Strategic Generation Capacity Expansion Planning With Incomplete Information
Jianhui Wang, Member, IEEE, Mohammad Shahidehpour, Fellow, IEEE, Zuyi Li, Member, IEEE, and Audun Botterud, Member, IEEE

Abstract—To study the competitive behavior among individual generating companies (GENCOs), an incomplete information game model is proposed in this paper in which each GENCO is modeled as an agent. Each agent makes strategic generation capacity expansion decisions based on its incomplete information on other GENCOs. The formation of this game model falls into a bi-level optimization problem. The upper level of this problem is the GENCOs’ own decision on optimal planning strategies and energy/reserve bidding strategies. The lower-level problem is the ISO’s market clearing problem that minimizes the cost to supply the load, which yields price signals for GENCOs to calculate their own payoffs. A co-evolutionary algorithm combined with pattern search is proposed to optimize the search for the Nash equilibrium of the competition game with incomplete information. The Nash equilibrium is obtained if all GENCOs reach their maximum expected payoff assuming the planning strategies of other GENCOs’ remain unchanged. The physical withholding of capacity is considered in the energy market and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is utilized to measure the market concentration. The competitive behaviors are analyzed in three policy scenarios based on different market rules for reserve procurement and compensation. Index Terms—agent modeling, generation expansion, market design, market power, noncooperative game, physical withholding, power system planning.

Load shedding cost of load . LMP for GENCO ’s unit at load block in scenario when GENCO ’s type is and its opponents’ type is . Number of loads. Number of committed units. Average operating cost of GENCO ’s unit. Probability for unit outage scenario . Probability when GENCO ’s type is . Conditional probability when GENCO is . type and its opponents’ type is Amount of curtailment for load at load block in scenario when GENCO is type and its opponents’ type is . Forecasted load at bus at load block . Total load at load block . Generation bid for GENCO ’s unit at load block when its type is . Scheduled generation for GENCO ’s unit. Reserve bid for GENCO ’s unit at load block when its type is . Called on reserve of GENCO ’s unit. GENCO ’s payoff. GENCO ’s payoff when its type is . opponents’ type is Capacity price. Index for unit outage scenarios ( indicating no-outage). Number of unit outage scenarios. GENCO ’s type. Load curtailment vector. Bus load vector at load block . Unit generation vector. Maximum capacity vector of transmission lines. Shift factor matrix. GENCO ’s type set. Type combination of all GENCOs but GENCO . Type combination set of all GENCOs but GENCO .

NOMENCLATURE Index for load blocks. Number of load blocks. Expanded capacity of GENCO when its type is . Lower bound of the capacity expansion of GENCO when its type is . Upper bound of the capacity expansion of GENCO when its type is . Annual levelized capital cost of GENCO ’s. Duration of load block . Index for load. Indicating expected value. Index for units.

and its

Manuscript received July 15, 2007; revised February 25, 2008. First published April 14, 2009; current version published April 22, 2009. Paper no. TPWRS00128-2008. J. Wang and A. Botterud are with the Division of Decision and Information Sciences, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL 60439 USA (e-mail: jianhui.wang@anl.gov; abotterud@anl.gov). M. Shahidehpour and Z. Li are with the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL 60616 USA (e-mail: ms@iit.edu; lizuyi@iit.edu). Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPWRS.2009.2017435 0885-8950/$25.00 © 2009 IEEE

If a market policy is not properly established. A payoff-based generation resource planning is discussed in [6] in which Benders decomposition is used to secure the economic and the reliability requirements of the market operation. Accordingly. Scenario A: The payment for called on reserve is based on energy price and a pre-specified fixed capacity price. Extensive research has been presented in analyzing bidding strategies in energy markets. In a competitive generation capacity planning. GENCOs estimate any opponent’s would-be cost represented by the opponents’ E type and the probability distribution of the opponent’s cost. Scenario A corresponds to the existing practice in PJM [20]. A hybrid co-evolutionary computation algorithm was proposed that searches for the global optima in games with the local optima [17]. the ISO considers a fixed ratio for the scheduled reserve to total generating capacity of a GENCO. In addition. . A transmission. the GENCO can make its own decision on generation expansion based on its estimates of the opponent’s generation expansion strategies. a GENCO must consider other GENCOs’ strategic plans when making decisions on generation capacity expansion. However. Market policies such as electricity pricing [18] are critical for generation expansion planning. Section II presents the problem formulation of the proposed strategic generation capacity expansion with incomplete information. Scenario C is a hypothetical policy which serves as