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It is poiesis, or creation in the largest sense of the word. It is in this sense that poetry is equivalent to primordial dwelling; man dwells only when poets exist in the world.”1 -Paul Ricoeur Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) is a philosopher whose works spanned some of the most disparate fields of knowledge in recent hermeneutic philosophy in his quest for the meaning of being. Throughout his career he has contributed to numerous topics of philosophical interest, often changing his methodology and style of presentation to match the contents. His technique of ‘distanciation’ (investigating the context of a particular text) accounted for some apparent disparity among his works, despite the actual continuity of the grandest of his themes. In his early opus, La Philosophie de la volonte (The Philosophy of the Will), for instance, he begins to present with a descriptive phenomenological style, the essence of the phenomena of the will in the first volume, and continues in the second volume to display a decryptive hermeneuticphenomenological style concerning the empirical facts of the will. Throughout these volumes he foreshadows the projected style and content of the elusive unwritten third volume, the Poetics of the Will in which the religious themes come to a head. Later, in an altogether different study, The Rule of Metaphor, and again in Oneself as Another, the religious themes become latent, while he, continuing previous analyses in wholly new contexts, brings the word, its expression, and the constitution of the self to the forefront. It is to the Poetics of the Will that we will turn our attention here. Ricoeur is well-known for saying “Le symbole donner a penser:”2 the symbol gives rise to thought. This would have been the guiding theme for the Poetics of the Will, had he written it. Consistent with Ricoeur’s “criteriology” of symbols as he developed it both in Symbolism of Evil and throughout his career, one may chose to view all forms of human experience as comprised of symbols whose hermeneutics are of varying degrees. Ricoeur defines three degrees of
Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 467. Cf. Freud and Philosophy, pp. 38 (a phrase he takes from Kant’s Critique of Judgment).
Dible, Randolph 2 hermeneutics, and three dimensions of every authentic symbol. The first degree consists of universal “primary symbols,” the primitive form of symbols, cosmic realities such as defilement, sin, and guilt, but also the sun, the moon, and waters. The “symbols of the second degree” are symbols arranged in narrative form, and this is what is referred to as myth. Lastly, “symbols of the third degree,” are conceptual, rational or speculative symbols. Within the third degree he includes original sin and the servile will, reflections upon which would have been a central theme to the Poetics of the Will. 3 Part 1: Symbolics Symbols are open to interpretation and provoke spontaneous hermeneutic action. While words are a species of symbols whose designations are limited by their definitions, symbols are ciphers open to indefinitely many possibilities, depending on the freedom of “poetic license.” Ricoeur writes, “No doubt a symbol is, in the Greek sense of the word, an ‘enigma,’ ...enigma does not block understanding but provokes it; there is something to unfold, to dis-implicate in symbols.”4 Ricoeur’s use of ‘symbol’ comes from the notion of ‘cipher’ found in the third volume of Jaspers’ Philosophy, devoted to transcendence, the inspiration for Ricoeur’s Poetics.5 Indeed, Ricoeur modeled the projected ontology of the Poetics after the reconciled ontology of Gabriel Marcel and the paradoxical ontology of Karl Jaspers. More than provoking understanding of symbolics en masse, the Poetics of the Will was intended to incite immanent ethical conduct through what he called “the genesis of desire.”6 In contrast to the abstract mentality of the dictation of moral duty found in Kantian ethical maxims, the ethics of Ricoeur promises through hope a completion, a fulfillment in an object of desire. The specific symbols of the ‘new man’ and the ‘second birth and regeneration’ are to be taken from the symbol of Christ. According to Ricoeur, Christ is a symbol that has become thoroughly
3 4 5 6
Cf. Symbolism of Evil, pp. 10, and “The Symbol: Food for Thought.” Freud and Philosophy, pp. 18, and Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 296. Faith and Philosophy in the Writings of Paul Ricoeur, pp. 216. Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 346-347.
