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AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE MARITIME MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS SET

DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
Dated: 14 Dec. 2009 Replacing/Superseding Nil

Volume 09 Submarine System Requirements Part 11 Watertight Integrity and Recovery From Flooding

Usage: Maritime Commonwealth of Australia 2006 This work is copyright. You may download, display, print and reproduce this material in unaltered form only (retaining this notice) for your personal, non-commercial use within your organisation. All rights are reserved. Requests and enquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to the Manager, Legislative Service, AusInfo: GPO Box 1020, CANBERRA ACT 2601 or by e-mail to: Cwealthcopyright@dofa.gov.au

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DEF(AUST)5000-Vol09 Pt 01-ISS 01

PROMULGATION
Sponsor Autho~ MRS-CMA Audit Document Format Requirements

Signed: Name: G. K. Watson Appointment:

Principal Naval Architect- Directorate of Submarine Engineering


Date: ...?.!!.!.!/.D.?

Name: P. F. King Appointment: MRS - Configuration Management Authority

.....................

Date: .............................................

Dec

G I

MRS Peer Review Group Assign Document Maturity Level

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Assistant Director Pass Technical Content

Signed: ;A / ! Name: G.K Watson Appointment:

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Chairperson of the Submarine MRS-PRG

Signed: Name: A Gates Appointment: Principal Mechanical gineer - Directorate of Submarine Engineering Date:

Date: ...

..?./ !.!L.&Y.. ...................

DML

2
5

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Director Approve Technical Convnt

Signed: / ) R l & l Name: Andrew Horobin Appointment: Director Submarine Engineering

Date: .............................................

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01

DEF(AUST)5000 CHANGE PROPOSAL


INSTRUCTIONS
1. 2. 3. This page is to be used to report specific errors, omissions or to suggest improvements to this publication. Please attach additional comments/drawings/sketches as necessary. Copies are to be forwarded for follow-up action to: a. Director of Submarine Engineering (DSME), South Australia PO Box 1292, North Haven SA. 5018 b. Navy Specification and Technical Documents Centre (NSTDC), Campbell Park Offices, CP4-SP-WS013, MDP9401, Department of Defence, CANBERRA ACT 2600, or alternatively c. Change proposals can be submitted electronically using the User Feedback form located on the DEF(AUST)5000 DEFWEB site: http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/home/documents/navycoll.htm And

PROPOSED CHANGE Proposal:

The Above Discrepancy

Materiel Safety

Materiel Capability

Other

ORIGINATING SOURCES CONTACT DETAILS Organisation/Ship/Establishment: Submitted by:


Signature Printed Name Rank/Designation E-mail Address Date

Recommended by
Signature Printed Name

Yes

No
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SPONSORS ACTION Document Sponsor: Comments: Change Proposal is Approved:


Yes No

Signature

Printed Name

Rank/Designation

E-mail Address

Date

Authorised by MRS-PRG:
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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01

ISSUE HISTORY
Issue No.
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Issue Date
14 Dec 2009

Description of Changes
Initial Issue

Affected Pages Sponsors Name


All Graham Watson

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01

PREFACE
1. 2. This document was prepared by the Directorate of Submarine Engineering and is an element of the DEF(AUST)5000ADF Maritime Materiel Requirements Set. The general requirements specified herein are to be used in the generation of capability-specific function and performance specifications associated with procurement, modification, maintenance, and repair of maritime materiel. This document will be updated at regular intervals to reflect lessons learned and changes in National Standards, or to incorporate other nations standards required for collaborative activities. Queries and comments regarding the use and/or interpretation of this document are to be directed to the sponsor.

3. 4.

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Scope ................................................................................................................................................ 5 1.1 Life Cycle .................................................................................................................................. 5 1.2 What is Covered ....................................................................................................................... 5 1.3 What is Not Covered................................................................................................................. 5 Documents ........................................................................................................................................ 6 2.1 Applicable Documents .............................................................................................................. 7 2.2 Referenced Documents ............................................................................................................ 8 DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................... 9 3.1 Definitions ................................................................................................................................. 9 3.2 Acronyms ................................................................................................................................ 10 3.3 Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................... 10 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 11 4.1 Significance to RAN ................................................................................................................ 11 4.2 Consequences of Poor Performance or Hazard ..................................................................... 11 Functional and Performance Requirements .................................................................................... 12 5.1 General ................................................................................................................................... 12 5.2 Submarine Safety Program (SUBSAFE) ................................................................................ 12 5.3 Hull Penetrations..................................................................................................................... 13 5.4 Valves on the Pressure Boundary. ......................................................................................... 16 5.5 Hard Systems. ........................................................................................................................ 16 5.6 Penetration Blanks.................................................................................................................. 17 5.7 Pressure Testing..................................................................................................................... 17 5.8 Fasteners ................................................................................................................................ 18 5.9 Materials ................................................................................................................................. 18 5.10 Welding ................................................................................................................................... 19 5.11 Non Destructive Examination (NDE)....................................................................................... 19 5.12 Recovery From Flooding......................................................................................................... 19 DESIGN AND PRODUCT CONSTRAINTS..................................................................................... 21 6.1 Specific Design/Engineering Constraints................................................................................ 21 6.2 Navy Practice Constraints....................................................................................................... 21 6.3 Navy Personnel Constraints ................................................................................................... 22 6.4 Navy Logistic Constraints ....................................................................................................... 22 6.5 Australian Industry Constraints ............................................................................................... 22 6.6 Legislative Constraints............................................................................................................ 22 6.7 Interoperability Constraints ..................................................................................................... 22 6.8 Commonality Constraints........................................................................................................ 22 6.9 Regulatory Constraints ........................................................................................................... 22 Deliverables (DIDs) ......................................................................................................................... 22 7.2 Title: Watertight Integrity and Recovery from Flooding ........................................................... 22 7.3 Description and Intended Use................................................................................................. 22 7.4 Inter-relationships ................................................................................................................... 22 7.5 Attachments and Applicable Documents ................................................................................ 23 7.6 Preparation Instructions .......................................................................................................... 23

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01

1
1.1
1.1.1

SCOPE
Life Cycle
This document is applicable throughout the life of the submarine from conception until disposal. Together with the documents and drawings referred to herein, it is subject to periodic revision. The Shipbuilder must ensure that he is in possession of the correct edition for each particular tender or contract. Enquiry in this regard should be made to the Department.

