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Media framing and social movement mobilization: German peace protest against INF missiles, the Gulf War, and NATO peace enforcement in Bosnia
ALICE HOLMES COOPER
Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi, USA
Abstract. How does media framing of issues affect social movement mobilization? This relationship is examined in light of the striking variation in levels of German peace protest against INF missiles, the Gulf War and the NATO peace-keeping mission to Bosnia. I argue that this variation in mobilization capacity can be explained in part by the degree of congruence between media framing and movement framing of the issues involved. Congruence between the two framings facilitates movement mobilization, whereas divergence hinders it. I compare the relative congruence between movement framing and media framing in Die Tageszeitung and Der Spiegel coverage of the three issues. I also evaluate possible alternative or complementary explanations, including public opinion, ‘normalization’ and elite cues, and political opportunity structure.
Conﬂicting interpretations of policies lie at the heart of political debate. Like other political actors, social movements are involved in a competition over meaning as they try to modify public policy. They must engage in ‘framing contests’ with political authorities if they hope to mobilize substantial protest. In their framing of issues, activists try to inﬂuence public perceptions of which issues are important, which solutions are workable, and why mobilization is worth the trouble. Framing involves, among other possible things, identiﬁcation of problems and their causes, along with suggested remedies. Framing contests play themselves out in the realm of public discourse. Public discourse consists of four sub-discourses: those found in ofﬁcial, challenger (e.g., social movement), expert and general audience media. General audience media (such as television and newspapers) incorporate, as part of their framing processes, varying amounts of the other three. Ofﬁcial discourse enjoys regular, routine access to the general media. Challenger discourses also depend on general audience media to reach a wider audience. Scholars have long examined how media coverage of movements affects the latter’s capacity to mobilize. The role of media discourse in stimulating or
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alice holmes cooper
subduing protest through its coverage of issues has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. Like ofﬁcials and social movements, the media also engage in framing. Media framing, among other things, identiﬁes problems and their causes, and evaluates possible remedies. Rather than constituting a neutral arena, media framing often lends more support to certain actors and discourses than to others. Ofﬁcial and social movement discourses may ﬁnd varying levels of support from media framing, and this in turn may inﬂuence the outcome of framing contests – the battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the broader public. Social movements’ capacity to mobilize may then depend substantially on media framing of the issue in question. I look at the relationship between mobilization and media discourse using the empirical example of German peace movements, which at different times mobilized with strikingly different degrees of success. West German peace movements mobilized against INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) missiles with phenomenal success in the early 1980s. Movement mobilization against the Gulf War in 1991 was again reasonably successful. By contrast, the movement failed utterly to mobilize the public against German participation in the NATO peace-keeping mission to Bosnia in 1995, despite widespread popular unease with German participation in missions beyond NATO territory. What explains this variation in the peace movement’s capacity to mobilize? I argue that this variation can in part be explained in terms of the congruence between media framing and movement framing of the issues involved. In a nutshell, I argue that congruence between the two framings facilitates movement mobilization by privileging the latter in its framing contest with ofﬁcials, whereas divergence hinders movement mobilization. I begin by reviewing the literature on framing in media discourse and as a mobilization tool for social movements. I then describe the ebb and ﬂow of German peace protest since 1945. After discussing my research design, I turn to the relationship between media framing and movement framing in the three policy episodes. After considering alternative explanations, I conclude with further discussion of media framing as an important component of political opportunity for social movements.
Media framing and movement framing
A sizeable literature has examined how media coverage of movements affects the latter’s capacity to mobilize, along with movement strategies to attract and shape media attention. If friendly, media attention can confer standing on movements, validating them as important players (Gamson & Wolfsfeld
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media framing and social movement mobilization
1993). Conversely, negative portrayals can marginalize movements (Gitlin 1980) and restrict mobilization even among their potential sympathizers, which reduces pressure on elites to respond to their concerns (Entman & Rojecki 1993). Media attention is indispensable in helping a movement communicate with the broad public, which is largely beyond the reach of more specialized movement organs. Friendly media thus contribute to mobilization without directly taking part (Kriesi 1996). To inﬂuence policy-makers, movements must mobilize the wider society. Both the extent and the content of media coverage inﬂuence whether the public develops sympathy for the movement and considers entering the fray (Lipsky 1968; McCarthy et al. 1996). For all of these reasons, the media are generally one of the main targets of movements’ efforts, and the need to attract media attention often shapes strategy (Zald 1996). Since media are accustomed to covering established political actors, movements must adapt their strategies to serve the news needs of the media. For example, movements often develop ﬂamboyant action strategies to attract media attention, but this leads to coverage of the dramatic action at the expense of the movement’s message (Molotch 1977; Rochon 1988). Despite these dilemmas, movements depend on the media to generate public sympathy for their challenges. But these are not the only functions that the media perform for social movements. Appropriately, scholars have also turned their attention to the relationship between media framing of issues and mobilization patterns. Through its coverage of issues, the mass media helps construct meaning by framing, in patterns that may well change over time. Journalists choose story lines and commentators develop arguments that support particular frames and affect the salience and intensity of issues. The mass media thus transform information rather than merely transmitting it (Zald 1996). Media coverage helps shape ‘issue cultures’, the set of discourses surrounding an issue (including expert, ofﬁcial and challenger discourses) which span multiple competing interpretations or ‘packages’ (Gamson & Modigliani 1989). When it comes to the mass media, there are many deﬁnitions of framing; Entman (1993: 52) refers to framing as a ‘fractured paradigm’ suffering from ‘scattered conceptualization’. In Entman’s words, to frame a phenomenon is to: select some aspects of a perceived reality and to make them more salient in a communicating text . . . Frames, then, deﬁne problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and beneﬁts, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes – identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgements – evaluate causal
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alice holmes cooper agents and their effects; and suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects (Entman 1993: 52, italics in original).
In similar fashion, Iyengar (1991) notes that framing includes attribution of responsibility for problems in two senses: ‘causal responsibility’ or the problem’s origin, and ‘treatment responsibility’ or means to alleviate the problem. In general, frames call attention to some aspects of ‘reality’ and deﬂect attention from others, Norris (1995) suggests. To establish that the end of the Cold War changed framing in American television network news, Norris focused on the frequency with which certain things were covered before and after 1990 – in particular international events as a proportion of total stories; the number of stories devoted to a geographic region or country (e.g., Russia); or the relative frequency with which topics such as wars, natural disasters abroad, or international economics are covered (Norris 1995). For Pan and Kosicki (1993), framing is an interactive process in which both the media and its audience engage, each operating within a shared culture on the basis of socially deﬁned rules. Through this interactive process, meaning is constructed on multiple levels (Edelman 1993).1 Why should congruence between media framing and movement framing of a given issue facilitate mobilization and lack of congruence hinder it? Many scholars have argued that movements need viable organizational structures and positive political opportunities, moments when the distribution of power resources shifts in their favour (e.g., McAdam 1982). In addition, social movements face crucial ‘framing tasks’. Assuming that perceptions of issues are socially constructed and therefore susceptible to movement inﬂuence, framing becomes a major strategic activity of movement organizations. Framing involves ‘conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’ (McAdam et al. 1996: 6, italics deleted). To mobilize the broader public, movements must link their interpretive orientations with those of targeted constituencies (Snow et al. 1986). Snow and Benford (1988) identify three essential framing tasks: identiﬁcation of the problem and attribution of blame or causality (‘diagnostic framing’), proposed solutions (‘prognostic framing’) and rationales for protest action (‘motivational framing’). Adherence to at least the general spirit of a movement’s collective action frame(s) is a prerequisite for individual participation in collective action (Klandermans & Goslinga 1996) despite factional ‘frame disputes’ over the ﬁner points (Benford 1993). To be persuasive, movement framing must make sense to, or ‘resonate’ with, its intended targets in several senses including ‘empirical credibility’ – an apparent evidential basis for the movement’s
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social movement mobilization is facilitated (but not single-handedly determined) by congruence between movement framing and media framing. especially for distinctive. People evaluate the frames offered by movements. cited in Kahrs 1999). of movement frames. and thus the resonance. media discourse occurs parallel to the processing of information by individuals and social networks (Erbring et al. of which individuals have little ﬁrst-hand information and little direct personal experience that could serve to ﬁlter media coverage (McCarthy et al. © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . counter-movements and public ofﬁcials in terms of whatever cognitive or experiential tools are available. people do not simply absorb media messages with utter passivity. these tools are primarily news coverage and previously held values. Kern & Just 1995. the ‘micromobilization contexts’ for actual mobilization. The public’s perceptions stem in signiﬁcant measure from media coverage. at least modest media effects on public opinion hold true. Alternative explanations will then be brieﬂy considered. Of course. 1996. Media framing of issues is a prime source of the cognitive tools for people to evaluate movements’ ‘diagnostic framing’ in particular.3 Thus. I argue. Thus. Gamson & Modigliani 1989).2 According to Niklas Luhmann (1996. and news frames affect causal beliefs held by citizens (Iyengar 1987). according to a wide-ranging body of scholarship. however. Media coverage has an important agendasetting effect. Congruence between media and movement framing is a function of the relative frequency with which media accounts of the issues in question reﬂect or echo the movement’s framing. 1980. particularly with respect to foreign policy issues. This is particularly true with respect to foreign policy issues. Especially in the foreign policy arena. Empirical credibility of a movement’s frames thus stems from approximate congruence between movement frames and the perceptions held by potential participants. media coverage helps shape individual perceptions and discussions in social networks (Gamson 1992). Instead. Does congruence between movement framing and media framing have. a signiﬁcant impact on movement mobilization? Empirically. In sum.media framing and social movement mobilization 41 framing from the vantage point of the targets of mobilization (Snow & Benford 1992). People depend primarily on the media for information about the political world. Brown & Vincent 1995). I explore this relationship by comparing levels of congruence between movement and media framing on the one hand with levels of mobilization in three cases of German peace protest on the other. what society accepts as reality is perceived through the mass media. an issue’s prominence in the news contributes signiﬁcantly to its prominence in the ‘public mind’ (Kenski 1996). High congruence enhances the apparent empirical credibility. as I argue. consistent media messages presented over relatively long periods of time (Bartels 1993).