Dible, Randolph 3 sedimented into an idol by Christianity. St. Paul, the first Christian theologian, was the first to connect the symbol of Christ with the symbol of its antitype, Adam. 7 The symbolic significance of Adam, in turn, is that he was created in ‘imago Dei,’ in the image of God, the ultimate symbol. Ricoeur is interested in revitalizing not only the religious sentiments surrounding these symbols, but through these symbols, philosophy itself. We human beings may be treated as our own primary symbols. Under the designation ‘Man,’ for instance, St. Paul declared that it is “in Adam” that we collectively have sinned. 8 Our ontological significance as beings can be appreciated through the sympathetic participation in myths, through the mediation of myths and their ultimate critical demythologization (the baptism of fire of critical reflection), opening the being that we participate in to fresh realizations of meaning. Poetics is the medium for truly fresh critical reinterpretation of symbolic potencies through the semantic innovation of the productive, creative imagination. Ricoeur intended to create, in a Biblical sense, but in philosophical form, a new poem of creation and revelation, drawing its symbolic power for good from the extant materials of the Philosophy of the Will, a body of works that articulate the diabolic depths of a phenomenology of the will in penitential confession through the symbolization of evil. Ricoeur writes, “One can suppose that the symbolism of evil is always the contrary of a symbolism of the good or salvation or that a symbolism of salvation is the counterpart of a symbolism of evil.”9 Within the different levels of interpretation “semantically as well as mythically, the symbols of evil are always the obverse side of a greater symbolism, a symbolism of salvation.”10 Thus, the significance of the orientation of the symbol (whether good or evil) is secondary to its essential structure. Ultimately all imaginal form is derived from empirical experience starting with the body and its cosmic concretion.
7 8 9
Symbolism of Evil, pp. 238, Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 278. Ibid. Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 316. Freud and Philosophy, pp. 39.
Dible, Randolph 4 Symbolism of Evil performed an exegesis of the myths of evil, an exegesis which left a task for the philosopher who participated in it and was thereby able to perform his or her own higherorder exegesis, which this time may be oriented toward transcending evil. The Poetics of the Will was to be more than a post-Biblical Genesis. It was to be a revolutionary philosophy and primordial poetry of transcendence. This leads one to speculate as to its form. Its territory is somewhat mapped out by the preceding parts of the project, but leaves much to the imagination. Ricoeur acknowledges that the semantics of the imagination of possible being is not limited to mere fantasy. There may be good reason to give the beyond of being cataphatic form in the imagination, be that form physical, conceptual, mythical, poetical, or otherwise. It also includes science, whose models are themselves metaphors, shorthand for paradigms of functional parameters, organized in narrative, and mythical form: “Imaginative projection is only one means and one stage of the giving of a worldly form to the beyond in terms of the here and now.” 11 We can now begin to envision the proposed ‘second Copernical revolution’ and ‘post-critical naivete’ Ricoeur sought to incite. This will be a preliminary imagining of what Ricoeur might have included in his unwritten Poetics of the Will, rendering the Philosophy of the Will in a revolutionary mode. Part 2: Volume I: Freedom and Nature The first volume of the Philosophy of the Will, published in 1950, is called Le Volontaire et l’involontarie (Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary). The second volume of the Philosophy of the Will was published in 1960, and is collectively referred to as Finitude et culpabilite. It was published jointly in two parts: L’Homme Fallible (Fallible Man), and La Symbolique du mal (Symbolism of Evil). One may look to Freedom and Nature for the foreshadowing of the overall project of the Poetics of the Will, and use the indications at the conclusion of Fallible Man as a direct prefiguring of the themes of Poetics. The structure of the projected Poetics is informed by a more explosive but enfolded set of directions to the ultimate diabolical symbol, ‘the Evil Infinite’ at the heart of Symbolism of Evil, whose zig-zag structure of
Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 391.
Dible, Randolph 5 references to ‘the Evil Infinite’ may be re-arranged backwards to give a possible structure to the Poetics of the Will. Ricoeur seems to hint this can take place in a reading of the Evil Infinite’s converse, which we can be identified with ‘originary affirmation,’ ‘the objectival synthesis,’ or ‘the surplus of meaning,’ which Ricoeur appropriates from various sources (Nabert, Kant, Freud, and others). From this we can begin to make out the long sought-after structure of transcendence towards which Ricoeur aimed. Freedom and Nature, the first volume of the Philosophy of the Will, is an application of phenomenology to the fundamental functions of the will: choice and decision, motivation and action, consent and refusal. It is an ‘eidetic’ analysis in Husserl’s sense, an intentional analysis which defers existential considerations in order to discern the essential (eidetic) description of the form of man’s fundamental possibilities. In each of the primary functions of the will, the voluntary and the involuntary aspects of willing are discovered to be mutually limiting. Decision is limited by involuntary motivations, action by the means beginning with the body and the habits of nature. Even consent is found to be limited by ‘the absolute involuntary’ of existence and its priority over the phenomena of the will, namely by the fact that I did not will myself into existence. A key to Ricoeur’s investigation can already be found in Freedom and Nature in the chapter on decision and motivation, where he projects “a philosophy of value” which entails “an ethic.”12 This leads to his wondering, “how can we trace the ultimate tangents of reference, and what does ‘ultimate’ mean? Anxiety about the ground of value seizes me; for the question ‘what does ultimate mean?’ inevitably leads to another--‘is there an ultimate in value?’... The Grund becomes Abgrund.”13 In essays collected in Conflict of Interpretations after the publication of the extant Philosophy of the Will, Ricoeur expresses a ‘fundamental’ or ‘originary ethics’ which will help us understand his intentions.14
12 13 14
Freedom and Nature, pp. 66. Freedom and Nature, pp. 74. Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 337 - 342.
