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PART THREE Application
by drawing on concrete examples. This should reveal a marked discrepancy between expressed goals and political behaviour that can be traced back to the influence of interstate reciprocity. The concept of reciprocity is so ingrained in the mentality of those involved that it arises in even the most curious of circumstances. It is very commonly seen in the phrase “inter-state reciprocity. The legal implications are merely the tip of the iceberg. A proper understanding of these mechanisms T . In this paper I will outline.” which reflects the minorities’ subjugation to the interest of the states. I will also look at the implications of this behaviour for the political agenda of the minority.119 7 The Concept of Reciprocity and its Significance for the Political Organisation of the Muslim Minority in Greece Vemund Aarbakke he concept of reciprocity has a very prominent place in the Greek-Turkish minority regime. how the concept of reciprocity has influenced the political behaviour of the Muslim minority of Greek Thrace in the period since 1974. Naturally. In the final analysis this testifies to a lack of belief in –and hence a lack of will to use– normal political channels in solving the minority’s problems. but it is often little understood how far the influence of the states extends into the internal organisation of the minorities. the minorities have to adjust to the strongest actors.
and Bozcaada. [. and I soon grasped that reciprocity was a key concept.] The events of 55 shocked public opinion. And then we lost even one more opportunity: Of course not to expel. And Turkey has breached this condition in the most provocative and crude fashion – she has destroyed politically.120 bölüm ad› should help us to better separate the substantial problems of the minority from the rhetoric that first meets us.1 I have no intention of delving into the legal aspects of this argument since there are more competent than me to do so. Our reaction –in its totality– provokes shame even today.. To cut the umbilical cord between Ankara and the minority. This was usually part of a mock polemic against Turkey intended for internal consumption that first specified Turkey’s obligations according to the Lausanne treaty and then sought to demonstrate how these obligations had been violated. the minority –which there were many suggestions and even plans for– but to announce the chapter on “Protection of Minorities” in the Lausanne Treaty to be in abeyance. economically and even physically the Greek minorities in Istanbul. Greece was not really obliged to honour its obligations either.. was deemed to have honoured its obligations. on the other hand. but obvi- . too. INTRODUCTION It was in the late 1980’s that I first started to take an interest in the way Greece approached the Muslim minority in Western Thrace. will act accordingly. Gökçeada. then –and only then– Greece. by force. The Greek Deputy Foreign Minister at this time. In reality. Under the condition that Turkey will fulfill the obligations. In the Lausanne Treaty reciprocity appears in its strongest form – the form of condition. Greece. Yannis Kapsis. the argument went further and implied that since Turkey had not honoured its obligations. expressed this candidly in an article for a major Greek newspaper: International treaties are applied and interpreted –on the basis of the Law of Treaties– with the term reciprocity.
”3 Reciprocity in Greek-Turkish relations is thus. Greece was reluctant to give Turkey a say over its “Turkish minority. or if you like. Apart from those with the most ethnocentric blinkers it is not difficult for anyone to see that both Greece and Turkey have violated the Lausanne Treaty and I will not occupy myself with mutual accusations.bölüm içeri¤i 121 ously the argument rests on dubious premises far removed from either a literal interpretation or the spirit of the treaty.2 This shows that what was as stake was not the interest of the minorities. It permeates the views of most people involved. He complained that after the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul had left. the key term employed in Greek parliamentary discussions during the late 1970s was Diakratiki Ameviotita (interstate reciprocity). He considered the minority question to be based on two balances: People and property. He thought that each country would be pleased to get rid of the minority on its territory but recognised the problems it would create for the kindred minority in the neighbouring country. First of all. the reality that the issue is not minority protection is evident from most of the material at hand. In its simple form it could be termed as a kind of bargaining mentality. . A former Turkish ambassador to Athens displays the same attitude. however. What concerns me here is how their interpretation of the Lausanne treaty has influenced the minority regime. in my opinion. but the interest of the states. as do countless other Turkish sources. For example. as if the two states and their various representatives are standing in the bazaar haggling over issues related to the minorities. a way of life. is that there are no clear rules for what they are haggling about. What complicates the situation. This is of course compounded by the lack of good faith among many of those involved in the minority regime. The combined demands of internal nation building and relationship to kindred groups outside the borders –which follow different patterns in the two countries– make comparison of the two minorities extremely difficult. a certain mentality. first and foremost not a legal problem but a political and social fact. and supported his view on the minutes of the Lausanne negotiations.
