You are on page 1of 62

Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka

The Sinhalese and Tamils


___________________

Practical Solutions for a


Pressing Problem

Duke University Talent Identification Program


Global Dialogues Institute
July 2005
Table of Contents

I. Introduction 2

II. Executive Summary 3

III. History of the Conflict 5

IV. Current Political Climate 12

V. Effects of the Tsunami 16

VI. Terrorism Tactics and their Consequences 23

VII. Role of Children in the Conflict 27

VIII. Long-Term Political Solutions 33

IX. Ensuring Long-Term Social Stability 41

X. Bibliography 50

1
I. Introduction
This report is the work of 26 high school students who attended the Duke University Talent
Identification Program’s Global Dialogues Institute at Wake Forest University in July 2005. The
Global Dialogues Institute takes as its core premise the idea that education’s foremost purpose is
to study and offer practical solutions for the urgent challenges facing the world today. With that
principle in mind, each year the program seeks to gather together gifted educators, students, and
leading guest lecturers for cooperative, intellectually challenging sessions that explore a current
global problem of international significance. The goal of the session is a collaborative student-
written document that proposes a practical solution to the session’s theme, to be shared with the
public at the end of the session. This year's theme was titled “Ethnic Conflicts”.

The opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Duke
University Talent Identification Program or its staff.

We offer this report with great hope for the future.

Students Faculty
Adina Appelbaum Noah Bopp
Richard Archer Matt Fehrs
Brandon Bedford Krista Wiegand
Brian Bloodworth Jessica Roeger
Lesley Brindle Kimberly Roller
Joseph (Tripp) Callaway Katharine Mitchell
Alexander Chan
Merritt Chesson
Sarah Clark
Bradford Crawford
Thomas Davis
Mary Dozier
Sarah Duzyk
Heather Hoffman
Amanda Kalmutz
William Leonard
Forrest McConnell
Leah Mintz
Victoria Moore
Greg Nigro
Kevin O’Hara For more information
Hannah Pakray Duke TIP Global Dialogues Institute
Jonathan Tarleton c/o Matt Fehrs
Angelina Upshaw 17307 Rose Garden Lane
Colum Weiden Durham, NC 27707
Angela Yenca noah.bopp@world.oberlin.edu

2
II. Executive Summary
The current ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka demands the attention of the international community.
The continued disagreement has caused turmoil and dramatic polarization within the Sri Lankan
state. Acts of terrorism from both the Tamils and Sinhalese have escalated the situation,
instilling fear and a sense of instability in all factions of the Sri Lankan population. As the recent
tsunami brings newfound media coverage to the area, more consideration should be directed
toward the ethnic conflict. If channeled correctly, this exposure could help to bring about a
future of peace and cooperation that will benefit Sri Lanka and the rest of the world. With the
international community backing the effort, Sri Lanka will turn into a success story for countries
plagued by ethnic conflict and will serve as a model for such nations to emulate.

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka dates back to the fifth century BC when the first Sinhalese
migrated from North India to the island. A thousand years later, the Tamils came from South
India with a totally different language and religion. From the beginning, territorial disputes
caused tension between the ethnic groups. Later, the Dutch, Portuguese, British, and American
intervention in Sri Lanka influenced political, educational, and religious developments within the
island, each country showing favoritism to either the Tamils or the Sinhalese. After Sri Lanka
gained independence from Great Britain in 1948, discrimination toward Tamils increased
through government policies and led to resistance. In the late 1970s, the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) materialized after nonviolent resistance groups failed to raise awareness for
their cause. The formation of the LTTE began the present day conflict between the Sinhalese and
the Tamils of Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese fighting to maintain control of Sri Lanka and the Tamils
fighting for an end to discrimination and for representation in political affairs.

The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE signed a peace agreement in 2002 with the mediation
of the Norwegian foreign minister, Erik Solheim. The cease-fire lasted for a year and a half, at
which point the LTTE pulled out of peace negotiations citing reasons the treaty was biased.
Currently, the LTTE urges the implementation of a Tamil Interim Self-Governing Authority in
which the Tamils of northeastern Sri Lanka would have autonomy for a limited time. A LTTE
head commander, Colonel Karuna, formed a separatist faction and joined the Eelam National
Democratic Liberation Front. The Marxist People’s Liberation Front (JVP) formerly was allied
with Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga, a moderate socialist. This alignment ended,
but the JVP continues to influence the government’s policies against the Tamils. While the
damage of the tsunami has created some national unity, it also has resulted in increased political
dissention.

After the December 2004 tsunami hit the coast of Sri Lanka, the political culture of the nation
was disrupted severely. The relief process turned into a political struggle over who could most
effectively handle the aftermath. Many minority parties used the tsunami to gain political support
within the nation. The Tamils, along with the Marxist JVP, were able to capitalize on their
efforts, and both gained international respect for handling the situation soundly. The tsunami
opened the peace process between the Tamils and the government, yet the Marxists have walked
out of the government in protest of the President’s offer to share aid with the Tamils. The
tsunami devastated the nation and brought the global community to its shores. The way in which

3
the Tsunami Relief Council, composed of Tamil and government leaders, distributes the relief
funds will be a significant predictor of the future political structure of the nation.

A primary characteristic of the conflict in Sri Lanka has been the use of terrorist tactics. Mostly
practiced by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), terrorism has caused death and fear
throughout the state. The Sinhalese government has used violence as a tactic as well, violating
the human rights set forth in the Geneva Conventions. Being one of the foremost users of
terrorism in the world, the LTTE has served as a model for other terrorist organizations.
Therefore, the terrorism in Sri Lanka not only poses a threat to the people of the country, but also
the people of the world. To combat further terrorist activities, funding and military support
should be cut off from outside sources.

Children in Sri Lanka currently are recruited by the LTTE to serve as members of the militia,
despite past pledges by the group to demobilize child soldiers and halt the recruiting of children.
Though some children volunteer to serve in the LTTE, many are coerced, threatened, and
kidnapped. While in the LTTE, children participate in rigorous physical activity, and suffer
emotional and psychological damage. Once released, children face numerous obstacles in the
process of reintegrating into society.

The political instability in Sri Lanka complicates the peace process and impedes the
determination of long-term political solutions. The Tamils need to be included in the
government, and the Sri Lankan government must work to convince the Marxists that the Tamils
are a legitimate authority on the island. The recent tsunami has created turmoil throughout the
country, and many groups in the country are dissatisfied with governmental action. President
Kumaratunga has sworn to pursue a course of action that will lead the country to peace. In order
to accomplish her goal, the government must be permanently altered. The options include a
federalist system, enhancing local governments, or a gradual fusion of local governments into a
national federalist system. We have concluded the third choice would be most effective in
solving the long-term demands of the ethnic groups in the country. The funds acquired from the
agreement by several nations to give increased aid if peace is achieved would serve to fund the
new municipal governments of the Tamils. After years of peace and stability, the Tamils will
gain national representation and equal political rights. The government will be united, and the
peace process will be finished.

The long-term social solutions to the current conflict involve the reconciliation of the two
peoples, the development of the public education system, and the advancement of the Sri Lankan
economy. The government, primarily through the media, should support the creation of a
national identity to supersede ethnicity. English should become the third national language and
the primary language to be used in education. A system of public libraries would give rural
regions access to literacy and electronic resources. A free trade shipping zone should be created
in the Northern Region, and Free Trade agreements should be created with developed nations
such as the U.S. Furthermore, Sri Lanka should develop its own national apparel brand to
compete on the global market, and the country should privatize industry.

4
III. History of the Conflict
The conflict between the Tamil Tigers and the Sinhalese has grown during the past couple of
decades on the island of Sri Lanka. In order to understand how to address the problem, it is
necessary to be familiar with the past. Throughout the following sections, we hope to introduce
you to the island of Sri Lanka and the history of its people.

The Original Settlers


Though many tribes and clans from predominantly southern India gradually populated the island,
the most powerful and dominating of settlers were the Sinhalese. The Sinhalese are customarily
brown-skinned people who originated from northern India.1 Upon their arrival, which historians
have calculated to be in the fifth century BC, the Sinhalese were probably able to share the island
and have great influence because of their intermarriage and relations with the aboriginal peoples.
By 200 BC, the Sinhalese occupied most of Sri Lanka, and Sinhalese kingships and royal
families governed various regions of the island.2 The Sinhalese people, though they were the
majority, lived peacefully with the non-Aryan populations of the island. According to historian
K.M. De Silva,

Sri Lanka, in the first few centuries after the Aryan settlement, was a multi-ethnic
society (a conception which emphasizes harmony and a spirit of live and let live)
rather than a plural society (in which tension between ethnic or other distinctive
groups is a main feature).3

The Sinhalese also came to share beliefs with the aboriginal peoples of Sri Lanka. During the
reign of Devanampiya Tissa, (250BC to 210 BC) the Mauryan Buddhist mission came to Sri
Lanka and preached to a receptive audience. With the help of Devanampiya Tissa’s conversion,
Buddhism quickly spread throughout the island and became a crucial part of Sinhalese culture
and life in Sri Lanka.4

Arrival of the Tamils


The Tamils tend to have darker skin than the Sinhalese and originate from the southern part of
India. They speak Tamil which is a Dravidian language commonly spoken in South India; Tamil
is a language totally different from the language of the Sinhalese and is derived from Sanskrit in
North India.5 The Tamils are also predominantly Hindu, while the Sinhalese preserve their
orthodox Buddhist beliefs. While it is hard to tell when the Tamils came to Sri Lanka, historian
S.A. Pakeman states,

1
Zeylanicus, Ceylon between Orient and Occident (Great Britain: Elek Books Limited, 1970), 23.
2
C.W. Nicholas, A Concise History of Ceylon (Colombo: Ceylon University Press, 1961), 21.
3
K.M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), 13.
4
De Silva, 11.
5
Zeylanicus, Ceylon between Orient and Occident (Great Britain: Elek Books Limited, 1970), 24.

5
There is ample historical evidence that well before the beginning of the Christian
era, invasions from south India had begun, and that these continued sporadically
all through the history of Ceylon [Sri Lanka] up to the coming of the Portuguese
early in the sixteenth century.6

Various tribes from southern India invaded and settled in northern parts of the island, spreading
down the northeast and northwest coasts. The northern peninsula of Sri Lanka, Jaffna peninsula,
became a principal settlement of the Tamils. During the nineteenth century, they designated the
peninsula as the Tamils’ independent kingdom. Due to the differences in religion and language
and tensions over land rights, the Tamil Kingdom of Jaffna was often at war with Sinhalese
kings until the coming of the Portuguese.

1505-1948: European Colonialism and Sri Lanka

European colonialism laid the foundation for the political, economic, social, and religious
infrastructure that now defines post-colonial Sri Lanka. Though Sri Lanka is positively identified
for having its own unique and distinct characteristics, 443 years of European domination cannot
be overlooked, as it had profound implications on the island’s development, growth, and
eventual transformation into a modern nation state. Most notable is the rise of various European
colonial powers, their impact, and the reaction of the Sinhalese, Tamils, and various indigenous
groups to the island during each of the three European nations’ colonial reigns.

Portuguese and Dutch Colonization:


In 1505, the Portuguese landed on Sri Lanka and successfully negotiated a trade agreement with
the Sinhalese Kingdom of Kotte.7 The Portuguese continued to rule Sri Lanka until the Dutch
forced them out in 1658. The Dutch were considered far more tolerant than the Portuguese, even
though they took complete control of the spice trade, and asserted their religious affiliation of
Protestant Christianity on the populace. The Sinhalese Kingdom of Kandy continued to exist
with autonomy8 under the Dutch, but the Tamil Kingdom and remnants of the Kotte and
Sitawake Kingdoms remained under colonial rule. The colony remained firmly in Dutch hands
until the middle of the 18th century, when British imperial ambitions in India brought Britain to
Sri Lanka in attempt to drive the Dutch from the Indian subcontinent. From around 1756 until
1795, conflicts around Sri Lanka were frequent between the Dutch and British.9

British Colonization:
The British took the major east coast port of Trincomalee in 1796, and effectively took the island
from the Dutch in 1797. Once again, the dominant Sinhalese kingdom, Kandy, pursued a trade
agreement and autonomy treaty with Great Britain, which was doomed to fail from the
beginning. The British did not intend to keep Ceylon (as they called it), but assumed that with

6
S. A. Pakeman, Ceylon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 20.
7
Steven Kemper, The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics, and Culture in Sinhala Life (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press) 104.
8
Richard Nyrop, Area Handbook for Sri Lanka, http://lcweb2.loc gov/frd/cs/sri_lanka/lk_bibl.html (U.S.
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) The Portuguese.
9
De Silva, 146.

6
the cessation of hostilities with the Dutch, it would be returned.10 However, it was not, and
Ceylon became the first Crown Colony (literally a colony of the Crown), meaning that it was
under direct British rule. Peace lasted no more than a year. The ensuing war lasted from 1803-
1815, but resulted in absolute British domination of Sri Lanka.11

When the British assumed control of the island, the main economic activity was subsistence
farming and limited plantation agriculture. The British built the island’s society around
plantation agriculture, and initially began with the main crop being cinnamon. However, as a
result of various agricultural disasters throughout the 19th century, the keystone crop changed
many times from cinnamon to coffee, cocoa, tea, and rubber. Some of these required more labor
than the island could initially provide, so the British brought in the ethnically similar Indian
Tamils to work on plantations. These Tamils were considered to be different by Tamils who had
lived in Sri Lanka for 900 years. The British effectively created a new ethnic rivalry on the
island.12 Generally, the Sinhalese and the Tamils had lived in peace (with occasional territorial
disputes), but now with the introduction of this third but ethnically similar group, a critical
imbalance in representation on the political level severed 900 years of Sinhalese and Tamil
coexistence.13

With the implications of the Charter of Justice, there was an opportunity for some Ceylonians to
advance to the new middle class. Traditionally in Ceylonian society, there was a caste system in
place that did not permit a middle class, only classes for the leaders and the poor. As a result, the
education field took off, and the English literacy rate rose dramatically. The British undertook
education of the Sinhalese, limiting their attempts to educate the Tamils. American missionaries
educated the Tamils, and actually gave them a better education, resulting in Tamils receiving
more roles in the civil service of the empire, and in turn gaining a tremendous amount of
influence.14

World War I was a critical point in Ceylonian history. Ceylon entered the war with the British
Empire in 1914, and provided primarily economic and agricultural commodities to the British
war effort. In light of strong British sentiment, Britain’s own propaganda worked against them in
fueling the then-underground independence movement with its ideals of nationalism and
patriotism.15 In 1919, all the major Sinhalese and Tamil political organizations banded together
to form the Ceylon National Congress. This new congress immediately submitted a proposal for
a new constitution that would increase local control over the Executive Council and the budget.16
These demands were not met, but instead led to a new constitution in 1920. Amendments in 1924
led to greater Ceylonian representation on the Executive Council. This momentous reform, gave
Ceylon tremendous autonomy under the empire, and yet strengthened its ties with Britain in the
upper classes, and lessened the overall nationalistic movement.

10
De Silva, 148.
11
Lennox A. Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule: 1795-1932, (London, Charles Birchall & Sons, 1933) 133.
12
Jonathon Spencer, Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, (New York, Routledge, 1990) 177.
13
De Silva, 231.
14
Mills, 195.
15
Spencer, 189.
16
Mills, 221.

7
In 1927, a royal commission under the Earl of Donoughmore visited Ceylon to ascertain why a
representative government as chartered by the 1924 constitution had not succeeded and to
suggest constitutional changes necessary for the island’s eventual self-rule.17 This resulted in a
new constitution, known as the Donoughmore Constitution, which was designed to address the
grievances and failures of the previous 1924 Constitution. This failed to produce anything more
than a splintering of more nationalist groups and movements, for example, the Great Council of
the Sinhalese (Sinhala Maha Sabha), founded in 1937.18 These groups were intended to attract
attention to the growing Ceylonian/Sri Lankan nationalism in an attempt to spark change. Their
failure led to the creation of more radical leftist groups during that decade. These groups never
gained significant political weight, but they nonetheless proved a nuisance to the greater political
machine in Ceylon/Sri Lanka.

In 1945, Great Britain agreed to grant Ceylon independence. Before independence was granted,
Lord Soulbury was sent with a commission to examine a new constitutional draft that the Sri
Lankan minister had proposed. The commission made recommendations that led to a new
constitution. The new constitution was known as the Soulbury Constitution. In 1948, Ceylon was
granted independence with a parliamentary system implementing a bicameral legislature. A
House of Representatives was directly elected by popular vote. The upper house, known as the
Senate, had its members elected through the House and partly by the governor general, who was
the primary figurehead. The most powerful man in the new government was the Prime Minister.
All seemed well, and a bright future seemed to guarantee a prosperous nation. But history has a
way of making itself fail to adhere to our assumptions.

1948-1978: The Rise of Tamilese Nationalism

The rise of Tamil nationalist groups, including the Tamil United Liberation Front, can be
attributed in part to the significant discrimination the Tamil people encountered in the immediate
post-colonial years, from 1948 up through 1978.

The British colony of Ceylon gained independence from Britain in 1948 after passage of the
Ceylon Independence Act. In 1948, the people of Ceylon elected the first Prime Minister, Don
Stephen Senanayake, a member of the United National Party.19 Senanayake immediately passed
legislation to disenfranchise and even deny citizenship to many estate Tamils who were brought
to Ceylon from India by the British.20 This can be shown in the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948,
the Indian and Pakistani Residents Act No. 3 of 1948, and the Ceylon Parliamentary Elections
Amendment Act No. 48 of 1949.21 Senanayake carried out these actions to ensure that he,
claiming to be a descendant of the original Buddhist monarchs, preserved the Sinhalese
hegemony. This angered the Tamil people because they wanted representation in the new

17
Nyrop, The Donoughmore Commission.
18
Spencer, 235.
19
Russell R Ross ed., Sri Lanka: A Country Study (Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
1990) http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.lk.
20
David Little, Sri Lanka The Invention of Enmity (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 1994),
56.
21
Russell R Ross ed., Sri Lanka: A Country Study (Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
1990) http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.lk.

