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Strategic Generation Capacity Expansion Planning With Incomplete Information
Jianhui Wang, Member, IEEE, Mohammad Shahidehpour, Fellow, IEEE, Zuyi Li, Member, IEEE, and Audun Botterud, Member, IEEE

Abstract—To study the competitive behavior among individual generating companies (GENCOs), an incomplete information game model is proposed in this paper in which each GENCO is modeled as an agent. Each agent makes strategic generation capacity expansion decisions based on its incomplete information on other GENCOs. The formation of this game model falls into a bi-level optimization problem. The upper level of this problem is the GENCOs’ own decision on optimal planning strategies and energy/reserve bidding strategies. The lower-level problem is the ISO’s market clearing problem that minimizes the cost to supply the load, which yields price signals for GENCOs to calculate their own payoffs. A co-evolutionary algorithm combined with pattern search is proposed to optimize the search for the Nash equilibrium of the competition game with incomplete information. The Nash equilibrium is obtained if all GENCOs reach their maximum expected payoff assuming the planning strategies of other GENCOs’ remain unchanged. The physical withholding of capacity is considered in the energy market and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is utilized to measure the market concentration. The competitive behaviors are analyzed in three policy scenarios based on different market rules for reserve procurement and compensation. Index Terms—agent modeling, generation expansion, market design, market power, noncooperative game, physical withholding, power system planning.

Load shedding cost of load . LMP for GENCO ’s unit at load block in scenario when GENCO ’s type is and its opponents’ type is . Number of loads. Number of committed units. Average operating cost of GENCO ’s unit. Probability for unit outage scenario . Probability when GENCO ’s type is . Conditional probability when GENCO is . type and its opponents’ type is Amount of curtailment for load at load block in scenario when GENCO is type and its opponents’ type is . Forecasted load at bus at load block . Total load at load block . Generation bid for GENCO ’s unit at load block when its type is . Scheduled generation for GENCO ’s unit. Reserve bid for GENCO ’s unit at load block when its type is . Called on reserve of GENCO ’s unit. GENCO ’s payoff. GENCO ’s payoff when its type is . opponents’ type is Capacity price. Index for unit outage scenarios ( indicating no-outage). Number of unit outage scenarios. GENCO ’s type. Load curtailment vector. Bus load vector at load block . Unit generation vector. Maximum capacity vector of transmission lines. Shift factor matrix. GENCO ’s type set. Type combination of all GENCOs but GENCO . Type combination set of all GENCOs but GENCO .

NOMENCLATURE Index for load blocks. Number of load blocks. Expanded capacity of GENCO when its type is . Lower bound of the capacity expansion of GENCO when its type is . Upper bound of the capacity expansion of GENCO when its type is . Annual levelized capital cost of GENCO ’s. Duration of load block . Index for load. Indicating expected value. Index for units.

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Manuscript received July 15, 2007; revised February 25, 2008. First published April 14, 2009; current version published April 22, 2009. Paper no. TPWRS00128-2008. J. Wang and A. Botterud are with the Division of Decision and Information Sciences, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL 60439 USA (e-mail:; M. Shahidehpour and Z. Li are with the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL 60616 USA (e-mail:; Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPWRS.2009.2017435 0885-8950/$25.00 © 2009 IEEE

