TREX-00080 | Mechanical Engineering | Nature

REPORT OF SURVEY

Semi-submersible Rig DEEPWATER HORIZON
Prepared for
BHP Billiton Americas
Customer Reference: 3600012493
ModuSpec Reference: US 1328.2
By
ModuSpec USA
Dates: 3- 12 April , 2005
CONFIDENTIAL

WIT:. ____ _
MODUSI 01 2 010105
1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS
NOTE: The numbering system in this report corresponds with the ModuSpec survey
program and numbers which are omitted apply to equipment which was not
reviewed during this survey.
1.0
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
4.0
7.0
7.1
7.1.1
7.1 .2.1
7.1.5
7.2
7.2.5
7.3
7.3.1
7.4
7.4.2
7.4.4
7.4.7
7.5
7.6
7.6.1
7.7
7.7.1
7.7.2
7.7.3
7.7.4
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....... .... ...................................... ............ 2
INTRODUCTION .......................................................... .... .. ........ 5
Rig Data ...................................................................................... 5
Survey Workscope ... ............. ... ............. ........... .......... .............. ... 5
Applicable Standards .................................................................. 6
ModuSpec Equipment Rating ..................................................... 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................... ...... ............ 9
Executive Summary ... ...... .. .... .. ................................ .................. . 9
Conclusion .................. ..... .............. .... ....................................... 10
End-of-Inspection Meeting Document ... .. .. ............................ .... 11
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS ........ .... ...... ... ........ ...... ... ... ..... 12
WELL CONTROL EQUIPMENT .. .... .. ... ..... ................. .... ......... . 17
Ram-Type Preventers ..... ..................... ............ ......... ................ 17
Ram Type Preventers (General) ............. ... ............................... 17
Cameron ST Locking System .. ....... ...... .................................... 20
Pressure Testing .................................... .. ........... .... .. .............. .. 21
Annular-Type Preventers .... .... ............ ..................................... . 21
Pressure Testing .. ........ .. .................... ... ... ....................... .. ........ 22
Gate Valves (BOP Mounted) .............................. ...................... 22
Pressure Testing ..... .............................. ... ...................... ........... 22
Choke and Kill Manifold ............................................................ 24
Mud/Gas Separator .................................................................. 24
Remote Choke Control Unit General .............. .. ... .... ...... .......... . 25
Pressure Testing ... ................................ ... ...................... ......... .. 25
Cameron-Style Hub Clamps ............................................... ...... 25
BOP-Handl ing Equipment.. .............................. ......................... 26
Bridge Crane ........... ... ............... .. ..... .... ............................. ........ 27
BOP Hydraulic Power Unit.. .................................................. .... 27
Accumulators .................................................................. .......... 27
Hydraulic Pumps ........... ........................ .................................... 28
Hydraulic Control Manifold ................. .. ................ ..................... 29
Remote-Control and Monitoring Panels .................................... 29
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
2
MODUSI 01 2 010106
7.7.4.1
7.7.4.2
7.7.5
7.8
7.8.1
7.8.2
7.8.3
7.9
7.9.1
7.9.2
7.9.3
7.9.3.1
7.9.5
7.9.5.2
7.9.5.3
7.9.6
7.9.7
7.9.7.3
7.9.7.9
7.9.7.10
7.9.7.11
7.9.7.13
7.9.7.14
7.9.7.15
7.9.7.16
7.9.7.18
7.9.7.19
7.9.7.20
7.9.7.21
7.9.7.22
7.9.7.29
7.9.7.30
7.9.7.31
7.9.7.32
7.10
7.10.1
7.10.6
7.10.7
7.10.8
7.10.8.1
7.1 0.8.2
7.10.8.3
Page
Driller's Panel .............. .. ........ .. ... .. ........................................... .. 29
Remote-Control Panels ............................................................. 30
Fluid Control ...... ............ ........................................................... 30
Diverter System .. ....................................................... ............... 30
Diverter Remote-Control Unit.. .................................................. 31
Diverter Assembly .................................... ................................. 31
Diverter Valves ........ .... ... .. .............................................. .......... 31
BOP Control System ......... ......................... ....... ....... ..... .. .. ... ... .. 32
Pods on the LMRP ........... ..................................................... .... 32
Control Hoses and Accumulators ............................... .............. 34
Multiplex Cable Reels ........... ... ................. .............. .................. 35
Mini Reel .................... .............. .. .................. ............................. 35
Emergency Back-Up Control Systems ...................................... 36
ROV Systems ........ ........................... .. .. .................................... 37
Emergency Recovery Systems ........................................ ......... 37
Multiplex Systems (General) ................. .................................... 38
Multiplex Systems (Cameron) .. ................... .............................. 38
UPS Check ................. ... ............................... ............................ 38
Test Hydraulic Power Unit Panel ............ .. ......... .................. ..... 39
Function Tests of Panel Alarms and Level Switches ................ 39
Subsea BOP Control System Accumulator Charging Testing ... 39
Function Test Diverter Panel .................................... ................ 40
Interlocks .......... ... ......... .. .............. .. ........................... ............... 40
Local and Remote/Electrical Operation .. ..................... ..... ......... 40
Pod Function Tests ............... ............................... ..................... 41
Annular Regulator Function Test .............................................. 41
BOP-Manifold Regulator Function Test Blue Pod .. ................... 41
Pod Function Tests ................................................................... 41
Stack Function Tests ..... ........................................................... 42
Indication Lamp Test ......... .. ............................ ......................... 42
Portable Electronic Unit (PETU) ............ .................... ............... 42
Communication/Power Interruption Tests ............... ............. ..... 42
Flow Counter-Toolpusher and Driller's Control Panel ............... 42
Dead Man Sequence ................................................................ 43
Marine Riser System ........................... .. .................................... 43
Marine Risers General ... .. ...................... ................................... 44
Buoyancy Modules ............................... .. .. .............................. .. 44
Telescopic Joints .... ................ ..... ............................................. 45
Riser Handling Tools ...... ........ ...................................... ............. 45
Spider and Gimbals ........................... ................................... .... 46
Riser Running Tools ... ............................................. .. ............... 46
Test Tools ............................. .................................. .................. 46
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
3
MODUSI 01 2 010107
7.11
7.11.3
7.12.2
7.13
7.14
7.14.1
7.15
7.1 5.1
7.15.2
7.17.4.2
12.0
12.1
12.6
13.0
13.1
Flex Joint/Ball Joint on LMRP ................................................... 47
Marine Riser Adapter ........................ .. ......................... ............. 47
Cameron Choke and Kill Connectors (Mini Connectors) .......... 49
Flexible High-Pressure Hoses (Coflexip) .................................. 50
Wellhead/Riser Connector ......................................... ............... 50
Connectors General ....... ........................................................... 52
Riser Tensioners ....................................................................... 55
General .. ................................................................................. .. 56
Riser Tensioner Panel .................................................. ............ 59
Active Heave Compensation ..................................................... 59
MAINTENANCE SYSTEM .................... .................................... 60
Preventive Maintenance ....................... .................................... 60
Spare Parts Inventory ........................... .. ... .............. .. ....... ... ..... 60
SPARE PARTS ............................... .... ....... ..... ....... .......... ........ 61
Stock Control Philosophy .......................................................... 61
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
4
MODUS! 01 2 010108
2.0
2.1
Vessel
Owner
Type
Built
Class
Performance
Location
Inspection dates
ModuSpec References
INTRODUCTION
Rig Data
: DEEPWATER HORIZON
: Transocean
: Semi-submersible rig
: 2000
:ABS
:Water depth 10,000 ft
drilling depth 30,000 ft
: Gulf of Mexico
:3-12 April, 2005
: JS/dw/jh/ss- US1328.2
2.2 Survey Workscope
In accordance with the instructions received, we attended on board the DEEPWATER
HORIZON to complete a condition survey of the well control equipment, maintenance
system and spare parts related to the subsea systems.
The aim of this survey was to determine the present general condition and state of the
subsea system equipment in order to minimize downtime caused by mechanical
breakdown during drilling operations and to ensure that the equipment is kept in safe
working order.
The audit was conducted in good faith, but the inspection of individual items of
equipment was subjected to time and operational constraints imposed by the time of the
survey.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
5
MODUSI 01 2 010109
This report is confidential. It has been prepared on behalf of the customer mentioned on the cover
page ("the customer") and is issued pursuant to an agreement between ModuSpec USA and the
customer. It has been produced according to the scope of work and is only suitable for use in
connection therewith. ModuSpec USA accepts no liability or responsibility whatsoever in respect of
any use of or reliance upon this report by any third party.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or
by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without prior written
permission, in writing, of ModuSpec USA.
2.3 Applicable Standards
The criteria which have been used as reference during this survey are internationally
recognized standards, local legislative requirements, customer's safety and operating
standards, the original equipment manufacturer's maintenance and operating
specifications and accepted oilfield operating and safety practices.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
6
MODUSI 01 2 010110
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating
The ModuSpec Equipment Rating (MER) is a unique system to:
• measure the condition of an individual rig,
• compare the inspection results of an individual rig with the industry average for this
particular type of rig, worldwide or in a specific area,
• visualize the strengths and weaknesses of an individual rig,
• benchmark the safety and maintenance standards of an individual rig against other
rigs or against the results of previous inspections,
• use as a risk analysis tool to proactively prevent accidents and downtime.
The added value of the MER system is that it visualizes and measures the present
condition of a rig and its equipment. The MER allows a direct comparison of a rig with
other rigs of the same type Gack-ups with jack-ups etc.) located in a predefined area or
worldwide.
A series of bar charts representing the inspection resul ts of the rig is included in the final
inspection report. These bar charts are only applicable to the scope of work as stated in
section 2.2.
The MER is presented as an average figure for the entire rig (chart 1) and for each
individual section of the inspection program (chart 3).
A low MER is an indication that certain steps must be taken, for instance:
1. to address the recommendations made in the report,
2. to effect structural improvements to the maintenance management system,
3. to conduct a recheck after the recommendations made in the report have been
addressed.
The following charts are included in the inspection report:
Chart 1: Rig Average lnsoection Rating
In comparison with an industry average, this chart shows:
• the percentage of the ModuSpec inspection program which was completed for the
rig,
• the average MER for the entire rig.
Chart 2: Percentaae Inspected
This chart shows the percentage inspected for each section of the rig in comparison
with the average coverage during an inspection.
