D N D p h o t o I S 2 0 0 9 - 0 0 8 5 b y M a s t e r C o r p o r a l R o b e r t B o tt r i l l .

The Heron, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), leased through Macdonald Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA), prior to launch at Kandahar airfield, Afghanistan, 11 February 2009.

ThE 21 ST CENTury BATTlESPACE: ThE DANgEr Of TEChNOlOgiCAl EThNOCENTriSm
by roy van den Berg
“Modern technology has become a total phenomenon for civilization, the defining force of a new social order in which efficiency is no longer an option but a necessity imposed on all human activity.” Jacques Ellul1 In 1964, French author and philosopher Jacques Ellul described the downfall of human freedom through technological determinism in his book The Technological Society. He lamented that humans have become too reliant upon technology, but offered: “…[that] it is not a question of getting rid of it [technology], but, by an act of freedom, of transcending it.” 2 This also holds true of advancements in military technology, and the debates with respect to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). War is a human endeavour, and thus we should be careful when we remove the human element from it. This article will examine how technological inequality between combatants will shape the potential battlespaces of the 21st Century. Using historical examples of such disparities between combatants from previous centuries, it will become apparent that the technological edge and reliance upon technology does not guarantee ultimate victory. Technological ethnocentrism, coupled with an obtuse reliance upon technol-

Introduction

I
10

mages of the 21st Century battlespace conjure up visions of digitized exoskeleton-armour-clad soldiers operating in a high-tech environment. And yet, early 21st Century indicators in current military engagements may foretell a reality of a battlespace resembling a blend of the small-war environments, such as in Afghanistan, and confrontations with formed militaries, as witnessed during the recent conflict in Georgia. In both of these types of conflict environments, technological differences exist to varying degrees. Using these examples as indicators of technical prowess, it is likely that Western forces will have a pronounced technological advantage over our next adversaries. The question is whether the technological advantage will be of benefit, or be our bane.

Captain Roy van den Berg, MMM, CD, has recently returned from an exchange tour as a military planner at United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Headquarters in Miami, Florida.

Canadian Military Journal

• Vol. 10, No. 4, Autumn 2010

and low-tech means to mitigate those factors. To substantiate this thesis. “lay in the spirit of the men. along with our packs and rifles. Battlespace is often defined as a threedimensional area – width. Furthermore.3 Its fourth dimension of time and distance. and patience – factors that shape every aspect of the battlespace from the application of force through the effect of bandaging a child’s hand. a superpower with a massive technological advantage.  An understanding of the sixth dimension allows a commander to exploit or disrupt enemy actions from a knowledge-based position while tending to the needs of the local population. and airspace. values. In these. and fears have to be understood and appreciated or any military gains will be shallow and temporary. but his first considerations were the human factors of morale and generalship. the United States. The evidence lies in the will of First World War soldiers to persevere despite the incredible physical hardship and psychological trauma4 imposed by pre-war advances in war technology. Viet Cong guerrillas. However. This was also obvious with respect to the Second World War’s airborne soldiers’ initiative and heart to overcome tremendous obstacles. recalled how an omnipotent America and its soldiers underestimated the Vietnamese when he wrote: “When we marched through the rice paddies… we carried. Clausewitz’s friction and fog of war. motivation. can be a force’s demise. determined enemy…”6 L i b r a r y a n d A r c h i ve s C a n a d a / D N D / W. By 1975. in my opinion. fighting skill. specifically the force that motivates. 10.L. Although Tzu refers to generalship and ‘top-down’ leadership. and to complete their missions behind enemy lines although outgunned and outnumbered. Hope brings this down to tactical level leadership to motivate soldiers in contact with the enemy: A First World War trench on the Canadian front. the implicit convictions that the Viet Cong would be quickly beaten… We kept our packs and rifles. To appreciate what the technologically inferior adversary will do to even the playing field/battlespace. as well as the human dimension of determination. depth. “The mainspring of these forces. This proposed ‘sixth dimension’ of human factors includes leadership. a young US Marine deployed to Vietnam in 1965. Marshall. as will how commanders could use a combination of high.ogy at the expense of acknowledging the human factor’s influence upon the battlespace. Human Factors and the Adversary T he most significant factor that eventually wins or loses wars is the individual soldier’s determination. This was particularly true in the Vietnam War. ingenuity. too confining.0 013 2 6 . the overlooked but critical and dynamic factor of the 21st Century battlespace is the human factor. No amount of technology can dissuade what resides in a soldier’s heart Vol. Ca s t l e / PA. The battlespace’s fifth dimension is cyberspace. is also already considered. 7 The will to continue fighting must be stoked by good leadership. and leadership. 4. I . This battlespace will also be home to noncombatants whose anthropology.”5 The human factor. 8 Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope’s article about his experiences as a battle group commander in Afghanistan reiterated the human aspect of the fight. T and spirit. morale. the convictions we lost. remains a significant element and an equalizer in the technologically unbalanced battlespace.as is the radio frequency (RF) spectrum. was defeated strategically by an enemy’s unwavering determination. ancient China’s General Sun Tzu named five ‘matters’ that needed consideration prior to going to war. Twenty-three hundred years ago. an area where battles will be fought anonymously but tenaciously. he provided four matters that described the battlespace. a commander must also consider how these factors influence his/her own forces in the same battlespace. The discovery that the men we had scorned as peasant guerrillas were in fact a lethal. Defining Battlespace he contemporary definition of ‘battlespace’ is. these human factors must be considered.A. Philip Caputo.” says Second World War Chief US Army combat historian S. Autumn 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 11 C a n a d i a n Pr e s s / C o u r t e s y E v e r e tt C o l l e c t i o n / 7 8 3 6 0 4 4 TODAy'S BATTlESPACE . No. an examination of human factors and their effect upon the battlespace will be discussed. tempo and synchronization. Technology predictions have ignored war’s inherent uncertainty.

