Studies on Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivrti. Part III: Can a . cognition become the object of another cognition?


Rʟ Tʀʟʟ e present paper is the third of a series of papers (Tʀʟʟ, forthcoming a, b) in which I am presenting the critical edition and English translation of the fragmentary codex unicus of the Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivrti, the long commentary . that Utpaladeva composed on his own Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā (ĪPK) and svavrtti, a work of outstanding importance for the philosophy of Kaśmirian . Śaivādvaita, and for Indian philosophy as a whole. I need not repeat here what I have already said elsewhere on the nature of the Vivrti and its relation to . the other commentaries.1 Suffice it to recall that Utpaladeva is said to have composed the ĪPK and the concise Vrtti at the same time, and later on to have . devoted an analytic commentary to the complex Kārikā-Vrtti, i.e. our Vivrti . . (or Tīkā), in which he discussed possible alternative views and rejected them, . also making occasionally quite long digressions on particular subjects. Of this lenghty work—corresponding to the extent of 8000 śloka (hence the traditional denomination of Astasāhasrī)—only a comparatively small fragment has come .. down to us, covering the section ĪPK I.3.6 through I.5.3. A detailed exposition of my discovery of the original manuscript after a cursory consultation, some 15 years ago, with a transcript of the same made by Prof. K. Ch. Pɴʏ, can be found in the first study that I have devoted to this text (Tʀʟʟ forthcoming a), which also contains a description of the manuscript (National Archives, Delhi, Skt. Mss. No. 30). e present paper deals with the Vivrti on ĪPK I.4.3–5. In the previous . chapter Utpaladeva, referring to an enigmatic statement in the Bhagavadgītā,2
With deep sadness I pay tribute to the memory of Hélène Bʀɴɴʀ. My admiration for her scholarly work is as great as my admiration for her unflinching courage and serenity in the last years of her life. 1 Tʀʟʟ 2002: XL–XLV. 2 Bhagavadgītā XV.15b mattah smrtir jñānam apohanam ca “From Me derive memory, . . . knowledge and exclusion”.

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had identified three powers (śakti) in the Lord: Cognition, Memory and Exclusion. After making some preliminary remarks concerning them as a whole, he starts a detailed inquiry into each of them. His aim is to show that cognition, memory and exclusion, which constitute the very basis of the knowledge process in human mind, are indirectly also a proof of the coinciding of the individual subject with universal Consciousness. None of these phenomena can be really explained and their complex functioning accounted for satisfactorily in merely ‘mechanic’ terms, as first of all the Buddhists do. e individual subject can cognize, remember and exclude only if it is conceived of as inscribed within an eternal and, at the same time, dynamic universal I-ness, i.e. Śiva. If Utpaladeva’s investigation starts with memory, by infringing the above stated order, it is “because in a very clear manner memory can serve as a logical reason for the establishment of the identity of the self with the Lord”.3 e starting point is the classical definition of memory given in Yogasūtra I.11: “Memory is the non-extinction of the object formerly perceived” (anubhūtavisayāsampramosah smrtih). e sustained analysis of Utpaladeva singles . . . . . out a few crucial points contained in such an apparently simple process: How is it possible to attribute temporal differentiation to a cognizer that is permanent in his essential nature? What is the relationship between the cognitive act of the original perception and the cognitive act of the subsequent memory? How can the latter bring the former to light again without objectifying it? On this point, in fact, the Śaiva and his principal opponent, the Buddhist epistemologist, are in full agreement: a cognition is self-luminous and cannot be the object of another cognition. e standard Buddhist explanation (examined in Tʀʟʟ, fortcoming b, from which I derive some of the observations that follow) is far from being satisfactory: saying that the perception produces a samskāra, which in turn will . produce the phenomenon of memory, only accounts for the fact that memory has a certain objective content but leaves out the ‘subjective’ component represented by the fact that the object has been ‘coloured’ by the previous perception, or, to be more precise, by its having been ‘already’ perceived in a certain past moment. Memory, in fact, is indeed the memory of the past object but also of the past perception of it. Instead, as Abhinavagupta says, what the
So we read at the very beginning of the Vivrti on I.4.1: smrtyādīnām idānīm . . . jñānaprakaranenānena svarūpam nirūpayisyann aśesakālānugatasvatantrāvabodhalaksanātmata. . . . . . ttvasvabhāveśvaraśaktirūpatām pratipipādayisuh smrter eva tāvat suspastam īśvarātmasiddhihetu. . . . .. tayā prathamam sambhavam āha. .
