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The new regionalism in Southern Africa Fredrik Söderbaum Department of Peace and Development Research Göteborg University ABSTRACT Drawing on the new regionalism approach (NRA) this article shows that Southern Africa is undergoing a deep transformation process. There are many regionalisms and regionalisations, which are all interacting with global, national and sub-national actors and processes. Regionalism in Southern Africa needs to be understood in relation to the transformation of the world and the global economy and to the restructuring (and crisis) of the nation-state. With regard to security regionalism, each country is interdependent with a regional security order and the major security threats are political, social, economic and environmental rather than military in character, and derive more from internal than external factors. Concerning developmental regionalism, it is often claimed that regionalism is a political response to economic globalisation - that is the return of the political and protectionism - and what is preferred depends simply on ideological position. This article suggests a more complex picture, inter alia highlighting that political, `formal' regionalism may also reinforce economic globalisation; that `spontaneous', market- and society-induced processes of regionalisation must not be neglected and should be related to economic globalisation and political regionalism. INTRODUCTION Southern Africa is clearly in a state of flux, and the region is being shaped by a great variety of dynamics. It is not only a pluralism of regionalisms and regionalisations, but these simultaneously interact in a complex game with other processes, such as globalisation, nation-/state-building and disintegration, which suggests that understanding will be enhanced by using the region as the main unit of analysis. The aim of this article is therefore, in an overview manner and a multilevel perspective, to analyse the origins, dynamics and consequences of regionalism(s) in Southern Africa in various fields of activity and combined. In doing so I will draw on the new regionalism approach (NRA), which has proved to be a useful, albeit open-ended, analytical tool for understanding the [75] dynamics shaping emerging regions elsewhere (see Hettne & Söderbaum in this issue; Hettne & Inotai 1994; Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel 1998, vol I-V). Given the recent development of NRA and the two-way traffic between theory and practice, it is assumed that the experience of Southern Africa will simultaneously contribute to further theory-building. The content of NRA should not be repeated here, but a few clarifications seems appropriate since the study of regionalism is both contested and emotionally loaded. The task at hand is to understand the transformation processes shaping Southern Africa in a historical, multidimensional and multilevel perspective, using an eclectic theoretical mixture of strands of international relations/international political economy theory, regional integration theory and development theory. [1] It is thus not the level of regional cooperation and integration per se which is in focus, but rather the `whys' and `hows' of regionalisms and regionalisations, that is, increasing and decreasing levels of `regionness' and to what extent Southern Africa is being `Southern Africanised'. There are two main overlapping ways of understanding regionalism: the role of the region towards the rest of the world and the internal dynamics of a particular region. Both are considered here. This aim does not imply that regionalism is a `good thing'. Although this may very well be the case, a regional world order is not necessarily to be preferred to a Westphalian or a globalised order, and regionalism may be the source of conflict, exploitation and de-development in some parts of the region. However, it is equally important to understand why and how a region disintegrates. The simple point of departure here is that regionalism is an interesting phenomenon which we need to learn more about. Furthermore, although the states (that is governments) are important actors in the process of regionalisation, and will be given due attention, it is necessary to transcend conventional state-centric, top-down, de jure perspectives of regionalisation - that is, the `formal' region - and take into consideration the non-state actors, bottom-up, de facto forces from the market and civil society - that is, the `informal' or spontaneous region. [2] The distinction is important because the various processes are not necessarily mutually reinforcing. By the same token, the ideology of regionalism should be distinguished from the process of regionalisation. Since there are many regionalisms and regionalisations, there are also competing definitions of regions, which makes it necessary to maintain some flexibility on the delineation of Southern Africa. This `problem' (for some analysts) will automatically disappear hand in hand with increasing or decreasing levels of regionness. The area covering the member states of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) - Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland - constitutes a rather sophisticated region in many important respects. However, it is fruitful to view Southern Africa in a wider perspective. A pragmatic and commonly used delineation, albeit changing over time, has been the member [76] countries of the SADC(C), plus South Africa before 1994. [3] Today it seems that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has reached (beyond?) the boundaries of `Southern Africa', and the inclusion of, for instance, Mauritius and Seychelles, but also Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania, in this group suggests a thin line towards East and Central Africa. From this perspective the SACU area can be understood as the minimum definition of Southern Africa, and SADC as the maximum. The article is outlined as follows. As a common point of departure, the main processes of change at various levels shaping Southern Africa as a region are briefly described. The analysis is concretised in the following two sections by a focus on security and developmental regionalism respectively. With regard to the former, the broadening of the security

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agenda, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and regional interventions in the domestic affairs of some other states are elaborated upon. The analysis on developmental regionalism suggests that contemporary regionalism in Southern Africa needs to be understood in relation to the structural transformation of the global economy as well as the restructuring of the nation-state. The role of South Africa in Southern Africa is also elaborated upon. Finally, the strings are drawn together and the similarities and differences between security and developmental regionalism are considered. CHANGE IN AND OF SOUTHERN AFRICA The role of the regional factor in Southern Africa had already grown strong during the colonial era, although colonialism of course also divided the region. South Africa was very much at the centre of gravity, mainly as a result of the discovery of gold and diamonds in the late nineteenth century, and gradually intensified its efforts to transform the region to suit its own needs by way of labour migration, mining expansion, trade, transport and communication etc. When the process of decolonialism was initiated, one important line of division ran between the independent majorityruled states and a gradually disappearing block of the Portuguese colonies and the white minority-ruled states, led by apartheid South Africa. The apartheid conflict shaped much of regional relations and had a devastating impact not only within South Africa but on the other countries as well, especially Mozambique and Angola. External actors were also deeply involved in the region; that is, the superpowers and their allies, the rest of Africa, a large part of the rest of the world, as well as transnational corporations (TNCs), which reveals that apartheid and regional divisions could not be separated from the Cold War logic and other systemic processes. In fact, the simultaneous existence of apartheid and global bipolarity created a vicious circle of war, conflict, poverty and disaster. With regard to `formal' regionalisation schemes in Southern Africa, such as the Front Line States (FLS); SACU/CMA; SADCC, these were used mainly as instruments in the larger power struggle. The ventures were dominated by state[77] actors in a top-down manner, and the private economic actors and civil society were involved to the extent that they promoted the national interests of their home governments. This implied that South African-based businesses were penetrating the rest of the region, often with active support from the government, while the neighbouring countries tried (but failed) to resist increased dependency. With regard to civil society, human interaction and solidarity it was rather the other way around. The neighbouring states supported the liberation movement in South Africa while the apartheid regime tried in all possible and impossible ways to prevent them from doing so. In the broadest sense the `old' regionalism in Southern Africa could only be understood in the context of the ideologised climate of the Cold War and apartheid and `in terms of a series of oppositional positionings: inside/outside; black/white; us/them; good/evil; etc' (Swatuk 1996:3). Today bipolarity and apartheid (formally) are gone, which means that the region is in the process of being transfigured from an unstable, conflict formation towards something 'new', or at least different. In several respects, the changes are for the better, although we do not yet know what the outcome is. There is a complex mixture of interacting processes at various analytical levels. Since Southern Africa does not exist in a vacuum, the end of the bipolar Cold War structure does not mean that the global system forces have disappeared. On the contrary, in accordance with the old regionalism, the contemporary phenomenon must be understood in a global perspective, and the effects of transnationalisation and globalisation of trade, production and finance, the reorientation of development ideology and the (mainly) externally imposed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), together with the hegemony of political and economic liberalism have a profound impact on regionalisation. Regionalism is also linked to the national level. As a project it must be understood from the perspective of the states and in the context of the restructuring of the nation-state. Regionalism can be an offensive instrument for facilitating the integration of the national economies (and the region) more closely into the world economy and exploiting the opportunities of globalisation, mainly through the generation of external and internal investment and trade. Regionalism is also to be conceived as a defensive strategy to organise and retake political initiative in an often hostile global economy and in order to avoid further marginalisation. Although contemporary processes of regionalism contain a strong political element, the new regionalism contrasts sharply with the old. The former is compatible with and reinforces the current globalisation of the world economy, and it is characterised by openness, interdependence and inclusiveness, whereas the latter was founded on an explicit competition with globalism, and the promotion of import substitution on a regional scale, protectionism, collective self-reliance and the reduction of dependency and exclusiveness. [4] As already indicated, regionalisation cannot be separated from processes within [78] the individual countries. One important aspect of this is that the economic policies and political systems have converged and become more similar during the last decade(s), mainly as a consequence of SAPs, economic reform programmes and the changed development ideology in general. These processes of policy convergence and homogenisation, `the elimination of extremes', have considerably improved the conditions for regionalism and regionalisation in Southern Africa. However, neoliberalism and SAPs favour unilateral development strategies, which somewhat paradoxically has led to regional disintegration, fragmentation, deindustrialisation and increased differences in the region. In addition, the SAPs and reform programmes are founded on the ideology of `the rolling back of the state', which reduces the potential not only for state-driven regionalism but also for market and society-induced integration, since the two depend on each other. These aspects will be further elaborated upon in the section on developmental regionalism. SECURITY REGIONALISM With the end of the Cold War together with that of apartheid, the two most important sources of insecurity in Southern Africa have disappeared. The conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and elsewhere in the region cannot be understood without taking into account the disastrous effects of the bipolar Cold War structure and apartheid. External powers, particularly the USA and TNCs, have kept on intervening in regional and national affairs, for instance in Angola, Congo and Mozambique, and they are likely to continue to affect and shape the region after the end of the Cold War and apartheid. This is rather 'natural' since the new (as well as the old) regionalism is (was) closely intermixed with the systemic forces at large. Nevertheless, as long as the regional and national security regimes serve

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the major global power interests and their demand for natural resources and global stability, it is reasonable to argue that the room for manoeuvre has increased since the end of the Cold War. The patterns of regional security interdependencies have changed. Although real and potential conflicts, security threats and exploitation still exist, a large-scale inter-state war in Southern Africa is not foreseeable. The extremely strong military capacity of South Africa has given rise to tensions and there are also some minor territorial disputes between some countries, for instance between Botswana and Namibia over islands in the Chobe river. These and similar disputes may possibly escalate into conflicts and strategic interventions, such as a temporary closure of borders and high-level rhetorics, but Southern Africa is no longer to be understood in terms of the conventional power-security dilemma or other militaristic logic. In so far as intergovernmental relations are concerned, Southern Africa has been transformed from an explosive security complex towards a security [79] community with cooperative relations, that is, the level of regionness has increased. The Southern African states `respect', although perhaps don't trust, one another, which has clearly improved the potential for security. As elaborated on below, the states are cooperating in various ways and acknowledge that an increasingly interdependent international and regional system necessitates increased security cooperation as opposed to unilateralism and a military logic (Swatuk & Omari 1997:6). When moving beyond intergovernmental relations, Southern Africa is not of course a security community. The debate on regional security in Southern Africa is not so much concerned with intergovernmental regional relations but focuses instead on a broad set of mostly 'new' or previously buttressed security threats, such as population growth; the environment and the competition for scarce natural resources; mass migration; food shortage; drugs; disease and Aids; ethnocentric nationalism; crime and small arms proliferation; the crisis of liberal democracy; the role of the armed forces; poverty and economic marginalisation (Booth & Vale 1995; Cawthra 1997; Cilliers & Mills 1995; Ohlsson & Stedman 1994; Swatuk & Omari 1997; Vale 1996; Van Ardt 1996, 1997). As Solomon and Cilliers (1997:194) correctly point out: `Wider more nuanced conceptions of security therefore constitute a more adequate conceptual `fit' with the realities confronting Southern Africa.' The broadening of the security agenda is intimately related to the fact that the states can themselves be sources of insecurity. The internal domestic conflicts constitute some of the main sources of insecurity in Southern Africa. The most violent of the recent conflicts are those in Angola, Mozambique, Congo, KwaZulu Natal, but the situation is also potentially explosive in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, etc. In these contexts, order is upheld mainly with power and by the armed forces. Of course the population in the countries are most affected, but most conflicts have a more or less strong regional dimension. They spill over into neighbouring states in one way or another, thus causing regional instability, once again drawing attention to the interplay between the regional and the national. As Laurie Nathan (1993:5) has pointed out, each country is interdependent with a regional security order and `many of the major threats to the countries of the region are political, social, economic and environmental rather than military in character, and derive more from internal than external factors'. There is intense ongoing debate in Southern Africa - amongst states, civil society, NGOs, donors, academics and research institutions - on how to address the new security problems. One concrete outcome which deserves to be treated in detail is the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security After lengthy discussions and several proposals that came to nothing, in June [80] 1996 the SADC leaders agreed on the establishment of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (Van Aardt 1996, 1997). The organ is still in its infancy and much is yet to be settled. According to its founding declaration, the organ is to abide by the same principles as SADC, including the sovereign equality of all member states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the observance of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It will operate at summit level, but also on ministerial and technical levels. The chairmanship of the organ should rotate on an annual and on a troika basis (in contrast to the three-year basis of the SADC chair). The organ is (likely) to function separately from other SADC structures and the SADC Secretariat. It is not clear whether the organ will require a permanent secretariat, but it seems that the country chairing the organ will perform the functions of the secretariat. One of the strengths and novel features of the SADC organ is its comprehensive and multisectoral approach to peace and security, which is based inter alia on military confidence, conflict prevention and resolution, political stability, home affairs, police and intelligence, foreign policy, social justice, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and minorities, as well as other problems that have regional implications, such as arms and drug smuggling, organised crime and migrant labour. The organ's purpose should also be understood in relation to SADC's other leg which focuses on regional economic development and integration. The objectives of the SADC organ can be structured according to table 1. SADC clearly has a long way to go before achieving these ambitions. Things are made even more difficult because the declaration establishing the organ was short on its formalisation and implementation. The institutional structure is still being debated. The existing Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) - originally launched within the structure of the FLS - provides a nascent coordinating and planning structure to start from (Van Aardt 1996, 1997). ISDSC is a forum in which ministers responsible for defence, home affairs, public security and state security meet to discuss issues relating to their individual and collective defence and security. It now includes all the SADC member states, and it functions effectively on a technical level, with a plethora of committees and sub-committees which meet as required or agreed, usually in the country chairing the committee concerned. The ISDSC operates fairly informally, with the country chairing performing the work of the secretariat. Most of the work is carried out by three subcommittees: defence, public security (policing) and state security (intelligence). The ISDSC represents a state-centric approach to security, and it remains to be seen if and how ISDSC will be integrated within the broader framework of the SADC organ (or perhaps vice versa). The SADC organ as such is also state-centric and designed to promote the national interests and enhance the political stability of the existing regimes.