8
government also. In 1949, the Tamil people formed the Tamil Federal Party and wished to
create a Tamil state on Ceylon. Tension continued between the Sinhalese-sponsored Sri Lankan
Freedom Party and the Tamil Federal Party for many years.

In 1956, Ceylon elected a new Prime Minister, Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike,
partly under the pretense that he claimed to be the “protector of Buddhism.”22 In 1957, the new
Prime Minister and the leader of the Tamil Federal Party, S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, created the
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact, a document drafted to repeal the disenfranchisement
legislation of estate Tamils and allow Tamil to be the official language of the Northern and
Eastern provinces of Ceylon. The legislators of Ceylon never passed this document. In 1959, a
group of bhikkhus, radical Buddhist monks, assassinated Prime Minister Bandaranaike.23 The
following year, the people of Ceylon elected his wife, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, as the Prime
Minister of Sri Lanka, the first female Prime Minister in the world. Discrimination against the
Tamil people continued as Sirimavo continued to promote Sinhalese hegemony. At this point,
the Tamil people took action and started a series of non-violent protests in response to the
discrimination.

In 1972, a new constitution for Ceylon was drafted that changed everything. It started by
renaming Ceylon as Sri Lanka and even contained a bill of rights that ensured religious freedom.
This is quite significant since there was no bill of rights in the original constitution of Ceylon.
However, the Tamil people still were not given the right to speak their language. The Tamils
talked of secession and quickly realized that their non-violent tactics were not working to create
any sort of change. Soon after, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) formed in May of
1976 and declared they were apart of a new independent state, Tamil Eelam.

In the 1977 elections, the people of Sri Lanka elected UNP representative, J.R. Jayawardene, as
head of state. He helped draft the 1978 constitution which is still used today. The constitution
included the use of Tamil and English as official languages, allowed the Tamils to have
representatives in proportion to their population, and ensured easier access to education.
Although this may seem to be a step towards resolving the discrimination against the Tamil
people, the basic freedoms outlined in this constitution have never been enforced for a variety of
reasons. The best explanation of this lack of enforcement is stated by David Little: “[T]he
possibility of improved ethnic relations was… undermined by the government’s failure to
implement its policies wholeheartedly.”24 In addition to this, legislative groups had less
authority than assumed and were limited by budget cuts and corruption to enforce such
legislation.25

1978 - 2002
Between the years 1978 and 1983, the terrorist group known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE), the strongest of the militant Tamil separatist groups materializing from the
former Tamil Students’ Movement, was responsible for approximately 265 bombings, robberies,

22
Little, 66.
23
Little 71-72.
24
Little 86-87.
25
Little, 87.

9
assaults, and other various crimes. Coincidentally, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)
was gaining political control of the northern and eastern sections of the country. The TULF had
long been pursuing the creation of a separate Tamil state, to the great aversion of the
government. The country’s first popular election of a president was in 1982. The TULF
encouraged its followers to boycott the election because its candidates were not allowed to run.
The United National Party (UNP) incumbent, Junius Richard Jayewaredene, won the election.26
In 1983, separatist movements were declared unconstitutional, and thus the TULF lost
representation in the government.27

The Indian government’s interest in Sri Lankan affairs increased from 1983 through 1987.
Numerous attempts at mediation between the Sinhalese and the Tamils failed. The impetus for
such intervention was most likely the pressure from the many citizens of Tamil Nadu who were
related to the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Indian government decided that military intervention was
necessary. However, a practical reason was needed to avoid international scorn.28

The Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord of 1987 was the Indian government’s way of satisfying its
own Tamil citizens and the Sinhalese government in Colombo. The accord stated that the Indian
government never would allow a separate Tamil state; however, it did recognize the northern and
eastern areas as “areas of historical habitation”29 by Tamil-speaking Sri Lankans and that
“Sinhalese shall be the official language of Sri Lanka. Tamil and English will also be official
languages.”30 Sinhalese was first, but Tamil and English were equal to Sinhala, satisfying the
Tamils. The Indian Army moved in to help restore order to the north and east. The Indians, not
knowing how to distinguish guerillas from citizens, killed 2,000 Tamil civilians and caused
significant property damage.31 The Indian Peace Keeping Force withdrew in March, 1990.

In 1993, President Premadasa, elected in 1988 after the creation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord,
was assassinated. A young boy with explosives strapped to his body ran his bicycle into the
President’s May Day parade. Prime Minister Dingiri Banda Wijetunge was sworn in to finish
out Premadasa’s term. 32

The people elected Chandrika Kumaratunga to the presidency in 1994. She immediately began
peace talks with the LTTE. An initial peace package was accepted by the LTTE under four
conditions:

1. The embargo of food, gas, and other supplies to the North was to be lifted.
2. Tamil fishermen should be allowed to fish in the North.
3. A military camp should be removed from the North.

26
Robert N. Kearny, “Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 25, no. 9
(1985): 906-910
27
Shantha K. Hennayake., “The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 29, no. 4 (1989): 402.
28
Hennayake, “The Peace Accord,” 407.
29
Hennayake, “The Peace Accord,” 408.
30
Hennayake, “The Peace Accord,” 409.
31
Hennayake, “The Peace Accord,” 410-412.
32
Molly Moore, “Suicide Bomber Kills Leader of Sri Lanka; President Slain During May Day Celebration in Island
Nation,” Washington Post, May 2, 1993, sec. A.

10
4. LTTE members should be able to carry guns in the government-controlled East.33

The first two demands were agreed upon, but it was difficult to enforce the lift of the embargo.
The LTTE was not satisfied and decided to extend the March 1995 deadline for the terms to be
met. However, in April 1995, the LTTE backed out of the agreement. The Tigers blew up two
ships in an east coast harbor and subsequently blew up almost a quarter of the Sri Lankan navy,
including airplanes and military personnel.34

The LTTE continued to commit various terrorist acts throughout the 1990s. The government
would then retaliate against Tamil citizens, and the cycle would go on. In 1999, President
Kumaratunga escaped a suicide bomber and was reelected President. The millennium saw failed
attempts at ceasefires and negotiating.35 Finally in 2002, a formal ceasefire was declared
between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, moderated by the Norwegian government.36

33
Marshall R. Singer, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: Have Bombs Shattered Hopes for Peace?” Asian Survey 36, no.
11 (1996): 1150.
34
Singer, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict,” 1150-1151.
35
MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Sri Lanka: 1999 Overview,
http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=CE&year=1999.
36
MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Sri Lanka: 2001 Overview,
http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=CE&year=2001.

11
IV. Current Political Climate
The Sri Lankan conflict between the Sinhalese government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam is still present, but ever changing. Due to increased violence that occurred at the turn of
the twenty-first century, the international community has begun to take notice of the instability in
Sri Lanka.

2002 Sri Lankan Cease Fire


In 2000 and in 2001, the LTTE repeatedly called for a cessation from hostilities with the Sri
Lankan army and the beginning of peace talks with the Sri Lankan government. In 2002, the Sri
Lankan government accepted the idea of peace talks with the Tamil rebel group, as long as the
talks were mediated by a third party. The Norwegian government offered to be the third party
and sent its foreign minister, Erik Solheim, to be the chief envoy in the Sri Lankan peace talks.37

The LTTE and the Sri Lankan government successfully brokered a cease-fire during the 2002
peace talks. Sri Lankan government officials and representatives from the LTTE signed a truce
that promised to end hostilities between the two ethnic groups. The truce specifically made clear
in article 1.2 that “neither party shall engage in any offensive military operation.”38 The truce
continued to elaborate on the measures that were needed to restore a peaceful atmosphere
between the two ethnic groups throughout the state of Sri Lanka. By the end of the negotiations,
a lasting peace agreement appeared attainable. The British Broadcasting Company (BBC)
reported, “The Tigers dropped their demand for independence and said they would settle for
regional autonomy, a major concession. The government also gave ground and agreed to share
power with the Tamil Tigers.”39 The 2002 peace accords held in place with minimal violence for
about a year and a half. In 2003, the fragile peace process dissolved when the LTTE announced
that its group was pulling out of peace negotiations with the Sri Lankan government until further
notice. They felt the Sri Lankan government was “sidelining” the Tamil people.40

Politics of the LTTE


Despite the near two and a half year success of the 2002 ceasefire, the LTTE has refused to
reinstitute peace talks with the Sinhalese government. The LTTE continues to urge the
implementation of a Tamil Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). The ISGA is an
experimental government, comprised solely of Tamils that would have their own government in
northeastern Sri Lanka for a limited time.41 The Sinhalese government refuses to accept the
ISGA proposal; the LTTE views the ISGA as the only grounds on which peace negotiations can

37
The Associated Press, “Norwegian envoy to push for Sri Lanka peace negotiations,” International Herald Tribune,
February 22, 2005, http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/02/21/news/srilanka.html.
38
2002 Sri Lanka Peace Accords (Colombo, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1836198.stm.
39
“Q&A: Sri Lanka Crisis,” BBC World News, April 2003,
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2405347.stm.
40
“Q&A: Sri Lanka Crisis,” BBC World News, April 2003,
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2405347.stm.
41
Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka,” Amnesty International,
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/lkasummary-eng.

12
resume, therefore halting the delicate reconciliation process between the two groups. In addition
to the deteriorating peace talks, there has been a significant fracture within the LTTE
organization. One of the LTTE’s head commanders, Colonel Karuna, broke off relations with the
LTTE over the issue of ruling the eastern portion of Sri Lanka, as well as the idea of negotiating
with the Sinhalese government.42 When the heads of LTTE spoke against this rule by Karuna, he
and several thousand militiamen disbanded, forming their own separatist faction. Karuna and his
men have allied themselves with the Eelam Nation Democratic Liberation Front (MEP) against
the government and mainstream Tamil Tigers. Many Sri Lankans suspect that Colonel Karuna
and his supporters are responsible for the recent violence; however, the government continues to
blame the LTTE for the violence.43 The splitting of the LTTE into two separate organizations
continues to threaten the peace process between the mainstream LTTE and the Sri Lankan
government.

The Sri Lankan Government


Since 1948, when Sri Lanka gained its independence from the British Empire, the Sinhalese
ethnic group has been in complete control of the Sri Lankan government; the Tamils, on the
other hand, have had little representation in the Sri Lankan government. The current Sri Lankan
government is comprised of a coalition of leftist interest groups that make up a 225-seat
Parliament. Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga is a moderate socialist.
Kumaratunga’s political party used to be aligned in a political coalition with the Marxist
People’s Liberation Front (JVP).44 This political coalition between Mrs. Kumaratunga’s party
and the JVP led to Kumaratunga’s first presidential election success in 1994 and her subsequent
election in 1999. However, very recent political bickering between the two parties has caused
this coalition to collapse. The MEP is another significant political party within Parliament, and
Buddhist and Muslim socialist parties with limited political power hold the remaining seats. As
discussed in previous sections, the Sri Lankan government has a long history of strong anti-
Tamil sentiment, with the past adoption of anti-Tamil legislation. On several occasions, the JVP
has made an effort to disrupt the President’s political agenda because of their anti-Tamil
sentiment. The JVP opposed both the President’s oil and electricity distribution plans because
resources were to be distributed to both Tamil and Sinhalese districts.45 The frequent and often
violent terrorist attacks by the Tamil Tigers in recent years did nothing to reverse this tendency
in the government. Many Sinhalese leaders in the government refuse to recognize the plight of
the Tamil people; these leaders believe that the rights of the Sinhalese people must be upheld at
all costs. This mindset, along with a historically deep seated fear of Tamil infiltration and
cultural takeover are still the viewpoints of the majority of those in government, resulting in very
few Tamil political and social rights.

42
Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka,” Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/lkasummary-eng.
43
Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka,” Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/lkasummary-eng.
44
PTI News Agency, “Sri Lankan president criticizes Marxist coalition allies,” The Hindu/BBC, June 12, 2005,
http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/document?_m=ae2334a71c8e5f9e1d6b2427f477105f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGL
bVtz-zSkVA&_md5=952fb4f07890ccb8b8077551ac883998.
45
PTI News Agency, “Sri Lankan president criticizes Marxist coalition allies,” The Hindu/BBC, June 12, 2005,
http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=ae2334a71c8e5f9e1d6b2427f477105f&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtz

13
Political Ramifications of the Tsunami
The tsunami has caused a severe backlash in Sri Lankan peace efforts, as well as the entire
political scheme of the government. The international community has collected over three billion
dollars in humanitarian aid for Sri Lanka. However, the distribution of this money has caused
great political dissent. President Kumaratunga, along with many international observers, suggests
that a plan to distribute tsunami aid to the Sri Lankan people be instituted.46 This “joint
mechanism” would consist of advisors from multiple ethnic groups to distribute the aid needed to
all Sri Lankans. Many view the tsunami as another possible opportunity to build peaceful
relations between the two ethnic groups. Often, groups unify and ignore certain differences when
there is a great foreign threat or disaster. As a result, many regard the natural disaster as a
stepping-stone towards peace.47 However, this does not accurately apply to Sri Lanka because
the issue of aid distribution and the peaceful experience that could be gained by a “joint
mechanism” has sparked violent opposition from other political groups. The Marxist People’s
Liberation Front (JVP) launched their sternest opposition to the government agenda over this
issue, refusing any cooperation with Tamil people. The JVP is strongly against the idea of giving
aid to the ravaged Tamil people in the northeast. Despite the strong opposition from her coalition
partner, President Kumaratunga has said in defense of the joint aid program: “The government
may fall…I might lose the presidency, but those things are not of national interest unlike
bringing last peace to the county.”48 The JVP has effectively renounced the government over the
issue of the aid program that was passed in late June 2005, leaving behind thirty-nine seats in
Parliament. The loss of these seats from her coalition has left President Kumaratunga’s political
party as a minority in Parliament, making it all the more difficult to get her agenda pushed
through.49 In addition, the Muslims in Parliament feel that they are not adequately represented in
the aid mechanism that primarily centers on Sinhalese and Tamils. According to analysts on Sri
Lankan politics, “Muslims feel they may be marginalized in that process while nationalists fear
the tsunami-aid deal gives legitimacy to the Tamil Tigers’ demands for a separate homeland in
the north and east.”50 The Muslims responded to their perceived lack of representation in the deal
by deciding to withdraw all their Mahajana Eksath Peramuna Party (MP) representatives from
Parliament as well. Buddhists, feeling underrepresented in the joint aid program, have left their
seats in government in protest as well and threaten violent attacks against the current regime. The
Buddhists have allied themselves with the JVP and are violently protesting the aid deal. In less
than ten days, seven political parties associated with three different ethnic groups have pulled out
of President Kumaratunga’s government in protest. The MEP that still remains contains an active

46
“Sri Lanka leader gambles on tsunami aid,” BBC World News, June 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//1/hi/world/south_asia/4628125.stm.
47
Simon Gardner, “Aid pact may help S.Lanka peace, but pitfalls remain,” Reuters, June 27, 2005,
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SP71606.htm.
48
“President vows Sri Lanka aid deal,” BBC World News, June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/1/hi/world/south_asia/4511765.stm.
49
“Sri Lanka ruling coalition splits,” BBC World News, June 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//1/hi/world/south_asia/4080564.
50
“Muslims strike over Sri Lanka aid,” BBC World News, June 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/1/hi/world/south_asia/4626551.stm.

14
militant wing that has been accused of carrying out politically targeted killings in the last six
months.51

The belief that the renegade Tamil Tiger, Colonel Karuna, is launching a series of political and
civilian killings in June 2005 after siding with the MEP only serves to further complicate the
current situation. According to Human Rights Watch, “while the perpetrators of the killings are
not yet known, it is widely believed that they were carried out by forces loyal to Colonel Karuna,
who broke away from the LTTE in March.”52 E. Kaushalyan, who was the political head of the
LTTE, was murdered on February 8, 2005 along with several other Tigers. Among these men
were the former parliamentarian, C. Ariayanayagam, and a member of LTTE human rights body.
These killings disrupt the now fragile ceasefire agreement and add yet another dangerous
element to Sri Lanka’s unstable atmosphere. There is now more strife among the Sinhalese
people about how to act towards the Tamils than there is actual ethnic strife between the two
groups. Current developments in the Sri Lankan conflict indicate that the conflict is changing
from ethnic strife between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, to a nationwide political struggle with a
potentially violent future.

51
Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka,” Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/lkasummary-eng.
52
Human Rights Watch, “Sri Lanka: Killings Highlight Weaknesses in Ceasefire,” Human Rights Watch,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/11/slanka10162.htm.

15
V. Effects of the Tsunami
On the morning of December 26, tragedy struck the South Asian coastlines. One of the hardest-
hit nations was Sri Lanka. Over three-fourths of the island nation’s coastline was hit by a
massive tidal wave, and over 31,000 were reported dead while half a million were displaced. The
economy was wrecked, inert, and the homeless roamed the streets, scavenging.

But not even a day after the tsunami struck, Tamil liberation forces were gathering bodies,
hauling off debris and searching for survivors while the government struggled to regain order.
When national aid reached Sri Lanka, the rebel group and the government reached a state of
tentative cooperation to distribute relief equally throughout the country.