a reference for comparing the market practices. The proposed process forms the noncooperative generation capacity planning framework with incomplete information. INTRODUCTION LECTRICITY restructuring has introduced major challenges to the traditional generation capacity planning approaches in the electricity industry [1]. The unbundling of generation and transmission makes the generation expansion planning much more competitive for self-interested independent participants in electricity markets. [10]. is responsible for satisfying the system reliability requirements while minimizing the generation supply cost to satisfy the hourly electricity demand. GENCOs may withhold generation capacities by submitting bids to reserve markets or consider scheduled outages of generation assets for maintenance. Section IV includes the numerical examples. In practice. which bears an analogy to the generation expansion planning game. the energy market will be in short supply. similar to the incomplete information day-ahead bidding. each generation company (GENCO) can pursue its own payoff maximization by strategically planning and operating its generating units.WANG et al. in an electricity market.constrained incomplete information game was studied in [12]. In a competitive market. A game-theoretic model is proposed in [7] whose analysis is based on the complete information game model. This means that the modeling of competitive behavior is essential in the planning process. the oligopolistic nature of electricity markets makes it more essential to investigate the competitive behavior and monitor the market power exertion in generation planning. The difference between these scenarios lies on procuring reserve bids that are submitted to the market. A framework for the control of energy services which is based on the leader-follower game theory was proposed [13]. It is thus possible to extend the techniques used in the day-ahead energy bidding to study the competitive behavior involved in generation expansion planning. Scenario B: The payment for called on reserve is based only on the energy price while the uncalled reserve is paid at the pre-specified fixed capacity price. A noncooperative incomplete information game approach was applied in [1] and [11] to model a GENCO’s optimal bidding strategy as a set of discrete bids.: STRATEGIC GENERATION CAPACITY EXPANSION PLANNING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 1003 I. Furthermore. Scenario B represents the practice in ERCOT [21]. The co-evolutionary computation emphasizes interactive connections among species [14]. Coalitions and collusions of participants in electricity markets were investigated with a cooperative game approach [1]. In this paper. And the market operator. which showed good convergence and faster speed [16]. while the uncalled reserve is paid at a fixed capacity price. Meanwhile the simulation of energy and reserve market clearing will yield GENCOs price signals for adjusting generation expansion plans. a well-designed market is supposed to encourage the generation capacity expansion that maximizes the social welfare. we propose a co-evolutionary computation approach. Section V concludes the discussion. which may lead to high energy prices. Certain generation planning issues such as the optimal location of new generating units and demand response are not considered since we focus our analyses on strategic interactions of GENCOs in generation planning. This characteristic makes the planning approach differ from that of the complete information game model. A market-based transmission expansion planning is proposed in [5]. From a planning point of view. Each GENCO adjusts its strategic bids for maximizing the expected payoff based on other GENCOs’ bidding information and its estimation of opponents’ types. market power should be monitored and curbed in market operations. The traditional Lagrangian relaxation method was combined with co-evolutionary computation to solve the unit commitment problem. the major objective of electric utilities was to achieve the least-cost operation that met a pre-specified system reliability level [2]–[4]. or the independent system operator (ISO). In conventional planning approaches for new generation resources. Section III discusses the co-evolutionary algorithm and its application to the solution of the proposed problem. [9]. Three market policy scenarios are considered in this paper. The algorithm has proven to converge rapidly and overcome the premature convergence of genetic algorithm (GA) in solving classical problems [15]. The iterative process continues until none of the GENCOs can attain any higher payoffs based on their strategic bids [12]. Scenario C: Scenario A is used. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. the generation expansion planning forms a first-price sealed-bid auction [8] in which individual GENCOs have an incomplete knowledge of other GENCOs’ planning information. The risk of each planning alternative is assessed based on various power system uncertainties. Such issues will be considered in our future work. Consequently. To search for equilibrium in this noncooperative game. Physical withholding of generation capacity is one of the common market power exertion techniques for increasing market prices [19].

