International Phenomenological Society

Husserl, Heidegger, and Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article Author(s): Steven Galt Crowell Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Mar., 1990), pp. 501-518 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: Accessed: 17/08/2009 10:49
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" I98I). L.Philosophyand Phenomenological Research Vol. but who had recently been experiencing misgivings about the "unorthodox" direction of Heidegger's work. Thus he invited Heidegger to collaborate. pp. HUSSERL. AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 501 . who had long considered Heidegger to be his most promising student and true heir of phenomenology. appears to have taken the occasion of the article as an opportunity to measure the distance between himself and Heidegger and. Hu. to attempt a reconciliation. in the Fourteenth Edition of i929.and much distorted abridged translation by Christopher V. 21-35. I "'Phenomenology'. Husserl's own final draft of the article' is of interest in itself as a rich. and the final version which contained little trace of Heidegger's participation. and Transcendental Philosophy: Look Another at the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article STEVEN GALT CROWELL Rice University Sometime in 19z7 Husserl began work on an article he had been asked to contribute to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. a transitional third draft. No." though this version was in fact a very free . concise "introduction" to phenomenology. The final version testifies to the collapse of the collaboration. but for several decades now scholars have been drawn to "the Encyclopaedia Britannica article" not so much as a text.ed. Husserl. and their mutual engagement yielded four drafts: Husserl's original. For Husserl's initial work on the article seems roughly to have coincided with the publication of Heidegger's Being and Time in February 19Z7. a second draft with an introduction completely written by Heidegger together with numerous marginal comments. 3. but as an episode in the history of phenomenology. if necessary. HEIDEGGER. Peter Elliston (Notre Dame: Universityof Notre Dame Press. "Phenomenology" was published over the name "E. in by Works. Salmon of Husserl's much longer text. McCormickand Frederick (1927). Eventually. Husserl:Shorter E.Edmund Husserl's Article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica revisedtranslation Richard Palmer. Heidegger. March I990 Husseri..

502 STEVEN GALT CROWELL .Though Husserl did subsequently name Heidegger as his successor at Freiburg. The latter. p." in favor of a "phenomenological ontology" which would break free of Husserl's egological "idealism.. the texts at hand can be seen to support a very different conclusion. finally. Mohanty and crucial for understanding the sense in which Husserl's phenomenology is "transcendental." But without denying the evident differences between Husserl and Heidegger. ' J." p. This paper will begin to suggest how such a conclusion might be reached by focussing on the conception of transcendental philosophy which emerges in Husserl's article. the meaning structures which make possible any truth. for example. commentators have interpreted the X "Dialogue With Emmanuel Levinas. on the basis of an original field of evidence. that Heidegger's Being and Time "represents" (as Levinas has claimed) "the fruition and flowering of Husserlian phenomenology"' and that. particular truth claims or categorial frameworks (quaestio juris). zI5. contrasting it with the conception of transcendental philosophy evident in Heidegger's comments thereon. a conception indicative of his position during the period of Being and Time. proceed by way of a certain kind of reflection which seeks to clarify. to speak of him (together with Scheler) as "my antipodes. Nijhoff. 1986). At the outset it will be useful to recall the distinction between "prinzipientheoretisch" and "evidenztheoretisch" varieties of transcendental philosophy. The Possibilityof Transcendental Martinus Philosophy(Dordrecht: See especially "The Destiny of Transcendental Philosophy. of central Husserlian notions. N. Husserl's disappointment notwithstanding. concluding from them that Heidegger altogether rejected Husserl's "transcendental" phenomenology." Scholarly attention has focussed on the documents of this failed collaboration (especially the original version and Heidegger's revisions of it) as evidence for the gulf which existed between Husserlian and Heideggerian conceptions of phenomenology.". he never again considered Heidegger his "student" and came. Mohanty. ed. N. of which Husserl's philosophy is an example." in Face to Face With Levinas. the real issues concern not so much Heidegger's rejection. This distinction has not always been heeded by those who have undertaken an analysis of the relation between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. i985). viz. on the basis of some principle or principles. a distinction recently emphasized by J. indeed any intelligibility at all. Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press. as his reinterpretation.3 The former proceed by way of a certain kind of argument which seeks to justify. Richard A. I5. with its characteristic doctrines of the "transcendental-phenomenological reduction" and "transcendental constitution. Thus.