Report of Survey - Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
7
MODUSI 01 2 010111
Chart 3: Detailed MER Results
This chart indicates how the rig is rated from a maintenance and safety
qualitative point of view, in comparison with an industry average for this type of rig for
each individual section of the inspection.
Chart 4: Detailed Critical Rating
This chart shows the percentage of critical non-conformances identified for each section
of the inspection program in comparison with the industry average. This chart is an
important indication of the risk to encounter a fatality or serious accident on the rig, and
the possibility of environmental damage caused by the rig.
Chart 5: Detailed Major Rating
This chart shows the percentage of major non-conformances identified for each section
of the inspection program in comparison with the industry average. It is an important
indication of the risk to encounter major equipment damage and/or operational
downtime ofthe rig.
Chart 6: Detailed Minor Rating
This chart shows the percentage of minor non-conformances identified for each section
of the inspection program in comparison with the industry average. It is an important
indication of the risk of lost-time incidents and it visualizes the overall safety and
maintenance standards on the rig.
Note: Charts 4, 5 and 6 indicate the probability for the rig to encounter accidents and
operational downtime measured against the industry average. These charts are very
important indicators to establish whether or not the rig is capable of operating in a safe
and reliable manner.
Validity of the MER
The MER is valid for the duration of one year after completion of the initial inspection.
If a recheck is conducted and completed within four months after the completion of the
initial inspection, only the non-satisfactory and non-inspected items will be checked
again. The MER is then valid for all equipment items which were inspected and found
satisfactory during the initial inspection as well as during the recheck.
Revalidation of the MER must be completed within a year after completion of the initial
inspection. An extension is possible for a maximum of three months after the expiry
date so as to establ ish the revalidation of the MER, provided that:
• the inspection is completed within this three-month period,
• the inspection is requested prior to the initial expiry date.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
8
MODUSI 01 2 010112
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating Chart No.1
Rig Average Inspection Rating
ModuSpec Equipment Rating- Repcrt of Survey - DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL MODUS! 01 2 010113
2.4 ModuS pee Equipment Rating Chart No. 2
Percentage Inspected
100%
90%
80%
70%

.?:
60%
t:r
50%
r
40% f.' .
'
30%
20%
'
10%
0%
Orllllng Woll Control M:u lno Boctl"l=l Malnton.1nco
Equipment
MudSystom
Equipment Equipment
Pow or P1a nt
Equlpmont

Sr.; tom
Sp.1.re P:lrts
lc llES'WATER HORIZON
o•;. o•r. 0% o•;. 0% 0%
lc Sam l Submorslblas GOM o•.<. 0% rr.-. w. 0% 0'/o 0% O't. o•t.
ModuSpec Equipment Rating - Report of Survey-DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010114
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating Chart No. 3
Detailed MER Results
100%
90%



80%

70%
.:.:.
60% ,:.;:_'
50%

.;•;
40%
30%
20%
..
10%
0%
D-iiOng Well Contr ol Morino Boc:triC'II M.llntona:nca
Equipmont
Mud Syst em
Equipment Equipment
PoworP1ant
Equipment
Sofety
System
Ports
!c CEEPWATER HORIZON 0% 0% 94% 0% 0% o•f. 0% 0% o,..
lc Semi Submersibles GOM 0% 0"!. 92% 0% 0% 0% 0% o•;. 0%
ModuSpec Equipment Rating · Report of Survey· DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL MODUS I 01 2 0101 15
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating Chart No.4
Detailed Critical Rating
100%
90%
I'
80%
70%
60% I
50%
I
40%
30%
20%
10%
1if1
0%
llrlllln g
Mu d Systom
Well Control M11rlno
Pow or P1:.nt
Boctrlc:.l
Sofoty

Sp.o1ro
Equip mont Equlpmont Equlpmont Equlpmont Systom
\o DePWATERHORIZON 0% o•t. 5% Oo/o O'Y. 0% o•,o o•t.
lo SomJ Submorslblos GOM o•,o 7'1'. 0% 0"!. o•t. o•;. o•t. 0%
ModuSpec Equipment Rating- Report of Survey - DEEPWATER HORIZON
CON Fl DENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010116
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating Chart no. 5
Detailed Major Rating
100%
.lt
90%
80%
70%
60%
,.
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
.r==r=1l
llrllll ng
Mud Systom
Well Control M3Tino
Pow or PiDnt
BoctriQI
s ~ f o t y
M:1lnton:snco
Sp3ro POJrt:s
Equipment Equlpmont Equlpmant Equipment System
lc CEEPWATERHORJZON O"'o o•t. 5'/o 0% 0% 0'/o o•;. O"'o o-;.
jo Soml Submorolbles GOM cw. o•t. 5'/o oo/. 0% oo;. o•J. O"'o 0'/o
ModuSpec Equipment Rating • Repcrt of Survey· DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL MODUS! 01 2 010117
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating Chart No.6
Detailed Minor Rating
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
d11
0%
Drilling Woll Control M:lrine Boctric:!l
Mud System Pow or Solfoty Spare Parts
fquipment l:qulpmont l:qul pment Equipment System
lc OEEPWATBHIORIZON 0% o•t. 0% 0% 0% 0% o•J. o•.4
Jo Somi Submersibles GOM 0% 0-Jo s•t. 0% 0% Oo/o 0% 0% 0°/o
ModuSpec Equipment Rating - Report of Survey - DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL MODUS! 01 2 010118
3.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3.1 Executive Summary
At the time of this survey the crew had pulled the BOP and was performing between
well maintenance. The subsea control system had faults that were corrected. The
major scope of work on the BOP included replacement of the well bore seals, rams,
packers, top seals, bonnet gaskets, annular elements and general maintenance. The
major component replaced was the wellhead connector that was a used Vetco Super
HD type stored at the shore base. Major unscheduled repairs included one failsafe
valve that had a defective gate and one failsafe operator that required a replacement
operator. Pod solenoid valves were replaced due to diagnostic fault indications.
Overall , the BOP was beyond the original equipment manufacturer's recommended
interval for major service requiring the changing of all the seals in the hydraulic systems.
The recommended interval is three years with a five year interval for disassembly,
hardness and dimensional inspection. It was noted that the certificate of compliance
would soon be out of date.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 / US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
~ - ~ --
9
MODUSI 01 2 0101 19
3.2 Conclusion
After service, the BOP was pressure tested to full working pressure, function tested and
run on the Shenzi 5 well. There were known fault indications in the electronic controls
that were possibly erroneous indications. Some hydraulic parts removed from the
controls due to failures were corroded and the planned maintenance was performed on
the well bore seals and predictable consumables. A maintenance program of major
equipment refurbishment needed to be established.
The system is modern, efficient and safe but will require a total overhaul and renewed
certificate of compliance to prevent downtime failures due to lack of maintenance.
12 April, 2005
ModuSpec USA, Inc.
20501 Katy Freeway, Suite 215
Katy, Texas
USA
Tel. No.
Fax No.
E-mail
Website
: + 281 -398-3998
: + 281-398-8694
: usa@moduspec.com
: www.moduspec.com
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 I US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
10
MODUSI 01 2 010120
-----
~ - - ~ - -
3.3 End-of-Inspection Meeting Document
Rig name: I DEEPWATER HORIZON
Owner: Transocean
Location: US Gulf of Mexico
Customer: BHP Billiton Americas
Inspection dates: 3-12 April, 2005
Date of meeting:
Order No.: US1328.2
Name Title Signature
I
Customer
I
Representative(s):
I J
Rig Staff: Billy Stringfellow Subsea
I
Supervisor
I I
I
I
I
I
ModuSpec
i
Surveyor(s):
j
Joe Spencer Subsea Surveyor
i
J
Note: The original signed end-of-inspection meeting document is kept on file in the
ModuSpec office and a copy can be provided upon request.
Comment by the surveyor: The end-of-inspection meeting was a review of the
recommendations with the senior subsea supervisor.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 I US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
----
11
MODUSI 01 2 010121
4.0 LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations in this report are defined as follows:
Critical recommendations
Critical recommendations are based on shortcomings which may lead to loss of life, a
serious injury or environmental damage as a result of inadequate use and/or failure of
equipment.
Major recommendations
Major recommendations are based on shortcomings which may lead to damage to
essential equipment or have a detrimental effect on the drilling operation as a result of
inadequate use and/or failure of equipment.
Minor recommendations
Minor recommendations are based on shortcomings which may lead to a situation that
contributes to an incident or to circumstances in which the required standards of
operation are not met.
7.0 Well Control Equipment
Ram-Type Preventers (General):
7 .1. 1.1 .1 Minor Perform major service of the complete BOP hydraulic
operating system. Disassemble and inspect BOP ram
operators and ram bodies.
7.1 .1.1.2 Minor Update certificate of compliance for the rams valid for five
years.
Cameron ST Locking System:
7 .1.2.1.1.1 Major Pressure test the unlocking brake clutches on the ST locking
system. The unlocking pressure should be recorded. The
rams should be closed, locked and then the ST unlock clutch
pressure recorded. Trends should be recorded in the
maintenance history.
Pressure Testing:
7 .1.5.1. 1 Minor Calibrate and maintain up to date certification of the test
pump gauges and chart recorder.
Mud/Gas Separator:
7.4.2.1.1 Minor Include the wall thickness testing of the piping to the mud gas
separator and the tank body in the HP piping survey.
Report of Survey - Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
~ - - ---- ----- ----
12
MODUSI 01 2 010122
7.4.4.1.1
7.4.4.1 .2
7.5.1.1
7.6.1.1
7.6.1.1.1
7.7.2.1 .1
7.7.2.1.2
7.7.3.1.1
7.7.3.1.2
7.8.3.1.1
Remote Choke Control Unit General:
Major Calibrate the transducers on the choke manifold Hitech
system. Ensure the electronic meter readout is accurate for
well control operations.
Major Calibrate the Hitech readouts from the Cameron BOP
controls to reflect actual pressure at the BOP sensors.
Cameron-Style Hub Clamps:
Minor Inspect all clamps, studs, nuts and spheri cal washers on the
five year certificate of compliance survey.
BOP-Handling Equipment:
Minor Repair the starboard bulkhead guidance stop that had been
damaged previously. This could fall off if struck again. A
safety sling would also prevent the part from falling if struck.
Bridge Crane:
Minor Paint the safe working load on each of the blocks for the
overhead bridge crane.
Hydraulic Pumps:
Minor Hydrotest and re-certify the HP relief valves on each of the
three BOP hydraulic skid 5,000 psi pumps. Add the relief
valves to the maintenance registry.