although in the latter case it may be questioned if the problem arose in the first place precisely because . This elicited the desired response and he became the first practising minority doctor in Thrace. Thus. In the cases above. in this case the minority was able to avoid the consequences of a general law and enjoy better terms than Greek citizens in general. This may have different consequences depending on the period in question and may be both advantageous and disadvantageous. In the early 1960s when the first minority doctor had finished his education in Turkey and returned to Thrace he had to go through the usual procedure for recognition of foreign degrees. for whatever reason the process dragged on and after a couple of years his degree had still not been recognised.122 bölüm ad› In this sense it is questionable if we can even talk about reciprocity. An even more striking example is to be seen in the case of an individual. the minorities are not considered proper citizens of the country in which they live. Much of the time it could be more properly called retaliation or extortion. but as appendices of a neighbouring state. There is no reason to speak only in general terms. this was to the advantage of the minority members concerned. but by fluctuating interstate relations. This measure was not implemented in Thrace on land owned by minority members. In reality. According to my information. A few examples will help clarify the picture. because of their special relationship with Turkey (League of Nations 1926: 126127). During the period immediately after the population exchange (1923) the Greek state was faced with the immense task of settling more than a million refugees. The important point is that treatment of the minorities is not conditioned solely by internal developments pertaining to nation building. In order to succeed in this it was necessary to expropriate land for distribution among the incoming refugees. However. Both of these examples testify to a highly irregular practice that differs from the usual treatment of citizens. Turkey then threatened to close the businesses of 10 doctors from the still sizable Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul if his degree were not promptly recognised. as is the case with other marginal or disadvantaged groups.
in the period after 1980. the examples above show how the concept of reciprocity influences treatment of the minority in both positive and negative ways. urban/rural. we have the state again as represented by the Foreign Ministry. However it is also possible to identify secondary actors that function as pressure groups such as immigrant organisations in Turkey and Germany.” and. I will concentrate on its effects on political representation of the minority. In its everyday form this depended on Foreign Ministry local offices in the minority area. the most important actor has been the Foreign Ministry through its Consulate in Komotini. Roma) etc. ethnic (Pomak.bölüm içeri¤i 123 it concerned a minority member. These restraints could manifest themselves in . To a certain degree. minority policy could be influenced by competition in party politics. but not to the extent that policies governing the lives of other Greek citizens were since there would be restraints laid down by inter-party agreements. minority members were pawns on the chessboard that is relations between Greece and Turkey. Of its many influences on aspects of minority life. In the case of Turkey. This was not something that took place only on a ground scale. There were of course many parameters affecting the selection of the minority’s political representation. In Greece. which became notorious for their intervention in even the smallest bureaucratic procedures affecting the minority. certain behindthe-scenes actors within the Turkish administration known as the Deep State. These main actors can again be divided into subgroups: In the case of the minority this refers to ideological cleavages among the voters of which the most important have been conservative/modernist. In short. The principle actors were minority voters and representatives of the Greek and Turkish states. it also filtered down to the everyday treatment of the minority. nationalist organisations occupied with “outside Turks. In light of the concerns of this paper. In this context it is worth mentioning that in the case of the minority many functions which for ordinary citizens belonged to other departments were handled by the Foreign Ministry. mountain/plain. Turk.
in which he claimed that the minority should go in the same direction as the Greek majority and vote for the strongest political parties. However.4 This gave minority politicians a certain leeway as they could play both sides (simultaneously or successively). The subsequent running of Muzaffer bey on a marginal right wing party ticket contravenes Fettaho¤lu’s political credo as expounded in his newspaper prior to the junta. but it was not so obvious to leading minority politicians at the time. we see it clearly in Xanthi where the Muzaffer bey/Osman Nuri Fettaho¤lu faction was unable to run for a major party in spite of its vote potential. It is clear from minority sources that the position of spokesman/middleman with the authorities . particularly in Komotini. Reciprocity was always a factor in minority politics. there was a certain understanding between the two. On an even lower level it is possible to mention other actors such as various branches of the secret services and local pressure groups in which the church played a prominent role. he sacrificed political representation of the minority in order to avoid competition that could threaten his position as spokesman for the minority with Greece and to a large extent Turkey. All this changed after 1974 with the breakdown of any GreekTurkish agreement on selection of minority candidates and attempts by Greece to monopolise control of the minority’s political representation. We had what Ilias Nikolakopoulos refers to as a system of dual dependence or protection. It also meant that while neither state could have its own way completely. where the national line broke down and selection of minority candidates became subject to competition in party politics. With the benefit of hindsight. whereby Greece would try to influence minority politics indirectly mainly through support for the conservatives. and in the minority’s having only limited influence on local government since the prefect was appointed centrally until the “Kapodistria” administrative reform in 1999.5 This time. The main feature of minority politics in the 1950-60s was the existence of a certain balance between Greece and Turkey. this is quite easy to see.124 bölüm ad› the selection of minority candidates for political parties.