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Fears have been expressed in the security debate that the SADC organ cements a conventional security paradigm and authoritarian regimes [81] Table 1 The objectives of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security

SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security
Military/ Defence protect against instability from within or outside its borders Crime prevention close cooperation to deal with cross-border crime Intelligence close cooperation Foreign policy promote cooperation and common political value systems and institutions to deal with cross-border crime develop foreign policy and a joint international lobby conflict prevention, management and resolution Human rights develop democratic institutions and practices

develop a collective security capacity

promote communitybased approach

provide early warning

encourage observance of universal human rights encourage and monitor international human rights conventions and treaties provide early warning

conclude Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external threats develop a regional peacekeeping capacity

mediate in inter- and intra-state disputes and conflicts promote preventive diplomacy and mechanisms, with punitive measures as a last resort provide early warning encourage and monitor international arms control/ disarmament conventions and treaties coordinate participation in peace operations address extra-regional conflicts which impact on the region

By the same token. Another case in point is the strong pressure on the Renamo leader. Afonso Dlakhama. `the elections are only fair if I win'. The goal was to ensure that the Savimbi syndrome was not repeated. The same three leaders continued to follow developments and were reported to be prepared to take action with respect to the brief coup attempt in February 1996 (Anglin 1997:62). Botswana and Zimbabwe successfully issued an ultimatum to the then king. Another example. In addition. and any . These examples are important because intervention in the affairs of another state challenges the conventional understanding of national sovereignty: a principle fundamental to the organisation of the prevailing Westphalian system. South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki rushed to Mozambique in response to a rumour that Dlakhama was plotting a coup. A common foreign policy framework is also being discussed. which would support the argument that international diplomacy increasingly will be conducted on a region-to-region basis rather than the more cumbersome and largely ineffective Westphalian state-tostate principle.have paid fatherly visits to King Mswati III to [83] caution him about continuing to resist popular demands for democratic reforms to his archaic monarchy (Anglin 1997). Solomon & Cilliers 1997). in October the year after. that is.Mandela. Mbeki quickly established that it was just a rumour (Anglin 1997:61--62). is when the leaders of South Africa. referring also to Lesotho. Furthermore. when he unconstitutionally dissolved. the three presidents mentioned above . They illustrate that national boundaries are no longer sacrosanct. However. social change. Masire and Mugabe . for example gender relations. national disintegration and domestic opposition. which may be counterproductive to many of the new security issues discussed above as well as positive peace. since March 1996.5 (Malan & Cilliers 1997) [82] in the name of `stability' and `order'. Although it is unrealistic to expect that the stated objectives of the SADC organ for collective security and ultimately even collective defence will be realised in the foreseeable future. Yet another intervention was undertaken with regard to the political situation in Swaziland where. by a number of SADC governments in October 1994. with the possible exception of Angola. the interventions cannot `realistically' be explained as an abandonment of the national interest as the guiding principle. From a more conservative standpoint. Regional interventions In the last few years several domestic conflicts have been `smoothened' or `solved' through external interventions by some of the SADC members. changes have materialised (Cawthra 1997. The doubts seem justified because there are no indications known to the author if and how the state-centric and militaristic approach to security inherent in the SADC organ should be transcended in order to integrate civil society and other relevant actors which peace ultimately depends on. The first intervention was conducted in June 1994 when South Africa and the FLS members threatened to send forces into Lesotho to control intra-force fighting. but perhaps as a joint pooling of sovereignty and an instrument to collectively secure the interests of the existing national regimes against political instability. Having said this. From a radical perspective the interventions may possibly be interpreted as that international actors are starting to think in terms of a new world order. although they do not quite know what kind of world order. Letsie III. the rural poor and other marginalised groups in society. that governments acknowledge that they are interdependent on each other for security and seek to cooperate in order to collectively defend their security should not be underestimated. The regional interventions in the internal affairs of another state are also interesting phenomena. the interventions have been undertaken by the strongest regional powers in the weakest countries of the region. some joint military training operations have also been undertaken in Southern Africa lately. the parliament and government. when he threatened to withdraw from the elections in Mozambique.

which supports the argument that `power' and (military) `strength' still shape the region. for instance in the field of beverages and brewery. such as transport and communications. Although the governments. the myth of free markets and liberalisation in all possible forms has dominated for the last two decades. with emphasis on external and internal liberalisation. of course. but how they relate and are constructed in relation to each another. Neither globalisation nor regionalisation can be approached in the singular form. commerce. the constraints of SAPs and the global economy in general. For instance. Those not trained according to the Washington doctrine acknowledge that a market cannot function effectively in the absence of a legal and guiding framework which can make the market function effectively. If the current albeit embryonic trend in the field of economics and international political economy continues. has been a political elite project which has tended to live a life of its own.but only to a certain extent. there seems to be an emerging paradox in the sense that the objective on the part of the governments is to consolidate the states internally while the strategies to do so are centrifugal and challenge the Westphalian rationality they strive to uphold. Private economic actors are now getting more closely involved in sectors previously under the main jurisdiction of governments. Botswana and probably also Zambia is unforeseeable. perhaps a balance between a 'new realism' and a post-Westphalian notion of national sovereignty. banking. The states may favour certain aspects of liberalisation and the development of (regional) markets . delinking. They are also executing and financing much of several important infrastructural projects in the region. the interventions suggest that there might be a 'new' interpretation of sovereignty in the making. There are different visions of what is and should be the relationship between [84] globalisation and regionalisation. SACU. The debate on the preferred type of developmental regionalism overlaps very much the classical debate on the role of the state in economic development. State-led regionalism in Southern Africa. will continue to be crucial actors in the regionalisation process. Many observers and institutions argue that a closer integration of the Southern African economies into the global economy promotes economic development. From the perspective of political leaders and most policy-makers development cannot be reduced to liberalisation. The Washington view is largely consistent with the cross-border initiative (CBI). mining. During the last decade the role of political authority has been downplayed to the benefit of a strategy which is opening up to the demands of private economic actors and (possibly) civil society.the building block argument . Given the commitments agreed on under the WTO formula. which is consistent with the NRA of this article.6 intervention in South Africa. This is the `Washington view' of the new regionalism as opposed to the NRA (see Hettne & Söderbaum. as exemplified by the current hegemony of neoliberalism. and the productive sectors. it seems that we are dealing with different layers of globalisms and regionalisms which are engaged in a complex and multifold dynamic. trade.is not desirable. As a result the much-needed framework for promoting the market and society-induced processes of . It should be mentioned that the private economic forces have been reacting faster to the new situation than the states and the political actors. All observers do not advocate `liberalisation' as the main means of developmental regionalism. with increased emphasis on the role of the state for development. Although there are competing opinions on the preferred balance between liberalisation and the role of a legal and political framework for developmental regionalism. the governments in Southern Africa have tried for a long time to direct and plan the process of regionalisation. and SADC. it should be recognised that there are relatively small differences between the various visions dominating the debate in Southern Africa. As mentioned. when in fact liberalisation prevails on all levels and in all sectors. is not so much what process is dominant. the former SADCC was solely based on political and bureaucratic decisions. and Odén in this issue). DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISM [5] Regionalism in the field of economic development has certainly not been isolated from the global system level. particularly of trade barriers (CBI 1995). consistent with the NRA. Even if the 'new' (or perhaps the `old') realist rationality will dominate. The new. Many South African businesses have well-developed regional strategies. perhaps even stronger than in the old world order. The old conception of collective self-reliance. The states have signed cooperation agreements and protocols in various fora and sectors. the analysis of both must be more effectively integrated into the analytical framework. that is CBI. often separated from market demands and civil society.the stumbling block . Comesa. of course. but it is difficult to discover the protectionism the advocates of the Washington view are so obsessed with. the strength of the Washington view will gradually be reduced in [85] favour of a political economy approach to developmental regionalism. Zimbabwe. Even though room for manoeuvre has increased in several respects since the end of bipolarity. often within the framework of SADC. is not independent of the old. SAPs and `debt'. that is states and markets are interdependent. however. Rather than dichotomising them in terms of economic globalisation versus political regionalism. but the process is (too) slow and inefficient. Irrespective of what kind of principle and order will shape Southern Africa in the future. accept `globalisation' and `liberalisation' in many forms. that is regionalisation that prevents globalisation . which was the case in the 1960s and 1970s. the debate centres mainly on the possibility of proceeding with regional trade integration at a faster pace compared to external trade liberalisation. Even the advocates of a more interventionist regionalism. The neoliberal paradigm with the rolling back of the state. there are relatively few arguments for protectionism on a regional scale. It is interesting to note that the private business community is included in the discussions and working groups of most schemes discussed in this article. Consequently. in accordance with the perceived national interest. they increasingly work together with and for the private sector. It is claimed that regionalisation and globalisation should be made mutually reinforcing. protectionism and exclusiveness has been replaced by openness. which reinforces a specific type of outward-oriented regionalisation. The question. with the main exception of SACU/CMA. dirigisme. inclusiveness as well as trade and market integration. This relates to the question of what the driving forces of the regionalisation process are. transport and communication. for instance the Maputo and Beira corridors. As far as trade matters are concerned. energy and water. global forces and structures have a strong impact on and in Southern Africa.

Hettne. that is. There are some negative trends. Reflecting on Southern Africa in a global perspective and regionalisation processes elsewhere. The history of regional relations and asymmetries must of course be remembered and Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan (1998) are probably correct that the aggressive penetration by South African business in the rest of SADC and Africa is at the expense of local producers and manufacturers. According to one line of thinking. for example the linkages between external and internal investment and trade generation as well as connection to production and employment creation. such as avoiding the `costs of non-integration'. 1989). Second. an opportunity rather than an obstacle for sustained regionalisation. However. that free trade (without compensation) between South Africa and non-SACU SADC (and Comesa) members would result in polarisation in favour of South Africa (ibid. Robson. That regional imbalances not only derive from regionalisation processes but may increase or decrease as a result of globalisation and national development (or crisis) is more or less overlooked. the role of the USA in the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). Petersson 1998). etc. For instance. if Southern Africa is viewed in a global perspective. dubious whether less cooperation and integration is the solution to imbalances in the region. Furthermore.7 regionalisation. it is. It is not only that the political and social motives for regionalism are being acknowledged. the content of balance and mutual benefit is poorly addressed in the debate on regionalism in Southern Africa. which is known as functionalism (and to some extent neofunctionalism) guides much of the contemporary debate in Southern Africa. there is also vast potential for a successful and mutually beneficial developmental regionalism in Southern Africa. Maasdorp 1996. These theoretical advances have specific bearing on the matter of polarisation versus mutually beneficial regionalism in Southern Africa. [6] Given the devastating historical experience in Southern Africa. Several studies show. This particular strategy of regional cooperation and integration. and for ensuring a more balanced regional development is still lacking. The limited space allows only mention of a few aspects (and some others should be clear from the previous section). a Constellation of Southern African Economies (Consae) instead of the old proposal of a Constellation of Southern African States (Consas). but of course not sufficient. but the narrow gains associated with trade integration and the (in)famous trade creation versus trade diversion dichotomy are transcended in favour of the broader gains of economic regionalism. the dominating position of Southern Africa accentuates the existing asymmetries in the region. If close to the end of this article. Holden 1998. perhaps correctly. especially within the framework of SADC. at least in my view. condition for successful regionalisation. According to this model the relationship between trade/transportation costs and output in the periphery is U-shaped (see Holden 1998. Towards a balanced regional development? Perhaps the most important question in the debate on developmental regionalism in Southern Africa concerns the distribution effects of existing and emerging patterns of interdependencies and various policy measures. the role of South Africa in Southern Africa is heatedly discussed (Baker. However. achieving 'non-orthodox gains' and other dynamic benefits. there is [86] indisputably a real and perceived risk of further polarisation. IDC 1995). 1998. that is. It seems counterproductive to argue that regionalisation as such should correct the differences in levels of development in the region. Begg & Van Nieuwkerk 1995). [7] Third. and with regard to the high degree of security and developmental interdependencies which already shape the region positively as well as negatively. Germany as an economic engine in combination with the German-French axis in the European Union (EU). historically as well as currently. there is an almost naive belief in Southern Africa that regionalisation can be sustained on the basis of enlightened and mutual self-interest. 1996) demonstrates that trade/transportation costs. new and revitalised theorising on trade integration has revealed that there is no convincing evidence that increased economic integration between partners of different sizes and levels of development leads to polarisation per se. Of course regionalisation must be mutually beneficial and promote a balanced development. 1994. Brazil-Argentine in the Mercosur. First. the formation of regional economic blocs is now being viewed in a global perspective with emphasis on exploiting the opportunities of globalisation and counteracting the present trend of economic and political marginalisation. suggests that a `leader' or a strong core of countries is a necessary. Suffice it to consider only the most obvious examples in the world today. and instead means that the level of integration is important if polarisation effects are to be avoided. it can be argued that too much energy and precious research capacity have been devoted to less important issues derived from a `bastardised' version of the orthodox theory of regional economic integration in general and trade integration within a comparative static framework in particular rather than the 'new' and to some extent `revitalised' theorising on economic integration (Robson 1993. various types of economies of scale not accounted for in the orthodox framework. Mills. This contrasts with (or integrates?) the orthodox theory as well as conventional structural economics. which also derive from globalisation and national development. but fundamentally the question boils down to whether the relative strength of South Africa is to be seen as a challenge. I am allowed to be somewhat provocative. allocation and distribution of resources and capacities (cf Page in this issue. Boraine & Krafchik 1994. 1993. although the risks should of course not be ignored. sufficiently strong economies of scale and a large share of footloose industries can account for concentration of manufacturing to cores and peripheries of economic activity. the development of infrastructure and other services as well as structural transformation leading to [87] improved utilisation. But what is the alternative? Finally. There is compelling criticism against functionalism as well as neofunctionalism in general and in Africa in . The main problem and challenge with this argument is that there is a thin line between a mutually beneficial and an exploitative hegemonic regime that cements a centre-periphery structure. Krugman (1991. political-economicsocial stability and credibility. Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan (1998) claim that market forces and private capital are now creating economically what the old apartheid regime failed to do politically some two decades ago. for linking the top-down with the bottom-up. the asymmetric trade pattern in the region is not sustainable in the long run. Increased integration may or may not lead to polarisation. Japan as an economic powerhouse in East and South-east Asia. 1998). the EU as a bloc with regard to Central and Eastern Europe. Guerrieri & Padoan.