Minor Install safety signs waming PUMPS START
AUTOMA TICALL Yin the proximity of the three HPU pumps.
Hydraulic Control Manifold:
Minor Test and certify the relief valves on the hydraulic control skid.
Include the relief valves in the maintenance registry.
Minor Reduce the test pressure and re-certify the relief valve for the
telescopic joint hydraulic packer. The maximum test
pressure of the packer assembly is 500 psi.
Diverter Valves:
Minor Test the diverter control system to ensure that the two hole
fill isolation valves will close when the diverter element was
closed. Consider installing check valves on the lines if
control software is not a solution.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
13
MODUSI 01 2 010123
7.9.1.1.1
7.9.1.1.2
7.9.3.1.1.1
7.9.5.1.1
7.9.7.3.1
7.9.7.3.2
Pods on the LMRP:
Minor Tilt test the LMRP to confirm that the internal pod angle data
is similar in trends to the riser angle sensors on the riser
adapter. Correct Cameron readout gain confidence in the
readout on the drillers and tool pusher's panels.
Minor Remove and inspect all valves control valves on the pods for
ceramic seal plates. Replace with 440C as required.
Mini Reel:
Minor Install safety signs on the hot line hose reel that it can start
turning automatically and that there is high pressure in the
hose.
Emergency Back-Up Control Systems:
Minor Surface test the BOP autoshear system in arm and disarm
modes.
UPS Check:
Major
Minor
Replace battery banks on the Cameron controls UPS banks
A and B 36 batteries each.
Perform the API UPS tests per API Spec 160 2.2.3 for two
hour depletion with system in drilling mode.
Subsea BOP Control System Accumulator Charging Testing:
7.9.7. 11.1 .1 Minor Consider changing subsea regulator pilot regulator pre-
charges to 1/3 working pressure plus hydrostatic
compensation 500 psi for a 1,500 psi normal setting on the
regulator.
Interlocks:
7.9.7.14.1.1 Major Upgrade the software to include interlocks that will prevent
the accidental unlocking of the riser connector- primary and
secondary, without ensuring the mini-collets are unlocked
primary or secondary, and that the BOP stingers were
retracted. One additional feature would be to also have an
interlock that the blind shear rams were closed to ensure the
well is secure prior to unlatching the LMRP manually.
Pod Function Tests:
7 .9. 7 .16.1.1 Minor Calibrate the pod readout pressures. Apply a calibrated
gauge and pump to each subsea transducer and adj ust the
readout meter accordingly.
Report of Survey - Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 / US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
14
MODUSI 01 2 010124
Annular Regulator Function Test:
7.9.7.18.1.1 Minor Consider changing the precharge of the pilot accumulators to
be 500 psi plus hydrostatic compensation to allow regulators
to operate more reliably at pressures less than 1 ,000 psi.
Pod Function Tests:
7.9.7.20.1.1 Minor Function test the pilot system by actuating the solenoid
valves and ensuring the pilot pressure is to the correct pod
and stack mounted component. Purge the air out of the
lines.
Stack Function Tests:
7.9.7.21.1.1 Minor Incorporate testing the autoshear system and EDS sequence
timing into the function test check list prior to running the
BOP.
7.9.7.29 Portable Electronic Unit (PETU)
Dead Man Sequence:
7.9.7.32.1.1 Major Upgrade the deadman sequence description to reflect actual
software logic. As described, it is assumed the stinger seals
were de-energized prior to extending the stinger to close the
shear rams. If the sequence did not de-energize the stinger
seals first prior to extending the stinger, the software should
be changed. This will ensure pod integrity and the closure of
the shear rams.
Marine Riser System:
7.1 0.1.1 Minor Obtain additional riser torque tools to minimize downtime due
to wear and tear.
Telescopic Joints:
7.1 0. 7.1.1 Minor Repair I replace the rotating goosenecks and use them to
avoid inducing torque in the auxiliary li ne hoses when
changing rig heading.
7.1 0.7.1.2 Minor Re-set the telescopic joint hydraulic packer relief valve to be
at or less than the working pressure of the packer. The relief
valve needed re-calibration as it is past its two year service.
Spider and Gimbals:
7.1 0.8.1.1 Major Write a procedure to maintain the gimbal prior to each use.
Include the procedure in the stack job preparation list. Check
pre-charge, fill with fluid and hydrotest to full rated working
pressure prior to each use.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
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MODUSI 01 2 010125
TestTools:
7.10.8.3.1 Minor Modify choke and kill test caps to be 1" autoclave to speed
up pressure testing times.
7.10.8.3.2 Minor Modify hydraulic line test caps to be SAE or NPT threads to
avoid the potential of over-pressurizing the hydraulic lines
when testing.
Cameron Choke and Kill Connectors (Mini Connectors):
7.12.2.1.1 Minor Obtain a fleet spare connector and swap out the choke side
connector as it has symptoms of not operating correctly.
7.13.1 .1
Flexible High-Pressure Hoses (Coflexip):
Minor The hoses should be removed from service and tested per
the OEM requirements for re-certification.
Wellhead/Riser Connector:
7.14.1.1 Minor Replace the riser connector with a rebuilt one as t he piston
stroke is at its maximum limit.
Connectors General:
7.14.1.1.1 Major Modify the BOP and LMRP frames to include the reaction
pads to prevent damage to the mini collet assemblies or pod
stinger receptacles in the event of a high angle disconnect.
General Tensioner:
7 .15.1.1.1 Major Install a drain valve on the stand by APV tensioner bottles.
There are eight each bottles without a drain.
7 .15.1.1 .2 Minor Paint identification marking on each high pressure bottle of
the tensioner system the working pressure. This includes the
tensioner bottles and standby APVs.
Riser Tensioner Panel:
7.15.2.1.1 Minor Calibrate the tensioner system transducers to allow accurate
control of the riser tension.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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7.0 Well Control Equipment
7.1 Ram-Type Preventers
The ram type preventers were 18-% "Cameron type TL with an ST locking system with
two shear ram assemblies. The upper shear ram was a sealing blind shear ram and the
lower was a 28" piston super shear ram without wellbore seals or locks. The pi ston
diameter on the locking rams was 18". The ram configuration was from bottom up: test
rams, lower pipe rams, upper pipe rams, casing shear rams, blind shear rams and riser
connector mandrel. It was noted that the test ram blocks were installed upside down to
allow pressure testing of the BOP on drill pipe with no wellhead test plug.
The outlets under the rams were as follows: choke side under the lower pipe rams and
upper pipe rams. The kill side was under the lower pipe rams and blind shear rams.
All pipe ram packers were VBR 3-Y2" to 6-5/8".
7.1.1 Ram-Type Preventers (General)
The casing shear rams and blind shear rams had a high pressure close function
separate from the conventional subsea manifold operated control system. The HP
shear close functions operated from separate stack mounted regulators that allowed
4,000 psi to shear high grade pipe or casing. In the lower BOP were eight each 80
gallon accumulators dedicated to the HP shear functions. Available for use was 6-5/8",
5-1/2" and 5" S-135 drill pipe. Per shear tables for the TL BOP with 18" pistons, the
shear pressure was higher than the allowable working pressure of the ram hydrauli c
system for shearing the 6-5/8" with the blind shear rams. The super shear rams with
the 28" piston could shear the 6-5/8" 40.9 lb/ft drill pipe with 1,790 psi and 5" 19.5 S-135
could shear at 2,020 psi with the blind shear rams. It was indicated that 2,400 psi was
required to shear 5.5" 24.7 S-135.
Above the upper pipe rams there was 3. 75 ft to the bottom of the casing shear rams and
6.78 ft to the bottom of the blind shear rams for tool joint clearance in the event of
hanging off on the upper pipe rams and shearing the pipe. There were three sets of
spare ram blocks on the rig including one spare set of 3-Y2", 6-5/8" rams, one set of 5"
rams and one set of casing shear rams. The spare VBR rams were outdoors exposed
to the sun which was not considered a good practice as the elastomers would be
affected and their service life decreased. All the rams were opened including the casing
shear rams for internal cavity inspection and ram block elastomer change out.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
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MODUSI 01 2 010127
The cavities were in good condition with minor buffing of scratches required to improve
the surface finish. The casing shear ram blocks were the updated style with the debris
slots in the bottom of the blocks. The block blade shear edge appeared like new. Per
the Cameron advisory 8164 (4/02), the retainer bolts (P/N 2724258-02) were replaced
on the super shear ram blocks. The Cameron advisory EB 8750 relative to cleaning
and lubrication of the super shear ram blocks and cavities was also available. One
super shear block retainer bolt on the port side bonnet was in tact but did not come out
easily indicating the bolt may have been bent.
The starboard bonnet super shear ram block retainer bolt was sheared and distorted.
Removal required shimming the ram block and shearing it completely. The shearing
may have been caused by debris behind the ram blocks or lack of lubrication on the
surfaces that the rams mate when closed. The sheared bolt parts were sent to town for
analysis. The BOP rams have been in service for five years without operator elastomer
maintenance. The manufacturer's recommendation was for the seals to be changed
every three years.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
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Size (in) Weight (ppf) Grade
Minimum Wall
Yield (psi) J.D. (in) (in)
should be verified an actual shear test.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 / US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
---- ----- -----
Shear Pressure (psi) @
Ambient
18"
Piston
with
Shear
Blind
Rams
19
28" Piston with
Casing Shear
Rams
MODUS! 01 2 010129
7.1.1.1.1
7.1.1.1.2
7.1.2.1
Ram-Type Preventers (General) Recommendations:
Minor Perform major service of the complete BOP hydraulic
operating system. Disassemble and inspect BOP ram
operators and ram bodies.
Minor Update certificate of compliance for the rams valid for five
years.
7.1 Spare VBR ram blocks.
Cameron ST Locking System
The pipe rams and blind shear rams contained ST locks. The ST locking system was
installed with both sequence valves installed on each locking system and had been
upgraded to the latest standards per the Cameron advisories 06124, 06104 and
inspection checklist T-240. The upgrades were hydrotested to 3,000 psi at the time of
installation however the procedures of individually testing the ST unlock brake operating
pressure was not done and was not in the surface testing procedures. Testing each
individual ST piston and brake lock to check the unlocking pressure was recommended.