England. Zealots rallied against Roman rule in Jerusalem. No. In future battlespaces. an unnamed Gaza Muslim activist rationale stated: “We lack arms possessed by the enemy…We have no planes or missiles.© C o r b i s N e w s / C o r b i s C o r p o r a t i o n / J e r r y A r c i e r i / 4 2 .. 10. the Zealots fought a low intensity and ‘low-tech’ war. despite the loss of many comrades. The Romans were superior in equipment and military skill.” The influencing of human behaviour is an art crafted by individuals demonstrating charisma. the Zealots are also reputed to have employed a primitive form of chemical warfare. As in all wars. Northern Israel. Radical interpretations of Islamic scripture have driven religious fighters. to some extent. or an offensive spirit in conducting operations. decisive. but once in the Red Army they changed their character. uncertainty.” 15 During an interview in 1994. a similar example would be the surge of 30. leaders like former Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier buoyed the morale of Canadian troops fighting in Afghanistan. and even sabotaging Jerusalem’s water supply. violence. 4. Radical Islam has been a motivator for those who want to eradicate what they perceive as immoral Western practices. Mao said: “The majority of the Red Army soldiers came from mercenary armies. in confronting a stronger and exponentially more powerful opponent. Autumn 2010 . And esteemed US military historian Bevin Alexander captured the essence of leadership in numerically lopsided battles when he penned: "There is nothing inevitable about military victory. to the benefit of the Communists. not through technology. History has proven that there are a number of motivators a leader can draw upon. more high-technology and manpower to manage the low-tech threat. History has shown that religion can be an effective motivator. In AD 66-73. “Leadership was one guarantor against the debilitating effects of friction. who walked through the bombed-out streets of London. company and battalion commander was – and will remain in the future. as did General Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist Army. Recently. courage. Aside from the very public assassinations of some Legionnaires. Their presence bolstered the common person’s will to persevere. and so. that is. and danger… [T]he role of the platoon. the technological ‘underdog’ will also have leaders whose cult of personality can influence groups to achieve more than they believed possible. Extremists have employed suicide attacks as a weapon “available to the weak. Morale can be lifted when a leader or cause instills a motivator in which the soldier can believe. By transforming the Red Army soldiers’ battle into an investment in himself and his country. These types of individuals can change the dynamic of the 21st Century battlespace just by their sheer presence.” 9 An old but I believe accurate Canadian Forces (CF) definition of leadership states: “Leadership is the art of influencing human behaviour in order to accomplish a task in the manner so desired by the leader. This is achieved through the leader’s ability to motivate. Sun Tzu. due to their belief that Israel could only be ruled by a Jewish king who was descended from King David. Chechnya draw their inspiration from religious ideals.” 11 Mao’s leadership’s influence upon the human factors of perseverance and patience directly shaped the battlespace’s fourth dimension of time and space. Afghanistan. Jihadists believe their fight will bring spiritual emancipation to not only the Islamic community but to the world. [The Red Army made] the soldiers feel like they are not fighting for somebody else but for themselves and the people [of China]. In Western militaries. not even artillery with which to fight the evil… [Suicide attacks are] the most effective instrument for inflicting harm… Through such 12 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. to fight for reasons that transcend geography or physical wealth. the more powerful side wears down the weaker. Jihadists. an army’s morale is critical. Today. In the early 20th Century. Commenting upon the Red Army soldier’s motivation. to the powerless. 14 The Islamic fighters’ wars in Iraq. during the Second World War. poisoning wells and granaries used by Romans. even for forces of apparently overwhelming strength… In the absence of inspired military leadership. Mao Tse-Tung (Mao Zedong) led his technologically inferior peasant army of Communists through years of revolutionary/guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. and.” 10 This will likely hold true for technologically unbalanced wars of the 21st Century.000 US forces between February and June 2007 13 to Iraq to mitigate the Iraqi resistance movement’s threat..17 3 9 7 10 6 . Mao overcame almost nineteen years (19301949) of struggle to make China a Maoist State. 12 Zealot low-tech actions caused Rome to deploy an inordinate amount of manpower and resources to subdue the Zealot menace. This was also true of England’s King George VI and Queen Elizabeth.