1.2
1.2.1 1.2.2

What is Covered
This document covers the submarine requirements for watertight integrity and recovery from flooding. The requirements of this standard shall take precedence over all documents quoted herein. Where anomalies occur in the documents quoted this should be brought to the attention of the MRS Configuration Management Authority.

1.3
1.3.1

What is Not Covered


The document does not cover all aspects of design nor does it cover the crew safety and recovery procedures. The onus on the designer is always to use good practice and best engineering judgement to ensure that the whole structure is fit for purpose and safe to personnel, the public and the environment. The document does not cover submarine structural integrity associated with the structural design requirements which are specified in DEF(AUST)5000 Vol 09 part 01.

1.3.2

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01

DOCUMENTS
DISCLAIMER NOTICE If any information in this publication is attributed to another work the reader should consult that work to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication. Should there be any discrepancy between this publication and the other work no person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from the Office of the Head Navy Engineering. The Commonwealth, the authors, consultants and editors are not responsible for the results of any actions taken on the basis of information in this publication which is attributed to another work if: (a) the reader has failed to consult that other work to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication which is attributed to that other work; or there is a discrepancy between the information contained in this publication which is attributed to another work and that other work and the person has failed to first obtain advice from the Office of the Head Navy Engineering.

(b)

The Commonwealth, and the authors, consultants and editors, expressly disclaim all and any liability and responsibility to any person, whether a reader of this publication or not, in respect of anything, and of the consequences of anything, done or omitted to be done by any such person in reliance, whether wholly or partially, upon the whole or any part of the contents of this publication which is attributed to another work if: (a) (b) the reader has failed to consult that other work to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication which is attributed to that other work; or there is a discrepancy between the information contained in this publication which is attributed to another work and that other work and the person has failed to first obtain advice from the Office of the Head Navy Engineering.

If the reader of this publication discovers any item of information in this publication which appears to be incorrect, then the onus is on the reader to verify whether this information is correct with the Office of the Head Navy Engineering.

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01

2.1
2.1.1

Applicable Documents
The following documents are called up in this document. When applying this DEF(AUST)5000 document, the user is required to negotiate with the sponsor a suitably dated version for each applicable document. In accordance with DI(G) LOG 0812 document selection shall be based on the following order of precedence. Noting that in situations where no other standard adequately addresses the ADOs requirements, Australian Defence Standards are to be used in preference to other standards. Government, operational and/or technical imperatives can override preference to other standards:
List of Applicable Documents Applicability and Availability Australian DOD specification. http://intranet.defence.gov.au/ - policy / documents

2.1.2

ABR 6492 Navy Technical Regulations Manual SUBSAFE Series DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 2 Part 2 - General requirements for RAN Submarines DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 5 Part 8- Electrical Systems for RAN Combatant Ships and Submarines. DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 10 Part 1 Integrated Control Systems for RAN Ships and Submarines DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 9 Part 01 Submarine Structures DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 9 Part 03 Submarine Stability

Australian DOD specifications. http://intranet.defence.gov.au/ - policy / documents Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp

DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 9 Part 04 Hydrodynamics, Manoeuvring and Control DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 3 Part 5 - RAN Welding Standard DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 2 part 3- Platform Vulnerability

Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp

DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 2 part 6 - General Shock Requirements DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 2 part 7 Classified Shock 7

Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp Australian DOD specification

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
Requirements - General DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 2 part 19 RAN Engineering Drawing Requirements. DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 3 part 4 - Painting
http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp

DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 3 part 10 - Weight Control

Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp

DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 3 part 16 - Cathodic Protection

Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp

DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 9 Part 7 - Submarine Escape and Rescue

Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp

DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 9 Part 5 - Explosive Stowages in Submarines DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 4 Part 5 - RAN Sea Water Pumps and Piping for RAN Surface Ships.

Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp Australian DOD specification http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/navysyscom/mrs/homepa ge.asp

2.2
2.2.1

Referenced Documents
The following documents were used in the development of this MRS Part. The appropriate information from these documents has been included and the authors are hereby acknowledged.
http://www.dstan.mod.uk/ RSwN Specification Collin Class SPO/Directorate of Submarine Engineering, ACF Adelaide

MOD Defence Standard 02-136 Design Testing and Acceptance for watertight integrity of Submarines FMV Safety Standard 1986

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01

3
3.1
3.1.1

DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS


Definitions
Requirement definitions used throughout DEF(AUST)5000 documents are contained in the DEF(AUST)5000Vol 01 Pt 03MRS Definitions and Abbreviations. Additional definitions not currently provided in the fore mentioned reference are listed as follows: Breach Hard Systems Collapse depth (CD) Failure of the pressure boundary Those systems that are subject to DDD pressure The design depth, referenced to the axis of the pressure hull, beyond which the hull structure or hull penetrations are presumed to suffer catastrophic failure to the point of total collapse. (NATO) Is the maximum depth, measured to the underside of the keel, to which the submarine shall be capable of unrestricted operation. Is the sea water pressure at DDD. CHS is defined as the largest single unsecured hole in the pressure hull when operating at DDD, from which it is possible for the submarine to recover successfully without propulsion and remain on the surface. (blowing must commence within a defined time period) Structure that is watertight must withstand the designed head of pressure without deformation and without weeping or beading at seals or penetrations.

Deep diving depth (DDD) Deep Diving Depth Pressure (DDDP) Critical Hole Size

Watertight:

Airtight: Gastight SUBSAFE Certification Boundary (SSCB) or Pressure Boundary

Structure that is airtight must withstand an overpressure test of 15 millibars. Structure that is gastight must withstand a vacuum test of 5millibars. Is the pressure boundary of the submarine that includes the pressure hull, its penetrations, systems, valves, and equipment whose failure could prevent the submarine from controlling and recovering from a credible flooding incident and returning to and remaining on the surface. The pressure boundary extends to the inboard flange of the backup valve of all sea connected systems with a bore of CHS or greater and extends to the inboard flange of the hull valve for all sea connected systems with a bore of less than CHS. This is the pressure to which depth dependant sea water systems are tested. This pressure is decided during the design process and for existing classes is as specified. It is normally the same as, or slightly greater than, sea pressure at Collapse Depth (CD). A term applied to any condition, event, operation, process, or item whose proper recognition, control, performance, or tolerance is essential to safe system operation and support (e.g., safety critical function, safety critical path, or safety critical component (MIL-STD-882).