In the event the unlocking pressure exceeded system operating pressure the locks
would not unlock and the ram would not open. The procedure of testing the brake
unlocking pressure was discussed with the subsea engineers and submitted as a
checklist item but was not performed prior to running the BOP.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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Cameron ST Locking System Recommendations:
7.1.2.1.1.1 Major Pressure test the unlocking brake clutches on the ST locking
system. The unlocking pressure should be recorded. The
rams should be closed, locked and then the ST unlock clutch
pressure recorded. Trends should be recorded in the
maintenance history.
7.1 .5 Pressure Testing
The reassembled BOP was pressure tested to full working pressure of 15,000 psi
without failure. The testing was performed by closing the rams, locking the ST locks
and venting the closing and locking pressure. The manifold pressure to close was
above the normal operating pressure of 1 ,500 psi and the manifold pressure was 2,200
psi. The subsea engineer explained that this was their normal operating practice. The
test pressure was 250 psi for five minutes and 15,000 psi for five minutes straight line.
The tests were on 6-5/8" drill pipe and 5" drill pipe against the lower BOP test rams.
The blind shear rams were tested the same against the test stump. The test pump used
did not have val id test certificates for the chart recorder or adjacent low and high
pressure gauges.
7.1.5.1.1
7.2
Pressure Testing Recommendations:
Minor Calibrate and maintain up to date certification of the test
pump gauges and chart recorder.
Annular-Type Preventers
In the LMRP were two 18-o/.J" x 10,000 psi Cameron type DL. New nitrile elements were
installed that were fabricated in August 2004 and September 2004 when the outer and
inner packers were replaced. Both annulars had outlets for annulus bleeder valves and
there was one set of 3-1 /16" valves installed under the lower annular tied into the choke
line for returns to the surface. There were bladder type surge bottles on the close side
of both annulars for stripping volume compensation.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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7.2.5 Pressure Testing
The upper and lower annulars were pressure tested to full working pressure on 6-5/8"
and 5" drill pipe. The pressure was 250 psi low for five minutes and 10,000 psi high
pressure for five minutes. The inner and outer bleeder valves were tested at the same
time as the annulars from the well bore side. Later, the bleeder valves were tested to
15,000 psi from the choke line side and the annular closing pressure was increased to
1,800 psi for the pressure tests. Each new annular element was opened and closed
three times prior to the test to achieve good tests. Cameron annulars are not wellbore
pressure assisted to close.
7.3 Gate Valves {BOP Mounted)
There were four each 3-1 /16" x 15,000 psi integral dual failsafe close Cameron MCS
valve assemblies installed on the lower BOP two on the choke line and two on the kill
line. There was one additional 3-1 /16" integral dual under the lower annular tied into the
choke line. There was one spare rebuilt valve assembly on board however it was used
for spare parts. The LMRP had one each 3-1/16" x 15K MCS failsafe open test valve
on the choke and kill lines above the mini-collet connector.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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------ ~ - --
7.3.1 General
The control system to operate the subsea valves was with a three position function
subsea manifold that supplied fluid to open and close the valves with a block or vent
mode. There was also a stack mounted failsafe assist system on each valve close side
to enhance closure of the valves in the event of manifold regulated close pressure
failure. The failsafe assist system was not installed on the choke and kill fine test valves
and the booster line isolation valve in the LM RP.
The BOP was function tested when it was first set back and the upper outer choke valve
started leaking externally at the close side of the valve operator. The valve operator
was replaced with a spare on board and the valves were greased with the
recommended lubricant. While greasing the valves, the grease displaced contaminants
out of another port of the valve cavities.
The valve repaired with the replacement operator failed a pressure test and it was
disassembled and the components inspected. The gate had a plating failure on the seal
surface of the seat and the hard facing had separated from the parent metal. The valve
was rebuilt and successfully pressure tested a second time.
The failsafe assist system in the lower BOP caused some downtime prior to running the
BOP. This system was a single point failure non-redundant passive actuated hydraulic
system. Valves leaked and required replacement and repair and a 5,000 to 1 ,500 psi
regulator required replacement. There were also some crossed hoses that required
troubleshooting to diagnose prior to running the BOP.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 / US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
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-- ~ - --
7.3 Failsafe assist corroded control valve.
7.3.8 Pressure Testing
The valves were pressure tested to full working pressure from the well bore side and rig
side.
7.4 Choke and Kill Manifold
The choke and kill manifold was fabricated by Stewart and Stevenson. The HP inlet
valves were 3-1/16" x 15,000 psi manual valves. The chokes installed were two each
hydraulic remote actuated chokes and two manual chokes and there was no choke
bypass line between the HP side to the buffer tank. Downstream of the chokes the
valves were 4-1/6" x 10,000 psi manual valves. The discharges were to port and
starboard overboard lines, mini-trip tank and the mud gas separator. The inlets to the
choke manifold were from the subsea choke and kill lines, cement unit and mud
standpipe manifolds. The choke manifold was not pressure tested at the time of the
survey.
7.4.2 Mud/Gas Separator
The mud gas separator was fabricated by Swaco. The gas discharge line was a 12"
line up the derrick. There was a 22ft liquid seal between the inlet and discharge piping.
The capacity specification was 20 MMSCF/day. The inlets to the mud/gas separator
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
CONFIDENTIAL
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MODUS! 01 2 010134
were from the choke manifold buffer tank and one overboard diverter line that could be
routed as a mud saver in the event of diverting riser gas and mud. The discharge line
had a vent line that went up the derrick as an anti-siphon suction breaker to prevent the
tank from siphoning dry. The mud gas separator was not included in the pressure
vessel register for inspection either by pressure testing or by a wall thickness survey in
conjunction with the HP piping. There was an electronic display for the mud gas
separator pressure and temperature in the driller's work station.
7.4.2.1. 1
7.4.4
Mud/Gas Separator Recommendation:
Minor Include the wall thickness testing of the piping to the mud gas
separator and the tank body in the HP piping survey.
Remote Choke Control Unit General
The remote actuated chokes could be operated from two locations. There was a
remote panel adjacent to the choke manifold with controls for the two hydraulic chokes,
15,000 psi choke and mud standpipe electronic gauges and a pump stroke counter.
There was another remote panel in the driller's work station with the same controls and
additional electronic instrumentation including the subsea pressure and temperature
gauges, mud gas separator P& T gauges. The virtual Hitech choke panel included
electronic pressure and temperature readouts from the lower BOP and choke line
sensors. When pressure testing the BOP the meters on the virtual panel indicated the
same erroneous pressures as seen on the Cameron system. The pressure readouts
from the choke manifold were closer to the pressure seen by the cementer when
pressure testing. There was no indication that the pressure sensors had been
calibrated.
7.4.4.1.1
7.4.4.1 .2
7.4.7
Remote Choke Control Unit General Recommendations:
Major Calibrate the transducers on the choke manifold Hitech
system. Ensure the electronic meter readout is accurate for
well control operations.
Major Calibrate the Hitech readouts from the Cameron BOP
controls to reflect actual pressure at the BOP sensors.
Pressure Testing
The choke system was not pressure tested at the time of the survey.
7.5 Cameron-Style Hub Clamps
There were a number of clamps on the flexible hoses and valve connections on the
BOP system. The clamps had been installed properly with spherical washers and equal
spacing between the clamp halves. Proper lubrication and torque tools were available
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 / US1328.2
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MODUSI 01 2 010135
for installation on the clamps on the LMRP and moon pool HP hoses serviced. The
clamps also would require inspection and re-certification for the five year survey.
7.5.1.1
Cameron-Style Hub Clamps Recommendations:
Minor Inspect all clamps, studs, nuts and spherical washers on the
five year certificate of compliance survey.
7.5 No.6 clamp.
7.6 BOP-Handling Equipment
A Hydralift BOP handling system was installed that provided the capacity to have the
BOP assembly to be fully unitized and tested prior to deployment. The system was
composed of a BOP trolley, overhead bridge crane, bulkhead guidance system and
support stands. The BOP trolley was rated for 31 0 metric tons. The trolley basically
was a carrier that traversed port and starboard in the moon pool. Installed in the trolley
was a work platform for install ing the multiplex cables on the riser and also for
supporting conductor casing on a false rotary. When sea fastened on the port location
the conductor casing could be run from an auxiliary hoist in the derrick and a horizontal
conveyor from the casing rack. There were retractable pins for supporting the BOP and
pins for locating in sea fastening fixtures on the moon pool beams. There were hydraulic
slip rings on the trolley for hydraulic fluid to operate the functions. There were no leaks
and the system worked as designed. The overhead hoists elevate the BOP from the
trolley and translate the BOP assembly to the storage I service location. There were
Report of Survey - Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 / US1328.2
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MODUS! 01 2 010136
bulkhead guidance systems to stabilize the BOP and LMRP when translating the
assemblies to service locations.
There were no travel limit control devices on the bulkhead guidance systems and the
bulkhead guidance assembly between the BOP and LMRP storage locations had
reached the end of its travel and had damaged a stopping mechanism. The bolted on
stopping fixture should be removed, repaired and bolted back on as there was a risk it
could fall off if struck again.
7.6.1.1
7.6.1
BOP-Handling Equipment Recommendations:
Minor Repair the starboard bulkhead guidance stop that had been
damaged previously. This could fall off if struck again. A
safety sling would also prevent the part from falling if struck.
Bridge Crane
The overhead cranes had two blocks rated at 155 MT and two auxiliary hoists rated at
20 metric tons. The safe working load for the main frame of the overhead hoist was
identified for the assembly however the two 155 MT hoists did not have the working
load identified. The cable had been replaced on one auxiliary hoist at the time of the
survey and the cable certification was on file. It was identified on the auxiliary hoists
WWL20.
7.6.1 .1.1
7.7
Bridae Crane Recommendations:
Minor Paint the safe working load on each of the blocks for the
overhead bridge crane.
BOP Hydraulic Power Unit
The HPU system was a 5,000 psi working pressure system with three electrically
operated pumps supplying the surface accumulators. The HPU had a 1 ,200 gallon
mixed fluid tank adjacent to the pumps. There was a nitrogen back-up bottle installed to
supplement a reduction of rig air supply per API specifications.
7.7.1 Accumulators
The surface accumulators were 40 gallon Cameron float-type bottles and there were 45
bottles for the BOP supply with a useful volume of 858 gallons. The minimum volume
required after meeting the API16D specification was calculated to be 374.6 gallons with
a minimum pressure of 2,239 psi closing ratio constraint. The remaining volume
exceeded the 50% volume reserve. The pre-charge pressure was 200 psi under the
minimum pressure required to close one set of pipe rams against full well bore
pressure. No subsea accumulators were included in the accumulator capacity
calculations. The accumulator capacity met the specification per API 160 2.2.2.5.