our technologically deficient foes at the beginning of the 21st Century have proven that they can outlast the West.000 local area networks and 100 long-distance networks. The media’s global connectivity and instantaneous reporting can create highly charged political problems. self-sacrifice. When addressing the cyber threat to US Defense networks in 2003.17 During the Vietnam War. 4. [T]he Department of Defense's networks may be vulnerable to anyone who has a computer. US Congressman Jim Saxton. Casualties in the fifth dimension may not bleed. the Vietnamese never won a major military victory against the Americans – nor were they required to do so.’ where our foes will conduct a strategic flanking through information. run more tasks. The morale of the American people at home was their real target. the technological edge is again marginalized by the cyberoperator’s ingenuity. Autumn 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 13 © C o r b i s C o r p o r a t i o n / B e tt m a n n C o l l e c t i o n / B E O 8 0 7 0 3 . Instant gratification is the mantra shaping Western society. An enemy with limited assets to face a technologicallysuperior foe on the battlefield can force his opponent to refocus resources and effort to win in the digital information plane. the American government withdrew. No.©Corbis Cor poration/Histor ical Collection/HU005322. joint defense and intelligence computers and networks are King George VI and Queen Elizabeth tour bombed areas of London during the action. Technology: Creator of the Enemy Within he 21st Century battlespace will extend to the ‘home front. the knowledge and the willpower to launch cyber attacks… [The Defense Department] operates approximately three million computers. Vol. 21st Century Western societies lack. TODAy'S BATTlESPACE . Contemporary examples demonstrate that if friendly war effort appears to be faltering. in Mao’s determination. an idea perpetuated by instant access to information.”16 No technology can defeat what some fighters perceive is a sure path to Heaven. stated: “While programmers and software developers build more advanced systems to Second World War. calls for troop withdrawals increase in proportion to a length of conflict. 18 Aided by the West’s requirement for instant success. daily defensive and offensive battles are fought. T Human Factors in the 5th Dimension: Cyberspace A lthough invisible and largely transparent to most Western soldiers on the battlefield. simply due to viewer reactions to news reports. Chairman of the Terrorism. or the religious-extremist’s conviction. 10. These systems include military service-based. To conduct cyber campaigns. but the results of successful attacks have definite effects in the real world. cyberspace is an area where Mao Tse-Tung. Shaped by technology’s penchant for providing convenience and comfort. When opposition at home became overwhelming. Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. and that they will be in the battlespace well after Western forces have departed. and exploit the West’s vulnerability of impatience. criminals become more creative in their methods to break into these systems…. the ‘martyr’ acquires the right to enter heaven and liberate himself from all the pain and suffering of this world. 100.