A framework for the control of energy services which is based on the leader-follower game theory was proposed [13]. similar to the incomplete information day-ahead bidding. In conventional planning approaches for new generation resources. Section II presents the problem formulation of the proposed strategic generation capacity expansion with incomplete information. The algorithm has proven to converge rapidly and overcome the premature convergence of genetic algorithm (GA) in solving classical problems [15]. Physical withholding of generation capacity is one of the common market power exertion techniques for increasing market prices [19]. which bears an analogy to the generation expansion planning game. Three market policy scenarios are considered in this paper. The risk of each planning alternative is assessed based on various power system uncertainties. each generation company (GENCO) can pursue its own payoff maximization by strategically planning and operating its generating units. which may lead to high energy prices. Section IV includes the numerical examples. Furthermore. Section III discusses the co-evolutionary algorithm and its application to the solution of the proposed problem. In this paper. A game-theoretic model is proposed in [7] whose analysis is based on the complete information game model. Certain generation planning issues such as the optimal location of new generating units and demand response are not considered since we focus our analyses on strategic interactions of GENCOs in generation planning. the ISO considers a fixed ratio for the scheduled reserve to total generating capacity of a GENCO. In a competitive generation capacity planning. If a market policy is not properly established. A payoff-based generation resource planning is discussed in [6] in which Benders decomposition is used to secure the economic and the reliability requirements of the market operation. Market policies such as electricity pricing [18] are critical for generation expansion planning. The iterative process continues until none of the GENCOs can attain any higher payoffs based on their strategic bids [12]. while the uncalled reserve is paid at a fixed capacity price. in an electricity market. This characteristic makes the planning approach differ from that of the complete information game model. the major objective of electric utilities was to achieve the least-cost operation that met a pre-specified system reliability level [2]–[4]. Scenario B represents the practice in ERCOT [21]. GENCOs estimate any opponent’s would-be cost represented by the opponents’ E type and the probability distribution of the opponent’s cost. [10]. To search for equilibrium in this noncooperative game. It is thus possible to extend the techniques used in the day-ahead energy bidding to study the competitive behavior involved in generation expansion planning. A hybrid co-evolutionary computation algorithm was proposed that searches for the global optima in games with the local optima [17]. However. Consequently. In a competitive market. Section V concludes the discussion. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.WANG et al. Coalitions and collusions of participants in electricity markets were investigated with a cooperative game approach [1]. From a planning point of view. the generation expansion planning forms a first-price sealed-bid auction [8] in which individual GENCOs have an incomplete knowledge of other GENCOs’ planning information. Each GENCO adjusts its strategic bids for maximizing the expected payoff based on other GENCOs’ bidding information and its estimation of opponents’ types. The traditional Lagrangian relaxation method was combined with co-evolutionary computation to solve the unit commitment problem. we propose a co-evolutionary computation approach. A market-based transmission expansion planning is proposed in [5]. which showed good convergence and faster speed [16]. And the market operator. . In addition. market power should be monitored and curbed in market operations. Scenario C is a hypothetical policy which serves as a reference for comparing the market practices. Scenario B: The payment for called on reserve is based only on the energy price while the uncalled reserve is paid at the pre-specified fixed capacity price. The proposed process forms the noncooperative generation capacity planning framework with incomplete information. A noncooperative incomplete information game approach was applied in [1] and [11] to model a GENCO’s optimal bidding strategy as a set of discrete bids. the oligopolistic nature of electricity markets makes it more essential to investigate the competitive behavior and monitor the market power exertion in generation planning. Meanwhile the simulation of energy and reserve market clearing will yield GENCOs price signals for adjusting generation expansion plans. The unbundling of generation and transmission makes the generation expansion planning much more competitive for self-interested independent participants in electricity markets. Scenario A: The payment for called on reserve is based on energy price and a pre-specified fixed capacity price. INTRODUCTION LECTRICITY restructuring has introduced major challenges to the traditional generation capacity planning approaches in the electricity industry [1]. Scenario A corresponds to the existing practice in PJM [20]. the energy market will be in short supply. [9]. A transmission.: STRATEGIC GENERATION CAPACITY EXPANSION PLANNING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 1003 I. Scenario C: Scenario A is used. is responsible for satisfying the system reliability requirements while minimizing the generation supply cost to satisfy the hourly electricity demand. GENCOs may withhold generation capacities by submitting bids to reserve markets or consider scheduled outages of generation assets for maintenance. a GENCO must consider other GENCOs’ strategic plans when making decisions on generation capacity expansion. In practice. The difference between these scenarios lies on procuring reserve bids that are submitted to the market. Accordingly. or the independent system operator (ISO). The co-evolutionary computation emphasizes interactive connections among species [14]. Extensive research has been presented in analyzing bidding strategies in energy markets. Such issues will be considered in our future work.constrained incomplete information game was studied in [12]. the GENCO can make its own decision on generation expansion based on its estimates of the opponent’s generation expansion strategies. a well-designed market is supposed to encourage the generation capacity expansion that maximizes the social welfare. This means that the modeling of competitive behavior is essential in the planning process.

