Many Shaiva tantras present themselves in the form of dialogues between the Goddess and Siva or Bhairava, in which generally the Goddess asks and Siva replies. These roles may also be inverted, as happens in the tantras assigning the highest position to the Goddess, accompanied in a subordinate position by the God, who may sometimes even be absent altogether. Thus in these texts sentences like these continuously recur: “The Goddess said [i.e. asked]” (dev uvaca), “Bhairava ı   said [i.e. replied]” (bhairava uvaca). In spite of their familiarity with such expressions which are very common in epic, narrative or stric sa literature of all time periods, the Saiva theologians did not conceal their embarrassment about them. How could it be possible to make the Goddess or Bhairava speak in the perfect tense? All the three essential features that grammatical speculation attributes to the perfect tense,  namely, referring to the past (bhuta), not pertaining to the current day (anadyatana) and being out of reach of direct experience (paroksa), . conflict with the nature of the Goddess, who, on the contrary, is par excellence what abides in the heart of any reality, not only directly perceivable in all the planes of being, but even forming the very substratum of any human experience. Prior to examining how the Saiva philosophers of the K mrian as ı advaita faced and solved this theological-grammatical problem, it is convenient to outline the grammatical frame of reference of the question. Pnini defines the perfect tense (lit) in III.2.115 parokse lit “[When the a. . . . action refers to the general past time excluding the current day] and beyond the perception of the speaker, l-substitutes of lit are introduced” . (transl. Katre 1989: 253).2 The concept of anadyatana is sufficiently ~ clear and does not require particular explanation. Patanjali (MBh vol. II p. 118) only underlines its being a bahuvrhi – which gives negation the ı meaning of prasajyapratisedha (cf. Uddyota thereon) for the declared . _ purpose of excluding the use of the imperfect (lan) in sentences like ‘We have eaten yesterday and today’, which, instead, require the aorist _ (lun). Thus, anadyatana means ‘not concerning today’. But what does ‘today’ mean? Grammarians provide a rather varied list of definitions, of which the most widely accepted seems to be ‘the current day together
Journal of Indian Philosophy 27: 129–138, 1999. c 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



with half the preceding night and half the following day’ (Pradpa ı  ı ~ . vol. III p. 249; cf. Kiranaval on Paramalaghumanjusa p. 211). . Far more problematic is the second feature ‘out of [or beyond] direct experience (lit. ‘sight’)’, being the object of an extensive analysis in the MBh, of which I will refer to only the points more directly relevant to ~ the question that interests us here. Pata njali (MBh vol. II pp. 119–120) asks himself three questions: ‘what is the meaning and derivation of the term’ (kim paroksam nama), ‘what is its referent’ (kasmin punah . . .  . parokse) and ‘what is its connotation’ (kathamjatyakam punah paroksam . . ı . . . .  nama).3 He does not ask ‘with respect to whom’ as it is obvious that the reference is to the speaker. The meaning is ‘out of reach not of the sense of sight alone but of all senses in general’ (cf. Uddyota ~  . vol. III p. 251 indriyajanyajnanavisaya ity arthah). Obviously, paroksa . . cannot refer to time, which, therefore, is not discussed at all (na vai   kaladhikaro ’sti). Thus, by exclusion, it must refer to the verbal root  (dhatu). However, the latter cannot be taken in its formal aspect (sabda), since the qualification paroksa/pratyaksa cannot apply to the word. For . . the word, in order to be able to fulfill its function of manifestor of the meaning, cannot but be pratyaksa, as Kaiyata points out.4 What is left . . is solely the root taken as ‘the meaning’ of the root, that is, action (kah .   ~ punar dhatvarthah/kriya). But every action, notes Patanjali, is already . paroksa by its own nature since it is a process formed by a sequence of . segments. Only each single segment can be directly perceived, whilst the action as a whole can only be inferred. If, through a cognitive effort, we lump together the single segments into a compact entity, the result is something to which the name of ‘action’ does not apply any more (“like an embryo taken out from the uterus”). 5 In this way, if we have  to exclude action, we are only left with the means of action (sadhana).6 Thus, the perfect tense applies to a past action when the factors that brought it about are beyond the direct experience of the speaker. But then it would be impossible to use the perfect in order to say that somebody, who is presently in front of us, cooked some rice in the past, which is also in front of us now, because in that case both the kartr .  and the karman would not be paroksa. Therefore, it is not the sadhana . (conceived as saktivyatiriktam saktimad dravyam, Pradpa vol. III ı . . p. 253) as being a substance that has to be out of the direct experience  of the speaker, but the sadhana as connected to a particular sakti or,  in other words, the sadhana as engaged in a particular action.7 This ~ is, in outline, the grammatical state of affairs, which makes Patanjali (provisionally) conclude that on these grounds the use of the first person 