IX. z86-303." the i.. References to these drafts will be to this volume and will be incorporated into the text. ed. The present essay concentrates on the first two drafts alone. James C. Herbert Spiegelberg. Its aim is simplyto of transcensuggestthe way in which the specificcharacter Heideggerian dentalontologycan be seento emergefromthe commonbasisof the Husserlian/Heideggerian phenomenologyof evidence. 47-59. and Herbert Spiegelberg. Husserliana Vol.the fault-line of which runs between Husserl and Heidegger should not be seen as transcendental phenomenologyy: philosophyor ontology?"(as though turn HeideggerrejectedHusserl'stranscendental in favorof realism)but rather "transcendental phenomenology:epistemologyor ontology?"It of would not be over the interpretation phenomenologyper se that the of two disagree. pp. Husserlarguesthat suchphenomenologicalexperience providesthe basisfor a purephenomenological psyto of as chologyby way of a reduction the "experiencing the experienced" 4 See for example Walter Biemel. however. HUSSERL.5 1. pp. 303. Third Revised and Enlarged Edition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 503 . abbreviated "Hus IX. both of which are found in Edmund Husserl. The Phenomenological Movement. ed.but over the interpretation "transcendental. and an account of the various drafts of the text.draftof the Encyclopaedia Britannica second. For further details of the collaboration itself. pp.Supportfor this can be gleanedfrom anotherlook at the draftsof the Encyclopaedia Britannicaarticleitself. "Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article. Inotherwords. n. I 8-zo.presenta full accountof this episode. i984). 1977). "On the Misfortunes of Edmund Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article 'Phenomenology"' in McCormick and Elliston. "Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and Heidegger's Remarks Thereon" in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals.e. What follows does not. Phdnomenologische Psychologie. Frederick Elliston (The Hague: Mouton Publishers.4 if. HEIDEGGER.Heidegger'sconception of phenomenologyis "evidenzthenthe issuecan be seento be not so mucha rejection the of theoretisch. ed. pp. Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. "Husserl and Heidegger: The Parting of the Ways" in Heidegger's Existential Analytic.).d. article as showingHeidegger's implicitrejectionof Husserl'sdoctrineof constiof tutionandso his rejection Husserl'stranscendental But philosophy. Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Heidegger-revised. i96z). The FirstDraft: Psychologyand Transcendental Philosophy In the first draft Husserl begins with the natural attitude of everyday how all "natural of experienceanddescribes experiencing" thingsadmits it of a "phenomenological turn"transforming into a "process phenomof enologicalexperience" (Hus IX z37). Morrison. Shorter Works." doctrineof a deepening it." All translations are my own." p. see Biemel. 34z-44. conceptionof what reflectionon the phenomenological fieldof evidence accomplishes. like Husserl's.

or "phenomenological reduction" (Hus IX 245). one in which the theoretical interest does not extend to questions having to do with the elements of the object as a natural object. But this is just to practice the epoche: in To graspthepurelypsychical a cogitoof thetypeperception . then Heidegger too "accepts" the reduction. can be made explicit. To the extent that this is what the phenomenological reduction (or epochs) means.. But if phenomenology is to be distinguished from psychology as a reflective positive science of inner experience. What is really involved in such an epoche'?In carrying it out the psychologist "sets out of play every position-taking with regard to the true being of the perceived. leaves us with a field of phenomena. viz.. its intentional structure. that he practicein this respectan epochi and accordingly makeno natural of judgment perception. Hence Husserl introduces the notion of the "phenomenological reduction" as a move beyond psychology (Hus IX 243). a field of pure psychic experience which remains what it is in its descriptive features whatever the ontological status of the cogitata inscribed within it may prove to be. The initial phenomenological turn from the attitude of natural world-experience is thus a reflective one. which would "go beyond" what belongs to that experiencing itself." Such descriptions at first only make explicit that we are dealing here with a reflective procedure. Reflection on experience in the natural attitude suggests the possibility of a pure science of "subjective experiencing" which would thematize the intentional structure of psychic life.such. this is 504 STEVEN GALT CROWELL . Though Heidegger does not explicitly invoke the epochsein Being and Time. Husserl must distinguish between a psychological phenomenological reflection and transcendental phenomenological reflection. experience as such. Instead of living straightforwardly in our world experience as Weltkinder. requires thatthepsycholwith respect the truebeingof the perceived to ogistput out of playeveryposition-taking (of the cogitatum). so Husserl thinks a pure psychology is possible which abstracts from those predicates of its object. They express the truism that investigation of my experiencing of an object is not a sufficient evidential basis for ascribing ontic predicates to the ("physical") thing. This move needs to be examined in more detail. Just as the science of physics abstracts from all those predicates of its objects which are seen to be bound up with the experiencing of such objects. whosemeaning of to indeeda continual assertion objective beingor nonbeingbelongs(Hus IX z43).. we exercise a "universal phenomenological reflection" (Hus IX 239) whereby what is implicit in such experience." he "makes no natural judgment of perception. The reduction in this sense merely confirms what belongs to the essence of reflection. Such an epoch6.

Heidegger'sontological phenomenologydoes not "take a the stand"regarding factualpresenceof any particular object.only one exampleof severalcasesin that work wherephenomenological proceduresare in play without being acknowledgedas such. however. of for Heidegger too.Der Wahrheitsbegriff Husserlund Heidegger bei (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Heidegger takes his point of departurefrom a featurewhich Husserlhimself frequentlyemphasizes. be sure. 7 HUSSERL. for example.. viz.he speaksof phenomenology a way of accessto the Beingof things. WhenHusserlgoes on to chargethe phenomenological psy6 On this point see ErnstTugendhat. 263.And. . We will return to this issue below.7 To describe a "natural view of the world" is not to is occupy such a view. concern how things are "given" in a primary sense.a reflectively considered is perception still perception-of-this-house.butwhat he meansby "Being" no moredrawnfrom is the naturalattitudeas a non-phenomenological presuppositionthan is Husserl's"transcendental" conceptof being. they take aim at the presuppostions about "Being" which Husserl imports into his conception of the natural attitude itself. Such ontoloof gist Heidegger"makesno naturaljudgments perception. They do not affect the "legitimacy" of the reduction as specified here. The being-character the perceptualobject is itself a descriptive featureof the experiencing the objectfor Husserl. and so remain within the phenomenological horizon of investigation into modes of givenness. pp.6Properly understood. AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 505 .To use Husserl'sexample. to speak of Vorhandensein not to predicatereal being of any particularentity. I would argue. HEIDEGGER. To grant this. 1974). . p. rather. Verstehen und Auslegung (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann. that in Being and Time Heidegger revises Husserl's conception of the natural attitude in such a way that "what things are" for practical activity (their Zuhandensein) is not derivative . 93-107 et pass. Phenomenological psychologysets itselfthe task of explicating evidential the levelsof constitution intentional of objectsby exploring "the severalforms of synthesis. does not imply that such a "being-character"will be described in the same way by Husserl and Heidegger. and Part II.On the contrary. Under the epoche the house is taken in its full descriptivecontent "as meaningcontent (perceptual meaning)of the perceptualbelief"(Hus IX of 243).as it is for Husserl . throughwhich in general with consciousnesscomes to be a unity of consciousness" consciousness (HusIX 244). however." does he nor compromise phenomenological by presupposing the field positiveor physicalisticpremisesgoing beyondwhat shows itself in phenomenological To as experience. it includes the sense of perceptual "believingin" the house as "actuallyexisting" (wirklichDaseiendes). note 8. 1970). and Carl Friedrich Gethmann.from "what they are" for theoretical consciousness (Vorhandensein). It is well known. that in the reductionto pureexperience nothing is lost from the descriptive in contentof what is experienced the natural attitude. But the reductionto the purepsychicalis still distinctfroma transcendentalphenomenology.