Dible, Randolph 6 A key contextualization of the Poetics of the Will arrives in “The Hermeneutics of Symbols,” an essay about the symbolic mediation of the relationship between speculation and the hermeneutics of reflection beginning with Fichte’s first truth, the ‘thetic judgment:’ “I am, I think.”15 In Freedom and Nature, Ricoeur, like Gabriel Marcel, one of his most immediate influences, struggles with the Cartesian dualism which we still think in terms of, if not ontologically, then semantically, in the problem of embodied consciousness. Ricoeur clarifies that there is “a chain of cogitos which constitute the reflective tradition.”16 The Cartesian, he says, is “only one of the summits--even if the highest” of them. 17 He refers to the Socratic cogito (“Look after your soul”), the Augustinian cogito (the “inner” man distinct from the flux of “external” things and “higher” truths), and the Kantian cogito. He explains the modern situation thus: “the Fichtean ‘Self’ is, without any doubt, the most significant instance of modern reflective philosophy; as Jean Nabert remarked, there is no contemporary reflective philosophy which does not reinterpret Descartes through Kant and Fichte. And the ‘egology’ that Husserl later attempted to graft onto phenomenology belongs to this line.”18 In Freedom and Nature, Ricoeur places the proposed Poetics of the Will in this context of progressing beyond Descartes: The ultimate consequence of the Cartesian revolution seems to us to lie here, in the discovery that the originality of consciousness with respect to all objectively conceived nature is such that no cosmology can any longer engulf this consciousness. The ‘Poetics’ of the will can hereafter rediscover the desire for God only thanks to a second revolution which breaks through the limits of subjectivity, as the latter had broken through the limits of natural objectivity. 19 This second revolution he calls ‘Copernican’ because from within the Cartesian revolution (that is, after it), superadded to it, the Cartesian deduction is subtracted while its truth remains in
15 16 17 18 19
Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 327. Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 236. Ibid. Ibid. Freedom and Nature, pp. 191.
Dible, Randolph 7 the form the Fichtean “Self,” de-centering and reinserting the thinking subject into its natural objectivity. The empirical deduction of the “I am” from the activity of mediating thought is displaced, just as the earth was displaced in the Copernican revolution, to make way for a necessary yet enigmatically impossible transcendental deduction of the “I am.” A subjectival synthesis is inferred from the necessity of an objectival synthesis beyond concrete existence, and thereby goes from center to cipher. What Ricoeur, following Malebranche, and contrary to Descartes, adds to the Fichtean first truth, the ‘thetic judgment,’ and so to reflective philosophy in general, is the recognition that the “I am, I think” is posited as a feeling. “I am, I think” is naively thought to be deduced from the mediating thoughts of reflection on representations of objects, and as the corollary apperception of a subject. This is a feeling, not an idea which would be understood essentially in terms of light and vision. It is not an intuition concerning a substantial soul, and it is not self-knowledge. Rather, Ricoeur writes “The first truth—I think, I am—remains as abstract and empty as it is unassailable. It must be ‘mediated’ by representations, actions, works, institutions, and monuments which objectify it; it is in these objects, in the largest sense of the word, that the ego must both lose itself and find itself.” 20 In the following selection, Ricoeur reaches beyond the nostalgic feelings of one’s own birth and prehistory by proceeding through the primary structures of the absolute involuntary, beyond the given character, beyond the given unconscious, and even beyond one’s own prehistory. This he later calls “a renewal of the [Platonic] theory of recollection,”21 a restoration called for by our modern forgetfulness of the sacred. He says that men are “born into the heart of language within the light of the Logos” and we can reach back to this birth through “a renewal of the ancient doctrine of recollection.”22 He proposes that it is through the interpretation of the symbolism of the sacred that we will reach the source of knowledge, eros, the ‘desire to be.’ This is how we
20 21 22
Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 327. Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 288, 319, 322. Ibid.