of the perfect is to be altogether excluded (sarvathottamo na sidhyati).8 I will dwell on this point later on. Let us go back to the Saiva theologians and their feeling of embarrassment, fully justified indeed, at the use of the perfect tense in “dev ı  uvaca”. To this has to be added the embarrassment at the very fact that the Goddess, who represents the totality of knowledge and consciousness itself, might be depicted in the act of ‘asking’, which, on the one hand, entails a limitation in her knowledge and, on the other, evokes the presence of something outside her towards which she turns. The sources where we are to search for the complex solution of this seemingly insoluble problem are, firstly, the two commentaries (Laghuvrtti .  .  and Vivarana) that Abhinavagupta devoted to the Paratrimsika, then the . ~ (only partly extant) commentary of Ksemarja to the Vijnanabhairava9 a . nanda in his Dpika on the Yogin . daya10  and a very brief hint by Amrta ı ıhr . (the last two authors basically follow Abhinavagupta’s arguments). To these texts we may add the unpublished commentary by Krsnadsa on .. . a ika [i.e. Paratrimsika]-Laghuvrtti.11   .  the Anuttaratrims . . I have said ‘solution’, but in fact the two commentaries by Abhinavagupta furnish two essentially different solutions. Let us see first the Laghuvrtti: .
Here [in the Partrim ik], it is the very deity of the own self that, while awakening [to a .s a its fullness], incessantly asks its own self with a part of its reflective awareness [: : : ]. In this way, when, in the course of its awakening, Consciousness asks the question, the ultimate essence of which is an imperfect shining, then, once it has attained the condition of ‘perfectly awake’, it is itself who, in the state of fullness, consisting of Bhairava, becomes the ‘answerer’. And there is no question here of something coming before or afterwards but it is only a primordial reality that, continuously revolving, appears under the illusory construction of a temporal differentiation. Consequently, the Goddess is presented in the sphere of ordinary linguistic communication as ‘past’   . . (bhutatvena). Then, she is presented as being ‘beyond direct experience’ (paroksyena) in the sense that there is no possibility of direct perception [of her] since by her very nature she cannot be the object of knowledge.12

In this way, the use of the perfect tense is made acceptable, and with all its three essential features13 included (if taken in a less obvious and subtler way). The linguistic realization in grammatical terms is made to correspond integrally to the vivaksa of the prayoktr (here the . . author of the text) who remains, basically, on the metaphorical plane  ~ (cf. bhutatvena vyavahriyate; see also Vijnanabhairava-uddyota p. 2  paroksam iva [: : : ] bhutam iva [: : : ] anadyatan iva). According to ım .  Krsnadsa, the initial sentence (tatra svatmadevataiva : : : ) is precisely a .. . aimed at giving a preliminary orientation to the listener/reader and preventing him from accepting a more obvious (and unacceptable) interpretation of the three features:



Here the phrase ‘the deity of the own self’ [i.e. ‘that is the own self’] is meant to negate paroksa [in its current acceptation] in the sense of ‘out of reach of direct . experience’ by affirming instead that it is uninterruptedly manifested in all living beings as ‘present to direct experience’, as being the I. By saying “ : : : the deity of the own self [asks] its own self : : : ”, it eliminates the differentiation between the questioner and the answerer; by saying “asks incessantly”, it also negates the feature of ‘past’ [taken literally] affirming that it has no contact with time, which would imply impermanence, the latter only qualifying objects of knowledge.14