In Fig. So the competitive behaviors among GENCOs constitute an incomplete information game. We assume that each GENCO will submit its would-be operating cost as market bid for energy and reserves. its payoff could be lower [8]. In this equilibrium. 1.e. The lower level of this problem is the GENCOs’ own decision on optimal planning strategies and energy/reserve bidding strategies. The GENCO ’s generation capacity expansion problem will maximize its expected payoff subject to capacity constraints (3) and (4) (1) where (2) . opponents’ proposed generating units for generation expansion planning are modeled as different types subject to a joint probability distribution. • Each GENCO may have several planning options represented by capital costs. For instance. However. operating costs. This iterative process will continue until the global Nash equilibrium is reached which means each GENCO has offered its best choice of strategy for planning in the sense that no GENCO can increase its payoff when other strategies are fixed. 24. which yields price signals for GENCOs to calculate their own payoffs. GENCOs are referred to as species. operating cost. Framework of the proposed co-evolutionary algorithm. in electricity markets. An equilibrium is reached when no player can increase its payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy. NO. To maximize its payoff in the incomplete information game. The Nash equilibrium is obtained if all GENCOs reach their maximum expected payoff assuming the planning strategies of other GENCOs’ remain unchanged. all players have the common knowledge of other players’ payoff functions and the information on each player’s payoff and strategy is acknowledged by other players. Each GENCO’s updated planning strategy will impact other GENCOs’ planning strategies which optimize their strategies again by applying the standard GA. Fig. PROBLEM FORMULATION In a complete information game.. MAY 2009 II. A GENCO assumes the ISO’s role for the simulation of the day-ahead energy and reserve market operations. each GENCO will maximize its own expected payoff by planning certain levels of generation capacity which can be marketed in energy and reserve markets. GENCO’s Generation Capacity Expansion Model In applying the co-evolutionary computation to the proposed planning game. and generation capacity limits. The upper-level problem is the ISO’s market clearing problem that minimizes the cost to supply the load. GENCO 1 evaluates the fitness values of individual GENCOs through the domain model. this assumption is purely for simplifying the discussion on the proposed formulation in this paper and can be relaxed in practice. The domain model is the ISO’s market clearing model which calculates the bus LMPs. • GENCOs maximize their levelized payoff annually. any GENCO’s payoff will decrease if it unilaterally changes its strategy while other GENCOs’ strategies are fixed. 1. The Nash equilibrium may not be found if a sufficient number of generations is not given or may not exist at all because of the complexity of power system operation. capacity cost. the interaction among GENCOs’ planning strategies is through the market clearing process (i. Meanwhile. in energy bidding. A. if the GENCO does not model its opponents’ types. The formation of this game falls into a bi-level optimization problem depicted in Fig. Species 1 runs its own standard GA after decoding the representatives (other GENCOs’ generation capacity expansion decisions and energy and reserve bids).1004 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS. VOL. a GENCO has to model its opponents’ information. In this paper. forced outage rate (FOR) form the information set for each type of proposed units. we assume each GENCO is represented as a species in each evolutionary generation which uses standard GA to find its own optimal generation capacity expansion strategy. The assumptions considered in this incomplete information planning game are listed as follows. • Each GENCO has a single candidate unit for planning. the ISO). In this incomplete information game. • A generating unit’s energy and reserve bids may not exceed the unit’s generation capacity. • The proposed generating units in GENCOs are modeled as different types subject to a joint probability distribution. The minimum and maximum capacity. 2. However. The market simulation is based on assumed energy and reserve bids submitted by GENCOs when considering the operating conditions and possible scheduled outage scenarios. 1. Each GENCO will use the LMP signals provided by the domain model to calculate its own payoff (fitness value) and find its representative. The components of the proposed model are discussed as follows. each GENCO as a player in the generation capacity planning game has the complete knowledge on its own payoff function but cannot acknowledge the complete information on other GENCOs’ payoff functions and planning strategies.