1980–1995. Given this history of activism. the largest protests ever seen in West Germany greeted the NATO decision to station new medium-range missiles in Germany and across Europe. Sources: 1980–93. Frequency of peace protest events. During the Cold War. In the 1950s. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. Dokumentation und Analyse von Protestereignissen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Prodat). author’s own data collected from Frankfurter Rundschau and Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Germany crossed an historic divide with its decision to contribute troops to the NATO effort. 1994–95. the Easter March movement demonstrated on behalf of test-ban treaties. protest against the Gulf War attracted over 200. nuclear nonproliferation and a new Ostpolitik (conciliatory policy toward Eastern Europe).. Peace movements thus contributed to public debate in conjunction with various critical foreign policy debates. waves of protest accompanied both West German rearmament and the stationing of American nuclear weapons in Germany. West Germany abstained from military activity outside of NATO territory and. it is all the more surprising that virtually no protest greeted the German decision to commit troops to the NATO peace-keeping mission in Bosnia. during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s.000 people to each of several major demonstrations. During the 1960s. In 1991. In 1995.42 alice holmes cooper Peace movement mobilization in postwar Germany Peace movements have a venerable history in postwar Germany (Cooper 1996). © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . 200 180 160 140 Number of Events 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1980 1981 1982 Number of Events 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Figure 1. In the 1980s. Rucht et al.
Wissenschafszentrum Berlin. © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . furthermore. Sources: 1980–93.media framing and social movement mobilization 43 the ‘out-of-area’ issue (military activity beyond NATO borders) was a major controversy in foreign policy debate.4 During the early 1980s missile debate. Rucht et al.000 people taking part. peace protests after 3500 No. Figures 1 and 2 show the incidence of protest events and the numbers of participants in these events from 1980–1995.860. peace protest was very frequent. Dokumentation und Analyse von Protestereignissen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Prodat). Participation in the NATO mission to Bosnia represented the biggest break with the past in this respect. In contrast. since for the ﬁrst time Germany sent troops to an Eastern European region occupied by the Wehrmacht (army) during World War II. author’s own data collected from Frankfurter Rundschau and Sueddeutsche Zeitung.. 1994–95. As sensitive as much of the German polity has been to any sign of militarism since World War II. it is striking that peace groups proved unable to mount signiﬁcant protest against this new direction in foreign policy. Participation levels in peace protest events. 1980–1995.000 people involved in peace protests each year. mass demonstrations. The years 1981–1984. The year 1991. court suits. saw more than 1. when the Gulf War took place. According to the ‘Prodat’ project. sit-ins. etc. of Participants (in thousands) 3000 2500 Number of Participants (in Thousands) 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Figure 2. action forms which count as ‘peace protest events’ include petitions. was also characterized by a multitude of peace protests with some 632.
In terms of numbers. der Spiegel had an estimated 4. of course. Of Germany’s weekly newspapers and news magazines. der Spiegel has long enjoyed a high readership.300 (Stamm 1997) with a probable readership again of at least 4. specialty journals. Since time and money restrictions precluded systematic coding of a larger number of media sources. I coded coverage of the three issues in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung. sources of political information for peace groups’ most likely constituencies. those media that are particularly inﬂuential in terms of their impact on society and the way other media respond to their coverage (Boothroyd 1998). etc.5 million. der Spiegel is one of Germany’s most widely read print media. As general media sources go.5 The three cases of the missile debate. Germans who are university-educated. As of 1979. Research design Media choices To investigate the relationship between media framing and mobilization in the three cases of peace protest mentioned above.44 alice holmes cooper 1992 were relatively infrequent and had relatively few participants. As is widely known. 1979. and Bosnia represent cases of high.307. as Gamson notes. It is considered one of Germany’s Leitmedien. I chose these two print media because they are widely read by the most likely potential participants for ‘new’ social movements in general and peace movements in particular. der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung were important. ‘no other publication has come close to matching the political impact of der Spiegel on the history of the Federal Republic’ (Kahrs 1999). that is. sheer numbers © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . as was the enormous offering of books. while die Tageszeitung is anchored in the ‘left-alternative’ milieu which is home to much of Germany’s hardestcore protest potential. Or. der Spiegel had a circulation of 1. just after the time span featured in this article. medium and low mobilization. belong to the postwar generational cohorts. general audience media are the central forum for public discourse (Gamson 1995). about 10 per cent of the adult population in then-West Germany. Kriesi 1991). der Spiegel is one of the two most prestigious. In 1997. However. reside in urban areas and place themselves on the center-left or left of the political spectrum participate disproportionately in ‘new’ social movements like the peace movement (Barnes et al. the Gulf War. respectively – not in any absolute sense. but relative to each other. the beginning of the time span featured in this article.6 Peace activists were.7 Furthermore. strikingly heterogeneous. and reasonably representative.5 million readers per issue. as Karl Kahrs puts it.
the military balance between East and West. issue sub-components included assessments of the Soviet Union. Der Spiegel is especially effective at reaching the politically-interested attentive public. 45 per cent are 20–49 years old and well-educated and one-half lives in cities of over 500. die Tageszeitung (commonly called ‘Taz’) is ideologically close to and especially targets adherents of the ecological Green Party and the left-leaning Social Democrats (Kahrs 1999).media framing and social movement mobilization 45 are not the whole story.000 in 1982 and a readership several times as high (Flieger 1992). I developed codes to capture the framing packages put forward by government ofﬁcials and by peace groups respectively. effects of the INF missiles if stationed and responsibility for the failure of superpower arms-control negotiations © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . In developing the codes. in the Bosnia case. Die Taz had a circulation of 38. By 1995 it had a readershipper-copy of 411. It is widely read across the political spectrum. I adhered to the actual words of the two sides or paraphrased them as faithfully as possible. Drawing on these documents.8 I used representative texts from each side as the basis for the codes – that is. but disproportionately on the center and left (Herf 1991). assessments of the United States.000 and a ‘widest readership’ of 873. Forty-three per cent of university graduates read der Spiegel regularly or frequently. essays by non-government pro-intervention ﬁgures on the left). and 60 per cent read der Spiegel for political commentary in particular. the demographic proﬁle of Tageszeitung readers is even closer to that of the most likely adherents of new social movements in Germany. Founded in April 1979. ‘No other national publication reached both the national elite and a more mass-educated readership as effectively and consistently as der Spiegel’ (Herf 1991: 71). including (as highly educated citizens on the left) the most likely adherents of new social movements. I identiﬁed the ‘issue sub-components’ that constituted the major points of disagreement for each policy debate. documents written by peace groups (such as calls to demonstrations (Aufrufe) and pamphlets) and by government ofﬁcials (such as speeches and White Books on defence policy along with. respectively: Should Germany accept INF missiles? Should Germany support the United States-led coalition in the Gulf War? Should Germany join the NATO peace-keeping missions to Bosnia? For the INF missile debate. ‘Everybody’ reads der Spiegel.000 (Taz 1995). Although its readership is much smaller than that of der Spiegel. Two-thirds of the Taz’s readership is 20–49 years old. Coding For each of the three cases (missile debate.000 people (Taz 1996). sources of threat to Germany. Bosnia). Gulf War. The overriding issues were. 60 per cent is well-educated (Abitur or university study).
I developed codes capturing speciﬁc idea elements as follows. Representing the government’s framing. Each code received a three-digit reference number. appropriate policy toward Bosnia. the codes included: ‘Warsaw Pact armed forces have an offensive structure.’ ‘The Soviets support repressive (communist) regimes or insurgencies abroad in non-Warsaw Pact countries. effects of the war and appropriate responses to the war. To give the reader a taste of the actual codes used to capture government and peace movement framing with respect to the INF missile debate and ‘assessments of the Soviet Union’ (one of the issue sub-components). and the second two digits captured a ‘speciﬁc idea element’ relevant to the issue sub-component (e. including nuclear war. Drawing on the government and peace group documents further.46 alice holmes cooper concerning INF. This is best illustrated with reference to the codes themselves. American policy and intentions in Bosnia.’ ‘The Soviets intervene militarily in Third World countries. The ﬁrst digit referred to one of the issue sub-components referred to above (e. for the Gulf War there were a total of 129 codes and for the Bosnia case there were a total of 114 codes. but also to a multitude of ‘speciﬁc idea elements’ that make concrete reference to the issue at hand and that collectively constitute the framing package (Gamson & Modigliani 1989: 11). For Bosnia. the issue sub-components included assessments of Iraq. For the Gulf War debate.g. I developed codes reﬂecting the two sides’ positions on these issue sub-components. American policy and intentions in the war. they included the nature of the conﬂict.’ ‘The Soviets intend to occupy Western territory in case of war.’ ‘The Soviets are pursuing an arms buildup. ‘The Soviets are pursuing an arms build-up’). ‘assessments of the Soviet Union’).g. the nature of the NATO mission to Bosnia and Germany’s proper role in international affairs. I modeled my coding schemes loosely on those found in William Gamson’s Talking Politics (Gamson 1992). causes of the Gulf War.’ ‘Other indications that the Soviets are aggressive or expansionary. for example... For the INF issue there were a total of 141 codes reﬂecting the government and peace groups’ framing in my coding scheme. Gamson’s coding schemes are based on the premise that framing packages involve not only references to values or symbols.’ Representing the peace movement’s framing.’ ‘The Soviets have damaged the détente process.’ ‘The Soviet Union has a war-ﬁghting strategy against the West. the codes included: © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 .’ ‘The Soviets repress freedom in Warsaw Pact countries.
