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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS While Bosnia and Herzegovina¶s time as an international protectorate is ending, which is in itself most welcome, now is the wrong time to rush the transition. The state put together by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement after a long war will never be secure and able to take its place in the European Union (EU) until it is responsible for the consequences of its own decisions. But tensions are currently high and stability is deteriorating, as Bosniaks and Serbs play a zero-sum game to upset the Dayton settlement. Progress toward EU membership is stalled, and requirements set in 2008 for ending the protectorate have not been not met. The international community should decide, at the important meeting on 26-27 March of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the international body that oversees Dayton, not to end the mandate of the High Representative and his office (OHR) by 30 June 2009, as has been foreshadowed. Rather, it should appoint a new High Representative and resolve to maintain the office until all seven of the 2008 requirements ± five ³objectives´ and two ³conditions´ ± are met, both to retain its own credibility and to keep in place powers that would help resolve immediate problems. Once the protectorate does end, hopefully by the end of 2009, a strong EU mission will be needed to continue encouraging Bosnia toward European integration. Brussels and member states should begin now to focus on the specific powers their Special Representative (EUSR) requires and resolve to serve as guarantors of the Dayton agreement. The OHR is no longer the motor driving Bosnia forward, and it is too late for it to resume that role in any open-ended way. The PIC announced already in 2006 that it wanted to close the OHR and rely henceforth on the EU. The PIC hoped this would spur Bosnia to qualify faster for EU membership, but the opposite has happened: left largely to themselves, Bosnian leaders have become locked in a standstill, and some reforms have begun to unravel. Some argue that the shock therapy of an end to the OHR would have a salutary effect on politicians who have grown accustomed to being protected against the worst effects of their irresponsible behaviour. There are four arguments, however, against an immediate end to the OHR¶s role. First, international credibility took a big hit in 2007 when the EU signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Bosnia ± a major step in the accession process ± even though specific police legislation it had strenuously insisted was a precondition had not been adopted, and the High Representative was engaged in a related confrontation with the leader of the Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb entity. The closing of the OHR while two objectives (resolving the status of the Br ko District and dealing with state property) and one condition (full compliance with the Dayton agreement) identified by the PIC in 2008 as requirements remain unmet would risk crippling the EU¶s ability to apply firm policies toward Bosnia long after the protectorate itself has ended. It would also weaken EU credibility throughout the region, notably in Kosovo.
including by guaranteeing Dayton. which has greater resources to lead on this job. but also to control the flow of pre-accession funds. first formulating a member-state consensus on the security stakes and making a corresponding political commitment to see the task through. to build peace and security in Europe¶s eastern reaches. Enlargement is the traditional tool it has been using. social and economic effects. Doing away with OHR now could kill the initiative by removing perhaps the main incentive for compromise. Hardliners on all sides recognise that advancing toward Europe means giving up their ideal solutions: the Serbs know that as Bosnia draws closer to Brussels. mostly to excellent effect. the EU can and should take advantage of a brief OHR respite to prepare better for the fuller responsibilities it will soon inherit. Uniquely in Europe. political and economic sanctions. The High Representative should hold his or her major powers in reserve but act creatively to unblock deliberate obstruction. make tough recommendations on targeted diplomatic. Brussels needs to reassess what Bosnia¶s unique environment requires. the Bosniaks fear that reducing RS autonomy will be impossible. as shown by a recent salary freeze that spurred Br ko municipal councillors into rapid action. it will be harder for them to break away. But Bosnia is unlike the other accession countries. OHR can also act in less disruptive but equally important ways. it will fail. there are some positive political signs whose development may be partly dependent on not prematurely closing the OHR. They are under attack from their own hardliners. and keep all actors. Its recent war still has political. OHR can make some short-term contributions by judicious use of the High Representative¶s special (Bonn) powers. if necessary. They deploy those differences against each other. The Obama administration should recommit to helping Bosnia in the interest of wider stability in the historically explosive and still somewhat fragile region that was Yugoslavia. including dismissal from office. Serb leaders are being conciliatory because they want the OHR to close. Thirdly. Serb and Croat communities have been making tentative efforts toward a workable compromise. Bosnian leaders still fear sanctions. none more so than the Bosniaks. If the EU approaches Bosnia like any other accession country. It should give its Special Representative a mandate to facilitate efforts by Bosnian actors to compromise. Since November 2008. including the UN Security Council. blocking progress towards the ultimate membership goal in the process. its political system stems from a wartime compromise between hostile factions. It can do that best by working with and supporting the EU.S. including on the PIC requirements and constitutional reform. Local decision-makers place different values on European integration and the steps they must take to reach it.Secondly. This will help ensure that its post-OHR mission in Sarajevo is not hobbled by weak political support as the OHR itself too often has been. the Bosniaks and Croats are more interested in constitutional reform and are leveraging the prospect of that closure to overcome Serb reluctance. This gives both a reason to hold back. and both secretly hope to win the EU and U. to their side by remaining intransigent. leaders of the Bosniak. abreast of developments so they can react quickly to any dangers. monitor Dayton compliance and progress toward membership. including the Western Balkans. . that can be imposed for egregious Dayton violations. Finally.