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samskāra is able to convey (or resurrect) is neither the original perception nor . the object insofar as it was cognized by such past perception.4 is presupposes a living organism at work, a dynamic and unitary consciousness able to freely move between different moments of time. It is the I that ensures the possibility of unifying the various cognitions occurring at different times, thus resolving the apparent inconsistency between a (present) vimarśa and a (past) anubhava. e one and same svasamvedana of both cognitions creates that necessary . bridge between them which the Buddhist epistemologist fails to account for.5 A further clarification is provided by Abhinavagupta in the ĪPVV (II, p. 32, ll. 10– 13): the prakāśa concerning the part-object (arthāmśe) belongs to the past; but . the prakāśa as grasped by the vimarśa, concerning the part-self (svātmāmse), is . not limited by time. us the vimarśa in the memory can connect itself with the vimarśa in the perception and, through it, with the former light of the object—in this way meeting both requirements: taking place in the present and not being divorced from prakāśa (Tʀʟʟ 2002:106–107, fn. 12). e portion of the Vivrti that I have edited here (its translation will . be published subsequently) is meant to answer the most obvious objection from a common sense point of view: why not simply say that the present memory ‘cognizes’ the former perception and, through it, the former object? Utpaladeva’s reply is centred on the vindication of one of the main foundation stones of Pratyabhiñā philosophy: the basic identity of the I, consciousness and any cognitive activitiy. If the I, the self, became the object of something outside it, it would simply cease being the I. Any cognition has as its essential nature self-awareness (svamvit), which can be taken in three different, and . complementary, senses: svasyaiva samvit, svaiva samvit, svasya samvid eva ca . . .
e point has been explicitly touched upon, in a different context, by Utpaladeva in ĪPK I.3.2cd […] samskārajatvam tu tattulyatvam na tadgati? “ e fact that [memory] arises from . . . latent impressions implies its similarity to the former perception, but not its cognition of that”. e samskāra of the former perception is awakened by a present perception—similar to the . other—which gives rise to the memory. e samskāra, therefore, ensures this ‘similarity’ in the . memory, but the memory itself has no direct access to (cannot ‘know’) the former perception and therefore nor can it, strictly speaking, establish the similarity between the latter and the present perception which has been reawakened by the samskāra (Tʀʟʟ 2002:99–100, fn. 4). . Vrtti thereon: “Since memory arises from the latent impression left by the former perception, . it only bears a similarity to that perception but does not have direct cognition of the latter; and, moreover, as there is no cognition of the former perception not even the similarity to it can be maintained. 5 Cf. ĪPVV II, p. 17, ll. 22–23 anubhavasmrtyor ekam svasamvedanarūpam ekavisayatopa. . . . lambhāt.