The only tense that would have been compatible with the Goddess’s action of speaking, on account of her being present – her asking is also not subject to temporal limitation – and accessible to direct experience, is the present tense (lat); if a past tense has been used, this is also . to arouse in the disciples a firm adhesion to and understanding of the doctrine, which is favoured by the presentation of the teaching as being old.15 The analysis of the same sentence “dev uvaca” in the PTV is utterly ı  different, and much subtler. First of all, the grammatical interpretation itself is unexpectedly different: by exploiting the fact that the first and the third persons of the perfect tense are morphologically identical  (uvaca), now the meaning is no longer “the Goddess said (asked)” but “I, who am the Goddess, said (asked)”. In so doing, Abhinavagupta aims to avail himself of the observations that the grammatical tradition, from Ktyyana onwards, has elaborated on the issue of the first person a a of the perfect. Such a kind of sophisticated operation – to translate grammatical paradigms into theological ones, and viceversa – is not new to him. He moves with elegance and suppleness between two factually different dimensions, nourishing one through the other, thus pointing, through the liberty of his exegeses, to the unpredictability of the paths of supreme Consciousness.  Whether one considers as paroksa the action, the sadhanas or the .  concrete entities being the substrata of the sadhanas, the first person would still be impossible, as here the speaker and the agent subject coincide, and an action is by necessity directly experienced by its agent,16 or, from a slightly different viewpoint, the agent, in carrying out his function, must be self-conscious.17 The impossibility of the first  person is to be accepted, replies a (possible) varttika by Ktyyana, a a except for a subject acting in a state of sleep or intoxication (MBh vol. II ~ p. 120 suptamattayor uttamah). Or, Patanjali adds, it is also possible . that someone, though being awake, is not aware of what happens in front of him (or even of what he is doing himself); for example, one a a among the grammarians, Skatyana, though standing on the road, . does not notice the multitude of chariots that are passing.18 This can 



~ be explained, goes on Patanjali (ibid.), by the fact that the senses can produce a certain perception only if united to manas, and here manas is absent, viz. engaged in other activities. Thus, when somebody, having his mind directed elsewhere – due to intoxication, sleep or mere absentmindedness – is not aware of what he did on a certain occasion and someone else who witnessed that action reminds him of it, then he is allowed to say, by using the perfect tense: “Indeed, while I was sleeping, I spoke a lot”.19 This is the grammatical background of the complex interpretation of “dev uvaca” in the PTV. In spite of its length, it is ı  worthwhile to quote this very interesting passage in full:
In this way, when the Blessed Goddess [as] Pa yant and Madhyam becomes aware s ı a of herself in these terms: “In the form of the deity Par Vc, thus I spoke (avocam)”,20 a a then, being in that state, in conformity with the differentiation with respect to herself a a a caused by my – for it is precisely in this stage that the myic creation begins  unfolding – she conceives of that plane of Par Vc21 as past (bhutatvena), looks at a a  . . a it as beyond direct experience (paroksyena) inasmuch as she [Par] transcends the paths of the inner and outer senses, to which the appearance of differentiation alone a gives life, and, lastly, [conceives of Par as ‘not concerning today’] in that she is not defined by the notion of ‘belonging to the current day’, created by the division into days which in its turn depends on the transit of the sun, etc. The three conditions  of bhuta, paroksa and anadyatana having been fulfilled, the perfect tense in the . first person is allowed. The meaning comes to be as follows: “I, who am nobody a a else but the Goddess Par Vc – as the state of non-differentiation of all expressing words and expressed meanings – said.” This use of the first person is only possible if we refer to situations and expressions such as “Indeed, while sleeping, I spoke a lot”. To elaborate: He does not recall that past situation because in the past he had not been able to apprehend it; now, instead, either because somebody witnessed it or due to some physical alteration, such as stammering caused by having spoken or sung too much, he comes to realize it with wonder. In fact, we cannot say that this is merely a case of non-apprehension. The fact of being out of direct experience (paroksatva) derives from the non-apprehension of a particular knowable object in . cases like intoxication, sleep or stupefaction (“While being intoxicated or sleeping, a indeed I spoke a lot”); in the state of Par, on the contrary, it derives from the very absence of any particular knowable object. The difference between the two situations lies precisely in this: the absence of any knowable object depends on the fourth state arising [in Her] once She attains the perfect identification with the knowing subject, whereas in the other cases (intoxication and so forth) it depends on the predominance of obfuscation. However, the fact of being out of direct experience (paroksatva) is, . in itself, the same.22