Report of SuNey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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MODUS! 01 2 010137
T
7.7.2 Hydraulic Pumps
The HPU was equipped with three 5,000 psi triplex electrically operated pumps. Each
pump had an output of 32 gallons I minute. The electrical supply was from the
redundant DPS3 switchboards. Adjacent to the HPU was the hydraulic control unit that
included the hydraulic supply to the rigid conduit line to the BOP and the hot line hose
reel. The HP discharge relief valves on each pump had been upgraded from original to
the new style with better resetting capacity and quality. The new relief valves did not
have tags to represent working pressure, testing or re-certification. Pressure sensors
between the pump and the first isolation valve, per API specifications, automatically
started the pumps however, there were no safety signs warning personnel that the
pumps start automatically.
7.7.2.1.1
7.7.2.1.2
Hydraulic Pumps Recommendations:
Minor Hydrotest and re-certify the HP relief valves on each of the
three BOP hydraulic skid 5,000 psi pumps. Add the relief
valves to the maintenance registry.
Minor Install safety signs warning PUMPS START
AUTOMAT/CALLY in the proximity of the three HPU pumps.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 / US1328.2
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7.7.3 Hydraulic Control Manifold
Adjacent to the HPU was the hydraulic control unit that di stributed the 5,000 psi
accumulator pressure to various remote functions. Discharges were to the rigid conduit
subsea supply, hot line hose reel and deck mounted supplies to actuate systems with
charged BOP fluid. Included in the hydraulic control unit was the diverter system,
telescopic joint operating system, BOP hot line hose reel , fluid bearing etc. There were
relief valves for various systems that had no certification tags or identification that they
had been tested since original delivery in 2000. The telescopic joint relief valve was 50
psi higher set pressure than the working pressure of the telescopic joint packer.
7.7.3.1 .1
7.7.3. 1.2
7.7.4
Hydraulic Control Manifold Recommendations:
Minor Test and certify the relief valves on the hydraulic control skid.
Include the relief valves in the maintenance registry.
Minor Reduce the test pressure and re-certify the relief valve for the
telescopic joint hydraulic packer. The maximum test
pressure of the packer assembly is 500 psi.
Remote-Control and Monitoring Panels
There were three locations for monitoring the BOP system located at the driller' s panel
in the driller's work station, toolpusher's panel in the bridge and a central control unit
system adjacent to the subsea shop. The system at the CCU had the event logger and
an additional system to allow interaction with the controls to al low locking out critical
functions as required for troubleshooting or safety. The panels had been upgraded to
provide safety latches on critical functions such as shear rams, riser connector,
wellhead connector etc., in addition to covers that triggered an audible signal if lifted for
safety.
7.7.4.1 Driller's Panel
The BOP panel in the driller's work station had control of all the BOP and diverter
functions. Included in the panel were readouts from the Cameron riser and stack angle
sensors. When retrieving the BOP the riser and stack angle sensors had slightly
erroneous readouts that needed calibration prior to having confidence in the angles
indicated. The Cameron interface with the automatic station keeping system was to be
bias calibrated prior to landing the stack for their confidence. The driller's panel
included both audible and visual alarms, error status readouts, flow meters both at
surface and subsea, and there were double safety covers on critical functions such as
the shear rams, riser connector and wellhead connector.
Report of SuNey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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MODUSI 01 2 010139
7.7.4 Driller's BOP panel.
7.7.4.2 Remote-Control Panels
There was another remote panel designated the bridge panel located in the navigation
bridge. This panel was similar to the driller's panel with full functionality, information
available and safety features.
7.7.5 Fluid Control
The mixing system for the HPU was a batch style fabricated by Cameron. As requi red
to replenish th_e mixed fluid tank a fixed volume of soluble oil was supplied per a pre-set
volume of fresh water. The soluble oil used was 'Stack Magic' at a 3% concentration.
The fluid mixing system had two tanks installed for glycol and soluble oil. The soluble
oil tank had a capacity of 500 gallons and the glycol tank had a capacity of 300 gallons.
The mixed fluid tank was opened on the top and the fluid was checked for bacteria
growth. There was no growth. Fluid samples were sent on a regular interval and the
returned reports indicated no bacteria, proper lubrication concentration and Ph.
7.8 Diverter System
The diverter system consisted of a Hydril FS-21 assembly with 500 psi working
pressure. There were two 14" vent line ports, one 18" flow line port and two 3" fill ports
and one overboard vent line had a tee branch to a 14" pipe going to the inlet of the mud
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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~ - ----
gas separator. Each of the vent lines were fitted with a 14" ball valve to allow the
selection of port or starboard discharge, or both. The mud gas separator pipe that was
routed to an overboard line was also fitted with isolation valves with electroni c position
sensors on the valve operators. The Hydril diverter spool had the inherent interl ock
between the flow line porting and overboard discharge such that if the diverter element
was closed, the vent lines would automatically be opened and the flow line closed. It
was also possible to prepare the overboard discharge to actually discharge into the
mud gas separator ifthere was flow when the diverter element was closed. The
overboard piping had long radius bends and additional reinforcement on the outside of
the bends for erosion protection. The two 3" hole fill lines were fitted with remote
actuated ball valves however there were no check valves on the hole fill lines to check
flow from the well bore in the event of diverter closure.
7.8.1 Diverter Remote-Control Unit
The remote controls were from the Cameron BOP control system with hydraulic control
valves at a HPU skid. The controls could be manually operated at the HPU, or remotely
operated from the driller's panel or toolpusher's panel in the bridge. The HPU pump
skid supplied a dedicated bank of six 40 gallon float-type accumulator bottles at 5,000
psi and there was one bladder-type bottle used as a surge compensator on the diverter
close piping to allow stripping through the closed diverter element if required. The
diverter control system also had controls for an annular installed under the telescopic
joint at the top of the riser string. The gas handler annular was not installed.
7.8.2 Diverter Assembly
The complete diverter assembly consisted of a handling tool rated for 750 tons, the
FS21 spool, support housing, Oil States diverter flex joint and riser crossover to suit the
inner barrel of the telescopic joint. The diverter flex joint was rated for 500 psi and
2,000,000 lbs tension. The closing element of the diverter was the original one with five
years' service. One flow port seal was damaged and a spare was on board. The
intention was to change the seal prior to the diverter being installed.
7.8.3 Diverter Valves
The diverter valves were full bore ANSI 300 hydraulic actuated ball valves with
electronic position sensors. In addition to the inherent control of flow line and overboard
vent lines within the diverter spool, there were two knife style valves for the selection of
flow line discharge to the shakers or the trip tank. The flow line knife valve was an 18"
valve and the trip tank valve was an 8" valve. The control interlocks on the flow line and
diverter valves were from the Cameron diverter control unit multiplex PLC system.
There was no interlock description in the Cameron system manual. There were two
hole fill lines that did not have check valves to prevent flow from the well bore if the
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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MODUSI 01 2 010141
diverter was closed and there was flow. These interlocks needed testing to ensure that
the hole fill lines would close automatically if the diverter element was closed.
7.8.3.1.1
7.9
Diverter Valves Recommendations:
Minor Test the diverter control system to ensure that the two hole
fill isolation valves will close when the diverter element was
closed. Consider installing check valves on the lines if
control software is not a solution.
BOP Control System
The BOP control was a multiplex system fabricated by Cameron in 2000. The pods
were the Cameron Mark 2 style. The pods were mounted directly to the LMRP frame
and there was one spare pod on deck that had not been fully refurbished as an active
spare. There was a test stand to allow function testing the spare pod with the portable
electronic test unit. The surface panels had fiber optic cabling for communications but
the subsea system was wi re only down the control umbilicals.
7.9.1 Pods on the LMRP
The Cameron Mk 2 pods had spare functions forfuture enhancement if required. There
were spare transducer locations, spare solenoid valve locations and subsequent spares
in the BOP and LMRP portions for manifold regulated valves. The pods were supplied
by 5,000 psi control fluid and there was a manual regulator to reduce the 5,000 psi to
3,000 psi. There were separate hydraulic actuated regul ators for control of the subsea
manifold pressure, LMRP connector pressure, wellhead connector regulator and each
annular. Each pod communicated to the surface with a dedicated multiplex cable. The
riser junction box interface to the pod communications also incorporated the input from
external sensors like the two pressure and temperature sensors, flow meter and riser
angle sensors.
Within each pod was an inclinometer that measured stack angle. The stack angle
information was read back at the driller's and bridge control panels as well as an output
to the ASK system in the bridge. The display on the Cameron system indicated
erroneous indications of angles. There was no confirmation t hat the electronic stack
angle sensors in the pods had been calibrated to ensure that they were in phase with
the external riser angle sensors i.e. that the X's and Y's have the correct orientation and
sign.
The pods required corrective maintenance when on the surface. When a hydraulic
valve was removed from a pod, it was observed that it had a ceramic shear seal side
plate. Those plates were obsolete and a liability if they cracked and the brittl e pieces
floated around in the hydraulics and caused mechanical damage. Cameron had issued
an engineering bulletin number 861 C that claimed that Cameron has elected to revise
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the use of AISI 44C for all control valve seal plates. Ceramic seal plates were avai lable
for customers who preferred ceramic seal plates however only ~ " control valves could
still have ceramic seats as the others had become obsolete.
It was observed that the pilot system on the yellow pod was continuously venting fluid
and the blue pod pilot system was much tighter. The Cameron electronics technician
ran solenoid diagnostics on each pod prior to installing them in the LMRP. There were
no faults on the solenoids but when multiplexed with the integral system, there were
intermittent coil faults that appeared. It was possibly not a coil fault, but a faulty utility
card that communicated between the solenoid drivers and the diagnostics system.
7.9.1.1.1
7.9.1.1.2
Pods on the LM RP Recommendations:
Minor Tilt test the LMRP to confirm that the internal pod angle data
is similar in trends to the riser angle sensors on the riser
adapter. Correct Cameron readout gain confidence in the
readout on the drillers and toolpusher's panels.
Minor Remove and inspect all valves control valves on the pods for
ceramic seal plates. Replace with 440C as required.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
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7.9.2 Control Hoses and Accumulators
In most cases, the hydraulic shuttle valves were mounted directly on the BOP function
operators. In few cases there was tubing between the shuttle valves and the operators
and there was no appearance of collapsed hoses observed. The accumulators on the
lower BOP were dedicated to the HP shear close function, failsafe assist valve function
and the backup deadman system.