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(see below, p. *). Abhinavagupta, availing himself of a device very popular among the commentators, maintains that the particle ca evokes the existence of a further sense to be added to the three explicitly stated by Utpaladeva: svā samvid eva. None of them would stand, if the objectifiability of cognition were . accepted. For each of them, apart from the first one,6 Abhinavagupta specifies the respective counterparts, aptly clarifying the terse lines of the Vivrti: svaiva . samvit→parāpy asya [jñānasya] samvit, svasya samvid eva→asamvid api ca, svā . . . . samvid eva→jadam api asya rūpam.7 . . But the opponent has one more argument, apparently a very strong one. e yogin, thanks to his extraordinary power of perception, is able to penetrate other minds and know their contents: this is an unequivocal proof that cognitions can become the object of others’ cognitions. Utpaladeva’s answer is expressed in the last kārikā taken under consideration here, and subtly elaborated in the dense Vivrti thereon. Even if we hypothetically admitted that . a cognition can be objectified, nothing would change, since the establishing of a valid relationship of visaya-visayin between the two cognitions should be . . mediated by the attainment of a state of unification between the two cognitions and the respective subjects, and, if a successful knowledge process has sārūpya as its core, sārūpya, for its part, is incompatible with unity. It is undeniable, concludes Utpaladeva, that the yogin can have access to other minds, but this is possible precisely because he has reached the identification with the supreme Self and consequently has gone beyond the distinction of limited subjects: at that point, the cognitions of others end up being ‘his’ own cognitions. us, ātmavāda has been finally established, but for Utpaladeva this is not enough. Cognitions now are provided with a permanent self as their ultimate ground, but the ‘lazy’ self (e.g. of the Nyāya or the Vaiśesika) is unable to freely move . among cognitions, unite them, separate them, or, for example, in the case at issue (the phenomenon of memory), recover an object and its perception from the past and make them shine again in the present without cancelling their original nature but also without reproducing them mechanically. For this, the ‘sovereignty’ (aiśvarya) of self of the Śaivas is needed.
e counterpart of svasyaiva samvit is not shown both because it is not relevant to what . the author intends to prove, and because an awareness also of the other does not constitute a characteristic of insentience (ĪPVV II, p. 45, ll. 5–7). 7 Cf. ĪPVV II, p. 44, l. 25– p. 45, l. 5 (l. 3 prāg iti is to be corrected to °pratiyogi).
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T8
[f. 31, l. 15] <Vivrti> 9 smrtikāle ca pūrvakālāvacchedenārthābhāsasya sama. . rthitasya 10 vārtamānikasmrtiprakāśād bhedo nopapadyata ity anubhavasmrtyā. . bhāsayoh śarīrībhūta eko ’rthah tayor apy 11 ekatvam āksipatīti 12 copadarśayan . . . drastāram 13 smartāram caika[16v]m upapādayati || 14 […] .. . . [16v, l. 4] na ca yuktam smrter bhede smaryamānasya bhāsanam | . . . tenaikyam bhinnakālānām samvidām veditaisa sah || 3 || <I.4.3> . . . . . . 15 […] [17r, l. 14] Vrttih || pūrvānubhūtaś cārtho ’nubhavena saha . . tātkālikasmrtiprakāśe ’vabhāsamānah smrtyabhinna eva prakāśād bhinnasya . . . prakāśamānatānupapatteh | 16 evam anubhavasmrtyā[17v]disamvidām aikyam . . . . sa eva cātmā vedakas | tathā hi || Vivrtih || pūrvānubhūtasyaivārthasya kevalasya na smrtau yogijñāna . . . ivātītārthavisaye prakāśah | tathā hi smrtitvam na syāt | anubhavamukhenaiva . . . . cārthasya svayam sthiratve ’pi smrtāv atītatvatvam 17 ucyata ity anubhavaprakāśa . . evātropayogī | tad āha “pūrvānubhūtaś cārtho ’nubhavena saha”
e words underlined in the text are those literally cited in the ĪPVV. Punctuation is mine (that found in the MS is often misleading). In the edition, <…> means ‘addition with respect to the transmitted text; […], means ‘elimination of portions of the transmitted text’ (also the indications ‘folio’ and ‘line’ are between square brackets). e sandhi has been ‘normalized’. e establishing of the text has resulted from the delicate balance of sometimes divergent factors: the text as transmitted by the codex unicus, internal coherence, literal citations in the ĪPVV, paraphrases in the ĪPVV, parallel texts. A few literal citations from the Vivrti can be found in . the footnotes of the KSTS Ed. of the ĪPV, which have been derived from the marginal notes of an important MS of ĪPV, that given the siglum Gh in the edition of the ĪPV (the MS is now at the National Archives, Delhi, where I have consulted it). When the transmitted text has been modified, this has been pointed out by using three different expressions: emendation, conjectural emendation and tentative restoration. e first is felt as virtually certain, the second as highly probable, the third as a mere attempt. 9 smrti˚, my conjectural emendation for bhūta˚ MS; cf. ĪPVV II, p. 33, l. 13 tad avatārayati . samksepena ‘smrtikāle ca’ iti. . . . . 10 vārtamānika˚, my conjectural emendation for vānumānika˚ MS. 11 ekatvam, my conjectural emendation for ekataram MS. 12 cit. p. 33, l. 14 as darśayan. 13 smartāram, my conjectural emendation for kartāram MS. . . 14 the avatāranikā of ĪPV follows. . 15 the ĪPV follows. 16 p. 36, l. 8 has evam ca (tadvrttim ‘evam ca’ ityādikām vivrnoti), which instead is omitted in . . . . .. the citation in the Vivrti (see below), tad āha “evam anubhava” iti; ca also added in the MSS . TT used for my edition of the Vrtti. . . 17 a possible emendation of ucyata to ucyatām could be considered.
