You are on page 1of 36

The Kajang Waste‐to‐ Energy Facility near Kuala Lumpur in Selangor

Executive Summary 2 Introduction 4 Conceptual and Research Methods 4 The Malaysian Electricity Sector 10 The Small Renewable Energy Power (SREP) Programme 12 Challenges to Implementation 18 Conclusions 23 Appendix A: List of Research Interviews 24 Appendix B: Small Renewable Energy Power (SREP) Programme Guidelines 26 References 27 Acknowledgements 28 About the Authors 29

and waste-to-energy facilities such as the one shown in Figure 1. less than three percent of its original goal. resistance. Relying on the dominant state-owned electric utility Tenaga Nasional Berhad proved to be a mistake.2 The Small Renewable Energy Power (SREP) Programme was the premier policy mechanism implemented by the national government of Malaysia to promote renewable electricity facilities less than ten megawatts (MW) in capacity from 2001 to 2010. try again. Its efficacy was diluted by fragmentation and lack of cohesion with other Malaysian energy policies. Rather than abandon their renewable energy efforts. dealing with actual renewable electricity power plant design and training issues. and institutional barriers. Though it is uncertain if such new policies will achieve their goals. in part due to an economic worldview in Malaysia that prioritised low electricity tariffs. It finds that the SREP largely failed to meet its targets because of technical. the move is a sign that if you don’t succeed at promoting renewable energy at first. Electricity tariffs under SREP did not match true production costs. unattractive financing rates. and few (if any) pre-feasibility studies. economic. SREP managed to install only 12MW by December 2005. Moreover. small-scale hydroelectric dams. It explores the history of the SREP in Malaysia. as was the “willing seller. and did not provide cost recovery for project developers. by the end of December 2010 only 11 projects constituting 61. most of these projects focused on only three types of renewable resources: byproducts from the palm oil industry.7MW of capacity had been installed. Malaysian planners therefore modified and extended the SREP for another five years and lowered its target to 350MW by 2010. try. SREP was weakened by capacity caps. However. and continued subsidies to fossil fuel producers. and regulatory failures. willing buyer” model of renewable energy power purchase agreements. or about five percent of national electricity capacity. involving flaws in programme design. and partly institutional. and the challenges planners faced when implementing it. It concludes with overall lessons for energy development and policy more generally. a lengthy approval process. This study investigates what happened. Although eligible technologies included a wide array of renewable resources. Obstacles were partly technical. exclusion of stakeholders. . The SREP aimed to install 500MW of total renewable energy capacity by 2005. lack of monitoring. were not based on sound economics. Malaysian planners seem to have learned from the difficulties facing the SREP and are in the process of implementing a progressive set of new policies. its drivers and benefits.

9MW Kajang Waste-to-Energy facility converts trash from around the Kuala Lumpur area into electricity and other recycled products .3 Figure 1: The 8.

Interviews lasted between thirty and ninety minutes with the average time of 45 minutes. Selangor. In total. biogas. Malaysian Palm Oil Board. and the challenges planners faced when implementing it. Malaysia Energy Centre (Pusat Tenaga Malaysia). and Water (Kementerian Tenaga. Malaysian planners altered the SREP by lowering its target to 350MW and extending it for another five years.2 We implemented this • Government and regulatory agencies such as the Malaysian Energy Commission (Suruhanjaya Tenaga). Sarawak Energy Berhad. and to be consistent with the other case studies.4 The Malaysian Small Renewable Energy Power (SREP) Programme attempted to install 500MW of qualified biomass. such approaches allow researchers to attain deep knowledge about a given phenomenon and develop a highly descriptive comprehension of the subject under study. The SREP was a central component of Malaysian energy policy. What lessons or insights does the SREP offer for the study of energy policy design and implementation more generally? The authors supplemented these five questions with “probing response techniques” when clarification or elaboration was sought and “reflecting response techniques” in order to elicit reflection when warranted. solar photovoltaics. What were the significant challenges to implementation? 5. and thus it provides an ideal situation to explore the dynamics at work within national energy planning. and Syarikat Sesco Berhad (formerly known as the Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation). and included members of: • Engineering and consulting firms such as the Berjaya Corporation. but ended up achieving only 12MW of capacity by that date. Technology. As methodological scholar Robert Yin has noted. This report asks: what in the world happened? It explores the history of the SREP in Malaysia. In designing the interview questions. To understand the impediments facing the SREP. Investigating the drivers. Sime Darby. What are the primary energy policy and security challenges facing Malaysia? 2. and United Nations Development Programme Malaysia. The SREP was specifically the cornerstone of the country’s Fifth Fuel Diversification Plan and also featured prominently in the Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001 to 2005) and the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006 to 2010). and Development Malaysia. 89 participants from 38 institutions from four Malaysian provinces — Sarawak. Teknologi Hijau dan Air). Green Technology. • Energy companies and electric utilities. Those interviewed were selected to represent the broadest possible array of stakeholders associated with the SREP.7MW of capacity had been built. What were the drivers behind the SREP in Malaysia? 3. What were the major benefits arising from the SREP? 4. benefits. and Eco-Ideal Consulting. Core Competencies Berhad. including Petronas. and trade organisations including the Centre for Environment.3 Because of these interviewing strategies.1 After conducting a preliminary literature review of documents related to the SREP to provide context. • Research institutes. approach by asking five initial questions for each interview and then allowing interview subjects to elaborate in as much detail as they wanted. and mini-hydroelectric facilities by 2005. the authors selected a qualitative case study methodology to gain the richest possible level of insight into the dynamics of the SREP in Malaysia. civil society organisations. It then discusses what the experiences with the SREP tell us about how to design future energy projects in developing economy contexts such as Malaysia. its drivers and benefits. municipal solid waste. Ministry of Energy. The five questions were: 1. Tenaga Nasional Berhad. but by the end of 2010 just 11 projects and 61. Johor. Recycled Energy Berhad. and the Economic Planning Unit in the Prime Minister’s Department. and challenges facing SREP offers a deeper understanding of the pressures and interests related to Malaysian policymaking. Renewable Energy Berhad. the authors employed an “inductive approach” to minimise interpretative bias caused by researchers trying to force answers into preset cognitive categories. participants often introduced new topics into the conversation not anticipated by the authors. and Kedeah — were interviewed over the course of March 2010 to February 2011. plans were made to conduct semi-structured research interviews and site visits. .

Sovacool at the Sungai Kerling Minihydro Plant . Benjamin K.5 Figure 2: Researcher Ira Martina Drupady at the Malaysian Palm Oil Board Figure 3: Researcher Ira Martina Drupady and Dr.