There are thus many interesting similarities between new security and developmental regionalism. the old regionalism was not so intimately intertwined and shaped by processes within the countries as the current processes of both security and development regionalism. it simply avoids it. in sharp contrast to what most observers seem to believe. at least not in a positive sense. and that the issue of an equitable regional development has been reduced to a discussion on the number of programmes and new investment projects in various sectors or trading preferences allocated to each country. Furthermore. It is therefore difficult to say which dynamics and processes will be dominating in the future.with regard to security as well as welfare . which ensures a mutually reinforcing relationship between states and markets/civil societies rather than the `Washington'-sponsored neoliberal paradigm.and interdisciplinary studies should be combined. nationalisms and fragmentations from within. The new regionalism is also more `open'. and is something more than a `primitive region'.will be replaced by a post-Westphalian rationality. external as well as regional. In so far as intergovernmental security relations are concerned it can be argued that Southern Africa has reached the stage of a security community. the global context and current transformation of the world tend to reinforce and spur contemporary processes of regionalisation in Southern Africa. and if properly conducted it has the dual strength of transcending overemphasis on one particular analytical level as well as highlighting the interaction between the levels. such as globalisms. Both explain why the new regionalism is likely to be more successful and lasting compared to the old phenomenon. The article also reveals what according to some readers may seem self-evident. Southern Africa has reached beyond a `pre-regional' stage of regionness. which is the dominating logic of SADC cooperation. The levels of analysis approach is conventional within the discipline of international relations/international political economy. It is interesting to note that the old as well as the new regionalism . which cannot be repeated here. if the process of regionalisation continues and intensifies it can be assumed that the conventional Westphalian understanding of national sover [90] eignty . functionalism tends to lead to increased instead of reduced imbalances. and whether the role of South Africa can be constructively used to ensure a mutually beneficial rather than an exploitative and asymmetric pattern of regionalisation. the regionalisms and regionalisations merely reflect the ongoing transformation process of Southern Africa in a global perspective and the interests of the participating actors. ultimately as a constituent part of a Southern African region-state. but ultimately on whether this state-centric approach to security can be transcended and civil society can be involved in a more constructive way. the functional strategy. there are several different regionalisms and regionalisations taking place simultaneously. inclusive and designed to take into account the high level of interdependence in the world today. given inequalities at the start. CONCLUSION This article has tried to reveal the great variety of regionalisms and regionalisations shaping present-day Southern Africa. A functional order is always hierarchically accumulating power at the top and is therefore likely to reinforce existing asymmetries. and that these simultaneously interact with other process forces. is not capable of solving the issue of a balanced development. The only clear (in)conclusion is that the future is complex. functional cooperation based on voluntary participation. NOTES [1] The NRA is based on that an interdisciplinary perspective is necessary but not sufficient for understanding the dynamics of contemporary processes of regionalisation. This is because.8 particular. In the short run the future depends on whether the states manage to collectively develop the SADC organ as a framework for addressing the security threats. In my view. which does not mean the end but rather the restructuring of the state in Southern Africa. the first level of regionness. But while the systemic forces up until the early 1990s effectively worked against developmental regionalism and reinforced the negative patterns of security regionalism in a vicious circle of war and disaster. However. interregionalisms. And since there are many different dynamics there are both centripetal and centrifugal processes at various levels. that is. actor rationality and national self-selection does not contain any distribution mechanism which can ensure the regional good (unless by egalitarianism or as a special case). In essence. thus transcending the old Westphalian logic. which are all quite different from the old regionalism. There are limits as well as possibilities and the future is particularly dependent on a positive outcome of the following two interlinked issues: whether the constituent actors manage to agree on a political economy approach to developmental regionalism. To conclude. It is this inherent weakness of functionalism that reinforces that regionalism in Southern Africa is evaluated according to short-term relative gains. There are also examples of regional conflict interventions in some countries. mono. such as Lesotho. On the contrary. [88] The important thing with regard to the polarisation question is that. the region is a very `insecure' part of the world where new and previously buttressed conflicts and threats have emerged on the scene after the end of the Cold War and apartheid. or at least a new interpretation of national sovereignty. where the crucial regionalisation process takes place. perceived as a zero-sum or even negative-sum game. often with a strong regional dimension. whereby regionalism is simply reduced to a second-best trade policy measure. Southern Africa is rather at the intermediate level. it is by no means an acting subject in its own right with a high degree of actor capability. [89] which might indicate the coming of a regional order. Swaziland and Mozambique. one of the most interesting being that both are intimately intertwined `upwards' with the systemic forces and global level as well as `downwards' with the domestic processes of change and the restructuring of the state. .security as well as developmental regionalism must be understood in a global perspective. However. multidimensional and multilevelled. namely that regionalism should not and cannot be understood as a `mystified' process beyond or separated from the interests of governments or the economic actors and civil society. With regard to development. but is nevertheless seldom recognised in the literature. the third and most sophisticated level of regionness.

Baker.9 [2] See Söderbaum (1996) for an introduction to the `formal' regional cooperation and integration ventures currently in existence in Southern Africa. [7] A related innovation of the new thinking on economic regionalism is the recognition that the Eurocentric and unrealistic assumptions of orthodox integration theory do not apply in the industrialised world and certainly do not apply in the developing world. F & McGowan. Krugman. Volume I-V. high transportation costs. `Subregional security: the Southern African Development Community'. 28(2):207-218. 16(1). B 1993. Hettne. Boraine. `Partner or hegemon? South Africa in Africa: part one'. `formal' regionalism in Southern Africa during the last decade. P J 1998. Booth. Hettne. R 1992. Lesotho. International Affairs 19:285-304. Malawi. In Guerrieri. MIT Press. A & Sunkel. Geography and trade. presentation to Workshop on SADC Trade Protocol organised by Department of Trade and Industry. J & Mills G 1995. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Botswana. In 1992 the sectoral and aid coordination approach of SADCC was changed into the much more ambitious SADC. Krugman. [4] The transformation of SADCC into SADC reflects the changed nature of de jure. Security Dialogue. b). externalities. Cawthra. which meant that Zimbabwe became a front line state as well as a member of SADCC and not part of Consas. Centre for Southern African Studies. Davies. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahwireng-Obeng. markets and institutions. bounded economic and actor rationality. Peacekeeping in Africa. `Economic integration and growth in the Southern African region'. P 1996. University of the Western Cape. 62. Hettne. together with an exclusive membership. Cilliers. P & Padoan. New analytical perspectives are based on more realistic assumptions. CBI 1995. Development. `Integration or co-operation in a post-apartheid Southern Africa: some reflections on an emerging debate'. P The political economy of European integration. International Monetary Fund and World Bank. beyond realism'. the presence of other market and government failures. Implications for global development and international security. States. B & Inotai. the role of institutions and the fact that various public and common goods may not always be achieved. (Forthcoming 1998-1999. P 1991. South Africa and the world economy in the 1990s. European Commission. such as the presence of underdeveloped. `Impact of trade liberalisation on intra-regional Trade in SADC'. distorted factor and goods markets and production structures. Southern African Perspectives. Anglin. and the Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles (both 1997). Zambia and Zimbabwe. G 1997. The aim was to increase the dependency of the neighbouring states on South Africa through economic penetration. Since then the following countries have also joined the organisation: South Africa (1994). London: Macmillan. Centre for Southern African Studies: University of the Western Cape. Seminar on `Old Order/New Border'. Investment and Payments in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution. . and thereby reduce their interest in supporting liberation movements. [6] Consas was advocated by the apartheid regime in South Africa in the late 1970s. Namibia joined in 1990. P 1995. `Neo-mercantilism: the pursuit of regionness'. June. Pretoria. the new SADC is much more open to the outside world. `Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. P & Padoan. [5] Development regionalism is defined as the concerted efforts of state and non-state actors within a geographical area to increase the economic efficiency and development of the region as a whole and to improve its position in the world economy. cooperation and adjustment policies'. P 1989. inclusive and emphasises both external and internal interdependencies as well as trade and market integration (SADCC 1992a. Cross-Border Initiative. overview. A & Krafchik. D 1997. Tanzania. MIT Press. `Integration. Maryland: Barnes & Noble Books. Mozambique. which makes a total of fourteen member countries. 1995-1996'. K & Vale. Unlike SADCC's previous emphasis on collective self-reliance and the reduction of dependency from the world in large and apartheid South Africa in particular. and areas for research' in Hettne. imperfect and asymmetric information and competition. P H. It failed when the elections in Zimbabwe resulted in a Zanu victory. `The new regionalism: implications for development and peace. Cooperation & Conflict. Helsinki: WIDER. B 1994. It was transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. Swaziland. Savage. W (eds) 1994. geography and economic theory. University of the Western Cape. in the same manner as the homelands within South Africa. Southern African Perspectives. Studies in the new regionalism. 28(3):211-232. [3] The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established in 1980 by Angola. 18. 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Windhoek. 58. Mills. J 1997. `Regional integration . P 1998. In Ellis. London: Routledge. Vale. Journal of Common Market Studies. Winter. J 1997. 4(2). Begg. Halfway House. A (eds) 1995. Centre for Southern African Studies. Gaborone: SADCC. A & Van Nieuwkerk. In Petersson.10 Maasdorp. Washington. H & Cilliers. `Southern Africa and the quest for collective security'. A H 1997. Nathan. M 1997. `Regional security in Southern Africa. Malan. `SADC Organ on Politics. McCarthy. `Doing battle with security: a Southern African approach'.and security-building measures in Southern Africa. South Africa in the global economy. The economics of international integration. Economic challenges and policies for the future. Paper prepared for Seminar on Confidence. L 1996. T & Stedman. L & Omari. Johannesburg: SAIIA. L (ed) Postapartheid Southern Africa. S J with Davies. Söderbaum. `Power and water: the coming order in Southern Africa'. London: James Currey and Heinemann.part of the problem or part of the solution'. Southern African Perspectives. Security Dialogue. Van Aardt. Solomon. S (ed) Africa now. P 1996. 21:363-391. Conflict resolution in Southern Africa. `Localization and integration between unequal partners: policy implications for Lesotho'. Handbook of regional organizations in Africa. L 1993. 28(2):191-205. `The SADC Organ for Politics'. Swatuk. `With open arms': confidence. SADCC (1992b) `Treaty of the Southern African Development Community'. Ohlson. Can South and Southern Africa become globally competitive economies? London: Macmillan. The South African Journal of International Affairs. G G (ed) 1996. 3(2).' Alternatives. M 1996. University of the Western Cape. `The new regionalism and developing countries'. G. Defence and Security: Future Development'. 31(3):329-348. United Nations Office for Disarmement Affairs. C L 1994. ISS Papers. Centre for Southern African Studies. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. London: Routledge. 19.and Security-building in Southern Africa. The South African Journal of International Affairs. 61. F 1996. Gaborone: SADCC. P 1993. `Regional security: Southern Africa's mobile ``front line'''. Van Aardt. R 1994. Robson. Fredrik Söderbaum Department of Peace and Development Research Göteborg University PO Box 700 SE-405 30 Göteborg Sweden E-mail: F Söderbaum . SADCC (1992a) `Towards the Southern African Development Community'. M & Cilliers. February. The new is not yet born. 4th ed. Winter. Southern African Perspectives. Petersson. University of the Western Cape. DC: Brookings Institution. Institute for Security Studies. Swatuk. L 1998. Robson.

First. The global system has more participants—is less Eurocentric with Third World states having greater autonomy and involvement—and clearly unipolar. weak state-dominant regional complexes generate a shared internal security dilemma that trumps the external one. Kelly in International Studies Review Volume 9. Second. and Sunkel 1999. regions are structurally open to intervention from above. regional cultural identities. The past 15 years have witnessed renewed interest in regions and regionalism. shifting the locus of conflict down from the global level. New centripetal forces—unipolarity and globalization—contest regional autonomy. This essay reviews the central issues in the new regional security literature. Regional subsystems are not closed as the global system is.‖ It builds regions along a relevant dimension—such as shared environmental effects. regional subsystems are porous. pages 197–229. between the state and the globe (the full international system). Accepting such autonomy. First. From the breadth of the literature. In this environment. Lake and Morgan 1997a. Nor has the establishment of unipolarity automatically constricted new space. room and IR theory has responded with a wave of ―new regionalist‖ thinking (Fawcett 1995. but their frustration with regionalism is unclear. But the new regionalism more successfully builds regional theory into IR. The end of the Cold War brought significant retrenchment of great power involvement from much of the developing world. proximity qualifies the security dilemma dramatically. that is. Summer 2007 Abstract The relevance of regional security theories has grown in the wake of the Cold War. Whereas Raimo Väyrynen (2003) has provided an overview of IR regionalism. 2 This review reports on a sustained and largely convincing theoretical effort to establish regions as a separate level of analysis. the literature broadly settles on three variables specific to regional structures. Its foundational and most contested challenge to international relations (IR) theory revolves around the autonomy of a regional level of analysis between the state and the globe.Mansfield and Milner 1999). Intervention from above can overlay local dynamics. or trade patterns—rather than according to pre-existing cartographic entities. A new wave of regionalist scholarship has arisen in response. Third. It builds on the previous flourish of regionalist theory that arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s. if still disputed. After centuries of intrusion and meddling during colonialism and the Cold War. Second. thus creating meaningful and distinct regional dynamics. this essay is intended to compare and contrast various models of regional security from this new work and distill commonalities for the purpose of social science cumulation. The new regionalism is broad and explicitly terms itself ―multidimensional. regions enjoy expanded. geographic density qualifies the security dilemma. Globalization is encouraging a regional pushback. This review identifies this literature‘s central themes and suggested new variables. primacy permits disinterest. Hurrell 1995. Regional organizations serve to repress shared centrifugal threats through pooled rather than ceded sovereignty. Most states only threaten their neighbors. global regions are enjoying greater autonomy. Hettne. it is possible to distill three new variables to distinguish regional from global structures.11 Security Theory in the “New Regionalism”† by Robert E. Inotai. Issue 2. Threats are unevenly geographically distributed because most states do not have the power projection .

deductively treating regions as parallel or mini-systems in which to try out traditional systemic theories. In the view of the present author. a critical mass of weak states turns the regional security dilemma inward. The planet is bound into one community. Building within the frames set by the maturation of neorealism and neoliberalism in the 1980s. Any regionalism will be brief.12 capabilities of great powers. can regions really be autonomous? Katzenstein argues that autonomy is really disinterest and neglect. These approaches have generated two pushbacks. for two reasons. the fundamental challenge of regional analysis to IR‘s privileging of the primary system has not (yet?) succeeded. appears the more important. historically. the system not the subsystem. serious rescission or delinkage is impossible. This essay begins with the broad argument that has been made for a regional level of analysis in IR and then turns to specifics regarding new regionalist security theory. To set the stage. Next the essay describes the new regionalism of the 1990s–2000s. Power transition theory reads the 1970s as the peak of the Soviet challenge. as he sees it. the globe has not been (in the language of old regionalism) ―subsystem dominant‖ since at least Westphalia. nor the mature work that appears in the neorealist-neoliberal debates (Baldwin 1993) mention it much. They prefer inductively theorizing ―up‖ from the reality of regional security. Argument for Regionalism as a Research Enterprise in IR Systemic Rejection of Regional Theory Standard IR accounts give regionalism scant attention. Many states function poorly. somewhat elaborated by Katzenstein. neomarxists in the beginnings of the world economy. It conceptualized the region as a subsystem of the larger international or primary system. Third World area studies scholars like Mohammed Ayoob have rejected deductive downscaling as too abstract. But all would agree there is no escape. But just as the old . If the dynamics of the primary system back up into the subsystems in extreme circumstances. Balance of power theory sees a brief deconcentration before bipolarity‘s resumption in the 1980s. the neorealist systemic critique. David Lake. Liberals see the first inklings in globalization. Indeed. IR focuses on the global level. Locally intense security issues create separable regional dynamics. And Peter Katzenstein has reasserted ―system-dominance‖ over the subsystems. William McNeill (1963: Chapter 13) has argued that there was a permanent ―closure of the global ecumene‖ in 1492. regions are actually local platforms for US primacy. Liberals perceive global economic dislocation after the closure of the gold window. Douglas Lemke. Regional organizations facilitate joint repression rather than integration. First. Third. realists in the emergence of one worldwide state system. scholars such as Barry Buzan. a reflection of systemic confusion that will work itself out. Alexander Wendt‘s (1999) response. and interstate war worries elites less than internal dissent. The old regionalism arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s as the American-led world order shook after Vietnam and Bretton Woods. Neither Kenneth Waltz‘s (1979) founding work. the earlier regionalist wave of scholarship is briefly discussed. and Björn Hettne have ―downscaled‖ extant IR theory to the region level. A similar critique holds for the new regionalism of the 1990s when the collapse of bipolarity lifted the pall of the Cold War ―overlay‖ (Buzan and Waever 2003:61) on the Global South. embodied in an organization focused on regional integration. Regions had space in the ensuing confusion.