he represented an attempt to solve the minority’s problems through the Greek political system according to democratic rules. struggling to find a place within a hostile political system. together with Hasan Hatipo¤lu. In Xanthi the new political figures represented two different approaches. Celâl Zeybek. religious fanatics and fascists. but. The additional ND seat in Ksanthi opened the way for another minority candidate. Previously. In many ways it is possible to say that he had internalised the dominant . ran on the marginal (Ethniki Parataksi) ticket and ‹mamo¤lu was indeed elected. but had no inclination to challenge the Greek-Turkish minority regime. but lost his seat after 6 months when final adjustments by the election court deprived PASOK of a seat in Xanthi. We see the emergence of a new generation of politicians.”6 ‹mamo¤lu’s association with this party can only be interpreted as an attempt to circumvent the political boycott against him brought on by greater demand for Greek control over the minority. Mavrogordatos has characterised EP as not “a party in any sense of the term. He was known as an upright defender of the minority. as we will see subsequently. dictatorship nostalgics. Orhan Hac›ibram was elected on the PASOK ticket. the anomalous political situation after 1974 resulted in a challenge against the MPs role as leaders. In this respect. He was passionate a young politician who was seduced by PASOK’s socialist rhetoric. His downfall is primarily connected to Greece’s reluctance to treat the minority democratically and abandon the habit of keeping the minority within the Greek-Turkish framework. but only an ad hoc assortment of converging reactionaries: Royalist diehards. The incumbent MPs’ inability to intervene effectively against the anti-minority policy of the Greek state led ultimately to their downfall. The 1977 elections are further indication of how the old system had been destabilised.bölüm içeri¤i 125 was of considerable power and the subject of fierce competition. The problems strong minority candidates faced in obtaining a place on the ticket of the major parties were most pronounced in Rodhopi where Hasan ‹mamo¤lu. MPs would be the natural candidates to fill this role.
neither ‹mamo¤lu nor Zeybek was able to serve the minority satisfactorily due to constraints imposed by the anomalous political situation. In the 1981 elections we reach the culmination of Greek control over the minority. Hence. The young Ahmet Mehmet was limited by a poor education and owed his position to his obedience to PASOK. but because of manipulation by the Greek authorities. Haf›z Yaﬂar represented the old leadership.7 Ultimately. who ran as a candidate for PASOK. The1981 elections may thus be considered a successful time for those who wished to control the minority and even exclude it from the country’s political life. the minority was left without representation in Ksanthi. The challenge was two-pronged: 1) From politicians among the traditional leadership who claimed that they had been sidelined by the authorities’ adoption of candidates with little legitimacy.8 He had no chance of election but became a pawn in their efforts to split the minority vote. Greece and Turkey had to solve the major issues. However. In his election propaganda he stated explicitly that he could only assist the minority members in small affairs. He had a poor command of Greek and had been singled out as a man of the authorities in the conservative-Kemalist rivalry before 1967. had been in the employ of the Greek secret services. Ahmet Faiko¤lu. The vote was split not only by the natural rivalry between minority candidates. The election of Ahmet Mehmet (PASOK) and Haf›z Yaﬂar (ND) in Rodhopi meant that the minority’s political representatives posed no serious challenge to the Greek authorities and their discrimination policy. It was later revealed that the secretary of the mufti office. and from popular reactions to discrimination policy that were difficult to contain with repression or underhand deals with the closed elite that traditionally represented the minority.126 bölüm ad› political approach and recognised the predominance of state interests. their success was deceptive: It simply would not be possible for a democratic country to keep a minority under the kind of control that may only be exercised by totalitarian regimes. .
Eventually this would lead to the election of the first “independent” (of Greek parties. These are best exemplified by protests against expropriations at the villages of Evlalon and Yaka and against the authorities’ (DIKATSA) reluctance to recognise minority members’ university diplomas from Turkey. As a result of the intrigues that sabotaged the villagers’ protest they not only lost their fields. but also the compensation to which they were entitled. This is of course natural. Sad›k Ahmet. Hasan Hatipo¤lu in particular played a central role in sabotaging the villagers’ protests. Some politicians who for various reasons did not become candidates for the major parties would accuse their rivals of timidity in defending the minority’s interest. as this would mean acceptance of the expropriation. Greek measures against the minority would also lead to certain popular reactions among segments of the minority population. In the expropriation cases. In the Evlalon case. the success of the Evlalon protest is in striking contrast to the dismal failure of that in Yaka. but dependent on Turkey) minority MP. the protest was weakened by internal rivalry among the minority leadership in their endeavour to maintain their positions as middlemen. Orhan Hac›ibram. or even worse. He is a classic example of the minority politician functioning as middleman within the framework of Greek-Turkish relations. but the anomalous political situation reinforced the more unsavoury features of this competition. In the Yaka case.9 Hatipo¤lu advised them.bölüm içeri¤i 127 There had always been fierce competition between minority politicians for leadership of the minority. They became sinister and damaging only after entering the field of Greek-Turkish competition for control over the minority in the mid-1980s. They presented their opponents as lackeys of the Greek parties. the minority lawyer in charge. . incorrectly. In the beginning these accusations lacked conviction and had little if any influence on minority voters. was able to keep the protest focused through a combination of legal and political arguments in spite of the many attacks of his political rivals. of selling out the minority. in the June 1989 elections. not to accept the indemnity.