6 Figure 4: Researcher Drupady speaks with a manager of the Bell Palm Oil Mill Figure 5: Dr. Sovacool speaks with workers at the TDM Palm Oil Estate .

some of them shown in Figures 6–10. Recycle Energy Sdn. Bhd. Figures 2–5 depict some of these visits and interviews.5kW Langkawi Development Authority and Tenaga Nasional Bhd. Terengganu Semenyih. Terengganu Off-grid Yes Jan 2011 Palm Oil 1. TDM Plantation Sdn. Sarawak Kerling. Sarawak On-grid Jul 2010 Hydroelectric 2. Sarawak Off-grid No Jul 2010 Microhydro 10kW Long Lawen Community Long Lawen. To ensure a degree of triangulation and reliability. Core Competences Sdn.0MW Dungun.7MW gas capture. . Bhd. Sarawak Off-grid No Jul 2010 Palm Oil 1MW Salcra Sdn. Kub-Berjaya Enviro Sdn. Sarawak On-grid No Jul 2010 Hydroelectric 944MW Murum. State Government of Terengganu and Tenaga Nasional Bhd. however.400MW Ministry of Finance/Sarawak Hydro Bhd. Bhd. the literature review and interviews were augmented with direct observation and site visits to thirteen renewable energy facilities in Malaysia over the course of July 2010 to February 2011. Kedah Off-grid Yes Jan 2011 Hybrid Integrated Renewable Energy System TDM Palm Oil Estate Kajang Wasteto-Energy Plant Solar / Wind / Diesel 400kW Pulau Perhentian. Sarawak On-grid No Jul 2010 Microhydro 25kW Mudung Abun Community Denang. Appendix A lists all institutions visited. Pulau Langkawi. and Bell Palm Industries Sdn. 10MW Combustion (under construction) Bell Eco Power Sdn. Selangor On-grid Yes Jan 2011 Palm Oil Mill Effluent (POME) Methane Capture and Empty Fruit Bunch Incineration 1.9MW On-grid Yes Bukit Tagar Sanitary Landfill Bell Palm Oil Mill Landfill Gas Capture 1MW Bukit Tagar. Bhd. Bhd.. Bakun. and adhere to institutional review board guidelines at the authors’ institution. Batang Ai. On-grid Yes Solar photovoltaics / Diesel 109. Sri Aman. respect confidentiality. Bhd. Batu Pahat. Selangor Off-grid No Jul 2010 Jan 2011 Minihydro 2MW Renewable Power Sdn Bhd. Sarawak Energy Bhd. Mudung Abun Microhydro Plant Long Lawen Microhydro Plant Lubok Antu Palm Oil Mill Sungai Kerling Minihydro Plant Langkawi Cable Car SolarDiesel Hybrid Hydroelectric 108MW Sarawak Energy Bhd. Johor On-grid Yes Feb 2011 Table 1: Summary of Malaysian renewable energy site visits Participants were guaranteed anonymity to encourage candor. Bhd. Selangor Off-grid No Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Waste Incineration 8.Name Type of facility Capacity Owner / Operator Location Connection Directly supported by SREP / 5th Fuel Policy No Date visited 7 Batang Ai Hydroelectric Station Bakun Hydroelectric Project Murum Hydroelectric Project Kg.

8 Figure 6: The 2MW Kerling Minihydro Plant Figure 7: The 8.9MW Kajang Waste-to-Energy Plant .

9 Figure 8: The 1MW Bukit Tagar Landfill Gas Capture Plant Figure 9: The 1MW Lubok Antu Palm Oil Mill .

To better understand the drivers pushing the creation of the SREP.5kW solar-diesel hybrid at the upper terrace of the Langkawi Cable Car As Table 1 summarises. Though Table 2 shows that prominent national policies related to energy have existed since 1949. waste incineration. the Bengkel Bersama Stakeholders Bagi Penyediaan on January 27. (2) utilise energy efficiency and conservation and eliminate wasteful consumption. These measures—especially privatisation and the fuel diversification policies—have seen oil’s share of national energy supply drop precipitously since the 1980s and the rise of .” started the privatisation of the electricity sector and enabled independent power producers to enter the wholesale electricity generation market. throughout the states of Johor. the 1981 Four-Fuel Diversification Strategy. large and small in size. and dropped national oil dependence from 90 percent in 1980 to less than ten percent in 2003. The National Energy Policy of 1979 came after the oil shocks of the 1970s. directly supported by the SREP and not supported. and the Fifth Fuel Diversification Policy of 2001. when Malaysia was heavily dependent on imported oil. four are the most pertinent: the country’s National Energy Policy of 1979. which one respondent called “the bible” and another “the biggest umbrella. and coal as an alternative to oil. in essence maximum use of domestic resources. hosted at the Marriott Hotel in Putrajaya. Selangor. or achieve the other two objectives without degrading Malaysia’s rich ecological and social heritage. the Electricity Supply Act of 1990. The Four Fuel Diversification Strategy of 1981 explicitly promoted hydroelectricity. these included a mix of hydroelectric. After a major blackout in 1993 followed by rolling brownouts in 1995. Kedah. The authors also attended a Renewable Energy Power Purchase Agreement (REPPA) negotiation. Malaysia. Sarawak. (3) protect the environment. the government began planning its Fifth Fuel Diversification Policy of 2001 intended to promote other forms of renewable energy. 2011.10 Figure 10: The 109. and Terengganu. natural gas.4 The Electricity Supply Act. everything else comes underneath it. it is necessary to briefly introduce readers to the Malaysian electricity sector. It stipulated three main objectives: (1) ensure an adequate and cost effective supply. landfill gas capture. and hybrid solar-diesel and solar-wind-diesel facilities that were both off-grid and on-grid. palm oil estate.

explore. hydropower. and produce petroleum and related products. and coal. created by privatising and corporatising the NEB. Small Renewable Energy Power (SREP) Programme created to achieve five percent renewable electricity supply by 2005. utilisation. 1949 to 2010 Figure 11: Fuel mix for Malaysian electricity generation. transmission. Sets regulations for the oil and natural gas industries to ensure economic development needs are met. National Petroleum Policy is augmented to extend the life of domestic energy reserves and lower reserve to production ratios. CEB is renamed to the National Electricity Board (NEB).Date 1949 1965 1974 1975 1979 1980 1981 1990 Event Central Electricity Board formed National Electricity Board formed Petroleum Development Act National Petroleum Policy National Energy Policy National Depletion Policy Four-Fuel Diversification Strategy Electricity Supply Act Description Central Electricity Board (CEB) created by the government for electricity generation. The state-owned Petronas is given exclusive rights to own. Sets the three objectives of supply. Pusat Tenaga Malaysia (PTM) created to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy. Strategy intends to develop non-oil based sources of energy such as natural gas. Established the state-owned utility Tenaga Nasional Berhad to be peninsular Malaysia’s national electricity provider. 1995 to 2010 (%) . and distribution in Malaysia. Renewable sources of energy recognised as the fifth primary fuel in national energy supply. and the environment. Department of Electricity and Gas Supply at the Ministry of Energy transformed into a regulatory agency responsible for energy matters 11 1999 1999 2001 Pusat Tenaga Malaysia formed Five-Fuel Diversification Strategy Small Renewable Energy Programme launched Malaysian Energy Commission formed 2002 Table 2: Timeline of major energy policy events in Malaysia.