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iti | smrtiś ca jñānarūpaivety āha “smrtiprakāśa” iti, smrtiprakāśasya . . . tātkālikatvaviśesanena vartamānatoktyā kāladvayānusandhānāt smartrsiddhir . . . upaksiptā, na ca smrtijñānasya 18 vartamānāvacchinnasya visayinah . . . . . pūrvānubhavasahito ’nubhūto ’rtho ’tītarūpasvakālāvacchinno bhinnātmaiva 19 visayyabhramśamānatālaksanasya visayatvasya prakāśād bhede saty . . . . . anupapatteh | tad ahā “avabhāsamāna” iti | prakāśasvarūpāsvīkāre . paroksārthavat prakāśamānatvam na yuktam arthasya 20 †…†, etac coktam . . . purastād vaksyate ca | [18r] 21 tad evam vartamānasmrtiprakāśatām . . . . vinā paurvakālikārthānubhavasya arthasya ca tajjñānadvayātmatām . vinā smrtivisayībhāva eva nopapadyata ity uktā smrtyanubhavayor . . . anusandhānamayaikarūpātmasiddhih | tad āha “evam anubhava” iti | . ādigrahanenotpreksādisamvid uktānubhavisyate punar artho mayeti . . . . bhavisyatkālānubhavenāpy utpreksābuddher anusandhānāt | kevalam . . atrānubhavasmaranotpreksādīnām tattadvisayavaicitryād vicitrātmatayā . . . . dharmarūpatām vā parikalpya taddharmavān eko ’nya ivātmā vyavahriyate, . 22 vastuta evāntarmukhasyānyonyam abhinnātmanas tadātmatvam | tad āha “sa evātmā” iti | svānubhavasmaranayor bhinnakālatve tadabhedino ’rthasyāpi . pūrvāparabhāvena kālabheda eva atha ca smrtāv arthasya 23 atītatābhāsenaikyam . uktam, tat katham etasya bhedābhedalaksanaviruddharūpayogah syāt | . . . atrocyate — pūrvānubhavajñānasya tāvat smrtijñānād bhedena prathaiva . nāstīty anantaram eva vaksyate | jñānānām ca svatah kālayogābhāvah, . . . . kevalam jñeya[18v]gato ’sau tatropacaryata ity etad api vaksyate | evam . . . cānubhavasmrtijñānayor anubhāvyasmaryamānārthābhedān na tāvat . . tadapeksayā pūrvāparavyavahāro vastutaś cābheda evātmāparanāmā vaksyate, . . tasyaiva tv ātmanas sarvaśakter īśvarasya kālaśaktyā citrāvabhāsakāritayā tattadādityādikriyāsāksātkāralaksanābhāsasadasadbhyām cābhāsabhedapra. . . . kāśanāt kramāvabhāsane vaksyamānakālacintākramenānubhavasmrtijñānayoh . . . . . śarīrādyavasthābhāsakramopacāro vāstavābhedo ’py 24 anayor | tadapeksam apy . arthasya paurvāparyam katham viruddham syāt, na ca — smrtāv avabhāsamāno . . . .