exploiting weaknesses. such as the spoken word).” 19 Because all data communication systems are so completely integrated and co-dependent. Each of us. Similarly. Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC) team. a grave consequence in the information-dependent 21st Century battlespace. discusses needs and requirements for a local area with the Afghan National Police (ANP). The unfortunate aspect of technological use is that users tend to rely upon it. No. Why? As stated by a Canadian Task Force Commander. defaults to the human instinct of caution when we learn that a computer may be infected. and employing unexpected or unusual techniques.014 3 .  All of these systems are susceptible to acts of cyber terrorists 24 hours a day. part of which is dependent on the commercial civilian systems. “…all the stupid Taliban are already dead. in fact. This is simply an adaptation of the Canadian Army Terminology Board’s definition of asymmetric warfare that states (comments in parentheses are the authors). or assess likely targets as considered by our adversaries. The demands for accurate and timely intelligence dictate a battlespace inundated with sensors of all kinds. This fear would be magnified exponentially if a virus was confirmed. Even a hint that a virus may have infected a system will cause an individual to reconsider operating the system for fear of further contaminating his/her network. look through rock to find caches of weapons. strategic imagery intelligence (IMINT) sensors like satellites or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) cannot determine a person’s intentions. The great Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz understood this when he wrote: “By the word ‘information’ we denote all the knowledge which we have of the enemy and his country. In the reality of the 21st Century.a part of the Global Information Grid (GIG).0 5 b y S e r g e a n t D a r e n K r a u s .”23 Technologically deficient foes have and will continue to adapt to survive. Intelligence and the Battlespace: No High-Tech Panacea Driven by necessity. Taliban fighters still manage to mount successful attacks that kill a number of Coalition forces and civilians. To gain ‘information’ on human factors requires a modified means of collection. even worse. Canada has employed its greatest intelligence effort since the Second World War. The need to survive will continue to spur innovation. another human factor. the loss of confidence in the system. whether in our homes or offices. these satellites are not capable of intercepting communications carried over landlines. Given the amount of information about these systems available on the Internet. D N D p h o t o A R 2 010 . collection efforts have to include determining the battlespace’s human factors. conventional (or nuclear) formations. Battles Without Weapons: Mitigating the Human Factors T he concept of intelligence driving operations is not new. and they performed well during the Cold War era. as well as radars and other electronic systems. 10.”24 In Afghanistan. the sophisticated collection platforms are useless. Autumn 2010 . 20 June 2010.”22 Sergeant Tim Longo. a small breach may cause the loss of connectivity between entities. Despite the intelligence effort employing all means of advanced technology.’ the need to understand the enemy’s collectors’ and sensors’ weaknesses and vulnerabilities will be paramount. The underdog will have to possess the ingenuity to capitalize upon an adversary’s vulnerabilities. or if a system was neutralized through a cyber attack. For the ‘technological underdog.”20 Those who remain have adapted to their new sensor-saturated battlespace. However. signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites are designed to detect transmissions from broadcast communications systems such as radios. 4. therefore. “[Avoid] a [collection] threat by an opposing faction… by avoiding [collectors’] strengths. Many of the collection platforms were designed to detect large. T he 21st Century battlespaces will require a greater degree of intelligence granularity to drive operations. These factors will include 14 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. or. The result would be the temporary slowing or the total cessation of information dissemination. “…armies must adapt or die. such as under-sea fibre optic cables (nor can they detect nonelectronic communications. This limits a sensor’s effectiveness. Instead of employing collection efforts solely to facilitate the ‘sensor to shooter’ paradigm. technologically deficient adversaries can develop their own low-tech standard operating procedures (SOPs) to defeat or mitigate their effectiveness. the foundation of all our ideas and actions. 21 If the adversary does not employ the type of technology targeted.