Relief Efforts
Both the Sinhalese Government and the Tamil Tigers have organized relief efforts in Sri Lanka;
however the Tigers have been far more successful in their efforts. As a result of being prepared
for the challenges they face everyday within their country, the Tigers were able to respond with
organized relief efforts and aid distribution.53 In the area controlled by the Buddhist Sinhalese,
supplies must first be sorted out to the politicians and other high-ranking officials. By these
means, immediate relief to the general population is delayed and obstructed. However, in the
area controlled by the Tamil minority, relief has been distributed quickly and efficiently due to
the lack of hierarchy within the organization.

The Tamil relief efforts were led by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). Tamils
divided into groups, some of which recovered bodies, assisted injured or ushered survivors to
refugee centers they set up in homes and schools.54 Tamils had cleared bodies and debris from
Tamil-controlled area before the end of January.55 According to Dr. P. Judyramesh Jeyakumar,
head of mental health and surgery at Kilinochchi District Hospital, “They were organized. They
set up field hospitals. They did triage. They sent people here with IVs and bandages. That’s
why we managed so well.”56 The foreign workers who aided the region also offered praise for
the organization of the Tigers’ efforts.57 A group of Tamil expatriates also contributed to the
cause by flying to Sri Lanka and designing temporary local housing from local material that
could later be used to rebuild homes. According to one expatriate who was a chartered engineer
from London, the homes were designed because the tents provided by a U.N. agency “[were] a
quick fix that did not meet the local people’s needs.”58

53
Bay Fang, “Keeping A War On Hold?; A Rare Visit to Rebel Tamil Tigers Territory in Sri Lanka Following the
Tsunami’s Carnage,” U.S. News and World, January 24, 2005, 24. http://www.proquest.com.
54
Kim Barker, “Rebel Group Uses Its Discipline, Organization to Help Tsunami Victims,” Chicago Tribune,
January 7, 2005, http://www.proquest.com.
55
Fang.
56
Barker.
57
Ibid.
58
Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Tsunami Impact: Tamils Building Cool Shelters to Replace Hot Tents,” Global
Information Network, February 16, 2005, http://www.proquest.com.

16
The Tigers initially received support from the Tamil Diaspora, but argued more aid was needed.
U.S. marines were unable to contribute aid to the northern areas controlled by the Tigers due to
the fact that the Tigers have been designated a terrorist organization by the United States. They
were, however, able to assist the southern areas.59

While there have been many reports of the success of the Tigers and their will to help their
people, there are also reports that the Tamils have refused aid offered to them.60 Foreign
militaries were not welcomed to the region,61 and according to Jeya Kularaja, deputy director of
health services in Mullaittivu, a group of Australian physicians were turned down when they
offered their services to the north.62 Additionally, the Tigers have been accused of burning a
refugee center located in Tamil territory because refugees living there accepted food and clothing
from the Sri Lankan army. A Tigers spokesman denied this.63

The Sinhalese government has also contributed to the aid distribution in Sri Lanka. According to
Ryan Anderson, the World Food Program coordinator, “The government is involved in our
program…It pays for all the transportation costs, the storage costs…In regards to food aid, in
terms of investment, they’ve invested quite a lot.”64 When interviewed about the response to the
tsunami, Oxfam America’s President Raymond C. Offenheiser stated:

I think one of the advantages of the response in Sri Lanka was they had the kind of
infrastructure, government presence, and institutional capacity to be able to respond… In
this case the response was good. And this was true from what I could tell up and down
that east coast; we also saw this in the south.65

There has been conflict over aid and how to distribute it from the beginning. The Tigers
originally tried to distribute all relief throughout the north and east using their own aid
organization. They claimed the government was allowing more aid to be distributed to southern
areas. The Sri Lankan government designated the military to run the refugee camps, including
those located in Tamil controlled land.66 Both sides have made accusations that the other was
not prepared to offer a satisfactory response to the situation.67

The government maintains that they have not withheld aid from the north deliberately.
According to government spokesman Niranjan de Soysa, “It’s possible the government wasn’t
allowed into certain areas. It’s possible it was our own inefficiencies that didn’t get us to certain
areas. But we have never actively discriminated against anybody.”68
59
Fang.
60
Ibid.
61
Barker.
62
Fang.
63
Barker.
64
Melissa Tjota, “Sri Lanka and the Fight for Peace,” The Harvard International Relief, (June 26, 2005):
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1306/.
65 Raymond C. Offenheiser, Interview by Chris Hufstader, Oxfam America,
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/emergencies/asian_floods_2004/latest_news/tsunami_analysis
March 29, 2005.
66
Fang.
67
Tjota.
68
Fang.

17
There are also reports that the tsunami has brought the two opposing groups together. S. P.
Thamiselven, a Tamil leader, stated, “This new tragic situation has laid the foundation for both
parties to come together and work towards closing the division between the two parties.”69 As
will be discussed later, the recent signing of the Tsunami Relief Council and the formation of the
Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) have provided new hope for peace
between the two groups.

Tsunami Relief Council/ P-TOMS


Days after the tsunami on December 26th, 2004, the idea of forming a joint management structure
between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and LTTE is proposed. Six months after
intensive negotiations, the two parties, under pressure from the international community, signed
a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on June 24 for the establishment of a Post-
Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS). P-TOMS, or the Tsunami Relief
Council, is an opportunity for the GOSL and the LTTE to work together in an administrative
structure to provide equally distributed relief and reconstruction work to tsunami effected regions
of Sri Lanka.70

However, this joint coalition and the stability of the GOSL are being threatened by opposition to
the MOU joint coalition document. Muslims, who represent about 7.5% of the 19.5 million Sri
Lankans, oppose the MOU because they are not a signatory in the deal. The Muslims feel
underrepresented in the tsunami relief efforts, despite their representation on the tsunami-aid
council.71 Mr. Ibrahim, secretary of the Federation of Amparai district Mosques, told BBC, “It is
shocking. The present deal would not give any real power to our representatives. We are totally
opposed to this arrangement.”72 The National Unity Alliance (NUA), a major Muslim party, is
considering extracting its two MPs out of the ruling coalition.73

The Muslims’ opposition endangers the GOSL and the effectiveness of P-TOMS. In addition to
the threat of the Muslim opposition, the opposition from the nationalist People’s Liberation Front
(JVP) heightens the country’s political instability. The JVP fears that the Tsunami Relief Council
gives the LTTE too much power, and that the rebels will be able to use the tsunami funds to
boost their armory.74 The JVP also fears that the joint coalition lends legitimacy to the LTTE’s
demands for an independent state in the north and east.75 Because of these misgivings, the JVP
withdrew its 39 members from Sri Lanka’s 225-member Parliament. This leaves President
Kumaratunga with a fragile minority government composed of 66 members from Kumaratunga’s

69
Tjota
70
Ethirajan Anbarasan, “Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid,” BBC Tamil
Service, June 27, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4628125.stm
71
“Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid,” BBC News, June 27, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4626551.stm.
72
Ethirajan Anbarasan, “Muslim Anger Over Sri Lanka Deal,” BBC Tamil Service, May 1, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/412100.stm.
73
“Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid.”
74
Anbarasan, “Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid.”
75
“Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid.”

18
Freedom Party and other smaller allied parties; 68 parliament members are from the opposition
United National Party. 76

Even with opposition of several political fractions, the P-TOMS agreement was signed and
employed on Friday June 24, 2005. President Kumaratunga stated, “The Government is
unshaken… but there is no instability. We will be short of 20 or 30 votes in parliament but that
will not be a problem to implement our policies.”77 The main focus of P-TOMS is to plan and
implement relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development to the coastal communities in
the six districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and Trincomalee. The
MOU will be in operation for one year, but this time frame can be extended if the parties
involved form a consensus. P-TOMS consists of three main subcommittees which include
GOSL, LTTE and Muslim representatives: The Post-Tsunami Costal Reconstruction Committee
(the “High Level Committee” or HLC), The Post-Tsunami Costal Reconstruction Committee for
the Six Districts (The “Regional Committee” or RC), and the Post Tsunami Costal
Reconstruction Committees for each of the Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu,
and Trincomalee districts (the “Districts Committee” or DC). The HLC has the ability to
formulate policies for the equal distribution of donor funds in the Tsunami Disaster Zone (TDZ).
This allocation is based on the needs assessment submitted to the HLC and is in proportion to the
number of affected persons and the extent of damage. The HLC also has a prerequisite of
advisory services and is in charge of monitoring the functions of P-TOMS. Members of the HLC
include one nominee by the GOSL, LTTE, and the Muslim parties. The mission of the RC is to
develop strategies for the execution and prioritization of post-tsunami emergency relief,
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development measures. It is also in charge of overall
monitoring of projects and fund management. Its members include two nominees by the GOSL,
five nominees from the LTTE, and three members nominated by the Muslim parties. The DC’s
main functions incorporate identifying and prioritizing needs, generating, receiving, appraising,
and prioritizing project proposals from stakeholders, and submitting recommendations to the RC.
The DC must also monitor and report on the project process to the RC. All parties will be
represented to varying degrees as part of the DC. 78

The international community, which donated $3 billion dollars to the Tsunami Relief Council,
lobbied for a joint mechanism so funds did not have to be directly channeled to the LTTE; many
countries list the LTTE rebel group as a terrorist organization.79 Conversely, the LTTE stated
that the tsunami aid was not being equally distributed to Tamil controlled regions in the north.80
In response to these allegations, the GOSL replied that the funds had not yet been channeled to
those areas. The Tsunami Relief Council represents the first time the rebel group and the Sri

76
“S. Lanka Government Nears Collapse,” CNN, June 16, 2005, http://www.cnn.com
/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/06/16/srilanka.government/index.html.
77
“Sri Lanka Split ‘Not a Disaster,” BBC News, June 16, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4100974.stm.
78
Government of Sri Lanka, “Sri Lanka: Tsunami Aid Deal Between Govt. and LTTE
Signed,” June 24, 2005, Quoted by Relief Web, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-
6DNHUA?OpenDocument.
79
“Sri Lanka Tsunami Aid Deal Signed,” BBC News, June 24, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4617917.stm.
80
“Sri Lanka: A Motion Against the Government – Tamil Agreement for Post-Tsunami
Aid,” Asian News, June 27, 2005, http://www.asiannews.it/view.php? l=en&art=3596.

19
Lankan Government have come together to work towards a common goal. Many, including
President Chandrika Kumaratanga, believe that this council is the first step in resuming the peace
process, which stalled in 2003. D.B.S. Jeyaraj, a Sri Lankan political analyst, states, “The most
important thing is, despite the stalemate in the peace process, the president has ensured that full-
scale hostilities will not return for a while.” The LTTE even has a chance to prove that they are
not only a military force, but also an organization capable of governing and improving the well-
being of the Tamil people. If all goes well during the duration of P-TOMS there is a possibility
of reconciliation between the LTTE and the GOSL and a permanent resolution to the ethnic
conflict.81

Aid and the International Perspective


The tsunami joint mechanism is an agreement between the Sinhalese government and the Tamil
Tigers to facilitate aid to the survivors. In the past several months of aid and relief distributions
to the tsunami survivors, the Tamil Tigers have gained positive public exposure including a
newfound approval from the United Nations.

Because of party tensions, peace is hard to facilitate, especially between two ethnic groups who
have been warring for twenty years. It came as a surprise to the international community that the
enemies largely put aside their differences for the tsunami relief effort. "They [the Tamil Tigers
and the Sinhalese government] have done the right thing in placing people's needs first," said
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan.82

As a result of their efficiency, the Tamil Tigers have adopted a public relations campaign that
alters the international community’s view of the confirmed terrorist group. Since the launch of
the Tamils’ media crusade to bring international attention to their country’s plight and their call
for relief aid, the rebel group gained more international credibility.

Before the tsunami, the world perceived the Sinhalese government as the legitimate party while
the Tamils retained their reputation as a terrorist organization. In the aftermath of the tsunami,
the Sinhalese government showed its instability and the Tamils proved themselves to be
politically able to compromise and employ an efficient organization in times of dire need.

Despite the technical cooperation, the antagonistic attitudes that dominated the Sinhalese and
Tamil groups still surface, such as in official arrangements concerning the relief effort for
survivors of the tsunami. SP Thamilselvan, the head of the rebels’ political wing, said, "We [the
Tamil Tigers] have agreed to sign the document [tsunami aid deal], but the government is
delaying it.”83

Numerous world powers have taken a newfound interest in the coalition between the Tamil
rebels and the Sri Lankan government, including India. India’s external ministry spokesman

81
Anbarasan, “Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid”.
82
“Annan Welcomes Sri Lanka's Tsunami Aid Management Accord,” Kyodo News, June 25, 2005,
http://asia.news.yahoo.com/050624/kyodo/d8au5kdo2.html.
83
“Tamil Rebels in Tsunami Aid Talks,” BBC News South Asia, June 22, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4118178.stm.

20
Navtej Sarna said, “Considering the scale of tragedy, it is important that the relief is made
available to all victims regardless of their religion or ethnicity."84 The statement by a foreign
official is crucial in indicating how the world views Sri Lanka in direct aftermath of the
Tsunami. India previously maintained a “posture of disinterest or neutrality”85 in terms of the
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. With its renewed interest in the condition of Sri Lanka, other
countries should follow suit.

Japan also plays an important part in the reconstruction of Sri Lanka. In the aftermath of the
tsunami, Japan loaned the island nation a total of nearly $100 million that will have to be repaid
within 40 years.86 China also abandoned its past silence with its recent donation of 270 tons of
canned fish for the homeless of Sri Lanka.87

In effect, the aftermath of the tsunami has shown that the Tamil Tigers are a viable organization
in terms of the management of Sri Lanka. With this fact, the international community has come
to view the Tamil Tigers as more than a terrorist group, and perhaps a future boon to avert crisis
in the south Asia seas.

Effects of the Tsunami

It is clear that this disaster served as a catalyst for more communication and cooperation between
Tiger rebels and the Sri Lankan government. The P-TOMS agreement recently signed by both
parties has allowed for the peace process to continue. In the process of signing this agreement,
over thirteen drafts were discussed between the rebels and the government.88 According to
Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen, “This is the first time in over two decades of armed
conflict that the parties have agreed to cooperate in a political-administrative structure that
comprises the national, regional and district levels.”89 Both the government and the Tamil Tigers
have turned much of their focus on relief efforts, and have even put forth the effort to ease their
trade barriers against each other.90 The international community has also promised 4.5 billion
dollars for tsunami aid if another peace agreement is signed between the two parties.91 This may
very well help push both groups to look for peace in order to gain this aid. With the
establishment of cooperation, negation, and communication, the tsunami’s devastation may
allow for political peace. Many believe that war cannot erupt due to the fact that the country is

84
“India Supports Tsunami Aid to Victims in Sri Lanka,” PTI news agency, New Delhi, June 24, 2005
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/mediamonitor/article_1021581.php/India_supports_tsunami_aid_to_victims_in_
Sri_Lanka.
85
P. Ramasamy. “The Tamil National Question,” Tamil Canadian Services, June 30, 2005,
http://www.tamilcanadian.com/pageview.php?ID=3360&SID=40.
86
“Japan Gives $100 mn in Aid to Lanka,” Sify News, June 8, 2005,
http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=13867313.
87
Mendaka Abeysekera. “China Donates 270 Tons of Canned Fish to Sri Lanka,” Asian Tribune, June 30, 2005,
http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=14916”.
88
“Sri Lanka Aid Deal with Rebels,” Sri Lanka Source, June 25, 2005,
http://story.srilankasource.com/p.x/ct/9/id/4e194e1d04f84f6d/cid/119937e494dd663e.
89
Ibid.
90
John Lancaster. “Tamil Tiger Guerrillas Directing Aid Efforts,” Washington Post Foreign Service, January 4,
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45028-2005Jan3.html.
91
“Asia: A Glimpse of Peace; Sri Lanka,” The Economist, June 25, 2005, 74. www.proquest.com.

21
already in ruins, and both the rebels and the government know that the country cannot afford
such a conflict.92

Even with these positive effects predicted, many experts feel as though the tsunami may harm
the political process. According to a report in The Economist, “The tsunami in fact seemed to
bring renewed war closer.” After the disaster, arguments erupted across the country on how aid
supplies should be shared and distributed. As the Sri Lankan population struggles, both the rebels
and the Sinhalese government have accused each other of distributing aid to areas that have a
larger majority of their party. The government was also reluctant to pass the aid agreement due
to the fact that it may give the rebels international recognition.93

With mixed views coming from the international community, the effect of the tsunami on the
conflict is yet to be seen. While the two groups are now communicating, their disagreements
within their dialogues do not predict a peaceful outcome. It may be possible to use the money
from tsunami donations toward finding a peaceful solution. It is not clear, though, that this is
acceptable.94 No matter how the conflict is affected by the tsunami, the tsunami’s wrath will
certainly play some role in the conflict’s future.

Recommendations

• Both parties should focus on maintaining the communication that they established after
the tsunami.
• Both the government and the Tamil Tigers should use the tsunami as a common ground
for cooperation.
• The cooperation between the two groups concerning the tsunami aid should not be
viewed as simply a humanitarian agreement. Both parties should view it as the first steps
to peace.

92
Lancaster
93
“Asia: A glimpse of peace; Sri Lanka”.
94
Mr. Brenden Varma, Phone call to UN, June 29, 2005.

22
VI. Terrorism Tactics and their Consequences
As in many ethnic conflicts, terrorism plays a pivotal role in the current Sinhalese/Tamil dispute
in Sri Lanka. Considered a terrorist organization by the United States since 1999,95 the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, has evolved into a
widely known terrorist group since its formation in 1976. Although the group has made strides
toward recognition as a political faction, the LTTE still resorts to terrorist actions. Connections
have also been made between terrorist acts and the Sri Lankan government.96 This violence may
impede the peace efforts and for this reason the terrorist operations must be addressed if
diplomatic negotiations are not successful.