© European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . in which case they were left uncoded.’ ‘The Soviet Union wants to prevent war at almost all costs.’ ‘Other indications that the Soviets are not aggressive or expansionary. the Gulf War. I turned to coding the media framing.’ ‘Maintaining their hold on the Eastern European satellites is already an economic strain for the Soviet Union. rounded to the nearest paragraph. but many blocks contained several codeable utterances.e.10 I divided each article into a series of blocks representing three columninches of text.9 (This resulted in 178 articles on the INF issue. is the result of feeling threatened by Western force. A second coder coded a random sample of 120 articles. Some blocks of text contained no codeable utterances.’ ‘Afghanistan is traditionally part of the Russian/Soviet sphere of inﬂuence. from one to several sentences) which corresponded to any of the codes discussed above and recorded the three-digit number associated with the appropriate code. The relevant codeable unit was any utterance in a given block of text from a Spiegel or Tageszeitung article that echoed or reﬂected any of the codes discussed above (i. No code was used more than once within any given three-inch block.. deﬁned by certain temporal boundaries. and in every second issue for the Gulf War (August 1990-February 1991) due to the shorter duration of the conﬂict. has great fear of war.’ ‘Soviet behavior represents a response to Western arms measures. I searched each block of text for passages (utterances of whatever length.) I coded all news accounts and political commentary in approximately every fourth issue of die Tageszeitung for the three debates and corresponding time periods. and 283 articles on the Bosnia issue. and Bosnia in every third issue of der Spiegel for the INF missile debate (1980–1983) and Bosnia (1991–1995). 209 articles on the Gulf War. that echoed or reﬂected any ‘idea elements’ contained in the government’s or peace movement’s framing package). namely the relevant articles in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung. Others contained utterances that were too vague or ambiguous to be coded properly. I coded all news accounts and political commentary related to the INF missile issue.media framing and social movement mobilization 47 ‘The Soviets are a defensive power. 41 articles on the Gulf War.’ ‘The Soviets are worried about spread of Islamic fundamentalism to their own Central Asian republics.’ Having developed codes which captured the government’s and the peace movement’s framing on each issue.) I thus coded coverage for the entire length of a given conﬂict. and 74 articles on the Bosnia issue. intercoder reliability was 79 per cent. (This resulted in 118 articles on the INF issue.
Results After completing the coding discussed above. is the result of feeling threatened by Western force’. A statement in the article that the American government considered the Soviet Union an expansionist power was coded as ‘Other indications that the Soviets are aggressive or expansionary’. All references in the article to the Soviet invasion were coded with the reference number corresponding to the code ‘The Soviets intervene militarily in non-Warsaw Pact countries (e. this resulted in a total of 964 codable utterances in die Tageszeitung and 994 in der Spiegel for the entire set of articles coded. both in terms of the overall count for each framing package and in terms of the issue subcomponents. the relative frequency with which Taz/Spiegel utterances contain idea elements belonging to government or peace movement framing packages. the reaction of the United States and the impact on détente. contradicted or qualiﬁed them in subsequent text. for the Gulf War a total of 603 codeable utterances in die Tageszeitung and 334 in der Spiegel. Figure 3. I then converted these raw numbers into the percentages (in terms of the total number of codeable utterances) presented in Figures 3–8.e. expressed as a percentage of the total codeable Taz/Spiegel utterances). and for the Bosnia debate a total of 909 codeable utterances in die Tageszeitung and 602 in der Spiegel for all articles coded. To capture the entire content to which readers of the articles (including potential peace movement participants) were exposed.g.. For the INF missile debate. I tallied the data produced in order to determine levels of congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing on the one hand..48 alice holmes cooper In order again to give the reader a taste of the coding process. Gulf War and Bosnia) debates. presents the percentages reﬂecting the various levels of © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . Gulf War and Bosnia debates on the other. I view congruence between Taz/Spiegel and movement/government framing as a function of the relative frequency with which Taz and Spiegel accounts of the issues reﬂect or echo the movement’s or government’s framing (i. alternatively. for each of the three (INF. The possibility that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan because they feared an American invasion of Iran (in response to the hostage crisis) was coded as ‘Soviet behavior represents a response to Western arms measures. Afghanistan)’. for example. and movement or government framing of the INF. I coded all codeable utterances regardless of whether the author agreed with them or. I counted the codeable utterances in die Tageszeitung and der Spiegel that supported the government’s or peace movement’s framing package. I refer to an article in der Spiegel on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Thus.
As the ‘overall’ category at the far right of Figure 3 indicates. Media framing and peace movement mobilization in Germany This section examines the empirical evidence for the argument that congruence between media framing and movement framing facilitates (but does not totally determine) movement mobilization while lack of congruence hinders © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . while about 3 per cent (or 24) reﬂected the peace movement’s framing. Thus. The results are presented in the section below and in Figures 3–8. both in terms of the overall count for each framing package for each debate and in terms of the issue sub-components for each of the three (INF. The Tageszeitung framing of the Soviet Union was thus more congruent with the government’s framing of the Soviets than the peace movement’s framing of the Soviets by a ratio of roughly four to one. With respect to the United States. approximately 12 per cent (or 112) of the 994 codeable utterances supported the government’s framing of the Soviet Union. and the other columns collectively add up to 100 per cent. the tables were more than turned. Gulf War and Bosnia) debates. 21 per cent (or 207) of the total 964 codeable Taz utterances reﬂected government framing of the INF issue. Approximately 36 per cent (or 347) of the Tageszeitung’s total codeable utterances were congruent with the peace movement’s framing of the United States. The ‘Overall’ category in Figures 3–8 constitutes the totals of all the preceding columns (to the left of ‘Overall’) of the respective ﬁgure. while the ‘Overall’ score for the peace movement’s framing package is the sum of the peace movement scores for the other ﬁve ‘peace-movement’ columns.media framing and social movement mobilization 49 congruence between the Taz framing of the INF issue and the government’s and peace movement’s packages. This system also characterizes Figures 5–8. The ‘Overall’ scores for the government and the peace movement combined add up to 100 per cent. while 79 per cent (or 757) of the codeable Taz utterances reﬂected the peace movement’s framing. for example. while only around 1 per cent (or 13) of the total codeable utterances echoed the government’s framing of the United States. in Figures 3 and 4 the ‘Overall’ score for the government’s framing package is the sum of the government scores for the other ﬁve ‘government’ columns. Thus the congruence of the Tageszeitung framing of the United States with the peace movement’s framing of the United States outweighed the congruence of Taz framing of the United States with the government’s framing of the United States by a ratio of roughly 36 to 1. With respect to the Soviet Union (the left-most set of columns in Figure 3). I repeated this process to arrive at the coding results for both Taz and Spiegel framing (displayed in Figures 3–8). however.
the frequency with which the media report on issues (Norris 1995) and their attribution of responsibility and remedies for the issues at hand (Entmann 1993. Iyengar 1991).0% 20. among other things. © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . the major 90.0% 30. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in Tageszeitung (Taz) utterances. is lend more weight to the government’s or peace movement’s framing packages over time through.0% 10. or Pershing II and Cruise missiles) in Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe unless arms control negotiations resulted in a satisfactory reduction of the newly installed Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles by late 1983.0% Soviet Union Government N = 207 Peace Mvt N = 757 United States Sources of Threat Effects of INF INF Negotiation Overall Figure 3.0% 80.0% Percentages 50. the peace movement made serious inroads into Schmidt’s own party (the Social Democrats). the instigator of the NATO decision.0% 60. Media framing does not generally take a position for or against a speciﬁc policy decision.0% 70. Pitted against the Schmidt government. the unions. What media framing can do. INF missile debate.0% 0.0% 40. The decision mandated the stationing of new American INF weapons (‘Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces’. hoped to restore the regional European balance in medium-range nuclear weapons and thereby also to shore up the credibility of deterrence. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. however. and media framing is certainly not synonymous with taking such a position.50 alice holmes cooper mobilization. The INF missile debate NATO adopted the ‘double-track decision’ in December 1979.