but from the idea of carrying out a "reform of philosophy to a rigorous science" (Hus IX 247). Phenomenological psychology has not yet revealed this realm since it is still "positive science. Inquiry into this "pure immanence" must provide the foundation. which for Husserl was always equivalent to establishing philosophy on a firm epistemological foundation. The subjectivity of phenomenological psychology is thus not yet in a position to address the transcendental-epistemological question of the foundation of all worldly knowledge. Husserl thus introduces the concept of a "fully universal phenomenological reduction (the transcendental)" (Hus IX 249) which will overcome the remaining "naivete" of phenomenological psychology. But what sort of mere "change of attitude" can prevent such circularity? In what sense are the phenomena of phenomenological psychology both mundane and transcendental? Husserl introduces the Einstellungsanderung by recalling the discovery of Descartes that "subjective conscious life in pure immanence is the place of all meaning giving and positing of being. including its own. The sense of the reduction to the purely psychological still carries the sense of a reduction to a "worldly" given stream of conscious experiences." it is possible to move from one to the other through a mere Einstellungsanderung (Hus IX 247). a transcendental philosophy" (Hus IX 248). of all problems arising with regard to empirical and metaphysical modes of knowing. to an entity within the world. it has the world as pregiven ground" (Hus IX 248). all verification of being" (Hus IX z48).chologist with the task of seeking "the necessary structural system without which a synthesis of manifold perceptions as perception of one and the same thing would be unthinkable. So the Einstellungsdnderung is introduced as necessary for the "project of a theory of knowledge. Whereas the phenomenological reduction brackets the facticity of the cogitata so as to focus on them as purely given intentional 506 STEVEN GALT CROWELL . however.which Husserl in the second draft called the "transcendental circle" . Toward the solution of this problem a phenomenological psychology can contribute nothing since it finds itself caught in the "absurdity of the epistemological circle" (Hus IX 249) . The demand for such a "change of attitude" does not arise from the project of establishing a pure psychology. the sense. But for Husserl such phenomenology is not yet transcendental. What more is required? Husserl admits that transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology deal with "the 'same' phenomena and essential insights. the attempt to ground the possibility of knowledge on a basis which itself presupposes the (unexamined) validity of certain forms of knowledge." Heidegger notes "transcendental questions!" (Hus IX 24 5).namely.

HEIDEGGER. guided by epistemological considerations. to its stream of intentional experiences.pp. Transcendental Philosophy. with the question of how (empirical and apriori) truths are to be "validated. isi-ziz. to "transcendental subjectivity" as such. What for Husserl. must be seen as prior to the naturally posited sense "human subject" is. is overcome in favor of an inquiry into the transcendental "positing" life of a "pure" subject. AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 507 . Instead he indicates the locus of a disagreement over how this field of transcendental subjectivity (or "transcendental life" as Husserl calls it) is to be interpreted. In the context of the theory of the reduction it is equivalent to the "taken for granted" existing of things encountered in the natural attitude.e. this man" (Hus IX z49)." 9 See Mohanty. in "bracketing" posited being such being is not deniedbut made explicit as "phenomenon. Here the last vestige of "posited" being.. from Heidegger's ontological perspective. but on a reflection carried out in methodologically controlled fashion. but a field of evidence. But when Heidegger attaches to this the rejoinder "Yet certainly as humanity (understood as the essence of man).not qua human (in the anthropological sense) but qua subject (in the transcendental sense). Thus Husserl can write that as I reflect within the reduction I grasp a subjectivity which cannot "be taken as I. In this way the sense of these experiences is altered: from being particular properties of a human subject they become the pure intentional field upon which even this sense of "human subject" is constituted in its meaning and posited being." we stand before the very issue over which the collaboration will collapse. HUSSERL. The difference between Husserl's concept of transcendental phenomenology and the "prinzipientheoretisch" versions of Kantian and Neo-Kantian transcendental logic stem ultimately from their different conceptions of what these "reason-theoretical problems" are. a context of meaning which is to be grasped as that "thematic field of an absolute phenomenological science which is called transcendental because it includes within itself all transcendental or reason-theoretical problematics" (Hus IX z5o). i. Transcendental subjectivity is not a principle.8 the posited reality of human psychological subjectivity. Thus. a possibility of the human subject . Before proceeding further with an account of this divergence it is important to recall that Husserl's recourse to the pure subject is not based on an argument. xiii-xxxii." the Neo-Kantians had recourse to formal principles of argu8 A full account of the notion of "positing" (Setzung) posited being would take us too and far afield here. How is it to be understood? Heidegger does not object here to Husserl's move toward a transcendental phenomenology.9 Concerned above all with the so-called quaestio juris."meaning contents." the transcendental reduction carries this bracketing one step further by applying it to the "worldly" character of the subject itself. that "givenness" which it is the task of the reduction to make explicit for reflection.