or any experience in their development or implementation. refugees from [enemy] occupied states. is not new. Action) Loop. in one way or another. 30 providing incredible insight into enemy intentions. and analyzed intelligence from myriad sources. and friendly forces will have to demonstrate that they are more human than soldier.what the local population thinks of the friendly forces. Orientation. and what commanders at all levels can do to win support. results from raiding parties. 29 Once inside the adversary’s OODA Loop. A SOINT collection plan must be created that meshes with the commander’s campaign plan. SOINT collection tasks need to be created. Although technology may assist a military in deriving the adversary’s OODA Loop. The 21st Century battlespace will also require shaping the civilian population’s view of the deployed forces. 25 For the purposes of this article. 28 The 21st Century battlespace will require intelligence profes- Special Operations Forces: Balancing Technology and Human Factors T here are examples of units that have embraced technology while simultaneously fostering the human element in their warfighting philosophy. SOINT must be disseminated to every soldier in the battlespace – potentially being the most critical element of mission command. the probability of a protracted and unwinnable war will increase. sionals to get into an adversary’s head to crack their OODA (Observation. prioritized. a commander’s priority has to be. 4. all form pieces of the battlespace’s fabric. friendly forces will have the initiative. and imagination far superior to the analytic capacity of the most powerful computer. Relying heavily upon SOINT. to complete his or her own OODA Loop faster than the enemy can complete theirs. From a strategic and tactical perspective. The strategic aim can be severely damaged due to a tactical error. as will the prospect of a low-tech victory for an adversary. the soldier must know how to preserve the local population’s confidence in order to achieve the conflict’s strategic aims. Results must then be analyzed. not technology. There is nothing hightech in this approach. and. Solid leadership. how they view our adversaries. Resistance group members. If the population cannot be won over. TODAy'S BATTlESPACE . Decision.’ or a military trucker’s observation while moving stores. demonstrating the friendly forces’ positive effect in the battlespace for the local population while highlighting the adversary’s negative influence. examined. synthesized. and disseminated. Because of the media’s instantaneous international reach. For this. corroborated. During the Second World War. cannot impose their values and their institutions upon a people who have no knowledge of them. this information will be referred to as social intelligence (SOINT). the low-tech but highly complicated human brain is the best tool. SOINT must be managed in the same way as other forms of intelligence collection. however. the low-tech means of HUMINT collection is by far the most effective. Autumn 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 15 D N D p h o t o LW 2 0 0 6 . the Canadian Intelligence Corps (CIC) sifted. This is a massive undertaking.5 2 18 d b y S e r g e a n t D o n a l d C l a r k . The results of this symbiotic Vol. assessed. assigned. The human mind has a capacity for judgment. thus keeping the adversary in a reactive posture. The rifleman’s conversation with ‘the guy in the market. a technological advantage will be of limited benefit. People respond to other people. information is now an equalizer enabling the weak (or the technologically inferior) to challenge the strong. but it is not impossible. Outsiders. 10. This concept. and then incorporated into an effects matrix. therefore. and disseminated. and then followed up. This is simply relearning old lessons that have been lost through years of automation and processing. Greater use of HUMINT can be used to gauge the SOINT environment and collection for the purposes of classic offensive and defensive operations. To be effective. Every soldier must be considered a sensor and ‘managed’ accordingly. 26 Not only must the soldier comprehend the mission’s end-state. To determine enemy intentions. and they must be captured. no matter how well intentioned. No. the intelligence professionals must have a greater interface with the soldiers to glean as much information as possible. Troops from the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) cover their arcs during a training exercise. is the key to safeguarding the mission’s strategic aim. 27 Reporting a tactical error that undermines a force’s strategic aims is a low-tech victory for a technologically poor enemy. information operations (IO) and civilian military cooperation (CIMIC) missions will become increasingly important. what the issues or institutions are that friendly forces should never tamper with. every form of media. intuition. and intercepted mail all flowed into the mix.