Depth dependent system test pressure (DDSTP)

Safety-critical

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
SUBSAFE Safety Critical Systems SUBSAFE Safety Critical Systems are defined as those individual systems or items of equipment, which although not part of the SSCB, are critical to a submarine or its crew in controlling and recovering from a credible flooding incident and in returning to and remaining on the surface. In the event of a Disabled Submarine (DISSUB), those systems maintaining life or facilitating escape or rescue are also designated as safety critical (ABR 6091). SUBSAFE Safety Critical Systems are derived from Safety Critical Functions. A function, which if performed incorrectly or not performed, may result in death, loss of the system, severe injury, severe occupational illness, or major system damage (MIL-STD-882). Safety Critical Functions are derived from Vital Capability considerations. Various capabilities may be designated as vital in the OCD or derived as vital from the OCD. Vital capabilities are determined from Navy Regulatory requirements. Vital capabilities are likely to be nominated or derived from safety of life, safety of the environment, mobility and fighting considerations in both the normal operational and post-incident recovery environments.

Safety Critical Function

Vital capability

3.2
3.2.1

Acronyms
The majority of acronyms used in this document are contained in the ADFP 103Abbreviations and Military Symbols or the Macquarie Dictionary

3.3
3.3.1

Abbreviations
Requirement abbreviations used throughout DEF(AUST)5000 documents are contained in the DEF(AUST)5000Vol 01 Pt 3MRS Definitions and Abbreviations. Additional abbreviations not currently provided in the fore mentioned reference are provided as follows:

MCD DDD DDDP DDSTP OCD DAR CHS

Minimum Collapse Depth Deep Diving Depth Deep Diving Depth Pressure Depth Dependent System Test Pressure Operational Concept Document Design Acceptance Representative Critical Hole Size

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01

4
4.1
4.1.1

BACKGROUND
Significance to RAN
Safety Aspects. Submarine watertight integrity and the ability to recover from uncontrolled flooding, is critical to the safety of the submarine. Should a breach of watertight integrity cause sea water to enter the submarine, the worst case flood could exceed the design recovery capacity and prevent the submarine from surfacing. This is a significant risk to equipment and personnel safety. A fundamental tenet of submarine safety is to maintain the integrity of the pressure envelope. The RAN SUBSAFE program manages this by providing objective assurance in the integrity of the sea pressure boundary (SUBSAFE certification boundary and Safety Critical Systems) during the submarines operational life. Capability Aspects. Submarine watertight integrity and recovery from a flood is critical to sustaining the operational capability and survivability under all conditions of depth and shock loading. Environmental Aspects. Adequate control of watertight integrity and recovery is essential to preventing an environmental hazard.

4.1.1.1

4.1.1.2

4.1.2 4.1.3

4.2
4.2.1

Consequences of Poor Performance or Hazard


Poor design of materials and systems creates a high risk of poor watertight integrity which can lead to catastrophic loss of the submarine or loss of life.

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01

5
5.1
5.1.1

FUNCTIONAL AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS


General
The operational conditions i.e., operation area and required life for which the submarine is to be designed, shall be as detailed in the OCD. This shall include Deep Diving Depth, shock loading and the design fatigue life of the pressure hull. The pressure hull structure shall have penetrations to connect systems and components such as pipes, shafts, tubes and hatches, to enable external access and supply of sea water to inboard services. These internal systems and components that are exposed to sea pressure shall be designed as part of the pressure hull boundary. The system design shall consider the risk that failure of components in this pressure boundary could cause an uncontrolled flood into the submarine, and provide design controls to ensure that any breach can be isolated and the submarine recover safely. An emergency flooding recovery capability shall be provided to rapidly return the submarine to the surface should there be a breach of watertight integrity causing an uncontrolled flood. The emergency flooding recovery capability shall rely on an emergency blowing system alone, to provide sufficient capacity to surface the submarine based on a worst case credible flood entering the submarine, and achievable detection and reaction times to minimise the water ingress volume. The bilge pumping capability shall operate from the surface down to CD and provide sufficient capacity to maintain the submarine on the surface following recovery from an uncontrolled flood through a hole size equivalent to the Critical Hole Size (CHS).

5.1.2

5.1.3

5.1.4 5.1.5

5.1.6

5.2
5.2.1

Submarine Safety Program (SUBSAFE)


The design requirements of the watertight integrity and recovery system shall include the requirements of the RAN SUBSAFE program. The SUBSAFE program requirements supports the maintenance of submarines watertight integrity and recovery capability by ensuring the approved design and maintenance is being managed and certified as compliant. SUBSAFE certification boundary (SSCB) components and systems shall be defined. This is the pressure boundary of the submarine that includes the pressure hull, its penetrations, systems, valves, and equipment whose failure could prevent the submarine from controlling and recovering from a credible flooding incident and returning to and remaining on the surface. The pressure boundary extends to the inboard flange of the backup valve of all sea connected systems with a bore of CHS or greater and extends to the inboard flange of the hull valve for all sea connected systems with a bore of less than CHS. SUBSAFE critical systems shall be defined. These individual systems or items of equipment are not part of the SSCB but are critical to the submarine or its crew in controlling or recovering from a flood. The design integrity of the pressure boundary shall be maintained and certified as compliant at completion of build and at regular intervals during its service life. SUBSAFE Material Certification requirements detailed in ABR 6103 provide specific material and management assurance requirements to demonstrate that the design integrity of the pressure boundary is maintained following build and maintenance of the Collins Class. Similar requirements will be required for any future submarine classes. Detailed requirements for items within the SSCB are provided in the following sections.

5.2.2

5.2.3 5.2.4

5.2.5

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01 5.3
5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3

Hull Penetrations
In general the number and size of pressure hull penetrations is to be kept to a minimum. Hull and backup valves and the associated systems in the pressure boundary which are exposed to sea pressure shall meet the submarine shock requirements of DEF(AUST)5000 Vol2 pt 6 and 7. A hazard risk assessment (HRA) of all hard systems shall be conducted to determine areas of risk to watertight integrity and the safeguards required. This shall identify components whose failure could lead to flooding from the sea, and determine design controls to mitigate unacceptable risks. These design controls shall consider inclusion of back up valves, sensors, and automation in the event of credible single and multiple failures (eg flexible hose and valve).