The DIKATSA controversy forms a striking contrast.11 This event must be seen in the context of Turkish efforts to gain greater control over the minority before launching the campaign to impose “independent” candidates. known as the “clique. This included the traditional minority elite. This was amply demonstrated later when they raised no objection to Mehmet Emin Aga’s instalment as provisional mufti of Ksanthi. However. In this case minority university graduates waged their struggle within the Greek political system and avoided becoming entangled in the web of Gre- . the Greek authorities and the Turkish consular authorities.128 bölüm ad› However. This is even more striking in the latter case of the mufti controversy. as it claimed. the only individual to take proper initiatives in dealing with the Greek authorities was MP Mehmet Müftüo¤lu. those who feared independent political initiatives by the minority sabotaged the villagers’ protest. Ultimately. but only the immediate consequences for minority petty politics.” disputed the appointment of Meço Cemali as provisional mufti of Komotini in 1985. it came as a surprise to him that strongest reaction came from the clique and Turkey. While he had expected reactions from the Greek authorities. in which we may observe the same constellations. When the group around Hasan Hatipo¤lu and Mehmet Emin Aga. He submitted a petition to the Supreme Court contesting the validity of the appointment. thus making clear their preference for dealing with the minority issue within the framework of Greek-Turkish relations. the expropriation procedure had already been brought to a conclusion as Hatipo¤lu should have known very well. They had no interest in the principles involved in the dispute. under pressure from the Consul Müftüo¤lu was forced to withdraw his petition. The behaviour of the Turkish Consul is even more interesting.10 The clique’s greatest fear was. that the petition would fail but that it would succeed and consequently increase Müftüo¤lu’s prestige. Rejection of the petition by the Supreme Court could have paved the way for an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights and thus put Greek policy to a strict test.
but did little to defend any vital interests of the minority. He had a very limited following among the minority. From the viewpoint of the minority’s political life. Furthermore. It is pertinent have to examine the significant difference between these politicians. it is time to look at the significance of the 1985 parliamentary elections. He was an experience middleman who could offer petty services. amply testified to by the few minority votes gained by PASOK in the 1985 election (4. clearly de- .bölüm içeri¤i 129 ek-Turkish relations. As mentioned earlier. minority politicians who did not become candidates would protest against the elected MPs precisely because of the strong party control over their selection. Eventually. For reasons related to domestic politics. both major parties included minority candidates in 2nd place on their tickets and it seemed certain that the minority would elect one MP in each of the two prefectures with a high minority population. during his time in office he clearly acted first and foremost as an MP for PASOK and only secondarily as a minority representative. Their eventual success must be ascribed to their ability to maintain focus on the issue and avoid the political manoeuvres of the traditional leadership. what is most interesting is that he did not attract much criticism from minority circles for his conduct. The minority elected Ahmet Faiko¤lu (PASOK) in Ksanthi and Mehmet Müftüo¤lu (ND) in Rodopi. Faiko¤lu worked as second (!) secretary of the Mufti office and had connections with the Greek secret services.13 The minority feared this devise would be used to exclude it from parliamentary representation and initiatives were undertaken for the purpose of putting pressure on the parties to include minority candidates in positions that would enable their election. and we must also bear in mind the influence of Christian candidates on the minority vote in Ksanthi). Later. He owed his election mainly to conjunctures related to the balance of votes between the two major parties and election law. the candidates’ position on the party tickets was fixed in these elections and could not be influenced by a conflict of preference.12 After this short excursion into some political events of the mid 1980s.405 votes.
Their opposition to Müftüo¤lu was primarily based on the fact that he stood in their way and prevented them from having a commanding role in negotiations concerning the minority. the role carved out for the late Sad›k Ahmet. It is a little bit harder to grasp the role of Turkey at this point. alternatively pressurising Greek and Turkey played a secondary role in the overall framework of reciprocity favoured by both Greece and Turkey. he faced an even greater struggle against the clique and Turkish diplomacy. The internal political battle during the period 1985-1989 centred on displacing Müftüo¤lu. but instead the Turkish state’s primary concern was backing an MP over whom it could exercise control or influence. If we look at the manoeuvrings of the clique we have to consider the history of its leading figures. he had a much better mandate than Faiko¤lu. Turkey was looking for someone whom it could use as a stooge in a Turkish diplomatic assault on Greece. He was a much more independent MP than any of his contemporaries. Both were used as middlemen. but that meant that he had to fight his battles on many fronts. He was also an able and conscientious person who put minority interests first. and his case provides us with a very good example of the minority politician’s difficulties in maintaining integrity. Objectively.130 bölüm ad› monstrating that the “clique” had only a secondary interest in defending minority interests. i.e. while Müftüo¤lu faced a difficult struggle against the Greek authorities. This was all the more pronounced when it became clear subsequently that. at this stage. The 20. We now have a sufficiently clear picture of the relevant backg- . In other words. Obviously. One would imagine that Turkey would be likely to support an MP who criticised Greek discrimination against its minority. it would not be to the liking of the Greek authorities that he challenged their policy. it wanted someone with less integrity than Müftüo¤lu.132 minority votes for ND in Rodhopi demonstrate clearly Müftüo¤lu’s popularity among minority voters. This is evident from his many efforts to make the authorities lift discriminatory measures against the minority. However. Hasan Hatipo¤lu and Mehmet Emin Aga.