An operator’s warrior always been a place where the value of technology on the spirit will enhance his offensive power. such as satellite imagery. allowing them to achieve the SOF stances. the relationship between operational experience and maturity. This was clearly demthe question of what technologies work best for special opera. High standards are also required for professionalism. General Sir Peter de la Billière. nition. what makes SOF effective is their adaptability and thrusts… stem from these generic.33 Tied into these attributes are inherent traits of and technological development – that is. and (SOF). Second. as well as satellite-supported laptops for • Excellent overall fitness.under fire. You need to identify the enemy and SOF was used to augment technology in the hunt for Iraqi know what he is doing. rather than a given technology.these forces’ capabilities. 36 as discussed in Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2) recruiting and information web US Navy SEAL and commander of US Joint Special page clearly outlines what personal attributes are required Operations Command Vice Admiral William McRaven’s for success as a special operator. 16 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. low-tech. meeting new needs as they arise – must be maintained and supported. • A high degree of dedication and determination. William forces during the First Gulf War.” 35 mission success. You would like to have surprise. successful war on its own. You need to care for them if they human traits they possess. and ment of technology is in the balance struck between the reliance upon superior human factors/traits and technology. agility and reflexes.” General de la Billière said. [However. mental aptitude. You need to communicate SCUD launchers. 39 The leadership and initiative.relationship are embodied in some of the most effective units A common theme among these technologies employed in the 21st Century battlespace: special operations forces or sought is that they enhance existing human factors. 4. Technologies providing capabilities beyond physiological limitation of whether it is the technology or the tions. Special operations units ensure that superior fight a battle. psychological profile. discipline. In general. what makes special operators “special” are the tect your troops. 10.] most of our technology However. and you need to proIn essence. oats for horses. integrity. are more operator that makes special operations ‘spe“Technology will help likely employed prior to a mission’s cial’ must be examined. operators have proven to be very effective in the contemporary battlespace. experience and individual (or in human factors.cess. These are: book Spec Ops. special operators have always been given an to provide capabilities beyond those limited by physiology. 37 The synergies of the combined ‘no-tech. You the ground. 32 In Jason Ridler’s paper on SOF and technology. right technology for success does not necessarily imply With such a significant emphasis being placed upon high tech. “experiShepherd. launch. and leather saddles to replace wooden saddles. and a selfless mission focus. Autumn 2010 .” their supporting elements does not make a candidates must possess the traits of physdifference. directing airstrikes against Taliban and al Qaeda targets. This mutual approach to the human/technological tors’ five human senses. only the most suitable candidates for such but it will not win a It cannot be argued that the technolemployment are chosen through rigorous ogy employed by special operators and selection processes. and • The ability to work independently and as a member high-tech’ equipment in the hands of skilled and innovative of a team. they will seek cover. the ability to think and act independently while under trying or uncomfortable circum. as demonstrated by the supply • A high level of maturity in both one’s professional of Special Forces teams in Afghanistan with AK-47 ammuand personal life. fundamental employment of the technologies provided them to achieve things that go back to the Greeks and the Romans.” 40 Although touted as the first high-tech war. what role does technology play in the SOF this case unit) capability must be leveraged to achieve sucsuccess? Are the technologies developed to enhance the opera. or do they provide capabilities that relationship is far more likely to achieve a positive outcome surpass the limitations of human physiology? 34 In answering than reliance upon technology alone. retired navy captain and former navy SEAL. Often singled out for their innovative use of technol. with people. having the right technology is paramount to success. No. Furthermore. opportunity to leverage equipment and technologies. are wounded. SOF has If one needs to move. stated: ence confirmed what the Special Air Service (SAS) has repeatedly demonstrated in Europe – that no amount of “Our basic needs in conducting warfare probably electronic surveillance is as effective as a pair of eyes on have not changed for a few thousand years. Technologies have enhanced ical fitness. “Once again.are not as critical to mission success as technologies used ogy in warfare. If operators are battlefield has been rated quite high. Canada’s SOF unit mission requirement of relative superiority. the ques. 31 Nonetheless. 38 Where SOF succeeds in their employ• The ability to communicate effectively. he says that two critical factors define the relationship between them.onstrated in comments made by the commander of British tions. and are not as critical to mission the technologically execution. one can walk. You need to orient and engage. First. need to move people around. You need to have offensive power. Special Operators regularly use an extraordinary range of technologies.