When it finds a new minimum. the pattern search will change its center of pattern and iterate until it cannot find a new minimum. The ISO’s objective (5) is to minimize the possibility of load shedding and the operating cost. B. and generation limits (9) by (11) for the reserve which is limited by the reserve bid (12): (10) (11) (12) . a hybrid GA algorithm with pattern search is employed after the standard GA is completed [22]. load blocks and unit outage scenarios are considered in (2). Market Clearing Model The objective of the ISO’s market clearing problem is to maximize the social welfare. In calculating the GENCO ’s payoff. To improve the fitness value of standard GA. C. Then pattern search sample points search the space and calculate the fitness value to find a minimum around the starting point in a fixed pattern. PROPOSED SOLUTION METHODOLOGY The co-evolutionary computation approach is applied to solve the above bi-level optimization problem. There are two possible methods to decode the opponents’ strategies. are calculated by simulating the and reserve ISO’s market clearing. scheduled generation . This iterative process will continue until the mesh size of the pattern search (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) When considering generating unit outages. the ISO supplies individual GENCOs with LMPs and each generation unit’s scheduled energy and reserves. which is called batch decoding. and generation limits (9): The above formulation is used for calculating LMPs in our case studies [1]. Note that the sum of energy and . we replace the objective function (5) by (10) to include the cost of called reserve. or equivalently minimize the operating cost with inelastic demands. The decision variables for GENCO include generation capacity expansion decision variable . Generalized Problem Formulation The above problem formulation is a bi-level optimization problem. The flowchart of the proposed algorithm is shown in Fig. One is to decode the strategies once all GENCOs have finished the evolution in the evolutionary generation. crossover. The other method is the online decoding which is to update the opponents’ strategies immediately after a GENCO has finished its evolution in the evolutionary generation. while satisfying the reliability requirements for supplying the load. Each GENCO runs the standard GA algorithm to search for its own best fitted plan through standard genetic operations such as reproduction.: STRATEGIC GENERATION CAPACITY EXPANSION PLANNING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 1005 (3) (4) The present value of capital cost for generation capacity expansion over the economic life of the GENCO ’s unit is converted to equalized annual costs. load curtailment limits (8). This iterative process will continue until certain termination conditions are satisfied. Then the search step or pattern size is reduced by half. In this paper. In this paper. The market clearing price reserve bids is equal to . The final solution of the standard GA is set as the initial point of the pattern search. line flow limits (7). 2. generation bidding variable and reserve bidding variable . The optimal generation expansion decision and energy and reserve bids are encoded as decision variables for each GENCO. which can be generalized as follows: (13) where generalized constraints for a GENCO’s capacity expansion model. The individual GENCOs supply the ISO’s market clearing model with their capacity expansion decisions as well as energy and reserve bids. III. ISO’s objective function for market clearing. the second method is used to update the opponents’ strategies.WANG et al. subject to load balance constraint (6). In the proposed bi-level optimization problem. we represent the reliability requirement by the load shedding cost in the objective function. generalized constraints for the ISO’s market clearing model. migration and mutation assuming that the opponents’ strategies are decoded [14].