5.3.4 5.3.4.1 5.3.4.2 5.3.4.3 5.3.4.4 5.3.4.5

The general requirements for Pressure hull penetrations are provided for five generic types: Type A. Type B. Type C. Type D. Type E. Penetrations with hull valves for systems open to sea. Penetrations with inner and outer boundary. Outer open/Diving pressure on inner e.g. SSE (CD), torpedo tubes. Penetrations with outer boundary normally shut; inner backup e.g. conning tower, hydraulic, lub oil and fuel system Penetrations for mechanical and electrical equipment Penetrations with no inner boundary

5.3.5 5.3.5.1 5.3.5.2 5.3.5.3

Type A.

Penetrations with Hull valves for systems open to the sea.

All valves shall be capable of being operated manually. All power operated hull and backup valves shall have remote, local and manual mode of control. Emergency shutting of all remotely activated power operated hull and backup valves shall be affected centrally from one manned position in each watertight compartment by a system ergonomically designed to reduce errors by use of mimic displays. Emergency shutting of a hull valve shall also shut its back up valve. Control shall be by a high integrity supply with an independent energy source, e.g. battery backed 24 volt DC . On the loss of this supply all remotely powered hull and back up valves shall fail shut, except those specified to fail open. Systems that are designed to be used only at shallow depths eg when snorting etc shall have their hull and backup valves shut automatically when the design depth pressure is exceeded i.e. deep dive isolation function. Remote indication of valve position shall be provided directly from the valve spindle. Indication is not to be derived from the valve control signal. A mechanical valve position indicator on the valve spindle is required for all hull valves Electrical and hydraulic control of hull valves shall not be vulnerable to physical damage and protection measures (shielding) shall be provided where required. DEF(AUST)5000 Vol 2 Pt 3 shall apply. Hull valves whose bore is equal to or greater than Critical Hole Size (CHS) shall meet the following requirements: All hull valves shall require back up valves. Back up valves shall be fitted directly onto the hull valve. The backup valve is a minimum mandatory requirement for submarine safety and will safeguard watertight integrity in the event of failure of the hull valve internals or actuator.

5.3.5.4

5.3.5.5

5.3.5.6

5.3.5.7

5.3.5.8 5.3.5.8.1 5.3.5.8.2

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
5.3.5.8.3 Back up valves and hull valves shall have power operation that can be controlled both remotely and locally. This will ensure shutting is achieved within the time required for recovery and to ensure that shutting can be carried out under pressurised flooding conditions. The power operating systems for both hull and back-up valves shall have separate energy storage devices (eg hydraulic accumulators) and alternative or secure supplies to take account of the possibility of power supply failure. Loss of energy storage for the hull valves shall not prevent operation of the back up valves and vice-versa. A single energy storage device may be provided for a group of collocated valves. Each energy storage devices shall have sufficient capacity to cycle all the valves it supplies at least twice. Back up valves and hull valves that are not designed to be opened when the submarine is submerged do not require power operation unless the size or location of the valve prevents manual operation. Hull valves (not including back up valves) that are not designed to be opened when dived, shall be provided with a means of being locked in the shut position. The locking device is to be strong enough to hold shut if power operation is provided and shall be removable should operational requirements dictate. Hull valves whose bore is less than Critical Hole Size (CHS) shall meet the following requirements: Hull valves shall generally require back up valves where watertight integrity needs to be safeguarded as determined in clause 5.3.3, or to support damage control and operational requirements. Hull and backup valves shall require power operation which is controlled in local and/or remote mode where this is needed to safeguard watertight integrity and recovery as determined in clause 5.3.3, or to support damage control and operational requirements, and where direct valve access is difficult. A back up valve shall be required where the possible flood rate exceeds the pumping capacity at DDD. Both the back up valve and hull valve shall have power operation which is controlled in local and remote mode. A back up valve is not required where the uncontrolled flooding rate at DDD is within the capacity of the Bilge pumps at DDD ie pumping at depth could control the flood. A back up valve may however be required to support damage control or operational requirements. Type B Penetrations with Inner and outer boundary. Normal operation includes periods with outer open, diving pressure on inner e.g. SSE, Torpedo Tubes. The inner boundary shall be designed, constructed, inspected and assured to the same standards as the outer boundary. The inner boundary shall be designed against a hydrostatic pressure appropriate to its operating requirement. Valves which control a watertight boundary when flooding, venting, equalising or draining type B penetrations shall be designed to be fit for purpose appropriate to the role of that watertight boundary as agreed by DAR. Mechanical Interlocks shall be fitted between the inner and outer boundary wherever practicable. Where interlocks cannot be fitted the penetration is to be subject to a full safety assessment and the absence of an interlock accepted by the DAR. Mechanical Interlocks shall not be capable of being damaged or being overridden when opening is attempted on a misaligned or jammed interlock. Where necessary torque limiters or similar shall be used to prevent excessive force being applied to the interlocks.

5.3.5.8.4

5.3.5.8.5 5.3.5.8.6 5.3.5.8.7

5.3.5.8.8

5.3.5.9 5.3.5.9.1

5.3.5.9.2

5.3.5.9.3

5.3.5.9.4

5.3.6 5.3.6.1 5.3.6.2 5.3.6.3

5.3.6.4

5.3.6.5

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
5.3.6.6 The catastrophic failure of the outer boundary (including welds, joints, coamings etc.) shall not be considered credible at depths less than CD because they shall be designed and manufactured to the same standards as the hull structure. The integrity of the outer boundary to CD shall be proven by analysis and if practicable by testing to DDDP. Operational testing and inspection during deep dive will be required. Testing of the inner boundary to DDSTP shall be required. Type C Penetrations with Outer boundary normally shut, inner back-up e.g. conning tower, hydraulics, fuel and lub oil systems. An inner boundary shall be provided if there is a credible risk of failure to the outer boundary resulting in a breach equal to or greater than the CHS. The outer and inner boundaries shall be demonstrated to be watertight at CD and the specified shock loading. Catastrophic failure of the outer boundary, (including welds, joints, coamings etc.), will not be considered credible at depths less than CD because it shall be designed and manufactured to the same standards as the hull. Hydrostatic testing will not be required, if it is impracticable. Pipes that penetrate the hull boundary but are not exposed to seawater pressure internally (e.g. hydraulics, or pipes penetrating a pressure tight subdivision etc) shall have a hull valve but do not require a back up valve. Systems such as fuel and lube oil filling lines penetrating the hull boundary may utilise a pressure tight cap as the outer hull valve but this shall be backed up by a valve attached to the pressure hull. In this circumstance power operation and remote actuation of the backup valve is not required irrespective of the size of the valve. Valves mounted on a pressure bulkhead shall not require a back up valve where the sea water exposure of the valve is via a tank and the tank can be isolated from the external seawater pressure by another valve. The valve operation shall be in a manned compartment and its design pressure shall correspond to the tank, system or bulkhead pressure whichever is greater.