and this conceptionof evidence must then be carriedover to the reflexiveproblemof how the cognitive claims of transcendentalphilosophy are themselves to be justified." Martin will not be constructed a speargument")which ("transcendental cial form of "meta-justification" unknownin othercognitivedisof would appealto principles justification of ciplines. i8o-8i..However. dass fur Husserl das transzendentale Ich lediglich den Sinn hat. Because it is upon this basis alone that any "meaning of being" can be clarified. and finally.Clarification whatit meansto justifya truthclaimpointsto the relationbetweenassertionand evidence. "consists its transcendental idealism" (Hus IX 250). Transcendental idealism is thus not a metaphysical idealism." as will also seekto justifythem. Husserl claims that it is a rejection of "every metaphysics which moves in empty formal constructions [Substruktionen]" (Hus IX 253)." including the "apriori ontology" of the form of any "world" whatsoever (Hus IX 25 i). op. letzte jeweilige Statte aller Geltung und Ausweisung zu sein. Thus the genuine transcendental projectwould not be to justifytruthclaimsbut to clarifythe "intentional sense" of such claims. kann man dann auch nicht die Lehre von der transzendentale Konsti- tution verstehen. trans. Against the tendency which such metaphysics has to 173--77. man das nicht festhalt. note x."" Husserl'sphilosophya "philosophical of philosophyis thus an investigation the field transcendental Husserl's purifiedfromall uncritical as of reflection a fieldof meaning-constitution positing of being . a sense which Heidegger also rejects as "carried out in the natural attitude and always tailored to it in particular historical situations of life. Tugendhat. as well as that of all other "meaningunities"or Sucha philosophywill of coursemaketruthclaims. I99: "Wenn Cf.andit "objectivities." Heideggerapprovinglycalled him to speak of "transcendental empiricism. 490.'0 field allows Thus Husserl'sconceptionof a non-formaltranscendental facts. Centralto Husserl'sadvance philosophyis his claimthat beyondsuch a conceptionof transcendental than "truth" that truthis itselfa particis "meaning" moreprimordial ular type or structureof meaning. "Idealism" here refers to the fact that the intelligibility of the mundane (presupposed by all positive inquiry) can be grasped only by recourse to the intentional structure of conscious experience. I89-93. 508 STEVEN GALT CROWELL . with its merely factical possibilities of knowledge" (Hus IX 5 3). cit. Being and Time." continues Husserl. nicht aber ein letztes Prinzip einer Begrundung. I96z). John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row.foundationfor ment (anda formalsubject)to constructa transcendental the justificationof specific truth claims. "transcendental idealism" contains within itself a "universal ontology. ioi-o6. pp. p."and in nothing else.

HEIDEGGER. is truethatHeidegger philosophy his writings."Husserl's trary that "Heidegger .lose itselfin aporeticdichotomies including"ontologismandtranscenor formal(dialectical logical)solutions dentalism" for whichdesperate work which progresses are sought.if Beingand Timeabandons"idealism" of A in any sense. . Encyclopaedia Britannica Article.i985). . 50: "Inpoint of fact.Theodore pp." mightrightlyobjectthatthe situationappears isticresidue in of avoidsthelanguage "constitution" It to be morecomplicated.'2 is accessiblesolely througha reflectiveinquiry. a task which I hope to carryout in anothercontext. 1-134.and is concerned with beingsper Thereis thus a good sensein whichHeidegse." bettertermforthe residues In serlwouldseemto be "theoretism.but the "thingitself"seemsto be at workin the transcendental of Beingand Time. arguesto the conWhenBiemel. . the issuehereis a kindof 'self-evidence' like to bringcloserto us .through not of recourseto Verhaltungen Dasein. Husserldemandsphenomenological "fromthe intuitivegivensto the abstractheights"(Hus IX 253). HUSSERL. .As of character theconstitution andif the "evidenztheoretisch" in seeksto overcome HuswhichHeidegger a for "idealism. idealism. butwith their"meaning.. Theseissuesare alreadyquiteapparentin the second draft of the article. For Heidegger." 303. as a as problematic an ideallooks on theconstitution and favorto Husserl" that"Heidegger one thatmustbe overcome." full interpretation theseissueswould of extensivecriticisms Husserlin Historyof the have to take into accountHeidegger's Press. phenomenologyas This sketch of Husserl'snotion of transcendental respects is in presented the firstdraftsuggeststhatHeidegger in important too.and he also findsno incompatibility between a kind of phenomenologicalidealism and that realismwhich alone can be at issue in the natural least if constitution(for Husserl)is not takento meancreation. the rather withinmundanity is "transcendental" a fieldof evidenceembedded than a formalconstructionof principlesdeducedto explain (or justify) It mundanity. influencethe philosophical it significance is takento is not in favorof " termsof the issuesandprobtwo theymustbe discovered lems which. If there are neverthelessessential differencesbetween the furtherback. ." congercan be said to adoptthe programof inquiryinto "transcendental "'i stitution. brought to this field by each. In this idealismcontainsnaturalrealway it can be shown that "transcendental ism entirelywithinitself" (Hus IX 254). trans. committedto the ideaof phenomenological dichotomiesare to be admittedonly after phenomeno"metaphysical" of logicalreconstruction theirsense.ForHeidegger. whichwe should Ibid. uses the expression 'transcendental constitution' .too. University Indiana Kisiel(Bloomington: Concept of Time. that the "sense"of naturalrealism is itself constitutedin evidentintentionalways." anycase.p. AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 509 . is problem keptin mind. ." p.