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7.9.2 Ceramic seal plate on left.
7.9.3 Multiplex Cable Reels
There was one reel dedicated to each pod and the cable lengths were 11,500 feet. The
reels were controlled by a common control location between the reels so the operator
could observe the person in the moon pool and the roller turndown sheaves.
7.9.3.1 Mini Reel
There was an additional hose run in conjunction with the multiplex cables which was a
1" inch 5,000 psi hot line to maintain control of the BOP when running and retrieving the
riser. The hose installed was about 11,300 feet long and the hose reel had 5,000 psi on
it at all times. There was one incident where the hose reel accumulator supply fitting
backed off and the surface accumulators discharged during the riser pulling operations
and subsequently the fitting was repaired. Safety signs needed to be applied at the reel
stating the contents as HP fluid and that the reel could start turning automatically.
Mini Reel Recommendations:
7.9.3.1.1.1 Minor Install safety signs on the hot line hose reel that it can start
turning automatically and that there is high pressure in the
hose.
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--------
7.9.3.1 Hot line hose reel.
7.9.5 Emergency Back-Up Control Systems
The back-up control systems installed in the BOP assembly were both an electronic
back-up system and a passive system to secure the well in the event of loss of BOP
controls. The Cameron 'Deadman' system would be actuated in the event of loss of
hydrauli c power and electrical power to the pods as during ri ser loss. This system
would control the pods to operate the shear rams close if it were armed and had
batteries in the subsea pod housings to activate solenoids in a programmed sequence.
There were dedicated four 60 gallon accumulators for hydraulic supply to the deadman
system.
The passive system was an autoshear system that was activated when the LMRP lifted
off the BOP when it was armed. The autos hear system used the lower BOP
accumulators for closing the blind shear rams. These were the same accumulators
used for the HP shear rams close functions from the pods. The deadman and
autoshear systems could be armed or disarmed with the surface controls. The
autoshear system was not tested when the BOP was on deck. We advised charging
the lower accumulators, arm autoshear and lift the LMRP off the BOP. The test should
be repeated with autoshear in disarm to confirm that the control system was working.
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7.9.5.1.1
7.9.5.2
Emergency Back-Up Control Systems Recommendations:
Minor Surface test the BOP autoshear system in arm and disarm
modes.
ROV Systems
There were ROV intervention receptacles installed on the BOP and LMRP for critical
functions. The single port receptacles on the BOP were shear rams close, shear rams
lock, wellhead gasket release, wellhead connector unlock and accumulators vent. The
panel on the LMRP included choke and kill connector unlock, LMRP connector unlock,
LMRP gasket release and rigid conduit flush valve back up close. The single ported
receptacles were run with a protective plug installed. The plug was externally ported to
the sea to allow ambient pressure compensation on the hose to the isolation shuttle
valve. There was no ROV intervention port for glycol injection for the wellhead
connector.
7.9.5 LMRP ROV intervention panel.
7.9.5.3 Emergency Recovery Systems
Installed on the LMRP and BOP were Kevlar slings for lifting the LMRP or BOP in an
emergency recovery event.
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7.9.6 Multiplex Systems (General)
There was an enhanced control system that provided another work station to control the
BOP and perform diagnostics in the subsea office adjacent to the workshop and an
interface system that allowed operating the BOP via a keyboard and CRT display.
There were screens for virtually all the BOP functions. Also included was an 'E' lockout
which allowed overriding or locking out the multiplex controls to inhibit the inadvertent
actuation of critical functions like the wellhead connector while drilling, riser connector
when running and retrieving the BOP.
Adjacent to the above control system was an event logger that logged the actuation of
functions and alarms. The event logger allowed the observation of solenoid status on,
off and error modes and the analog readouts of the transducers and angle sensors
could be monitored on a strip chart.
7.9.6 Event logger.
7.9.7.3 UPS Check
The BOP UPS system was tested to check battery voltage and there were two banks of
batteries and UPS controllers. One bank had good batteries on initial voltage checks of
13 - 14 volts. The other bank had one battery at 9.6 volts and two at about 11 volts out
of 36 batteries. The output voltages were checked and recorded during intervals.
There was a Cameron controls technician on board who performed a test per Cameron
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specification to check the depletion voltage over a 30-minute period. It was noted that
this was not per the API specification. The input rig service breakers were opened and
a depletion test per Cameron specifications was performed. One UPS bank was
critically low and local alarms came on within thirty minutes. The other UPS bank held
for thirty minutes without fault and was able to run for one hour prior to reaching limits
that would induce the alarms. The battery banks were the originals delivered in 2000
and had five years of service. New batteries needed to be installed and the tests
performed again with testing continued for a duration of two hours. We were informed
that the replacement batteries were on order.
7.9.7.3.1
7.9.7.3.2
7.9.7.9
UPS Check Recommendations:
Major Replace battery banks on the Cameron controls UPS banks
A and B 36 batteries each.
Minor Perform the API UPS tests per API Spec 160 2.2.3 for two
hour depletion with system in drilling mode.
Test Hydraulic Power Unit Panel
The HPU panels were not function tested at the time of the survey. This included the
diverter controls and interlocks.
7.9.7.10 Function Tests of Panel Alarms and Level Switches
The alarms were apparent when low voltage, low accumulator pressure and control
system faults happened.
7.9.7.11 Subsea BOP Control System Accumulator Charging Testing
The lower BOP accumulators were not included in the system volume calculations.
There was reserve volume in the lower BOP accumulators for operation of HP shear on
the blind shear rams and the casing shear rams. There were additional accumulators
for the failsafe valve assist close system and small accumulators for the pod regulators
and pilot supply fluid. The accumulator precharge calculation was based on water
depth and working pressure and it was noted that the correction for temperature
variation from surface to depth was compensated by using 0.50 times depth rather than
using the 0.445 times depth corrected with adiabatic extrapolation from nitrogen gas
tables. The pilot pre-charges for the regulators was 1 ,000 psi plus depth compensation.
If the regulators were set below 1,000 psi , they behaved erratically. It was someti mes
known to be required to reduce regulators below 1 ,000 psi and we recommended
considering setting the regulator pre-charges to 1/3 working pressure- 500 psi plus
depth compensation.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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Subsea BOP Control System Accumulator Charging Testing
Recommendations:
7.9.7.11.1.1 Minor Consider changing subsea regulator pilot regulator pre-
charges to 1/3 working pressure plus hydrostatic
compensation 500 psi for a 1 ,500 psi normal setting on the
regulator.
7.9.7.13 Function Test Diverter Panel
The diverter panel was not function tested at the time of this survey.
7.9.7.14 Interlocks
The control system was tested to check interlocks and it was noted that the riser
connector was not interl ocked with the mini collet connectors, BOP stinger receptacles
or shear rams. The Cameron interlocks between the stinger de-energize and stinger
retract was not tested to see if the interl ocks existed. Having safety interlocks between
the riser connector and the other functions that interface with the lower BOP to prevent
damage to equipment if the riser connector accidentally unlatched while the lower BOP
was in the standard drilling mode was recommended. The interlock with the shear rams
would also ensure the well was secure prior to unl atchi ng the LMRP. The diverter
system interlocks were covered in the diverter valve descriptions. There were no
sequences between the primary and secondary functions such as the HP shear rams
close and the shear rams open or close, the mini-collet primary and secondary or riser
connector primary and secondary. These sequences would prevent having a lock and
unlock function actuated simultaneously.
Interlocks Recommendations:
7.9.7.14.1.1 Major Upgrade the sofuvare to include interlocks that will prevent
the accidental unlocking of the riser connector - primary and
secondary, without ensuring the mini-collets are unlocked
primary or secondary, and that the BOP stingers were
retracted. One additional feature would be to also have an
interlock that the blind shear rams were closed to ensure the
well is secure prior to unlatching t he LMRP manually.
7.9.7.15 Local and Remote/Electrical Operation
The system was tested with both remote panels and the test panel called the central
control unit. The CCU has the capacity to override functions to prevent accidental
actuation of the controls.
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References: Contract No. 3600012493 I US1328.2
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7.9.7.16 Pod Function Tests
After the BOP was retrieved and on the deck, it was function tested to check faults and
purge any sea water from the system. The pods were removed from the LMRP for
servicing and function tested prior to running the BOP. There were no fault indications
when using the portable electronic test unit. Upon installation and testing, there were
error messages on the remote panels showing coil faults. Intermittent faults also came
up on the event logger and self cleared. The transducers for regulator readouts
including pilot and pressure readout needed calibration. The transducers needed to be
tested with a calibrated gauge and the readouts meters adj usted to display the input
pressure.
Pod Function Tests Recommendations:
7.9.7 .16.1.1 Minor Calibrate the pod readout pressures. Apply a calibrated
gauge and pump to each subsea transducer and adjust the
readout meter accordingly.
7.9.7.18 Annular Regulator Function Test
Each of the two annulars had a separate regulator system. It was recommended in
section 7 .9.7 .11 to revise the pilot accumulator precharge to allow the regulators to
regulate below 1 ,000 psi. The regulator increase and decrease functions worked fine.
Annular Regulator Function Test Recommendations:
7.9.7.18.1.1 Minor Consider changing the precharge of the pilot accumulators to
be 500 psi plus hydrostatic compensation to allow regulators
to operate more reliably at pressures less than 1 ,000 psi.
7.9.7.19 BOP-Manifold Regulator Function Test Blue Pod
The subsea manifold regulator worked fine within its operating range. Again, the
recommendation to revise the pre-charge was recommended to allow the regulator to
regulate below 1 ,000 psi.
7.9.7.20 Pod Function Tests
The pods were function tested with full hydraulics to operate the BOP. The pilot
systems were not bled of air prior to full stack function tests. We recommended first
function testing the pilot system prior to function testing the BOP.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
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Pod Function Tests Recommendations:
7.9.7.20.1.1 Minor Function test the pilot system by actuating the solenoid
valves and ensuring the pilot pressure is to the correct pod
and stack mounted component. Purge the air out of the
lines.
7.9.7.21 Stack Function Tests
The BOP was function tested prior to deployment and the times and volumes were
recorded. We noted that the times were long due to the reduced hydraulic supply flow
from the hot line hose reel. The annulars and rams were still within API specification
and the emergency disconnect sequence was also tested in both modes. The time to
unlatch the riser connector from its solenoid actuation to the complete unlatch stroke
was 22 seconds. The actual EDS sequence timing from actuation to physical unlatch
was not measured. The LMRP was not separated from the BOP after pressure testing
which did not allow function testing the autoshear system or EDS timing.