5.3.7 5.3.7.1 5.3.7.2 5.3.7.3

5.3.7.4

5.3.7.5

5.3.7.6

5.3.8 5.3.8.1 5.3.8.2 5.3.8.3

Type D Penetrations incorporating mechanical or electrical equipment e.g., periscopes, masts, shafts, cable glands etc. This requirement covers hull penetrating masts, periscopes, main and control surface shafting and cable glands. The outer boundary shall have a pressure capability equal to that of the pressure hull and is to be demonstrated by hydrostatic shop test. An inner boundary shall be provided with the same capability as the outer boundary if there is a risk of credible failure in the outer boundary resulting in a breach equal to or greater than CHS (eg due to collision), and a credible failure of the inner boundary would result in a breach equal to or greater than CHS. In such circumstances the inner boundary capability must be demonstrated by a hydrostatic shop test. All main propulsion shafting, and systems including the stern gland sealing arrangements shall meet the performance requirements of DEF(AUST)5000 Vol 02 pt02. Propeller shaft sealing shall have a mechanical seal backed up by an internal gland and external inflatable seal to provide for seal failure and maintenance. All shaft bores through the pressure hull shall be provided with a double seal because of the severe operational consequences of even small leaks of sea water. The design is then to be such that the function of the external sealing, i.e. the one acting against the sea, can be checked easily.

5.3.8.4

5.3.8.5

5.3.9 5.3.9.1

Type E

Penetrations with no inner boundary.

This category covers accommodation and service hatches, torpedo embarkation hatches etc.

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
5.3.9.2 Catastrophic failure of the boundary, including welds, joints, coamings etc., will not be considered credible at depths less than that of the hull because they shall be designed and manufactured to the equivalent standards. In circumstances other than these the watertight integrity at CD shall be demonstrated by a hydrostatic shop test.

5.4
5.4.1

Valves on the Pressure Boundary.


The type of valve (ball etc) and materials used shall be proven to be highly resistant to all types of corrosion and erosion, and shall be easy to maintain and meet the performance requirements in the OCD. The design of valves on the pressure boundary which are exposed to DDD shall survive the severe requirements of an underwater shock pressure pulse during an underwater explosion of the level specified within the OCD in accordance with the shock requirements in DEF(AUS)5000 Vol 2 pt 6&7. Valves on the pressure boundary are typically designed to withstand a pressure equivalent to at least 3.0 DDD which is the equivalent static pressure. Non welded valves shall be flanged and spigot type attached to the hull pad or insert with fasteners as specified below. They shall be designed to limit leakage under shock loading which will require sealing of flange face and also circumference of spigot. Hull valves and hull inserts, designed to be welded into the pressure hull, shall be fitted with corrosion resistant linings. Pressure testing of the hull valve, its attachment to hull and the inboard piping shall be possible insitu. This will require a valve and hull pad/insert design that accepts an attachment to seal the outboard end. Security measures shall be put in place to prevent the submarine being sunk while alongside through unauthorised actuation of flood or vent valves.

5.4.2

5.4.3

5.4.4

5.4.5

5.5
5.5.1 5.5.2

Hard Systems.
Pipes and pipe penetrations in the pressure boundary are typically designed to withstand a pressure equivalent to at least 3.0 DDD. Pipes and pipe penetrations on the pressure boundary which are exposed to DDD shall survive the severe requirements of an underwater shock pressure pulse during an underwater explosion of the level specified within the OCD in accordance with the shock requirements in DEF(AUS) 5000 Vol 2 pt 6 & 7. It is to be a principal design aim that the extent of depth dependent sea water systems within the pressure hull are to be minimised and that the number and hole size of pressure hull penetrations is to be kept to an absolute minimum. The design should aim to avoid systems liable to cause a flood being sited adjacent to systems necessary for recovery. A vulnerability analysis shall be conducted iaw DEF(AUS) 5000 Vol 02 Part 03. The general design principles and testing requirements for Sea Water piping systems are specified in DEF(AUS) 5000 Vol 04 pt 05. Piping with welded connecting joints shall be extensively used in lieu of mechanical joints which present a greater risk to water tight integrity. All piping shall be seamless along its length. System flexible hoses shall be evaluated through a hazard risk assessment (HRA) for risks to personnel safety and recovery system vulnerability caused by hose failure, and provide system shielding where a credible risk exists. Pipes for systems that are designed to be opened to sea water at only limited depths shall be fitted with relief valves to prevent over pressurisation. An alert shall be raised when the relief valve is actuated. 16

5.5.3

5.5.4

5.5.5 5.5.6 5.5.7 5.5.8

5.5.9

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
5.5.10 Hard systems with a bore greater than CHS and located outside the SSCB shall be prevented from causing a flood should there be credible risk of component failure eg suction and discharge flexible hoses at a pump. The system design shall provide controls that would automatically stop the uncontrolled flow through the breach (eg flow fuse, non return valve).

5.6
5.6.1

Penetration Blanks.
Spare penetrations in the pressure hull which are provided in the design or created during its service life, shall have equivalent strength and watertight integrity as the pressure hull during maximum pressure and shock loading. The Designer shall provide the blank design and installation requirements for initial build and inservice. For guidance on in-service requirements, refer to the MoD DEFSTD 02-136 in clause 2.2.1

5.6.2

5.7
5.7.1

Pressure Testing.
Systems subject to Deep Diving Depth Pressure (DDDP) in normal operation (including hull and back-up valves) shall be tested routinely to a pressure equivalent to, or slightly greater than, that at the Collapse Depth of the submarines hull. This reduces the probability of system failure under pressure equal to or less than that of the pressure hull. Regular ongoing testing shall be conducted throughout the submarine or systems life, to provide: a) Demonstration of structural strength of the structure (valve body, garbage ejector body etc.), and its associated fastenings and fittings b) Assurance of watertight integrity at the time of testing c) Evidence of correct assembly and standard of workmanship d) Demonstration of correct functioning/operation and performance and thus e) Evidence for acceptance from the shipbuilder or refit authority f) A basis for estimation of further acceptable service life.