"to understand them with respect to their Being" (Hus IX z56).. by way of the project of a pure psychology.2. to source in rejection of of the disagreement betweenHusserlandHeidegger the latter's"ultimate the possibility a scientific of philosophy" claimsthatin the seconddraftof theEncyand clopaedia Britannica article Husserl's "emphasison subjectivityand science" is However.whatHeidegger "subordinated an ontological to problematic" Heidegger. philosophical inquiry has at every stage of its history sought "illumination of Being" by way of a reflective turn "from entities to consciousness. but the themeis present virtually of Hei"scientific at philosophy" all. i987). Next Heidegger notes that whereas the positive sciences pursue their task by immersing themselves in the object as theme. (Hus IX 256) In keeping with his conviction that the article should emphasize the transcendental nature of phenomenology from the outset." Is this an accident? To see in it an essential necessity is the epoch-making contribution of phenomenology. in spite of the unfamiliar language of "Being" in which it is expressed." writes Heidegger. What then can be left for philosophy? Not the determination of entities in their particular factual constitution. by conception what "scientific" of rejects not "scientific is philosophy" rather but Husserl's Heidegger's protracted means as appliedto philosophy. The Second Draft: Ontology and Transcendental Philosophy Whereas Husserl's first draft introduced transcendental phenomenology indirectly.Materialsfor understanding the sourcesof "rigor" in attempts. it was degger's earlylecturecourses.. is parcelled out to the various positive sciences as "object domains" for their research."'4 The "totality of beings. Heidegger's introduction to the second draft begins with the question of philosophy's claim to be "fundamental science. is constituted" (Hus IX 257). 56/57. but rather the determination of entities as entities. are instructiveis Vol. which Heidegger defines as the fundamental of the clarification the necessityof the recourseto consciousness. Zur Bestimmungder Philosophie. nothing in Heidegger's introduction would necessarily conflict with Husserl's idea of phenomenology. The various object domains of the positive sciences (including psychology) all contain 14 Morrison. purports locatea fundamental articulate peculiar in Especially philosophyas the Urwissenschaft now availablein the Gesamtausgabe. Heidegger writes that this "pure subjectivity" can be called "transcendental" since in it "the being of all that is experienceable for the subject in varying ways. 5 10 STEVEN GALT CROWELL . the 'transcendent' in the widest sense. radical the andexplicitdetermination the way andthe laws of the stagesin this recourse. To this point.If Heidegger rejected only afterBeingand Time."HusserandHeidegger. princiof pleddelimitation systematic and exploration the fieldof puresubjectivity of whichdiscloses itself throughthis recourse. BerndHeimbuchel in all (Frankfurt: VittorioKlostermann.ed." 50-5 I. culminating Beingand Time.

transcendental subjectivity. in the "immanence of our own perceiving. life" (Hus IX 271). a bit of the world. In a letter to Husserl.e. Heidegger emphasizes that what needs to be discussed is the precise sort of unintelligibility which spreads over the taken for granted world under the reduction: "In which respect is such being [Seiendes] HUSSERL." is. falling into "transcendental psychologism. HEIDEGGER. etc. The issues separating Husserl and Heidegger do not become visible until the interpretation of this intentional field." did not recognize that the transcendental problem was to clarify this world's Seinsgeltung itself.this is the task of positive inquiry. a "cloud of unintelligibility" spreads over the world as the "taken for granted reality and pre-given field of all our theoretical and practical activities" (Hus IX 27 I). The world."transcendent" objects in Husserl's sense and are "ontologically" grounded in the fundamental categories. is now seen to be "constituted in whatever meaning it may have. Overcoming naturalism is made possible only by the "method of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction" (Hus IX 270) which "raises up the totality of the positive to the philosophical level. is explicitly addressed. thinking. In Section II we find Husserl's revised presentation of the progress from pure psychology to transcendental phenomenology. a "referral"which takes place through reflection on the constitution of the intentional field of meaning. These in turn are referred to transcendental subjectivity as the source of their ultimate clarification. which tests hypotheses and secures true propositions through positive criticism . regional ontologies. that of the "meaning genesis of the world. Again Husserl's point is that the epistemological investigations of modern philosophy "continually presupposed the existential validity [Seinsgeltung] of the experienced world" and so." bracketing the lingering naivete of that psychological reflection which posits the realm of subjective experience as a natural entity. 'in ourselves'. as Heidegger notes. valuing. expressing the "essential being" of such objects. the transcendental question is not that of whether it is valid (ob es gilt) . and whatever existential validity is attributed to it.. Regarding the evidence of the world and worldly entities. "the task of transcendental philosophy and must be identified as such at this point" (Hus IX 271). however.but rather that of "what meaning [Sinn] and extent [Tragweite] such validity can have" (Hus IX 265). whose reality before the reduction was never so much as questioned. For Husserl it is "universally dominant naturalism" (Hus IX 267) which impedes recognition of transcendental subjectivity as a "field of transcendental experience" (Hus IX 269). AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 511 . The problem identified here. representing. With the reduction." i.

