatalities resulting from each incident outcome case. or exposure to toxic vapors. and counting the number of people inside the impact zone.(5) ∑ x. per year Table 5 summarizes the cumulative frequency results.(6) Curve: FN = Fi . pf. Population Distribution in and around CP Societal Risk Calculation Societal risk measures the risk to a group of people. Because the impact zones for the example are simple. y where Ni is the number of fatalities resulting from Incident Outcome Case i.

0 x 10-5 0 IIB1 1. IIB1 1.4 Frequency of N or more Fatalities .5 10 .0 x 10-5 6 -5 IIB2 1.Table 4 Estimated Numbers of Fatalities from Each Incident Outcome Case Incident Outcome Case Frequency Fi Estimated Number of Fatalities (per year) I 1.6 10 .0 x 10 3 Table 5 Cumulative Frequency Data for F-N Curve Number of Fatalities Incident Outcome Cases Total Frequency N Included FN (per year) 3+ I.0 x 10-6 13 IIA 1.x 10-5 13 + I 1. per year 10 .0 x 10-6 >13 + None 0 10 .7 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) Figure 8. Societal Risk F-N Curve 36 .1 x 10-5 6+ I. IIB2 2. IIB1.

actions are identified. sneak (leak) higher. phase Commonly Used Guide Words no. as well as. reverse. The purpose is to identify all possible deviations from the design conditions and to identify all the hazards associated with these deviations. To enable a thorough examination. other than 37 . The application of an accepted set of guide words ensures that every conceivable deviation is considered. Each part is subjected to a number of questions based on a set of guidewords for the project. reaction. less. Where deviations result in hazards. more. The guide words are normally applied in conjunction with a series of process parameters to arrive at a meaningful deviation. pressure. The questions are formulated using a number of guide words to ensure a consistent and structured approach. The basic concept behind HAZOP studies is that processes work well when operating under design conditions. more. The main process parameters with their commonly used guide words are as follows: Main Process Parameters flow temperature. These solutions are reviewed and accepted by the HAZOP team before implementation. level composition. part of.HAZOP: An Introduction The Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) systematically questions the design to discover how it can deviate from the design intention. less. deviations from the process design conditions cause hazards and lead to operability problems. lower no. This requires the design engineer to review and suggest solutions to either remove the hazard or reduce its risk to an acceptable level. the plant is split into a number of parts.

HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY REORT Project title: Project number: P&ID number: Line number: Guide word Deviation Cause Consequences Sheet Date: Chairman: Study team: Safeguards Numbe r By Action Details Reply accepted of 38 .

2. Select valve to fail open Install filter with maintenance procedure Install cooling water flow meter and low flow alarm Install 39 . Loss of cooling. 2.Exothermic Reactor: HAZOP CASE STUDY Item 1A Study node Cooling coils Process parameters Flow Deviations (guide words) No HAZOP Study applied to the Exothermic Reactor Possible causes Possible consequences 1. possible runaway –do- Action required 1. 2. Control valve fails closed Plugged cooling coils 1.

Monomer feed continues. Not possible here 1. 5. Interlock between cooling flow and reactor feed 1. 4. 1. 1. builds. Temperature rises.2 See 1A. 3. 1 Low water supply temperature 1. high temperature alarm to alert operator Check and monitor reliability of water service Place controller on critical instrumentation list See 1A. controller handles 1. 5. Stirrer motor controller fails.1 Instruct operators and update procedures See 1A-4 See 1A. 2. Contamination of water supply Covered under 1C Failure on water source resulting in backflow Backflow due to high backpressure Not considered possible Cooling normally started early Operator error 1. –do–do–do- 3.3. Control valve fails open Controller fails and opens valve 1. Interlock with feed line 2. possible accumulation of unreacted materials 2. 2. 4. possible runaway on heating – do Diminished cooling. possible accumulation of unreacted materials 1. 2. 1C Low Reactor cools. reactant conc. 4. High water supply temperature 1. 1. Sooner than Later than Low High No 1. possible runaway –do–do1. Partially plugged cooling line Partial water source failure Control valve fails to respond 1. None 1. 2. resulting in high motor speed 1. closing valve 3. 2. 2. See1A. None 1. None 1. 3. Loss of cooling. 2. Cooling water service failure Controller fails and closes valve Air pressure fails. increases 1. Stirrer motor malfunction Power failure 2B More 1. 1.2 Install check calve 1D 1E 1F As well as Part of Reverse 1G 1H 1I 1J 1K 2A Stirrer Temperature Agitation Other than. 1. 1. None. None 1. 3. 2. possible runaway –do- 5. Monomer feed valve must fail closed on power loss 40 .2 Place valve on critical instrumentation list 1. 1B High 1. No mixing. 2. 2. possible runaway 1. Install high flow alarm and/or cooling water high temp. alarm 1. 1. Cooling system capacity limited temp.