Stack Function Tests Recommendations:
7.9.7.21.1.1 Minor Incorporate testing the autoshearsystem and EDS sequence
timing into the function test check list prior to running the
BOP.
7.9.7.22 Indication Lamp Test
Both the driller's panel and the tool pusher's panel contained lamps and a button to
check that the bulbs were intact. This was tested and there were no bulbs t hat required
replacement.
7.9.7.29 Portable Electronic Unit (PETU)
There was PETU system to operate the spare pod and there was a test stand to allow
the pod hydraulic functions to operate against a vented line or dead head against a
pressure gauge.
7.9.7.31 Flow Counter-Toolpusher and Driller's Control Panel
There was indication at all the remote panels for fluid use from the surface and subsea
flow meters. These meters were calibrated in gallons.
7.9.7.32 Deadman Sequence
The deadman system was described above as an emergency system. The schematic
in the Cameron manual showed a different plan than that actually installed. Transocean
provided a logic description of what was intended to be actuated when the deadman
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sequence was completed. The deadman system software ensured the pod stinger was
extended and seals energized, and the shear rams were closed. The logic had an
anomaly that it was assumed that the stinger seals were initially de-energized. We
spoke with a Cameron software person on board that had upgraded the software and
he explained that the stinger seals were first de-energized prior to ensuring the stinger
was extended into the BOP prior to energizing the seals and closing the shear rams.
The deadman system was not tested at the time of the survey.
Dead Man Sequence Recommendations:
7.9.7.32.1.1 Major Upgrade the deadman sequence description to reflect actual
software logic. As described, it is assumed the stinger seals
were de-energized prior to extending the stinger to close the
shear rams. If the sequence did not de-energize the stinger
seals first prior to extending the stinger, the software should
be changed. This will ensure pod integrity and the closure of
the shear rams.
7.10 Marine Riser System
The marine riser was a Vetco system of HMF-H grade riser with a working length of 90
ft each. The tensile capacity of the riser was 2,000,000 lbs. The riser main tube was
21.5 inches OD X 80 grade with a wall thickness of 1". There were two choke lines with
an OD of 6.625" x 1.062" wall 15,000 psi working pressure. One hydraulic conduit line
3.5" 00 x .437" wall x 5,000 psi and one booster line with an OD of 4.5" and wall
thickness of .337" wall x 6,000 psi working pressure. The riser system was complete
with two telescopic joints, two termination joints, and pup joints. The riser was a flanged
type riser that required 22,500 ft/lbs of torque. During pulling riser in April 2005 there
were three Francis torque tools on board. The normal wear and tear on the tools
required maintenance on the tools during the riser pulling operations and at times there
was only one tool available for use.
7.10.1 .1
Marine Riser System Recommendations:
Minor Obtain additional riser torque tools to minimize downtime due
to wear and tear.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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7.1 0.1 Marine Risers General
The riser inventory was as follows:
12 each slick joints
3 each buoyant 8,000 ft. rated buoyancy
11 each buoyant 7,000 ft. rated buoyancy
11 ea. buoyant 6,000 ft. rated buoyancy
11 each buoyant 5,000 ft. rated buoyancy
11 each buoyant 4,000 ft. rated buoyancy
11 each buoyant 3,000 ft. rated buoyancy
11 each buoyant 2,000 ft. rated buoyancy
9 each buoyant 1 ,000 ft. rated buoyancy
1 each 45', 37.5', 22.5' , 15', pup joints
2 each telescopic joints and termination joints (one set of termination goosenecks)
7.10.6 Buoyancy Modules
The buoyancy modules were fabricated by Cuming Corporation and the buoyancy was
installed and run per its water depth rating.
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7.10.7 Telescopic Joints
The telescopic joints had an integral fluid bearing support ring and two inner barrel
packer assembl ies. The support ring was actuated from the BOP HPU controls
remotely via an umbilical. There was a displacement cylinder at the HPU controls to
control the volume of fluid going to the fluid bearing. The fluid bearing was rotated
passively when the rig changed heading. The fluid bearing in use prior to this survey
had leaking primary seals as noted by a monitor port between the primary and
secondary seals. The refurbished telescopic joint was run on the Shenzi 5 well and the
fluid bearing was landed on the support ring that was permanently attached to the
bottom of the in line tensioners. There was a remote actuated door with a locking pin to
allow the support ring to be opened with no riser load.
The packers for the inner barrel were actuated from the HPU controls. The upper
packer was activated by air and the lower was actuated by hydraulic fluid and the lower
packer actuation was automatically actuated when the diverter packer was closed. The
upper packer had an input pressure range to 100 psi and the lower packer maximum
working pressure was 500 psi. The HPU system controlling the lower packer had a
pressure relief valve set at 550 psi. The relief valve should be changed, or reset to the
working pressure or less for the hydraulic packer. The inner barrel had a latch
mechanism that was actuated remotely to lock and unlock to the outer barrel. The inner
barrel had a 65 effective stroke.
Installed under the telescopic joint was a termination joint that had preparations for the
moon pool hose goosenecks. The original design for the goosenecks was to have them
swivel at the hose termination to avoid twisting the moonpool jumper hoses when the rig
changed heading. One swivel failed in the past, under pressure, and the terminations
have been replaced with non-rotating type.
Telescopic Joints Recommendations:
7.1 0. 7.1.1 Minor Repair I replace the rotating goosenecks and use them to
avoid inducing torque in the auxiliary line hoses when
changing rig heading.
7.1 0.7.1.2 Minor Re-set the telescopic joint hydraulic packer relief valve to be
at or less than the working pressure of the packer. The relief
valve needed re-calibration as it is past its two year service.
7.1 0.8 Riser Handling Tools
There was a lifting spreader for horizontal handling of the riser with the crane. The 90 ft
spreader allowed higher angles on the crane spreader and did not induce bending in the
riser flanges. Two lifting nubbins were used on the riser flanges to attach the short
lifting slings that were inserted in spare auxiliary line holes in the riser flanges.
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There was a riser hang off handling tool that was a contingency for handling the riser
string in the event of a disconnect. The tool was a rotation actuated tool that locked into
a profile in the bottom of the telescopic joint to control the riser with the drawworks for
landing without removing the diverter and picking up a handling joint of riser.
7.10.8.1 Spider and Gimbals
There was one spider and gimbal on board which were rated at 2,000,000 lbs working
capacity. The spider was a sliding gate type run locally by the floor hands. The gimbal
was a passive hydraulic shock absorber with +/- 6 degrees of rotation at mid-stroke.
The gimbal had a relief valve rated for 5,500 psi. The subsea department did not have
a procedure to hydro-test the gimbal prior to use and if the gimbal blew a fitting or seal it
could collapse quickly with personnel possibly on the work platform. There was a risk of
damage being induced in the riser with abrupt shock loading on the top flange in the
event of the gimbal collapsing.
Spider and Gimbals Recommendations:
7.1 0.8.1.1 Major Write a procedure to maintain the gimbal prior to each use.
Include the procedure in the stack job preparation list. Check
pre-charge, fill with fluid and hydrotest to full rated working
pressure prior to each use.
7.10.8.2 Riser Running Tools
The riser handling tools were actuated hydraulically that latched into a lifting profile
within the riser flanges and the driller had control of the hydraulic actuated tools. There
was a safety latch on the tool to prevent inadvertent unlatching if no hydraulic pressure
was applied. The tools were also designed to be in the latch mode when lift was
applied. The tool also had preparations for test plugs to suit pressure testing the
auxiliary lines.
7.10.8.3 Test Tools
The riser handling tools had preparations for test plugs for the auxiliary li nes and all the
test plugs contained 9/16" autoclave test ports. Due to the volume of the choke, kill and
booster lines it was recommended to increase the size of the test ports to 1" autoclave.
Also, the hydraulic conduit line was only rated to 5,000 psi and it was recommended to
change the thread on the hydraulic conduit test cap to be a SAE or NPT fitting to avoid
confusing the HP porting of the higher pressure line when testing.
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Test Tools Recommendations:
7.1 0.8.3.1 Minor Modify choke and kill test caps to be 1" autoclave to speed
up pressure testing times.
7.1 0.8.3.2 Minor Modify hydraulic line test caps to be SAE or NPT threads to
avoid the potential of over-pressurizing the hydraulic lines
when testing.
7.11 Flex JointfBall Joint on LMRP
The flex joint was welded directly to the bottom of the riser adapter which was an 18 %"
Oil States flex joint rated for 5,000 psi and flanged to suit the upper annular on the
LMRP. The debris shield was installed and intact.
7.11.3 Marine Riser Adapter
The riser adapter was a Vetco HMF-H that suited the riser on board and there was a 3-
1/16" x 10,000 psi failsafe close valve for testing the booster line. The booster line was
ported into the side of the riser adapter. There were also kick-outs for choke, kill and
the hydraulic conduit lines. The inside diameter of the choke and kill kick-outs was 3-
1/8". Inside the top of the riser adapter was a replaceable wear sleeve that had an 10 of
18-%" and the 10 of the riser adapter below the wear sleeve was 19-%". The riser
angle sensors were also installed on the riser adapter. Upon inspection of the riser
adapter it was noted that there was keyseating on the replaceable wear sleeve
approximately X" deep and t here was slight wear indications on the riser adapter upper
body. The riser adapter was last inspected January, 2004 while it was in place.
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7.11.3 Wear on riser adapter and booster port.
7.12.2 Cameron Choke and Kill Connectors (Mi ni Connectors)
The choke and kill connectors on the LMRP were Cameron mini-collet connectors with
an external secondary unlock system controlled separately from the primary lock and
unlock control valve. The connectors used an AX style 3" x 15,000 psi gasket between
the LMRP and BOP which were retained in the mini-collet connector with positive
retainers that eliminated the potential of the ROV replacing the gasket if required.
Transocean had spare mini-collet connectors available as fleet spares.
The mandrel on the BOP kill side had a few dings in the seal surface that appeared to
be contamination debris trapped during a re-entry connection.