Dible, Randolph 8 will overcome our forgetfulness of the sacred and bring about its recollection or manifestation, through hermeneutics. 23 For this, we are required to go more into the philosophical expression of what he calls a ‘fundamental’ or ‘originary’ ethics. In the following selection, Ricoeur characterizes the Poetics in terms of the Platonic doctrine of recollection: This beginning which escapes memory, which is not rationally conceivable, which biology hides in the success of generations, this beginning must finally be suggested at the heart of consciousness as the fleeting limit beyond my oldest memories…. Innateness of knowledge, according to Plato, is attested in the myth of prior life, of reminiscence. The non-temporal nature of intelligible character according to Kant expresses itself as a choice of myself prior to my life; finally, Divine Omnipotence, which is like a transcendent beginning, is the primordial past of predestination. This will be one of the themes of the Poetics of the Will.24 Ricoeur begins Freedom and Nature with a description of the method he will employ, including the bracketing of the phenomena of the fault for this eidetic analysis of the functions of the human will, as well as the bracketing of the converse notion of transcendence. So far this has been bracketed within Freedom and Nature, and now we will be removing the brackets and delving into the fault in Fallible Man: The fault is an event with immense possibilities. At its outer limits it is a discovery of the infinite, an experience of the holy in reverse, of the holy in the demonic; it is sin in the strongest sense of the word... It is related to God, it is before God, going beyond subjectivity by its very excess. Only later, among the fruits of the Spirit, can harmony be presented as a new ethic. 25 The discovery of the infinite is articulated in the myth of the Fall. The ‘Evil Infinite,’ or the false infinite, shows itself in the myth as the wrath of God. Yet it is actually the lack, the nothingness of absolute freedom in absolute necessity, the gaping hole of infinite possibility, and finally the negativity of finitude, that motivates all voluntary action as a refusal to consent to involuntary Nature. This is what is meant by the genesis of desire, as well as the discovery of the
Cf. “The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection” 1 and 2, Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 287 – 334.
Freedom and Nature, pp. 441-442, n. 99. Freedom and Nature, pp. 22.
Dible, Randolph 9 infinite in the fall from finitude. Moreover, he writes, “The false infinite needs to be placed in brackets to bring to light the authentic infinite of freedom, the infinite of which Descartes says that it makes us like God... The possibility of consent cannot be understood unless we abstract that deification of willing which is in fact its demonization.”26 This “Evil Infinite” and the “paradoxical coexistence of freedom and the fault”27 will be seen in Symbolism of Evil under the theme of the superimposition of the fundamental nature of freedom (innocence) and its bondage (fault). In a footnote here, Ricoeur states that the reminiscence of innocence and the hope of freedom are so intertwined that “the Poetics and the Empirics of the Will constantly interact... the fault itself, in penetrating the region of the holy, already participates in the Poetics: the sinner is closer to the saint than is the just man.”28 Ricoeur argues it must be accepted that the sacred and the profane necessitate each other, and operate on the same essential structures. Even so, no description of innocence is possible, only of broken innocence. We cannot dissociate the fault and transcendence. The concrete experience of transcendence is what saves and liberates freedom from the fault (“Captivity and deliverance of freedom are one and the same drama”).29 The vision of innocence and the affirmation of transcendence are linked by a subterranean affinity: “There is a Genesis only in the light of an Apocalypse.” 30 But transcendence, innocence, is not accessible to any description, not contained in the method of pure description, of descriptive phenomenology, but only in the later hermeneutic phenomenology where the fault and transcendence become accessible by the removal of the eidetic brackets. In the transition from descriptive to hermeneutic phenomenology, we transition from description of the pure to decryption of the obscure. The
26 27 28 29 30
Freedom and Nature, pp. 24. Ibid, pp. 26-7. Freedom and Nature, pp. 26, n.13. Freedom and Nature, pp. 29. Ibid.