a possible emendation of vartamānā˚ to vartamānatā˚ could be considered. visayyabhraśamānatā˚, my tentative restoration for visayād bhraśamānatā˚ MS. . . 20 I reproduce the passage, apparently corrupt, for which I have not been able to find a plausible restoration: śvetarūpādauveśeśvetamānayetiprasādasya. 21 cit. p. 36, l. 8 as tad eva ca. 22 vastuta evāntarmukhasyānyonyam abhinnātmanas tadātmatvam, my conjectural emenda. tion for vastu evāntarmukhā anyonyam abhinnātmanas tadātmatattvam MS. . 23 cit. as atītā˚ p. 36, l. 22 (also possible). 24 anayoh | tad ˚, my conjectural emendation for anayor atad ˚ MS. .
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’pi smaryamānārthah sphutākāro nāvabhāsata ity — ābhāsabhedād api . . . bhidyate vimarśābhedād ity etad api vaksyata eva | yady api25 pūrvānubhavah . . prthak smrtau na prathate tathāpi pūrvānubhūtatvenārthāsya prathanād . . arthamayo ’sau prakāśata eva | evam bhedavyavahāre ’pi tattvatas tadai26 kyam . evedānīm darśayati | tathā hīti || . Vivrti || na ca prakāśamānatānyathānupapattyā prakāśānupraveśe ’pi . ghatavad grāhyāmśāvasthā[19r]nam pūrvānubhavasya grāhakāmśopārohena . . . . . prathanād ity āha || 27 […] naiva hy anubhavo bhāti smrtau pūrvo ’rthavat prthak | . . prāg anvabhūvam aham ity ātmārohena bhāsanāt || 4 || <I.4.4> . 28 […] [19v, l. 9] Vrttih || smrtau smaryamāno ’nubhūtārtho yathā . . . . prthagbhūto bhāti na tathānubhavah svātmana evāhantāpratyeyasyānubhava. . mayatvena prathanāt | yaś cānekakālo ’hamvedyo ’rthah sa evātmā || . . Vivrtih || smaranajñāne ghatādyarthākāra eva ekah pūrvakālādyavacchinno . . . . . grāhyabhāvasthah prthaktvenedantānirdeśyo ’vabhāti, na tu pūrvānubhavākāro . . 29 ’parah | “smrtāv” iti | na cāsau yogino ’tītārthamātrajñāna iva pūrvānubhavo . . naiva prakāśate ’ha˙ kārāspadībhūta30 grāhakāmśānupravistasyāham anvabhūn . .. 31 vam iti mayānubhūto ’rtha iti vā pūrvānubhavasya smartrbodhaikyena . prakāśanāt | mayānubhūta 32 ’rtha ity atrāpi artha eva prthagbhūto bhāti, . anubhavas tu tadānīm arthopasarjanabhā[20r]vena srjyamāno ’pi taduttīrna . . ivedantāparāmarśasamsparśāksamo ’hammātraviśrāntisatattvah, tasya tu yah . . . . . sa iti sphuta iti ca parāmarśah tad anubhāvyadharmopacārena vyava. . . hāramātram deśakālādyavacchedaprthagbhāvād iti vaksyate | so ’ham evam . . . āsam ity ātmanah pramātur api grāhyatvena buddhyādidharmopacārena . . . vyavahārāt | vastutas tu nātmā nāpy anubhavajñānam anubhāvyātiriktam . grāhyapakse rūpavad ābhāti iti | yo ’yam ahampratītau prathamāno vedya. . bhūmikāvatīrno ’nekakālagatavedyonmukhatvamātrāt pratyagātmatādāśāyām . . tathānekakāla33 topacāropacaryamānah sa evātmā drastā smartā ceti | tad āha . . ..
cit. p. 39 as yady api ca. in MS ˚kyam eve˚ corrects a previous ˚kyeneve˚. 27 the avatāranikā of ĪPV follows. . 28 the ĪPV follows. 29 aparah, my conjectural emendation for apara˚ MS. . 30 ˚grāhakāmśā˚, my emendation for ˚grāhakām cā˚ MS. . . 31 iti, my conjectural addition. 32 ’rtha, my conjectural addition. 33 ˚pacāropacaryamānah, my emendation for ˚pocāracaryamānah MS (also possible: . . . . upacārenācaryamānah or upacārācaryamānah). . . . . .