forced outage rate (FOR) form the information set for each type of proposed units. all players have the common knowledge of other players’ payoff functions and the information on each player’s payoff and strategy is acknowledged by other players. An equilibrium is reached when no player can increase its payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy. a GENCO has to model its opponents’ information. NO. The formation of this game falls into a bi-level optimization problem depicted in Fig. However. Each GENCO’s updated planning strategy will impact other GENCOs’ planning strategies which optimize their strategies again by applying the standard GA. capacity cost.e. Meanwhile. • A generating unit’s energy and reserve bids may not exceed the unit’s generation capacity. we assume each GENCO is represented as a species in each evolutionary generation which uses standard GA to find its own optimal generation capacity expansion strategy. its payoff could be lower [8]. any GENCO’s payoff will decrease if it unilaterally changes its strategy while other GENCOs’ strategies are fixed. the interaction among GENCOs’ planning strategies is through the market clearing process (i. GENCOs are referred to as species. The minimum and maximum capacity. each GENCO as a player in the generation capacity planning game has the complete knowledge on its own payoff function but cannot acknowledge the complete information on other GENCOs’ payoff functions and planning strategies. • Each GENCO may have several planning options represented by capital costs. However. A. • The proposed generating units in GENCOs are modeled as different types subject to a joint probability distribution. Each GENCO will use the LMP signals provided by the domain model to calculate its own payoff (fitness value) and find its representative. in energy bidding. GENCO 1 evaluates the fitness values of individual GENCOs through the domain model. 1. operating cost. in electricity markets. Fig. 2. • GENCOs maximize their levelized payoff annually. MAY 2009 II. The components of the proposed model are discussed as follows. A GENCO assumes the ISO’s role for the simulation of the day-ahead energy and reserve market operations. The assumptions considered in this incomplete information planning game are listed as follows.1004 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS. GENCO’s Generation Capacity Expansion Model In applying the co-evolutionary computation to the proposed planning game. VOL. 1. opponents’ proposed generating units for generation expansion planning are modeled as different types subject to a joint probability distribution. and generation capacity limits. In this incomplete information game. 24. The lower level of this problem is the GENCOs’ own decision on optimal planning strategies and energy/reserve bidding strategies. which yields price signals for GENCOs to calculate their own payoffs. This iterative process will continue until the global Nash equilibrium is reached which means each GENCO has offered its best choice of strategy for planning in the sense that no GENCO can increase its payoff when other strategies are fixed. if the GENCO does not model its opponents’ types. 1.. For instance. The market simulation is based on assumed energy and reserve bids submitted by GENCOs when considering the operating conditions and possible scheduled outage scenarios. In this paper. The GENCO ’s generation capacity expansion problem will maximize its expected payoff subject to capacity constraints (3) and (4) (1) where (2) . So the competitive behaviors among GENCOs constitute an incomplete information game. The Nash equilibrium is obtained if all GENCOs reach their maximum expected payoff assuming the planning strategies of other GENCOs’ remain unchanged. this assumption is purely for simplifying the discussion on the proposed formulation in this paper and can be relaxed in practice. To maximize its payoff in the incomplete information game. • Each GENCO has a single candidate unit for planning. operating costs. The upper-level problem is the ISO’s market clearing problem that minimizes the cost to supply the load. Framework of the proposed co-evolutionary algorithm. In Fig. We assume that each GENCO will submit its would-be operating cost as market bid for energy and reserves. In this equilibrium. Species 1 runs its own standard GA after decoding the representatives (other GENCOs’ generation capacity expansion decisions and energy and reserve bids). PROBLEM FORMULATION In a complete information game. The Nash equilibrium may not be found if a sufficient number of generations is not given or may not exist at all because of the complexity of power system operation. The domain model is the ISO’s market clearing model which calculates the bus LMPs. each GENCO will maximize its own expected payoff by planning certain levels of generation capacity which can be marketed in energy and reserve markets. the ISO).