Organization
The LTTE has proven itself an organized and sophisticated group. LTTE Chief Velupillai
Prabhakaran leads a governing committee that oversees the two branches of the group: political
and military. The military department is divided into a series of different groups including the
Sea Tigers, a maritime operation wing; the Air Tigers, an airborne operation wing; the Charles
Anthony Regiment, a combat wing; the Black Tigers, a suicide bombing wing; and an extremely
secretive intelligence wing. Anton Balasingham, considered to be a top political advisor and
mind behind the LTTE, also under the control of the governing committee, heads the political
department.97

Funding
The LTTE receives funding and military support from many sources, mainly by Tamils in other
nations. According to Rohan Gunaratna, a professor specializing in LTTE research at St.
Andrew’s University in Edinburgh, “the Tigers are on the cutting edge of arms trafficking”98 as
well. Indian Tamils once contributed a majority of the LTTE’s external funds. As the death toll
and human rights violations rose within the conflict, however, most Indians ceased to back the
terrorist group. The loss of Indian support did not hurt the Tigers.99 The LTTE soon began to
rely on a large population of expatriates in countries such as Canada, Britain, Switzerland, and
Australia for funding. Tamils in these countries are said to donate approximately $1 million U.S.
a month.100 LTTE supplies, such as surface-to-air missiles, assault rifles, and grenade launchers,
have been traced to Cambodian generals and the Khmer Rouge.101 Ukraine has come onto the

95
National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, “Patterns of Global Terrorism: Sri Lanka: 1999
Overview,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=CE&year=1999.
96
Chris Smith, “South Asia’s Enduring War,” in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 36.
97
“Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM.
98
Raymond Bonner, “Tamil Guerrillas in Sri Lanka: Deadly and Armed to the Teeth; A WORLD OF ARMS: The
Colombo Connection,” New York Times, March 7, 1998, http://www.proquest.com.
99
Robert I. Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War: From Mayhem toward Diplomatic Resolution,” in Creating Peace in
Sri Lanka, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 9.
100
Bonner, “Tamil Guerrillas in Sri Lanka.”
101
Ibid.

23
scene as a growing source of LTTE military equipment by providing approximately sixty tons of
explosives to the rebels.102 The LTTE also receive arms directly from the Bulgarian and North
Korean governments, along with dealers from Hong Kong, Singapore, Lebanon, and Cyprus.103
Former Tamil Tigers have given accounts that the group had two American Stinger missiles at
one point, apparently acquired from Afghan Mujaheddin rebels. There have also been hints that
organized crime groups in Russia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and
Mozambique are supporting the LTTE. Although the LTTE tends to receive most funding and
arms from external sources, it also has internal projects to provide for itself. By the mid 1980s,
the group had already started its own arms program. In addition, the LTTE runs a number of
small businesses such as gas stations, restaurants, and shops in Sri Lanka and elsewhere in the
world to fund their cause.104 The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, which raises money for
tsunami relief, has been accused of being a front for the LTTE that funds the terrorist
organization with money raised for tsunami relief. The LTTE has denied the claim.105

Tactics and Targets


Credited as being the “deadliest terrorist group in the world until September 11,”106 the LTTE
uses a variety of techniques but mainly relies on suicide bombers from their Black Tiger wing.
According to the New York Times, “the Tigers did not invent the suicide attack, but they proved
the tactic to be so unnerving and effective for a vastly outmanned fighting force that their
methods were studied and copied, notably in the Middle East.”107 The group also developed
special devices for suicide bombings including bodysuits and protective equipment that make the
act more effective. The LTTE was credited with over half of the suicide bombings worldwide in
2003.108 According to the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, the group
has been responsible for 70 attempted killings since 1968. Twenty-eight percent of these attacks
were aimed at Sri Lankan government officials. Other significant targets include military
personnel, airports and airlines, businesses, ships, police, and transportation devices. Five of
these incidents have been acts of international terrorism. All the international attacks were
against Indian government officials and occurred between 1984 and 1995. Since then, the LTTE
has not attacked outside Sri Lanka.109

Sinhalese Violence

Though not as extreme as the LTTE in its violent tendencies, the Sinhalese government has also
committed unjustifiable, brutal acts. In particular, it often seems to resort to violations of the

102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War, 9.
105
Stewart Bell, “Terrorists behind Tamil fundraising group, RCMP says: Seeking charity
status: 'Front' controlled by Tamil Tigers, expert testified in 1999,” National Post, January 19, 2005,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.
106
Amy Waldan, “Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka,” New York Times, January 14, 2003,
http://www.proquest.com.
107
Ibid.
108
Ibid.
109
National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorist Group Profile: Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE), http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3623.

24
human rights of Tamil civilians when combating the LTTE. Other allegations of Sinhalese
violence also represent the government’s destructive nature.110 As a result of the state of
emergency that the government of Sri Lanka imposed in July of 1997, thousands of Tamil
civilians were detained without charges. Furthermore, thousands more civilians simply
disappeared. Most of these detainees are suspected Tamil sympathizers or supporters; while
lawful detentions of suspected terrorists are acceptable, illegitimate imprisonments infringe on
human rights, and they should therefore be considered acts of state terrorism.111

In 1990, the government of Sri Lanka, frustrated by the presence of Indian peacekeepers that, it
believed, were meddling in Sri Lankan affairs, again resorted to state sponsored bloodshed in an
attempt to remove the Indian troops. Ironically, the group that the government sponsored was
the organization that they hoped to fight after the withdrawal of the Indians: the LTTE. The
resulting arms shipments to the Tamil Tigers allowed them to put increasing pressure on the
peacekeeping force. By the end of 1990, the Indian army had completely withdrawn its troops
from Sri Lanka, thus allowing the fighting to continue between the Tamils and the Sinhalese.112
After the removal of the Indian peacekeeping force, fighting again erupted in Sri Lanka between
state troops and the LTTE. Using brutal strategies that they had learned during conflicts against
JVP socialist guerillas, the government troops waged total war against the Tamil people.
Execution squads killed anyone associated with the LTTE. In addition, the Sinhalese decimated
several areas of the countryside and persisted in treating the Tamil people inhumanely.113

Repercussions
The violent events and organizations associated with the Sri Lankan conflict have affected the
United States, as well as other nations, and will continue to do so until the conflict is brought to
an end.114 For example, as a result of the splintering of the Tamil people into different groups,
intra-ethnic violence among the Tamils has occurred throughout Sri Lanka and other countries
across the globe. Perhaps the most obvious manifestations of such bloodshed are the
assassinations of enemy Tamils in Europe, North America, and the southern region of Asia.115 In
addition to assassinations, the LTTE also influences the United States and other nations in other,
more peaceful ways that may not be in the states’ best interest. For example, the LTTE used a
public relations firm to lobby the United States Congress in order to prevent the acceptance of a
bill that restricts terrorist operations. It has taken similar steps in other nations, especially
Canada, where much of the group’s funding originates.116 The LTTE not only takes measures
that directly affect other nations, but also pursues strategies that indirectly affect other conflicts,
often causing them to become more deadly. For example, the group claims an incredible number

110
Chris Smith, “South Asia’s Enduring War,” in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 36.
111
Ibid, 36.
112
Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” 9.
113
Ibid., 9.
114
Rohan Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency,” International
Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=57 (accessed June 28,
2005).
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.

25
of suicide bombings.117 Such a large number of bombings could have inspired other terrorist
groups to follow similar procedures in the past and may continue to encourage such groups in the
future. Furthermore, the LTTE’s use of child soldiers may encourage rebel armies in Africa and
other regions of the world to recruit more children to fight because of the LTTE’s relative
success as a terrorist organization. The group’s expanding influence in Africa may further
impact such organizations. One example of such expansion is the LTTE’s recent opening of an
office in Botswana. Finally, the group’s growing ties with other terrorist organizations may
prove to increase their influence in the international terrorist community as a whole.118

Recommendations
The following suggested solutions for the Tamil/Sinhalese conflict are primarily geared towards
the disarmament of LTTE. While a diplomatic victory is ideal, the situation suggests that
solutions involving propaganda, military operations, and economic actions may be more
practical. These suggestions stem from this realization.

• The Sri Lankan government, with the support of moderate Tamils, should strongly urge
nations with significant Tamil populations to ban their population’s donations to the
LTTE. The government should make this request to the United Nations but other
countries must fulfill this suggestion using their own free will.
• The government should effectively use the media inside and outside of the country to
sway popular support against the LTTE.119 Without the support of the Tamil people
inside and outside of Sri Lanka, the group will find it much more difficult to recruit
combatants and fund its operations. Such results would seriously cripple the LTTE.
• The government should further educate its population and diplomats about the
complexities of the LTTE and other groups associated with it. 120 Such education is
critical in the diplomats’ endeavors to rally foreign governments’ support for the
campaign against the LTTE. Better education on the subject would also be invaluable in
attempts to urge Tamils in Sri Lanka and other nations to cease their support of the
LTTE.
• In order to limit arms procurement, the Sri Lankan government should request that
nations improve their enforcement of laws banning black market arms sales. This request
should especially be made to nations that are known suppliers of LTTE weapons.
Hopefully, nations such as the United States would back this request in order to aid their
own anti-terrorism agendas. Such a request could be made to the United Nations.
• Finally, the government should improve the Sri Lankan military and intelligence systems
by teaching both organizations about effective methods of cooperation and information
sharing. In addition, training them more rigorously in strategies of unconventional
guerilla warfare would improve their chances of military victories against the Tamil
Tigers.121

117
Waldan, “Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka,” New York Times, January 14, 2003,
http://www.proquest.com.
118
Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications.”
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid.

26
VII. Role of Children in the Conflict
The involvement of Sri Lankan children in the LTTE calls for immediate action towards
deterring future recruitment as well as helping children already affected by warfare. Following
the 2004 tsunami and the civil war, the children of Sri Lanka have become increasingly prone to
participation in the military wing of the Tamil Tigers.

The tsunami resulted in the displacement of more than 550,000 persons122 while the nineteen-
year civil war in Sri Lanka resulted in the displacement of 800,000 people, one third of whom
were children.123 Orphaned children often become targets of the Tamil Tigers organization,
which is located in the area where the tsunami hit the country the hardest; thus those orphaned by
the tsunami are particularly at risk for abduction and recruitment by the LTTE.124

In 2004, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) formulated an action plan in accordance
with numerous organizations such as the Ministry of Social Welfare, Tamils Rehabilitation
Organization (TRO), Save the Children in Sri Lanka, and the United Nations to address the
situation and improve the lives of Sri Lankan children affected by war. This plan called for the
LTTE to cease all recruitment of children and release all child soldiers. This plan instructed the
Sri Lankan government to take action to rehabilitate the basic infrastructure within the country.
Additionally, this plan called for the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
accelerate and improve their implementation of programs related to children affected by war and
child rights in this region.125 As of October 31, 2004, UNICEF documented 3,516 new cases of
child recruitment since the cease-fire signed in February of 2002. Only 1,206 children were
formally released by the Tigers, according to UNICEF. As of November 2004, UNICEF files
hold documentation of 1,395 child soldiers within the Tamil Tigers. According to UNICEF
these numbers most likely remain low due to the fact that:

Some families may be unaware of the possibility of registering, may be afraid to


do so, or may have difficulty reaching a UNICEF office…this suggests that the
total number of children remaining with the LTTE may be as much as four times
higher than the 1,395 figure suggests.126

Recruitment and Re-Recruitment


The LTTE uses a number of tactics to recruit children. The LTTE has an advanced propaganda
campaign which, according to Human Rights Watch, “regularly exposed Tamil children
throughout the North and East [of Sri Lanka] to special events honoring LTTE heroes, parades of

122
Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami Disaster, http://www.idpproject.org/tsunami.htm.
123
UNICEF, At a Glance: Sri Lanka,www.unicef.org/infobycountry/srilanka_901.html.
124
Mayank Chhaya, “Biggest Victims Are Children: A journalist grieves for orphaned children, focus on
psychological trauma.” News-India Times, January 14, 2005, http:// www.proquest.com.
125
UNICEF, Call to increased action for Sri Lanka’s war affected children, UNICEF
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_19036.html.
126
Human Rights Watch, Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka,
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/srilanka1104/.

27
LTTE cadres, public displays of paraphernalia, and speeches and videos, particularly in
schools.”127 The poverty in North and East Sri Lanka, especially in the East, along with a “lack
of vocational and educational opportunities”128 causes many children to volunteer. The Los
Angeles Times reported that the LTTE contests the accusations that they recruit children, saying,
“many youngsters lie about their age to join the group.”129 However, according to a report by
Amnesty International, “[t]he Tamil Tigers are increasingly turning to threats and violence in a
recruitment drive for child soldiers.”130 A number of children have been abducted while walking
to or from school or work and others have been taken by force from their homes or public places.
Families often do not resist because they fear retaliation from the LTTE. In a report from the
BBC, a former child soldier said that “he was picked up by the rebels while going to pluck yams
from the palm trees to sell to support his family.”131

The LTTE does not discriminate when it comes to the gender of the child either. UNICEF has
reported that 40 percent of all child recruits for the LTTE are girls, and girls have carried out
numerous attacks throughout Sri Lanka.132 Orphans are also prime targets for recruitment by the
LTTE. The Toronto Star reported, “since the tsunami disaster, UNICEF has recorded more than
40 cases of child recruitment, including several cases from relief camps for tsunami
survivors.”133

The LTTE not only recruits new child soldiers, but they also re-recruit many former child
soldiers. In April 2004, a faction group of LTTE adult and child soldiers lead by Colonel Karuna
dispersed, and between 4,000 and 6,000 soldiers returned to their homes. According to a Human
Rights Watch report, of those soldiers returning by early August 2004, UNICEF registered 1,800
children. By June, extreme LTTE forces had begun a large campaign to re-recruit those soldiers
who had returned to their homes in the East. This included the re-recruitment of many child
soldiers. The extreme LTTE forces used many of the same tactics for re-recruitment as they had
used for the original recruitment, except that violent tactics were used more regularly. Girls are
even more susceptible to re-recruitment because as former members of the LTTE they are easily
identified by the short haircuts that they received when they became members.134

Even though the LTTE has agreed to end all recruitment of children and stop using children as
part of its forces, the rebel group has failed to do so. In 2003, the LTTE, along with the Sri
Lankan government, agreed on and signed an Action Plan for Children Affected by War. The
LTTE pledged to stop the recruitment and use of children, but figures from UNICEF show that
even though a large number of children have been released, almost twice as many have been
recruited.135

127
Living in Fear, 5.
128
Ibid.
129
“Rebels Recruiting Children, U.N. Says,” Los Angeles Times, January 15, 2005, http://www.proquest.com.
130
Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: Tamil Tigers beating up families to recruit child soldiers, Amnesty
International, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA370022004?open.
131
Frances Harrison, “Hope for Sri Lanka’s child soldiers,” BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2289944.stm.
132
Living in Fear, 6-7.
133
Namini Wijedasa, “Saving Child Soldiers,” The Toronto Star, March 21, 2005, http://www.lexisnexis.com.
134
Living in Fear, 37-47.
135
Living in Fear, 7.

28
Life as a Child Tamil Tiger
Similar to other military groups, the Tamil Tigers use a process of basic training followed by
advanced training, which eventually leads to actual combat. Basic training lasts between three
and five months with more specified or advanced training lasting around six months.

Basic training consists primarily of rigorous physical exercise and both military and weaponry
education. Morning sessions focus on building strength and endurance training through such
exercises as “weight lifting, jumping, running, crawling over sharp terrain, karate, rope climbing and
practice in climbing heights.” Those who are unable to keep up are forced to do more difficult
exercises in greater amounts and are sporadically hit and kicked.136 Afternoon sessions focus on
training of special skills such as map reading and code breaking, as well as educating the children on
Tamil Tiger history and war tactics. A girl recruited at age 13 commented that she “had training on
war tactics: if there is an army camp, how to approach, kill, plan the attack…if you get too tired and
can’t continue, they will beat you.”137

Advanced training is more specialized and the children are placed in units based on officers’
assertions of their strengths. Areas of specialization range from intelligence, security divisions to
protect higher officers, and specified training on specific weapon systems such as landmines and
bombs, to non-military skills like medicine and administration. The more educated a child is the
greater the opportunity to work in non-combat fields; those who are less educated, often the youngest
children, train for combat. Combat training includes preparation by “attacking unprotected or weakly
defended border villages.” Hundreds of people have been killed in these attacks by the child soldiers
armed with automatic weapons being led by older, experienced fighters.138 The cease-fire
agreement signed in February of 2002 between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan government has
caused a reduction in children in actual combat, though recruitment and training persist.139

Training also consists of an emphasis on the importance of securing Tamil information and of
giving one’s own life if necessary; that is, the children are taught to fear the Sri Lankan
government and are told that if they are caught they will be brutally beaten and killed. Thus, the
children wear cyanide capsule necklaces that they are instructed to swallow if they are ever in
imminent danger of being caught.

During their time in the military children are not allowed to have contact with their parents with the
exception of Martyr’s Day (Hero’s Day) on November 27th. On this day Tamils revere those killed
in war and celebrate their attempt to gain liberation from the Sri Lankan government. Parents have
sacrificed their lives in search of their children’s location and have been turned away by Tamil
leaders after several days of waiting in hopes of speaking to their children. The leaders tell the

136
Keairns, Yvonne E., Ph.D, The Voices of Girl Child Soldiers. Quaker United Nations Office (New York, 2002),
30. http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/QUNO%20Child%20soldiers%20report.pdf.
137
Living in Fear, 28.
138
Gunartna, Rohan, “LTTE Child Combatants”. Jane’s Intelligence Review. July 1998. 3.
http://www.operationsick.com/reports/20011025_lttechildcombatantsinsrilanka.htm
139
Living in Fear, 28.