5.7.2

5.7.3

Boundaries of watertight or oil tight structure shall not leak when subjected to pressure of the specified fluid, equivalent to the design head on the boundary. Tightness, in any degree, shall be attained by positive means such as welding or gaskets/seals (for mechanical fastened structure only). Mechanical sealing using bolted joints shall be provided by using a specified torque applied to the fasteners to prevent overloading that could cause plastic deformation and failure. Where practicable hull valves shall be given full functional test (i.e. testing against operational performance requirements). The functional test shall incorporate, where practicable, realistic operation of the control and indication systems, power supplies, actuators and valve mechanisms against the flow rates, differential pressures etc. which would be experienced in service. If it is not practical to carry this out with the hull valve installed, the operational testing should be performed at the manufacturers as part of type testing. The evidence provided by testing assists in minimising the risk of incorrect assembly, incorrect use of materials, and gross deterioration of materials in service; and thereby provides assurance of submarine safety and fitness for use throughout the operational period until the next due test. The test results will form part of the evidence supporting the design justification for the Submarine Safety Case. Regular testing to a pressure representing the expected maximum operational depth also engenders faith in the operators that the systems will operate as required, when required.

5.7.4 5.7.5

5.7.6

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01 5.8
5.8.1 5.8.2 5.8.3 5.8.4 5.8.5

Fasteners
Fasteners shall be designed to meet the pressure and shock requirements. Individual fasteners on the SSCB shall be fully traceable from the initial material formation to its final location on the submarine. All fasteners used in the SSCB shall have a specified torque applied to preload the joint. If stainless steel fasteners are used, the risk of failure due to crevice corrosion shall be minimised by appropriate material selection and joint/ fastener design. Replacement and maintenance of fasteners during service shall be certified with assurance that the respective fasteners design configuration and strength is maintained and any deviations and risks are identified and approved by the DAR. For guidance on maintenance of fasteners and studs, refer to the MoD DEFSTD 02-136 in Clause 2.2.1

5.9
5.9.1 5.9.2 5.9.3 5.9.4

Materials
The selection of material for the submarine structure shall take into consideration the operating environment, existing technology, infrastructure and RAN experience The material selected shall be appropriate to its location within the structure and the environmental condition in which the submarine has to operate. The materials used shall be qualified for the operating environment, manufactured and tested in accordance with ISO or equivalent standards. Requirements for the quality and traceability of all materials and components shall be specified during the fabrication process. Materials specified for boundary application shall be certified as compliant with the specification and be traceable to the original batch of material produced. These requirements shall be subject to approval by the DAR. In addition to any other criteria deemed necessary to meet OCD requirements, the materials proposed for the pressure boundary should meet the following criteria regarding mechanical properties: High yield strength High toughness levels Ability to withstand extreme deformation at high strain rates Low susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking Resistance to high stress low cycle fatigue Resistance to corrosion, marine growth or loss of properties at environmental extremes. Materials which protect the watertight integrity of the submarine shall have proven performance in resisting corrosion. They shall be comprehensively qualified by operational experience in a worst case tropical environment similar to that which the RAN operates. The following materials are currently used by the RAN for key components in submarine sea water systems : Sea Water Valves- Nickel Aluminium Bronze (NiAlBr) to NES 747 part 2. Weld repair of castings effects corrosion resistance and therefore must be qualified iaw this standard and procedures for management of Selective Phase Corrosion and recertification developed. Sea water Pipes- 70/30 Copper Nickel (CuNi) Stainless Steel shall not be used in contact with sea water with the exception of SMO 254. Any further exceptions shall require qualification in the proposed application. The following materials shall not be used: 18

5.9.5

5.9.5.1 5.9.5.2 5.9.5.3 5.9.5.4 5.9.5.5 5.9.5.6 5.9.6

5.9.7 5.9.7.1

5.9.7.2 5.9.8 5.9.9

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
5.9.9.1 5.9.9.2 5.9.10 5.9.10.1 5.9.10.2 Aluminium shall not be used in the pressure boundary, structural or external application. Phosphor Bronze castings and Brass shall not be used in contact with sea water. All material is to be protected in accordance with DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 3 Pt 04 Painting and Vol 3 Part 16 Cathodic Protection as applicable. Coatings in highly corrosive areas (e.g. Bilges and battery compartments) shall be individually qualified by testing. Coatings and weld cladding using dissimilar metals for use in conjunction with penetration inserts and sealing faces to provide hard wearing and corrosive resistant surfaces shall be individually qualified by testing. .

5.10
5.10.1 5.10.2 5.10.3 5.10.4

Welding
Welding of RAN submarines shall be in accordance with DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 03 Part 05. All welded joints shall be used to the maximum extent possible to limit the risks to watertight integrity inherent in mechanical joints and seals. For design of welded joints, reference shall be made to the appropriate design or equipment standards. The weld classification, positioning qualification procedures and NDE requirements are at the discretion of the designer but they shall consider the technical capability of the selected builder and minimise the need for additional infrastructure. Wherever possible the welds shall be placed in areas of low stress to allow the use of lower strength consumables and minimise weld preparation requirements while meeting the other criteria for the submarine structure materials. Where this is not possible the welds shall have similar performance or better than the base material. All welding and related processes shall be subject to approval by the DAR. During fabrication a summary of the weld repairs undertaken shall be provided to the CoA on a regular basis at intervals to be agreed. Fabrication contractors and subcontractors shall be accredited iaw DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 3 Part 05 requirements.

5.10.5

5.10.6 5.10.7 5.10.8

5.11
5.11.1 5.11.2 5.11.3 5.11.4 5.11.5

Non Destructive Examination (NDE)


NDE shall be in accordance with standards approved by the CoA. An NDE plan detailing the scope of examination to be undertaken on welds shall be developed by the designer and endorsed by the DAR. The NDE contractor shall be independent of the fabricator to prevent any conflict of interest. Proposed NDE procedures shall be submitted to the DAR for endorsement. NDE personnel shall be subject to proficiency testing prior to starting and periodically when engaged. Results shall be available for audit by the CoA.

5.12
5.12.1 5.12.1.1

Recovery From Flooding


Detection All hull valves exceeding Critical Hole Size (CHS) and opened to external seawater pressure shall be fitted with flood sensors to provide reliable alerts of any flow rates outside normal operating parameters that could indicate flooding.