Natural gas was already an uncomfortably large share of the national electricity portfolio. a minimum 30 percent equity had to be held in all projects by Bumiputera (“indigenous Malaysian”) stakeholders. and were required to distribute electricity into the network between 11 to 33 kV. switchgears. Ancillary support mecha- Table 3: Achievable renewable energy potential for Malaysia (MW) coal and hydroelectricity in the nation’s electricity mix. biogas. 2001. Both estimates imply that Malaysia could possibly be completely powered by renewable resources. Renewables were seen as the only viable alternative. the perception that waste-to-energy and palm oil technologies were polluting. Project developers had to negotiate a REPPA with the relevant utility according to a “willing buyer. Renewable energy project developers were responsible for the costs of grid connection and utility system reinforcement including cables.6 Malaysian planners seem cognisant of this potential. and poor coordination among different national players and ministries. Malaysia is blessed with abundant renewable resources. the Ministry of Energy. hundreds . Notwithstanding reliance on fossil fuels to meet most national energy and electricity demand. and embarked in 2001 to capture some of it through the Small Renewable Energy Power (SREP) Programme. these were inefficient. and was sometimes opposed by local communities.300 500 400 30. One study went so far as to argue that renewable energy was looked upon as a “primitive and dirty fuel. Green Technology. Facilities had to be within ten kilometres of the nearest interconnection point to the grid. These projects could sell to two of the three major utilities in Malaysia: Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) in peninsular Malaysia or Sabah Electricity Sendirian Berhad (SESB) in Borneo. These included lack of a national policy in support of renewable energy. One study estimates no less than 30. solar photovoltaics. and it was basically successful at promoting large hydro and a collection of natural gas and coal-fired power plants.12 Sources Hydropower Solar photovoltaics Biomass and Biogas Mini-Hydro Municipal Solid Waste Total MW 22.700MW of renewable energy potential shown in Table 3. and Water announced the SREP on May 11.”7 To address these issues. transformers.700 of kilometres away from major urban centres. costly.3TWh. municipal solid waste. and mini-hydroelectric facilities. Most of the large hydro potential had either already been tapped.000MW. and all facilities had to meet regulations set by the Department of Environment. Eligible technologies for the SREP were limited to biomass. or were in places like Sabah and Sarawak. Increased reliance on coal was thought to be too environmentally damaging. and foreign companies were allowed to participate only with a maximum equity of 30 percent.000 6. depicted in Figure 11. Lastly. the International Energy Agency projected that realisable potential for renewables in Malaysia was about 130 Terrawatt-hours (TWh) per year by 2030. when in 2009 existing installed capacity was less than 23. willing seller model” and were granted a license for 21 years after the commissioning of a plant. and metres. One expert we interviewed explained the decision to proceed with the SREP as follows: Î We had the four fuel policy operating for many years. Project developers also had to go through a somewhat cumbersome and complicated process involving an “application for approval” followed by an “application for license” depicted in Figures 12 and 13. but that in 2006 the country generated only 101.5 Similarly. The Ministry established a Special Committee on Renewable Energy (SCORE) to oversee the programme and permitted projects up to 10MW of installed capacity.500 1. Though we had some diesel power plants. The Malaysian government also recognised that a collection of pernicious barriers prevented the wider adoption of renewable energy in the late 1990s and early 2000s. protection equipment. But we saw the need to promote other types of renewable energy. It was intended to be the main vehicle to meet the renewable energy targets espoused by the Eighth and Ninth Malaysia Plans as well as the Third Outline Perspective Plan. and polluting. inability to cover project costs and lack of financing.

13 Figure 12: SREP Approval application process flowchart .

14 Figure 13: SREP License application process flowchart .

and SREP was believed to help develop suitable off-grid and micro-grid technologies. SREP was conceived as a way to reduce Malaysia’s greenhouse gas emissions and environmental pollution.3 million tons of empty fruit bunch produced each year along with the 19 million tons of crop residue.12 Second.059MW from the 71. Every single ton of palm oil creates six tons of palm fronds. implementation did not proceed as planned.000 tons of waste every day. POME is usually collected in open ponds or storage takes to degrade. one study estimated the value of palm oil waste at more than US$200 billion. including lack of economies of scale. the SREP was seen as a mechanism to also help achieve the country’s remaining electrification goals. Appendix B provides the full list of project criteria. A separate assessment calculated at least 665MW of renewable energy capacity from biomass as well.” Despite these reasons in favor of renewable energy. given Malaysia’s location on the equator. it was believed that accomplishing a five percent share of renewable electricity supply by 2005.” Fourth and finally. however.4 percent of its original goal. and higher risk premiums for financing. Tun Dr. mostly in the poorest and most rural parts of Malaysia.962 5.197 218 Potential Capacity (MW) 30 68 365 25 Rice Mills Wood Industry Palm Oil Mills Bagasse Palm Oil Mill Effluent (POME) Total 424 2.863 665 Table 4: Biomass electricity potential in Malaysia nisms. about 150. First.14 Taken together.Sources Quantity (kton/yr) Potential Generation (GWh) 263 598 3. such as waste incin- .13 Third. The SREP programme was partly hoped to “develop smaller scale systems. In 2003 a study noted that major obstacles remained in Malaysia two years after SREP had started. one of the largest agricultural sectors in the country.15 At the end of 2005. and converts “what is in essence a fugitive emission into a source of electricity that was seen as attractive. At the time the SREP was launched. noted at the time: Î The SREP … has not been able to connect the envisaged 500MW of electricity generated from renew- 15 31. ostensibly US$600 billion of value exists. still rely on diesel generators or receive no modern energy services at all.” but also enough to create “US$10 billion of revenue if converted to electricity. from the 400 plus palm oil mills producing millions of tons of empty fruit bunches. five tons of empty fruit bunches (EFB).10 Another study assessed a whopping 2. the SREP was heralded as a way to promote innovation and technological learning in alternatives Malaysia had little experience with.” Indeed.980 300 eration.11 and yet another study calculated 2. poor perception of commercial viability for projects. 750 kilograms of palm kernel cake and endocarp.” Solar energy potential was cited as “extremely favorable” with 6. as every ton creates 28 cubic metres of methane. and palm oil mill effluent each year. especially from the palm oil industry. One participant told us that “we thought we could get at least 600MW alone. which would reach hard-to-access populations. and solar photovoltaic panels.9 Given that the price of oil is three times that amount in early 2011. and a staggering 100 tons of palm oil mill effluent (POME).0 to 6. small-scale hydro. palm fronds. especially minihydro and solar. Lim Keng Yaik.000 homes. such as Pioneer Status or Income Tax Allowance and tax exemption on equipment. Malaysians produce roughly 20. it was seen as a way to tap the waste energy potential from the palm oil industry. enough to “bury the Petronas Towers under a pile of trash every four days.” Another respondent commented that “hydro and solar provide a convenient and cost-effective way to produce power in rural areas as it is near impossible to build transmission lines to cater for the small number of homes currently off-grid.000 to 200. While more than 99 percent of the country’s population has access to the existing grid. one ton of mesocarp fiber. or a total of 500 megawatts (MW)—the stated goal of the Eighth Malaysian Plan— would save the country about US$2 billion over those five years. a practice that produces voluminous amounts of greenhouse gas emissions.400MW of potential. 100MW above the target. at the price of only US$30 per barrel of oil. such emissions from the palm oil industry account for roughly 12 percent of national greenhouse gas emissions. were implemented in tandem with the SREP.5kWh of potential energy per square metre. Before it is discharged.8 Respondents told us that the SREP was designed to accomplish multiple goals.177 17. As the Minister of Energy.500 1. SREP had achieved a meager 2.587 177 72. one ton of palm trunks. figures presented in Table 4.