Dible, Randolph 10 indetermination of the whole in which I am involved and within which I was born and will die is the cipher of transcendence. 31 Ricoeur develops hermeneutic phenomenology in the light of the cipher of transcendence, as a worship, one could say, of Lux-cipher. Indeed, the second Copernical revolution, the second coming of philosophy, marks the subject’s transition from center to cipher. This indicates a tendency to the deification of a will to die and become, a genesis that is anthropogenesis upon the demythization of the accusatory agency, particularly the “Evil Infinite.”32 But this anthropogenesis may be re-inserted into a post-critical re-writing of the myth by a decision of man that is a deicision of God. Where the decision is to be made between meaninglessness and a surplus of meaning, between Nothingness and the beyond, a mythical projection of Divine agency may choose to relinquish the command that is mythically attributed to it. This is a post-critical myth toward which a Poetics of the Will could aim. The origin of such a post-critical myth, would no longer be the murder of the mother chaos, the Sumerian Tiamat, nor the more elaborate and anthropotropic Orphic titanomachy in whose ashes philosophy itself first arose like a Copernical newt of the first degree. Instead we could suggest a second degree newt, a new
“Hence the idea of the whole itself disappears as the sum obtained by addition of parts. I cannot give an accounting of being in which I am included. The world is where I entered in being born. It is not an enumeration of objects—about which, in addition, I do not know whether it is finite or infinite—but the indeterminate encompassing my subjectivity. I do not know the whole, I am in the whole…. And yet the Whole has a different meaning which is the hidden meaning of Stoic philosophy and the reason for the detour of consent. The beginning of philosophy is a Copernican revolution which centers the world of objects on the Cogito: the object is for the subject, the involuntary is for the voluntary, motives are for choice, capacities for effort, necessity for consent. The whole is the horizon of my subjectivity in the sense of this first Copernican revolution. This entire work is carried out under the sign of that first Copernican revolution…. But the deepening of subjectivity calls for a second Copernican revolution which displaces the center of reference from subjectivity to Transcendence.” Freedom and Nature, pp. 471-473.
Cf. “The Demythization of Accusation” in Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 335: “The result of this renunciation is the gaining of a thought and a will which are no longer alienated. The positive side of this destruction is the manifestation of man as maker of his own human existence. It is an anthropogenesis.”
Dible, Randolph 11 iconoclasm 33 in the wake of the onto-theological God of classical philosophy,34 a hermeneut baptized in the fire of Lux-cipher, in the alchemical transformation of critical reflection. From the rich soil of classical philosophy, in the desert of formal, univocal, technical languages and symbolic logic, we are called to transit beyond the age of information, toward a new species of thought, a new genre, a new Genesis. It should suggest the way of a living eschatology. But perhaps the cipher of transcendence is only a cipher to thought itself, whose dialectical vacillations we shall find in their purest form in the drama of temptation. To feeling, transcendence is only a new direction. This axiological undertow, recurrent and building in Ricoeur’s thought, is found in the ‘surplus of meaning’ or ‘supra-signification of the verb,’35 as well as his later admission that the conjugal symbol would be at the heart of the Poetics of the Will. 36 The end of Freedom and Nature is again darkly Orphic, hoping for a revaluation of consent in a reconciled ontology and restoration of freedom, having found that human freedom is essentially an incarnate freedom, a willing born of refusal to consent to the involuntary, and not a creative freedom—both its limitation and its grandeur. Part 3: Volume II: Fallible Man and Symbolism of Evil The second volume of the Philosophy of the Will, published in 1960, begins with Fallible Man, which does away with the brackets of the first volume and focuses on the involuntary aspect
“An idol must die so that a symbol of being may begin to speak.” Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 467, and “…every myth is iconoclastic toward others, in the same way that every symbol left to itself tends to thicken, to solidify into an idolatry. It is necessary, therefore, to share in this battle, in this dynamics, by which symbolism is subject to being itself surpassed.” Ibid, pp. 293. Following this selection, of course, we must acknowledge that such a Genesis would in fact be diabolic.
“Which god is dead? We can now reply: the god of metaphysics and also the god of theology, insofar as theology rests on the metaphysics of the first cause, necessary being, and the prime mover, conceived as the source of values and as the absolute good. Let us say that it is the god of onto-theology, to use the expression that was coined by Heidegger, following Kant.” Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 445.
Fallible Man, pp. 36. Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 370.