This took very concrete forms: Minority politicians visiting Turkey would be taken in for intimidating interrogations. potential opponents to the “independent” candidates would be refused entrance to Turkey and their being turned back at the border would be the subject of whispering campaigns to stigmatise them as opponents of the “mother country. 3) Turkey’s decision to impose an MP of its choice was followed up with strong measures to influence minority voters. The independent Güven (Trust) ticket represented an innovation in minority politics in as much as it was not connected to the internal political situation in Greece. Previous independent or quasi-independent candidatures had appeared as a reaction from candidates unable to secure a place on the tickets of the major parties. to sequestrate investments . In short. Very few had a proper understanding of the independent ticket in the June 1989 elections.bölüm içeri¤i 131 round to make a correct assessment of the 1989 elections.”14 There were threats to throw minority students out of school. However. Greek discrimination policy had made the minority turn to Turkey for protection and Turkey was now using this dependence as leverage in pressurising the minority. It may be useful to recapitulate a little. 1) Greek discrimination policy had estranged minority voters completely and desperate attempts to find a solution within the Greek political system had failed. After 1974 Greece tried to gain complete control over selection of minority candidates and succeeded to a certain degree in this. 2) Attempts by Greek authorities to strictly control minority candidatures had changed the character of competition between minority politicians and weakened the legitimacy of party candidates. The time had come to turn in another direction. Before 1967 there had been a certain understanding between Greece and Turkey regarding minority candidates. the real significance of the independent ticket was that control of the minority swung completely to Turkey’s side. The pendulum swinging to the Turkish side was contingent on several factors. Most people viewed it only within the framework of Greek party competition during a critical political situation when PASOK was losing ground amidst a glut of scandals.
Turkey’s intervention was decisive in the election of his temporary substitute Molla ‹smail (Rodoplu). Sad›k was clearly able to embarrass the Greek government on a regular basis. I recall being asked by a leading figure in the Western Thrace Turkish Solidarity Organisation (BTTDD) if I thought Turkey controlled Sad›k.132 bölüm ad› such as real estate. but also that of Ahmet Faiko¤lu in Ksanthi – this time as “independent” MP. apartments etc. when Turkey required one step of him Sad›k took ten with results that were often quite different from those intended by his masters. Turkey had picked him to serve its interests. Turkish control was confirmed in the following elections: Although Sad›k was prevented from running in the November 1989 elections for technical reasons. however. For Turkey. it was proving more difficult than expected to exercise fully the control it now extended over minority parliamentary representation.16 In Greece. made by minority members in Turkey. In subsequent elections in April 1990 Turkey not only secured the re-election of Sad›k Ahmet. All these measures contributed decisively to the landslide victory of independent candidate Sad›k Ahmet in the 18 June 1989 elections. the prevailing mood was fear that the MPs would slip outside control of the Greek state.15 In Turkey. Sad›k Ahmet had been the first choice of Turkey and the main focus was on his initiatives. Sad›k Ahmet was even presented as the 451th MP of the Turkish parliament (The Turkish parliament has 450 MPs). but indirectly as a card to embarrass Greece in international organisations. It was generally known that they owed their election to Turkish interference. there were vital differences in their behaviour of particular interest to this paper. because how could Turkey control someone who could not control himself? In spite of his erratic behaviour. Turkey was hampered by the indepen- . However. a role he was only too eager to fill. In this context. The behaviour of these two during the next few years is very interesting from the perspective of Greek-Turkish relations. The answer was of course no. mainly because the work of the independent MPs was not directly usable in Greek-Turkish bilateral relations. Although both MPs functioned as mouthpieces for Turkey.
but as a display for his Turkish masters. Ahmet Faiko¤lu’s role is even more interesting in our context. the explanation offered was that he did not make them to promote a policy in his capacity as Greek MP. To put it slightly differently. His main weapon was to slander them in Turkey as men in the service of Greeks. Some of his more provocative statements could be viewed as compensation for his previous association with Greek authorities and its secret services. It even gave him the confidence to come into conflict with local representatives of Turkish diplomacy. when Faiko¤lu made statements that were provocative and unproductive in the Greek political framework. Sad›k had no clear understanding of his own limitations and Turkey’s promotion of him boosted his ego to unprecedented heights of megalomania. and in this respect Faiko¤lu’s past was quite problematic. For example. His desire was to be the one and only leader of the minority and towards this end he commenced relentless battle against his political rivals within the minority. Most of the traditional leadership had at one time or another depended on the Greek authorities. or ‘deep state’. In contrast to Sad›k.bölüm içeri¤i 133 dent MPs lack of ability to work on this level as well as its own problem in acting as a sincere defender of human rights. the logic of his behaviour had changed as well. Faiko¤lu was acutely aware that he was a pawn in Greek-Turkish relation and consequently fulfilled a role within this framework. Sad›k’s nomination by the parastate. Hence. since the whole political framework had changed. who became intoxicated by the promotion of his person.17 Thus we see that there was a paradox from the point of view of Turkish diplomacy in . network in Turkey further complicated the picture. The other source of seemingly erratic behaviour was his rivalry with Sad›k. One of the most discomfitting effects of this political regime was that his relationship to minority voters gradually fell completely under the shadow of Turkey’s priorities. we see a far less erratic behaviour on his part and when he indulged in such behaviour it was for a specific purpose. He went from being an ardent advocate of the Greek nationalist PASOK to becoming an even more extrovert exponent of Turkish nationalism.