29
parents that their children do not wish to see them. Letter writing and phone calls are also prohibited.
140

The Tamil Tigers often practice collective punishment for child soldiers. In this type of punishment,
the entire group is punished for an individual’s mistakes, which often results in children resenting
their peers for their actions. Those that try to escape are beaten in front of their unit to discourage
others from attempts. Nirmala, recruited at age fourteen, told Human Rights Watch that “Some
children die. If you do it twice, they will shoot you. In my wing, if someone escaped, the whole
group was lined up to watch them get beaten.”141 Alcohol use and sexual activity are punished and
the children are forbidden to comfort each other through physical touch or emotional support.

Throughout training the children receive adequate amounts of food and sleep to ensure their physical
growth. The children receive uniforms as well as a pair of jeans, a few shirts, and shoes. During
menstruation girls receive necessities. Girl soldiers commented that “When sick or injured they were
taken care of and given medicine. They would be taken to see the doctor and may even be sent to a
camp hospital.”142 The basic problem is that while the children are mistreated physically as well as
psychologically, their physiological needs are often met much more as a soldier than they would be
in their poverty stricken homes; thus one can see the enticing nature of the Tamil Tigers to youth.

Psychological Effects of Child Warfare

As a result of their exposure to warfare, children in Sri Lanka suffer from numerous detrimental
psychological results. After being exposed to the atrocities of war, enduring a rigorous training
schedule, or following strict codes of conduct under the control of the Tamil Tigers, the children
of Sri Lanka face psychological problems significantly hindering their adolescent growth and
development.143

In addition to the possibility of death and injury, time with the Tamil Tiger army often results in
a multitude of psychological consequences. Children observed after their time spent with the
Tamil Tigers portrayed signs of mental conditions such as depression and post-traumatic stress
disorder, which “leave children as complete psychological and social wrecks.”144 Children are
exceptionally vulnerable and impressionable and therefore a child’s time with the Tamil Tiger
army can result in permanent damage to their mental health.145

According to Daya Somasundaram, professor of Psychiatry at University of Jaffna in Jaffna, Sri


Lanka:

In the civil war that has been in progress in northeast Sri Lanka for almost two
decades children have been traumatized by common experiences such as shelling,

140
Ibid.
141
Living in Fear. 27.
142
Voices of Girl Child Soldiers, 22.
143
The Voices of Girl Child Soldiers, 2.
144
Daya Somasundaram, Child Soldiers: Understanding the Context,
http//bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/324/7348/1268.
145
Ibid.

30
helicopter strafing, round ups, cordon and search operations, deaths, injury,
destruction, mass arrests, detention, shootings, grenade explosions and landmines.146

Somasundaram later concludes that exposure to war situations cause children to experience
psychological effects that may significantly hinder their development. A large percentage of
children who studied at a school in Vaddukoddai, Sri Lanka, a region particularly exposed to the
ethnic warfare, experienced numerous psychological consequences, including sleep disturbances
and irritability. These students also portrayed significant decline in school performance and
increased violent use of war vocabulary and practice of war games.147

During their time spent in the Tamil Tiger army, children miss out on childhood experiences
crucial to their development. UNICEF representative Ted Chaiban acknowledges the important
aspects of childhood that child soldiers miss when he discusses their reintegration back into their
communities, saying, “For too long these children have had to live as soldiers and have been
denied the rights of other children to learn, play, and live in the security of a family
environment.148

When children are released from the LTTE, there are numerous issues which they and their
families must face, including security, education, vocational training, and psychosocial
problems. A hindrance to reintegrating children back into society is the result of a prevalent fear
of re-recruitment. Many children will not leave their homes for school or vocational training for
fear of being taken away and forced back into the LTTE. According to Human Rights Watch,
“The LTTE threatened families that they would take children by force if they did not return, or
they would take other children or parents in their stead.”149

Upon returning to school, former child soldiers are years older than the children at their
educational level, as the soldiers have not received formal education since their recruitment. Sri
Lanka’s education system is competitive, and often former children soldiers are unable to catch
up. Additionally, these children are not as receptive to discipline in their schools. Angie Peltzer,
founder of Go M.A.D. international volunteer organization, states, “There can be difficulties in
discipline…as the child has gone from a leader, militant to being treated as a student.”150
According to one writer, girls have a particularly difficult time:

As an alternate to returning to school, children attend vocational training. However, even


after they receive vocational training, there are few jobs open for females. Girls are not
readily accepted into jobs that are traditionally for males. This creates a situation in
which females are left without a place in society.151

146
Ibid.
147
Ibid.
148
UNICEF, “Close to 150 soldiers released by the LTTE,” United Nations,
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_20399.html.
149
Living in Fear , 37
150
Angela Peltzer, e-mail to author, June 29, 2005.
151
Rachel Brett, Girl Soldiers: Challenging the Assumptions,
http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/Girl_Soldiers.doc.pdf.

31
Recommendations

In response to the need within the Tamil community to prevent LTTE use of child soldiers as
well as to provide care for those children that have already been affected, we propose the
following:

• As an international community, work with NGOs to develop after-school social programs


within Tamil areas to establish a sense of community and provide children with an
alternative to volunteering for the LTTE. Programs could include sports and activities
based on art, education, and community building to provide youth with a sense of
accomplishment and belonging separate from that of the LTTE.
• Educate youth on the illegality of joining the LTTE as a minor. This information could
be presented on such items as posters, flyers, and various school supplies such as erasers
and pencils. NGOs would need to fund the purchase, shipping, and distribution of such
items.
• Through an organized campaign, raise awareness among the international Tamil
community of the continued recruitment of child soldiers in hope of discouraging their
funding of the LTTE. Promote the funding of NGOs working towards furthering
education, vocational training, and economic stability among the Tamil community.
• Encourage children and their families to walk together to and from school to decrease the
occurrence of kidnappings. By encouraging neighborhood protection and watch, children
will experience a safe and a more close-knit environment.
• Provide meals within the school system to encourage children to attend. Meals would be
funded through NGOs in hope that schools would serve as a nurturing environment to
ensure mental stability.
• Provide vocational training for both boys and girls through funds set up by UNICEF and
other NGOs. Training could be in computer use, mechanics, medicine, carpentry, and
textiles. Training would offer the children lifestyle opportunities separate from the
LTTE.
• Maintain a presence of UN observers within Tamil communities and in governmental
buildings where Tamil families are able to report missing children. The international
community should provide translators so that the Tamil families can communicate with
the government. Women should be encouraged to travel together when reporting missing
children. The international community should encourage the UN to work closely with the
Sri Lankan government to ensure the safety of families that report.

32
VIII. Long-Term Political Solutions
Recognizing the fragility of the Sri Lankan government, significant changes must be made in
order to ensure a peaceful and successful state in the future. Recent developments have proven
that the leaders of the Sri Lankan government are willing to cooperate with the Tamil rebels, yet
the Marxists’ protest of the government’s decisions regarding tsunami aid complicates the peace
process. The Tsunami Relief Council will be a vital component in the political process and it
will help determine the future of the peace process. Furthermore, according to a BBC News
report, “Sri Lanka's minority Muslims have gone on strike to protest for a greater role in a deal to
distribute billions of aid dollars for December's tsunami victims.”152 The tsunami has created
complex relationships inside of the country that have to be mended in order to preserve the peace
process.

President Kumaratunga’s resolve to form an agreement with the Tamil rebels will be a main
factor in determining the future of the Sri Lankan government. If Kumaratunga follows her
current plan, peace between the Sinhalese and the Tamils will be a possibility. This is the
essential aspect of solving this conflict, despite the growing animosity between the Marxist
faction and the government. Under a new governmental plan, the Sri Lankan government will
have the ability to bridge the gap between the Tamil rebels and the government which has been
preventing peace for twenty years. The Tamils have expressed their preference for regional
autonomy and with compromise, this gap can be mended and peace can be reached.

Perhaps the paramount reason to form a coalition is to capitalize on promised donations if a


peace agreement is reached: “Sri Lanka has been promised about $3 billion in tsunami relief, on
top of $4.5 billion promised in reconstruction help to follow a peace settlement.”153 This
monetary offer will accelerate reconstruction plans and help develop the Sri Lankan government.
This aids the peace process by giving the government incentive to form an agreement.

The most important component of the peace process is tsunami aid. This topic will determine
the future of cooperation between various groups in the country. The largest obstruction to peace
is the nationalist Marxist party. The Tamils and Kumaratunga’s People’s Alliance have
expressed their wish to distribute the $3 billion in tsunami aid yet the Marxists refuse to
recognize the Tamils as a legitimate party.154 While forming a peace agreement, the Sri Lankan
government will have to convince the Marxists to support a peace process that will inevitably
involve sharing tsunami aid.

Essentially, the Sri Lankan government must be altered in order to settle this long conflict that
has taken so many lives. The tsunami opened the peace process once again and this opportunity
must not be missed. There are many strategies that can be analyzed to ensure peace. We will
present three and recommend one we feel will be the most effective.

152
BBC News, Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4626551.stm
153
Stanley Samarasinghe, “Can Donors Broker Peace in Sri Lanka,” Far Eastern Economic Review 168, no.2
(2005): 38-40.
154
BBC News, Sri Lanka’s growth turns upwards, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4636981.stm.

33
Partitioning
In a geographically defined ethnic conflict, many in the international community have advocated
the separation of the groups involved into their own “home” areas under their own governments.
However, as has been the case in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the notion of two independent
states within what was a larger state is impractical in setup and implementation, and potentially
damaging in the long-term given the current situation and past tensions in Sri Lanka. Despite
these facts, some in the international community consider partitioning Sri Lanka to be the most
timely and practical plan to end the conflict in Sri Lanka. Therefore, we propose the following
principal arguments against a divided Sri Lanka:

First, as described in the Current Situation section, the current conflict in Sri Lanka is not limited
to the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Parts of Sri Lanka’s Muslim community have been
attacked by the LTTE, and Muslim groups have attacked the LTTE. Additionally, the Marxist
JVP party has, for the time being, left the governing coalition and is currently attempting to form
a new political coalition. Several smaller Muslim political parties have pledged to join the new
JVP coalition. Furthermore, the JVP views any government cooperation with the LTTE as a
violation of Sri Lankan sovereignty and collaborating with a terrorist organization, and has
vowed to defend Sri Lanka against such violations. It would be unwise to underestimate the
possible backlash from the JVP, Muslims, and other strongly anti-Tamil parties.

Second, the process would place immense stress on the currently strained balance of powers in
the Sri Lankan government and could result in a coup attempt by the anti-Tamil political parties,
such as the JVP. In addition to the JVP pull out and new coalition with the opposition and
Muslim parties, a handful of Buddhist monks in Parliament have used their influence in the Sri
Lankan government to oppose cooperation with the LTTE. The President’s support for the joint
mechanism agreement, P-TOMS, and the Memorandum of Understanding has served to
simultaneously attempt to resume dialogue with the LTTE and alienate her anti-Tamil allies.
These events have made the possibility of a vote of no confidence from Parliament a real threat
to the current powers in the government, and such a motion could result in a strong executive
reaction. A series of events of this nature would most likely result in utter political turmoil in Sri
Lanka and cause further damage to the already-stalled peace process with the LTTE.

Third, the geographic distribution of Sri Lanka’s ethnic groups would cause major problems for
the partitioning process. For example, there are sizable Muslim communities in what would most
likely become LTTE controlled territory in the north. There are large pockets of Tamils in the
south-central part of the island which would likely fall under Sri Lankan control. Conversely, the
predominately Sinhalese city of Trincomalee on the northeastern coast would likely fall under
LTTE control.155 Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government, which would be under intense
political pressure from anti-Tamil organizations, and would be unlikely to concede any
additional land which could lead to yet another deadlocked peace process.

155
University of Texas at Austin: PCL Map Collection, Sri Lanka (Ethnic communities and religions, Population
density, Land use and economic activity) 1976,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/sri_lanka_charts_76.jpg

34
Fourth, the distribution of natural resources in Sri Lanka and its location relative to India would
likely cause further bickering among negotiators. A likely point of contention would be the
relative lack of natural resources in the LTTE-controlled northeast. The LTTE would have a
valid point on the resource issue due to the fact that many of Sri Lanka’s leading exports,
specifically diamonds, emeralds, and rubies,156 would be in Sri Lankan territory.157 The Sri
Lankans would likely be unwilling to forfeit these resources located in the middle of their
territory. Conversely, the LTTE would get an economic advantage of its own out of partitioning.
While Sri Lanka does not have any roads or rail lines connecting it to India, there is a major ferry
between Dhanushkodi, India and Mannar Island, Sri Lanka on Sri Lanka’s northwest coast.158
The ferry route serves as an entry and exit point for cargo bound for Sri Lankan railways and
roads. It is unlikely that the Sri Lankan government would willingly concede this location of
strategic and economic importance.

Finally, the formal separation of the Tamil and Sinhalese people could have a damaging impact
on the perceptions of future generations and breed future conflict due to the centuries-old
suspicion and tension between the two groups, and the distinct possibility of cultural isolation
between the two states. Additionally, any act of violence against either government would lead to
an increase in the tension between the two states and could spur citizens to call for a counter-
attack. The delicate balance of peace between the two states would be an easy target for
extremists from Sri Lanka and the LTTE, and could be used to further the extremists’ agendas.
By inciting a cycle of violence on a small yet ever growing level, the terrorists could set the new
states against each other in an armed conflict where both sides claim they are acting in self
defense, much like the current situation.

Given the inherent impracticality of implementing a partition plan for Sri Lanka and the
indisputable potential for future conflict and instability on the island we must recommend a
solution other than partitioning Sri Lanka along ethnic lines. Therefore, we propose two possible
solutions, each relying on a reintegrated government with protection and representation for all
who call Sri Lanka home. The two approaches differ primarily in the level of government they
impact. One solution focuses on a strong federal system, while the other focuses on community-
minded local governments to unite Sri Lanka’s ethnic groups.

Federalism
One solution towards resolving the conflict in Sri Lanka would be establishing a stronger
federalist government in the region. Although this federal government would have a centralized
authority centered on the president, it would be essential to have representation for many ethnic
and political minorities in the region to avoid further escalated conflict. One such way to
accomplish a more representative federal government is to change the parliamentary system from
a unicameral parliament to bicameral representation with smaller houses and less elected
officials. This would provide sufficient representation for the minorities in the area, most
156
United States Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook - Sri Lanka,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html
157
University of Texas at Austin: PCL Map Collection, Sri Lanka (Ethnic communities and religions, Population
density, Land use and economic activity) 1976
158
University of Texas at Austin: PCL Map Collection, Sri Lanka (Political) 2001,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/sri_lanka_pol01.jpg

35
importantly the Tamils, and limit some of the overriding power from the more influential
Sinhalese parties. This system would also guarantee more control for the president and prime
minister of Sri Lanka, much like the British parliamentary system.159

The two houses in the government would be elected in two different ways, similar to the houses
in the United States Congress. The lower house would have proportional representation for the
ethnic and political parties who are approved by a higher court in Sri Lanka. This house would
not be as influential in the overall governing of the state as the upper house, purely because there
are so many different minorities in the region, including the Muslims, who are currently heavily
involved in the domestic policies of the government. This house would allow all voices to be
heard and therefore attempt to satisfy the Tamils and other minority groups in the region. The
upper house would be larger and more influential in the country. The people in predetermined
congressional districts would elect this house. The districts would allow the more influential
minorities some positions in the larger house, but still allow a majority to make the decisions.

The executive branch of the government would also have more authority than the present
organization of the government allows. One problem with the current situation in Sri Lanka is
the inability of the executive branch to control or influence the legislative branch. Although the
president can dissolve the current parliament and call for new elections of the members, this does
little to affect the policy that the legislative branch is creating. By having a strong centralized
government, the minority as well as the executive branch can feel secure in the power of the
government. By creating this security, minorities, especially the Tamils, will have a more
prominent influence in the government and not feel alienated by the Sinhalese majority who
currently control most aspects of the government.

Especially with all the coalitions and private agreements in today’s Sri Lankan politics,
minorities are excluded from political decisions unless political alliances are made with more
powerful political parties. The stronger centralized government would create a more balanced
political spectrum.

This is not to say that federalism does not have problems as well as benefits. The likelihood of
the majority approving a government that includes its opposition as a more equal party is
currently unlikely. The United National Party currently has the most seats in the parliament, but
they do not have a majority. The likelihood that they would be willing to voluntarily forfeit their
seats in favor of an opposition who resorts to terrorist actions is highly unlikely. The majority of
the parliament is not in support of the President’s party. The majority party in the parliament is
against the peace talks and cooperation with the Tamil government, which is advocated by the
current President of Sri Lanka.

In order to maintain a strong executive branch of the government, it would be most beneficial to
implement a true British parliamentary system where the majority of the legislative branch
supports the prime minister. To insure that this occurs, the prime minister could not be a
member of a minority party, which might cause problems with the Tamils and the Muslims.

159
Rohan Edrisinha, ‘Federalism and the Case for Radical Constitutional Reform in Sri Lanka’, in K.M. de Silva
and G.H. Peiris, eds., Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka: Past Failures and Future Prospects (Kandy: ICES, 2000), pp.
175-78.

36
Thus, the prime minister should be elected by the parliament and be a member of the majority
party in the parliament; the president should be a member of the opposite ethnicity of the prime
minister. This still does not create a strong backing of the prime minister within the government,
but it would prevent any feelings that one ethnic group is being ignored by the government.