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
5.12.1.2 All bilges shall be fitted with level sensors to measure the depth of water in the bilge. Alarms and Alerts are to be transmitted to the central control points when the water reaches the set levels and rates indicative of an uncontrolled flood. The water level and flow sensor signal shall reliably confirm that uncontrolled flooding is occurring and should ideally activate the shutting of hull valves automatically to isolate the flood. However, inclusion of this capability to automatically shut valves shall be supported by a safety case that considers the risks and reliability issues. The design shall provide a communication (visual/audible) capability that will support expedient confirmation of a flood alarm so that recovery action can commence without delay. As a minimum, manual call points shall be provided at the entrances to all compartments containing bilges. Recovery The design of the recovery system shall be based on the worst case credible uncontrolled flood. Flooding volume will depend on the hole size, number of holes (ie double ended flood), flooding rate and the reaction time to isolate the flood. Recovery from a flood at DDD shall be possible by commencing the blowing of main ballast tanks within a specified time period after the flood started (that allows the crew to adequately react and respond) to provide upward motion without using propulsion. Isolation of the flood will be necessary should the flood rate through a hole (defined as the critical hole size) exceed the bilge pumping capacity on the surface. The following is the existing RAN philosophy of how a flood through an equivalent critical hole size impacts the recovery process at DDD: a. Hole size is less than or equal to CHS. Blow main Ballast tanks within the specified time limit. Assume the flood is not isolated, and pumping commences to remove water ingress when the submarine reaches the surface. Submarine shall be capable of remaining on the surface with flood not isolated. b. Hole size is greater than CHS. Isolate the flood and Blow main Ballast tanks within the specified time limit. Pumping commences to remove water when reaching the surface. The submarine shall be capable of remaining on the surface. 5.12.2.3 The emergency blow system shall be designed to recover from DDD following a worst credible flood situation for a flood of duration no less than the time taken to detect, react and complete isolation of the flood. It shall be demonstrated that the following requirements are satisfied: Detection, initiation and isolation of the flood in a specified time period that allows recovery of the submarine. Pipe and fitting losses and any other minor losses at maximum flood rate shall be ignored. Emergency blow system capacity shall be conservative and assume adiabatic conditions unless agreed otherwise and include design margins catering for the assumptions in design analysis, production tolerances and in-service degradation. The design of the emergency blowing capacity shall be conservatively based on the worst case response time with man in the loop and not the best case time achieved when the valve is shut using a flood sensor. The time period required to react and successfully recover shall consider the worst case time to detect, react and isolate a flood, accounting for human factors, command decision making and valve isolation method. The reaction and isolation of a flood shall assume worst case scenario with man in the loop and shall not assume a sensor automatically shuts the valves alone. Emergency Blow shall be capable of being actuated from each watertight compartment and locally. Bilge Pumping Each watertight compartment shall be equipped with a bilge pumping capability from the surface down to Collapse Depth. Each pump shall be capable of taking suction from both the bilges in its own compartment and in other watertight compartments. Performance across the full depth

5.12.1.3

5.12.1.4

5.12.2 5.12.2.1

5.12.2.2

5.12.2.3.1 5.12.2.3.2 5.12.2.3.3

5.12.2.4

5.12.2.5 5.12.3 5.12.3.1

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
range does not need to be provided by a single pump, but could be provided by a group of pumps. 5.12.3.2 5.12.3.3 5.12.3.4 It shall be possible to start and stop the bilge pump from the compartment in which it is located, and also from the central control point in each watertight compartment. (eg Collins PCC and DSC) The Bilge pump design capacity shall be capable of removing water from a continuous flood equivalent to the critical hole size when on the surface, and be able to operate down to CD. Each bilge pumping installation shall consider the survivability requirement on the surface and at CD and ensure there is a capacity of at least 1.5 times the required capacity after all design and service wear margins are considered. i.e. if the capacity margins are based on surfaced conditions then these capacity margins should be maintained at CD. The Bilge pumping capacity at CD shall be capable of removing expected water leakage from likely leak paths such as seals and leaks. The existing RAN design philosophy is as follows: a. With a continuous flood of sea water into the submarine from an unsecured hole size less than or equal to CHS and whilst on the surface, the pumping capacity to remove the continuous water ingress shall be sufficient to keep the submarine on the surface. b. With a continuous flood of sea water into the submarine from an unsecured hole size greater than CHS between the surface and DDD, isolation of the flood and blowing main ballast tanks shall be completed within the specified response time. The pumping capacity shall remove the accumulated water from the submarine on the surface. 5.12.3.7 5.12.3.8 5.12.3.9 It shall be possible to perform bilge pumping at trim and heel angles up to +/-- 30 degrees, and as specified in the OCD. The bilge pumping capacity specified shall be met using the bilge system configuration with the maximum head loss. Bilge pumping shall be capable of achieving full pumping capacity within the design response times for recovery and damage control. This shall consider priming with all suction lines maintained in a filled condition using strategically placed non return and controlled isolation valves. The bilge pumping function shall be made independent of the general power and auxiliary systems. Battery power alone shall be used for this function. Battery power shall be capable of being taken from either the full submarine battery, or from only that portion of the battery located in the same pressure tight compartment as the pump. The electric bilge pump motors, including its starting equipment, shall be a waterproof type corresponding to IP 67 per IEC 529 meeting the requirements in DEF(AUST) 5000 Vol 05 part 08 A lower class of sealing may be approved depending on how the equipment is located in relation to potential ways of water inflow, and on what may be perceived as a reasonable water level in the room after a water intrusion has taken place.

5.12.3.5 5.12.3.6

5.12.3.10

5.12.3.11

6
6.1
6.1.1

DESIGN AND PRODUCT CONSTRAINTS


Specific Design/Engineering Constraints
There are no specific design/engineering constraints.

6.2
6.2.1

Navy Practice Constraints


There are no Navy Practice constraints.

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01 6.3
6.3.1

Navy Personnel Constraints


There are no Navy Personnel constraints.

6.4
6.4.1

Navy Logistic Constraints


There are no Navy Logistic constraints.

6.5
6.5.1

Australian Industry Constraints


There are no Australian Industry constraints.

6.6
6.6.1

Legislative Constraints
There are no Legislative constraints.

6.7
6.7.1

Interoperability Constraints
There are no interoperability constraints.

6.8
6.8.1

Commonality Constraints
There are no commonality constraints.

6.9
6.9.1

Regulatory Constraints
There are no regulatory constraints.