From another. the new election law in 1990 had declared a 3% cut-off point for both parties and independent candidates on a nationwide basis. Faiko¤lu was both more predictable and more trustworthy than Sad›k. A countermove by Greece was imminent and. no less concerned about his political future. Both Sad›k and Faiko¤lu would now do their best to plead for a candidature in the same Greek parties they had just recently condemned so resoundingly. it represents an attempt to construct a political formation that could be used effectively to outwardly represent the minority. However. As the elections approached independent MPs ever more alarmed as they understood that they could only be elected if they ran for a Greek party. we had a situation in which Greece controlled the elections system and Turkey controlled minority voters. this anomalous situation whereby two MPs controlled by Turkey were carrying out the task of embarrassing Greece internationally could not be allowed to continue. also began wooing parti- . Faiko¤lu tried to curry favour with his old party PASOK. this project proved more difficult to realise than anticipated. also without success. Effectively this excluded the prospect of any minority representation outside Greek political parties since minority votes did not amount to anything near this figure. In the period leading up to the election. In turn. among other innovations. From one point of view. Clearly. particularly on international fora. Equality and Peace” Party should be seen in this context. minority politicians had to adjust to this situation.134 bölüm ad› that. and when this failed proceeded to court Tsovolas’ DIKKI. is the background to the highly anomalous showdown between Greece and Turkey in the subsequent October 1993 elections. but quite understandable in view of the MPs’ petty interests. This led to a series of moves that were highly contradictory from an ideological perspective. it represented the faint hope that various forces would assemble under its umbrella to surmount the 3% cut-off point obstacle. In short.18 This. despite his problematic past. Sad›k. Turkey continued its attempt to impose its will on Greece using Sad›k as its tool and his establishment of the “Friendship. than.
At best. he had lost touch with reality. Haki commented that while Sad›k was fearful of rejection by ND. or. The most central figure to oppose Sad›k in this respect was ‹bram Onsuno¤lu. This took on a rather odd form as it meant that Turkey would demonstrate its control over the minority by supporting a candidate that had no hope of election and consequently deprive the minority of parliamentary representation. this being that it would be impossible for any Greek party to accept one of the independent MPs in light of their previous excesses. between Sad›k. The second confrontation was within the minority faction that based its power on support from Turkey. Turkey could use the non-election of a candidate with a strong popular mandate to criticise Greece on international fora. At the top we had confrontation between Greece and Turkey over control of the minority’s political representation. Some of the latter disagreed strongly with the policy of the former and what they considered to be a wrong and dangerous course for the minority. The parties recognised Sad›k’s vote-gaining capacity among the minority and ND reputedly offered to field a candidate indicated by Sad›k. as he would probably have estranged more majority voters than he would secure minority votes. the first contest found its place in relation to the nomination of candidates by Greek parties. an initiative which came to nought as Sad›k stated that it had to be him or no one. however. who sought to impose himself and his party on the minority as its sole political leadership. Thus the scene was set for a full-scale confrontation between several actors. in turn. Once again. The third confrontation was between minority politicians who depended on Turkey and those who did not. In a perceptive observation on this political turnaround.bölüm içeri¤i 135 es. the clique was fearful of his acceptance into the party ranks.19 Sad›k would. knock on the door of all Greek parties without result. It appeared that no sacrifice was too great in order to insure that Sad›k became MP. When . in more concrete terms. Sad›k would be a liability rather than an asset. and the other minority politicians who had traditionally enjoyed Turkish support and competed for Turkey’s favours. As mentioned before.