Frederick Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff." On the one hand. in the sense of something "present at hand" (if not as a whole) for the theorizing (and pre-theoretiThus when the reduction is said to bracket the world. Even at this stage there is no necessary conflict between the Husserlian and Heideggerian projects. The Being of which Heidegger speaks is in no sense equivalent to the "posited being" bracketed by the reduction.. p. a clarification of that which enables these entities "in truth" to be as they are encountered in the natural attitude. . Genuine difficulties do emerge. First Book.e. Pure subjectivity is no longer "my ego as soul" . 6. disclosed through phenomenological reflection on their constitution. trans. The world as something "on hand for me" in the natural attitude is bracketed in order to reveal "pure subjectivity as source of meaning and validity" (Hus IX 273).an idea which "already in its own meaning presupposes an existing or possible world" (Hus IX 274) -but rather "my ego" as transcendentally reduced "self-contained field of experience with all its intentional correlates" (Hus IX 275). the admission of which leads to the absurdities of "transcendental psychologism" attested in the traditional problem of proving the existence of the external world (Hus IX 265). what cal) subject. 512 STEVEN GALT CROWELL . . Husserl tends to use the term "world" to mean "the totality of objects.unintelligible? . With regard to the sense of this transcendentally reduced ego Heidegger poses the decisive question: Is it not the case that "a world in general belongs to the essence of the pure ego" (Hus IX 274)? Before evaluating this question one must note an ambiguity in Husserl's concept of "world. The "posited" being of the world is bracketed in order to to and Husserl. I983)." With his eyes on the same field of "transcendental experience" Heidegger envisions a clarification of the Being of entities. [W]hat sort of higher claim to intelligibility is possible and necessary" (Hus IX 6oz)? Husserl envisions a transcendental clarification of the sense in which the world and all worldly objects are constituted as "an sich seiend" (Hus IX 271) in order to gain insight into the genuine sense of all epistemological problems concerning "knowledge of what transcends consciousness. as Husserl continues his explication of the sense of the transcendental reduction."5 is meant is the naive assumption of its independent being-in-itself as present at hand. If "the transcendental problem concerns the existential sense [Seinssinn] of a world in general." i." then the "decisive point" which distinguishes the transcendental from the psychological-phenomenological reduction is the "universal inhibition" of "natural experience as the pregiven ground of possible judgments" (Hus IX 273).IdeasPertaining a PurePhenomenology to a 5See for exampleEdmund Phenomenological Philosophy. though.

p." must be clarified by recourse to the transcendental dimension which."Philosophical HUSSERL." a "world. p. For if "nothing is lost" under the reduction. proposesas "the annihilation the world of and physicalthings.Dorion Cairns(TheHague:Martinus Nijhoff. On this view it could seem that the transcendental ego must. Totnaubergconversation[i92z6] on 'being-in-the-world' .forHusserl. trans. HEIDEGGER. of Thisis not the placefor a full examination the consequences that thought-experiof of mentwhich Husserl. This is of course precisely not what Heidegger means by "world. "Husserl's Realism." Agreement consists in the fact that for both Husserl and Heidegger the being of the present at hand.cannot be of represented briefly. as reflectively disclosed. analogueof Kant's Britannica article. AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 513 .focus on the "positing" (including the "modes of givenness") in which it is posited. is precisely not present at hand within the natural attitude. But on Heidegger's view such i6 17 EdmundHusserl. Heidegger indicates this to Husserl by reminding him of "our .If "Ego"meansmore bothin Ideasandin theEncyclopaedia than"mental processes" as it does." something which has a very different structure from any posited entity. However Husserl also sometimes speaks of the world as a non-objective "horizon" of all positing. reduction to pure subjectivity as intentional field must also include the "world" as pure phenomenon. its motivation.But even if it is conceivable that a reductionto purechaos would leave behinda "residuum" "mentalprocesses"(thoughprocesseswhichwould not of it haveunified"concatenations experience" theircorrelates). .then it is likely that some phenomenological requires object-identity "Refutation Idealism" of argument theeffectthatego-identity to in not sense)wouldcomeinto play (thoughperhaps "physical objectidentity" Husserl's see here. as reduced. IIo. Thus when Heidegger writes in his letter to Husserl that in call in [w]eagreethatbeing[dasSeiende] thesenseof what-you 'world'cannotbe clarified of its transcendental constitutionby recourseto being [Seiendes] preciselythe same sort (Hus IX 6oi)." as the horizon of constituting activity. is farfromclearthat of as thesewould be mentalprocesses"of an Ego" as Ideas I. and its essential difference from presence at hand 'within' such a world" (Hus IX 274). It is far from clear that the transcendental ego could be worldless in this sense. its "constitution. KarlAmeriks. i969). one must be careful to note just what such "agreement" means. 498-519. given as simply existing "in itself" in the natural attitude. Review 86 (I977).'7 Indeed it would seem that Husserl's claim to avoid the formal "epistemological subject" would demand that transcendental subjectivity have an apriori "content. as the "transcendental phenomenon 'world'. be wordless to the extent that world is equivalent to naively posited being.For an interesting discussionof Husserl'sthought-experiment. pp. 95."The intricacies Husserl'sargument.Cartesian Meditations. For "world" in Husserl's sense here means all posited being which is merely present at hand.