In Abhinavagupta’s involute discourse, diverse levels of meaning progressively emerge, without, however, excluding each other. After all, it is the Supreme Goddess that is at issue here. The use of the perfect tense in the first person has the purpose of implicitly indicating, so-to-speak, a stratification in the subject but within a basic unity. This imperfect coincidence accounts, on the one hand, for the differentiation between a questioner and an answerer, which, as we have seen, would not suit the nature of the Goddess; these two roles correspond respectively



to the plane of ‘being about to awake’ and ‘fully awake’. In fact, the utterance of this verb in the perfect tense occurs in the present, that is, within samsra, and has as its agent Pa yant-Madhyam (in the latter, I s ı a . a  is to be understood). Such ‘imperfect coincidence’, believe, also Vaikharı on the other hand, is grounded on a basic unity too. The three features  of the perfect do not concern action (the dhatvartha) but its stratified or concentric agent. In particular, the term paroksa is explained twice and . with two different meanings, always with reference to Par. The first a time it refers to her being inaccessible to an objectifying knowledge; the second time it points to the general absence of the very notion of ‘knowable object’ on the Par level, thus making the question of a paroksa/pratyaksa meaningless. . . Abhinavagupta does not say it explicitly but he seems to expect the recipient of his teaching to realize by himself that all this argument is essentially only a variation on the theme of recognition, evoked through the solution of a grammatical problem. Just as the first person of the perfect presupposes, so-to-speak, a splitting of the subject followed by a new integration and reconstitution of the original unity, so the Goddess starts from the state of Pa yant-Madhyam and finally res ı a affirms herself as the all-encompassing Par, or, in other words, begins as a the questioner (Dev) and ends as the answerer (Bhairava). In fact, what ı Abhinavagupta says about the subject who, thanks to the intervention of somebody close to him or to his noticing certain unequivocal signs, becomes aware that he has spoken in his sleep, irresistibly recalls the dynamics of the recognition of one’s own identity with the Lord.
However, since He, though being directly perceived is not discerned for what He is because of delusion, precisely for this reason, by bringing His powers to light, the recognition of Him is shown.23 When, on the contrary, by virtue either of the guru’s words or of the recognition of the powers of knowledge and action in the self, he realizes the greatness of his s own Mahe vara’s nature, then liberation in life, consisting in the state of absolute fullness, is immediately achieved.24 

This experience is connotated by ‘wonder’ (camatkara).25 But had   not Abhinavagupta described precisely in these terms (camatkarat pratipadyate) the recovering of the speaker’s awareness of his nocturnal talking? The perfect tense in the first person is therefore the ideal model to express a distinction and a coincidence of planes at the same time, that is, the empirical subject’s existing and acting in ordinary reality and, at the same time, his being eternally rooted in supreme Consciousness. To conclude with Abhinavagupta’s words: 



.     evam sarva eva pramata gurusisyadipade anyatra va vyavahare sthitah sarvakalam . . .    eva yat kimcit kurvana enam eva samvidam anupravisya sarvavyavaharabhajanam . . .  bhavati / atas tam eva vastuto vimrsati dev uvaca iti. ı  . Thus, every subject, in whatever empirical state he may be (either of master or disciple or any other), at any time, whatever he may be doing, is able to deal with all human transactions [only] because he is compenetrated with this Consciousness. Therefore, it is it alone that, in reality, he refers to in saying “I, the Goddess, said” (PTV p. 190).