Total renewable energy supply. Bhd. Negeri Sembilan Sg. Lack of information on renewable energy was referenced as a major barrier. Bhd. 2001 to 2009 this was only for biomass and biogas technologies. Sandakan Sabah Lot 2. the SREP was revised at the end of 2006 to increase tariffs from 17 Malaysian sens/kWh to 19 sens/kWh and later 21 sens/kWh. Bhd.18 less than a one percent share for the country.7 2 Fuel Source Empty fruit bunches (EFB) EFB EFB Mini hydro Mini hydro Municipal waste EFB Mini hydro Mini hydro Biogas Biogas Jalan Seguntor. Selangor Parit Ju. compared to conventional electricity costs of 4–6 U. Of these projects.5 10 4 2 1. Esajadi Power Sdn. 2011) . Batu Pahat. Bell Eco Power Sdn. an additional 33 projects with 210. nonetheless. Because of these problems. Malaysian planners extended the SREP for another five years but scaled down its targets to 350MW: 300MW in peninsular Malaysia. though Renewable electricity price 17 sen / kWh (2001) 19 sen / kWh (2006) 21 sen / kWh (2007) Biomass Biogas Mini‐ hydro X Solar Photovoltaics (PV) X X X X X X X Table 5: Revised tariffs under the SREP. Bhd. AMDB Perting Hydro Sdn Bhd Renewable Power Sdn. Bhd. implementation lagged far behind targets.S. did not significantly accelerate participation in the programme. and weak public awareness about the benefits of renewable energy was widespread. 3226. cents/kWh. Recycle Energy Sdn. As Table 7 illustrates. What it has been able to deliver in the last four years is 12MW from two projects. At the end of 2010.17 Costs of production were still higher than many other countries at 7–25 U. Kota Marudu. Perting. including projects supported by SREP as well as those from other programmes an incentives. When. Bhd. MHES Asia Sdn. roughly 80 percent were related to waste and palm oil. Sabah Project Location Capacity (MW) 10 10 10 2 4.16 able sources to the national grid. Tawau. The wide gap between policy and implementation clearly indicates that there are barriers to the effective transition from a conventional to a sustainable model of energy development. Mukim Serting. Bhd.5 5. not mini-hydro and solar system.7MW of renewable energy capacity had been connected to the grid from 11 projects. Project Developer TSH Bioenergy Sdn. Bentong Pahang Sg. Table 6 shows that only 61. Bhd. was 217MW. Kina Biopower Sdn. cents/ kWh. Kerling . Jalan Seguntor. Seguntor Bioenergy Sdn. Sabah Sungai Pangapuyan. Esajadi Power Sdn. Bhd. as shown in Table 5.S. Labuk Road Sandakan Sabah Sungai Kadamaian. Jana Landfill Sdn. Bhd. Kundasang. palm oil facilities were still not converting their waste to electricity. Even the revised tariffs.16 The Minister’s comments were confirmed by an independent study which noted that the development of renewable energy technology was not sufficiently developed in Malaysia. and 50MW for Sabah in Borneo. Sabah Lot 3041 & 3042 Mukim Semenyih Daerah Hulu Langat Selangor HS(D) 12572. Lot PT No. yet again. Selangor Table 6: Licensed and operational SREP projects (as of February.85MW of capacity were in the pipeline but not yet approved or licensed. Johor Puchong.

catalyze the growth of the renewable energy industry. Insufficient education. and mistrust among financiers and investors still remained in Malaysia. for instance. and overcome the barriers it was intended to prevail against? This section explains the challenges facing SREP implementation. One-third were not issued with licenses. Table 8: Summary of challenges facing the SREP in Malaysia . Technical Economic Institutional Disinterest and occasional hostility from national utilities and convoluted Renewable Energy Power Purchase Agreements (REPPAs). in part economic due to low electricity tariffs. and continued subsidies to fossil fuel producers. with one interviewing key stakeholders in Malaysia and finding that regulators and investors “commonly see renewable energy as immature. planners.”20 The International Energy Agency documented that a lack of standard codes and certification. and regulatory failures. It argues that obstacles were partly technical. Another participant calculated that “about two-thirds of the projects proposed under SREP never progressed” and that “even today.05MW 210. developers. From 2001 to 2008.85MW Table 7: SREP projects under construction and approved (but not yet licensed or operational) For all intents and purposes. had “no experience with advanced boiler technology and no understanding of bio- Dimension Explanation Lack of technology such as boilers that could combust empty fruit bunches and experience with digesters. Technical Obstacles One major technical obstacle involved developing renewable electricity systems that would work in a Malaysian context.8MW 140MW 20. unproven. training. 50 projects were approved for a capacity of 288MW. then. Lack of adequate and strongly implemented national policy frameworks. As one respondent told us: Î The SREP is not a success.”19 Another argued that “utilisation of renewable energy [in Malaysia] is still very low. One respondent noted that the palm oil industry. and partly institutional. financial institutions) Expensive feasibility studies and high grid interconnection costs. Table 8 provides an overview of these barriers. and lack of awareness were impeding the diffusion of renewable energy.21 Another study analogously argued that limited local experience. most of the duration of the programme.”23 Why.Category Number of projects 9 14 10 33 Capacity 17 Mini-Hydro Biomass Biogas Total 50.” Still others commented that “our conclusion is that the SREP is a failure. The government needs to relook at it if they wish to see some success in the near future” and “the SREP experience has been dismal. Subsidies to fossil fuels and the failure to include the cost of externalities in electricity prices. Flaws in programme design including capacity caps. Low electricity tariffs for renewable power producers. unattractive financing rates. the major players are not getting into the renewable energy business … they just don’t want to get involved. and one-quarter were issued with licenses but never started operating. research institutes. exotic. but 40 percent were cancelled. did the SREP fail to meet its targets. and sharing of experience among all stakeholders (e. resistance.” A slew of recent studies have also implied the same. and only 13MW was built for the first eight years of the programme.g.22 Yet another study concluded in their assessment that “renewable energy in Malaysia is still being generated on a small-scale basis [even though] Malaysia is blessed with abundant resources … The progress in bringing renewable energy generation into the mainstream has been slow. improperly designed regulations. long lead times for project approval. Unfamiliarity and resistance of financiers and bankers. inadequate training. involving flaws in programme design. the SREP was suboptimal. and no authority given to programme managers over enforcement. electric utilities. dealing with actual renewable electricity power plant design and training issues. and risky.