No. Spring 2007).” in Canadian Army Journal (7. patience. 13. Cp. Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press. at <http://news.stm>. 14. p.2. or in fact. The Technological Society (New York: Knopf. Bevan Alexander. NY: Columbia University Press. “Guest Editorial. 17. Conclusion T of political or human reality. personalities. HIE 275 Course notes. but it will not win a war on its own.com/database/a. 40. A CH-146 Griffon from 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (427 SOAS) takes off after recovering CSOR troops during a training exercise. p. Autumn 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 17 TODAy'S BATTlESPACE . McMahon. Robert J. 4. he knew nothing NOTES 1. 1998). Dr. at <www. 4. 10 September 2007. 3. Learning to balance technological benefits while nurturing the soldiers’ key human traits will provide a commander with a tangible advantage. Colonel B. The Thought of Jacques Ellul: A Systematic Exposition  (New York & Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press. 55. 5. By understanding how human factors shape their battlespace. soldiers and commanders must be able to transcend their technology and get to know the battlespace’s actors through human endeavours such as HUMINT and SOINT. Perhaps Jacques Ellul best summarized the enigma of human factors when he wrote: “It is clear that Einstein. Winter 2002-2003).5 2 2 2 d b y S e r g e a n t D o n a l d C l a r k . as demonstrated in contemporary battlespaces such as Afghanistan and Iraq. 21. Captain Eric Dion. 6. Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope. By putting trust solely in the advantages gained from technology – in essence committing the sin of technological ethnocentrism – soldiers fighting in the 21st Century battlespace will be too focused upon what they see in their scopes. William J. Military Quotes. 10. p. 89.htm>. “Jihadist Strategies in the 2. Inside Terrorism (Irvington. (eds. Jacques Ellul.) Major Problems in the Vietnam War. Human actions. or on their computer screens.1. 1981).D N D p h o t o LW 2 0 0 6 . 10. Horn. 11. p. Pomeroy (ed. and other non-technological means to survive. was no Pascal. 8. 2002-8. 83.co. and spirit cannot be distilled into an algorithm or spied upon by faceless and virtually invisible sensors.” in Canadian Army Journal (Vol. extraordinary mathematical genius that he was. 1964). 7. Technological inequality between combatants will shape the potential “battlespaces” of the 21st Century by forcing the ‘technological underdog’ to rely upon human factors such as leadership. p. Mary R. ingenuity. 1968). Griffith. Habeck. emotions.) Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism (New York: International Publishers. Samuel B. “U.S.” 41 In order to succeed in the future battlespace. Vol. 1963). p. 10. echnology will help the technologically superior fight a battle. p. 168. p. while a given foe slips under the wire and slits their throats – either actually or metaphorically.” in Canadian Army Journal (Vol. Tim Cook. the commander can retain the technological advantage. 3. 2003). in Asia or North America. Summer 2004). 7. Bruce Hoffman. “Like So Many Rats in a Trap. No.4 Fall/Winter 2004). Human factors are the sixth dimension and common denominator in the 21st Century’s battlespaces – a dimension that will continue to be a major dynamic in shaping the technologically unbalanced battlespace. “The Devil’s Playground: The Airborne Battlefield in World War II. 9.3/7. 12.” BBC News On-Line.bbc. p. Surge Plan in Iraq Working. BBC News. p. whether it be a city or desert. anything outside of his mathematical reach. “The E-fantry Warrior! The Evolution of the Queen of Battles in the Face of the 21st Century. 7.military-quotes. p. Philip Caputo. 4. 176.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6986461.” in The Army Doctrine Bulletin (Vol. 3rd Edition (Boston: Houton Mifflin Company. Darrell Fasching. 5. xxxiii. 8.