NOTES This paper intends to be a small contribution to the study of the interaction between grammatical doctrine and religious-philosophical speculation, a study carried out (and, if not opened, at least re-opened) by Professor Kamaleshvar Bhattacharya with a series of masterly papers, too well-known to be listed here. 2 The specifications ‘the general past time’ and ‘excluding the current day’ are to  be added to the sutra through anuvrtti from P. III.2.84 and III.2.111. For a survey .  of the lakaras’ doctrine see Renou 1960 and Gune 1978. 3 ~ Patanjali refers to different views: something can be paroksa because it belongs . to a more or less remote past, because it is hidden by a screen, and so forth (MBh    . vol. II p. 120 kecit tavat ahur varsasatavrttam paroksam iti / apara ahuh katantaritam . . . . . .  paroksam iti / ahur dvyahavrttam tryahavrttam ca). . . . . . 4  .    Pradpa vol. III p. 252 pratyayaprakr teh sabdasyoccaryamanasyanubhutatvat ı . .  . paroksatvasambhavah. . . 5       . . ı   MBh vol. II p. 120 kriya nameyam atyantaparidrs. anumanagamyasakya pindbhuta ..t  nidarsayitum yatha garbho nirluthitah. . . 6 Provided that they are conceived as something different from the various gunas . that compose them, for, in this case, being gunas (= saktis), they too could only be .   .  known by inference (MBh vol. II p. 120 yadi tavad gunasamudayah sadhanam apy .   anumanagamyam / athanyad gunebhyah sadhanam bhavati pratyaksaparoksatayam . .  . . .  . ı .   sambhavah (Pradpa vol. III p. 253 saktnam nityanumeyatvat). ı . . 7    Pradpa vol. III p. 253 [: : : ] sadhanatvasya samrambharupasya paroksatvat ı . .   .t  papaceti yuktam; Uddyota ibid. samrambhah saktis tadavis. arupasyety arthah; . . .  . .     .  .       Vyakaranabhusanasara p. 186 vyaparavis.tanam kriyanukulasadhananam evatra .  . . paroksyam vivaksitam. . 8  ‘In all cases’ (sarvatha), that is, irrespective of how paroksa may be conceived . (see above n. 3). 9      P. 2 tatra pasyantyadipade dyotanadisatattva samviddev prabudhyamanataya ı . .   .  pras.tr svam (KSTS Ed. sva) parabhairavabhinnam (KSTS Ed. abhinna) . ı   .       .  parabhumim sada svabhasam apy antarbahyaksagocaratvat paroksam iva, .   .   ~ .  .  . pasyantyadikalapeksaya tu bhutam iva, tattadrudraksetrajnatattatpranamsam.  .       sikapeksyakalpavadhikadinamasanvayabhavat anadyatanm (KSTS Ed. adyatanm) iva ı ı   .   ı yavad anves. um amrsati, tavat ’supto ‘ham kila vilalapa’ itivat aham eva sam viddev .t .   .t  pasyantyadipade prabubhutsur asphutasphuritaparabhat. arikaikyacakasadrahasyam .   uvacamamarsa. 10  .  .  .  P. 4 siva evaham vaikharparyantam vyaprtya vimarsamsena prs. avan iti yavat ı ..t  .     / uvaceti liduttamapurusaikavacanam / bhutatvam ca vaktavyasya sadatanatvat / . . .    anadyatanatvam akalakalitatvat / paroksatvam anindriyagocaratvat. . 11 Oriental Research Institute and MSS Library, Trivandrum, MSS No. C.2108D and 5854F.