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“yaś cānekakāla” iti | vedyatā atra prathamānatātātparyenoktā na tv anyāyat. taprakāratvena 34 vedanakarmatayā || Vivrti || nanu prakāśānupraveśam vinā prakāśamānatā mā bhūt, na tu . . tāvataiva prakāśyaprakāśakayor aikyāpattir grāhyabhāga eva grāhakād vicchinne ghatādeh prakāśyasya prakāśābhinnasyāpi prathanāt, tathā yoginām . . . parapramātrbodhah paratvenaivedantayā prakāśate ’nyathā bhrāntih syāt, tat . . . katham jñānasya 35 jñānāntarāgrāhyatve ’nubhavavisayāyāh smrter anubhavena . . . . sahaikyam syād iti || 36 […] . [20v, l. 12] yoginām api bhasante na drśo darśanāntare | . svasamvidekamānās tā bhānti meyapade ’pi vā || 5 || <I.4.5> . 37 […] <21v, l. 2> Vrttih || sarvajñānām api pramātrantaragatā . . upalambhāh svasamvinmātravedyasvabhāvāh svātmārūdhā eva bhāseran | ataś . . . . ca 38 tesām yoginām 39 paramātmatāpattir eva 40 tattvam, prameyakaksyāyām . . . . evam vā ghatādivat prātisvikena śuddhabodhātmanā rūpenāvabhāseran, yadi . . . tathā sambhavet || 41 Vivrtih || tad atra | yoginām api parabodhah svasamvinmaya evāvabhā. . . . sate ‘nyathā prāguktanityā bodhatāhānih syāt svasamvedanaprathāmātrarūpa. . tvāt tasya | grāhyabhūmigatatvenāvabhāsanābhyupagame ’pi vā tasya smr. tyanubhavavrttāntavailaksanyam eva parabodhavisayayogivijñānotpatteh, na . . . . tv etan42 nidarśane ‘nubhavasmrtyor grāhyagrāhakabhāva ity āha “yoginām” . iti | yogitvam iha upayujyamānatvāt paroksajñānamātramayam nirdistam | . . .. tad āha “sarvajñānām” iti | yogipratyaksasya anyaprasiddhatvamātre sarva. jñagrahanam 43 krtam | “pramātrantaragatāh” pramātrantarasiddhāh pra. . . . . mātrantarātmānas tattadghatādibhinnabhāvavisayā ity arthah | jñānānām . . . . jñānāntaravedyatve svabhāvahānih syād iti “svabhāva”padam upāttam nāpy . .
in MS vedana˚ apparently corrects a previous vedaka˚. jñānāntarāgrāhyatve, my conjectural emendation for jñānāntaragrāhyatve MS. 36 the avatāranikā of ĪPV follows. . 37 the ĪPV follows. 38 MS inverts the order: yoginām tesām; all the mss. of the Vrtti read tesāM yoginām. . . . . . . . 39 I accept now the reading paramātmatā˚ MS, while in my edition of the Vrtti I had preferred . parātmatā˚ (the mss. of the Vrtti oscillate between the two readings). . 40 tattvam is written above the line to correct a previous na tu. . 41 vivrttih has been added in the left margin. . . 42 ˚nidarśane, my emendation for ˚nidarśano MS. e reading ˚nidarśane is also found in the fn. 121 of ĪPV I, p. 137, which reproduces literally (with the only addition of one explanatory gloss) the above passage of the Vivrti (grāhyabhūmi … grāhyagrāhakabhāva). . 43 I delete na (na krtam MS), which apparently does not fit the context. .