20 With the backing of Turkey. independent MPs produced some astonishing demagogy during the election campaign. the potent combination of demagogy and coercion secured an overwhelming victory for Sad›k. not only disappointed with being deprived of parliamentary representation. the next step was to put pressure on other likely minority candidates in order to prevent them from running. In one respect. Faced with the problem of having to explain their candidacy when there was no hope of actual election. in addition to which marks of preference for candidates on the independent ticket would serve as a way to decide the pecking order among those who were under the Turkish umbrella. They claimed that this time it was an election for leadership and not for parliament. In Ksanthi Faiko¤lu had no chance of election this time around and was reputedly not overly interested in running. if necessary a separate election could be staged for leadership and representation in the “world parliament. this victory for a certain Turkish policy was even more impressive than victories in previous elections since it ran contrary to any sound political thinking and served only to cut the minority off from the Greek political system. the Güven ticket was revived in Rodopi. Onsuno¤lu would counter by stressing that these elections were indeed for the Greek parliament and. Although the result was presented as a great victory for Turkism.136 bölüm ad› Sad›k was unable to be nominated. This had two purposes: There was a slight chance that it would be better in challenging the legality of the election law as candidates of an independent ticket rather than a party. However.”21 However. Equality and Peace party fielded a candidate under the ‹kbal (Good Fortune) banner in Ksanthi he felt obliged to run in order to counter Sad›k’s bid for dictatorial powers. he succeeded through threats and intimidation in excluding several strong minority candidates. Equality and Peace Party. many people were uncomfortable with this turn of events. or that they were electing a leader who could be sent to the “world parliament” instead of the Greek parliament. In spite of the existence of Sad›k’s Friendship. since Sad›k’s Friendship. but concerned .
. Promotion of minority’s problems in the “world parliament” proved little more than empty demagogy. Greece. I have had sex. In the following years the problems related to these choices would become ever clearer. The decision about what to do was in the balance until immediately prior to the nomination of candidates. Turkey.I cannot sit down because my behind hurts so badly. was still faced with the problem of how to handle the minority issue as the next parliamentary elections approached. This was expressed satirically but quite clearly in an anecdote published in a minority newspaper: A young boy returns home and tells his father: . . he clashed with everybody. Turkey had. you have become a man. Becoming ever more frustrated. This situation could not continue. on the other hand. It would find it difficult to sustain pressure on the minority as dissatisfaction with the deprivation of political representation was mounting and the heavy-handed methods employed in previous elections had attracted negative attention from international observers. and instead was mired in petty rivalry with his erstwhile comrades. however. painted itself into a corner and was having diffic›lty in finding a way out without a great loss of prestige. but Turkey was evidently at a loss as to how to dethrone this leader of his own creation. both countries ma- . including Turkish diplomacy. Come here and sit down beside me so that you can tell me all about it. There were feelings that Turkish pressure had made the minority shoot itself in the foot. In the end. was faced with the problem of handling highly-profile politicians completely under the influence of Turkey. Sad›k was unable to develop a dynamic policy of depth and vision. in many ways.Congratulations my son. Sad›k was surely set for an ignominious end were not his reputation saved by his untimely death (in July 1995). In its own coarse way.bölüm içeri¤i 137 about who would now represent the minority in dealing with Greek authorities. this illustrated clearly how minority politics had become subject to a complete reversal of values.Daddy.
). In short. Greece was able to exclude politicians who had been most stigmatised by their unbridled promotion of Turkish nationalism (Faiko¤lu. while Mustafa Mustafa was also elected for Synaspismos.). where it has remained ever since. as was evident in the most recent April 2004 elections. Hac›ibram etc.) Turkey was allowed to propose candidates on condition that it restrained their outward promotion of Turkish nationalism. all the evidence indicates that Stohos had access to official sources. This plan effectively secured the election of Galip Galip in Rodopi and Birol Akifo¤lu in Ksanthi. we have a more relaxed political atmosphere and the minority has gradually been able to express itself more freely. it may be said that at the core of the problem of reciprocity we have the identity issue.22 In this case. it resulted in indecisiveness and lack of initiatives from these MPs. In conclusion. while Turkey was able to exclude minority politicians who had taken a stance against Turkey’s blatant interference in previous elections (Onsuno¤lu. the use of which depended on whether they were addressing their Greek or Turkish audience. Improvements in Greek-Turkish relations since 1998 have undoubtedly made the MPs’ position less precarious. Rodoplu etc. The 22 September 1996 elections mark the point the time when the issue of minority political representation found its way back into the logic of inter-state reciprocity. Most of all. In general. outside the above agreement. Turkey also pooled the minority vote for their favoured candidates to PASOK in Rodopi and ND in Ksanthi. Galip and Birol proved to be very inexperienced politicians who struggled to find a balance between the demands of Turkey on one hand and their parties on the other. or maybe the word “belonging” provides us with a more immediate understanding of what confronts us: Where do the minorities belong? What is their place in what kind of society? The successful integration of the minorities in question he- . In practice they solved this problem by developing two parallel discourses.138 bölüm ad› de clear their preference for dealing with the minority issue as a Greek-Turkish affair in an extraordinary deal struck between representatives of the two countries.