F = events P = probability S = entire sample space n = number of samples in which event A occurred N = number of experiments m = number of components in series or in parallel Operations: ∪ : Operation of union ∩ : Operation of intersection A : Operation of complementation : Conditional P ( A ∪ B ) = P ( A) + P( B) − P( A ∩ B) Mutually exclusive events: P ( A ∩ B) = 0 Complementary events : P ( A) + P ( B) = 1 ⇒ P( A) + P( A) = 1 Conditional Probabilities: 41 . One must be familiar with this concept to be able to determine the value of the input parameters and to understand the results of a risk or reliability analysis. B.PROBABILITY THEORY IN CHEMICAL RISK ASSESSMENT The probability concept is the basis for a risk analysis or reliability analysis. A.

It follows that: For independent events: If events are dependent: Bayesian Estimation We know that in general: For any arbitrary event Ai Or: 42 .

the following conditions hold: Using the previous relations: The last expression is Bayes’ theorem. Exhaustive implies that every conceivable outcome is included in the prior distribution. A2. prior to learning fact B. Available generic data) P(B|Ai) : The probability of the observation. given that A... An. is true. A3 A1 AB A2 Considering Ai as class i.e. It is important to understand the meaning of the various terms in the Bayes expression: B: Collected plant-specific data. (i.(i. Updated failure data) P(Ai|B) : Probability of Ai after learning fact B. P(Ai) : Probability of Ai.e. The equation is valid in general for any number of events A1. 43 .….Let’s consider that one has a set events Ai which are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.

The probability density function f(x) is given by: ‘t’ = dummy variable The properties of probability density functions make it possible to treat the areas under f(x) as probabilities: Mean.PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS The cumulative distribution function F(x) is defined as the probability that the random variable x assumes values of less than or equal to the specific value x. median and mode of a distribution Mode (X) = the most preferred value of ‘x’ (the one with the maximum probability) 44 .

Skewness: Skewness ≡ E[( X − μ )3 ] = ∫ ( x − μ )3 f ( x)dx −∞ ∞ For a symmetric distribution: Skewness ≡ E[( X − μ )3 ] = 0 If.Median (Xm) = value of ‘X’ at which values of X above and below are equally probable. Skewness ≡ E[( X − μ )3 ] > 0 . the values of X > μ are more widely dispersed than X < μ. Thus: F (Xm) = 0. 45 .5 Mean (or Expectation): E( X ) = μ = ∫ ∞ +∞ −∞ xf ( x)dx In general the expectation of a function G(X) where ‘X’ is a random variable is: E[G ( X )] = ∫ G ( x) f ( x)dx −∞ Variance: Var ( X ) = σ 2 = ∫ ( x − μ ) 2 f ( x)dx −∞ +∞ Standard Deviation: σ ( X ) = Var ( X ) Coefficient of Variation: COV = δ ( X ) = σ ( X ) / μ ( X ) The COV gives the relative spread of ‘X’ around its mean value.

the values of X < μ are more widely dispersed than X > μ. GX ( s ) ≡ ∫ e sX f ( x)dx −∞ ∞ Now it follows that: ∞ ⎡ d {G ( s )} ⎤ ⎢ ds ⎥ = ∫−∞ xf ( x)dx = E ( X ) ⎣ ⎦ s =0 It may be shown that in general: ∞ ⎡ d n {G ( s )} ⎤ n n ⎢ ⎥ = ∫−∞ x f ( x)dx = E ( X ) n ⎣ ds ⎦ s =0 Binomial Distribution: p = probability of an event occurring Exponential Distribution: f ( x) = λ e − λ x F ( x) = 1 − e − λ x Normal Distribution: 46 . Skewness Coefficient: θ≡ E[( X − μ )3 ] σ3 Moment Generating Function: In general the nth moment of a probability distribution function is given by: E[( X n ] = ∫ x n f ( x)dx −∞ ∞ The moment generating function MGF of a random variable X ≡ GX ( s ) .If. Thus. where‘s’ is an auxiliary (deterministic) variable. Skewness ≡ E[( X − μ )3 ] < 0 . where: GX ( s) ≡ E (e sX ) .

The probability density function f(x) is given by: 47 . σ z = 1 The Normal Distribution Curve Lognormal Distribution: The lognormal distribution is used quite frequently in reliability and safety studies. x has a lognormal distribution.Standard Normal Distribution: It follows that: μ z = 0. The relationship to normal distribution is as follows: if the stochastic variable ln(x) has a normal distribution.

The Lognormal Distribution Curve Weibull distribution: β = shape parameter δ = lowest value life parameter θ= characteristic life Typical shapes of f(x) is shown below with δ = 0 48 .

49 .Poisson Distribution: The Poisson distribution gives the probability of exactly x occurrences of a rare event (p ➝ 0) in a large number of trials (n ➝ infinity). The Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution and not a probability density distribution.

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