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ubhayavedyatety pratipādanāya “mātra”grahanam | svasamvinmātralaksanatvāc . . . . copalambhasya svasamvinmātravedyatvam svabhāvah [22r]44 | svasyaiva sam. . . . vit 45 svaiva samvit svasya samvid eva ca iti | jñānam svasamvillaksanam, . . . . . . . param api hi tat prakāśayet svātmānam eva prakāśayan na tu 46 svātmaprakāśanād aparam paraprakāśanam jñānasyeti svasyaiva samvit tathābhūtam ca . . . . sat | parenāpi yadā taj jñānam prakāśyate tadā nāsya svaiva samvit, na ca . . . svasya tat samvid eva syād, api tu parāpeksaprakāśanatvāt parāpy asya samvid, . . . asamvid api ca taj jadasyaivamlaksanatvāt | tadā tv etāvat syāt — 47 yam . . . . . . yoginam pratyupasthitam parapramātrjñānam svayam eva prakāśeta 48 tam . . . . . praty asya evam jñānalaksanātikramo na syāt | 49 na tv etad upapadyate parena . . . . saha sambandhāyogāt | jñānam ca visayālambhanam sārūpye50 naiva bhavati . . . . nīlādeś ca jñānavilaksanarūpatvāt tadanukārena jñānasya bhedābhedaniba. . . ndhanam sārūpyam upapadyate, jñānayos tu dvayor visayavisayinor ekabodha. . . . mātralaksanatvād abheda eveti na sārūpyam ālambanārtho ’nayor, api tu . . aikyam eva | darpanayos sarvarūpavailaksanyād anyonyasārūpyam syāt | jñā. . . . nayos tu bodharūpatātirikto deśakālayogāveśaviśeso ’pi hi na sambhavī | . kimca yad yathābhūtam tadrūpenaiva jñānam tadākāram bhavat tadvisayam . . . . . . . bhavet, anīlavyavacchinnena hi nīlena nīlākāram jñā[22v]nam 51 tadvisayam, . . . tataś ca grāhyavyavacchinnagrāhakaikasvabhāvena jñānena jñānāntaram tu. lyākāram eva syād | yadi hy ekabhāga eva niveśayet, etat pramusitasvarūpam . . na kuryāt | 52 evam dvayor 53 aikyāpattyaiva visayavisayibhāvah | tad āha . . . . “svātmārūdhā eva” iti | 54 svātmā jñānasya grāhakāmśah, parapramātrsam. . . . bandhi tu śarīrādi sarvajñajñāne bhedena grāhyāmśa evāvabhāsate | tadabhi. prāyenaiva tu parasattānupraveśavisayam sarvajñajñānam iti vyavahārah | . . . . vāstavena tu bodhaikātmanā 55 pramātrā pramātrantaraikyāpattir eva parathe passage “tāvanmātram laksanam hi esām”, cit. p. 44, l. 10, might be a quotation from . . . . . the Vivrti (not found in MS). . 45 svaiva, my conjectural emendation for svasya MS. 46 svātma˚, my emendation for svātmā˚ MS. 47 yam, my tentative restoration for param MS (which, alternatively, could simply be deleted). . . 48 cit. p. 45, l. 14 as tam yoginam prati (yoginam being most probably a gloss). . . . 49 cit. p. 45, ll. 15–16 as nanu etad api. 50 ˚naiva, my emendation for ˚naivam MS. . . . 51 MS reads, incorrectly, na tadvisayam. . 52 evam, my emendation for eva MS (also possible, but less satisfactory: na kuryād eva – . aikyāpattyaiva …). 53 in MS aikyāpattyaiva corrects a previous aikyāpattir eva (also possible*). 54 svātmā, my conjectural emendation for svātma˚ MS. 55 I restore pramātrā, not found in MS (most probably dropped by haplography; see the
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446

Mélanges tantriques à la mémoire d’Hélène Brunner