The majority of the population in Sri Lanka is Sinhalese and tends to be against the Tamils in the
northern and eastern regions of the island. Having elections on the national scale in the country
would also pose potential problems for the Tamils. Without gerrymandering the area to ensure
the Tamils got some representation on the national level, it would be difficult to have
representation of all or even some of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The gerrymandering would also
anger the Sinhalese majority in the country because they would have more control if measures
were not taken to ensure Tamil representation.

There is also still a large probability of corruption in the government, especially with having the
majority party in control of the more influential house and the executive branch. Discrimination
is still a real threat, especially to the Tamils who have experienced limitations of rights in recent
history. This could be a hindrance to further negotiations in the region and an eventual
reintegration of Tamils into the government.

Another major problem with the implementation of a strong federal government with
representation of minorities is the lack of bipartisan negotiations in Sri Lankan history. The two
main ethnic groups in Sri Lanka have no history of working well in the government, so there
might be resistance by both parties when they are expected to share the responsibility of running
the government.160

Local Governments
The political instability of Sri Lanka over the young nation’s history demands a complex and
unique answer, mixing different political theories together to suit Sri Lankan society. The multi-
ethnic and multi-religious nature of the nation creates a unique mix of political desires, motives
and voices. History shows that nations which have faced similar problems in the past have
attempted to solve the problems posed by ethnic conflict by creating a federation state. Some
nations have succeeded more than others, and the success of federalism as a model for political
progression must be reviewed on an individual basis.

Before implementing a federalist government in Sri Lanka, one must weigh the political and
social consequences on the indigenous people. Having examined federal experiments in nations
experiencing ethnic conflict throughout history, political analyst K.M. de Silva “would rather
advocate ‘innovative local government institutions’ because they ‘are likely to be a more
appropriate means of recognizing ethnic and religious diversity in areas like the Eastern Province
with its mixed population.’”161 This dispersion of power would take place within the current
constitutional organization of Sri Lanka and its provinces, allowing the northern Tamils to
participate in the political process within the current municipal and provincial systems. The

160
The Economist, “Asia: A Glimpse of Peace; Sri Lanka,” June 25, 2005, 74, http://proquest.umi.com.
161
K.M. de Silva, “The Federal Option and its Alternatives,” in de Silva and G.H. Peiris eds., Pursuit of Peace in Sri
Lanka, pp. 203-29

37
entire process of political integration of the Tamils would occur under the guidance of the
Norwegian government, due to Norway’s historical role as a mediator in the Sri Lankan ethnic
conflict.

This active political participation by the Tamils would start at the municipal level. Tamil
political leadership in their own municipalities would be beneficial in two ways. First, the
experience gained by Tamils on a municipal level would give them necessary knowledge and
skills to be a peaceful and effective force in provincial and national politics in the future. The
Tamil political leaders would be able to effectively administrate their own people in their cities
and towns. Second, Tamil representation in their own cities would give them a degree of
freedom and autonomy within a greater Sri Lankan state.

The next step in the process of Tamil political integration would occur at the provincial level.
Having gained legitimate political control of Tamil cities, the northern and eastern provinces
containing a Tamil majority would be administered by a coalition of Tamil representatives and
Sinhalese representatives. This coalition between the two ethnic groups in provincial
governments is necessary in order to prevent the full realization of Tamil self-determination and
Tamil Eelam. Similarly, by having the Tamils enter into coalition municipal governments with
other ethnic, political or religious groups, a degree of compromise and dialogue would be
fostered.

Moreover, the increased representation of the Tamils in provincial governments would help to
decrease the need for political extremism, including terrorist actions taken by the LTTE.
According to the Global Information Network, the LTTE, which now represents a majority of
Tamils, has worked to become a legitimate political and social force in Sri Lanka through a
number of varied institutions.162 The further legitimization of the LTTE on a national political
scale will lessen the need to resort to violence in order to achieve moderate Tamil goals.

While this solution is not the Tamil Eelam that the northern and eastern Tamil majority hoped
for, it is a step in the right direction. Given the current lack of Tamil representation in the
national government, a slow increase of representation from the municipal level to the provincial
level is an improvement. The Tamils might oppose the proposed solution because they already
have a high level of autonomy, but the possibility of creating their own nation, separate from the
current state of Sri Lanka, is very small.

Although the history of Sri Lankan independence is extremely bloody and marked by armed
disagreements between the government and the LTTE, President Kumaratunga has recently
demonstrated that she is willing to deal with the LTTE, especially in distribution of tsunami aid
money.163 Some Sinhalese factions, including the JVP and leading Buddhist monks, oppose any
concessions to the Tamils at all. Similarly, author Partha Ghosh believes “any ethnic
compromise with the Tamils may become difficult given the deep-seated distrust of the Buddhist

162
Marwaan Macan-Marker , “Politics-Sri Lanka: Tigers Forming a Shadow ‘Government’,” Global Information
Network Feb. 18, 2005, http://www.proquest.com.
163
Ethirajan Anbarasan, Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4628125.stm.

38
Sangha vis-à-vis Tamil extremism.”164 These extreme views do not offer any reasonable or
viable solutions to solving the current ethnic violence within the nation, and they are hindrances
to the progression towards peace.

By allowing the entrance of Tamil representatives into municipal and provincial governments,
the Sinhalese majority will include the ethnic Tamils in their nation’s politics, instead of forcing
the Tamils to advocate self-determination. This process of Tamil representation in provincial
coalition governments should take approximately five to eight years. During this time period, the
representatives of the minority will have the chance to distribute funds to the people in need
equitably, and develop Sri Lankan (not Sinhalese or Tamil) political and social infrastructure in
the areas of contention, the north and south. After Tamil integration at the municipal and
provincial levels, a true federalist system, uniting all ethnicities and political entities, can be
attempted. By this time, the LTTE will have evolved to become a strictly political group. The
Tamils will be able to have the adequate representation in the 225 member Parliament as
stipulated by local elections. Similarly, the constitution should be modified in order to create an
indirect election of the President, giving the Tamil minority proportional representation in
executive elections.

Recommendations
Having explored the options of partitioning Sri Lanka, an immediate federal solution, and
evolutionary local government integration, we have decided that the last option is the most
beneficial to the people of Sri Lanka and has the greatest chance for long-term success.
Therefore, we recommend the following:

• Integration of the Tamil people into government at the municipal level. Beginning
immediately, the Tamil people should create nationally recognized municipal
governments in order to govern and distribute tsunami aid on a local level. The creation
of these governments should ease the Tamils’ demand for regional autonomy and provide
the Tamils with a legitimate form of government to distribute aid and serve as a voice for
the people in the provincial governments. This process should also satisfy the Sri Lankan
government because of the relatively small immediate change and planned immediate
peace. The Tamils will form legitimate municipal governments and stay relatively
independent from Sri Lankan rule, but within the limits of the Sri Lankan constitution.
This precaution is necessary to prevent Sri Lankan aggression and to secure the
legitimacy of the new Tamil municipal governments. The funds acquired after the peace
agreement is fulfilled should be distributed proportionally among the municipal
governments and should be used to reinforce the local governments. This system will
operate until advanced integration at a later date when the governments have developed a
stable relationship and the peace is maintained. The Tamils can then be included in more
advanced levels of government.
• Norway should be asked to oversee the municipal, provincial, and national integration
because of its long standing as a mediator in the conflict. Norway is currently the
mediator of the peace agreement and a recognized player in the formation of peace.
164
Partha S. Ghosh, Ethnicity Versus Nationalism: The Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka. (New Delhi: Sage
Publications, 2003), 291.

39
Norway has a strong presence in Sri Lanka and is respected by both parties. Foreign
intervention is necessary to ensure that an agreement is carried out and fulfilled by both
parties and Norway is already dedicated to solving the conflict.
• Following peaceful Tamil integration and assimilation (approximately five years) into
government on the municipal level, integration should commence at the provincial level.
The Tamil people who comprise the majority of the population in the northern and
eastern provinces of the island must first be integrated into municipal governing bodies in
order to be efficient representatives on the provincial level. The Tamil politicians should
help organize coalition governments on the provincial level with proportional
representation of Tamil and Sinhalese leaders. These governing coalitions of the
provinces are necessary in order to restrain the Tamil people from seceding from Sri
Lanka in order to create their own nation, Tamil Eelam.
• Following peaceful Tamil integration and assimilation (approximately eight years) at the
provincial level, national political integration should begin with ongoing Norwegian
oversight. The Tamil people will then be incorporated into national politics, following
peaceful, successful and efficient administration in provincial coalition governments. The
Norwegian government should continue to guide and oversee the integration of Tamil
politicians at the national level, as they have done at the municipal and provincial level.
The national government would continue to operate as parliamentary system. The
integration should include equal representational rights for Tamils and Sinhalese. The
Tamil and Sinhalese people should have the right to join any political organization of
their choosing.

40
IX. Ensuring Long-Term Social Stability
When contemplating the future situation in Sri Lanka, one must consider the factors that
will influence the development of the nation and its recovery as a post-conflict state. By
planning the reconciliation, education, and economic development of Sri Lanka, we can
attempt to mitigate repercussions of the conflict. Reconciliation allows the people of Sri
Lanka to overcome the psychological effects of their ethnic conflict, while education
ensures the next generation will have a secure foundation to become responsible citizens.
Improving the economy will give Sri Lankans a sense of national identity and invoke
pride for their cooperative achievements. As international peacekeeping analyst
Amalendu Misra states, “External powers nursing old grievances or feelings…could
undermine the fledging peace process,”165 and therefore must be addressed. While it is
necessary to provide social programs for the people, it is also important that Sri Lanka
develops into a competitive trading partner in global markets. These factors will be
addressed as they are the most pressing and essential to a stable and peaceful Sri Lanka.
The recommendations that we propose will address these aspects of the social recovery in
Sri Lanka.

Reconciliation

Before Sri Lanka can fully develop as a stable and financially promising state in the
aftermath of its conflict, the people must reconcile and form a new national identity.
Misra explains that part of returnees’ “social and psychological insecurities damaged by
violence and brutality…could be addressed if the returnees’ physical and material
security is assured,” yet the state is not fully “consolidated until the returnees, civil
society, and the state form a constructive relationship.”166

Due to the tension caused by Sri Lanka’s conflict, the state would have difficulty uniting
in the aftermath. The psychological impact on the people, in addition to the strong ethnic
ties that they still feel, will impede reconstruction. The people of Sri Lanka have endured
polarization, terrorism, child soldiers, and warfare. According to a Médecins Sans
Frontières study, 10 percent of Sri Lankans have witnessed the death of their child, 48
percent have been separated from their family, and 24 percent have had a member of their
family attempt suicide.167 Because of their current divisions, there is little opportunity for
the Sinhalese and Tamil people to cooperate and develop a shared society. We present
solutions to create a society with the potential of being stable and prosperous in the
future.

165
Amalendu Misra, “Rain on a parched land: Reconstructing a post-conflict Sri Lanka,” International
Peacekeeping 11, no. 2 (2004): 274, http://www.proquest.com.
166
Misra, Rain on a parched land, 280.
167
Kaz de Jong, Maureen Mulhern, Nathan Ford, Isabel Simpson, et al, “Psychological trauma of the
civil war in Sri Lanka,” The Lancet 359, no. 9316 (2002): 2, http://www.proquest.com.

41
It is necessary that the people of Sri Lanka adopt a policy of “rehumanization… and
incorporate other people’s perceptions, to see the experience with their eyes.”168 They
must try to identify with their enemies and look at them through an unbiased perspective.
Only then can they begin to “rebuild emotional connectedness” and strive to lessen their
hostility.169 The Sri Lankan government can use education as a tool to gradually form
similar beliefs, as in Moroccan schools, which emphasized the common heritage of both
Arabs and Berbers to help smooth the path for a new identity.170 The media is also a way
to spread shared ideas of a new Sri Lankan identity, possibly through news stations or
even in cartoons for future generations to witness. Essentially, the message of Sinhalese
and Tamils existing peacefully together must be presented as feasible and as the most
beneficial way to live.

Besides education and financial incentives, the people must feel a strong connection to
their new identity of being a Sri Lankan, and modify their classification of being either a
Sinhalese or a Tamil to further develop coexistence. In the past, the groups existed
peacefully together in Sri Lanka for many years and DNA tests have shown that the two
ethnicities may come from the same area. It is therefore possible for the groups to
eventually coexist again. “The sense of community…has to grow from within,” for the
“reconstruction project will not take off until complete trust is established between the
parties.”171 One possible way of developing nationalism for the people is to celebrate Sri
Lanka’s Independence Day and other holidays of both the Sinhalese and Tamil people, as
is done in Lebanon by different religious groups to celebrate their multicultural society.

Most importantly, the government could support the equal treatment of Sri Lankans.
Community based programs, with an emphasis on psychological consequences of
violence, can help alleviate painful war memories and counsel Sri Lankans to learn to
understand each other. According to Jong, et al., activities, including “increasing
awareness, community strengthening, and reinforcing coping-strategies, can help people
find positive solutions to their difficulties.”172

Finding the will to forgive would allow Sri Lankans to succeed past their ethnic conflict
and the ramifications of the conflict on their nation’s stability. Future disagreements
would only result if current tensions and divisions continue. The people of Sri Lanka can
escape continual clashes by trying cooperation and addressing effects of the ethnic
conflict.

Education

In order to create a new generation of responsible, informed, successful Sri Lankans, the
Sri Lankan government needs to modify and expand its current education system.

168
Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein, “Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation,”
Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2004): 3, http://www.wwwproquest.com.
169
Halpern “Rehumanizing the Other,” 3.
170
Daniel L. Byman, Keeping the Peace (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 122.
171
Misra, “Rain on a Parched Land,” 285
172
Jong, Mulhern, Ford, Simpson, et al, Psychological trauma of the civil war in Sri Lanka, 3

42
Although the 1997 adult literacy rate was 92 percent, a figure near those of most
industrialized nations, the functional literacy of both the Sinhalese and the Tamils is
severely lacking. Since the Central Bank calculates this figure by considering a literate
person one who can read and write a simple sentence, it is clearly misleading.173 The Sri
Lankan government created General Education Reforms to promote functional literacy
after realizing the difficulties of a population with poor literacy. However, the language
currently promoted by the government of Sri Lanka is Sinhalese. The programs initiated
by the Sri Lankan government are encouraging literacy in only the Sinhalese language.

We propose to use language, a former boundary between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, as
a uniting factor for the Sri Lankan people. Because English is the language of commerce,
it is important that all Sri Lankans possess functional literacy in their native language and
also in English.174 In addition to aiding Sri Lankans in the private sector of business,
learning English would also grant the Tamil people access to areas such as politics and
education, which are currently restricted to the Sinhalese alone. While the education
system would be run on a system of local autonomy, the core curriculum would be
nationally written and in English. The textbooks in the primary schools would involve
dual languages, English and either Sinhalese or Tamil, but by the secondary level of
education all texts would be written entirely in English. By teaching English nationally,
children from all economic levels would be given an equal opportunity for advancement
and competition for the myriad jobs requiring literacy in the English language.175 In order
for all children to receive the benefits of education, school attendance would no longer be
voluntary but would become mandatory for all children under the age of fourteen.

The current education system of Sri Lanka does not use examinations to assess the
quality of education. While this method of evaluation allows the focus of education to be
on the individual child,176 national examinations would allow the basic knowledge of Sri
Lankan students to be assessed. These examinations would include a literacy test in
English and either Sinhalese or Tamil in addition to a math test on basic algebra and a
geography test on world states. The years to administer the tests would be decided by the
Sri Lankan government and the passing of the exams would be required for advancement
within the school system. The Sri Lankan government would be able to use the
examinations as a way to unify its citizens with their common value of education. The
exams would invoke a healthy sense of competition between students for academic
reasons rather than the current ethnic causes. The exams would also enable the students
to be promoted on a basis of merit instead of ethnicity.

173
Pradeepa Wijetunge, “The role of public libraries in the expansion of literacy and lifelong learning in Sri
Lanka,” New Library World 101, no.1155 (2000): 104, http://www.proquest.com.
174
Bruce Matthews, “University education in Sri Lanka in context: Consequences of deteriorating
standards,” Pacific Affairs 68, no.1 (1995): 77, http://www.proquest.com.
175
Siddharth Dube, “The prospect of peace,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 41, no.33 (1995): A65-7,
http://www.proquest.com.
176
Seth Spaulding, “Changing Schools from Within: A Management Intervention for Improving School
Functioning in Sri Lanka,” Comparative Education Review 45, no. 2 (2001): 280,
http://infotrac.galegroup.com

43
One method to increase functional literacy is creating a system of rural public libraries. A
vital component of the new libraries would be literature, written in English, teaching a
combination of Sinhalese and Tamil folklore. Written by Sri Lankans for the children of
Sri Lanka, the folk tales would emphasize the common history of both peoples that dates
back to before either migrated from India. Such children’s books would emphasize
“national identity [as] a means of promoting the idea that despite what separates [the
Sinhalese from the Tamils] there is much more that unites [them as Sri Lankans].177
Books that unify Sri Lankan folklore would complement the project currently in place by
the United Nations Children’s Fund. The project focuses on booklets telling current tales
of people crossing ethnic and religious boundaries in order to aid one another in a time of
crisis. Sybil Wettesinghe, the author of the booklets, describes the project by stating that
“through a well-told tale, with interesting and easily identifiable characters and colorful
illustrations, any message can be got across to a child.”178 Common folklore would
communicate a message of compassion and cooperation to the children of Sri Lanka and
would create a future absent of ethnic conflict.