blowers. so we had to develop it all on our own. The Kajang waste incineration plant we visited had to specially design a refuse derived fuel cycle that involved magnetically sorting waste. pumps. Such lack of capacity became apparent during two of the site visits we conducted to TNB renewable energy demonstration plants. instead we had to do our research on an ad hoc basis.” Thus. not many people knew about renewable electricity. biogas. and quality assurance. We showed up at the first. splitting and recycling non-combustible items. As one respondent summed it up. one respondent noted that “there was no centralised training institution. One official at the Bell Palm Oil biogas facility we visited shown in Figure 14 called designing the digester system as “a nightmare.” Most of the Malaysian landfills “were not designed or well suited to capture methane gas. given the ten kilometre restriction set by TNB.18 Figure 14: The digester tanks of the 1. and treating effluent. waste and other renewable energy technologies. gas extraction wells. It is therefore not surprising that there is a seeming imbalance when it comes to stakeholder capacity. with some real innovations happening in some places but not others.7MW Bell Palm Oil Facility gas technology.” The Bukit Tagar sanitary landfill gas capture power plant we visited. training. “when the SREP kicked off. drying and shredding. digesting organic waste. took “years” to design and involved geo-synthetic clay liners. water treatment facilities. “biomass projects had to proceed with a lot of costly trial and error.” and “the country had practically no experience with designing and using solar panels to generate commercial electricity. a hy- . high design polyethylene blankets.” and also mentioned how devastating palm oil plantations could be to the local environment if managed improperly. no place to learn about how to innovate technology. combusting the remaining material.” Another respondent mentioned that although his institute undertakes research in solar.” Small hydroelectric projects had trouble “because of the great fluctuation in water supply between the wet and dry seasons. and were also location dependent. flame arresters. anaerobic closing ponds.” Another closely related obstacle was lack of skills and insufficient education. meaning engineers encountered numerous problems related to how to combust empty fruit bunches or gasify palm oil effluent. which is why no solar projects were ever sponsored by SREP. their findings have contributed little toward the SREP. and flare stacks. While it is clear that all stakeholders are making their own efforts to build their capacity in renewable energy.

” One dimension to this issue of capacity is “poor project feasibility assessments. lightning short circuited the system. because there was no one available to train us in what to do. only to find that it was no longer working. Another remarked that “it’s hard connecting to TNB’s grid. One respondent noted that “the tariffs paid to SREP developers were not based on sound economic principles.19 Figure 15: The inoperable solar-diesel hybrid system at the Langkawi Cable Car in Kedah. “all the solar panels are broken. was no longer operational due to “lack of maintenance skills” and “interest” from its operators. but they also set very stringent protection requirements that really complicated the technical efficiency of our project. a TNB solar-wind hybrid project on Pulau Perhentian in Terengganu.” Clearly. they were set with no consideration of ac- . and propagate best practices. but they did anyways because they wanted to be seen as cooperating with the new SREP. “that system hasn’t been working for years even though it’s still featured on the TNB website.” That same project developer estimated that such complications accounted to a staggering 20 percent of the total project cost (though other project managers told us interconnection costs amounted to only 2–5 percent of total costs). One project developer exclaimed that “we were forever at the mercy of TNB to say which substation to interconnect to. share their experiences. A final technical obstacle relates to onerous interconnection and feasibility requirements stipulated by TNB. insufficient tariffs for renewable electricity providers “hobbled” project developers. it’s just decoration now. how much we had to spend on feasibility studies.” The reason is that “planners didn’t really have the expertise to approve a project. As one local community member told us. we had to hire a full-time technician from China to live at the plant. Malaysia brid system at the Langkawi Cable consisting of 16kWp of solar panels and two 50kW diesel generators shown in Figure 15. the lack of a strong capac- ity building component within the SREP is a missed opportunity for stakeholders to build expertise.” with “many substandard projects passing the approval stage that never should have.” The second. there is the legitimate concern that our distribution system could damage their network. As one of the operators told us. one of the facility managers told us that “spare parts and maintenance is a big problem. what type of circuit breakers and equipment we had to use. despite being built in 2002. it’s been long abandoned.” Even at one of the operational SREP sites we visited.” Economic and Financial Obstacles In the economic realm. we can’t get spare parts and wouldn’t even know what to do with them if we did.

” Another project developer told us that “SREP tariffs pay only enough to cover operation costs and to run the plant. cooking. local banks were unwilling and unready to give financing.” Another commented that “bank managers had . or to manufacture compost fertiliser. Landfill gas. we make no money at all unless we get carbon credits under the CDM.20 Figure 16: Land in Perak is cleared to make way for the expansion of palm oil mills tual cost recovery.” At another facility.” Because the tariff was so low. respondents mentioned that at least RM 1. sometimes a nuisance. This. Project developers usually had to go abroad to Chinese and Japanese financiers. can be used to generate electricity.” As another respondent noted. sometimes worth doing. Palm oil millers. “was not allowed. similarly. rather than generating electricity. A separate economic obstacle dealt with lack of financing and the unfamiliarity of Malaysian banks with renewable electricity projects. however. “but it’s not a key factor. respondents noted that many project developers could make more money doing “other things” with renewable fuels. or when upgraded and “sweetened” used for a variety of other applications including heating.70 per kWh would be needed to make projects viable. “the SREP rate is way too low for such projects to be commercially viable.” The original tariff of 17/sen per kWh was “shockingly low.” A third project developer we spoke with concurred. for use in the paper and pulp industry. respondents argued that “the tariff is too low. and a transport fuel.” For solar projects. we need extra income from tipping fees. since they were paying 30 sen/ kWh for electricity but could only sell at 21 sen/kWh. projects would never make it—SREP is insufficient. something extra. recycling. we don’t even get enough to cover operations. can use wastes and residues to generate grid electricity. and noted that “without CDM. and making plastic resin onsite. or as a component of mattresses and chipboards.” In the case of the Bukit Tagar sanitary landfill. operators told us that it would have made more sense to just use the electricity onsite for the facility. far below even the actual cost of operating SREP facilities. “SREP is just another option for mills. “more than seven times the rate currently offered by TNB. One respondent noted that “when SREP started.” Managers also spend much of their time focusing on acquiring land for the expansion of palm oil mills shown in Figure 16. for example. to make animal feed.” forcing the landfill in essence to “sell electricity to TNB for 21 sen per unit that we then buy right back at 30 sen.” one respondent told us.