and c) indicate that once Bosnia satisfies those requirements. pursuant to which the EU would specifically pledge that it will not recognise or accept: a) any solution to the state¶s problems imposed on one or more of its constituent nations without consent. including attempts to abolish or reduce the entities unilaterally or to violate the sovereignty of the state. To the Office of the High Representative (OHR): 2. and c) extend the mandate of international legal staff for up to two years if the Parliamentary Assembly has not done so. 4. Use the 26-27 March 2009 meeting to: a) appoint a new High Representative and affirm that his or her executive (Bonn) powers remain available to deal with serious threats or violations of the Dayton Peace Agreement and to act in place of the national government if it is temporarily prevented from acting. 3. the OHR will close without delay. property and a constitutional amendment regulating the status of the Br ko District) and the one remaining PIC condition (full compliance with the Dayton agreement). including defence. Offer to facilitate the Bosnian political process. Announce that the High Representative will not henceforth use the Bonn Powers except to: a) prevent serious threats to and violations of the Dayton Peace Agreement.RECOMMENDATIONS To the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and its Steering Board: 1. b) affirm that the OHR will remain until Bosnia has fully met the two remaining PIC objectives (adoption by the Parliamentary Assembly of a law regulating the disposition of state. Authorise the EU presidency to negotiate an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina guaranteeing the Dayton Peace Agreement. Work with the legislatures of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the entities to fill any legal or regulatory gaps that depend on OHR action. dismissals. salaries and benefits. . b) act in place of the Bosnian state executive if it is temporarily unwilling or unable to fulfil its duties. such that no serious challenges to the Dayton agreement remain. To the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of the European Union: 5. including in matters of appointments. assist in resolving deadlocks and mediate discussions on constitutional reform and advancing European integration.
and c) an entity¶s unilateral withdrawal from the state or its institutions. regarding visa bans. b) monitor. Welcome by resolution. however. 6.S. Government: 9. at least for the duration of the OHR. including through joint exercises. .b) abolition of one or both entities or deprivation of their rights without consent. Maintain Operation ALTHEA (EUFOR) and use it to contribute to training the Bosnian military. Continue to support the OHR. Thereafter. report and advise on compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement and the country¶s progress in the Stabilisation and Association Process. as may be required. embassy in Sarajevo and by seconding expert and technical staff to the EU mission. 7.S. once the OHR closes. and especially after closure of that office. its entities and other political actors. conclude an agreement on the use of military facilities for such joint exercises and for training European forces to conduct European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions. in particular. Establish. It should not. upon closure of the OHR. renew the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) when its mandate expires in December 2009. whose mandate should be. To the U. c) monitor. including through the U. and e) make recommendations. including the signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement. d) disburse or restrict Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance funds ± which should be significantly increased ± as deemed appropriate to encourage progress toward European integration. report on and assist in the process of bringing Bosnia¶s legislation into compliance with the EU¶s acquis communautaire and strengthening the capacity of Bosnian institutions to implement and enforce this legislation. an EU mission headed by a senior official double-hatted as EU Special Representative and Head of the Delegation of the European Commission. the EU¶s support for the maintenance of peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and invite the EUSR to report regularly to the Council and other interested parties. cooperate closely with the EUSR. To the Members of the UN Security Council: 8. to: a) maintain close contact with and offer advice and facilitation to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. asset freezes and suspension of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).