. for whom "man" is never "merely present at hand. and in ual humanbeing." In continuinghis letterHeideggervoices a relatedpoint of divergence.lives initiallyexclusively the positive[Positivitdt]. The ground and possibility of the "will" to transcendental reflection lies in the ontological constitution of the subject itself: Dasein is that being in whose "very Being that Being is an issue for it."the subjectof the naturalattiesi. Heideggerasks "Andthis will ellipticalquestionindicatesthe problemof the motiitself?"Heidegger's reduction.e. is Husserl's it psychology: throughthe detourof phenomenological reduction vate the transcendental as humanity such. already in the natural attitude. Phenomenological reduction. tries to offer an account of such motivation by interpreting the transcendental as a "'marvelous' existential possibility ['wundersame' Existenzm6glichkeit]" (Hus IX 275) of "the subject. so the tranwhichgoes of reduction an alteration the entireformof life [Lebensform] is scendental and. Even if the constitutingdimensionis not an entity presentat hand is this does not implythat that which makesup the place of the transcendental not being at raisesthe problem: what is the modeof beingof that [Seiendes] all . is thetranscendental-philosophical could be of muchhelp unlessthe mundanebeing hardto see how such a propaedeutic from entitieswithin the its itself ("man")did not already"understand" "difference" as reflection one of transcendental difficult understand to psychologyis supposedto serve as a "propaedeutic" the ?76). didnot already(insomesense)understand its possibilities.andeachindivid"Onessential grounds whichareeasyto understand. on accountof its absoluteforall beyond [hinfibersteigtJ previouslife experience (HusIX to with respectto its possibilityand actuality" eignness." Dasein is "ontically dis8 whichaccountsfor his attemptto motiof awareness thisproblem Indeed.i. it is altogetherconcealed tude?"8Heidegger." never merely an item in the world of the natural attitude. ex hypothscendentallevel (for engagingin reflective from "man.giventhat for Husserltherecan disclosureof the transcendental be no motivationwithinthe naturalattitudefor movingto the puretranphilosophy)since. however.WhenHusserlarguesthat the transition by the transcendental standpointis effected "in from the psychologicalto the transcendental will" which "spansthe totalityof theoretical one stroke"by a "universal currentand habituallife" (Hus IX 274).But since what motivatesit (a pure scienceof the psycheas worldlyentity fromthatwhichmotivates different is a alongside purescienceof thephysical) altogether of it of question the "ground" allworldlyknowledge.ratherit precisely in itself?Thatis the central problem des being[Seinsart Seienden] which'world'constitutes of Being and Time (Hus IX 6oi).dimensionwould in factbe "worldly" preciselyas the a transcendental phenomenon"of world whichtherefore"belongsto the "transcendental essenceof the pure ego." man. set to the Theissuehereconcerns meaningof the "limits" phenomenology reduction.How is a will to the the vation for performing transcendental possible. 514 STEVEN GALT CROWELL .

This issue comes to the fore at the end of the second draft where Husserl identifies the Umdeutung from phenomenological psychology to transcendental phenomenology as the key to the "riddle of the Copernican Turn" of Kant. as Heidegger writes. it "is transcendental.. If "being" is equivalent to worldly (posited) being. For Husserl. not from a genuine per- 19 Beingand Time. though decisive. It will not be enough to identify it. HEIDEGGER. psychology.." Only so is it possible to account for the fact (which Husserl continually emphasizes) that psychological reflection can be seen as transcendental experience through a simple. then the naive sense of the psychical with which psychology begins must itself be put into question. But though Heidegger too distinguishes between "man" and Dasein (as the Being or transcendental constitution of man) he insists."'9 The psychological subject is not merely a transcendent entity.butprecisely is neversimplyon hand.p.e. as Husserl did. "the focus on that which belongs purely to the soul has never grown out of consideration of the ontology of the full human being. a modeof being. so neversimplybelongsto the positivityof what is on hand (Hus IX 275)? What Heidegger argues against here is not the reduction per se. AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 5I5 . that transcendental subjectivity must be seen as an existential possibility of man: a of Is not thisact [thetranscendental becauseman reduction] possibility man. by analogy with the physicist's reduction to the "purely physical.. against Husserl.e..tinctive in that it is ontological. psycho-physiology of the present at hand. now everything positive becomes transcendentally problematic" (Hus IX 277). Heidegger. then recourse to the transcendental level of positing is a departure from all questions of ontology. properly seen in its ontological constitution." Yet for Husserl this Umdeutung meant that the question of ontology (regional or otherwise) had been left behind. Husserl's regional ontological assumptions about "man" cloud his view of what reduction to the transcendental means.." Inquiry into transcendental constitution cannot avoid the quest for proper ontological categories of the psychical since. but the implicit ontology in which Husserl locates the entity "man" .e. 32. "interpretive turn [Umdeutung].i.whichit securesforitselfand i. If so. i. the fact that the transcendental subject is "identical in content" with the psychological but "freed from its 'seelischen' (worldly real) sense" (Hus IX 275) means that the question of the "existence" (=worldly existence) of such a subject can no longer have any meaning.a comportment. Here Heidegger notes that following Husserl's own presentation the Umdeutung is simply a "supplemental development of the transcendental problematic which you found incomplete in pure psychology so that . HUSSERL.