the SREP had “limited oversight” and “poor evaluation. a collection of institutional obstacles “wreaked havoc” on the SREP. “some developers never bothered to complete the process.S. with one study noting that in Malaysia “there is still massive support for conventional energy sources in the forms of subsidies and export idea about renewable energy. Cents/kWh) Political and Institutional Obstacles Just as significant as technical and economic barriers. without consultation with key stakeholders in the industry. all SREP projects had to be approved by SCORE. “the marketplace in Malaysia is not fair. it’s an entirely different game. but larger projects were functionally excluded. Malaysians are not paying the full cost of electricity. eroding the motive to go into renewables … the playing field isn’t only uneven. biomass projects.”24 The result is a “lack of economies of scale for renewable energy.” The 10MW cap.” Another remarked that the 10MW cap created a “no man’s land” where “smaller projects had too many transaction costs such as interconnection fees and negotiating with TNB. the initial five percent and 500MW by 2005 national target was set “without any feasibility studies” and “chosen almost randomly. or to expedite projects. neither SCORE nor the Malaysian Energy Commission “had the authority to enforce SREP. or to reconcile complaints about TNB. especially as the country is already 99 percent electrified. Our respondents identified no less than seven. it’s hard for them to visualise what a landfill gas capture or municipal solid waste plant looks like. First is that the capacity cap of 10MW was set too low.” Such organisation were also “compromised” and prone to “conflicts of interest” since their members included TNB and the Malaysian Palm Oil Board. fossil fuels have been cross-subsidised for decades. “meant all we could do was generate peanuts.” Another argued that the explanation behind SREP’s poor performance is that “other items and damages associated with fossil fuels. and not solar and hydro technologies. such as carbon dioxide or acid rain.” One participant told us that they “didn’t know where either of the numbers came from.” Add all of these design flaws up.” Another 21 Source Electricity generation cost 4–6 1–12 5–10 7–10 7–15 20–25 Gas and Coal Electricity Hydro Mini-Hydro Geothermal Biomass Solar Table 9: Existing levelised costs of electricity generation in Malaysia (including subsidies). subsidies to natural gas and oil.” Such sentiments have been confirmed by other studies. are not factored into tariffs. for it “ruled out economies of scale for hydroelectric.” Seventh. One respondent went so far as to suggest that “the Energy Commission really does nothing. As one respondent put it. One respondent called the low tariff for solar PV “odd” since that technology had the highest costs compared to all qualified systems.” Yet another jokingly called the SREP “the small-small renewable energy programme. nothing more. meaning if a project missed the first session they would have to wait another six months to apply. Fourth.” and the 21 year operating license was “hard to meet given that many of the fuel contracts and financing agreements for things like fruit bunches or waste were done on ten and fifteen year bases.” Third.” Second. waste. one respondent told us. along with energy prices that do not reflect full costs result in an oversupply of electricity generated from fossil fuel sources and impede the diffusion of technologies under SREP. altering the tariffs in 2005 was seen as “picking winners” since it only applied to biomass and palm oil technologies.” and “artificially low prices” for fossil fuel supply presented in Table 9. 2009 (U. it’s just a surrogate for TNB and has their interests in mind.” Lastly. and . but not solar and hydro developers or consumer advocate groups. according to some respondents. but the committee met only twice a year. REPPAs took “too long to negotiate” and “TNB had the ability to stall or delay whenever they wanted to. and some projects took “five years or longer” to get completed.” meaning problems like those above were “not caught or remedied. Sixth.” Fifth.” and “many more never bothered to start in the first place. it surely wasn’t by consulting the experts.

” another respondent told us. the ten kilometre restriction to the grid meant that many rural areas and Orang Asli communities were still too far from the grid to qualify for a project. Bell could have done 4MW but was limited to 1. for example. As one respondent put it. it’s a convoluted policy landscape. or an atheist in charge of a church. Bukit Tagar could do 6MW but was limited to 1MW. demanding half of the savings developers accrued from tax reductions.22 Figure 17: A diesel generator provides electricity to the Long Wat Penan Settlement in the interior of Sarawak project developer told us that “it took a terribly long time to go through the SREP process—it was supposed to be done in three months. and setting unfair standby tariffs for backup power.” Furthermore. intentionally delaying the approval of projects to put pressure on developers to accept unfair provisions.” and “saw the SREP as a threat to its revenue and profits. “with TNB setting extremely low tariffs. “SREP was designed and implemented with no thought or relationship to the various other ongoing renewable energy programmes. had to “compete” with the Malaysian Energy Commission and TNB over the “direction of national electricity policy” in addition to “actors like the Ministry of Housing taking charge of waste.” The Ministry of Energy. TNB had “all the bargaining power. strongly implemented policy framework on renewable energy. levying penalties for shortfalls in expected generation. the Ministry of Science technological development.” Another respondent .” All three of the site visits we undertook revealed that project developers had asked for greater amounts of capacity but had been denied from TNB: Kajang could generate 10MW but was limited to exporting less than 7MW. there was no harmonisation. and lowers their electricity sales. no coordination. expensive. the only buyer in peninsular Malaysia that renewable power producers could sell to.” “It was a recipe for disaster. A final institutional challenge related to the lack of a national. One respondent explained that: Î TNB sees independent renewable power production as a lose-lose situation because it displaces their capacity. cohesive. and took us ten times longer. setting performance provisions that facilities had to deliver electricity at precise capacity factors. and had to instead rely on inefficient. and polluting diesel generators like the one in Figure 17. the Department of Environment regulations. TNB put up hurdles every way they could.7MW. Another key institutional problem was resistance from TNB. Putting them in charge of SREP was akin to letting a fox manage a chicken coop.” “didn’t need renewable energy.