the economy could very well end up crippled. Egypt s military controls as much as a third of the national economy. To this day the Army holds what is effectively the biggest conglomerate in the country. factories and of course Cairo. They are currently demanding what are effectively state hand-outs in order for the wealth gap to be closed. the fat lady has not yet warbled a note. Egypt s economy mainly rests on tourism. Mubarak is respected by his successors who claim that they have no intention of changing his economic model. Banks and . Egypt s economy has been dragged into the 21st century through various reforms. Allocation of state lands for private development. This area is home to vast swathes of agricultural land. without ever paying taxes on or disclosing revenues that are believed to be stratospheric. Increase NATO¶s presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina by concluding agreements on the use of military facilities for NATO training operations and by scheduling more frequent joint exercises. Most of Egypt s economic activity takes place in the North Eastern Nile Delta. waving Egyptian flags and generally still fighting the machine when the brain of the machine has given up and gone home. and sweet deals on privatised state industries for regime figures were common. concessionary loans for the ruling elite. for the time being at least. the capital. slowed the amount of tourists entering the country. business legislation and investment promotion has seen it being transformed from the highly centralized economy inherited from Gamal Abdel Nasser to a functional market based economy. With its staggering array of manufacturing and service operations. mineral deposits. For this at least. By some estimates. foreign investment and exports. And. is extremely harsh on the poor. Scanning Egypt¶s Post-Revolution Revolution Stragglers still haunt Tahrir square and surrounding streets. Cronyism was almost a norm and corruption was a given.To the North Atlantic Council: 10. Think about it like this. But it is obvious that increasing numbers still have genuine grievances. Some of them are probably trying to relive the moments of exhilaration experienced during the overthrowing of Mubarak. Such a market based economy of course. They have suffered the most because of increasing food prices and are seeing the overthrowing of Mubarak as a sign that everything should now go their way. but if all these demands for hand outs are met. in Egypt at least. The revolution is still not over. privatisation. But the market based Egyptian economy isn t really all that market based. The protests have. The army has promised a 15% pay hike for civil servants. the military provides everything from pest control services to washing machines. that fat lady is Mammon. Structural reforms including fiscal and monetary policy. In the last 30 years.
On the other hand if the people do put trust in their new government to make the sweeping changes necessary to eventually bring Egypt s economy out of its very own dark age. like sycophants of the Pharaoh seeking a new master to latch onto. Mubarak after all. But this is easier said. Egypt s ruling military council will face mounting public pressure to provide immediate relief with subsidies and other welfare measures. If the people s mood bends toward mass scale populism. including policies to address inequality and sweeping reforms to rejuvenate a flailing educational system. paralyzing labour strikes. That s why the economy and political situation is balanced on a needlepoint right now. This in fact. Fears of the economy has led to large scale capital flight with foreign investors removing their money and Egypt s stock market is closed and will remain so indefinitely. This has resulted in the growing problem of unemployment and underemployment among youth under the age of 30. But to switch from this model and to go all out welfare state will mean a very bleak future indeed for Egypt. seeking their temporary support. prompting the military to launch a SMS campaign to get people off the streets and back into their workplaces. Question is if they are to do this. they will be running the real risk of it all going back to the way it has been for the last few decades. rendering their revolution ultimately impotent. And this is a much harder task than simply getting one man out of office. What Egypt may need then. Many analysts argue that what Egypt needs now is a new blueprint for sustainable development. is a complete dialysis of their whole political system. Many of the people in his regime who enjoyed the privileges of power are still up there in the Egyptian system waiting for a chance to slowly ease back into their former status. The interim government has already indicated a clear propensity for economic populism. And in the coming months. Egypt has already lost over $15 billion in output since the start of demonstrations on January 25. Sure. a campaign which has largely failed. $255) to the families of protesters killed over the course of the uprising. according to Foreign Ministry officials. and the benefits of growth have failed to trickle down to improve the lives of the poor. would require a whole new revolution . promising to pump up government salaries by 15 percent and offering a monthly pension of LE 1500 (roughly U.S. then it would be an easy task for a not-so-enterprising and short-termist government to comply. rising food prices and you have a perfect recipe for collapse. Add to this a frozen financial market. where will the money come from? Admittedly Egypt s liberalization policies have yielded mixed results.factories have only just opened because the people have not been going back to work. but the government s large failure to share this income with the people has convinced the latter that the very economic model has failed. Mubarak s government failed to share the wealth. there was growth averaging at around five percent annually. was only one man.