Dible, Randolph 12 of the will, on finitude, the inherent limitation of man’s being, and specifically upon the notion of fallibility. From there it develops the beginning of a philosophical anthropology. As he says in the preface to Fallible Man, “the theory of fallibility represents a broadening of the perspective of the first work, which was more closely centered on the structures of the will.”37 Fallible Man and Symbolism of Evil were published jointly, and constituted the second volume of the Philosophy of the Will. Fallible Man continued a descriptive phenomenology, whereas Symbolism of Evil introduces a decryptive phenomenology. Possible creative interpretations of the Poetics can be derived from viewing the structure of Fallible Man as the development of a philosophical anthropology of human consciousness as distended between two poles: on the one hand, the infinitesimal basis of the negative power of the finite, “existential difference;” and on the other, that which is seen (known in imago) only in the light of the mysterious “objectivity of the object,” 38 the “objectival synthesis.”39 This is the characterization of man as mélange, as disproportionate, that guides the analysis of the intelligibility of the possibility of evil in Fallible Man. In The Surplus of Meaning: Ontology and Eschatology in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Theodoor Marius Van Leeuwen performs an extensive analysis of the Philosophy of the Will. Although it is clear that Symbolism of Evil contains much in the way of a springboard to the mysterious waters of the unwritten Poetics, Van Leeuwen suggests “Fallible Man can be read as a prelude to both the study of the empirics of evil and to the work that is projected as the concluding part of Philosophy of the Will, the Poetics.” 40 We shall certainly heed this and see what structure in it indicates the way to our chosen interpretation of the Poetics. There are many interpretations of what the Poetics was intended to be, what it may be like, and in deciding among them we must acknowledge that we have a poetic responsibility to be
37 38 39 40
pp. xli. Fallible Man, pp. 38 - 41. Ibid, pp. 39 – 40, 45, 82. Ibid, pp. 36.
Dible, Randolph 13 independent from Ricoeur’s project. There is a conflict of interpretations which necessitates a choice among the various possible orderings of relevant elements to achieve different ends. Since the Poetics was left wide open to interpretations, we shall here skip the chronological treatment of such clues that we had committed with regard to Freedom and Nature, leaving a systematic analysis of Fallible Man to another time, and go straight to a specific structure which will inform a new ‘post-critical’ myth, a new way of making the “transcendental deduction” from the premises of existential difference (the infinitesimal, the origin of the finite) and primary affirmation (the destination of transcendence). 41 This transcendental deduction is the human condition as a conclusion derived from the premises of ‘originary affirmation’ and ‘existential negation:’ respectively, love and difference. Difference here means both perspective as the origin of the finite, and the being that “I am,” constituted by the action of existing. Love means the ‘objectival synthesis,’ the objectivity of the object, which calls out to the inimitable singularity of difference by its own supra-signification, by the super-jection implied by the positing of subjectivity. As Ricoeur writes, “The first truth—I think, I am—remains as abstract and empty as it is unassailable... It is an undeniable certitude, but a certitude without any truth value.” 42 This much is given, and may be taken as a premise. Whereas, “we are always already in the dimension of truth,” 43 we do not find certainty there; on the contrary, “the equivalence of certainty and truth is what we pursue through consciousness.”44 The meaning of consciousness is the vocation of equivocation of certainty and truth. Consciousness is false consciousness, naive consciousness. The transcendental deduction can only be premature as a logical conclusion, and the true infinite escapes any certainty despite its ultimate truth. Ethics, therefore, is much more than morality. If we take the notion of primary affirmation,
41 42 43 44
Ibid, pp. 134. Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 327. Fallible Man, pp. 29. Ibid, pp. 30.
Dible, Randolph 14 or the surplus of meaning, as basic to our semantics as Ricoeur does, 45 and acknowledge that “… the semantic level must not be separated from the mythological level of symbols…,”46 we might be ready to read Ricoeur’s ethics into a creative inversion of the Adamic myth. Ricoeur seeks to preserve the Platonic eros, which he calls the ‘desire to be,’ as the source of knowledge, and unify it with the Spinozistic conatus, which he calls the ‘effort to exist:’ “This effort is a desire because it is never satisfied; but conversely, this desire is an effort because it is the affirmation of a unique being. Effort and desire are the two aspects of this positing of the self in the first truth: I am.”47 This is Ricoeur’s ‘fundamental or originary ethics.’ To understand the Poetics of the Will, we may read Ricoeur’s philosophical exegesis of the myth of the Fall in reverse. This will serve to convert it into a post-critical understanding of transcendence through participation in the naivete of the transcendental deduction of an innocent existence and an ontology of understanding. I shall call this participation “exegenesis,” an understanding that is itself an act of transcendence. The effort to exist will be a necessity for existence itself (the meaning or referent of being) to arrive from beyond being (from the surplus of meaning) in the manner of an interpretation arising from beyond the text (for instance, the reader). The death of God will take place in the imagination, where God is the surplus of meaning, the beyond, primary affirmation, and the objectival synthesis, all superimposed on one another. Such transcendental deductions are ultimate in truth value and yet premature for certainty, and hence articulated only at the level of the mythical organization of the symbols of the sacred. The desire to be is a premature designation, not an empirical reality. It is the basis of the passions, a nothingness in relation to being, but the very basis of meaning, significance, and value: the ultimate of value. The symbol of God is the beyond from which all beings arrive as
“…originating affirmation becomes progressively richer and more inward: at first it is only the vehemence of the Yes, which has the correlate of the “is” that is signified—or, to be more precise, supra-signified—by the Verb. This is the “transcendental” moment of affirmation. This moment is necessary but not sufficient; it is necessary to make the power of existing pass from the register of “living” to that of “thinking”; it is insufficient to assure us that we are that thinking.” Fallible Man, pp. 136.
Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 316. Ibid, pp. 329.
Dible, Randolph 15 interpretations in the transcendental imagination, and the beginning of an ontology of comprehension: existence becomes the very exigence of exegesis. Symbolism of Evil begins its hermeneutics with the phenomenological account of the confessions of the religious imagination of man found in the traditional myths that tell of the origins of evil in man, by their “spontaneous hermeneutics,” that is, as symbols of the second degree. As such, they have primitive analogical meanings that are “spontaneously formed and immediately significant.”48 There he continues, “In this sense, symbols are more radical than myths. I shall regard myths as a species of symbols, as symbols developed in the form of narrations.” 49 With these considerations, Ricoeur proceeds to read the myths of the beginning and the end of evil: the Sumero-Babylonian myth of chaos (the theogony which precedes anthropogony), the Hellenic and Orphic titanomachy and tragic myth, and finally the Adamic myth, whose pre-eminence is projected to be observed in the Poetics of the Will by means of the crede ut intelligas,50 the hermeneutic circle in the dialectical form of believing and understanding: Thus it is in hermeneutics that the symbol’s gift of meaning and the endeavor to understand by deciphering are knotted together.... How does hermeneutics meet the problem?... What we have just called a knot--the knot where the symbol gives and criticism interprets--appears in hermeneutics as a circle. The circle can be stated bluntly: ‘We must understand in order to believe, but we must believe in order to understand.’ The circle is not a vicious circle, still less a mortal one; it is a living and stimulating circle... It is not a kinship of one life with another that hermeneutics requires, but a kinship of thought with what the life aims at--in short, of thought with the thing which is in question. It is in this sense that we must believe in order to understand. And yet, it is only by understanding that we can believe. 51 Thus the hermeneutic circle is a knot which ties together the strands of understanding and belief. What it unites is the matrice poetique.52 Untying the knot, the circle which is an arc or a
48 49 50 51 52
Symbolism of Evil, pp. 18. Ibid. Ibid, pp. 308, cf. “Conclusion: The Symbol Gives Rise to Thought”, pp. 347 - 357. Ibid, pp. 351 - 352. Surplus of Meaning, pp. 39.
Dible, Randolph 16 bow between the discourse of the text and the act of understanding, gives birth, out of the matrix, out of the uterus, ‘out of the box,’ so to speak, of the myth, to the semantic innovation, the novel meaning of being. Our task is to get beyond the circle, to untie the knot, by transforming it into a wager: 53 ...the task of the philosopher guided by symbols would be to break out of the enchanted enclosure of consciousness of oneself, to end the prerogative of self-reflection.... The task, then, is, starting from the symbols, to elaborate existential concepts-- that is to say, not only structures of reflection but structures of existence, insofar as existence is the being of man.54 At the end of Freedom and Nature, Ricoeur criticizes Sartre and Kierkegaard for placing no bets on life, seeing no hope, and lacking faith. Although this makes Ricoeur seem to be the idealist, he diagnoses their “Black existentialism” as a wounded idealism that had “thought itself divine and which becomes aware of itself as fallen.”55 Their wish for an excess of freedom is concretely wounded and transformed into a refused condition, and develops into a defiance and scorn that sees the human condition as absurd, vile, and base. Regarding this wounded interpretation of freedom, Ricoeur writes: Suicide presents itself to it as one of the highest possibilities: it is in effect the only total action of which we are capable with respect to our own life.... Suicide can appear the highest consecration of that act of rupture introduced by consciousness.... Thus the no would no longer be a word but an act. But suicide is not the only expression of refusal. There might be a courage to exist in the absurd and to face up to it, in comparison with which suicide itself would be only an evasion like those of myths and hopes. This courage of disillusion refuses suicide in the sole intent of affirming--and preserving in the act of affirming--the no of freedom in face of the nonbeing of necessity. 56 This courage to exist is Ricoeur’s answer to the profound freedom of suicide, but it may be conflated with the deity’s suicide, with deicide, where, in a myth, God is beyond being, and as
Symbolism of Evil, pp. 355 - 357. Ibid, pp. 357. Freedom and Nature, pp. 466. Ibid.