Second. new regionalism faces an uphill battle. but clearly regional theory has more moving parts. if less harsh.13 regionalism waned as the 1980s came on. from the primary system. Typical global-level IR theories read regionalism as a brief upsurge while system-level forces calibrate new equilibria. can regionalism be meaningful? Liberals who see globalization tying the planet together ―faster. Waltz had only listed two—anarchy and the distribution of power— whereas Buzan and Waever are adding two more. weak state-dominant systems have significantly different security dynamics. And. anarchy. Regionalists make five arguments for the regional level of analysis. so the new regionalism could collapse before hegemony and globalization. First. 478) have provided four ―key elements of essential structure‖ in regions— boundary. Just as the old regionalism collapsed before resurgent systemic bipolarity and failed Third Worldism.‖ Realists and other traditionalists reject much of this as confusing. After a period of dislocation. IR is incomplete. Power projection is a luxury of great powers. mixing normative with positive theory ( Hentz and Bøås 2003). deeper. The coming decade will be crucial to this IR subliterature. Although this theory may explain great power behavior. 270).‖3 The aggressiveness of the war on terror has generated a booming literature reading the United States as a revisionist hegemon imposing imperial domination. so local dynamics will be much more intense for most states. polarity. 4 It erodes parsimony and threatens to become a landfill. States are not free billiard balls but geographically fixed. Fawcett 2003:24–25. Hoogensen 2005:269. As Lemke (2002)has observed. Väyrynen (2003:37. not wrong. is also a structural characteristic. region-specific variables. Globalization in most variants is reducing heterogeneity. most states confront a punishing ―loss of strength gradient‖ over distance. Centripetal forces in the world—unipolarity and globalization—and systemic prejudices in theory challenge post-Cold War regionalism. European critical theorists go further. If the United States is an empire. most recognize these as the foundational claims to be demonstrated against traditional IR theory (Buzan and Waever 2003:18. the new regionalism will subside. cheaper‖ (Friedman 2000:9) distinguish a similar. and social construction. Systemic theory misses the limitations on threat extension facing the large majority of states. Most can only ―bounce‖ or ―knock‖ into a few neighbors. most regionalists accept that the openness to intervention from above. If regions in the world do not establish dynamics that are meaningfully independent from imposing global/systemic forces.The present review seeks to limit this proliferation to only three extra variables. a regional level of analysis adds new variables and characteristics. most states worry more about their neighbors than about distant states ( Buzan and Waever 2003. centripetal force. a unit-level characteristic. regional analysis in general will appear as an occasional fad. analytically. Miller 2005: 241). the world is settling into US-dominated ―semi-permanent unipolarity. has structural implications. . 39) speaks of ―imagined or cognitive regions‖ that will ―free security studies from their territorial prison. They dispense with the structural language altogether. and awkward ( Miller 1998:752). farther. it simply ignores dozens of states and billions of people. New Regionalism and the Case for a Regional Level of Analysis As the discussion above suggests. Further. scholastic. Buzan and Waever (2003:53. so will the new regionalism fade as global forces once again make systemic dominance clear. Highly limited threat potential means the security dilemma is uneven ( Buzan 1991). If the new regionalism buckles under this weight. the area studies literature suggests that state strength.

indefensible mismatches between theory and reality ( Hentz 2003:7–8). systemic theory an American social science prejudice that reifies American primacy and conveniently sidelines the study of other places. Pugh and Sidhu 2003). who is not well grounded in regional area studies. Fawcett 2003:14. Lemke (2002:52) notes that his regional theory requires great powers indifference to work. Capabilities to resist. And the publics of the major power have little interest and willingness in supporting such ventures (Buzan and Waever 2003:10–11). Regionalists will accept that subsystems are formally open and that overlay is a constant threat.Katzenstein (2005:8). that is. see also Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). when great powers do intervene in regions.Buzan and Waever 2003:68. supposedly neoimperial war on terror has run aground on politically activated. Moreover. Third. For decades. It is a classic example of an international relations theorist. squirming. much evidence suggests that local partners exploit external patrons to pursue local opponents (Acharya 1992a. who argues for an ―American imperium of regions. As a China specialist. there is a growing norm that small states and regions deserve space (Falk and Mendlovitz 1973. in my view. Even the aggressive.‖ cedes that nationalism and mobilization make outright hegemony impossible. But the costs of penetration have risen substantially in the populous. a restive periphery makes it so today. The United States needs regional allies to cloak and translate its power. regionalism reflects the increasingly normative awkwardness of systemic overlay. have risen as willingness to intervene has declined. Overlay is not a one-way process. sustained successful overlay has grown more challenging. and that it does work suggests much great power retrenchment from the regions. 245. De-colonization and the collapse of bipolarity have set the regions free (Buzan and Waever 2003:19). as the United States learned in Vietnam and Iraq and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Even though great powers may have excessive power resources. 1992b. Regions already have more autonomy than we think. resistant populations in Eurasia. politically mobilized Third World. David Shambaugh (2004/2005: 94) has written: Both the logic and application of offensive realism in this case are. I do not recognize the China that Mearsheimer describes. Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002. hedge. and finally. imperialism and colonialism. The density of the socially mobilized Third World precludes semi-imperial ventures (Falk 1999:230. Kim Il Sung maneuvered China and the Soviet Union into competitive support for his expansionism. and other autonomy-generating techniques small states deploy. Buzan and Waever (2003:69) find traditional IR‘s insistence on abstract. Fifth. at least in home territories. Fourth. Lemke 2002). as clients can blackmail. flip-flop. Systemic theories that see a simplistic one-way transmission of preferences from great powers to the rest miss the gamesmanship. de facto regional autonomy in security affairs is the new norm ( Lake and Morgan 1997a:6–7).14 Second. Israel has successfully prevented its reduction to a simple client of the United States through unilateral actions like settlement expansion or the 2006 Lebanon campaign. . If a regional level of analysis was unwarranted in the imperial centuries after Westphalia. unsustainable. deductively applying a theory to a situation rather than inductively generating theory from evidence. ―Eclectic theory‖ avoids ―rigorously reductionist and highly implausible‖ theory in the interest of ―elegant parsimony‖ (Katzenstein 2005:8. Väyrynen 2003:28). Buzan 2000:6ff. African and Arab countries in the Cold War routinely jousted and toyed with supposedly dominant patrons. or otherwise strategically manipulate patrons. regionalists reject too much insistence on parsimony as a doctrinaire blinder that leads to deep.

peripheral. It is theoretically. it upsets standing bodies of theory as well as places research expectations on scholars by significantly expanding the scope of the IR enterprise. Nevertheless. then one need only—quite conveniently—study the United States. is little more than a competitive space for clashing great powers. done rigorously. between the state and the overly abstract system ( Hettne 2000:44ff). This argument descends from another systemic prejudice—an interest in only the great powers (Lemke 2002:4). for example. At the cost of parsimony. European critical theorists particularly see system justificationism in American scholarship buttressing primacy (Hentz 2003).15 Shambaugh captures regionalism‘s general concern that systemic IR is too abstract and distant to capture regional dynamics (Hentz and Bøås 2003). Or.‖ And good. Small. they frequently become ciphers for systemic politics. empirically. For example. Instead. and comparativists such as Shambaugh. . The state evolved in Europe as a universal form. Standard IR theory would read this from the top–down—as great power penetration and manipulation. but regionalism suspects that there are other motives. they serve to pool sovereignty to jointly repress shared internal challengers. If unipolarity is the central insight of IR today. unwittingly Eurocentric. the new regionalism asks. theoretically defensible insights— such as the inversion of security dynamics—may be uncovered. regionalist models are intended to enrich IR theory and fit regional behaviors better. areas studies scholars. regional analysis is more of a Lakatosian challenge—that IR complete its mission by expanding its scope— than a Kuhnian paradigmatic assault (Thomas 2003:640). the United Nations and European Union have become models for international organizations (IOs) everywhere. They find them narrow. These ―new facts‖ challenge Waltzian parsimony with a retort that calls for greater accuracy and more sophisticated theory. The region is a good middle level. The historical data that inform the standard account are modern and Eurocentric too. They are not primarily free trade areas or integrating EU-like bodies as established IR theory would predict. overfocused on the central system. the English School. Like constructivists. The standard account universalizes many European templates ( Buzan and Waever 2003:21–22). and methodologically simpler to reduce one‘s scope to a rotating roster of some 10–15 states over just a few recent centuries. and excessively abstract. and regional states merit investigation too. The standard account notes that systemic polarity sets the tone for the entire planet. the new regionalists dislike the standard rationalist. Africa. if regions have their own dynamics if no one studies them much? As the Third World emerges from centuries of external control. international organizations in weak state-dense environments reflect the concerns of weak-state elites. History before 1648 and areas beyond the North Atlantic are rarely studied and. It captures the diversity of non-European experience and. if so. It argues for decentralization not revolution. Researching regions is empirically difficult and expensive. may generate new theoretical insights. the new regionalism finds regional powers recruiting from outside their system in order to trump local rivals. billions live in the so-called ―periphery. in exploiting regional systemic openness. How can one know. Less conspiratorial is the easy dismissal of the rest of the planet that systemic IR permits. These insights can be integrated into the larger edifice and may be culled by initially bringing our systemic theories to bear on the regions. it is increasingly apparent that our structural theories do not travel well. neorealist-neoliberal accounts of world politics (Baldwin 1993). Regionalism and Philosophy of Science in IR The above critique-and-response locates regionalism‘s paradigmatic roots in a prototypical clash about philosophy of science in IR.

First. For example. When the European integration effort slowed. other regional organizations such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Arab League attempted to mimic its efforts. and similar established themes. is to ―downscale‖ extant IR theory to regions and not to devise dramatic new theory. De-colonization and EC integration generated interest in regional subsystems and regional integration. Within Morton Kaplan‘s (1957)―systemic‖ framework. these themes tie the old to the new regionalism. . and uses accepted methods of quantitative and qualitative analysis. Some of the most critical new work does argue for new actors (like NGOs or ethnic groups).16 This proposal is not radical. Indeed. The EC (now the European Union) has served as a model for other regional integration efforts and frequently motivates regional theorizing in IR (Wallace 1995). especially as a means for producing regional order. Lakatosian improvement in IR theory. if temperate. explains rather typical IR concerns like the use of force. Regional security theorists take extant IR concepts and expand them. When the effort accelerated. as noted before. Hettne (1999) speaks of the new regionalism ushering in a ―second great transformation. Definitional efforts have focused on received geographic notions like Africa or the Middle East. healthy response to the abstractness of the dominant models. Fragmentation of the system continued in the 1970s with the Third Worldism of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and what Väyrynen (1984:353–55) has called the ―rebellion of the periphery. First Regional “Wave” in IR: The Regional Subsystem The first wave of regional scholarship emerged in the 1960s and continued through the early 1970s. Its demonstration effect on the rest of the world has been enormous. or the social construction of regions. The latter appeared too broad and homogenizing to embrace the proliferation of problems and tensions that accompanied the dramatic expansion of the state system (Thompson 1973:90). a normative element of resistance to the center suffused this work ( Väyrynen 1986. Second. yet permit greater local specification of ―shared socio-historical characteristics‖ to explain behavior ( Boals 1973:403). regionalizing away the state. Lindberg and Scheingold 1971. war. which came to life again in the 1990s. This is a moderate. The old regionalists identified two reasons for the awakening interest in regions. so did its academic counterpart. states. who followed European integration for almost five decades. As the European Community came together in the 1950s and 1960s. too. nonalignment. 15.‖ Regionalism was a ―Southern‖ movement to protect recent independence. regional theory may occasionally oversell itself. as in the 1960s and 1990s. and resist overlay. de-colonization brought a wave of new states into international politics and the UN ( Miller 1973a:53). as in the later 1970s and 1980s. Subsystems maintain the systemic constraints of the higher international level. As with the new regionalism. Most regionalism begins with states and IOs. the notion of regions as ―subsystems‖ emerged (Russett 1967). Focus shifted away from the original holistic systemic approach of early IR theory ( Kaplan 1957). the European Community (EC) generated enormous interest in regional integration ( Haas 1971. but most adheres to geography. 1975). Falk and Mendlovitz 1973:3). Acharya 1992b:9. the writings of Ernst Haas (1958. Fawcett 2005:28). exhibit this academic fluctuation. did the academic response.‖ More likely is a rich. The first instinct of the regional theorist. so.

Falk and Mendlovitz 1973:7). much as it has in the new regionalism. 1973b. Such organizations also resolved a growing problem—the definition of a regional subsystem. so regionalism was not simply an analytical approach. The identification of a regional organization. Integration was a tool to end the conflicts cropping up in the wake of de-colonization. that is. there was much discussion of. Zartman 1967). and remain. Brecher 1963. Regions were. 10. not preexisting geographic or organizational categories. ―regions are political creations and not fixed by geography. There could be some ―transregional‖ interaction as well. one between the individual state and the international level. and Joseph Nye (1968a).‖ But the old regionalism tried to build holistic.‖ and ―system dominance‖ was insured by the possibility of external intervention (Boals 1973. and implicit hope for. order-bringing project. some manner of integration ( Russett 1967. Falk and Mendlovitz 1973:1.Väyrynen 1984). Old Regionalism‘s Chandelier Within these subsystems. The new regionalism resolves this problem by defining regions by their relevant dimensions. Figure 1. but a normative. in Waltz‘s (1959) and J. Such a practice has been undone by unanswerable boundary questions such as where does the Middle East end and Africa begin. 1964). along the EC model. questions of boundary and composition crop up. though that could be constrained by the primary system (Cantori and Spiegel 1973:352). and by compositional questions such as do the British Commonwealth or the NEIO constitute regions? . and South Asia ( Binder 1958. Hurrell 2005:39). like the international system. Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel (1973: 346–350). Regionalism elided into neofunctional regionalization and the study of regional IOs. Particular subsystems—subordinate. increasingly became a qualification for the identification of a subsystem (Russett 1967: Chapters 6. 6). a new level of analysis. A strong normative bent increasingly informed this work ( Mitrany 1968. Regional subsystems were ―subordinate. Russett 1967: Chapters 6. Regional organizations were. 7. As Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002:575) write. Research on subsystems labored with the problem of definition. often committed to local integration. (1957). is Asia a subsystem or is South Asia such a subsystem. the Middle East. A subsystemic structural variable is its open nature. macro-regions around traditional cartographic and geographic terms or by regional IOs seen through the lens of the EC (Fawcett 2005: 27–28. 11). undergirds a new region. Haas (1958. David Singer‘s (1961) terminology. permitting ―external intrusion‖ from the closed primary system above. Intense interaction along a shared vector. The subsystem shares structural characteristics with the international one. The relationship of the subsystem to the primary system was modeled as a ―chandelier‖ ( Schweller 1999:41) as evidenced in Figure 1. regionalization. 1973. but with their own regional dynamics—were geographically identified in Africa. have their own international organizations and further subregions ( Miller 1973a.17 The subsystem was. The EC and neofunctionalism attracted scholars such as Karl Deutsch et al. Nye 1968b:vii. postulate that a regional subsystem has a polar configuration due to power distribution as well as its own core and periphery. Even if one accepts a regional level of analysis. Regions. notoriously difficult to operationalize (Moon 1998:338). for example. identified as the motor of such integration ( Miller 1973a). Falk and Mendlovitz 1973:3–4).