Libraries would also serve as a way for printed information to become available in
regions where access to electronic resources is rare or entirely unavailable. In addition to
being more physically accessible than electronic resources, libraries would allow the
general populace, not just those in the higher economic levels, to have access to relatively
expensive books. Programs in rural libraries would serve as a way to promote literacy
and would also provide communities with a Selective Dissemination of Information
(SDI), a program in which libraries work with their surrounding neighborhoods to invest
in resources that would cater to the people’s needs. SDI serves as a way of fueling “the
lifelong learning of the community.” Author Pradeepa Wijetunge gives the example that
“in a region where brass industry is common, the public library can provide useful
information in SDI form. . . [such as] newspaper cuttings, trade opportunities, product
designs, market survey information, insurance and safety measures.”179 In addition to
providing written information, the libraries of Sri Lanka, in conjunction with the public
schools around which they would be built, would be a part of the growing organization
Schools Online. Founded in 2001 by Kamran Elahian, Schools Online is a nonprofit
agency which sets up Internet Learning Centers, each of which contains the electronic
equipment necessary to introduce people of all ages to the world of technology. Elahian
states that the most valuable part of her organization is its ability to “allow students to
communicate and learn from each other. They learn the value of knowledge, tolerance,
and cooperation. This new outlook will change the future."180

Another issue to be addressed is the source of the instructors of these new academic
institutions. According to Albert Aime, senior education planner at the World Bank, “Sri
Lanka has more teachers than needed, despite shortages in poor areas. However, a large
177
Meni Kanatsouli and Theodora Tzoka, “Embracing Multiculturalism through Understanding
‘Greekness’,” Bookbird 43, no.2 (2005): 38, http://www.proquest.com.
178
Vijita Fernando, “Arming children with peace education in Sri Lanka,” India in New York 3, no. 4
(1999) : 33, http://www.proquest.com.
179
Wijetunge, “The role of public libraries,” 104.
180
Diane Mailey, “Project Brings Internet to Schools in So. Asia,” India West 26, no.2 (2000): B18,
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=495884841&sid=8&Fmt=3&clientId=

44
number are untrained, or often inadequately trained on outdated programs.”181 Because
the Sri Lankan government did not end its ban on English education until 1998, there are
several generations of university graduates who are not proficient in English. According
to Mr. Lakshman, the leader of the drive to reinstate English into the Sri Lankan
education system, “it will take years before the country has enough qualified teachers to
expand English-language instruction to all high-school students and to universities.”182
Because of the imminent need of English teachers and the lack of English-fluent
university graduates, several thousands of teachers would need to be supplied through the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Peace Corps. The English
teachers brought in to Sri Lanka would work alongside the native teachers, thus both
instructing the next generation of Sri Lankans and training the current educators.
Additional English-teaching volunteers would be needed to hold night classes for the Sri
Lankan population not yet functionally literate in English. The classes would take place
in the newly built libraries and be open to the general public. The Sri Lankan government
would give businesses incentives to have their employees participate in English classes
and the employees themselves would be given advancement opportunities upon
completion of such courses and the passing of an English fluency examination. The
funding for such a system would come from NGOs in addition to the World Bank, which
pledged $64.1 million credit to Sri Lanka in 1996 but has not yet fulfilled this promise.183
Even if outside funds for incentives were lacking, it would still be beneficial to the
businesses themselves to fund such an endeavor. By having English-literate employees,
Sri Lankan corporations would have an advantage in the global community where
English is the primary languages of commerce.

At the university level, several reforms need to occur in order to create equal
opportunities for enrollment and advancement. Scholarships should be made available to
low-income students, the funding of which would come from international aid. College
classes would be conducted primarily in English but fluency in English would not be a
requirement for admission. The universities would be required to provide English classes
for those students not yet fluent. One of the obstructions to joint university education of
Tamils and Sinhalese is the “standardization” formula invoked by the Sinhalese
government in 1973 which limited the enrollment of Tamils into universities by requiring
them to score higher on entrance examinations.184 Mr. Uyangoda, a professor of political
science at the University of Colombo, states that “one way to resolve the conflict is to
enable Tamil and Sinhalese to study together.”185 Classes would provide an open
environment in which the different ethnicities could learn to peacefully interact through
discussion and shared experiences.

181
“World Bank Aids Lanka Teacher Training,” India Abroad 26, no.42 (1996): 28,
http://www.proquest.com.
182
Marion Lloyd, “Ban on English-language teaching haunts college students in Sri Lanka,” The Chronicle
of Higher Education 45, no.6 (1998) : A51, http://www.proquest.com.
183
“World Bank,” 28.
184
Siddharth Dube, “Higher education a key issue in armed conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri
Lanka,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 41, no. 33 (1995): A66, http://www.proquest.com.
185
Lloyd, “Ban on English-language,” A50

45
In the non-arable soil of the Tamil territory, education is the mark of high society and
thus is highly valued. One Tamil academic (who requested anonymity) commented that
due to “the Jaffna Tamil's worship of education. . . . the guerrilla fighters seem perfectly
quiet during examination periods."186 The Tamils demonstrated their commitment to
education by ceasing terrorist activities in response to the academic schedule. Likewise,
the importance of education in the Sinhalese culture is evident through the fact that the
government of Sri Lanka has continued its support of the University of Jaffna despite the
fact that the institution is run and attended strictly by Tamils.187 The common devotion of
the Sinhalese and the Tamils to quality education can be utilized as a uniting force
against ethnic conflict.

Economic Development

In order to stabilize the economy, bring about economic cooperation, and ensure that
ethnic violence does not again erupt, we offer two proposals. The first proposal is the
establishment of a national apparel or clothing brand because Sri Lanka’s top exports are
apparel and textiles. Similar to the manner in which Samsung was established in South
Korea as a competitive, nationally produced product, this project would be a national
endeavor and the work force would be composed mainly of Sri Lankans. This would also
allow the Sri Lankan economy, or at least this particular industry, to gain strength in the
global market. Since this is also a national endeavor, it will also create new jobs for the
Sri Lankan people. Open employment practices would be beneficial in this business and
English will be used to promote global involvement and foster unity. These two factors
would allow the firm to employ both the Tamil and Sinhalese people. Since this will tie
the economic futures of the two people together it will decrease the likelihood of future
conflict. As some scholars have proposed,

In order to gain a competitive edge during the process of internationalization or


globalization, firms have attempted to develop their brands on a global scale. The
benefits of developing such brands include high quality and prestige perceived by
local customers, ease in attracting potential employees and partners overseas along
with cross-border learning and cultural benefits, all of which result in cost
efficiencies of marketing strategies and facilitate international market entries.188

In this case the reasoning will be different than that described by the scholars. Instead of
the company creating an industry based on a single nation to better its own status in the
global economy, the goal of this industry would be to benefit the overall economy of the
country as well as end the ethnic conflict. The stabilization of the economy and its status
as a competitor on the global market would prevent future ethnic conflict. Economically

186
Dube, “Higher education,” A66.
187
Dube, “Higher education,” A66.
188
Cheng, Julian Ming-Sung and others. “A Stage Model of International Brand Development: The
perspectives of manufacturers from two newly industrialized economies” South Korea and Taiwan
Industrial Marketing Management, Volume 34, Issue 5 , July 2005, Pages 504-514.
http://www.proquest.com

46
there would be too much at stake for either group to risk any violent action against the
other, and thus the children would grow without conflict, allowing the new generations to
be free from tensions.

The other idea that we propose is the creation of a free-trade port in the north in the
Jaffna peninsula region. This would be beneficial, as it would capitalize on Sri Lanka’s
location, which according to the CIA World Factbook has a “strategic location near major
Indian Ocean sea lanes.”189 By creating a port where countries can place goods to be
transported elsewhere, free of duties, numerous jobs will be created in the northern
region. Thus the Tamil region will have a stable industry that will provide economic
stability for the poverty-stricken north. After the peace settlements, Sri Lanka would
receive an additional $4.5 billion dollars of aid. This would be beneficial; as one analyst
states, “the financial stakes are high. Sri Lanka has been promised about $3 billion in
tsunami relief, on top of $4.5 billion promised in reconstruction help to follow a peace
settlement.”190 A larger portion of this aid should be given to the north. Although this
seems controversial the government has already acknowledged that the north is lacking in
infrastructure and needs rebuilding. The government stated in a 2003 letter of intent to
the IMF that

The challenges arising in securing lasting peace are two-fold—immediately, the


relief, rehabilitation, and reconciliation (RRR) process will need to be advanced,
while in the medium-term, the destroyed infrastructure and institutions in the North
and the East have to be reconstructed and the regions reintegrated to the rest of the
country. Significant resources will be needed to meet these challenges.191

We call upon the Sri Lankan government to uphold and advance this and other economic
programs discussed in this letter. This aid will allow for the construction of
transportation, communication, various other infrastructure, and the proposed port
regions in the north. Thus the port already has the potential funds necessary for
construction. After construction the economy will prosper more and the region will
become a viable location for foreign investment. One other aspect of the economy that
must be addressed further is privatization of the economy.

Prior to 2003, the government of Sri Lanka requested aid from the IMF. In doing so they
wrote a letter of intent to the IMF which outlined the economic intentions of the
government through the year 2006. The government claims some privatization, but in
order to have a successful and stable economy it needs to have complete privatization of
industry. In the letter the government states

189
CIA online, “The World Fact Book”, Sri Lanka,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html
190
“Asia: A glimpse of peace; Sri Lanka,” The Economist, June 25, 2005, 74, http://www.proquest.com
191
Government of Sri Lanka, Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and
Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 2003 (Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2003),
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2003/lka/01/index.htm

47
The electricity reform bill was enacted in December 2002 to pave the way for
restructuring the state electricity monopoly (CEB). The restructuring of the Ceylon
Petroleum Corporation (CPC) is progressing in step with the liberalization of the
petroleum sector. Twelve percent shares of Sri Lanka Telecom (SLT) were sold
through an IPO in December 2002, and the privatization of the bus companies is
expected to be finalized in March 2003.192

In order to obtain peace, these claims must be followed through and the economy must be
privatized. This is also essential for foreign investment in the country once the peace
process has stabilized the region. People in the north of Sri Lanka will benefit from the
addition of the shipping industry, while privatization will allow for the stabilization of
this region on all accounts. As a scholar points out, “however, in terms of human capital
it stands out from all other war-ravaged societies. Tamils happen to be one of the most
industrious communities.”193 Through the inclusion in the economy and the addition of
new industries the Tamils will rise from poverty and be integrated into a successful
society with the Sinhalese.

For the peace process to continue and for there to be a lasting peace in Sri Lanka, a stable
economy free of discrimination is necessary. The following recommendations would
create a positive economic status for Sri Lanka. These recommendations must be
instituted after the peace process has allowed for a peaceful settlement between the
Tamils and the Sinhalese.

Recommendations:

• Create a single, Sri-Lankan national identity that presides over ethnic


identification. Celebrate that Sri Lankan national identity and multiculturalism.
• Direct programs toward alleviating psychological problems.
• While the education system should be run on a system of local autonomy, the core
curriculum should be nationally written and in English. The textbooks in the
primary schools should involve dual languages, English and either Sinhalese or
Tamil, but by the secondary level of education all texts should be written entirely
in English. School attendance should no longer be voluntary but would become
mandatory for all children under the age of fourteen. National examinations
should be implemented to assess the level of basic knowledge of Sri Lankan
students. Several thousand teachers need to be supplied through the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Peace Corps. The English
teachers brought in to Sri Lanka should work alongside the native teachers, thus
both instructing the next generation of Sri Lankans and training the current
educators. Scholarships should be made available to low-income students, the
funding of which would come from international aid.

192
Government of Sri Lanka, Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and
Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 2003 (Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2003),
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2003/lka/01/index.htm
193
Amalendu Misra, "Rain on a parched land: Reconstructing a post-conflict Sri Lanka," International
Peacekeeping 11, no. 2 (2004): 285, , http://www.proquest.com

48
• It is necessary for the Sri Lankan government to give businesses incentives to
have their employees participate in English classes and the employees themselves
should be given advancement opportunities upon completion of such courses and
the passing of an English fluency examination.
• Rural public libraries should be built to bring literacy to remote areas. Folk tales
should be written to build a common Sri Lankan identity. A Selective
Dissemination of Information (SDI) program should be used in libraries to work
with surrounding neighborhoods to invest in resources that would cater to the
people’s needs.
• Institute an economic policy that will prevent discrimination of any ethnic group
specifically through the use of the English language in major businesses.
• Ensure investment into the economy on a long-term basis by the IMF and World
Bank.
• Create a national apparel brand in Sri Lanka, which will be a competitive
company in the global market. The creation of a free trade shipping zone in the
northern region of Sri Lanka, potentially the Jaffna peninsula, is essential. Create
free Trade agreements between Sri Lanka and developed countries, in particular
the U.S. and the EU. The free trade zone would be government property with
private organizations bidding for contracts in the port.
• Privatize the entire Sri Lankan economy and the ensure the availability of IPOs
from the major Sri Lankan industries, in particular the new international apparel
company. The major industries in Sri Lanka, especially the new apparel industry
must be open to foreign investment as well.
• Ensure reconstruction and rebuilding of the infrastructure in the northern and
eastern regions and the construction of a major port on the Jaffna peninsula.
Create improved telecommunications and transportation especially in the
traditionally underdeveloped Tamil regions in the north and east.

49
X. Bibliography
I.
De Silva, Chandra Richard. Sri Lanka: A History New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House
PVT LTD.

De Silva, K.M. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981.

Geiger, William. Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz,


1960.

Hennayake, Shantha K. “The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka.” Asian Survey
29, no. 4 (1989)

Kearny, Robert N. “Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka.”
Asian Survey 25, no. 9 (1985)

Kemper, Steven. The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics, and Culture in Sinhala
Life Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press

Little, David. Sri Lanka The Invention of Enmity. Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 1994.

Mills, Lennox A. Ceylon Under British Rule: 1795-1932. London: Charles Birchall &
Sons, 1933.

MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. Sri Lanka: 1999 Overview.


http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=CE&year=1999.

MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. Sri Lanka: 2001 Overview.


http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=CE&year=2001.

Moore, Molly. “Suicide Bomber Kills Leader of Sri Lanka; President Slain During May
Day Celebration in Island Nation.” Washington Post, May 2, 1993, sec. A.

Nicholas, C. W. A Concise History of Ceylon. Colombo: Ceylon University Press, 1961.

Nyrop, Richard F. et al. Area Handbook for Sri Lanka. Washington, DC: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1971

Pakeman, S. A. Ceylon. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.


http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sri_lanka/lk_bibl.html.

Ross, Russell R. ed. Sri Lanka: A Country Study. Washington DC: Federal Research

50
Division, Library of Congress, 1990. http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.lk.

Singer, Marshall R. “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: Have Bombs Shattered Hopes for
Peace?” Asian Survey 36, no. 11 (1996): 1146-1155.

Spencer, Jonathon. Sri Lanka: History and Roots of Conflict, New York: Routledge 1990.

Zeylanicus. Ceylon between Orient and Occident. Great Britain: Elek Books Limited,
1970.

II.

Agence France-Presse, “Norwegian Envoy to Push for Sri Lankan Peace Negotiations.”
February 22, 2005.
http://iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/02/21/news/srilanka.html.

Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka: Covering Events from January-December 2004,”


http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/lka-summary-eng, accessed July 28, 2005

Anbarasan, Ethirajan. “Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid.” British


Broadcasting Corporation, June 27, 2005.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//1/hi/world/south_asia/4628125.stm.

British Broadcasting Corporation, “Full Text: Tamil Tiger Proposals.” January 1, 2003.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/3232913.stm.

British Broadcasting Corporation, “Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid.” June 27, 2005.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4626551.stm.

British Broadcasting Corporation, “President Vows Sri Lanka Aid Deal.” May 4, 2005.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4511765.stm.

British Broadcasting Corporation, “Text of Sri Lanka Truce Deal,” February 22, 2003.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1836198.stm.

British Broadcasting Corporation, “Sri Lanka Ruling Coalition Splits.” June 16, 2005.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4080564.

British Broadcasting Corporation, “Sri Lankan President Criticizes Marxist Coalition


Allies.” June 12, 2005. http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=ae2334a71c8e5f9e1d6b2427f477105f&_docn
um=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVA&_md5=952fb4f07890ccb8b8077551ac883998.

ColomboPage: Sri Lankan Internet Newspaper, “Sri Lankan Marxists’ Ultimatum Ends
Midnight Today.” June 15, 2005.
http://www.colombopage.com/archive/June1524925UN.html.

51
Gardner, Simon. “Aid Pact May Help Sri Lanka Peace, but Pitfalls Remain.” Reuters,
June 27, 2005. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SP71606.htm.

Ghosh, Partha S. Ethnicity Versus Nationalism: The Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka.
New Delhi: Sage Publications Inc., 2003.

Human Rights Watch, “Sri Lanka: Killings Highlight Weaknesses in Ceasefire.”


February 11, 2005. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/11/slanka10162.htm.

The Press Trust of India. “Marxists Quit Sri Lanka Government.” June 15, 2005.
http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=449fc4f91fa7bb46b5e5c20637c69a51&_docn
um=2&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=ebab904cb5c091acaba262497012f907.

Ratnatunga, Sinha. “Chandrika: Relief Deal Does Not Pose Threat to Security.” Global
News Wire- Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, June 13, 2005. http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=0ef8d03ae47ac7c8ba21c9da68f27ef1&_docnu
m=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=c35b95f26c1c919cbfdb5d712d486278.