ISO’s objective function for market clearing. The final solution of the standard GA is set as the initial point of the pattern search. generation bidding variable and reserve bidding variable . The other method is the online decoding which is to update the opponents’ strategies immediately after a GENCO has finished its evolution in the evolutionary generation. scheduled generation . load blocks and unit outage scenarios are considered in (2). the ISO supplies individual GENCOs with LMPs and each generation unit’s scheduled energy and reserves. and generation limits (9) by (11) for the reserve which is limited by the reserve bid (12): (10) (11) (12) . line flow limits (7). generalized constraints for the ISO’s market clearing model. load curtailment limits (8). Then the search step or pattern size is reduced by half. migration and mutation assuming that the opponents’ strategies are decoded [14]. Then pattern search sample points search the space and calculate the fitness value to find a minimum around the starting point in a fixed pattern. When it finds a new minimum. crossover. The flowchart of the proposed algorithm is shown in Fig. subject to load balance constraint (6). To improve the fitness value of standard GA. Each GENCO runs the standard GA algorithm to search for its own best fitted plan through standard genetic operations such as reproduction. Note that the sum of energy and . the pattern search will change its center of pattern and iterate until it cannot find a new minimum. which is called batch decoding. The market clearing price reserve bids is equal to . while satisfying the reliability requirements for supplying the load. which can be generalized as follows: (13) where generalized constraints for a GENCO’s capacity expansion model. The individual GENCOs supply the ISO’s market clearing model with their capacity expansion decisions as well as energy and reserve bids. the second method is used to update the opponents’ strategies. Market Clearing Model The objective of the ISO’s market clearing problem is to maximize the social welfare. One is to decode the strategies once all GENCOs have finished the evolution in the evolutionary generation.WANG et al. we represent the reliability requirement by the load shedding cost in the objective function. The decision variables for GENCO include generation capacity expansion decision variable . C. The optimal generation expansion decision and energy and reserve bids are encoded as decision variables for each GENCO. B. In calculating the GENCO ’s payoff. or equivalently minimize the operating cost with inelastic demands. Generalized Problem Formulation The above problem formulation is a bi-level optimization problem. This iterative process will continue until certain termination conditions are satisfied. The ISO’s objective (5) is to minimize the possibility of load shedding and the operating cost. III. are calculated by simulating the and reserve ISO’s market clearing. In the proposed bi-level optimization problem. and generation limits (9): The above formulation is used for calculating LMPs in our case studies [1]. There are two possible methods to decode the opponents’ strategies. we replace the objective function (5) by (10) to include the cost of called reserve.: STRATEGIC GENERATION CAPACITY EXPANSION PLANNING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 1005 (3) (4) The present value of capital cost for generation capacity expansion over the economic life of the GENCO ’s unit is converted to equalized annual costs. a hybrid GA algorithm with pattern search is employed after the standard GA is completed [22]. In this paper. This iterative process will continue until the mesh size of the pattern search (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) When considering generating unit outages. 2. In this paper. PROPOSED SOLUTION METHODOLOGY The co-evolutionary computation approach is applied to solve the above bi-level optimization problem.

and scattered crossover. The convergence ensures the local minimum for this pattern search. NO. be trapped by a local minimum. and 7. VOL. Two load blocks that have the same duration within a levelized planning year are listed in Table I. For example. Flowchart of the proposed bi-level planning algorithm. 2. Obviously. 6. IV. However. and forced outage rates. It is assumed that all generation capacities are made available to energy and reserve markets. Each GENCO will follow the procedure to update its expansion decision and energy and reserve bids based on the updated information on opponents. 2. Table III shows the data for existing units. TABLE III EXISTING UNITS’ INFORMATION TABLE IV TRANSMISSION NETWORK DATA The parameters of standard GA for each GENCO are set as follows: population size of 30. GENCO 2 has a lower capital cost but has a higher operating cost compared to the other two GENCOs. and 3 will invest in generation expansion.06. operation costs. Thus the combination of GA with pattern search can improve the quality of solution and speed up the convergence. the GA solution provides a good starting point for pattern search. The capital cost is recovered in 20 years and no discount rate is considered for simplicity. capital costs. The joint probability . is less than an initialized tolerance value. The network data are given in Table IV. the pattern search may only search around this point. CASE STUDIES An eight-bus system shown in Fig. Eight-bus system. MAY 2009 Fig. and fail to locate the global optimal solution. 3. self-generation number of 5. mutation rate of 0. Three existing generation units owned by three other GENCOs are located at Buses 4. Three GENCOs located at Buses 1. 3 is used to illustrate the proposed approach and its solution. 24. If a point is selected that is far from the optimal solution. 2. TABLE I LOAD INFORMATION [MW] TABLE II GENCOS’ PLANNING INFORMATION Fig. The information for GENCOs’ types is shown in Table II including generation capacity limits. and reserves can only be provided by the units proposed for planning.1006 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS. the quality of the final solution depends on the starting point of the iterative search.