Unfortunately Thompson‘s muchneeded paring down led to no accord.‖ Simultaneously. The Security Theory of the “New Regionalism” World events in the 1970s and 1980s undercut subsystem security analysis. Keohane 1986. Neorealism elevated the primary system to overwhelming preponderance. As in the new regionalism. economics. Conflict over membership in particular subsystems and the definition of a region blocked the development of deeper theory on what might actually occur in the regions. The debt crisis and renewed Soviet and American ―external intrusion‖ demonstrated just how system dominant international politics was. By 1973. Kay Boals (1973:399) condemned regionalism as ―pre-paradigmatic. Cantori and Spiegel 1973:337–40). and integration characterized the first regionalist wave (Russett 1967: Chapter 11. and theory of specific regional dynamics never quite took off (Lemke 2002:60). Abruptly the regions regained a measure of autonomy. Huntington 1968). But the sudden collapse of bipolarity swung the pendulum back. regions so loosely defined. and (4) a minimum of two actors. like OPEC or the Non-Aligned Movement. but found instead clubs of dictators and decay (Haas 1964. the Reagan era initiated a dramatic return to bipolarity in the so-called ―second cold war. Détente failed. the debate had become so diffuse. As integration in Europe and the NIEO faltered. with vaguely geographic subsystems ―below‖ or subordinate to a primary one. the first instinct of the old was to downscale current IR theory— Kaplan‘s (1957) system and Haas‘ (1964) neofunctionalism. William Thompson (1973:98–101) content analyzed the major work to identify core indicators of a region. The need to consider regions as distinct from the primary system was no longer apparent. and the system/subsystem dominance controversy ( Väyrynen 1984) were excluded in favor of the interactional characteristics that positivists in the new regionalism stress. which later research has failed to utilize ( Cantori and Spiegel 1973:336–341). and theory followed. Moribund IOs. integration.‖ and liberals like Nye (1973) turned away from regionalism to interdependence. 1971. 11) in particular has made strenuous quantitative efforts at identification. identity. Oye 1986). Russett (1967: Chapters 10. As we have . Nye 1968a:xi–xvi. The chandelier was a basic model. indeed. Regions remained weakly conceptualized. (3) actor recognition of the subsystem as a distinctive area. Definitional wrangling slowed the cumulation of knowledge. (2) geographic proximity. The fit was partial at best. Security theory reflected these shifts.18 Little consensus has emerged around the answers to these questions. From Old To New Regional Security A search for total. inhibiting the development of regional subsystems as a research program ( Hurrell 1995:333). or noncontiguous groupings. Neofunctionalism looked for spillover and integration.‖Haas (1975) declared integration theory ―obsolete. inclusive regions that encompass all factors of security. He identified four master variables: (1) regular and intense interaction. Even neorealism‘s critics chose to focus on the international systemic level ( Krasner 1983. the normative dimension around regional organizations. have not generated the ―regionness‖ (Hettne 2005) the EC did. Significantly. nor did Robert Gilpin‘s (1981) important elaboration. Third World assertiveness collapsed under the failure of OPEC and the NIEO. Waltz‘s (1979) groundbreaking effort made no mention of regional subsystems. like the OAU.

2005). So Africa is not a region if security flows—of threats or friendship—do not demonstrably bind its entire expanse.‖ Väyrynen (2003:25) has noted that ―our regional images are often based on unexamined and outdated metageographical conceptions of the world. most of the new regional security casework still uses typical territorial rubrics like Africa or Latin America ( Lake and Morgan 1997b.‖ The new regionalism intends to transcend cartography and build regions on a shared characteristic according to a functional demand. environmental externalities (transnational communities of fate bound by ecological impacts). Regions may also be based on dimensions such as economic interactions (trade blocs in the international political economy regional literature). States continue to wield force. Buzan and Waever 2003. Yet the new regionalism‘s stress on interaction density still returns security regionalism to geography. Multidimensionality and the implied cognitive turn Väyrynen advocates are contentious. Hettne and European and critical scholars have made the greatest effort (Hentz and Bøås 2003. he sees large historical forces (the ―second great transformation‖) at play and makes philosophical arguments about regionalism displacing . interaction is most likely among proximate states. geography. Väyrynen 2003). Hettne (2000) is very interpretive. Cartography is a cul-de-sac. and Van Langenhove 2005). Hettne et al. positivistic new regionalists have left security in its territorial jail. Proximity is a central pillar of the argument for a distinct regional level of analysis. But the effort to build holistic. Thompson (1973) cataloged the wide disparity of regional indicators. His focus on proximity. Buzan and Waever (2003:476) find jettisoning territory and the state premature. geography heavily qualifies their reach. And postnationalism is a bridge too far. identity (―regionness‖). Some measure of density is required if a region is to be meaningfully carved out. Regions are a function of our theoretical purposes. Like Thompson (1973) and Buzan (2000). Benjamin Miller (1998:752) calls ―the constructivist criterion of regional identity and consciousness…problematic and subjective. Väyrynen (2003) also ties a method split to multidimensionality. We build them as we need them intellectually or politically ( Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002:575). subordinate systems proved unworkable. Hentz and Bøås 2003. Andrew Hurrell (1995:333–334) writes: ―the contemporary debates remind us that there are no ‗natural‘ regions. a ―growing differentiation between physical (geographical and strategic) and functional (economic.‖ there is a need to search for ―imagined or cognitive regions‖ ( Väyrynen 2003:37. Again. Farrell 2005:8). Farrell. 39). Hettne. and interaction set up the current wave of security theory. But they do accept the new regionalism‘s functionalist focus on interaction and flows that bind. and definitions of ‗region‘ and indicators of ‗regionness‘ vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation. and cultural) regions…[is] manifested in the new [methodological] divide between rationalist and constructivist research agendas regarding the process of region formation. Farrell et al. ―Multidimensionality‖ expands the possibility of regions beyond simply politico-security axes. especially after 9/11. 1999. Hettne and affiliated critical scholars fit this best. environmental.‖ To ―free security studies from their territorial prison. Conceiving de-territorial regional security is challenging and. Moreover. according to Väyrynen (2003:26). tellingly. or other functionally relevant vectors (Fawcett 1995:4ff. at the expense of the old regionalism‘s cartography.Hettne. New dimensions require new methods—a cognitive and constructivist turn. and Sunkel 2000. Inotai. Contemporary regional studies broadly eschew the handwringing over definitions in favor of functionalism (Alagappa 1995:364. But the more formal. Lemke (2002) and Lake (1997) retain geography through their insistence on proximity.‖Lemke (2002) and Lake (1997) also stick with states and power projection.19 observed. Cognitive multidimensionality is so wide that Thompson‘s (1973) master regional variables better track most of the current regional security theory. in fact.

Buzan (1993) does the same with Waltz (1979) and the IR literature built by his successors. Lemke (2002) is quite quantitative with little case narrative at all.481). he eliminates any hint of interpretive method by dropping history and geography altogether in favor of highly rationalist security ―externalities. 5 This regional security complex theory forms the rich theoretical basis on which the rest of the literature. positivist IR theory. The following analysis tracks this split between the more positivist-formal (Buzan. his work reads as mainstream. Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002) provide qualitative. Both camps reflect and perpetuate the divide in the old regionalism. Lake (1997)uses formal theory. Alagappa 1995:363. The old regionalists responded to Kaplan‘s (1957) theory regarding the system by downscaling it to look for ―subordinate.‖ in practice Buzan and Waever present a fairly orthodox reading of security (Hoogensen 2005). Hettne 2005:160). All will face a Eurocentric critique from inductivist area studies. and Hettne (1999) tries out normative neofunctionalism. cognitive turn that Väyrynen and Hettne are suggesting. the security theory of the new regionalism appears to reject the nonterritorial. more identifiable focus in Buzan‘s notion of a ―regional security complex‖ (Buzan 1986.‖ but structurally analogous.‖ Despite flirting with constructivist possibilities for ―securitization. even critical and Third World area studies scholars. Buzan and Waever 2003). They are all joined by the shared theoretical impulse to downscale extant theory.20 the states.‖ The present author does not share Väyrynen‘s perception of a method shift. if not normative. Buzan (1991. IR. not overturn. Haas (1964) and Falk and Mendlovitz (1973) pushed neofunctionalist. Buzan has been the one to most thoroughly lay out variables distinct to regions that make local politics unique. But the positivists‘ work is rationalist and traditional. He does add new variables. Buzan (1993) downscales his historicizing variant of English School neorealism to regions and retains the traditionalist focus on the state and competition while reviving geopolitics. Ayoob 1995:56–59. stressing ―ideas of bounded territoriality and distribution of power that are close to neorealism‖ and the ―significant opportunities for analytical synergy between RSCT [regional security complex theory] and neorealism‖ (Buzan and Waever 2003: 4. Security dilemmas are sharper among proximate actors with shared histories of interaction. Consciously building on neorealist-neoliberal models. 2000. Regions are dense. Lemke) and the critical-normative (Hettne) theories. Lake. diplomatic historical analyses with many comparative cases. imperialism). Conversely. Lemke (2002) downscales power transition theory. . Lake (1997) and Buzan (2000) bring Waltzian neorealism to the regions. Buzan and Waever 2003) and Katzenstein (2005. Concepts such as ―swing power‖ and ―overlay‖ are clearly descended from prototypical neorealist notions (offshore balancers. the state is the prime actor throughout Buzan‘s work. Whereas the positivists explicitly build on each other in traditional IR model-building fashion. 1997b. Hettne (1999) argues for a normative-critical IR focused on regionalization into international organizations at the expense of the state. Buzan and Waever (2003:4) freely admit that ―the regional level is compatible with and…complementary to neorealism‘s structural scheme. build ( Job 1992a:5–6. Maoz 1997a:2–8. regional systems. Regionalism is to expand and enrich. Buzan and Waever (2003) elaborate nine distinct regional security complexes with contiguous states and conduct lengthy research to buttress their distinction.‖ regional security moved to a tighter. but it contradicts the tendency of most neorealist analysis to concentrate heavily on the global structure. integration theory. Thompson (1973) sought to build abstract regional theory. 1991: Chapter 5. Buzan and the Regional Security Complex From old regionalism‘s ―subsystem. Lake and Morgan 1997a:11. Indeed.

‖―territorially coherent subsystems [are] defined by interlocking patterns of securitization. in turn. this notion will be formalized here as openness. The present author‘s distillation of three new master variables for regions begins with the proposals of Buzan and Waever (2003). But they are unsure how to proceed. States are immobile. Yet those relationships will be more acute among geographically proximate states (Buzan 1991:191). they add the ―boundary. in Western Africa and the Horn. Glaser 1997). Buzan retains the notions of geographic proximity and interdependence from Thompson (1973). patterns of amity and enmity arise from these regular transactions. 462)―define regions specifically in functional terms of security. state-based military-political complexes‖ that are qualified and delimited by these new variables (Buzan 2000:19). region. 463). which made little appearance in Buzan‘s (1991. and global (Buzan and Waever 2003:47. They retain anarchy and polarity. For purposes of integration and to assuage the systemic fear of spiraling variable proliferation.21 Like the new regionalists. contiguous. As such. Regional security complexes require strong states that can project amity or enmity toward others. definition of region. Buzan settles on traditional. these two ideas will be bundled here into proximity. or. Buzan and Waever (2003:20–25) also introduce the notion of state strength. Regional security complexes are ―mini-anarchies‖ (Buzan 2000:4). Like the old regionalists. which. ―anarchy. set the relevant boundaries of the regional security complex. are ―unstructured protocomplexes‖ (Buzan and Waever 2003:xvi. The security dilemma‘s geographical unevenness creates intense local histories. Geographic density generates interdependence. Regional security complexes are ―traditional. creating patterns of amity and enmity (history). macro-cartographic spaces like South Asia or North America as regional security complexes. History and geography are typical English School characterizations of the security dilemma for states in a locality. Buzan‘s work is a more useful analytic tool than the abstract neorealist model.‖ Buzan initially accepts Väyrynen‘s (2003) functionalist. which differentiates the [regional security complex] from its neighbors…and social construction. 2000:3) earlier writings. He and Waever (2003: Chapters 4–13) note in their case work how regions can expand and contract. 50. build distinct regions in commonly accepted geographic areas. Security interaction—flows of threats or friendship—is more locally intense. plus the distance effect. 62). whose limits are determined by power projection. Lateral interactional pressures build historical patterns over time among contiguous states. Over time. and most cannot project power over long distances. The same cluster of states will interact with each other again and again through time. Local patterns of amity and enmity. They note the possibility of intrusion by external powers. ―the globe is not rightly integrated in security terms‖ (Buzan and Waever 2003:43). . inter-regional. plus several new variables unique to regions. for example. more formal postulates of neorealism—the security dilemma and anarchy (see also Jervis 1978. The history of Buzan‘s work on the level of analysis question culminates in the assertion that regions are actually the most important level among four levels—domestic. For analysts of Third World regional security complexes. but combines them with later. But Buzan (1991:190) qualifies functionalism with accumulated history— recurrent ―patterns of amity and enmity‖ among neighbors. Buzan and Waever (2003:43. involving states with only local power projection capabilities. not physical. Anarchy formally places all states in competitive relationships with one another. states are much more threatening to their near neighbors than to others. plus geographical diversity‖ ( Buzan and Waever 2003:46). which covers the pattern of amity and enmity among units‖ ( Buzan and Waever 2003:53). Further. so weak state areas.

the period of neorealism‘s maturation. Particularly now. regional security complex theory complements neorealism by applying it to newly emerging subsystems. Wohlforth 1999). were characterized by strong tensions between the two superpowers with planet-wide reach. Figure 2. Regions are not simply ‗little‘ international systems‖ ( Lake and Morgan 1997a:7)—a claim made by the old regionalism. The 1980s. Those countries affected by a particular security externality belong to a regional security complex focused around that externality. given the enormous consequences of nuclearized bipolarity. it produces a regional security system or complex. regardless of their location. Buzan‘s model is graphed in Figure 2.‖ Local geographic density is unnecessary. but once the Cold War overlay retracted. Furthermore. Lake (1997:48–49) defines a regional system as a set of states affected by at least one transborder but local externality that emanates from a particular geographic area. he escapes the constant confusion over which countries belong to which regions by interpreting a regional security complex as issue-specific. They use the language of regional security complex theory but break substantially with the retention of geography and history. Lake (1997) strips out English School historicism to present a rationalist or ―systems theory.22 To rebuff the global focus of neorealism. Any regional security complexes were so penetrated from above that systemic dynamics overlay local ones (Buzan 1991. Buzan and Waever 2003:185–439). Buzan (1991:198) develops the notions of ―overlay‖ and ―penetration‖ (see also Buzan and Waever 2003:46. he builds them around shared ―security externalities. 61). Lake dispenses with all the geographic. They are cool to the notion of subsystems and reject the need for ―territorially coherent‖ regional security complexes ( Buzan and Waever 2003:462). and historical ties that have undergirded the usual efforts to identify distinct subsystems or regional security complexes ( Russett 1967. If the local externality poses an actual or potential threat to the physical safety of individuals or governments in other states. it does bolster the theory for an era when regional conflicts will concern analysts more than unipolar passivity. regional dynamics re-emerged. Instead.‖ Instead of geographically and historically distinct regions. . Using a new regionalist functionalism. The security dilemma did not (apparently) diminish as distance increased. because what really matters are flows of threats (or friendships) that bind states. It accepts system-dominance. cultural. Miller and Kagan 1997). Buzan‘s Regional Security Complex (RSC) Regional security complexes fit neorealism‘s focus on the primary system. the superpowers‘ security dilemma subsumed most of the regional ones. Although the regional security complex dilutes neorealism‘s parsimony with area studies and comparative politics. they form regional security complexes around shared security externalities. as the primary system appears to be settling into static unipolarity ( Mastanduno 1997. Buzan (2000) and Lemke (2002).6 Lake and Security Externalities Lake and Morgan (1997b) apply neorealism more directly. Overlay is not eradication.