0% Soviet Union United States Sources ofThreat Effects of INF INF Negotiation Overall Figure 4. Germany’s largest peace protests occurred in the early 1980s in the context of the INF missile debate. References to repression of freedom in Warsaw Pact countries were also relatively frequent. as well as contributing to the rise of Germany’s Green Party. 80.0% 0. while peace groups framed it as a defensive power straining to hold on to its existing sphere of inﬂuence.0% Government N = 327 Peace Mvt N = 667 70.0% 30. INF missile debate. © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 .0% Percentages 40.0% 60. As Figures 1 and 2 show.0% 20. framing of the INF issue in both die Taz and der Spiegel was much more congruent with the peace movement’s framing package than with that of the government.0% 50.) News accounts in die Taz and der Spiegel of the Soviet Union’s relationship to other countries were almost always negative. The ‘Overall’ category in Figures 3 and 4 provides an initial conﬁrmation of this congruence. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in der Spiegel utterances.media framing and social movement mobilization 51 churches and society at large. As Figures 3 and 4 show.0% 10. References to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan accounted for more than 25 per cent of all coded utterances concerning Soviet foreign policy. Assessments of the Soviet Union’s armed forces focused largely on the arms buildup occurring at the time. It is true that framing in both die Taz and der Spiegel of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy (labeled ‘Soviet Union’ in Figures 3 and 4) echoed the government’s framing package far more frequently than that of the peace movement. (The government framed the Soviet Union as politically repressive and militarily aggressive.
the peace movement framed the United States as an aggressive military power that intervened in the Third World. which is consistent with the peace movement’s tremendous mobilization capacity. This was particularly true for assessments of American foreign policy and NATO (labeled ‘United States’ in Figures 3 and 4). Taz and the peace movement much greater danger to Germany was posed by: the rising conﬂict between the superpowers and the deterioration of détente.52 alice holmes cooper On the other hand. Finally. Spiegel and Taz framing of the INF missile debate was much more congruent with peace movement framing than with the government’s. The government maintained that the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact had aggressive intentions and that its military superiority posed the chief threat to Germany.) Taz and Spiegel frames concerning American defense policy focused especially on the Reagan administration’s alleged striving for worldwide superiority and its arms buildup. Spiegel and Taz attribution of the blame was modestly more congruent with peace movement framing than with the government’s. the government’s claim that the INF missiles would chieﬂy serve as counter-deterrents to Soviet missiles got little support from either die Tageszeitung or der Spiegel. whereas nuclear deterrence provided security. Taz and Spiegel framing made frequent mention of American military intervention in Central America and its support for repressive regimes there. the arms race and the sheer presence of nuclear weapons on German soil. frames in der Spiegel and die Taz concerning all other components of the missile debate were much more congruent with the peace movement’s framing package than with that of the government. according to Spiegel. With respect to America’s relationship to other countries. and they indicated that the United States considered nuclear war wageable on European territory. Forty per cent of the coded utterances in Taz reporting concerning the United States referred to American activities in Central America. in most of the individual components and certainly overall. Taz and Spiegel framing was also largely congruent with peace movement framing of the sources of danger to Germany (labeled ‘Sources of Threat’ in Figures 3 and 4). In sum. there was the question of responsibility for the failure of the superpower negotiations to eliminate the INF and SS-20 missiles (labeled ‘INF Negotiations’ in Figures 3 and 4). whereas Spiegel and particularly Taz articles lent much more support to the peace movement’s claims that the INF missiles were usable in waging war against the Soviet Union and therefore provided tempting targets on German soil for ‘preemptive’ Soviet strikes (labeled ‘Effects of INF’ in Figures 3 and 4). the destruction that nuclear weapons would wreak on Germany if used and the rising danger of war in Europe. © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . (Whereas the government framed the United States as committed to defending freedom and democracy. By contrast. Similarly. deterrence run amok.
logistical and material support (although it did send ﬁghter jets to help defend Turkey from Iraqi attack).0% 20. particularly in terms of numbers of participants. students. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in Tageszeitung (Taz) utterances. © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 .0% Iraq United States Causes Effects Responses Overall Figure 5. This left Germany unprepared for sudden demands to accept more international responsibility. although not nearly as large as protest against the INF missiles. 80. several demonstrations took place in January 1991 that mobilized over 200.0% 0.000 people each. and peace and ecology groups (Cooper 1996). framing of the Gulf War was more congruent with the peace movement’s framing package than with that of the government.media framing and social movement mobilization The Gulf War 53 The Gulf War found Germany in the throes of the uniﬁcation process (Müller 1992). Germany quickly sent aid to Israel following embarrassing revelations that German ﬁrms had illegally contributed to the Iraqi military buildup. Peace protests were directed against the German government’s support for the war and the American-led coalition against Iraq.0% 10.0% 30. particularly in die Taz and.0% 50. Figures 1 and 2 show that protest against the Gulf War was relatively substantial. and Germany restricted its contribution primarily to ﬁnancial. including the Scud missiles directed against Israel. to a lesser extent. As Figures 5 and 6 show. Nevertheless.0% 60. Gulf War. The demonstrations’ sponsors ranged from left-wing parties to unions. in der Spiegel.0% Percentages 40. church groups.0% Government N = 160 Peace Mvt N = 443 70.
0% 50. the peace movement as a whole.0% 0. The government.54 70. Congruence with government and peace movement packages in der Spiegel utterances. both media sources framed the motives and role of the United States (labeled ‘United States’ in Figures 5 and 6) in negative tones that echoed those of peace groups – the United States and its allies had con© European Consortium for Political Research 2002 .0% Iraq United States Causes Effects Responses Overall Figure 6. der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung all framed Iraq in a negative light – Saddam Hussein was a dictator. there was also a ﬂurry of mentions in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung of the threat posed by Iraqi Scuds to Israel. etc. Gulf War. During the actual ﬁghting in January 1991. Although this characterization of Iraq did not constitute concrete bones of contention between the government and the peace movement.0% 10. I have assigned the relevant codings in Taz and Spiegel articles to the ‘Government’ column of the ‘Iraq’ component of Figures 5 and 6.0% Percentages 40. Virtually universal agreement existed in the characterization of Iraq (labeled ‘Iraq’ in Figures 5 and 6). Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. The government and other supporters of the Gulf War brought Iraqi aggression and the danger to Israel into their discourse much more frequently than did peace groups.0% alice holmes cooper Government N =140 Peace Mvt N =194 60. First.0% 30.0% 20. Iraq had committed clear aggression against Kuwait. and they linked their support for the war explicitly to this negative characterization of Iraq. On the other hand. the peace movement received more support than the government from Taz and Spiegel framing of the other components of the Gulf War debate.
diplomacy and sanctions were not given enough time to work. both media. Both media described the physical damage and civilian suffering caused by the American bombing of Iraq. In the case of the Gulf War. etc. the German Bundestag voted on two issues: whether to contribute ﬁghter jets and warships to a NATO mission to assist a possible UN withdrawal from Bosnia (June 1995) and whether to join the multilateral peace-keeping mission envisioned by the Dayton peace agreement (December 1995). A third component for which peace movement and media framing were congruent concerned the effects of the Gulf War (labeled ‘Effects’ in Figures 5 and 6). In sum. Furthermore. the West (including Germany) had earlier delivered arms to Iraq. the United States/West had contributed signiﬁcantly to the causes of the war – President Bush was eager for war. The ﬁnal component for which peace movement and media framing were congruent concerned appropriate responses to the Gulf crisis (labeled ‘Responses’ in Figures 5 and 6). the ecological danger posed by burning oil ﬁelds and potential climate damage. however. Spiegel and Taz framing of the Gulf War was more congruent with peace movement framing than with the government’s.media framing and social movement mobilization 55 doned Iraq’s earlier war with Iran but now opposed the invasion of Kuwait. Bosnia and the NATO peace-keeping mission Toward the end of the Bosnian component of the ‘wars of secession’ from the former Yugoslavia. their calls for continuing diplomacy in the place of force. The issue of involvement in military missions to Bosnia was © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . die Tageszeitung lent support to peace groups’ views that war would not solve problems in the Gulf. the ‘margin of victory’ in terms of media support for peace groups’ framing was somewhat lower than in the case of the INF missile debate. and the United States and its allies were waging the Gulf War primarily for economic reasons. framed the Gulf War as a source of threat to Germany – speciﬁcally. the reasonably high congruence between media and movement framing paralleled the peace movement’s moderately successful mobilization against the Gulf War. the government held Iraq responsible. Moreover. and in particular die Tageszeitung. Nonetheless. in particular to guarantee their oil supply. in most of the individual components and certainly overall (labeled ‘Overall’ in Figures 5 and 6). While der Spiegel was largely silent on the issue. the American military buildup in Saudi Arabia in 1990 paved the way for war. With respect to causes of the Gulf War (labeled ‘Causes of War’ in Figures 5 and 6). thereby contributing to the current problem. whereas in the framing of peace groups and the two news media. and their calls for an export ban on war materials.