CASE STUDIES An eight-bus system shown in Fig. IV. 2. the GA solution provides a good starting point for pattern search. operation costs. It is assumed that all generation capacities are made available to energy and reserve markets. VOL.06. 3. 6. The capital cost is recovered in 20 years and no discount rate is considered for simplicity. capital costs. GENCO 2 has a lower capital cost but has a higher operating cost compared to the other two GENCOs. 2. and 7. mutation rate of 0. and fail to locate the global optimal solution. Two load blocks that have the same duration within a levelized planning year are listed in Table I. The network data are given in Table IV. the quality of the final solution depends on the starting point of the iterative search. NO. be trapped by a local minimum. Each GENCO will follow the procedure to update its expansion decision and energy and reserve bids based on the updated information on opponents. TABLE III EXISTING UNITS’ INFORMATION TABLE IV TRANSMISSION NETWORK DATA The parameters of standard GA for each GENCO are set as follows: population size of 30. the pattern search may only search around this point. and scattered crossover. The information for GENCOs’ types is shown in Table II including generation capacity limits. Three GENCOs located at Buses 1. 3 is used to illustrate the proposed approach and its solution. Flowchart of the proposed bi-level planning algorithm. 24.1006 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS. The joint probability . and reserves can only be provided by the units proposed for planning. For example. is less than an initialized tolerance value. However. Obviously. 2. The convergence ensures the local minimum for this pattern search. Table III shows the data for existing units. If a point is selected that is far from the optimal solution. Three existing generation units owned by three other GENCOs are located at Buses 4. MAY 2009 Fig. Thus the combination of GA with pattern search can improve the quality of solution and speed up the convergence. Eight-bus system. and forced outage rates. TABLE I LOAD INFORMATION [MW] TABLE II GENCOS’ PLANNING INFORMATION Fig. and 3 will invest in generation expansion. self-generation number of 5.

2. The reason GENCO 2 has a negative payoff in Table VI is that the LMP at Bus 2. Fig. Note that the amount of generation submitted to the market as energy bid is the difference between the listed capacity and reserve bid. TABLE VI EQUILIBRIUM IN CASE A2 Table VI shows that the three GENCOs submit bids to the reserve market even though the generation capacity is priced at zero. Case A1: Capacity price is 5 $/MW First we consider the case when the capacity price is set at 5 $/MW in the Policy Scenario A. The equilibrium solution is listed in Table V in which GENCO 1 invests in the minimum capacity in both types while the other two GENCOs invest in the maximum available capacity.WANG et al. 4 shows the solution space for GENCO 1 of type 1 by an exhaustive search of possible solutions where represents the ratio of reserve capacity scheduled in the market to the generating unit capacity. Fig. We label this case as nowithholding. The following three policy scenarios simulate the GENCOs’ competitive behavior in the planning game for different market conditions.: STRATEGIC GENERATION CAPACITY EXPANSION PLANNING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 1007 distribution of GENCOs’ type is given as follows: where represents the probability when GENCO 1’s type is . So the GENCOs gain an extra profit through the reserve payment which is equal to their capacity times the capacity price. 5 shows the solution of GENCO 3 for every evolutionary generation in the co-evolutionary process. the probability of 0. where GENCO 2 is located. The solution fluctuates at the beginning but converges after 25 iterations to the equilibrium listed in Table VI. which prevents GENCO 2 from recovering its capital cost. The exhaustive search solution is exactly the same as that of the co-evolutionary computation in Table V which demonstrates that the proposed co-evolutionary algorithm is able to find the global equilibrium in the game. Representatives in each evolutionary generation for GENCO 3. We observe that the maximum payoff corresponds to the entire generating capacity bidding in the reserve market. we also simulate the scenario in which the three GENCOs 1. and GENCO 3’s type is 1. In other words. Policy Scenario A: The payment for the called on reserve is based on energy price and a pre-specified fixed capacity price. is close to its operating cost. In this case. For example. 5. We consider the following cases. ERCOT market. Table VI shows that the planned generation capacity is dramatically decreased in comparison with that in Case A1. GENCO 2’s type is . The capacity of existing units will not meet the demand and reserves will be inevitably scheduled to guarantee the reliability of system operation. GENCO 2’s type is 2. and 3 bid their entire capacity to the energy market without any withholding. no physical withholding would occur. To analyze this condition. Fig. 4. Case A2: Capacity price is 0 $/MW In this case. while the uncalled reserve is paid at a fixed capacity price. GENCOs submit their generation capacity as bids to both markets rather than applying the arbitrage to the reserve market (as in Case A1) when the generation capacity is priced at 0. and one hypothetical market. TABLE V EQUILIBRIUM IN CASE A1 Fig. energy bids are zero because of the physical withholding of generating assets from the energy market. The three scenarios are considered according to the PJM market. withholding still exists.125 in row 2 and column 3 represents the combination when GENCO 1’s type is 2. and GENCO 3’s type is . The GENCOs’ expected payoffs are lower except that of GENCO 1 because GENCOs cannot consider the physical withholding for gaining payoffs. Solution space of GENCO 1’s type 1 in Case A1. Table VII shows the LMPs in both cases when .