―Regional‖ just means anything less than global. and other variables with sub-global threats. as Buzan (or Lemke) define it. Even the casework in the edited volume (Lake and Morgan 1997b: Chapters 9–14) hews to accepted cartographic notions like Africa or Southeast Asia. Lake‘s Security Externalities Lake‘s formulation sidelines the foundational and operationalization issues raised earlier. Lake (1997) channels Väyrynen‘s (2003) argument for nonterritorialized regions and security studies. density. He does not need to establish a level of analysis.7 NK and SK in this figure refer to North and South Korea. interdependence. but does so with states and the traditional tools of neorealism. Any shared threat can bind a collection of states into a region. may nonetheless be a part of a regional security complex. If that dyad shares history (little beyond the peninsular stand-off). Lake‘s revision has had weak legs. North Korea‘s missile ranges (purportedly) now include the US West Coast. respectively. Lake‘s revision is graphed in Figure 3 around a specific security externality—North Korea‘s intermittent nuclear weapons program. Fearful interaction overrides the rest. Patterns of amity and enmity may rise in a regional security complex. Geography. Proximity is just a function of technology. which is neither contiguous to the United States nor proximate. which are not adjacent or quite close. If regional complexes congeal around them. not territorial contiguity. then geography is simply space and cartography is just received opinion. and other new regionalist add-ons obscure the issue—conflict from extended threat. Ironically. because it so strips the notion of region that it raises the question of whether . history. Theoretically it is a cul-de-sac. Figure 3. Lake (1997:50–51) cites US involvement in the Middle East. Technological shifts. because regions are wholly functional.23 Local externalities that produce threats to physical safety bound the set of interacting states that constitute regional security systems…It is the limited scope of such externalities that differentiates regional systems from the global system ( Lake 1997:49–50). 1997b) want to dispense with all the tortured efforts to list variables describing regions as scholasticism and get to actual issues. Lake has replaced regionalism‘s varied interests in geography. Externalities are emanations of threats or dangers from one state that stretch far enough to contact another. Hence. Lake and Morgan (1997a. but they are derivative. Geography is out. Questions of boundary and composition are easy—the reach of the threat determines who is in and out. Those states no longer need to be contiguous (or have much shared history) to generate security interdependence. Only the subglobal limits of power projection among some states define a regional security complex. because some states. the United States has now been sucked into a security complex with North Korea. he breaks significantly withBuzan and Waever (2003:78– 82). how much overlay might succeed today or whether a norm against imperialism protects regional autonomy—disappear. regionness. national growth. and other changes can alter power projection capabilities. multidimensionality. Troublesome questions that sidetrackBuzan (2000)—for example.8 Despite the rationalist paring down of regions to the raw security issues. it comes from flows of threats not density or interdependence. Hence contiguity and patterns of amity and enmity are unnecessary extras. What matters is interaction regarding a threat. While retaining the ―regional security complex‖ concept.

to the regions. Tellingly. These challengers signal their dissatisfaction through military build-ups and launch wars to overturn dominance if their chances are good. Lemke . but Lemke finds general and frequent disinterest. intervention becomes more likely. And he says nothing about state weakness. understood as contiguity. He shares the regionalist desire to expand the geographical base of IR beyond the West and to account for nongreat powers (Lemke 2002:1–4). He imports neorealism on the regions but then jettisons any regional characteristics. Both sides have marketed their causes to external patrons.‖ cagey locals may also sell their regional hegemonic bids to extraregional allies. A regional twist—which also buttresses the notion of the region as a distinct level of analysis—is the possibility of recruitment of outsiders to aid in overturning the local hierarchy. Like the other downscalers. By that measure. and Lemke tries to do so with power transition theory. By Lake‘s definition. He accepts Buzan‘s (2000) proximity. we have moved so far from the intuitive notion of region that the regional operationalization problem becomes scholastic again. as a power transition theorist. speaks of ―local hierarchies. openness need not mean one-way traffic of ―overlay. The primary image of this ―multiple hierarchy model‖ is a pyramid of power with the global hegemon at the top. Lemke (2002:52) begins from the notion that regions are ―parallel smaller international systems. Lemke‘s hierarchies are grounded in territorially adjacent states. Lake also so bends proximity that it becomes any flow that does not involve global reach. whereas challengers rise. Of the three variables presented earlier. would be a part of almost every regional complex on the planet. As most states are militarily weak. neighboring states threaten each other with greater intensity. the local hierarchies are hypothesized to behave according to the model. great powers. This multiplicity of regions rings of Väyrynen‘s (2003) multidimensionality and explains why Buzan pulls back from a wholly de-territorial vision. mostly unadulterated. especially under unipolarity. It seems analytically unworkable. The multiple hierarchy model…assumes great power indifference.‖ He unearths 23 separate mini-hierarchies under the larger global one (contemporary American primacy). Lake does not argue for a regional level of analysis. one can find thousands of regional complexes based on almost every sub-global threat perception.‖ General theory can be imported. most interstate threat projections are even more limited than Buzan suggests. Lemke (2002:49). but for the openness variable. One of Lemke‘s 23 local hierarchies is the Korean peninsula. These hierarchies have the same structural characteristics as the global one. Lemke and Third World Power Transitions If Buzan downscales Waltz and balance of power to the region. Buzan accepts openness when he sees regional security as local complexes in which great powers can intervene as outsiders.24 there can be regions at all. Lake would make great powers into direct participants in myriad regional complexes according to threat perception. As discussed earlier. as Buzan and Waever (2003:80) note. Accepting the regional level of analysis. Lemke offers a hybrid. Instead of subsystems or regional security complexes. Like Buzan. semi-historical model of regions mixing the ideas of Buzan and Lake.‖ When local leaders‘ interests vary dramatically from the global hegemon‘s. Lemke (2002:52) observes that ―if great powers do not interfere. states have a ―relevant neighborhood‖ ( Lemke 2002:71). then Lemke (2002) does the same for Organski (1968) and power transition theory. If regions are just subglobal-issue networks. and especially a superpower like the United States. Leaders dominate a status quo. Lake accepts the first—openness—but in such a way that it almost loses its meaning.

Lemke (2002:175) hints at the importance of state weakness. ahistorical boundary for regional complexes: a loss of more than 50% of military power across the distance from one national capital to another. Lemke accepts variants of the three variables distilled in the present review. Using transportation infrastructure. It is correct that interstate war is rare in Africa. but the notion of local intensity is similar for all three. and precisely the sort of outcome that drives the inductivist. so there is some shared history to help set them more clearly apart from each other.25 fractures the planet beyond Buzan and Waever‘s scheme of nine nearly continental-sized regional security complexes. or the presence of opportunity‖ (Thomas 2003:639). Lake‘s strictly rationalist regional security complexes do not require this level of intense interaction. States suffer from a punishing ―loss of strength gradient‖ over space (Lemke 2002:70–72). All of Lemke‘s regions have existed for at least 30 years. however. Lemke does. regions are based on the capability for military interaction. The loss of strength gradient formally restates Buzan‘s insight that security dynamics are uneven because of geography. Lemke (2002) provides a rationalist. This last statement buttresses the present author‘s assertion that the uneven security dilemma is a new variable. Lemke and Lake may strip out history and interaction in favor of strict power projection. Lemke builds individual hierarchies around this gradient. to his credit Lemke admits this problem. Also like Lake (1997). The ability to project declines steeply over distance for most states. A reduction in power projection by more than 50% between capitals pulls the respective states out of a regional complex. like the Koreas or Chile and Peru. Lemke focuses on the ability to interact. Lemke realizes that most threats do not go too far beyond one‘s neighbors and that this does generate a distinct local nexus. By contrast. three in South America have existed for 130 years. his model of regional war prediction.‖ The model generates such miniaturized regions because ―rather than examining actual interactions. as Buzan does. struggles with weak states. But Lemke (2002:176–181). like Buzan. Eight of Lemke‘s 23 separate hierarchies are as small as dyads. but ultimately neither can do much with it within their frameworks. But threats are usually geographically contained among smaller states. Lemke finds regions like the ―Northern Rim‖ of the Middle East.‖ All states in a Lemke hierarchy must be able to reach each other. This prediction is empirically awkward. projection in past conflicts. thus he accepts regional openness to penetration or overlay. generates an ―African peace‖ ( Lemke 2002:161). retain Lake‘s rationalist definition of a region as bound around threat understood as sheer power projection. his model erodes in environments of endemic state weakness. But unlike Lake‘s strict rationalism. so the resultant security geography violates traditional expectations. Lemke also tries to capture some of the interactional intensity Buzan tags with ―patterns of amity and enmity. The African peace is also a normatively . or ―North Korea–South Korea. the ―Central Lowlands‖ of Africa. He accepts the second too—intensification of the security dilemma under proximity. Lemke (2002:60) explicitly laments the difficulty of operationalizing regions and using the notion of hierarchies rather than complexes alleviates the definitional issue. based on regional power transition. Like Lake. Most awkwardly. but clearly violent conflict is not. If pressed. almost a nonfinding. area studies pushback. and even travelogues of explorers. which Lake almost eliminates. a regional level of analysis can be real. His theory requires great power indifference. any threat can kick up a complex. history and geography are secondary drivers in this model. Like Buzan. Hence. and separate local hierarchies can be identified.

However. usually culminating in a regional organization. ―regionalism [has] a strategic goal of region-building.26 uncomfortable outcome. Lake. Hettne (1999:xix).‖ then IR is normatively flawed. . A regional order mitigates two problems emergent from the retraction of the Cold War overlay: local disorder ( Pugh and Sidhu 2003) and the possibility of new penetration ( Falk 1999). the critical theorists still share the downscaling impulse of the positivists. In effect. changing the theoretical apparatus from variants on neorealism toward liberal institutionalism and constructivism ( Hurrell 1995). These scholars are consciously breaking the mold of security studies ( Hentz 2003). 2005) resent the normative disinterest of the Anglo-American positive theorists discussed so far (Buzan [and Waever]. The new regionalism carries this forward with a parallel normative interest in integration through various order-bringing schemes. Stadtmüeller 2005). 2003). for example. He ( Hettne 1999) views this as a ―second great transformation. regionalism will help to pacify chaotic geopolitical spaces like Bosnia and Central Africa.‖ The positivists discussed above are aware of the notion. instead. Regional order will also provide resistance to hegemonic centripetal forces such as US primacy and neoliberal globalization. that is. This critical theory literature styles itself as ―new regionalist. Farrell et al.‖ Order is achieved by re-conceptualizing regionalism as regionalization and cooperation. In this way. Farrell 2005. but for theories of regionalization (Lähteenmäki and Käkönen 1999. They import a normative neofunctionalism to considerations of regions that views regionalization as a means for engaging in conflict resolution and resistance to global threats. A normative desire for regional integration drives this work. By contrast. Security regionalism is not the formal search for analytical models. If. Critical Theory and Regional Integration Critical theorists (Hettne et al. but do not mine the distinction as Väyrynen (1984. they believe. probably the most prolific expositor of this position. This prediction opens the door for a sharp critical theory revision of regionalism away from positive theory. an urge for regionalist order. ―Regionalism is a policy and project whereby states and nonstate actors cooperate and coordinate strategy…[to] create an interlocking web of regional governance structures such as those already found in Europe‖ (Fawcett 2005:24). Hettne (2005) speaks of regions integrating local IOs and replacing states in a post-Westphalian ―world of regions‖ to counteract the US war on terror.‖ At his most fulsome. speaks of an ―ideology of regionalism. The old regionalism wrapped a normative interest in third party conflict mitigation into neofunctional integration theory using the European Community as a model ( Hurrell 2005:39). Pugh and Sidhu 2003. of establishing regional coherence and identity‖ ( Farrell 2005:8). 2000. 1999. The positivists are fairly comfortable picking up where Thompson left off in 1973 and improving on old regionalism‘s initial research with the improved tools of the neorealistneoliberal tussle of the 1980s and 1990s. other Hettne-edited volumes from the United Nations University ―New Regionalism‖ series9. IR theories generate findings like an ―African peace. critical theorists are engaged in a major break with traditional IR. does. 1986. Variables and levels of analysis scarcely interest these theorists. Lemke). IR should be developing frameworks regarding regional order and integration that respond to the realities of violence and dislocation in the postoverlay Third World. Hentz and Bøås 2003. the critical theorists add a normative element missing so far.

Regionalism is viewed as serving progressive values like multilateralism and global governance. 21). Bøås 2005:210). This split over the coherence of regions drives the second concern of critical new regionalism—resistance to centripetal pressures. On the one hand. Conversely. which is split over whether preferential trade areas are stepping stones toward a global multilateral trade order or bulwarks against globalization with the retention of some local autonomy (Mansfield and Milner 1999). and Somalia may simply be forgotten. Katzenstein 2005:24). The end of the Cold War released regional organizations to be regional conflict managers. Writers like Falk (1999:228). less apocalyptic in Fawcett 2003:27). Hettne and the critical theorists adopt the latter idea and translate it into a mixed security/economics language. This concern draws from the regional international political economy literature. Regionalism becomes a means to fend off American-dominated economic hegemony and security unipolarity. Louise Fawcett‘s (2005:24)arc from ―soft‖ to ―hard regionalism‖ ends in a regional IO. Kaisa Lähteenmäki and Jyrki Käkönen (1999:214–15) find that proximate states come to share a local identity (regionness) from which can emanate a regional organization and later a regional security community. Michael Pugh and Waheguru Sidhu (2003) as well as Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (2005) fear that retraction means abandonment and ghettoization. large powers like regional organizations when they handle the unruly periphery and dislike them when they become a pushback mechanism against intrusion (Pugh 2003:40. much of the effort to theorize regional organization looks to relationships with the UN. Not surprisingly. Hettne (1999:xxi. regional organizations serve not just economic but other purposes. The critical theorists are schizophrenic regarding Northern involvement in regional organizations. The fear is that the great powers may ―burden-shed‖ development and peacekeeping to regional organizations and the UN. The normative downside of overlay‘s retraction is that systemic powers will not intervene to help troubled regions. second. The future of world order is at stake in the coming contest between EU-style.27 Critical theorists routinely elaborate stages or a continuum of regional order. globalization. The stages are linear and tend to culminate in a regional organization or regional security community. to resist American primacy and.‖ These integrationists are divided over the strength of regional organizations. and Stadtmüeller (2005)118) are normatively excited about the prospect of regional self-determination and stabilization through regional groupings. Fulvio Attina (2004:11) sees a regional ordering continuum that peaks in a ―regional security partnership. Sideri 2000. post-Westphalian liberal institutionalism and US neo-Westphalian unilateralism (Hettne 2005:285. informal domination.) This so-called ―defensive regionalism‖ (Farrell 2005:16) counters systemic ―hegemonic regionalism‖ (Acharya 1992b). Regionalism as ―project and policy‖ serves two functions: first. overlay means imperialism or. at the least. Spaces of the world such as Bosnia. Hettne makes the most robust claims. . Hettne and his European colleagues want regional organizations to be bulwarks against globalization and US hegemony.‖ and the critical theorists argue vociferously for it. They fear Katzenstein‘s (2005) model of hegemonic regionalism in which regions are so porous that the great powers can easily re-intrude or even use regions as platforms to project power. Haiti. Hence. The critical theorists know that regions are open. (This last statement demonstrates how the new regionalism is multidimensional. not just tools of great power influence (Fawcett 2003:16). 2000:58) alternately anticipates regional security communities or regional organizations at the end of regionalization. The two frequently elide. Regionalism aims to make the world more multipolar and protect pluralism from unipolarity ( Hettne 1999:7. Acharya speaks of an ―autonomous regionalism. Hettne (2005:153ff). Regionalism shows similar promise in resisting globalization and the homogenization it brings ( Falk 1999:233ff. Hettne 2000:45.