© European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . there was virtually no mobilization against the Bosnia mission.0% 10.0% Conflict United States Policy Mission Germany Overall Figure 7. and this self-restraint became associated with an interpretation of certain constitutional clauses. Bosnia. the most substantial (and the most internationally sensitive) episode of ‘out of area’ activity up to that point.0% Pro-Intervention N = 606 Anti-Intervention N = 303 50. however.0% 30. In July 1994. and it capped a lengthy debate on the ‘out of area’ question – the issue of whether Germany could or should participate in military activity beyond NATO’s core territory. mobilization protesting Western use of force in Bosnia or German participation therein was minimal to nonexistent. West Germany restricted its military activity to defence of NATO territory. as did the Kohl government’s decision in 1992 to send one German destroyer and three German jets to monitor the UN embargo against Serbia. the Constitutional Court ruled that German participation in multilateral ‘out of area’ missions was indeed constitutionally permissible. There was also little popular enthusiasm for ‘out of area’ military activity.56 alice holmes cooper extremely controversial. Congruence with pro-intervention and anti-intervention packages in Tageszeitung (Taz) utterances. As Figures 7 and 8 show.0% 20.0% Percentages 40. As Figures 1 and 2 show. In spite of consistent opposition to ‘out of area’ military activity. During the Cold War. framing of the Bosnia issue by both die Tageszeitung and 70. shared by virtually all established elites. Even participation in ‘blue helmet’ peace-keeping like the UN mission to Somalia in 1993 provoked both enormous controversy and a suit taken before the German Constitutional Court. which seemed to restrict military engagement in just such terms.0% 60.0% 0.
media framing and social movement mobilization 70.0% Pro-Intervention N= 398 Anti-Intervention N= 204 57 60. For the pro-intervention side. neither media source offered much framing support to the concrete claims of either side.0% 20. and so on.0% 10.0% 50. as well as die Tageszeitung and der Spiegel. overall (see the ‘Overall’ category in Figures 7 and 8) and in most individual components. In contrast. sanctions and diplomacy had failed to stop the ﬁghting.0% Conflict United States Policy Mission Germany Overall Figure 8. Taz and Spiegel coverage offered considerably less framing support to the diagnosis of peace groups – that the Bosnian war was caused by nationalism and aggression on all sides. the Serbs were aggressors and the Muslim were victims. more congruent with the pro-intervention side (the government and parts of the left) than the anti-intervention (peace groups) side.0% 0. UN peace-keeping. Congruence with pro-intervention and anti-intervention packages in der Spiegel utterances. attribution of blame for the war (labeled ‘Conﬂict’ in Figures 7 and 8).0% Percentages 40. had its roots in historical instances of ethnic conﬂict in the region. The congruence in framing between both media sources and the prointervention side was particularly strong for the component of the debate which got the most notice. der Spiegel was. Bosnia. Die Tageszeitung and der Spiegel also offered considerably more support to the pro-intervention than the anti-intervention side when it came to the American role in the Bosnian conﬂict (labeled ‘United States’ in Figures 7 and 8).0% 30. but their framing was compati© European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . Both media sources described the United States and Western Europe as hesitant to intervene. In so doing.
These included. In two areas Spiegel and Taz framing lent more support to the antiintervention side. While the anti-interventionists denied that military intervention would serve any useful purpose and argued that the West should instead focus on humanitarian aid to Bosnia. would increase Germany’s ‘great-power’ role. in addition. ﬁrst. the pro-intervention side enjoyed greater visibility than the anti-intervention side in die Tageszeitung and the two sides enjoyed about equal visibility in der Spiegel in terms of the relative frequency of mention of their respective positions. with respect to the Tageszeitung. In particular. The chi square statistics generated by the paired comparisons demonstrate that variations in congruence across issues are statistically signiﬁcant. but neither of these areas attained much prominence in their news accounts. the anti-interventionists’ claim that joining the NATO mission would mean breaking with Germany’s postwar policy of restraint. These included. Table 1 shows that INF and Bosnia are indeed polar cases and that the Gulf War case lies in between. and so on (labeled ‘Mission’ in Figures 7 and 8). In terms of genuine differences between levels of congruence between media and movement framing. etc. exhibiting a systematic trend rather than a random occurrence. Tageszeitung framing ‘favours’ the peace © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . the tests of signiﬁcance demonstrate the extent of the differences in congruence between media and movement framing in the INF-Bosnia and Gulf War-Bosnia comparisons. In sum. the prointerventionists argued that force was acceptable to protect human rights and to end the ﬁghting. (labeled ‘Germany’ in Figures 7 and 8).58 alice holmes cooper ble with the pro-interventionist claims that the United States had a genuine interest in peace in the region. would militarize German foreign policy. When it came to appropriate Western policy toward Bosnia (labeled ‘Policy’ in Figures 7 and 8). The two media sources offered absolutely no support to the anti-intervention side’s (peace groups) claims that the United States was serving self-interested economic or power motives in the Bosnian War. Spiegel and Taz framing of the Bosnia issue was much more congruent with prointervention framing than with the peace groups’ anti-intervention framing. the notion that the NATO mission would enshrine dominance of military solutions in international conﬂicts and would serve to defend ‘imperialist’ economic interests. Thus. and this was consistent with peace groups’ incapacity to mobilize the broader public. in most of the individual components and certainly overall. Testing causation Table 1 demonstrates that genuine variation in the independent variable exists.
003 Gulf War 140 194 Pr = 0.92 INF 327 667 Pearson c2(2) = 168.30 INF 207 757 Pearson c2(2) = 455.4663 Bosnia media framing and social movement mobilization 398 204 Pr = 0.86 Gulf War 140 194 Pearson c2(1) = 51.000 Bosnia 606 303 Pr = 0.614 59 .59 INF Congruence with: government framing peace movement/ anti-intervention ALL CASES Congruence with: government framing peace movement/ anti-intervention 207 757 Pearson c2(1) = 5.024 Bosnia 606 303 INF 327 667 Pearson c2(1) = 166.021 Gulf War 160 443 Pr = 0.000 ASE = 0.63 g = -0.01 g = -0.000 Bosnia 398 204 Pr = 0.000 ASE = 0.99 Gulf War Congruence with: government framing peace movement/ anti-intervention © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 Spiegel Bosnia 606 303 Pr = 0.46 INF 327 667 Pearson c2(1) = 8.032 Bosnia 398 204 160 443 Pearson c2(1) = 233.Table 1. Gulf War and Bosnia regarding congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and government/peace movement framing Taz PAIRWISE COMPARISONS Congruence with: government framing peace movement/ anti-intervention INF 207 757 Pearson c2(1) = 388.000 Gulf War 160 443 Pr = 0.000 Gulf War 140 194 Pr = 0. Cross-tabulations for differences between INF.
but less strongly. but to a lesser extent. © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . The chi square statistic for the INF-Gulf comparison shows that Tageszeitung framing of these two cases is more alike than for any other paired comparison.60 alice holmes cooper movement with respect to INF and the Gulf War. the gamma correlation is weaker but signiﬁcant and in the same direction (ASE less than 0. which is consonant with the middle-case status of the Gulf War. indicates a strong negative relationship between Tageszeitung congruence with government framing and the extent of mass mobilization. 3500 Spiegel 3000 Taz INF 2500 Number of protest participants (in thousands) 2000 1500 1000 Gulf War 500 Bosnia 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 Congruence between media framing and movement framing (% agreement) Figure 9. The same holds true for der Spiegel. Gulf War and Bosnia. Relationship between protest levels and media congruence with peace movement packages for INF. The gamma statistic. but ﬂips to ‘favouring’ government framing with respect to Bosnia. which assumes that cases are ordered by degree of mobilization (INF > Gulf > Bosnia). The same holds true for der Spiegel.05).
In sum. peace © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . mobilization was also high. framing in both die Tageszeitung and der Spiegel shifted toward somewhat higher levels of congruence with peace group framing after the ﬁrst or second major demonstrations of the early 1980s. levels of congruence between Taz framing and peace group framing actually fell after the ﬁrst major demonstration. moreover. demonstrations certainly did not tilt media framing toward the peace movement in the case of the Gulf War. mobilization was also low. During the INF debate. comparing levels of congruence before and after the ﬁrst major demonstration against the Gulf War on 14 January 1991. Where congruence was low (the Bosnia case). Figure 9 summarizes this relationship. I undertook similar comparisons for the Gulf War debate. mobilization was moderate. although it may have played a slight role in the INF missile debate. The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Two more large demonstrations took place in the second half of January 1991. I have pointed to a reasonably strong relationship between media framing and peace groups’ capacity to mobilize with respect to the INF missiles. we can make the reasonable inference that a causal relationship exists between media/movement framing congruence and movement mobilization capacity. I therefore compared levels of overall congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and peace group framing for the INF debate before the ﬁrst major anti-missile demonstration (October 1981) and between each of the largest subsequent demonstrations (June 1982 and October 1983) with levels of congruence for the entire missile debate. since levels of congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and movement framing change systematically across the three cases and since the INF missile. During the Gulf War. On the other hand. Where congruence was somewhere in between (the Gulf War case). Where congruence between media framing and movement framing was high (the INF case).11 Reverse causation? As noted above. the Gulf War and the NATO mission to Bosnia.media framing and social movement mobilization 61 Finally. Gulf War. and Bosnia cases are ordered in terms of descending mobilization by the peace movement. Taz and Spiegel framing of the INF issue was already quite congruent with peace group framing even before the ﬁrst major demonstration in October 1981. or does mobilization tilt media framing toward the peace groups’ side? This question can be most usefully addressed with respect to the INF missiles and the Gulf War. and this shift may be partly attributable to inﬂuences of the peace movement on the two news sources. the two cases in which mobilization actually took place. But what about the possibility of reverse causation? Do media establish framing patterns in advance of movement mobilization.
by time periods Framing congruence with peace movement. Congruence between media and peace group framing of the Gulf War. Congruence between media and peace group framing of the INF debate. INF debate die Tageszeitung January 1980–October 1981 November 1981–June 1982 July 1982–October 1983 Entire period (January 1980 –October 1983) der Spiegel January 1980–October 1981 November 1981–June 1982 July 1982–October 1983 Entire period (January 1980 –October 1983) 65% 74% 74% 67% 35% 26% 26% 33% 77% 77% 84% 79% 23% 23% 16% 21% Framing congruence with government. Gulf War © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . Gulf War die Tageszeitung August 1990–15 January 1991 15 January 1991–28 February 1991 Entire period (August 1990– February 1991) der Spiegel August 1990–15 January 1991 15 January 1991–28 February 1991 Entire period (August 1990– February 1991) 59% 59% 58% 41% 41% 42% 77% 71% 73% 23% 29% 26% Framing congruence with government.62 alice holmes cooper Table 2. INF debate Table 3. by time periods Framing congruence with peace movement.