   .   . P. 1 tatra svatmadevataiva prabudhyamanavasthayam svatmanam   .  paramarsamsenanavaratam (KSTS Ed. avatarantam) prcchati [: : : ]; p. 3 evam . .    .  .   prabudhyamanarupa samvid yada prasnam nibhrtavabhasanaparamartham (KSTS Ed. .  .     .    nirbhrtavabhasamanaparamarthasvarupam) karoti tada prabuddhavasthapratipattau .   .      ı saiva purnarupa bhairavadevatatmika prativacanadatr sampadyate / na ca .    atredamprathamika kacid (KSTS Ed. atra aidamprathamikatvam kadacid) api tu . .  .    .   ı  puratanam eva tat param avartamanam kalabhedakalpanaya bhatti bhutatvena   vyavahriyate ’vedyarupatvena (KSTS Ed. divyarupatvena) pratyaksabhavat paroksyena .    . . (KSTS Ed. paroksena) tad etad ucyate. I have emended the edited text on the basis . . ı of the readings found in Krsnadsa’s [Anuttaratrimsika]laghuvrttivimarsin (MSS); .. . a . .  see above n. 11. 13 In fact, anadyatana is not mentioned, but we may consider it as understood in   the phrase kalabhedakalpanaya. 14 Oriental Research Institute and MSS Library, Trivandrum, MS No.   . . C.2108D f.156b tatra svatmadevatety uktya sarvapranisv anisam aham ity    . .    aparoksataya prathamanatvat paroksatvam nirakrtam, svatmadevataivatmanam . . .  . ı iti vacanena pras. rprativaktrbhedo ’pahasthitah, anavaratam prcchatty anena . t. . . . . .            vedyavisesanabhutatayanityatvapadakakalasparsabhavabhidhanat bhutatvam api nirastam. 15 Oriental Research Institute and MSS Library, Trivandrum, MSS    No. C.2108D f.157a vastugatya tu akalakalitatvena tatprasnavacanasyapi     .  vartamanatvad aham iti svatmarupenaparoksatvac ca latprayoga eva yogya . .  .    ı ityabhiprayenanavaratam prcchatti vyakhyeye purvam uktam bhutaprayoge . . .     ı pade’pi deva [read dev ] prasnaprativacanarupasya sastrasya puratanatvadyotanat    . .  . .  . .   nutanatvaprayuktapratipattinirakaranat sisyanan drdhapratipattir upapadita bhavati. 16 At least, this is the common assumption; in fact, for the above mentioned reasons, action as a whole cannot be experienced directly even by the    .  .   ı agent (Pradpa vol. III p. 254 atmasadhyayah kriyayah pratyaksatvabhimana .  . iti bhavah; the sense of Kaiyata’s remark is overlooked by his commentator .  .      . a ı Rmendrasarasvat (Mahabhasyasiddhantaratnapraka sa vol. VI p. 279 atmasadhyayah  .   . kriyayah pratyaksatvad iti bhavah) whilst it is correctly pointed out by Nryana aa . .  .  ı (Mahabhasyapradpavivarana vol. VII p. 280 kriyapratyaksatvabhrama ity arthah / . . .    .  . na hi samuharupayah kriyayah satyatah pratyaksatvam. . . 17 ~ ı   . ı  _  . Padamanjar on Kasikavrtti vol. II p. 630 tatra hi buddhndriyasarradisanghatah ı   karta sa catmanah pratyaksa eva. . . 18 ~ According to Nge a, Patanjali says ‘one among the grammarians’ to let us know a s that this is not a case of intoxication or madness, but of mere absent-mindness, to which, it seems, grammarians (not to speak of most modern indologists) were particularly inclined. 19 ~ ı   . Padamanjar vol. II p. 630, madasvapnadibhis citte vyaksipte bhavati vai kascit     .   _ svakrtam eva na janati, pascad eva tvaya krtam iti parsvasthebhyah srutva prayunkte . .  – supto ’ham kila vilalapeti. . 20 Interestingly, here the aorist, not the perfect, is used. This means that Abhinavagupta does not intend to give this past any specific connotation. He wants to express only a ‘basic’ past, which, only after receiving the specifications that immediately _ follow, will become a perfect tense. In fact, the aorist (lun, P.III.2.110) expresses first of all a generic past (its specific use for an adyatana past, which is the more frequent in common practice, is established only indirectly through the following _ ~ ı  sutra anadyatane lan). However, as the Padamanjar points out in an interesting passage, the aorist can express any past action, even belonging to the most remote past, provided that the speaker is not driven by the wish to express (or, as well, is driven by the wish not to express) the specific connotations of that past action    _ . _ . ı (vol. II pp. 623–624 iha bhutasamanye lun vidhyate, tasya visese ’nadyatane lanlitav 



_ . . apavadau, tadvisaye ’pi lun drsyate [: : : ] tatra visesavivaksayam samanyasrayanena . .   .    .  _ . vastuto’ nadyatane ’pi lun upapadyate, tadrupavivaksayam eva tu lanlitau). This is . .  precisely the case of Abhinavagupta’s argument. 21 A plane which, instead, coincides with herself. 22     evam bhagavat pasyant madhyama ca svatmanam eva yada vimrsati aham ı ı . .      .     ı eva paravagdevatamay evam avocam iti, tada tena rupenollasanmayarambhataya   .   ı       ı. svatmapeksataya tanmayyabhedanusarat tam eva parabhuvam svatmamaym .      .  bhutatvena abhimanvana, bhedavabhasaprananantarbahiskaranapathavyativartintvat ı  . .     .    paroksataya suryadisamcarayattadinavibhagakrtadyatananavacchedat [: : : ] . .     . bhutanadyatanaparoks arthaparipuranat paroksottamapurusakramena vimrset / . . . . .        ı  aham eva sa paravagdevrupaiva sarvavacyavacakavibhaktatayaiva uvaceti     tatparyam / supto ’ham kila vilalapa iti hy evam evopapattih / tathahi tam . . .    ı.    ı attam avastham na smarati pragavedyatvat, idanm purusantarakathitamahatmyat .        .   ativilapaganadikriyajanitagadgadikadidehavikriyavesena va tadavastham camatkarat   .  pratipadyate / na hy apratipattimatram evaitat / mattah supto vaham kila vilalapa .   . .    . iti madasvapnamurchadisu hi vedyavisesanavagamat paroksatvam, paravasthayam . .        tu vedyavisesasyabhava eva, kevalam atra vedakatadatmyapratipattya turyarupatvat,  .     . .  ı  madadisu tu mohavesapradhanyat – ityan visesah, paroksata tu samanaiva. .  23    . IPK I.1.3 kimtu mohavasad asmin drs. e ’py anupalaks ite / saktyaviskaraneneyam ..t . . . . ~ pratyabhijnopadarsyate // (tr. Torella 1994: 86). 24    ~  . . ~   IPV vol. II p. 275 atmani guruvacanaj jnanakriyalaksanasaktyabhijnanader va   _    .   ı  yada paramesvaryotkarsahrdayangambhavo jayate, tada tatksanam eva purnatatmika . . . . ı jvanmuktih. . 25     Cf. e.g.  IPV vol. II p. 273 “aham mahesvarah” iti evambhutacamatkarasara . . .     ı paraparasiddhilaksana jvanmuktivibhutiyogamayy arthakriya : : : . . .