Hence. LMPs at Buses 1 and 3 where the other GENCOs are located are higher than their operating costs. Table IX shows that GENCO 2 invests in the maximum generation capacity while GENCO 3 invests in the minimum capacity. HHI is defined as (14) . Policy Scenario C: Scenario A is used.1008 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS.2 is applied here which will satisfy the ISO’s reliability requirement and curb market power as discussed in Section D. In addition. the existing expensive units will generate more to supply the load. In the no-withholding case. the three GENCOs do not submit the entire generation capacity to the reserve market even though the generation capacity price is high. We consider the following two cases: Case C1: Capacity price is 5 $/MW Case C2: Capacity price is 0 $/MW The issue with this policy is that GENCOs cannot arbitrage generation assets freely between energy and reserves. In this case. But the withholding is limited in Policy Scenario C because of the restriction on reserve bidding. Planning capacities for all GENCOs’ Type 1. This will directly lead to the zero payoff for GENCO 2. D. 6. NO. Table VIII shows that in the withholding case. GENCO 2’s payoff will be negative. 2. In comparison. the ISO considers a fixed ratio of scheduled reserve to the total generating capacity for each GENCO. Comparison of the three scenarios The above cases show that physical withholding can be exercised when the reserve is priced at a certain level in Policy Scenarios A and B. The HHI is calculated here to measure the market concentration in the three policy scenarios. VOL. 6 shows that a solution does not exit for the proposed GENCOs’ capacity expansion decisions. the LMP at Bus 2 where GENCO 2 is located is 22 $/MWh. three GENCOs withhold from the energy market part of their generation capacities. TABLE XI EQUILIBRIUM IN CASE C2 A fixed ratio of 0. Furthermore. which is also equal to the GENCO 2’s operating cost. Case B2: Capacity price is 0 $/MW Fig. All three GENCOs invest in minimum generation capacities which indicate that GENCOs cannot gain extra payoffs by excessive physical withholding in the energy market unless they submit reserve bids as well. Case B1: Capacity price is 5 $/MW A dramatic decrease in payoff is encountered. Due to its huge capital cost. 24. In this case. GENCO 2 might quit its participation in the game to avoid its negative payoff and the game will be considered between the other two GENCO players accordingly. In comparison. Policy Scenario B: The payment for the called on reserve is based only on energy price while the uncalled reserve is paid at the pre-specified fixed capacity price. and the GENCO 2’s generation is dispatched more because the new LMP is higher than its operating cost. various GA parameters are considered which do not result in any equilibria for the GENCOs’ competition game. The GENCOs can gain more if they submit generation bids to the energy market instead of bidding the capacity to the reserve market. Tables X and XI show minor differences between the two cases. LMPs increase to 25$/MWh. MAY 2009 TABLE VII LMPS AT LOAD BLOCK 1 AND NO OUTAGE [$/MWH] TABLE VIII DISPATCH AT LOAD BLOCK 1 AND NO OUTAGE [MW] TABLE IX EQUILIBRIUM IN CASE B1 Fig. TABLE X EQUILIBRIUM IN CASE C1 all GENCOs are assumed type 1 without any outages.