many scholars ﬁnd survey evidence useful ‘in spite of all its well-known and indisputable shortcomings’ (Everts 1993: 197). the Gulf War or Bosnia. on the eve of the missile debate. one might expect to see a general relationship between public opinion and movement mobilization. with respect to ‘threat of communism’. Measuring public opinion through surveys is fraught with methodological difﬁculties. and German participation in ‘out-of-area’ military activity like the Bosnia missions on the other. I am aware of no data that would reveal prior German public opinion concerning wars like the Gulf War. Gulf War and Bosnia debates Before concluding. the percentage of (Western) Germans holding attitudes that suggested likely receptivity to subsequent peace movement positions was higher than or equal to the percentage holding attitudes that suggested likely receptivity to sub© European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . prior to the speciﬁc controversies over the INF missiles. First. However. That is. the public held attitudes that increased or decreased receptivity to peace movement arguments once those controversies actually arose. If prior public opinion did indeed contribute to mobilization potential in the three cases.media framing and social movement mobilization 63 movement mobilization was not the driving force behind media framing of these two issues in any consistent fashion. Weighing alternative or complementary explanations Public opinion prior to and during the INF. Eichenberg 1989). As Table 4 shows. both prior to and during the three debates. Let us now consider prior public opinion as an explanation for varying levels of peace movement mobilization. since mobilization against INF missiles greatly outstripped mobilization against the other two. I consider public opinion. All caveats notwithstanding. Unfortunately. Nonetheless.‘military balance’ and ‘nuclear balance’. several alternative explanations for the ebb and ﬂow of peace movement mobilization capacity need to be considered. The status quo ante of public opinion on the eve of the missile debate (late 1979) constituted a mixed but not wholly inhospitable terrain in terms of the public’s a priori likelihood of being receptive to peace movement arguments and mobilization attempts. one would expect that it favoured receptivity to peace movement arguments about the INF missiles more than about the Gulf War or Bosnia. including the susceptibility of survey responses to the framing effects of the survey questions themselves (Entman 2000. we can compare prior public opinion concerning issues associated with the INF missiles on the one hand.
hospitable terrain for peace movement mobilization in terms of a priori public opinion. P = ‘neutrality’) Federal Republic should defend itself against military attack by using military force? (G = ‘yes’.g. P = ‘disagree’) Withdrawal of American troops from Federal Republic (G = ‘against’. attitudes suggesting receptivity to subsequent government positions outweighed attitudes suggesting receptivity to subsequent peace movement positions by a large margin. P = ‘not great’ or ‘not serious’) Military balance (G = ‘Warsaw Pact superior’. Bosnia).. German public’s prior attitudes to INF missile-related issues. and these people might be considered potential supporters of subsequent peace-keeping missions despite potential use of force © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . government arguments (G)) Peace movement arguments 40 65 56 5 18 27 Don’t know/no answer 18 4 17 11 4 16 Issue Threat of communism (G = ‘great’ or ‘very great’. P = ‘disagree’) Government arguments 41 31 27 84 77 57 19 57 24 21 55 24 Sources: Eichenberg 1989. P = ‘no’) Attack from East best prevented by deterrence with West adequately armed? (G = ‘agree’. Schmidt 1985. and in any event not less. P = ‘NATO superior’ or ‘both sides equal’) NATO essential to European security (G = ‘agree’. As Table 5 shows. It is true that as much as 45 per cent of the German population was prepared to accept German participation in unarmed peace-keeping missions. survey results reveal a potentially more.64 alice holmes cooper Table 4. this relationship was reversed. P = ‘NATO superior’ or ‘both sides equal’) Nuclear balance (G = ‘Warsaw Pact superior’. With respect to German participation in multilateral military missions beyond NATO territory (e. however. Schweigler 1984. support for German involvement in combat missions outside NATO territory was extremely limited from 1991 to mid-1993. sequent government arguments. P = ‘in favour’) Military alliance with United States or neutrality? (G = ‘alliance with United States’. Szabo 1987. 1977–1979 (percentage of public holding attitudes likely to make them receptive during the INF debate to peace movement arguments (P). With respect to the other issues listed in Table 4.
The case of the INF missile debate sustains this expectation quite well. Thus. © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . but the bulk of those surveys conducted in 1983 found large-scale opposition to stationing INF missiles (Berger et al. Nonetheless. which would certainly indicate receptivity to the anti-intervention position. (Admittedly. (such as the decision to send German ﬁghter jets to aid UN peace-keeping troops in June 1995 or the decision to contribute German troops to the enforcement of the Dayton accords in December 1995). the Gulf War and Bosnia) would logically represent an upper limit on mobilization potential (on this general point. However.. whatever stance one takes on the question just mentioned.e. Reuband 1985). see Klandermans & Goslinga 1996. public opinion between 1979 and 1983 increasingly turned against the INF decision and the possible stationing of missiles. from 1991 to 1993 a substantial portion of the public (at least 38%) wanted to see the German military limited to missions within NATO territory only. 1992. the proportion of the general public sharing the peace movement’s fundamental positions (i. responses varied considerably depending on the wording of survey questions. German public’s attitudes toward German participation in ‘out of area’ military missions (percentages) Combat missions acceptable March 1991 June 1992 April 1993 17 14 12 Unarmed peace-keeping only 41 44 21 Acceptable only within NATO territory 39 38 53 Don’t know/no answer 3 4 14 Sources: Spiegel 1991. Therefore. by late 1983 as many as 74 per cent did so. As Table 6 illustrates. In particular. prior public opinion was moderately propitious for peace movement attempts to mobilize against both INF missiles and German involvement in Bosnia.media framing and social movement mobilization 65 Table 5. This evolution of public opinion may well have increased mobilization potential and contributed to the actual mobilization which grew by leaps and bounds between 1981 and 1983 (see Figures 1 and 2). 1983). opposed to INF missiles. peace movement mobilization against the INF missiles was vastly more successful than against the NATO missions to Bosnia.) Whereas in late 1979 only 35 per cent opposed possibly stationing the missiles. Die Woche 1993. The evolution of public opinion during the three controversies themselves might also help explain the peace movement’s mobilization capacity. prior public opinion fails to provide a satisfactory alternative explanation for the varying success of peace movement mobilization.
SINUS 1983. however. 40 per cent of German respondents supported German participation in UN or NATO missions through 1994. This rising support for German participation in the Bosnia missions corresponds to the peace movement’s inability to mobilize signiﬁcant protest in 1995 or at any earlier point (see Figures 1 and 2). the evo- © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . Table 7 shows the evolution of German public opinion on this most sensitive issue. 1981–1983 (percentages) Opposition to INF/missile stationing October 1979 July 1981 August–September 1983 October 1983 35 44 66 74 Approval of INF/missile stationing 39 29 16 25 Undecided 26 27 18 – Sources: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach 1981. with 30 per cent opposing it (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1995). German support for the use of Western multilateral force rose between 1992 and 1995. the remaining Germans divided their opinions between ‘indifference’ (24 per cent of Westerners and 23 per cent of Easterners) and ‘disapproval’ (18 per cent of Westerners and 32 per cent of Easterners) on this issue.66 alice holmes cooper Table 6. The case of Bosnia also sustains this expectation. 64 per cent of Germans were ready to support the NATO mission to Bosnia. Juhasz (2001) found that 58 per cent of Western Germans and 45 per cent of Eastern Germans supported military enforcement of the UN-imposed no-ﬂy zone in Bosnia in March and October 1993. At most. Thus. the two parliamentary votes in June and December 1995 on the issues mentioned above would have provided the most logical focal points for protest. By late September. with 57 per cent supporting deploying German Tornado ﬁghter jets to support UN peace-keepers in June 1995 and 72 per cent supporting German participation in the NATO peace-keeping mission in December 1995. German public’s attitudes toward INF missiles. Similarly. however. Emnid 1983. with the issue of German participation in such multilateral endeavours. Starting in 1995. The signiﬁcant rise of public support for German participation in 1995 was particularly constraining. The acid test came. Both Juhasz and Sobel found lower levels of support (around 40 per cent) for bombardment of Serb troops (Juhasz 2001) and launching air attacks (Sobel 2000) at those respective times. support for German participation increased dramatically. Sobel (2000) found that 59 per cent of all Germans approved of ‘ﬁght(ing) to get aid convoys through’ in late February 1994 (39 per cent opposed).
media framing and social movement mobilization 67 Table 7. although this support dropped somewhat in the course of the War. On the other hand. The fact that the peace movement achieved moderate mobilization (in comparison to the INF or Bosnia cases) despite high public support for the war would appear to be a paradox. public opinion prior to and during the INF. The ﬁrst two entries measured German support for a potential war waged by the United States-led coalition against Iraq prior to the onset of ﬁghting in mid-January 1991.000 participants in over 140 events (see Figures 1 and 2). Sample-Institut 1995. In the ﬁnal analysis. lution of public opinion may well have helped constrain the peace movement’s mobilization capacity concerning Bosnia. Kaiser and Becher (1992) also draw attention to this. they note the high public support for the war. however. Forsa 1995. as Table 8 shows. Once the ﬁghting began. Infas 1994. it is clear that Germans supported the Gulf War in high numbers (c. German public’s attitudes toward German participation in Western military intervention in Bosnia. but they also characterize the mobilization against the Gulf War as ‘big’ and suggest that it would have been even larger except for the long-held hope that a non-military solution would be found. 75 per cent). The ﬁrst two entries are also inconsistent with each other. the peace movement was able to mobilize some 600. however. Despite this high level of public support for the Gulf War. which may be due to question wording (the October 1990 question measured support for ‘using force to liberate Kuwait’ (Everts 1993). the case of the Gulf War lends little support to the notion that public opinion adequately explains mobilization capacity. Sources: Sobel 2000. Gulf War and Bosnia debates turns out to be an imperfect predictor of the peace movement’s mobilization capacity. 1993–1995 (percentages) Date of interview January 1993 (Western Germans only) 27 April 1994 13 March 1995 6 June 1995 11 December 1995 No 57 56 44 31 (no report) Yes 40 39 49 57 72 Note: the ﬁgures do not add up to 100% because ‘don’t know/no answer’ responses were generally not reported. while the 16 January 1991 question measures support for military attack in the event that Iraq had not withdrawn from Kuwait before the expiration of the UN’s ultimatum). Emnid 1995. Prior public opinion should have prepared more © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 .