costly feasibility studies. Part of this is .spoke about a “mishmash between the SREP and local policies and regulations that would still impede projects even after TNB would give approval. this was made without costing studies and created the perception of “picking winners” of biomass and biogas.000MW by 2030 and 21. the experience with SREP implies that planners can learn just as much from project failures as successes. prevented an organic renewable electricity market from taking hold. from CDM credits to tipping fees and recycling. 2006. install.370MW by 2050. Equally important. because they interfere with tipping fees. A sort of policy gap existed between the lofty targets enshrined in SREP and the local developers and officials on the ground charged with realising those targets. the move is a sign that if you don’t succeed at promoting renewable energy at first. electricity tariffs under SREP did not match true production costs. and delays. Ultimately. try. 23 Even though SREP did not meet its targets. Rather than embrace renewable energy. to discourage projects. especially the 10MW cap. lack of monitoring. The new policy framework is setting up a single agency. approve. to consult with stakeholders and then monitor and evaluate progress. with hydroelectric projects. and did not provide cost recovery for project developers. and 2007. with Johor having different requirements than Pahang which is still different than Selangor. and connect ended up taking 3–5 years. waste-to-energy. artificially. in order to be financially viable. Finally. such as interconnection fees. At the top of the list is better design: SREP was “hobbled” from the start by capacity caps. Relying on the dominant state-owned electric utility TNB also proved to be a mistake. Electricity tariffs were changed under the programme in 2001.25 Such targets have also been incorporated into the 10th Malaysian Plan (2011–2015) and a National Renewable Energy Policy and Action Plan. and palm oil effluent and waste. try again. and also set tariffs based on reasonable rates of return to project vendors. the efficacy of SREP was eroded by fragmentation and lack of cohesion with other Malaysian energy policies. because they deal with water. and targets were revised downward in the middle of the programme. the Sustainable Energy Development Authority (SEDA). When tariffs under SREP were changed in 2006. were not based on sound economics. including an ambitious feed-in tariff. and few (if any) pre-feasibility studies. It will streamline approval and sitting procedures. and waste projects. and perhaps unnecessarily. Project developers had to pay the cost of interconnection and had to build systems within ten kilometres of the existing electricity grid. Each of these design flaws.” Apparently communication between local and national governments was “not good” and requirements and standards “differed state by state. Operating licenses were stipulated to be 21 years but financing agreements and fuel contracts rarely extended beyond ten years. but they instead learned from its difficulties are implementing a progressive set of new policies. it offers many lessons for energy planners and policymakers. In addition. as was the “willing seller.” understandable. given that the structure of SREP meant that small-scale renewable electricity projects traded off with TNB revenues and profits. Unlike the SREP. evidence from our pool of respondents strongly suggests that TNB opposed it and used a variety of tactics. Projects supposed to take three months to design. willing buyer” model of REPPAs. especially polemic. notably continued subsidies for natural gas and oil as well as conflicts with state guidelines and policies concerning hydroelectricity. this new policy framework will guarantee access to the grid by requiring TNB and other utilities to accept all electricity from private renewable electricity producers. Every single project we visited highlighted the need for extra streams of income. Planners in Malaysia expect total grid connected renewable energy capacity to grow from 219MW in 2011 to 4. exclusion of stakeholders. Though it is uncertain if such ambitious targets will be accomplished. a lengthy approval process. and scores of project developers abandoned their efforts midstream. and perhaps the most important lesson of all: Malaysian planners could have given up after SREP and abandoned the idea of renewable electricity overall.

Selangor Kuala Lumpur. Sarawak . Prime Minister’s Department Public Private Partnership Unit. Selangor Putrajaya. Selangor Putrajaya. Green Technology & Water United Nations Development Programme Malaysia Institute of Strategic & International Studies Malaysia Sarawak State Government Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Friends of the Earth Global Environment Facility Sarawak Hidro Sdn Bhd United Nations Development Programme Malaysia Economic Planning Unit. Selangor Kuala Lumpur. Selangor Putrajaya. Green Technology & Water Sime Darby Petronas State Planning Unit. Selangor Kuching. Selangor Putrajaya. Selangor Kuala Lumpur. Selangor Kuala Lumpur. Selangor Kuala Lumpur . Sarawak Kuching. Selangor Kuching. Sarawak State Government Sarawak Energy Berhad Universiti Malaysia Sarawak Sarawak Rivers Board Kuala Lumpur. Selangor Kuala Lumpur. Selangor Putrajaya. and Development Malaysia OSK Research Ministry of Energy. Selangor Kuching. Selangor Kuala Lumpur. Selangor Petaling Jaya. Technology. Prime Minister’s Department Corridor Development Unit. Prime Minister’s Department Regional Corridor Development Authority Ministry of Tourism Centre for Environment. Sarawak Putrajaya.24 Date Institution Location Number of interviews 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 5 2 8 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 1 2 Mar 2010 Apr 2010 May 2010 May 2010 May 2010 May 2010 May 2010 May 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Board of National Economic Advisory Council Ministry of Energy. Sarawak Kuala Lumpur. Selangor Kuala Lumpur. Selangor Putrajaya. Sarawak Kuching. Sarawak Kuching.

Bhd. Selangor Putrajaya. Selangor Kepong. Mudung Abun. Bhd. Kedah Batu Pahat. Thailand Bukit Tagar Sanitary Landfill. Selangor Kerling. United Nations Development Programme Kub-Berjaya Enviro Sdn. Forest Research Institute Malaysia Ministry of Energy Tenaga Nasional Berhad Malaysian Palm Oil Board Renewable Energy Research Centre (SIRIM) JD Energy Systems Langkawi Development Authority Bell Palm Industries Sdn. Sarawak Kuching. Sarawak Batang Ai. Sarawak Kuala Lumpur. Selangor Putrajaya. Sarawak Kg. Selangor Langkawi. Bhd. Bhd.25 Date Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jul 2010 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Feb 2011 Feb 2011 Institution Natural Resources and Environment Board Sarawak Sarawak Electricity Supply Company Alstom Hydro Sarawak Hidro Berhad Borneo Resources Institute Malaysia PACOS Sarawak Energy Berhad Sarawak Electricity Supply Company Eco-Ideal Consulting Sdn. Mudung Abun. Selangor Kuala Lumpur. Sarawak Bakun. Selangor Number of interviews 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 3 1 5 1 1 3 1 1 1 4 . Selangor Putrajaya. Recycle Energy Sdn. Bhd. Johor Bangkok. Malaysian Energy Commission Renewable Power Sdn. Location Kuching. Selangor Shah Alam. Sarawak Bakun. Sarawak Kg. Selangor Kuala Lumpur. Selangor Semenyih. Sarawak Batang Ai.

switchgears and other protection equipment) and the necessary metreing installation. 4. in the case of proposals for setting up new RE power plants (or where “re-powering” is proposed) that require the installation of new boilers or turbo-generator systems. The small RE power plant must be ready for gridconnection within 12 months from the date of approval for such grid connection. . it will be charged accordingly with the prevailing tariff. The minimum of 30% equity in an RE power plant project must be by Bumiputera shareholder(s). However. The RE electricity producer shall be given a licence for a period of 21 years. A power plant can be more than 10MW in size. No stand-by charges shall be levied. solar. 11. and any other statutory approvals required. 2. 3. including biomass. and the developer of the project is responsible for obtaining the necessary approval of DoE. including the selling price on a willing-seller. This is applicable for existing plant that wishes to connect to the grid. based on take and pay. The stipulated period of construction until commissioning shall be counted from the date of signing of the Renewable Electricity Purchase Agreement (REPA) between the developer and the utility. 7. The small RE power plant shall be located within a distance of 10km from the nearest interconnection point. 6. 9. Power generation through co-generation technology shall be given special preference. 5. mini-hydro and wind. the relevant Utility system reinforcement (electric cables. transformer. municipal waste. if back energy is requested by project developers. the plant shall be commissioned within 24 months. RE electricity producers will be responsible for all the costs of the grid-connection. to be effective from the date of commissioning of the plant. SREP shall apply to all types of renewable sources of energy. but the maximum capacity that will be allowed for power export to the distribution grid will be no more than 10MW. However. biogas. 10. 8. The distribution grid interconnection shall be made at a voltage between 11 – 33 kV. The RE power plant must meet all environmental regulations set by the Department of Environment (DoE). Maximum capacity of a small RE power plant designed for sale of power to the grid shall be 10MW. Exception is given for hydro power generation project. Foreign agency / company is allowed to participate in SREP project with maximum participation equity of 30%. Project developers will have to negotiate the Renewable Electricity Purchase Agreement with the relevant Utility.26 SCORE will adopt the following Guidelines in promoting the development of grid-connected small with regards to power plants: 1. willing buyer basis.