Dible, Randolph 17 such, needs to withdraw from ‘itself’ for existence to arrive in a mythical innocence. This would be a deicisive conversion of the symbol of the serpent in the Biblical Genesis into a symbolism of “exegenesis.” The wrath or rage of God so feared in the innocent creation of Genesis is converted through demythization of the accusatory agency into a courage to commit to being created being, to being finite. Existence becomes its own interpretation in an absolute comprehension through the epigenesis of existence as an innocent creation superimposed upon the cosmos itself as heirophany. Existence becomes marvelous, oracular audience to the ambience of life. This accounts for an understanding or comprehension of existence belonging to a God who no longer exists. In the beginning, God created the universe, the garden, Adam, and all was good. To account for evil, the serpent in the garden asks the woman (an externalization of Man) “Has God truly said...?”57 which opened Man’s mind to a vascillatory doubt, to thought, and with it to consciousness of good and evil. Man comprehended somewhere to fall through a rupture in the relationship of trust once held between God and Man: in the instance of the act of transgression, suspicion (self-speculation), radical doubt, made a clearing in consciousness for Man’s autonomous thought. This radical doubt is analogous to the radical doubt of Descartes. What was once a creative limit, an innocent freedom, became the interdict, God’s “No:” “The soul of the serpent’s question is the ‘evil infinite.’”58 The meaning of finiteness or “being created being” became obscured, and whereas the limit had been Man’s “Orient,” it became Man’s “Other.”59 The inversion of this myth is obvious: God, as the ‘surplus of meaning,’ the ‘objectival synthesis,’ ‘primary’ or ‘originary’ affirmation, must radically end; “value” gives way to “form,” beginning with the infinitesimal point origin, of the “I am.” God, in the only act permitted to such a symbolic ground, an act of love, gives up the holy ghost for there to be existence of Self, for there to be Life. This is a myth of the origin of finitude.
57 58 59
Symbolism of Evil, pp. 253. Ibid. Ibid.
Dible, Randolph 18 The unwritten third volume of the Poetics of the Will is more than a metaphor for the beyond, it is an heirophany. Philosophy comes from the fire of reflection, but its spirit is speculative, and its form is the speculum of that spirit. For the meaning of the wisdom sought by philosophy to be an innocent human freedom, philosophy must be fleshed out by human being as a passionate way of life, a wheel for falling with grace, a harnessing of gravity in learning to walk. By seeing darkness as an indication of light, Ricoeur found a way of harnessing the darkness of evil in the scope of theodicy. The “post-critical naivete” and “second Copernical revolution” Ricoeur sought to instigate in the unwritten Poetics was the turning of a wheel whose revolution, being beyond mere simile, was real. By inventing the wheel whose eye is the origin of being, the non-being of infinite possibility may be traversed and navigated. The traveler, the walker, falls with grace. The Biblical scope of Ricoeur’s projected revolution demonstrates that the engine of the Poetics was driven by the fires of Hell beyond subjectivity, to the blackness of space and by gravity to a faulty firmament among the stars. For the Poetics of the Will to be unearthed, philosophy must wager on the side of an ontology of understanding that God is the epigenesis of the meaning of life, and life is an exegenesis of a spectral God. Reading existence as desire and effort, the symbolic Fall of the symbol of God finally gives rise to an ontology of understanding that would be a mode of being finite in the wake of the infinite.
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Dible, Randolph 19 Ricoeur, Paul. Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969. Print. ___. Fallible Man. Trans. Charles A. Kelbley. New York: Fordham University Press, 1960. Print. ___. Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary. Trans. Erazim V. Kohak. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1950. Print. ___. Freud and Phillosophy. Trans. Denis Savage. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, September 1977. Print. ___. History and Truth. Trans. Charles A. Kelbley. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965. Print. ___. Symbolism of Evil. 1960. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. Trans. Emerson Buchanan. Print. ___. “The Symbol: Food for Thought.” Philosophy Today 4: 196 - 207, 1960. Print. Van Leeuwen, Theodoor Marius. The Surplus of Meaning: Ontology and Eschatology in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Amsterdam: Rodopi, B.V., 1981. Print.