7
7.1.1

DELIVERABLES (DIDs)
The following is a Data Item Description (DID) for Watertight Integrity and Recovery from Flooding. The level of required Objective Quality Evidence (OQE) shall be adjusted for the various design phases, i.e. concept, preliminary and detailed design, DID Number: (Project Specific)

7.2 7.3
7.3.1

Title: Watertight Integrity and Recovery from Flooding Description and Intended Use
Submarine watertight integrity and the ability to recover from uncontrolled flooding is critical to the overall capability and safety of the submarine. Should a breach of watertight integrity cause sea water to enter the submarine, the worst case flood could exceed the design recovery capacity and prevent the submarine from surfacing. This is a significant risk to equipment and personnel safety. The MRS specifies the requirements for this capability to which this DID inherently refers, with the intention of evidence being provided to demonstrate that the design has captured the requirements.

7.3.2

7.4
7.4.1 7.4.2 7.4.3 7.4.4 7.4.5 7.4.6

Inter-relationships
DID-xxxxx Design Drawings DID-xxxxx General Arrangement Drawings DID-xxxxx Damage Control DID-xxxxx Stability DID-xxxxx Hydrodynamics, Manoeuvring and Control. DID-xxxxx Welding 22

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
7.4.7 7.4.8 7.4.9 DID-xxxxx Fire Safety Systems DID-xxxxx Shock DID-xxxxx Cathodic Protection

7.5
7.5.1 7.5.1.1 7.5.1.2 7.5.2 7.5.2.1 7.5.2.2

Attachments and Applicable Documents


Attachments (Project Specific and as required) (Project Specific and as required) References DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Watertight Integrity and Recovery from Flooding DEF(AUST)5000Vol 02 Pt 19Engineering Drawing Requirements

7.6
7.6.1 7.6.1.1 7.6.2 7.6.2.1 7.6.2.1.1

Preparation Instructions
Generic Format and Content The Data Item shall comply with the general format content and preparation instructions contained in the CDRL clause entitled General Requirements for Data Items Specific Content Preliminary Design Review (PDR) Pre Contract A design disclosure document on the recovery design shall be provided to establish the credibility of the designer to provide a quality design that complies with proven submarine standards and methodologies. Design philosophy shall be provided for recovery in the event of an uncontrolled flood. This shall include a preliminary analysis that provides the following and any assumptions: The critical hole size, how is it determined and used in the design. The minimum reaction time and the maximum seawater ingress allowed if the submarine is to recover to the surface, and how is it determined. The emergency blow system capacity using conservative approach that assumes adiabatic conditions in the analysis. Include the margin for error and proposed validation. The bilge pump capacity on the surface and at CD, together with suitable pump availability at CD. Submarine recovery modelling, it methodology, validation and the preliminary results. Material Qualification Plan. Shock design philosophy. Hard Sea Water system design philosophy, including valves, flooding sensors, alerts. Etc Emergency Blowing System design philosophy. Material traceability and pressure testing philosophy for hard systems and the pressure boundary.

7.6.2.1.2 7.6.2.1.2.1 7.6.2.1.2.2 7.6.2.1.2.3 7.6.2.1.3 7.6.2.1.4 7.6.2.1.5 7.6.2.1.6 7.6.2.1.7 7.6.2.1.8 7.6.2.1.9

7.6.2.2 7.6.2.2.1

Critical Design Review (CDR)- Post Contract Definition of the items that form the subsafe certification boundary and safety critical systems iaw the SUBSAFE requirements. This will include all documentation required to manage the integrity of boundary e.g. functionality and re-entry control procedures and records. 23

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
7.6.2.2.2 7.6.2.2.3 7.6.2.2.4 7.6.2.2.5 7.6.2.2.6 7.6.2.2.7 7.6.2.2.8 7.6.2.2.9 Modelling and validation of submarine surfacing response with varying hole sizes that demonstrates the recovery of submarine with a worst case credible flood. Human factors and time analysis to detect, respond and recover the submarine. Shock calculations applied to all subsafe systems and equipment particularly those open to the sea. Calculations of maximum water ingress from a worst case flood into the submarine Calculations and validation of emergency blowing system design including air expansion (conservative adiabatic expansion)and water removal in ballast tanks Calculations of Bilge pumping system design Weld and NDE plans (showing locations of welds) Vulnerability analysis and Hazard Risk Assessment (HRA) that identifies the possible hazards that could impact on watertight integrity and recovery, and the design controls proposed to mitigate them to an acceptable level eg back up valves, automation, etc . Further details of data, calculations and drawings capturing all the up-to-date information of the capability shall be provided. Safety case for whole of submarine design that includes watertight integrity and recovery Drawings Schematics, diagrammatics, system arrangements and equipment arrangements that describe the Subsafe Certification boundary and critical systems Submarine designers drawings and system performance specifications Original Equipment manufacturers (OEM) design drawings Penetration list and design data Material selection and supporting test results. Report of the qualification results for materials used in the SSCB and hard systems shall be provided to demonstrate the respective materials performance in the Australian Environment. Some of the evidence maybe by extension from proven experience whilst others will require qualification testing and trials. A qualification plan and the subsequent evidence that supports acceptance shall be agreed by the DAR. Qualification shall include the materials resistance to corrosion including crevice and galvanic (dissimilar metals) when used in the designed application. Manufacture Technical Procurement specifications for items in the SSCB. Work Instructions and Installation Instructions for items in the SSCB. Designers certification and supporting evidence that approved subsafe certification boundary items all meet the specification. Material Traceability of all items in the Subsafe certification Boundary OQE requirements as specified in the Subsafe Manuals. Test Regime Test report of all Items in the SSCB tested iaw Subsafe manuals. Maintenance/Hull Survey Protocols for material and management requirements of the SUBSAFE program as specified in the Subsafe manuals. 24

7.6.2.2.10 7.6.2.2.11 7.6.2.2.12 7.6.2.2.12.1 7.6.2.2.12.2 7.6.2.2.12.3 7.6.2.2.12.4 7.6.2.2.13 7.6.2.2.13.1

7.6.2.2.13.2 7.6.2.2.14 7.6.2.2.14.1 7.6.2.2.14.2 7.6.2.2.14.3 7.6.2.2.14.4 7.6.2.2.14.5 7.6.2.2.15 7.6.2.2.15.1 7.6.2.2.16 7.6.2.2.16.1

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DEF(AUST)5000Vol 09 Pt 11Iss 01
7.6.2.3 7.6.2.4 Delivery All reports provided at final delivery of each vessel shall be updated and provided to reflect the as built and installed configuration of the system.

25

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