.  Abhinavagupta, Paratrimsikavivarana (see Gnoli 1985). .  ı  a a Abhinavagupta, Paratrsikalaghuvrtti, edited by Pandit Jagaddhara Zdoo Shstri, . KSTS No. LXVIII, Srinagar 1947.  ~ ı a Abhinavagupta, Isvarapratyabhijnavimarsin, edited by Mukund Rm Shastri, vols. I–II, KSTS Nos. XXII XXXIII, Bombay 1918–1921.  .  Kaunda Bhatta, Vaiyakaranabhusanasara with ‘Darpana’ Hindi Commentary, edited by .. .. . . ı Sr Brahma Datta Dvived Chaukhambha Pracyavidya Series No. 17, Varanasi-Delhi ı, 1985.   .    e ı Mahabhasya Pradpa Vyakhyanani, dition par M.S. Narasimhacharya, Publications e de l’Institut Francais d’Indologie, No. 51, 6 Pondich ry 1979. ¸   ~ .  a s Nge a Bhat.a, Vaiyakaranasiddhantaparamalaghuman jusa, edited with ‘Kiranval . a ı’ .t . Sanskrit Commentary and Hindi Translation by Acharya Lokmani Dahal, Chaukhambha Surabharati Granthamala No. 180, Varanasi 1991.  .   .    aa . ı ı Nryana, Mahabhasyapradpavivarana (see Mahabhasya Pradpa Vyakhyanani). .    ~ ı Patanjali, Vyakarana-Mahabhasya with Kaiyata’s Pradpa and Nagesa’s Uddyota, . . . edited by Guru Prasad Shastri and Bal Shastri, vols. I–V, Varanasi 1987–1988.  .     . a ı, ı Rmendrasarasvat Mahabhasyasiddhantaratnapraka sa (see Mahabhasya Pradpa    Vyakhyanani).  ~   Utpaladeva, Isvarapratyabhijnakarika (see Torella 1994). ~    Vijnanabhairava with Commentary partly by Ksemaraja and partly by Sivopadhyaya, . a ı, edited with notes by Pandit M. R. Shstr KSTS No. VIII, Bombay 1918. ..



   .  ~  Vmana-Jayditya, Kasikavrtti with Nyasa or Pancika commentary of Acarya a a  ~ ı Jinendrabuddhipada and Padamanjar of Haradatta Misra, vols. I–VI, ı aa Sudhgranthaml No. 2, Varanasi 1983.  .   ı . ı a Yoginhrdayam amrtanandayogikr tadpikaya bhasanuvadena ca sahitam, anuvdakah .  . . sampdaka ca Vrajavallabhadvivedhah , Delhi 1988. a s .

.  Gnoli, R. (1985) Il Commento di Abhinavagupta alla Paratrimsika  .  (Paratrimsikatattvavivaranam), traduzione e testo, Serie Orientale Roma LVIII, . IsMEO. Roma. Gune, J. A. (1978) The Meanings of Tenses and Moods [The Text of Kaundabhatta’s .. ..   Lakararthanirnaya with Introduction, English Translation and Explanatory Notes], . Pune.  ı . Katre, S. M. (1989) (tr.) As. adhyay of Panini, Roman transliteration and English .t translation by : : : , First Indian Edition, Delhi. e e Renou, L. (1960) “La th orie des temps du verbe d’apr s les grammariens sanscrits”, Journal Asiatique 248 (pp. 305–337); repr. in J. F. Staal (ed.), A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians, SIL (1), Cambridge (Mass.), 1972 (pp. 478–499).  ~   Torella, R. (1994) The Isvarapratyabhijnakarika of Utpaladeva with the Author’s Vrtti. Critical Edition and Annotated Translation, Serie Orientale Roma LXXI, . IsMEO. Roma.

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