but is apparently inconsistent with the mobilization achieved against the Gulf War. Furthermore. part of the explanation for this ‘lag’ lay in the need for the peace movement’s arguments – about the missiles. This credibility was undoubtedly enhanced by the support it found in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung. the same public came to support German participation in the armed NATO peace-keeping mission to Bosnia by 1995. the ﬁrst major demonstration against the missiles did not take place until October 1981 (a full 21 months after the NATO double-track decision was announced in December 1979). 1991b. Arguably. (or equally) hospitable ground for mobilization against German participation in the Bosnia mission than against INF. the above observations dovetail nicely with my central argument. deterrence and the international constellation – to attain credibility with the populace. while the climate of public opinion was © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . Infas 1991a. for example. on the relationship between prior public opinion and the timing of protest with respect to the INF debate. German public’s attitudes toward the Gulf War. 1991b. namely that media framing strongly affects movement mobilization capacity. While part of the (West) German public can be considered receptive a priori to peace movement positions in the missile debate. despite the fact that peace groups began mobilizing in 1980. The effect of media framing sheds light. if not downright opposed to. Similarly. Sources: Everts 1993. These developments were quite plausibly due in part to the lack of support for the movement’s positions in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung. While public opinion undoubtedly plays a certain role in facilitating or constraining mobilization. 1991 (percentages) Date of interview Against (potential) Gulf War 24 79 21 23 37 Support (potential) Gulf War 63 16 75 76 60 October 1990 16 January 1991 29 January 1991 6 February 1991 19 February 1991 Note: ﬁgures do not add up to 100% because ‘don’t know/no answer’ responses were not reported. but mobilization was vastly more successful against the latter than against the former. The evolution of public opinion during the debates themselves seems consistent with the levels of mobilization achieved (or not) during the INF and Bosnia debates. German participation in ‘out of area’ military involvement through 1993. although the German public was at best highly ambivalent about. The peace movement’s chances to mobilize against participation in the Bosnia mission were also low.68 alice holmes cooper Table 8. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1991a.
e. While some conservatives advocated that Germany become so ‘normal’ as to pursue its national interests unilaterally. the peace movement was able to mobilize considerable protest against the Gulf War with the help of media framing in two of the organs read most often by those with high protest potential. German foreign and security policy has undergone a certain ‘normalization’ (Otte & Greve 2000. including the commitment to participate in multinational military missions ‘out of area’ (i. Since the Cold War ended. whereas the absence of congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and movement framing helped hinder mobilization against Bosnia. It was also reluctantly accepted as of 1995 by most of the Social Democratic leadership and roughly half of the leadership of the Greens.media framing and social movement mobilization 69 favourable to both the Gulf War and German participation in the Bosnia mission. There is indeed an apparent correlation between the internal consistency of elite cues on the left and the peace movement’s ability to mobilize. Cooper 1997).. an argument concerning elite cues. Thus. This argument intersects with an additional possible explanation of the peace movement’s incapacity in 1995. The issue of normalization intersected with the issue of elite cues on the left since normalization entailed the acceptance of German involvement in military missions on the left as well as the right. This was advocated relatively quickly by the conservative-liberal coalition that governed until 1998. ‘Normalization’ of German foreign policy and elite cues on the left Yet another possible explanation for the peace movement’s inability to mobilize against German participation in the NATO mission to Bosnia (in contrast to its earlier successes) exists: that German foreign policy had undergone a process of ‘normalization’ by 1995 which changed attitudes held by political parties and the general public concerning the use of military force. even when majority public opinion worked against it. the deep divisions among left elites over the Bosnia mission discouraged mobilization against it. most of the German political class equates normality with multilateralism. Dufﬁeld 1998. beyond NATO territory). The most prominent ﬁgures of the left were virtually united against the INF missiles and relatively united during the © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . the congruence between Taz/Spiegel framing and peace movement framing facilitated the movement’s reasonably successful mobilization against the Gulf War. the fact that left elites were solidly united against the INF missiles and relatively united against the Gulf War facilitated mobilization of rank-and-ﬁle potential protestors. By contrast. Gordon 1994). potential peace protestors respond to cues emanating from leftwing elites. Thus. According to this argument. but only after sharp restrictions were placed on German deployment (McKenzie 1996.
Instead. the nature of the cause also played a large role for pro-interventionists on the left. acceptance of ‘out of area’ military involvement evolved only gradually and as the result of a highly conﬂicted process. It is at this point that my argument about the congruence between media framing and movement framing comes in. For them. willingness to sanction force in Bosnia was catalyzed by the fall of Srebrenica and other UN-protected zones. this skepticism was slowly overcome by several countervailing factors. and the subsequent Serbian massacre of Bosnian Muslim civilians (Maull 2000). in particular within the left parties and public opinion (Cooper 1997). rather than constituting an automatic response to the lifting of Cold War constraints on policy. Thus. In addition. Joschka Fischer of the Greens most notably among them. Banchoff 1999). In the 1990–1995 period. Why did parts of the left elite change their collective minds about the use of force and communicate this to their compatriots in the citizenry at large? By 1995. Judging from the rhetoric concerning the NATO mission to Bosnia. and the UN to become more involved in peace-keeping and peace enforcement. These pressures brought into play two norms of German foreign policy: namely the desire to be a reliable partner in the above-mentioned institutions and the desire to avoid a Sonderweg. the Social Democrats and the Greens were very deeply divided over German participation in Western intervention by the time the crucial parliamentary votes were taken in June and December of 1995. Dufﬁeld (1998) attributes this resistance to the persistence of a ‘postwar national security culture’ (similarly described by Berger 1998) characterized by deep-seated skepticism toward the appropriateness and utility of military force. Germany experienced pressures from NATO. Prominent ﬁgures on the left.70 alice holmes cooper brief conduct of the Gulf War (although deeper splits became apparent in ‘post-mortem’ debates conducted after the Gulf War). The course of ‘normalization’ on the political left can not be divorced from the concrete cases in which military intervention was under debate. the left © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . which engaged the ‘never again Auschwitz’ tenet (the dictum to prevent genocide) of the left’s postwar political culture (Cooper 1997). the left’s former antiAmericanism was not a hindrance to support for intervention this time. a unilateral course of action (even a peaceful one) on the international stage (Dufﬁeld 1998. along with its desire that Germany remain a ‘civilian power’ (Maull 2000). spoke out in favour of Western use of force. as an explanation that complements and interacts with a focus on ‘normalization’ and elite cues. they viewed the NATO missions to Bosnia as motivated by humanitarian concerns rather than sordid power-political considerations. Otte & Greve 2000. However. in the Bosnian case. the EU.
with respect to Bosnia).) Coverage of these statements in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung is included in the articles coded for this analysis and adds to the frequency of the ‘pro-intervention’ coded utterances captured in Figures 7 and 8. statements supporting German participation in NATO missions by key ﬁgures on the left received ample press coverage in Der Spiegel and Die Tageszeitung as well as other media. They were particularly newsworthy because they generated intense conﬂict within the SPD and Greens. because these events followed three years’ worth of reporting and commentary on (primarily) Serbian barbarism in the Balkans. And how did rank-and-ﬁle potential protesters pick up these transformed elite cues. Moreover. such a claim has a great deal of merit. (Political opportunities are the features of the political context that affect movements’ emergence and success. A number of components of political opportunity. Instead. Where left-elite cues were divided (e. enhanced the peace movement’s mobilization capacity against the INF © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . potential protestors are not simply passive recipients of elite cues which they duly translate into activism or lack thereof. Although elite views did not receive any special weight in the coding process.media framing and social movement mobilization 71 elite’s perceptions of the Bosnian conﬂict and the NATO missions had been at least partially formed by approximately four years of media framing of the Balkan conﬂict. they weigh these cues in conjunction with other sources of their perceptions of issues. (The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) opposed the NATO missions without much internal controversy and did not attract as much media attention. and especially their overall conﬁguration. potential protestors on the left may have given more heed to pro-interventionists like Fischer because these views were more consistent with the cumulative trend of media reporting.) Indeed. Political opportunity structure A ﬁnal possible alternative explanation might be that the ‘political opportunity structure’ was better for the peace movement during the INF missile debate than during either the Gulf War or the Bosnia debate. including that by die Tageszeitung and der Spiegel as outlined in previous sections. The fall of Srebrenica and the other ‘safe areas’ served as the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back of resistance to German participation in multilateral military missions abroad.. and because they broke with the left’s consensus on anti-militarism. including media coverage. they were amply discussed in der Spiegel and die Tageszeitung and thus had a cumulative impact on both the readers and the coding for this article. in addition to their impressions of the Balkans conﬂict itself? Naturally.g.