even though the critical theorists share much of the former‘s normative concern for reducing Third World conflict and protecting its autonomy from centripetal pressures. Third World states are read into frames devised from above. They generally operationalize regions around geography and IOs. Constructivist. actually. or that critical theorists find regional integration paralleling . They accept the openness variable proposed earlier. Figure 4. the critical theorists. like the positivists. indeed. comparative politics. they fear it. an ―African peace‖ is. not theorize weak-state realities. the lengthy operationalization issues that bedevil Buzan and Lemke are generally absent. The regionalism of the critical theorists also informally accepts the variables of proximity and intensity proposed in this essay. Regionalism opens IR to the diversity of global political experience in contrast to the reification of modern European history. particularly in the Third World. Alagappa 1993. Much of the empirical and normative thrust of the new regionalism is grounded in a rejection of Eurocentrism in IR. 1995. implicitly theorized. The hierarchic arrangement of world politics normatively demands regional organizations. The critical theorists invert the argument to the same purpose: flows of amity—expressed as integration in local IOs—build regions. This deductivist impulse turns area studies scholars against them. Hentz (2003:14) and Hettne (2005:163) flirt with the notion that regionalization might be easier among weak states because the member states are already so artificial. But downscaling presents an irony. Regions have less innate autonomy than Buzan argues is there—hence. Or. Deductive downscaling clearly does not do this. Hentz‘s and Hettne‘s answer to state weakness is an obvious effort to prop up neofunctionalism. But. But this is only partially. Critical Theory‘s Defensive Regionalism Inductive Pushback: Regional Security in the Third World Area studies scholars seek regionalist theory less detached from empirics. Inevitably the critical theorists do rely on theoretical foundations despite their open disappointment with the conservatism of the positive theorists. Critical new regionalists accept the basic chandelier model of hierarchic world politics. so they fumble with state weakness. Part of regionalism‘s Lakatosian moderation is its willingness to carry extant tools deductively ―down‖ into the regions. Without pooling resources for pushback—most easily accomplished through the formalism of an IO—the center will simply overlay the periphery. weakness often breeds the opposite—paranoia over state security (Ayoob 1995:2–4). to paraphraseShambaugh (2004/2005:94).28 Figure 4 ties together the many strains of these critical theorists‘ proposals. Finally. the ungainly product of deductively forcing events into a theory rather than inductively fitting theory to the actual practice of violence in Africa. Maoz 1997. 1995. are downscalers. the strong need for regional integration. and Third World scholars and historians ( Ayoob 1986b. The positivists founded regions on intense local flows of threat. Their focus on regional organization betrays an acceptance of contiguity. Palmer 1991. Shambaugh 2004/2005) will hardly be surprised. In these examples. This makes some cumulation with the positivists possible. ironically it brings universalized concepts out of European history into the regions. therefore. that Lemke sees power transitions in the regions too. Wriggins 1992. Downscaled theorizing blinds investigators to the real drivers of events by predetermining what they should find.

not from other states. Miller 2005). Downscaled neofunctionalism would expect integration. viewing it as an internal one. modernist prejudices may unveil new facts to support new or emended theory. in an excellent demonstration of theoretic extension and renewal in the social sciences. domestic tussles over the loss of sovereignty. Predominantly weak-state systems will focus on what Job (1997:180) terms the ―internal security dilemma. 1995. and similar EU-like issues. Ayoob (1992. Yet. 1999. So Lemke (2002) may find an unexpected interstate ―African peace‖ but he has deductively overlooked the real story. First. The downscalers broadly retain IR‘s disinterest in unit characteristics. Weiss and Kessler 1991.‖ so they become hazy ―proto-complexes. Two shifts in regional security ground the argument being made in this essay that state strength is the third new variable we may distill from the regional security literature.‖ The greatest threat to the Third World state comes from its meager roots and legitimacy in the civil society ―beneath‖ it. Third World area studies scholars are free to look more widely and build theory upward. free trade. those engaged in inductive research are ready to build new theory based on the wide prevalence of weak states. spillover. . The recurrent emphasis on this point motivates the distillation of it in the present essay as one of the new regional structural variables. This notion profoundly restructures regional security dynamics from interstate to intrastate conflict. Job 1992c. A region populated by weak states will be structurally different from strong state systems in the ―North-West‖ (Ayoob 1995:13). 1989. lateral pressure toward intrastate. terrorists. 1992. 1992b) re-worked the traditional security dilemma. Beginning without Eurocentric. Their most important theoretical advance has been the growing perception that weak or failed states radically affect regional security complexes and regional orders ( Ayoob 1986a. and others. But Buzan is unsure what to do with this notion.‖ especially Buzan (1993. These IOs pool the low capacity of weak states for the purposes of joint sovereignty defense against internal challengers. 1995.‖ AndLemke (2002) openly notes that his theory stumbles when weak states fill his regional hierarchies. Yet. By contrast. militias. centrifugal challengers—secessionists. Weak states do not fit well in Buzan‘s scheme that considers regional security complexes as essentially ―mini-anarchies. 1995) and Brian Job (1992a. Weak States and the Internal Security Dilemma Unencumbered by IR‘s tendency to ―black-box‖ internal state characteristics. regional organizations in weak state-dense environments serve state-building. Third World area studies scholars such as Ayoob (1992. Doing such research is difficult because many traditional IR markers are suspect. the traditional logics of structural IR theory do not seem to capture the real security tensions in these regions. in critical mass.29 the European Union. have picked this up as well. Third World regionalism reinforces individual sovereignties. 1999) have generated enough new facts that new theoretical insights have emerged. Where the units involved in regional security complexes are radically internally dysfunctional. New regionalism‘s full promise demands empirical research beginning in Third World realities and building theory inductively up. Specifically Ayoob and others have noted the centrality of state strength. Endemic state weakness shifts the focus of security from interstate. 2000). Second. Several of the ―downscalers. Inductive work might easily slide into narrative without some guiding concepts. this unit variable will have regional systemic effects.

‖ Robert Jackson (1990:29) defines weak. This internal security is much more important than the external.30 Miller (2005:243) notes that ―the notion of state strength (or coherence) is a different and separate concept from the realist notion of state power or capabilities. It is the distinctive overall feature of a ―developed‖ state. warlords. Conquered populations worsen the legitimacy crisis. War is a luxury rickety postcolonial states can scarcely afford. many weak states face continual challenge to their ―positive sovereignty‖ from within. and infrastructural depth (a capable bureaucracy). faces competing loci of authority. Miller (2005:230) speaks of a ―state-to-nation balance‖ or congruence. positive sovereignty…(which) is not a legal. war is doubly dangerous.11 Both dilemmas exist. these otherwise imposing states crumbled seemingly overnight. most suffer from severe legitimacy problems. Building congruence between the state and the civil society is the long-term project of nation-building. During the Cold War.12 But without resolution of internal issues. Ayoob (1995:4). Even victory is threatening. Ayoob (1995: Chapter 2) and Job (1992b)suggest that such states are in the early process of nation-building with a consequent stress on the domestic. potentially unruly territory. Most important is the first descriptor: strong states have deep roots in civil society and command high constitutional allegiance. and expensive. states as those lacking. Most Third World states do not seek conquest of their neighbors. communist guerillas stressed weak states across this same Global South. Quasi-states struggle to extend their writ across physical territory. First they must get their own house in order. As the Cold War ended. countries like Somalia or Afghanistan exist on maps but not as actors. psychological. and similar wherewithal to declare. Without the substantial popular legitimacy of strong states. Ayoob‘s (1995) and Lemke‘s (2002) finding that interstate war in the Third World is rare. Many of the successor states are still weak states. rather than international. Ethno-tribal secessionist and irredentist movements are common in much of the Global South as are other sovereignty-rejecting militias. terrorists. technological. and weak states near strong states find themselves in a punishing security environment. and enforce public policy both domestically and internationally. especially when proximate states face similar internal challenges. Wars make domestic turbulence dangerous to frail regimes. Although endowed with strong coercive capacities and adequate infrastructure. The traditional mechanics of the security dilemma are there but are placed on hold. today Islamist insurgencies threaten states in the Muslim world. or ―quasi-‖. but rather their cooperation on similar internal threats. functioning coercive capacity (loyal police and military). Holsti (1996:97). Few Third World states have these qualities of stateness and so they face regular internal crises. and Miller (2005:234) formalize missing ―stateness‖ around three dimensions. Lake‘s (1997) security externalities could be re-imagined as ―internalities. implement. use of force. however. and flimsy institutions lack the infrastructural and coercive capacity to dominate further. but a political attribute…the sociological. dangerous. The Third World state. and traffickers. especially when they . as Ayoob (1995:4)notes. economic. A strong state enjoys reasonably broad popular legitimacy. Hence. Nation-building that involves reducing these centrifugal challengers into subservience is difficult.‖ Internal flows matter more.10 Even many Second World states do not command much allegiance. Competing sub-groups with loyalties to other identities urge secession or otherwise view the regime as an alien imposition. Consequently it is a stronger characteristic of some states than of others.

b. Hills 2005). they do the opposite. Bremmer and Bailes 1998. Proximate states with analogous internal security dilemmas—similar sets of centrifugal pressures—are likely to coalign to jointly repress and buttress claims of sovereignty. The joint strategy regionalizes not sovereignty but domestic conflict and elite pushback. yet their real purpose is to collectively resist similar internal enemies. Sokolsky. Instead the area studies work finds that they coalign to serve common statist interests. State elites have a common interest in avoiding external conflict in order to concentrate pooled efforts on their domestic security ―internalities. Its focus on the processes of integration turns attention toward the character of the units. The inductive research on Third World regionalism finds ―regionalization without integration‖ (Bach 2005:184). Organizations such as the OAU/AU (African Union). economic trade areas. Julius Nyerere purportedly remarked that the ―OAU exists only for the protection of African heads of state‖ (cited in Alagappa 1995:385).‖ Regional Organizations in the Third World: Serving Intrastate Security Inductive IR generates another theoretical insight that puts downscaled theory on its head. Ostensibly interstate conflict managers. then regional security efforts are more likely to turn on the suppression of internal dissent than interstate conflict management. From state weakness flows the internal security dilemma and from that. Weak states do not integrate into IOs as the critical theorists hope. illegitimate elites. Weak-state regional IOs are mutual sovereignty reinforcement coalitions not integrationist regional bodies like the European Union. Attina 2004. The Arab League tried to be an anti-Israel bloc. so even their IOs reflect this concern. Alagappa 1993. in turn. If the central local security issue is not interstate war but state fragility. regionalism becomes a ―project and a policy. and Winner 2003. Against the critical and neofunctional expectations of regional integration. Transnational links between regime elites to bolster one another‘s security characterize such regional security complexes. Buzan and the positivists are the target of the internal security dilemma critique. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Not surprisingly.31 synergize with rickety neighbors‘ own internal flows. not erode. but its real purpose was to solidify weak. Regional security organizations do not pool sovereignty so much as amass it for joint. coordinated repression. weak states ―obsess‖ about sovereignty. Critical neofunctionalism is the next downscaling target. and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have strict nonintervention norms and officially sanctioned external intervention is very rare (Acharya 1992a. sovereignty.McMillan.13Amitav Acharya (1992b:8–9) has observed how weak Third World IOs are when functioning as the ostensible external pacts they claim to be. or IOs like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) actually exist for tacit elite collaboration to quell their common intrastate challenges. weak-state regions actually generate regional IOs that reinforce. the sovereignty-reinforcing IO. They are ostensibly created for security or economic purposes. Scholars of Third World security note consistently that state strength determines the extent and nature of regionalism. The critical theorist sees state weakness creating a normative need for integration. As Ayoob (1995:4) has noted. Shambaugh 2004/2005. shared concerns shape the quality of regional order.‖ But weak states do not follow this deductivist advice to replicate the European Union. Israel easily overcame its unintegrated members. Suzanne Nossel (2007) writes of the SCO: .

Sovereignty-Reinforcing Third World Regional Security Organizations Figure 5 illustrates the perplexing effects the internal security dilemma brings to regional security theory and. declaring that the organization does not involve itself in the internal affairs of its member states. insulation from outside powers. Both find a role for regional organizations as part of a wider network of security efforts. In a scathing verdict. elites cooperate to promote their ―collective internal security‖ ( Leifer 1989:1. external security dilemma. Muthiah Alagappa (1993. in practice. massacring hundreds of unarmed protesters. Uzbekistan violently suppressed a political demonstration in May 2005. In the traditional. even the European Union—financially and institutionally well-endowed—failed in Bosnia. Because so many states in Third World regional security complexes share common internal challenges. the internal security dilemma suggests that such externalities wash only as far as the state borders.‖ problems that are of concern everywhere from Africa to Europe to Washington. the constituent states‘ elites collectively have little interest in exploiting them internationally. But. Containing those internalities is hard to achieve alone. the organization has behaved as a front for authoritarian regimes. so much so. MacFarlane and Weiss (1992:11) write: The institutional capacities of regional organizations are extremely feeble. extremism. by extension. Figure 5. What might otherwise be externalities become internalities. Although such weak organizations as the OAU or Organization of American States (OAS) not surprisingly failed. 1995) and Alan Henrikson (1995) reach a gentler if similar conclusion.32 Chinese President Hu Jintao declared that the SCO is focused on ―separatism. Ayoob 1995:61–65). that they have not been able to carry out mandates in peace and security. local rivalries. although the SCO‘s charter commits members to ―promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. need to deal with acute issues—are more than offset by such practical disadvantages as partisanship. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss (1992) set the more sober organizational tone on the continued failure of regional organizations at local conflict management. Pooling sovereignty and other attributes of state strength bolsters all the members of the IO. In it.‖ the SCO‘s secretary general rejected calls from human rights advocates to condemn the bloodshed. and lack of resources. generating shared security concerns. . They conclude that regional peacekeeping and other more complicated forms of conflict monitoring will not devolve to the regional arrangements of Chapter 8 of the UN Charter because regional IOs are not meaningful external conflict managers. The regional security complex characterized by the internal security dilemma is modeled in Figure 5. regional IOs. It is collective action for an end wholly unforeseen by downscalers because of the desire to ―black box‖ unit variables. and it has brought together military leaders to plan counterterrorism exercises. The so-called comparative superiority of organizations in the actual regions—familiarity with the issues. and terrorism. But. Alagappa (1995:387) writes. Yet. security externalities wash across borders.