is not.ThusHusserlmostoftenspeaksof ontologyas a branchof formallogic (whichincludesformalapophanticsand formal 20 I Husserl.anthropolThis ogy.i. the specificallynaturalisticsense which Husserl gives to "human being" plays no role in Heidegger'stranscendental phenomenological descriptions. pp. In other words. as has emerged primarily from epistemologicalconsiderations"(Hus IX 6oz).Forif. the beingof the fieldof positing/ constituting acts.evenon Husserl's own termsthereis somethingartificial abouthis of restriction the questionof Being. For Husserl. which both accept so far as it places into questionthe ontological of presuppositions the naturalattitude. as Husserlarguesin IdeasI. can haveno sense.sinceDescartes spectiveon psychology rather.. Ideas I.the issueturnson whether the phenomenologicalclarificationof being (which Husserl proposes) must be extendedto the being of the transcendental subjectitself. constituting Indeed.The questionaboutthe modeof beingof thatwhichconstitutes not to be avoided."' one must again recallthat such "ontological"characteristics the transcendental of subjectarisenot froman inquiryinto the considermeaningof beingper se (ontology).but from epistemological ations which everywhere that the meaningof beingis simply presuppose given(as "posited" being).who associatesbeing with "beingposited.Theproblem Beingis thusdirected is of towardthe and the constituted alike (Hus IX 6o0).e. p. 5I6 STEVEN GALT CROWELL .i."the questionof the beingof the transcendental subject.that Husserldoes indeedenvision an ontology of the transcendental subject and in fact attributesto it an "absolutebeing. IO. Husserl.Ideas I. It would appear.ButHeidegger arguesquiteplausibly that [t]hatwhich constitutesis not nothing. if is "to be" (formally)means to be the "subjectof possible true predications"" - then a transcendental phenomenology must leave open the since therecan possibilityof an ontology of transcendental subjectivity.Rather..and thus it is somethingand in being [seiendthoughto be surenot in the senseof the positive. If it is argued.then. be no denyingthat Husserlthinks true propositionsconcerningsuch a subjectare possible. the "formal"sense of Etwas uberhaupt the basis of all ontology.on the contrary. that the essentialdifference betweenHusserlian and Heideggerian interpretations the meaningof transcendental of phedoes not concernthe "legitimacy" the reducof nomenological reflection tion. to "that which belongs purely to the soul" has been misinterpreted exclude the proper transcendental determinationsof "world" (of the "soul"as being-in-the-world). iio et pass.

.Formaland Transcendental Historyof the Conceptof Time.p.22 Sucha discipline."" and helps himself (as in Ideas I) to the languageof "absolutebeing"in characterizing such a subject.e.and ideating taken as an essence. 102-14. p. Nijhoff. Husserlwill even state that "in itself .Formaland Transcendental MartinusNijhoff. Husserl's "ontological"determinationsof transcendental subjectivity"are not derivedby consideringthe intentionalin its very being. as the positingor constitutingorigin of objective meaning. in particular.As Heidegger puts it in a detailedcriticismof Husserlon justthis point: "Husserl's priof maryquestionis simplynot concernedwith the character the beingof consciousness. Logic.. 107.trans. the investigation whichdeserves couldvery of and that onlyto indicate the "parting theways"betweenHusserl Heidegger prowell have been motivatedby immanentcriticismof Husserl'sphenomenological character.with regardto its epistemologicalprivileges. but to the extent that it is placedunderscrutinyas apprehended. turnedinto something"posited"for the reflective i. phenomenologicalontology based on unprejudicedrecourse to the "thingsthemselves. 271.e.Heidegger's and conceptionof the relationbetweenphenomenology ontologyinvolveproblemsof here of treatment. i969).For in orderto bringthe subjectinto view ontologicallyit mustbe "objectified" reflectively. given. pp. constituting.thatis.' which relatesto everythingthat exists in any sense: to what exists as transcendental and to subjectivity everythingthat becomes constituted in transcendentalsubjectivity. gaze. p. by of derivingthe ontologicalcharacteristics "absolutebeing"from episteHusserlcloses off the possibilityof a genuine mologicalconsiderations. .DorionCairns(TheHague: Edmund Husserl.ontology). Theyarerecalled separate theirown. KleinandWilliamE. Pohl(TheHague:Martinus Philosophy. "17. i. AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 5I7 . Husserl. i980).is not yet transcendental. HEIDEGGER. criticisms Husserl's of Formoreon thisissueseeibid. and Phenomenological EdmundHusserl.""3 When.pp. The result is that Husserl can characterizethe "absolutebeing" of the transcendental subjectonly negativelyand.he encounterssystematicproblems. io6."" In short.rather thanby a wholesale 23 24 25 z6 27 HUSSERL.TedE. he speaks of "another'formalontology..he is guidedby the following concern:How can For consciousnessbecomethe possibleobjectof an absolutescience?"2" this reason. Of course. Heidegger. I48f.though in need of transcendental (epistemological)grounding. an alterFor of rejection its "transcendental" gram.Rather.""7 Logic. as an objectivediscipline concerned with what it is to be an object in generaland with specific"regional" differentiations among objects. .. Ibid.Ideas Pertainingto a Pure Phenomenology ThirdBook. ontology is not phenomenology. however.p. trans. But the transcendental subjectwas glimpsedinitiallythroughthe reduction of everythingpositive.

"see RudolfBoehm. 72-105.suchan inquirypreserves genuinesenseanddirection a for Husserlian"constitutional" investigationswithin the projected(fundamental) ontology of Being and Time. 5i8 STEVEN GALT CROWELL . native to Heidegger's"epistemological" readingof Husserl's"AbsoluteBeing. The groundupon which entities are encounterable explicitlyin theirmeaningstructure must itself be inquired as to its Seinssinn. therefore becomesthinkable. i968). The modeof being of the absoluteego mustitselfbecomea transcendental problem.thoughthe pointcannot into At be arguedhere. A significant rapprochement betweenHusserland Heidegger. pp.So with regard the phenomenological to investigation the domainof of transcendental subjectivity Heideggercan ask "Whatis the character of the positingin which the absoluteego is posited?To what extent is there no positivity(posite4ness) foundhere?"(HusIX 6oz).Onlyso can it be phenomenologically clarified how the pureego both is and is not "thesame"as the facticego (Hus IX 6oz)."DasAbsolutund die Realitat.leavingneithertotally unrevised. the sametime."in Vom Gesichtspunkt Phanomeder nologie (TheHague:MartinusNijhoff.