Ratnatunga, Sinha. “Chief Minister of Sri Lankan Province Resigns.” Global News Wire-
Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, June 21, 2005. http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=e1a12e707cddeab2e0c8066fef53ea33&_docn
um=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=6499dc5c2699ba1e164ef3a563651340.

Sabaratnam, Lakshmanan. Ethnic Attachments in Sri Lanka: Social Change and Cultural
Continuity. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

III.
Abeysekera, Mendaka. “China Donates 270 Tons of Canned Fish to Sri Lanka.” Asian
Tribune, June 30, 2005. http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.
php?id=14916”.

Anbarasan, Ethirajan. “Muslim Anger Over Sri Lanka Deal.” BBC Tamil Service, May 1,
2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/412100.stm.

Anbarasan, Ethirajan. “Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid.” BBC Tamil
Service, June 27, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4628125.stm.

Asian News, “Sri Lanka: A Motion Against the Government – Tamil Agreement for Post-
Tsunami Aid,” June 27, 2005. http://www.asiannews.it/view.php?
l=en&art=3596.

Barker, Kim. “Rebel Group Uses Its Discipline, Organization to Help Tsunami Victims.”
Chicago Tribune, January 7, 2005. http://www.proquest.com.

52
BBC News, “Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid,” June 27, 2005. http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4626551.stm.

BBC News, “Sri Lanka Split ‘Not a Disaster,’” June 16, 2005. http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4100974.stm.

BBC News, “Sri Lanka Tsunami Aid Deal Signed,” June 24, 2005. http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4617917.stm.

BBC News South Asia, “Tamil Rebels in Tsunami Aid Talks,” June 22, 2005.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/.

CNN, “Sri Lanka Government Nears Collapse.” June 16, 2005. http://www.cnn.com
/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/06/16/srilanka.government/index.html.

The Economist, “Asia: A Glimpse of Peace; Sri Lanka,” June 25, 2005.
http://www.proquest.com.

Fang, Bay. “Keeping A War On Hold? A Rare Visit to Rebel Tamil Tigers Territory in
Sri Lanka Following the Tsunami’s Carnage.” U.S. News & World Report,
January 24, 2005, 24. http://www.proquest.com.

Government of Sri Lanka. “Sri Lanka: Tsunami Aid Deal Between Govt. and LTTE
Sign.” June 24, 2005. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw
/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-6DNHUA?OpenDocument.

Kyodo News, “Annan Welcomes Sri Lanka's Tsunami Aid Management Accord.”
June 25, 2005. http://asia.news.yahoo.com/050624/kyodo/d8au5kdo2.html.

Lancaster, John. “Tamil Tiger Guerrillas Directing Aid Efforts.” Washington Post
Foreign Service, January 4, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A45028-2005Jan3.html.

Macan-Markar, Marwaan. “Tsunami Impact: Tamils Building Cool Shelters to Replace


Hot Tents.” Global Information Network, February 16, 2005.
http://www.proquest.com.

Offenheiser, Raymond C. Interview by Chris Hufstader. Oxfam America.


http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/emergencies/asian_floods_2004/latest_n
ews/tsunami_analysis. March 29, 2005.

PTI news agency, New Delhi, “India Supports Tsunami Aid to Victims in Sri Lanka,”
June 24, 2005. http://news.monstersandcritics.com/mediamonitor/article_
1021581.php/India_supports_tsunami_aid_to_victims_in_Sri_Lanka.

53
Ramasamy, P. “The Tamil National Question.” Tamil Canadian Services, June 30, 2005.
http://www.tamilcanadian.com/pageview.php?ID=3360&SID=40.

Sify News, “Japan Gives $100 mn in Aid to Lanka,” June 08, 2005.
http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=13867313.

Sri Lanka Source, “Sri Lanka Aid Deal with Rebels,” June 25, 2005.
http://story.srilankasource.com/p.x/ct/9/id/4e194e1d04f84f6d/cid/119937e494dd6
63e.

Tjota, Melissa. “Sri Lanka and the Fight for Peace.” The Harvard International Review
(June 26, 2005). http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1306.

IV.
Bell, Stewart. “Terrorists behind Tamil fundraising group, RCMP says: Seeking charity
status: ‘Front’ controlled by Tamil tigers, expert testified in 1999.” National Post,
January 19, 2005. http://www.lexisnexis.com.

Bonner, Raymond. “Tamil Guerrillas in Sri Lanka: Deadly and Armed to the Teeth; A
WORLD OF ARMS: The Colombo Connection.” New York Times, March 7,
1998. http://www.proquest.com.

Gunaratna, Rohan. “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil
Insurgency.” International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism.
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=57.

National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. “Patterns of Global


Terrorism: Sri Lanka: 1999 Overview.” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.
http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=CE&year=1999.

National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Terrorist Group Profile:
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3623.

Rotberg, Robert I. “Sri Lanka’s Civil War: From Mayhem toward Diplomatic
Resolution.”In Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 1-
16.Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

Smith, Chris. “South Asia’s Enduring War.” In Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, ed. Robert
I. Rotberg, 17-40. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).”


http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM.

54
Waldan, Amy. “Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka.” New York
Times, January 14, 2003. http://www.proquest.com.

V.
Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: Tamil Tigers beating up families to recruit child
soldiers, Amnesty International,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA370022004?open

Asian Tribune, “LTTE returning to old practice of abducting children from Hindu
temples,” http://www.asiantribune.comj/show_news.php?id=14744.

Becker, Jo. “Child Soldiers: Changing a Culture of Violence.” Human Rights Chicago,
Winter 2005. http://www.proquest.com.

Brett, Rachel, “Girl Soldiers: Challenging the Assumptions,”


http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/Girl_Soldiers.doc.pdf

BBC News, “Tamil Tigers ‘drafting children,’” January 13, 2005.


http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4171251.stm

Chhaya, Mayank, “Biggest Victims Are Children; A journalist grieves for orphaned
children, focus on psychological trauma,” News-India Times, Jan, 14, 2005, http://
www.proquest.com.

Gunartna, Rohan, “LTTE Child Combatants”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1998
quoted on Operation S.I.C.K,
http://www.operationsick.com/reports/20011025_lttechildcombatantsinsrilanka.ht
ml

Harrison, Frances. “Hope for Sri Lanka’s Child Soldiers.” BBC News, October 1, 2002.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2289944.stm

Human Rights Watch, Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka,
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/srilanka1104/srilanka1104.pdf.

“Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami Disaster,” http://www.idpproject.org/tsunami.htm.

Keairns, Yvonne E, “The Voices of Girl Child Soldiers,” Quaker United Nations. 2002.
http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/QUNO%20Child%20soldiers%20report.pdf.

Los Angeles Times, “Rebels Recruiting Children, U.N. Says,” January 15, 2005.
http://www.proquest.com.

The New York Times, “Sri Lanka Rebels Said to Recruit More Children.” January 23,
2004. http://www.proquest.com.

55
Somasundaram, Daya, “Child soldiers: Understanding the context.”
http//bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/324/7348/1268.

UNICEF, “At a Glance: Sri Lanka.” www.unicef.org/infobycountry/srilanka_901.html .

UNICEF, “Call to increased action for Sri Lanka’s war affected children.”
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_19036.html.

UNICEF, “Close to 150 soldiers released by the LTTE”


http://www.unicef.org/media/media_20399.html.

Waldman, Amy, “Sri Lanka Young Still Forced To Join in Endless Rebellion,” The New
York Times, January 6, 2003, sec. A.

Wijedasa, Namini. “Saving Child Soldiers.” The Toronto Star, March 21, 2005.
www.proquest.com.

VI.
BBC News. “Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid.”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4626551.stm

BBC News. “Full Text: Tamil Tiger Proposals.”


http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3232913.stm

BBC News. “Sri Lanka’s growth turns upwards.”


http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4636981.stm.

de Silva, K.M. and G.H. Peiris, eds. Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka: Past Failures and
Future Prospects. Kandy: ICES, 2000

The Economist. “Asia: A Glimpse of Peace; Sri Lanka.” June 25, 2005.
http://proquest.umi.com.

Ghosh, Partha S. Ethnicity Versus Nationalism: The Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka.
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003.

Jayasuriya, Dr. D. “An appeal to all Sri Lankans who are committed to defending the
territorial integrity of the Nation: The time is right to unite and put the interest of
the country first.” Society for Peace, Unity and Human Rights in Sri Lanka
(SPUR). http://www.spur.asn.au/SPUR_20050624_Joint_Appeal.htm.

Macan-Marker, Marwaan. “Politics-Sri Lanka: Tigers Forming a Shadow


‘Government.’” Global Information Network. Feb. 18, 2005.
http://www.proquest.com.

56
Permuna, Janatha Vimukthi. “Chandrika - Piribaharan agreement is as worst as the
betrayal of Ranil - Piribaharan agreement!” People’s Liberation Front (JVP).
http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/pb_release/pb_release_24062005_eng.htm.

Samarasinghe, Stanley. “Can Donors Broker Peace in Sri Lanka?” Far Eastern Economic
Review 168. no.2 (2005)

United States Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook - Sri Lanka.”
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html.

University of Texas at Austin: PCL Map Collection. “Sri Lanka (Ethnic communities and
religions, Population density, Land use and economic activity) 1976.”
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/sri_lanka_charts_76.jpg.

University of Texas at Austin: PCL Map Collection. “Sri Lanka (Political) 2001.”
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/sri_lanka_pol01.jpg.

VII.
Byman, Daniel L. Keeping the Peace. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.

Cheng, Julian Ming-Sung, Charles Blankson, Paul C.S. Wu and Somy S.M. Chen. “A
Stage Model of International Brand Development: The perspectives of
manufacturers from two newly industrialized economies—South Korea and
Taiwan.” Industrial Marketing Management 34, no. 5 ( 2005): 504-14.
http://www.proquest.com.

Dube, Siddharth. “Higher education a key issue in armed conflict between Sinhalese and
Tamils in Sri Lanka.” The Chronicle of Higher Education 41, no. 33 (1995): A66.
http://www.proquest.com.

Dube, Siddharth. “The prospect of peace.” The Chronicle of Higher Education 41, no.33
(1995): A65-7. http://www.proquest.com.

The Economist. “Asia: A Glimpse of Peace; Sri Lanka.” June 25, 2005.
http://proquest.umi.com.

Fernando, Vijita. “Arming children with peace education in Sri Lanka.” India in New
York 3, no. 4 (1999): 33. http://www.proquest.com.

Government of Sri Lanka. Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial


Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 2003 (Colombo, Sri
Lanka, 2003). http://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2003/lka/01/index.htm.

57
Halpern, Jodi and Harvey M. Weinstein. “Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and
Reconciliation.” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2004).
http://www.www.proquest.com.

Jong, Kaz de, Maureen Mulhern, Nathan Ford, Isabel Simpson, et al, “Psychological
trauma of the civil war in Sri Lanka.” The Lancet 359, no. 9316 (2002).
http://www.proquest.com.

Kanatsouli, Meni and Theodora Tzoka. “Embracing Multiculturalism through


Understanding ‘Greekness.’” Bookbird 43, no.2 (2005): 30-38.
http://www.proquest.com.

Lloyd, Fernando. “New Action Plan on the Cards to Improve the Lot of Children.” News
India 22, no. 21 (1992): 22. http://www.proquest.com.

Lloyd, Marion. “Ban on English-language teaching haunts college students in Sri Lanka.”
The Chronicle of Higher Education 45, no. 6 (1998) : A49-51.
http://www.proquest.com.

Mailey, Diane. “Project Brings Internet to Schools in So. Asia.” India West 26, no. 2
(2000): B18. http://www.proquest.com.

Misra, Amalendu. "Rain on a parched land: Reconstructing a post-conflict Sri Lanka."


International Peacekeeping 11, no. 2 (2004): 285. http://www.proquest.com.

Samarasinghe, Stanley. “Can Donors Broker Peace in Sri Lanka?” Far Eastern
Economic Review 168, no. 2 (2005): 38. http://www.proquest.com.

Senanayake, Primalla. “Safe motherhood: A success story in Sri Lanka.” World Health
51, no.1 (1998): 28-30. http://www.proquest.com.

Spaulding, Seth. “Changing Schools from Within: A Management Intervention for


Improving School Functioning in Sri Lanka.” Comparative Education Review
45, no. 2 (2001): 280. http://infotrac.galegroup.com.

Tagge, Anne. “Steeped in Jane Austen on a Sri Lankan Mountaintop.” The Chronicle of
Higher Education 48, no. 12 (2001): B.5. http://www.proquest.com.

United States Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook - Sri Lanka.”
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html.

Wijetunge, Pradeepa. “The role of public libraries in the expansion of literacy and
lifelong learning in Sri Lanka.” New Library World 101, no.1155 (2000): 104.
http://www.proquest.com.

58
Wijetunge, Pradeepa and Jonathon Willson. “A descriptive survey of library and
information science education personnel in Sri Lanka.” Asian Libraries 7, no. 11
(1998): 315-23. http://www.proquest.com.

India Abroad. “World Bank Aids Lanka Teacher Training.” vol. 26, no. 42 (1996): 28.
http://www.proquest.com.

VIII.
Anbarasan, Ethirajan. “Sri Lanka Leader Gambles on Tsunami Aid.” BBC Tamil
Service, June 27, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4628125.stm.

BBC News, “Muslims Strike Over Sri Lanka Aid,”


http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4626551.stm.

BBC News, “Sri Lanka’s growth turns upwards,”


http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4636981.stm.

de Silva, K.M. “The Federal Option and its Alternatives,” in K.M. de Silva and G.H.
Peiris eds., Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka, Kandy: ICES, 2000

The Economist, “Asia: A Glimpse of Peace; Sri Lanka,” June 25, 2005.
http://www.proquest.com.

Edrisinha, Rohan. “Federalism and the Case for Radical Constitutional Reform in Sri
Lanka,” in K.M. de Silva and G.H. Peiris eds., Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka,
Kandy: ICES, 2000

Ghosh, Partha S. Ethnicity Versus Nationalism: The Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka.
New Delhi: Sage Publications India, 2003.

Macan-Marker, Marwaan. “Politics-Sri Lanka: Tigers Forming a Shadow


‘Government.’” Global Information Network. Feb. 18, 2005.
http://www.proquest.com.

Samarasinghe, Stanley. “Can Donors Broker Peace in Sri Lanka?,” Far Eastern
Economic Review 168, no. 2 (2005): 38-40. http://www.proquest.com.

United States Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook - Sri Lanka.”
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html.

University of Texas at Austin: PCL Map Collection. “Sri Lanka (Ethnic communities and
religions, Population density, Land use and economic activity) 1976.”
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/sri_lanka_charts_76.jpg.

59
University of Texas at Austin: PCL Map Collection. “Sri Lanka (Political) 2001.”
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/sri_lanka_pol01.jpg.

IX.
Byman, Daniel L., Keeping the Peace. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.

Cheng, Julian Ming-Sung and others. “A Stage Model of International Brand


Development: The perspectives of manufacturers from two newly industrialized
economies” South Korea and Taiwan Industrial Marketing Management, Volume
34, Issue 5 , July 2005, Pages 504-514. http://www.proquest.com

Dube, Siddharth. “Higher education a key issue in armed conflict between Sinhalese and
Tamils in Sri Lanka.” The Chronicle of Higher Education 41, no. 33 (1995): A66.
http://www.proquest.com.

Dube, Siddharth. “The prospect of peace.” The Chronicle of Higher Education 41, no.33
(1995): A65-7. http://www.proquest.com.

The Economist, “Asia: A Glimpse of Peace; Sri Lanka,” June 25, 2005.
http://www.proquest.com.

Fernando, Vijita. “Arming children with peace education in Sri Lanka.” India in New
York 3, no. 4 (1999): 33. http://www.proquest.com.

Government of Sri Lanka, Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial


Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding Colombo, Sri Lanka,
2003. http://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2003/lka/01/index.htm.

Halpern, Jodi and Harvey M. Weinstein. “Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and
Reconciliation.” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2004).
http://www.www.proquest.com.

India Abroad. “World Bank Aids Lanka Teacher Training.” vol. 26, no. 42 (1996): 28.
http://www.proquest.com.

Jong, Kaz de, Maureen Mulhern, Nathan Ford, Isabel Simpson, et al, “Psychological
trauma of the civil war in Sri Lanka.” The Lancet 359, no. 9316 (2002).
http://www.proquest.com.

Kanatsouli, Meni and Theodora Tzoka. “Embracing Multiculturalism through


Understanding ‘Greekness.’” Bookbird 43, no.2 (2005): 30-38.
http://www.proquest.com.

60
Lloyd, Marion. “Ban on English-language teaching haunts college students in Sri Lanka.”
The Chronicle of Higher Education 45, no. 6 (1998): A49-51.
http://www.proquest.com.

Mailey, Diane. “Project Brings Internet to Schools in So. Asia.” India West 26, no. 2
(2000): B18. http://www.proquest.com.

Bruce Matthews, “University education in Sri Lanka in context: Consequences of


deteriorating standards,” Pacific Affairs 68, no.1 (1995): 77.
http://www.proquest.com.

Misra, Amalendu. "Rain on a parched land: Reconstructing a post-conflict Sri Lanka."


International Peacekeeping 11, no. 2 (2004): 285. http://www.proquest.com.

Spaulding, Seth. “Changing Schools from Within: A Management Intervention for


Improving School Functioning in Sri Lanka.” Comparative Education Review
45, no. 2 (2001): 280. http://infotrac.galegroup.com.

United States Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook - Sri Lanka.”
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html.

Pradeepa Wijetunge, “The role of public libraries in the expansion of literacy and lifelong
learning in Sri Lanka,” New Library World 101, no.1155 (2000): 104.
http://www.proquest.com.

61