Solution space of GENCO 1’s type 1 in Case A1. The reason GENCO 2 has a negative payoff in Table VI is that the LMP at Bus 2. the probability of 0. withholding still exists. Representatives in each evolutionary generation for GENCO 3. In other words. which prevents GENCO 2 from recovering its capital cost. Fig. 4 shows the solution space for GENCO 1 of type 1 by an exhaustive search of possible solutions where represents the ratio of reserve capacity scheduled in the market to the generating unit capacity. where GENCO 2 is located. we also simulate the scenario in which the three GENCOs 1. no physical withholding would occur. 2.125 in row 2 and column 3 represents the combination when GENCO 1’s type is 2.WANG et al. Table VII shows the LMPs in both cases when . and GENCO 3’s type is 1. while the uncalled reserve is paid at a fixed capacity price. The three scenarios are considered according to the PJM market. To analyze this condition. TABLE VI EQUILIBRIUM IN CASE A2 Table VI shows that the three GENCOs submit bids to the reserve market even though the generation capacity is priced at zero. 5. GENCO 2’s type is 2. The exhaustive search solution is exactly the same as that of the co-evolutionary computation in Table V which demonstrates that the proposed co-evolutionary algorithm is able to find the global equilibrium in the game. The capacity of existing units will not meet the demand and reserves will be inevitably scheduled to guarantee the reliability of system operation. Table VI shows that the planned generation capacity is dramatically decreased in comparison with that in Case A1. Note that the amount of generation submitted to the market as energy bid is the difference between the listed capacity and reserve bid. and one hypothetical market. Policy Scenario A: The payment for the called on reserve is based on energy price and a pre-specified fixed capacity price. is close to its operating cost. We label this case as nowithholding. We observe that the maximum payoff corresponds to the entire generating capacity bidding in the reserve market. and 3 bid their entire capacity to the energy market without any withholding. ERCOT market.: STRATEGIC GENERATION CAPACITY EXPANSION PLANNING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 1007 distribution of GENCOs’ type is given as follows: where represents the probability when GENCO 1’s type is . Case A2: Capacity price is 0 $/MW In this case. The solution fluctuates at the beginning but converges after 25 iterations to the equilibrium listed in Table VI. Fig. 4. In this case. The equilibrium solution is listed in Table V in which GENCO 1 invests in the minimum capacity in both types while the other two GENCOs invest in the maximum available capacity. For example. Fig. GENCO 2’s type is . Case A1: Capacity price is 5 $/MW First we consider the case when the capacity price is set at 5 $/MW in the Policy Scenario A. The following three policy scenarios simulate the GENCOs’ competitive behavior in the planning game for different market conditions. The GENCOs’ expected payoffs are lower except that of GENCO 1 because GENCOs cannot consider the physical withholding for gaining payoffs. GENCOs submit their generation capacity as bids to both markets rather than applying the arbitrage to the reserve market (as in Case A1) when the generation capacity is priced at 0. and GENCO 3’s type is . We consider the following cases. energy bids are zero because of the physical withholding of generating assets from the energy market. So the GENCOs gain an extra profit through the reserve payment which is equal to their capacity times the capacity price. TABLE V EQUILIBRIUM IN CASE A1 Fig. 5 shows the solution of GENCO 3 for every evolutionary generation in the co-evolutionary process.