Chang Mai. BK. 1251. Ibrahim. 8. Cameron KS. Mohd. 9. ti Kamaruddin.” Presentation to the PEA-AIT International Conference on Energy and Sustainable Development. “Renewable Energy in Malaysia: A Policy Analysis. 29-41. 2010). Oh et al. 2008. Mohamed.” Energy Policy 37. 4 ed. Overview of International Renewable Energy Policies and Comparison with Malaysia’s Domestic Policy (Kuala Lumpur: Pusat Tenaga Malaysia). Olz. Thailand. 2. “Renewable Energy and Malaysia. Leong Yow Peng. 1779–1793. Lim. “Energy for Sustainable Development in Malaysia: Energy Policy and Alternative Energy. Bangkok. Lim et al 2006. “Issues and Challenges of Renewable Energy Development: A Malaysian Experience. 2010: 1251. Badriyah Abdul. 33–40. 1241–1252. Abdul Rahman and Keat Teong Lee. Sovacool. 8 ed. 2002. 6.” Electricity Journal 24(5) (June. 2006. Mohamed and Lee 2006. 2003. “Small Renewable Energy Power Programme for the Promotion of Renewable Energy Power Generation. Hitoshi. 2004. NJ. Ibid. Lim Keng Yaik. 2010. Oh. 15. 2010: 1245. “Renewable Energy Policy and Initiatives in Malaysia. 2006. pp. BK and IM Drupady. 16. Tick Hui. Hassan. 22. “A Comparative Analysis of Renewable Electricity Support Mechanisms for Southeast Asia. 18.27 1. 11. 21. 2010. pp. April 11. Shigeoka.” Presentation to the First Meeting of ASEM Green IPPs Network. June 2–4.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 14. Norhaya- . 13. “Innovation in the Malaysian Waste-to-Energy Sector: Applications with Global Potential. Olz and Beerepoot 2010. Keat Teong Lee. 2010. 12. “Renewable Energy Development in Malaysia.” Presentation to EU-Malaysia Cooperation in Green Technology.” Energy Policy 34. Mustapa. Newbury Park. UK: Polity Press. Whetten DA. 2006. 4. 19. and Amir Hisham Hashim. Sovacool. 14. and Shing Chyli Chua. Mok Poh and Hoi Why Kong. 2388–2397. Mohamad et al. Chung Lau. USA: Sage Publishing. Yin RK. pp. pp. Marriot Hotel Putrajaya. Chin Haw. Malek. 4771–4778. 2011). Empress Hotel. 24. October 24–25. 20.” Energy Policy 31. 23. 25. Lee. Elias Salleh. 10. 2010. Samantha and Milou Beerepoot. 2009.” International Journal on Sustainable Tropical Design Research and Practice 1(1) (December). “Energy Policy and Alternative Energy in Malaysia: Issues and Challenges for Sustainable Growth. Case study research: Design and methods. Blaikie N. 2005. 7. pp. 2002. Shen Yee Pang. Oh et al. 1061–1072.” Energy for Sustainable Development 6(3) (September). Deploying Renewables in Southeast Asia: Trends and Potentials (Paris: International Energy Agency/OECD). 5. Koh. Siti Indati. and Philip Jones. Zamzam. Wong Hwee Kheng. 3. Upper Saddle River. pp. Abdul Rahman Mohamad. 31–39. pp. Developing Management Skills. 2000. Jaafar.” Energy 35(4) (April. Designing Social Research. Kok Tat Tan. 2010. 17. pp. USA: Prentice Hall Publishing. “A Comparative Study on the Energy Policies in Japan and Malaysia in Fulfilling Their Nations’ Obligations Towards the Kyoto Protocol. “Greener Energy Solutions for a Sustainable Future: Issues and Challenges for Malaysia.” Presentation to the Regional Forum on Sustainable Energy. Malek 2010. June 1.

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. which have supported elements of the work reported here. or MacArthur Foundation. Any opinions. The authors are also extremely grateful to the National University of Singapore for Faculty Start-up Grant 09-273 as well as the MacArthur Foundation for Asia Security Initiative Grant 08-92777-000-GSS. National University of Singapore. the views of the author(s) expressed in this study do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. findings. and travel for this project. . field research.28 The authors are appreciative to the Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy for some of the financial assistance needed to conduct the research interviews. and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation. Also.

professor and consultant on issues pertaining to energy policy. the environment and science and technology Ira Martina Drupady is currently a research associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. His email is bsovacool@nus. She currently researches energy security. Oak Ridge National Laboratory. rural Benjamin .S. National Science Foundation’s Electric Power Networks Efficiency and Security Programme. and energy development and poverty. Before joining the LKY School. where she also graduated with a Masters in Public Policy in 2010. Dr Sovacool has published or edited six books. Semiconductor Materials and Equipment more than 100 academic articles and presented at more than 60 international conferences and symposia in the past few years. U.S. Dr Sovacool has worked as a researcher. He has served in advisory and research capacities at the U. she worked as a Project Assistant with the Asia-Europe Foundation. Virginia Centre for Coal and Energy Research. Austria. She can be reached at iramartina@nus. Sovacool is an Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. New York State Energy Research and Development Authority. Virginia Tech Consortium on Energy Restructuring. Department of Energy’s Climate Change Technology Programme and the International Institute for Applied Systems and Analysis near Vienna.

30 A worker with a fresh batch of fruit bunches at a palm oil plantation in Terengganu .

Energy Governance Case Studies Series 1. Rural energy development on the “Roof of the World”: Lessons from microhydro village electrification in Nepal 8. Summoning the sun: Evaluating China’s Renewable Energy Development Project (REDP) 7. Gers just want to have fun: Evaluating the renewable energy and rural electricity access project (REAP) in Mongolia 3. Living up to energy governance benchmarks: The Xeketam hydropower project in Laos 4. Untapped potential: The difficulties of the Small Renewable Energy Power (SREP) Programme in Malaysia 31 . Settling the score: The implications of the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE) in Malaysia 5. What went wrong? Examining the Teacher’s Solar Lighting Project in Papua New Guinea 6. The radiance of Soura Shakti: Installing two million solar home systems in Bangladesh 9. Lighting Laos: The governance implications of the Laos rural electrification programme 2.

home to a hybrid diesel‐solar power system no longer in operation .32 The view from the top of the Langkawi Cable Car in Kedah.

33 .

sg For more details on the LKY School. contribute to the transformation of Asia. professional graduate school of the National University of Singapore. improving the lives of its people and.nus.Strategic partners The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy is an autonomous. Its mission is to help educate and train the next generation of Asian policymakers and leaders. with the objective of raising the standards of governance throughout the region. please visit www. in so doing.