By contrast. as demonstrated by massive press coverage. This difference in political opportunities also helps explain an apparent anomaly in the relationship between framing congruence and mobilization capacity. levels of ‘protest potential’ were high in society at large. Furthermore. many peace movement positions had become institutionalized in two of the left-wing parties: the Social Democrats and the Greens (the Eastern German PDS also maintained anti-militarist policies. other than the engineering of uniﬁcation itself. this general decline of protest on the left may well have dampened protest on peace issues during the 1990s. in the 1990s. political opportunities for peace movement mobilization against both the Gulf War and Bosnia were less favourable overall. On the positive side. (The anti-foreigner protest on the extreme right during this period would not be expected to feed into peace protest. the issue was salient in each case. the issue of ‘peace’ squeezed out any competitors for mobilization energies in the extra-parliamentary arena. Moreover. to the reduction in the peace movement’s capacity to mobilize in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s.72 alice holmes cooper missiles. protest with respect to ‘new social movement’ issues like environmentalism had subsided since the 1980s and ‘post-material’ issues had lost ground to the material ones of uniﬁcation (Della Porta & Rucht 1995. and these reduced opportunities dampened mobilization capacity independently of framing effects.) On the more negative side. and in insti© European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . the popularity of uniﬁcation in 1990 should have dampened protest against the Gulf War more than against German involvement in Bosnia. (If anything. Both of these negative aspects of political opportunity can be assumed to have contributed.) In addition. independently of the effects of media framing. Veen & Zelle 1995). and government social. in particular if this decline reﬂected a deterioration of the informal networks that had contributed to the organizational basis and ‘micromobilization contexts’ (McAdam 1988) for peace protest in the 1980s. Variations in levels of active protest potential. In comparison to the 1980s. The ‘Overall’ category in Figures 5 and 6 show Taz and Spiegel framing of the Gulf War to be almost as congruent with peace movement framing as was the case with the INF missiles. The movement had a salient issue with which to work. One can plausibly argue that this institutionalization dampened enthusiasm for extra-parliamentary mobilization in the 1990s. no other overriding issues competed in the extra-parliamentary arena with protest against either the Gulf War or Bosnia. albeit from a different historical perspective). whereas mobilization was considerably lower. by the 1990s. economic and foreign policy as a whole was already relatively unpopular (Cooper 1996). the Kohl government’s policies were not known for widespread popularity in the 1990s. its positions were not co-opted by conventional politics or the major parties.
moreover.e. the negative aspects of political opportunity which prevailed throughout the ﬁrst half of the 1990s were ‘held constant’ and thus cannot explain the differences in the peace movement’s mobilization capacity against the Gulf War versus the NATO mission to Bosnia. On the other hand. The Gulf War case was more complicated. Where congruence between media framing and movement framing was relatively low. and it should not per se have dampened mobilization against Bosnia had potential protestors been so moved. Conclusion This article has demonstrated a reasonably strong relationship between media framing and peace groups’ capacity to mobilize with respect to the INF missiles. Signiﬁcant levels of congruence between media and movement framing were associated with medium. The signiﬁcant differences in mobilization capacity against the Gulf War in comparison to Bosnia are thus not attributable to decisive differences in political opportunity between the two cases. Although worse (more mixed) in the 1990s than in the 1980s. the Gulf War and the NATO mission to Bosnia. as in the NATO mission to Bosnia. Where congruence between media framing and movement framing was quite high. may also have dampened protest. The short duration of the Gulf War conﬂict. mobilization was also high. ‘in-between’ levels of protest which was probably © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . they have an independent effect on mobilization capacity).media framing and social movement mobilization 73 tutionalization of movement positions in party platforms. political opportunities were roughly the same for peace groups hoping to mobilize against either the Gulf War or Bosnia.. mobilization was also low. as in the INF missile debate. the existing political opportunities should have permitted mobilization in both cases if it was possible in either case individually. comparisons of peace movement mobilization against the Gulf War and Bosnia suggest that levels of convergence between media framing and movement framing do matter (i. An important difference between the Gulf War and Bosnia lay in media support for movement frames which facilitated moderate mobilization against the Gulf War but virtually none against the NATO mission to Bosnia. While it is not surprising that mobilization in both cases was lower than in the 1980s. probably reduced the level of potential protest. Institutionalization of ‘peacenik’ orientations in the SPD and Greens. and particularly the active ﬁghting. The candlelight marches in 1991 and 1992 against violence toward foreigners demonstrated that the ‘right’ issue could still mobilize a certain level of protest on the left. Instead. did not stop numerous Social Democrats and Greens from protesting against the Gulf War.
Mary Hampton. For constructive comments. since social movement organizations can only partially inﬂuence media framing of issues. I am also extremely grateful to John Adham. At the same time. media framing contributes to the context. To survive or maintain their inﬂuence. Since the 1960s. But peace groups’ old package was stressed by its apparent inability to offer plausible diagnostic framing of the nature of the Bosnian conﬂict or credible prognostic framing of appropriate responses to the conﬂict there. and perhaps particularly for instrumental movements that focus primarily on policy issues rather than on sub-cultural identity or countercultures. making it one of the more volatile components of political opportunity (Gamson & Meyer 1996). Peter Hall. In short. Manfred Lieb. moreover. which expands or constricts political space for movements. movements’ interpretive packages must be able to incorporate new events or developments plausibly. Ebbs and ﬂows in the levels of congruence between media and movement framing therefore contribute to an explanation of varying mobilization capacity over time. as argued above. Media framing as part of political opportunity structure can constrain the framing options of challenging groups. Media framing can change signiﬁcantly over time. given Taz and Spiegel framing. Lee Ann Banaszak.74 alice holmes cooper dampened. Framing as a strategic social movement activity may not be inﬁnitely malleable. Thus. ‘imperialistic’ images of the United States. or the ‘political opportunity structure’. suggestions and encouragement. This can be hard. peace groups and the German left in general had subscribed to a view of the world that stressed (among other things): negative. the absolute necessity of preventing war in the nuclear age. by less favourable political opportunities in other respects. This package could be superbly adapted to the speciﬁcs of the INF missile issue and reasonably well to the Gulf War. and détente as the only viable means of managing the East-West conﬂict and providing security for Europe. Alan Melchior. Paulette Kurzer. media framing of issues can matter tremendously for social movements’ capacity to mobilize. Charles Amegan. Pierre Landry. for many peace groups. Matthew Baum. © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . They must also be able to offer interpretations of new developments that are consistent with their past story line. relinquishing paciﬁsm would have presumably seemed a sacriﬁce of their very identity. Acknowledgments I with to express heartfelt thanks to Dr Dieter Rucht for the data stemming from the ‘Prodat’ project at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin on protest events and numbers of participants from 1980–1993.
8. 4. In the Gulf War. including in Bosnia. Mary Stuckey. Media are. I coded all Taz articles relevant to the Gulf War in every fourth issue. public action by non-state actors which expresses criticism and formulates a social or political demand. At the same time. mass demonstrations and marches. David Meyer. etc. Turkey’s Kurdish policy. following ‘Prodat’ procedures. Barbara Pfetsch. at least in such general terms as ‘conservative’. in part. I coded all relevant articles for every ﬁfth issue. Arms exports. 2. Opposition to German participation in ‘out of area’ military missions beyond NATO territory. the battle lines were largely the same except for some notable defections of the left to support of the Gulf War. 3. court suits.5 to 4. During the INF missile debate of the early 1980s. This estimate is based on the ratio of readers-per-copies-sold of the major German daily newspapers: 2.2 readers per copy (Taz 1994). (Rucht et al. both of which are necessary for action mobilization. Singh. In the case of Bosnia. due to the longer duration of the conﬂict and the six-days-per-week appearance schedule. moreover. I owe thanks to Dr Dieter Rucht for the data stemming from the ‘Prodat’ project at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin on protest events and participation from 1980–1993. 9. the pro-intervention side included the government. a site of struggle in the competition between movements and others in the construction of social reality. strikes and sit-ins. the Tageszeitung archive and four anonymous reviewers for the EJPR. brochures. ‘centrist’. while the antiintervention side included peace groups and other parts of the left (Cooper 1996. I coded every third issue of die Tageszeitung for the INF debate. the most prominent German newspapers and news magazines are characterized by identiﬁable ideological stances. For the Bosnia issue. although movements can help shape media discourse. and French and Chinese nuclear weapons tests were other themes of peace protest in 1994 and 1995. Klandermans (1988) considers social networks as the locus for consensus formation and consensus mobilization. Notes 1. To a signiﬁcantly greater extent than in the United States. 1992). 7. 5. conservatives supported the government and peace groups garnered support from virtually the entire political left. More precisely. J. I owe thanks to Mary Stuckey for introducing me to works cited in this paragraph.) The ‘Prodat’ project deﬁnes protest events as collective. 6. taking into account the relatively short duration of the conﬂict and the fact that by 1990 die Taz was appearing six days per week. the years in which the question of German participation in NATO efforts became most acute. media discourse also dominates the larger issue culture within which social movements have to contend (Gamson & Modigliani 1989). Cooper 1997). © European Consortium for Political Research 2002 . land mines. P. or ‘left’. Carol Mershon. conservatives and parts of the political left. because during this period die Taz appeared only ﬁve days per week. Action forms considered part of protest events include petitions. constituted a theme of protest in fewer than half of the total peace protests for 1994 or 1995.media framing and social movement mobilization 75 Marybeth Melchior. Here I focus on the independent impact of media and movement framing of issues. (I assembled the data for 1994–1995 myself.
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