A testing recommendation was provided to measure the locking stroke and preload
conditions prior to pressure testing the assembly. The mini-collet connector primary
piston stroke was measured both on and off the mandrel of the BOP and the choke side
connector had one inch less stroke overall than the kill. When the connectors were
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latched to the mating mandrel on the BOP the connector stroke was measured again
and both connectors had sufficient stroke remaining ensuring that the connection was
preloaded. They were pressure tested to full working pressure when testing the BOP
prior to deployment. We advised that these connectors also should be rebuilt with new
seals as they were past the three year recommendation per the original equipment
manufacturer. The five year certificate of compliance required updating.
Cameron Choke and Kill Connectors (Mini Connectors) Recommendation:
7.12.2.1.1 Minor Obtain a fleet spare connector and swap out the choke side
connector as it has symptoms of not operating correctly.
7.13 Flexible High-Pressure Hoses (Coflexip)
There were flexible HP hoses in the moon pool and on the LMRP for the choke, kill,
booster and hydraulic conduit supply for operation of the BOP. The moonpool booster
line hose was a 4" Beattie hose rated at 10,000 psi 206' long. The Coflexip hoses
installed in the moonpool for the choke and kill lines were 3" 10 x 15,000 psi standard
temp 208ft long. The hydraulic conduit moonpool jumper hose was fabricated by
Copper State as 2" 10 x 208ft long 10,000 psi working pressure with No. 2 hub bed
ends. The hydraulic conduit hose was actually two 1 04 ft hoses one of which was
replaced between wells 15 April 2005.
The jumper hoses on the LMRP were fabricated by Coflexip. The hydraulic conduit
hose was a 3" 10 x 10,000 psi hose 19ft long and the choke and kill hoses were 17ft
long 15,000 psi working pressure standard temp 3" 10 hoses. The choke hose was
fabricated May 1999 and the kill February 1980. The hoses in the moonpool had not
been removed for inspection and testing per the original manufacturer's
recommendations. A spare hose assembly, shipping reel and spare end clamps should
be standing by to allow removal and shipping of the hose for re-certification. The
clamps should be inspected at that time as well. They will require re-certification to
maintain the five year certificate of compliance.
7.13.1.1
Flexible High-Pressure Hoses (Coflexip) Recommendation:
Minor The hoses should be removed from service and tested per
the OEM requirements for re-certification.
7.14 Wellhead/Riser Connector
The wellhead connector was a Vetco 18-% x 15,000 psi Super HO configured to suit a
27" diameter wellhead profile. The super HO had gasket pin retainers, hydrate inhibitor
fluid ports and hydrate seals. The gasket profile was a VXIVT to suit a metal to metal
remedial gasket if required and the swallow of the Vetco SHOH4 was 32-%" with the
standard piston end caps. The gasket retainer pins were damaged and not fi t for use.
Report of Survey - Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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The connector was latched to the test stump with 1 ,500 psi and unlatched with no
excess pressure required. After pressure testing the connector required 2,800 psi to
unlatch using both primary and secondary unlatch functions. The connector was then
greased and cycled to extrude excess grease prior to deployment to the wellhead. The
Vetco connector did not have the hydrate seal installed, there was no replacement seal
on board and there was no re-entry funnel down installed on the wellhead connector.
The riser connector was a Cameron 18-%" x 10,000 HC with remote actuated gasket
retainers. The HC connector piston stroke was measured both on and off the BOP
mandrel and when latched, there was only 0.063" stroke remaining which should be
0.188" as new. This implied that the connector was near the end of its service life until
major rebuild was required. Both connectors had remote visual indicators for ROV
confirmation that the connectors were latched or unlatched.
7.14.1.1
Wellhead/Riser Connector Recommendations:
Minor Replace the riser connector with a rebuilt one as the piston
stroke is at its maximum limit
7.14 Vetco SHDH4 connector.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 / US1328.2
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r
7.14.1 Connectors General
The riser connector was a high angle release Cameron connector mounted in the LMRP
frame that rotated with the frame. One concern was that at high angles of disconnect
there could be damage to peripheral equipment installed between the BOP and LMRP.
The peripheral equipment that could be damaged was the choke and kill mini collet
connector assemblies and the BOP pod receptacles. Cameron designed the BOP and
LMRP frame and also had part numbers for reaction point gimbal pads that allowed the
disconnect rotation forces to be transferred away from the critical interface components
between the LMRP and BOP.
Connectors General Recommendations:
7.14.1.1.1 Major Modify the BOP and LMRP frames to include the reaction
pads to prevent damage to the mini collet assemblies or pod
stinger receptacles in the event of a high angle disconnect.
Ri :ser Bending ~ + - ~
Moment w-
Riser
Connec:tor sho•-Nn
UnhJcked
t•.o11ni Collet sho·-.•m
unlocked
U•1IRP and EIOP sho·-.ovn ··Nithout any
external reaction points.
The BOP control pod receptacles
contact each other 'Nhen orientation is
correct .
Potential damage ind1.1ced by high angle disconnect ··Nithout
reaction points on peripherie of BOP f LMRP interface
Reset ion Forces due
t•) rig ofiset and riser
sngle when
disconnecting
Report of SUJvey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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Reaction points
instaaed on
LMRPand SOP
Fremes
Reeoon forces wlh resc00n
pads on frames. Riser snd
tension connectors unlocked.
Mini and Riser Connector shown unlocked
Cameron manufactured the reaction pad assemblies. The part number of the upper
adjustable guide cone was 2068380-01 and the lower bearing pad was 2068379-01.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 / US1328.2 53
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7.14.1 Frame corner.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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7.15 Riser Tensioners
The riser tensioning system was a Hydralift N-Line system with six each tensioner
assemblies installed. Each tensioner had a 50 ft stroke and 800,000 lb capacity at
2,700 psi giving a total capacity of 4,800,000 lbs. Each tensioner was suspended from
a common skidding system and was terminated at the bottom to the riser tensioner
support ring. The system was designed such that if two cylinders were taken off line the
tension capacity would still be 3.2 million lbs. The control system for the tensioners was
interactive with the Cameron BOP controls. The BOP emergency disconnect
sequences actuated the riser recoil speed control valve Olmstead Valve near the end of
the sequence and the valve had to be reset locally at the moon pool control panel.
The actuation of the riser recoi l valve was confirmed with testing of the EDS sequences
1 and 2.
7.15 Riser tensioner set back.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 I US1328.2
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7.15 Tensioners and tension ring.
7.15.1 General
The tensioner rods had a positioning system installed to monitor the position of the rod
via a PLC system. The tensioners included a riser recoi l system that allowed the riser
to lift off the BOP but arrest motion with stroke left in the telescopic joint. When
supported, the tensioners allowed fluid to pass from one tensioner to the other to
provide a gimbal effect. The extensometer device that measured the speed of the
tensioners was originally installed but had been removed. The decision was to only use
the sensors and proximity grooves machined into the rods. With six tensioners there
was enough redundancy in the speed and position acquisition per Transocean.
Each individual tensioner had an air/oil bottle charged by air pressure vessels. There
was a bank of stand-by ai r pressure bottles charged as supply to the tensioner system.
All the working APV bottles had drain valves at their low points to check for water or
fluid collection. The standby bottles were a bank of sixteen bottles composed of
horizontal pairs of installed bottles. The bottles were joined by their end connection and
each pair of bottles had a drain on one bottle but not the opposite bottle. There was a
plug where the drain valve should be for each of the eight bottles however there was no
identification on the standby bottles or the working APV bottles indicating the working
pressure. There should be clear identification of the working pressure of each bottle.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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Tensioner pressure and tension readouts were dependent on pressure t ransducers.
These transducers should be checked against a calibrated gauge to ensure proper
tension was applied to the riser.
General Tensioner Recommendations:
7.15.1 .1.1 Major
7.15.1.1.2 Minor
Install a drain valve on the stand by APV tensioner bottles.
There are eight each bottles without a drain.
Paint identification marking on each high pressure bottle of
the tensioner system the working pressure. This includes the
tensioner bottles and standby APVs.
7.15.1 APV bottles joined.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 / US1328.2
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7.15.1 APV bottle inlet.
~ .
liiiiil
...
J
..
7.15.1 APV relief valves and drains.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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7.15.1 Tensioner bottles.
7.15.2 Riser Tensioner Panel
The tensioners were controlled from two panels. One panel was installed in the
moonpool area and the other in the driller's control station. The moonpool panel had
the potential to override the riser recoil interface and the control of the units displayed
on the panels. The local transducers on each tensioner system control did not have any
identification that they had been calibrated. The riser recoil actuation was tested when
the BOP emergency disconnect sequences were tested. The function worked as it
should. When testing the riser connector separately for piston stroke measurements, it
appeared that the riser recoil system was inadvertently actuated and the tensioner fluid
tank had overfilled.
Riser Tensioner Panel Recommendations:
7.15.2.1.1 Minor Calibrate the tensioner system transducers to allow accurate
control of the riser tension.
7.17.4.2 Active Heave Compensation
The drawworks were active compensated and the motion reference unit was installed in
the driller's control station.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 I US1328.2
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12.0 MAINTENANCE SYSTEM
12.1 Preventive Maintenance
The maintenance system EM PAC was running. We did not have the opportunity to go
into many details of the equipment management system to evaluate outstanding tasks
required on a routine maintenance schedule. In preparation for the service of the
subsea system between wells, it was predicted what would be required, work orders
issued, spares predicted, ordered as required and material was standing by for t he
maintenance of the stack.
12.6 Spare Parts Inventory
The warehouse was reviewed for parts in stock. There was a minimum of spares on
board with the exception of critical spares with long lead times. There was a situation
when the failsafe valve that required a gate and seats needed those major parts
removed from the spare valve. The rubber goods were stored in a separate room with
the lights normally off. New bonnet gaskets were in stock as well as stem and tail rod
packing seals. There were rebuilt BOP hydraulic component spares in the warehouse
as well as the subsea shop however there was no spare accumulator bladder to repair a
15 gallon accumulator that had failed on the BOP and the spare BOP control pod was
incomplete. Parts were missing and on order. The pod may have been used as critical
spares for the active pods.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493 I US1328.2
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13.0 SPARE PARTS
13.1 Stock Control Philosophy
The philosophy of stocking the quantity of spares for the subsea system is to maintain a
minimum on board the rig. The centralized warehouse in Amelia, Louisiana maintained
stock as shared spares for the fleet of Transocean rigs with common equipment. For
example, the prediction and preparation for this between wells BOP maintenance task,
the consumable spares were ordered based on the maintenance system, shipped to the
rig in preparation and consumed immediately.
Report of Survey- Rig name DEEPWATER HORIZON
References: Contract No. 3600012493/ US1328.2
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