Hopefully. For this reason. I have helped to shed light on interaction between local and bilateral politics and expand our knowledge in new areas. See in particular the briefing by the under-secretary of the Foreign Ministry. At the same time. 1 2 To Vima 03. public debate has a tendency to present the priorities of the states –either through representatives of the states or their proxies within the minorities– and ignore many issues that logically should be of greater concern to minority members themselves.09.bölüm içeri¤i 139 re is difficult as they are considered foreign elements in their “host countries” and they themselves display introvert behaviour towards the state they live in. I have sought to demonstrate how the concept of reciprocity penetrates heretofore little-explored areas of the minority’s political life. Andreas Zaimis. By collating the general framework of the minority regime with the effects of continuing political developments after 1974. I have taken political representation of the Muslim minority in Greece as my point of departure. The reciprocity issue has also been aptly . While fully acknowledging the leading role of the states. The other more immediate factor has of course been the fluctuations in GreekTurkish relations. Kapsis employs the historical names of toponyms in Turkey while my translation employs the present Turkish names. 31 May 1978 (Parliamentary minutes. we observe that both Greece and Turkey ascribe a high value to their kindred minorities in adjacent states. a situation which provides a socio-political explanation for a lopsided power relationship in which the kin state is able to wield enormous influence over a minority outside its own jurisdiction.1989. As a consequence of this. His notion of reciprocity seems tied to a peculiar interpretation of article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty. 4293-4297). Problems of the minorities have been presented mostly from the viewpoint of their kin states since the minorities lack the power to promote their own agenda. I think that we have to move beyond the state perspective in order to obtain a more multi-faceted understanding of how the concept of reciprocity influences the minority regime. pp.
cf. Ploumidis. Nikolakopoulos’ discussion refers particularly to the developments during the 1950ies in the conservative camp.1995 A Ömero¤lu. When the minority candidates were first set up in 3rd place on each party ticket this meant in practice their exclusion. Mavrogordatos.1993. This was also acknowledged openly by Ahmet Faiko¤lu in his Kurban Bayram› Message for 21.09. ‹leri 95/18. 1994.1990. In practice this meant that PASOK and ND would divide the three mandates in each of the Ksanthi and Rodopi prefecture between them. has not exactly the same connotations. 196-198. “The Emerging Party System” in R. with the largest party taking 2 and the smaller 1.1993. “How the new elections law steals seats in parliament”. 75. by I. 2nd.11. He presents his position in Cumhuriyet 15. Pretenderis. see To Vima 21. and R. by Ilias Nikolakopoulos.05.1992. 1994.05. p.1989. He has stressed this repeatedly.1994. A document disclosing Faiko¤lu’s work for the Greek secret services appeared in Stohos 421/15. 315. “The country where election systems flourish”.02. See also M.07. pp. 294-295. See the discussion by Onsun¤lu in Trakya’n›n Sesi 446/24. Trakya’n›n Sesi 519/31. Pontiki 23.10.1991. Mother country is a term that should be seen in its proper cultural context. which is the common term in western scholarly presentations. Akar. Cf. Frankfurt a.03. 1964’te Rumlar›n s›n›rd›ﬂ› edilmesi. for an example of a presentation in the Greek press.05. 1967-1982.01. pp.M.02. Trakya’n›n Sesi 483/19. I ellinotourkikí krísi.1994. While the Greek term Mitera Patrida corresponds very well to the Turkish Anavatan. Meinardus.1994.02. 1983. and in a conference on Western Thrace. see Sad›k Ahmet. but the dual dependence perspective has also relevance for the Kemalists. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974. Alexandris. p. Demir and R. See also the discussion by Onsuno¤lu in Trakya’n›n Sesi 402/05. cf. 1992). ‹leri 746/18. See for example Trakya 877/18. Fahir Alaçam was ambassador in Athens 1980-1985.” Milletleraras› Hukuk ve Millerleraras› Özel Hukuk Bülteni 1995. I. éna próvlima simvióseos. Greece in the 1980’s. ‹kibin’e Do¤ru 06.09. 1985. but it was also reported in the ultra right newspa- . Istanbul.” Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon VIII. ‹leri 727/10.10. “Politikés dinámis ke ekloyikí simperiforá tis mousoulmanikís mionótitas sti Ditikí Thráki: 1923-1955. reprinted in Trakya’n›n Sesi 484/02.1964.1987. 15(1-2). 53-58. Belgeler ve olaylar ›ﬂ›¤›nda bilinmeyen yönleriyle Ba›› Trakya Türkleri ve Gerçek -I-. Clogg (ed. ‹leri 464/27. p.1993.1990. Istanbul.08. Die TürkeiPolitik Griechenlands: Der Zypern-Ägäis-und Minderheitenkonflikt aus der Sicht Athens. ed. “Bat› Trakya Türklerinin ﬁikâyetleri ve istekleri. ‹leri 730/01. the term kin state. 184. K. London. _stanbul’un son sürgünleri.06. Athens. This deal is well known in minority circles.10. Athens. Bülent Ecevit expressed very similar views in H. 747/25. 1975. and Ta Nea 29.1993. pp. G.1990. Ellás ke Turkía.03.1977. 81.).02.1994.1994. For general discussions of this law.140 bölüm ad› 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 dealt with by A. Nikolakopoulos.
1996. which is known to have good connection to the secret services.bölüm içeri¤i 141 per Stohos 638/11.09. .