Comment made during a discussion with the author during operations in Afghanistan. Robert Sherman. 59. 13. p. “The Spriger Journal: The War on Terrorism. 27 February 2002. an area where humans cannot sense without the assistance of technology. Vol. 29. p.heritage. p. Bevin Alexander. p. “Military Space Programs: SIGINT Overview.” in The Heritage Foundation. Autumn 2002). 41. National Defense Industries Association. 27. 221. p. Bevin Alexander. 5. Colonel R. p. 38. 6. while other systems may detect disturbances in the electromagnetic spectrum. Command. FM 6-0 Mission Command and Control of Army Forces (August 2003).fas.forces. Uhler. 37. 3.3.” in Joint Force Quarterly.” in Federation of American Scientists. Innovation and Change in the Canadian Army. 33. p. generally smaller.” at http://www. 34. 17. 4.> <http://www. p. at <http://commdocs. Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives. Ibid. Dale G. 8 November 2004.” in Hearing Before the Terrorism.pdf. 1-9. p. 47. at <http://www. 2 (Summer 2003). US Special Operations 32. 22. War on Terrorism. 36. 2005). Dr Scot Robertson. the Whole Truth or Nothing: A Media Strategy for the Military in the Information Age.000/ has205260_0f. 26. Issue 40. 28. 4 (Winter 2000/Spring 2001).H.house. Science & Technology Advisor. gains a decisive advantage over a larger force or defended enemy.jtf2. 36. 31. 21. 435. 225.org/ Research/NationalSecurity/hl855. p. U. 1st Quarter. 99. 70.J. Major R. Robert D. NC. No. at <http://www. Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn. Relative superiority is a condition that exists when an attacking force. 4. Ibid. published by Presidio Press. Ibid. p. Ruiters.asp. 2002). forces. Ellul. WRAL-TV. “Challenge and Response: 24. “Information Technology in 21st Century Battlespace. 1968). night vision goggles (NVGs) enhance human sight in darkness.gc.” in Canadian Military Journal (Vol. p. p. How Wars Are Won: 13 Rules of War From Ancient Greece to the War on Terror (New York: Crown Publishers.” Part IV.gc. 1-17). Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. 10.htm>. 39.cfm.ca/ajt-sfo/pro/indexeng. “Complexity Squared: Operating in the Future Battlespace. No. No. (FM 6-0.ca/ic-ci/index-eng. Spriger.org/spp/military/program/sigint/overview. Dwight Hamilton. 3.jtf2. No.htm>. 23.. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding. No. 24 July 2003.org/Divisions/ Divisions/SOLIC/Documents/Interview%20 with%20Shepherd%2012-22-08.. 19. 4. 10. “The Truth. The Ideal Candidate.> For example. 162. Shepherd. How Wars Are Won: 13 Rules of War From Ancient Greece to the War on Terror.gov/ committees/security/has205260. 25.asp. 16. Williams. 145. pp. “As Old as Warfare Itself: An Examination of Asymmetric Warfare.15. John Pike. http:// www. 3. Autumn 2010 . p. An Interview with William M.” in Canadian Military Journal (Vol. “Solutions Driver: Leveraging Technology Solutions to Meet Current Warrior Needs. On War (London: Penguin Books. United States Army. Inside Canadian Intelligence (Toronto: Dundurn Press. “Technology: Force Multiplier for Special Operations. Choice of Force: Special Operations for Canada (Kingston: Queen’s University Press. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. Autumn 2003). David Last and Bernd Horn.S.ndia. 35. at <www.” in The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin Vol. National Defense Industries Association. 1997. 30.” in The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin. 2006). 18 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. This concept is discussed in depth in William McRaven’s thesis Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and Practice. Carl von Clausewitz. 20. Government. 40. Raleigh.>.M. 18. p. HIE 275 Lesson 10 Course Notes. 6. 1995.