The GENCOs can gain more if they submit generation bids to the energy market instead of bidding the capacity to the reserve market. Planning capacities for all GENCOs’ Type 1. Tables X and XI show minor differences between the two cases. The HHI is calculated here to measure the market concentration in the three policy scenarios. NO. which is also equal to the GENCO 2’s operating cost. In comparison. Case B2: Capacity price is 0 $/MW Fig. the three GENCOs do not submit the entire generation capacity to the reserve market even though the generation capacity price is high. D. In comparison. In this case. TABLE X EQUILIBRIUM IN CASE C1 all GENCOs are assumed type 1 without any outages. LMPs increase to 25$/MWh.2 is applied here which will satisfy the ISO’s reliability requirement and curb market power as discussed in Section D. This will directly lead to the zero payoff for GENCO 2. In the no-withholding case. GENCO 2’s payoff will be negative. Table VIII shows that in the withholding case. In this case. But the withholding is limited in Policy Scenario C because of the restriction on reserve bidding. MAY 2009 TABLE VII LMPS AT LOAD BLOCK 1 AND NO OUTAGE [$/MWH] TABLE VIII DISPATCH AT LOAD BLOCK 1 AND NO OUTAGE [MW] TABLE IX EQUILIBRIUM IN CASE B1 Fig. Policy Scenario B: The payment for the called on reserve is based only on energy price while the uncalled reserve is paid at the pre-specified fixed capacity price. the ISO considers a fixed ratio of scheduled reserve to the total generating capacity for each GENCO. the LMP at Bus 2 where GENCO 2 is located is 22 $/MWh. In addition. Hence. three GENCOs withhold from the energy market part of their generation capacities. Due to its huge capital cost. We consider the following two cases: Case C1: Capacity price is 5 $/MW Case C2: Capacity price is 0 $/MW The issue with this policy is that GENCOs cannot arbitrage generation assets freely between energy and reserves. Case B1: Capacity price is 5 $/MW A dramatic decrease in payoff is encountered. and the GENCO 2’s generation is dispatched more because the new LMP is higher than its operating cost. HHI is defined as (14) . the existing expensive units will generate more to supply the load. 2. Furthermore. various GA parameters are considered which do not result in any equilibria for the GENCOs’ competition game. 24. GENCO 2 might quit its participation in the game to avoid its negative payoff and the game will be considered between the other two GENCO players accordingly. Table IX shows that GENCO 2 invests in the maximum generation capacity while GENCO 3 invests in the minimum capacity.1008 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS. LMPs at Buses 1 and 3 where the other GENCOs are located are higher than their operating costs. All three GENCOs invest in minimum generation capacities which indicate that GENCOs cannot gain extra payoffs by excessive physical withholding in the energy market unless they submit reserve bids as well. Policy Scenario C: Scenario A is used. VOL. 6. TABLE XI EQUILIBRIUM IN CASE C2 A fixed ratio of 0. Comparison of the three scenarios The above cases show that physical withholding can be exercised when the reserve is priced at a certain level in Policy Scenarios A and B. 6 shows that a solution does not exit for the proposed GENCOs’ capacity expansion decisions.

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S. Rasanen.D. 2. China. . degree in management science and engineering and the M. Mohammad Shahidehpour (F’01) is Carl Bodine Professor and Chairman in the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at the Illinois Institute of Technology. degree in electrical engineering from Shanghai Jiaotong University. he is an Assistant Professor in the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at the Illinois Institute of Technology. “Pricing of electricity tariffs in competitive markets. respectively. degree in electrical engineering from Tsinghua in 1997 and 2003.. Norway. 2004. [19] J. 4. Presently. no. Baldick. in 2007. Jun. Shahidehpour is the recipient of the 2005 IEEE/PES Prize Paper Award and 2006 IEEE/PSO Prize Paper Award. [18] J. He was previously with SINTEF Energy Research in Trondheim. Dr. vol. 32. he is an Energy System Engineer with the Division of Decision and Information Sciences at Argonne National Laboratory. “Hybrid coevolutionary programming for Nash equilibrium search in games with local optima.ercot. NO. Available: http://www. 24. Zuyi Li (M’03) received the B. Presently. degree in industrial engineering and the Ph.. 8. [21] [Online]. 21. Jianhui Wang (M’07) received the B.D.Sc. the M. “California’s electricity crisis: A market apart?. respectively. degree in technical economics and management from North China Electric Power University. 1999. IL.S. China. Chicago. in 1998. pp. Son and R.” Elsevier Sci. stochastic optimization. Comp. Beijing. Beijing. vol.D. 213– 305–315. Argonne. Chicago. no. degree in electrical engineering from the Illinois Institute of Technology. Argonne. His research interests include power system planning and economics. he is an Assistant Computational Engineer with the Division of Decision and Information Sciences at Argonne National Laboratory. and agent-based modeling. Aug. Matlab R14 help files. Energy Econ. Audun Botterud (M’04) received the M. Presently. [20] [Online]. Evol. and the Ph. IL. Keppo and M. pp. Bushnell. J.. in 1995. vol. degree in electrical engineering from Illinois Institute of Technology.” Energy Pol.S. and the Ph. [22] The Mathworks. Chicago. 9. China. degree in electrical power engineering from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. pp. 2004. VOL. MAY 2009 [17] Y. 1045–1052. in 2001 and 2004.1010 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS. decision analysis.” IEEE Trans. Shanghai. in 2002.S. Available: http://www. Trondheim.