Hettne. most regional security complexes are still dominated by the balance of power or regional great power concerts. regionalism will be ineffective in insuring the security of participating countries. Alagappa‘s conclusion reflects the low position of most regional security complexes on ladders of regional order posited/hoped for by many critical theorists. 2005. 16 The inductivist pushback sharply rejects the deductivist impulse to replicate systemic theories in mini-systems. the Association of Caribbean States. Systemic Pushback: Hegemonic Regionalism The focus here will be on Katzenstein‘s (2005)―world of regions in American imperium. In the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The openness variable that all the regionalists accept presents a constant danger of overlay. Miller and Kagan . India and Pakistan continue their standoff. Hettne 2000.33 On its own. Hook and Kearns 1999). based in rich casework. Among others. it was perhaps inevitable that systemic theory would pushback at the foundation of the regionalist challenge—in effect. But inclusive regional organizations have generally reproduced regional tensions within their structures rather than ameliorated them through neofunctional integration. today it is very apparent. Bremmer and Bailes 1998. and the UN collective security system. But it does accept the validity of the regional level of analysis.‖ but he is not alone. at regional autonomy. Like realists who reject regions‘ autonomy from the central system. As a result. With the striking exception of Western Europe. The area studies literature reflects the fear of hegemonic regionalism at the expense of autonomous regionalism ( Acharya 1992b). Its important theoretical revisions. directly contradicting neofunctionalist/critical hopes for regional integration. some regional organizations characterized by relative consensus have explicitly not sought to become regionally inclusive in order to maintain their efficacy. Given this powerful challenge. At best. Indeed. 17 The war on terror particularly drives this fear (Falk 1999. Miller (2005. Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Fawcett 2005:27). Indeed. because ostensible local conflict managers are paralyzed. have added a third variable—state weakness—to future analyses. He calls for overlay. The critical regional theorists‘ normative drive to read regionalism as regionalization responds to a deep fear that unipolarity and globalization are centralizing forces reducing regions and weak states before American primacy. In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Nigeria‘s neighbors are resisting its hegemonic efforts. Most Third World states ameliorate their attenuated external security dilemma without intense cooperation. 14 If this was not visible to the early regionalists. perhaps because most Third World states had not been independent for more than one or two decades. It has to be viewed as part of a package that includes self-help. the most pessimistic critical theory already sees the triumph of American power over regions. regional and global balances of power. that regional conflicts can only be brokered by hegemonic intervention. Lemke. some states may join subregional organizations and so pool their bargaining power for intraregional security disputes. and the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) have had limited success in this domain ( Tow 1990: Chapter 3. 15 These tensions often doom the organization to irrelevancy. Miller (2005) finds. scholars such as Buzan. and Ayoob all agree that regions enjoy enough autonomy to warrant distinct investigation. alliance with extra-regional powers.

Katzenstein (2005:37. Instead of Figure 4‘s multipolarity. Yet in a semi-realist revision of dependency notions of hegemony. they become even more so. Top down unipolarity erodes a regional level of analysis. it stems from hegemonic disinterest. invalidating the sustained delinkage or resistance of the critical/neofunctional approach. And with many weak states. State weakness powerfully tempts outsiders to intervene. Latin America. it is likely because of American disinterest not failure. overlay. and repackage American influence in a locally acceptable manner. not internal dynamics. he revives Figure 1 to dispute in particular the resistance image of Figure 4.34 1997) theorizes regional conflict reduction through external great power intrusion. is missing.43) observes a hub-and-spoke system like that in Figure 1 with the United States at the center. Japan and Germany transmit and cover American influence in their critical regions. Germany and Japan serve as nodes. Only one needed node. The nodes represent overlay in the postimperial era. The recession of the Cold War has created space and social mobilization of Third World populations makes intrusion from above tougher ( Katzenstein 2005:4. Because Third World regions are so prostrate and dysfunctional. is necessary for peace. Latin America. The two most critical regions are Europe and East Asia. East Asia. Katzenstein accepts some of the regionalist project. Katzenstein‘s regions reflect the US military‘s division of the world into six unified combat commands. the operationalization question that plagues the new regionalist work is eliminated. the Middle East. but he creatively uses them against the foundational claim that regions are a distinct level of analysis. Openness and state failure erode regions rather than bolstering their distinction. so these friends/allies/subjects serve to mask. Hegemony overwhelms regional organization.‖ Washington coordinates the nodes for its own purposes. Katzenstein accepts the variables of openness and state weakness. not real autonomy. Africa. not integration. Katzenstein (2005) takes the new regionalism seriously. Regions are not just open. soften. Regions are products of the hegemon. and South Asia. Figure 6. Rather than a blithe neorealist dismissal. Regions are platforms for the transmission of US power and cultural tropes. Africa. and South Asia are less relevant and have no node. in the Middle East. Katzenstein (2005) sees six regions—Europe. Regionalism does show signs of post-Westphalian integration (Katzenstein 2005:42). In a similar fashion to Miller (2005). The United States does need a node in the Middle East that the Iraq war could generate. He reconstructs systemic theory after the strong regionalist progress made in the literature surveyed here. Direct overlay is harder. they are ―porous‖ ( Katzenstein 2005:22). If a region does not have a node. he sees the United States coordinating critical regions through nodal states in a hub-and-spoke model. If Latin America or Africa is enjoying freedom from intervention. Katzenstein‘s Imperial Regionalism . 8). Katzenstein‘s hegemon finds it even easier to intrude when locals are weak. Katzenstein terms the US world order an ―imperium. In this way. Katzenstein‘s imperial or top-down regionalism is graphed inFigure 6. System effects flow downward.

then regionalism‘s explanatory power decays. whether soft (US bases around the planet) or hard (the Iraq War). the balance of power. Intrusion is common. the inductive work has found new facts that have fed new theory. the present author considers new regionalism Lakatosian and not Kuhnian. much less imagined or identity-based communities. First. Further. Katzenstein (2005) does grant regions an existence that systemic theories dismiss but does not grant them much autonomy of action. So if hegemonic indifference is necessary for a regional theory (as Lemke claims). ―scientistic. not an analytical frame. Lake. they accept the most basic neorealist IR frame—such as territoriality. When Lemke and Hettne simply look for regional power transitions and EU-style IOs. positivists looking to build IR theory for the regions in an explicit. Hegemonic regionalist models like Katzenstein‘s upend much of the new regionalism and are its most fundamental challenge. Their social theory is less formalized because it is focused on ends not process. . Hettne and the critical theorists are more European in focus. critical theorists.‖ Anglo-American manner of social theory. Because of that theoretical conservatism. Ayoob. not explaining war again just with different variables. This is nuanced systemic theory that takes account of regions in a sophisticated way. Regionalism is a project and a policy. But it still challenges much of the regionalist edifice developed here. disappointment is inevitable. Ayoob and the inductivists are pushing the regionalists to more seriously break with standing IR theory. Hegemonic regions are a nonconfrontational. And to their credit. Regions are not levels of analysis or actors. Lemke. value-free. and Hettne take theories down to the regions that were built for the system. Buzan. and Katzenstein reflect the abstract. but tools of the dominant state at the global level. Regionalism seems less original and creative than its promise. not lateral interaction among a region‘s constituents or local IOs.35 This challenge is painful for the new regionalism. A second cross-cutting divide pits deductive theory that downscales standing bodies of theory against an inductive impulse to build theory from the data. The hegemon creates regions. is the point of regional theory. The internal dynamics of intense interaction that worried the old regionalists and Buzan are irrelevant—as are the regional resistance projects sought by Hettne and the critical scholars. war and violence. When regionalism urges IR to complete itself by looking beyond the North-West. Conclusion Theory The new regionalist security literature is robust but disparate. somewhat cloaked way for the United States to project influence rather than a way to protect against US control. Several theoretical fissures will shape the future output of this research enterprise. formal manner collide with a loose web of constructivists. The system is still system-dominant as Kaplan (1957) argued decades ago. the state. But part of the normative appeal of the new regionalism is the well-known Eurocentric bias of IR. Buzan. Bringing order. and normative institutionalists seeking to aid regions with conflict and threats. Lemke.

to distill from the many models and arguments several shared points of view. in turn. Critical neofunctionalists find regions in IOs. Clearly such an interpretation is inaccurate. Having devoted the most energy to the operationalization question. Katzenstein complements regionalist work by taking it seriously. but what about mixed strong. The figures illustrate the evolution and continuity of thinking as do the variables. and his critiques are powerful. Clearly it is a central variable. The work on regional IOs acting as ―sovereignty reinforcers not eroders‖ is an example of such creative scholarship. Hoogensen 2005). Ayoob. for example. then regionalist progress in the philosophy of science dispute over the feasibility of a regional level of analysis will unravel. Powerful centripetal forces in globalization and the US war on terror give systemic theories like Katzenstein‘s plausibility. but it has not generated similar definitions. Future research could also develop an empirical measure of weak-state density. But its emendation of regional theory is not complete. Weak states. That Buzan and Lemke both acknowledge state strength suggests that the Third World area studies pushback has been successful. If the new regionalism does lapse as a fad. Certainly the United States acts as Katzenstein (and Miller) describe. and others note how an abundance of weak states can turn the security dilemma inward. reject as misconceived. Proximity. which Third World area studies scholars. Buzan finds nine regional security complexes whereas Lemke finds 23 local hierarchies. The three variables that the present author has proposed in this essay are distillations from across the literature and not formally presented anywhere (although Buzan comes close). tried to read state weakness as support for integration. From the old regionalist interest in subordinate systems through Katzenstein‘s imperial regionalism. Miller. Job. as the old did. Most of the new regionalists fall back on geographically intense interaction to found regions. The intent in extracting and tracing them across the writings of a number of prominent scholars was to tighten their focus and firm-up a wide-ranging body of work. Hettne (2005:163). Regional autonomy turns on this openness not being exploited too frequently. the imperium makes the regions. lurking behind these two challenges is the running problem of regionalist interaction with systemic theory. The purpose here was to flag common insights. Hegemonic regionalism is easy.36 Finally. all have noted how regions can be penetrated from above by pesky great powers. Future research cannot escape the nagging question that regions are not reliably operationalizable (Moon 1998. the three variables are: Openness. Recapitulating. Väyrynen 2003. History . An empirical question for future research would pit Buzan‘s and Lemke‘s assertion this overlay is declining against Katzenstein‘s and Miller‘s that intrusion is quite common. Future research will need to build better regional theory around the reality of weak-state dense environments.and weak-state complexes like the Middle East or Southern Africa? 1. 3. Lake would create as many regional security complexes as there are nonglobal security externalities. 2. their incongruity is a blow to the new regional security literature because it creates room for systemic theorists to write off the operationalization issue as scholasticism. Perhaps most important in this debate is the work of Buzan and Lemke. The rapidly expanding literature on the United States as an empire would simply dismiss regional autonomy.

The division between regional systems and the global or primary one ―on top‖ of it was more distinct than ever (Barraclough 1964: Chapters 3. too. perhaps. the regions lost their distinctiveness as European imperialism spread its regional security complex world-wide. When the world community closed after 1500. Europe. South America. As the regional subsystems were freed of the European system by de-colonization. The burden on IR theory to explain regional systems will likewise increase. The United States has not governed as the extremely intrusive hegemon one would have expected from a Soviet victory. Regional security promises to be more interesting than it ever was before and. there were no powers with the global reach the superpowers would have later. 3) notes how little conceptual work on regional security has actually accompanied the new interest in regions. Cold War overlay replaced European intrusion.  3 Personal conversation with Randall Schweller. 42 fn.  5 These regional security complexes are North America. has dissipated. even unique. not just great powers. Southern Africa. Such a position may give the resurgent regions room to be relatively distinct and autonomous within a closed international system for the first time in history. Middle East. The Cold War period involved a fuller. more truly global system. post-Soviet space. (This activity was not actually overlap. stood outside the widely distributed European subsystem. The Bush Doctrine may not survive the Bush Administration. Central Africa.  6 This is not meant to suggest that we are entering a period of subsystem dominance.  4 Much of the following derives from editorial comments from Randall Schweller on an earlier version of this paper. Today. Footnotes  2 Maoz (1997:2. but not as thoroughly as past intrusion and overlay. this essay explicitly responds to Maoz‘s concern for the formalization of regional security theory. regional security complexes were alternately inflamed or restrained by the bipolar overlay (Stein and Lobell 1997). South Asia. but rather intrusion. it had superpowers.) A few large powers. If William Wohlforth‘s (1999) analysis is even partially accurate. However.37 This research agenda is all the more pressing because the post-Cold War period is the first with potential regional autonomy and poses an historical watershed for IR theory. 4). the Iraq War has gone too badly for that. Now that. With the partial exception of Great Britain. then the United States is so preponderant that the subsystems are not serious rivals. given the great . The primary system was effectively a regional system writ-large (Buzan and Waever 2003:15). The international system was disparate and regionalized. The European regional system was exported to as many other regional systems as feasible. Unipolarity is looking like American aloofness rather than dominance. globalization and unipolarity challenge regional space. Even the war on terror will not likely expand into anything like American global empire. like the United States and Japan. Whereas Väyrynen (2003) has provided a broad view of the new regionalism. and East Asia (Buzan and Waever 2003:xvi). For 40-odd years.

It may be that Africa is. States. belatedly. when no state-driven security externality from that region reaches the United States? US intervention in the Middle East is better understood as overlay or external intrusion in an open subsystem.  13 The new regionalism is explicitly multidimensional. frequently play a shadow security role as well as an identity-based one for the more constructivist-minded (Mansfield and Milner 1999:601.‖  11 In fact. Lake‘s (1997) example in his article.  7 The difficulty of graphing the Middle East. North Korea would have been a wiser choice—hence Figure 3— given its pretensions to nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology. By contrast.Väyrynen 2003:31.  14 The suspicion is that this is due to what Ayoob (1995:2–4) calls Third World elites‘―obsession‖ with sovereignty. How can his inclusion of the United States in the Middle Eastern regional security complex be accurate. This fact also explains the extraordinary power position of strong states. Hurrell 2005: 45. As the NorthWestern states slowly jettison the Westphalian system. particularly given the low frequency of interstate compared with intrastate war in the Third World since the end of bipolarity. The authors covered here broadly concur that ostensibly economic IOs.html 10 As Rupert Emerson (1963:107) has observed: ―everywhere in the world.gu. points to a problem with his reconceptualization of security externalities. and Fear. it seems likely that the interests of IR and other analysts will follow the action to the regions. in regional security complexes of mixed weak and strong states.se/forskning/contents. in the process of molding nations in the same way that they have been molded elsewhere. Ayoob (1995: Chapter 7) argues that the external security dilemma must be added to the internal one in the Third World.38 power quietude of unipolarity and the relative indifference of the unipole to many regional conflicts beyond terrorism. States crippled by their internal security dilemma cannot effectively compete in the more strenuous external security dilemma of the entire. such as Israel or South Africa. and the European Union. 9 http://www. planet-wide system. thereby doubly handicapping such states. but structural IR theory‘s parsimonious refusal to include domestic politics is more defensible there. exist at the global level. often through living together in a superimposed state. ASEAN. nations have been shaped from diverse and hostile communities which have been brought into a common framework over the centuries. At the global level only strong states may compete for the great power status that permits them to participate in fashioning the entire international system.  12 Weak states do. Katzenstein 2005:23–24).    8 The title of Buzan‘s 1991 book is People. Hills 2005:95. most Third World states are just entering it and their elites insist vociferously .padrigu. closed. of course. IOs are widely seen to play a variety of roles even when formally economic in tone. Job (1992b) contends that the internal security dilemma mostly trumps the external one in Third World regional security complexes. such as NAFTA. 610.

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