mātma56 vedakatvam sarvajñasya | tad āha “yoginām paramātmatāpattir eva” . . iti | na ca pramātrantarair aikye ’pi sarvajñasya parasukhaduhkhayogah . . sukhāder vāstave pramātari bodhaikalaksanāhantāmātraprathātmany asanni. . veśāt | māyīya eva buddhyātmani pramātary ahantedantāpratītivisaye tasyāva. sthitir iti vaksyate | ata eva grāhakabhūmikottīrnānām vāstavapramātrdaśāsa. . . . māpannānām tattatsvahetūpasthāpitasukhaduhkhasāksātkāre ’pi na sukhitvādi, . . . tesām notpadyata eva vā sukhādihetuvaikalyāt | sahajānandāvirbhāvas tadā . . syāt | pūrvajanmāntarapratyaksīkāre ’pi yoginām janmā[23r]ntarānubhūtā. . nām arthānām pūrvānubhūtatvena sāksātkāre pūrvānubhavaikyāpattir eva, . . tadā ca vartamānena mayā pūrvajanmany anubhūtam iti pūrvānubhavānusandhānāj janmāntarānubhūtena smrtir evāsau | pramātrantaradrstam artham . ... . pramātrantaradarśanena saha yadottarakālam sāksātkaroti yogī, tadā tatpūrva. . vartipramātrantaradarśanaikyāpattyā sāksātkarotīti smrtir eva sā | pramātranta. . raikyāpattāv api ca svapratyagātmasamskārānivrttes tatpramātrantara57 svarū. . papuryastakādi parapramātrtvenaivāvabhāsate, sarvathā samskārapariksaye tv .. . . . īśvarāyamāno yogī sarvam ātmaśarīram eva paśyati, na tasya jñānapravibhāgah | . . . tad evam sarvathā jñānānām 58 na vedyavedakabhāvah, grāhakabhāvaikyāpattyā . . . svaparavibhāgasamskārabhramśe ’pi vastutah svasamvedanarūpatayaiva 59 bha. . . . vantīti sthitam | abhyupagamyāpy ucyate — sarvajñasya pramātrantarā60 nu. bhavā yadi grāhyabhāga evā61 vabhāserams tad abhedenaivāha˙ kārabahirbhān . vena tatpramātrantarasambandhiśarīrabuddhyākārottīrnena bodhamātrenā. . tmanā idantayā paratvenāvabhāseran | tad āha “prameyakaksyāyām” iti . 62 “prātisvikena śuddhabodhātmanā” iti ca | esa ca pakso noktanayena sam. . . bhavatīty abhyupagamavādamātram evedam | tad āha “yadi tathā sambhaved” iti | iha tv aham 63 anvabhūvam mayānubhūtam iti grāhakāmśādhi. . ropenaivedam64 bhāvottīrnatayaiva[23v] prathanād anubhavasmaranajñānayor . . . .
following pramātrantara˚). 56 ˚vedakatvam, my conjectural emendation for ˚vedanam MS (quoted p. 47, l. 10 as . ˚vedakam); cf. l. 11 ‘tattvam’ paramātmavedakatvam ity arthah (contra: cf. ll. 13–14 sarva. jñagrahanam […] parātmavedakaparyāyatām eti). . . 57 ˚svarūpa˚ (or, also possible, ˚svarūpam), my emendation for ˚svarūpah MS. . . 58 na, my conjectural addition (na, not found in MS, is strictly required by meaning). 59 bhavantīti, my conjectural emendation for bhavatīti MS (the only possible subject being jñānāni understood from the previous jñānānām). 60 ˚nubhavā yadi, my emendation for ˚nubhavāya MS. 61 avabhāserams tad abhedena, my conjectural emendation for anubhāseran | stadbhedena MS. . 62 prātisvikena, my emendation for svikena MS. 63 anvabhūvam, my emendation for anvabhūyam MS. . . 64 ˚bhāvo˚, my conjectural emendation for ˚bhāso˚ MS.

Raffaele Torella

447

aikyam eva naitattulyateti siddha evātmavādah | ātmanaś ca aikyamātrenāpy . . audāsīnyān 65 ananubhavasmaranādiśaktimattvād aiśvaryam na syād, etac . . coktam vaksyate ca || . .

ananubhava˚, my conjectural emendation for nānubhava˚ MS. e citation p. 53, l. 17 of yāvat, not found in MS, leaves some doubt on the last sentence as transmitted in MS.

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