2006. 1961. Bai. pp. 16. Advances in Power System Control.” in Proc.. 3. May 2003.” IEEE Trans. “Marketbased transmission expansion planning. no. pp. 437–447. Fleten. “Power generation planning and risk management in a liberalized market. The GENCO’s objective is to maximize its payoff by implementing a strategic generation capacity expansion planning and maximizing its energy/reserve bidding strategy for its assets in real-time. K.” IEEE Trans. 2000. A co-evolutionary algorithm is proposed in this paper to model GENCOs as agents in the capacity planning game. A market with HHI between 1000 and 1800 is considered moderately competitive. Shahidehpour. Sep. [12] T. vol.. it may be difficult to set the ratio between the ISO and GENCOs in the Policy Scenario C. Power Syst. Yu. [6] Y. a market is usually considered to be fully competitive.” in Proc. CONCLUSION In comparison with the traditional centralized planning in power systems. Our simulation model also illustrates the payoff profile for each GENCO. V. the market power is curbed to a great extent which makes the case close to the competitive situation in Case A2. [7] A. Chen and X. [15] H. Case A1 has the highest HHI of 2049. no. Li. no. Ventosa. GENCOs make their own plans for generation capacity expansion by simulating the clearing process of energy and reserve markets in the real-time operation. vol. and P. 6th Int. The proposed algorithm is shown to be an effective approach to search for the Nash equilibrium. 2001. generation expansion planning has been separated from transmission planning and performed by GENCOs in the restructured electricity industry. 21. 2005. Shahidehpour. GENCO 2’s payoff is zero which may lead to its withdrawal from the generation expansion planning game. and C. vol. Wong. 1. and Z. 4. no. pp. 4. no. GENCOs can schedule part of their generation capacity for maintenance. 1997. pp. Ramo. 2001. Bloom. [13] A. 1998. vol. S. Chuang. GENCOs could simulate the market operation to project their payoff. Aug. 2001 IEEE Porto Power Tech.58.. Li and M. M. and A. 3. 1. [3] T. 1. “Applications of games with incomplete information for pricing electricity in deregulated power pools. Even though the ISO fixes the ratio of reserve to capacity in Policy Scenario C. [5] M. vol. Shahidehpour. auctions. F. In generation expansion planning. M.. Shahidehpour.” IEEE Trans. Chen. 16. Keyhani. and competitive sealed tenders. Wallace. Market Operations in Electric Power Systems. Chen and X. vol. In this competitive environment. Wang. pp. no. market power cannot be avoided. Operation & Management (APSCOM). 4. [2] M. pp. . 2. Summer Meeting. 19.: STRATEGIC GENERATION CAPACITY EXPANSION PLANNING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 1009 Fig. Feb. “Profit-based generation resource planning.” IEEE Trans. 2002. 4. Feb. 16–20. H. 1046–1052. PAS-101. 2004. “Counterspeculation. Math. 2. vol. Power Syst. So such market simulations are crucial for measuring GENCOs’ planning risks. Manage. Fu and M. V. 2002. and E. Chung. Ferrero. Power Syst. 7.” IEEE Trans. 827–832. A market with HHI higher than 1800 is considered to be highly concentrated. no. 7. [14] H. [10] X. Vick. Tomasgard. But as discussed before. 20. If HHI is less than 1000. 17. 184–189. Bjorkvoll. G. Due to the nonexistence of equilibrium in Case B2. 143–152. “Long-range generation planning using decomposition and probabilistic simulation. Case B1 also has a high HHI which points out that the move from Policy Scenario A to Policy Scenario B does not change the market concentration much. where the ratio of a unit’s reserve to the total capacity is fixed.. D. Press. no. Conf. 128–133. no. [9] R. Nov. pp.” IMA J. HHI in the three policy scenarios. The discussion on strategic maintenance behavior is beyond the scope of this paper. “Analyzing oligopolistic electricity market using coevolutionary computation. Shahidehpour. its HHI cannot be calculated. 12. “Transmission analysis by Nash game method. J. Also in the Policy Scenario B. no. Nowak. Balzer. vol. [4] J. New York: Wiley. 1982. Syst. pp.” IEEE Trans.” IEEE Trans. 15. Physical withholding may not be discovered easily. 1. Wang. “Transaction analysis in deregulated power systems. pp.86 and Case A2 has the lowest HHI of 1749. This is because the generation capacity price in Case A2 is set to zero which renders a stronger competition among GENCOs. Wu. Buygi. In Policy Scenario C. Nov. vol. “Cooperative coevolutionary algorithm for unit commitment. The ob- jective of the ISO is to ensure the reliability of power systems based on individual GENCOs’ proposed plan for generation capacity expansion planning and maximize the social welfare in real-time by utilizing the GENSOs’ bids for clearing the energy and reserve markets. and M. pp. M. 2004.WANG et al. Power App. However the competition is stronger if the capacity price is set appropriately.” IEEE Trans. pp. Ramesh. Simulation results show that the market design in Policy Scenario A may encourage physical withholding from the energy market. Power Syst.. 12. no. Varaiya. Rivie. 4.. 1. vol. [8] W.. 8–37. Shanechi. The competition among GENCOs is based on an incomplete information game.. pp. REFERENCES [1] M. the proposed model can be extended to include a multi-period game in large power systems. “Leader-follower framework for control of energy services. setting the ratio may discourage investments. 837–841. “An MCP approach for hydrothermal coordination in restructured power markets. Jul. Aug. A. Yamin. Power Syst. Oxford Univ. pp.. Ferrero. “Strategic bidding of transmission-constrained GENCOs with incomplete information. Garcia-Alcalde. 1997. 2000 IEEE Power Eng.. The goal here is to show the effectiveness of the simulation model for testing the proposed market rules.” IEEE Trans. Power Syst. Fin. Shahidehpour. vol. M. and S. 2003. 13. vol. The results show that the payoff of GENCOs may be zero when generating costs are close to LMPs.” in Proc. Three policy scenarios are studied..” J. [16] H. “Cooperative coevolutionary approach and its promising applications in power system. 1. Power Syst. 18. In Fig. 7 depicts the results. Power Syst. no. and V. Nguyen. and M. [11] R. Power Syst. Soc. Rivera. 273–289. pp. H. 797–802. vol. vol. In our case studies. Feb. vol. Fig.” IEEE Trans. Feb. Ramesh. “A game-theoretic model for generation expansion planning: Problem formulation and numerical comparisons. Furthermore. Shahidehpour. 2060–2067. 885–891. Scenario Policy C is an alternative market design which can be used for market monitoring. A. 1340–1347. In addition.

Chicago.” IEEE Trans. Baldick. in 1998. “Pricing of electricity tariffs in competitive markets. 2. NO.S. and the Ph. degree in electrical engineering from Illinois Institute of Technology. Presently. 2004. Evol.S. IL.D. . decision analysis.. Shanghai. Beijing. no. 9. IL. stochastic optimization. 32.” Energy Pol. Jun. [18] J. [22] The Mathworks.D.S. the M. [21] [Online]. no. 24. Available: http://www. Chicago. degree in industrial engineering and the Ph. in 2007. and the Ph. China. respectively.Sc. 1999. and agent-based modeling. he is an Energy System Engineer with the Division of Decision and Information Sciences at Argonne National Laboratory. degree in technical economics and management from North China Electric Power University. 8. His research interests include power system planning and economics. in 2002. degree in electrical engineering from Tsinghua University. Rasanen. Beijing. Zuyi Li (M’03) received the B. VOL. Norway. Bushnell.. degree in electrical engineering from the Illinois Institute of Technology. Aug.pjm. Trondheim.1010 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS. 305–315. pp. Available: http://www.” Elsevier Sci. in 1997 and 2003. Energy Econ. Shahidehpour is the recipient of the 2005 IEEE/PES Prize Paper Award and 2006 IEEE/PSO Prize Paper Award.com/. he is an Assistant Professor in the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at the Illinois Institute of Technology. China. vol. pp. “Hybrid coevolutionary programming for Nash equilibrium search in games with local optima. degree in electrical power engineering from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Chicago. 2004. Dr.S. degree in electrical engineering from Shanghai Jiaotong University. [20] [Online]. China. Argonne. vol. respectively. 21. Argonne. pp. degree in management science and engineering and the M. Son and R. J.. Keppo and M. [19] J. in 2001 and 2004. Presently. “California’s electricity crisis: A market apart?.ercot. MAY 2009 [17] Y. he is an Assistant Computational Engineer with the Division of Decision and Information Sciences at Argonne National Laboratory.com. 213–223. Jianhui Wang (M’07) received the B. He was previously with SINTEF Energy Research in Trondheim. Matlab R14 help files. in 1995. Presently. 4. Comp. Audun Botterud (M’04) received the M. 1045–1052.D. Mohammad Shahidehpour (F’01) is Carl Bodine Professor and Chairman in the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at the Illinois Institute of Technology. vol.