Constitutional Law II Bill of Rights I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND CONTRACT CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing

the obligation of contracts shall be passed. LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, notably the due process, equal protection and non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting the exercise of these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to protect individual rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the government, telling it what it cannot do to the individual. A. Due process - Procedural and Substantive Civil Procedural Due Process In civil cases, the SC laid down its elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca: a. Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. b. Court with jurisdiction over the party-defendant c. Judgement rendered according to law. d. Defendant given the oppotunity to be heard (requirement on notice and hearing) Criminal Due Process In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People: a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, and what charge he must answer. b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and after the defendant was heard. If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed. c. Judgment according to law d. Tribunal with jurisdiction Administrative Due Process In administrative proceedings, the elements were laid down in the case ofAng Tibay v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary rights" in justiciable

cases before administrative tribunals: a. There must be a hearing, where a party may present evidence in support of his case. b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented by a party. c. While the tribunal has no duty to decide the case correctly, its decision must be supported by evidence. d. The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. e. The evidence must have been presented at the hearing or at least contained in the record and known to the parties affected. f. The tribunal must rely on its own independent consideration of evidence, and not rely on the recommendation of a subordinate. g. The decision must state the facts and the law in such a way that the parties can know the issues involved and the reasons for the decision. Substantive Due Process Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987) F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review. HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal orce rtiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. (2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where

The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be heard. convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment.The EO defined the prohibition. Perhaps so. As for the carabeef. Obviously. We do not see. w/ no less difficulty in on province than in another. and to deserving farmers through . considering that they can be killed any where. it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as. w/c was carried out forthright. the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise. retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. dead meat. thus denying him elementary fair play. however. However. in the case of carabeef. if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited.there at least 7 yrs. so says the EO. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit. it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given asupe rse de as bond w/c was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. (3) In the instant case. how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter. not to be flippant. any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. (4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander.

fine. providing penalties for viol. It is laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse.dispersal as the Director of Animal Industrymay see fit in the case of carabaos. those classified as S (Service). One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines. the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. T (Truck). (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face. however. The resps. or better still. F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the energy crisis. They. of Public Works. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's Kaiser Jeep. CC (Consular Corps). if condition it is.. Due Process and Police Power Bautista v. The resps. The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. Juinio. 127 SCRA 329 (1984) Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid. As underlying the questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation the . DPL (Diplomatic). denied the petitioner's allegations and argued that the suit amounted to a request for advisory opinion. B. The petitioners brought suit questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was discriminatory and a denial of due process. issued memo. and even corruption. and TC (Tourist Cars). and cancellation of registration. therefore. confiscation of vehicles.VV. It excepted. It has behind it the presumption of validity. namely." The phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous condition. Min. of the LOI. have standing to challenge the validity of the LOI. Transportation.

W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate equally and uniformly. The LOI is an energy conservation measure. That the LOI does not include others does not render it invalid. (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the petitioners. to that extent the memo. ."(4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. would beul tra vires. Code does not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty.presumption of validity must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record overthrowing the statute. it is an apporpriate response to a problem. of the resps. VV. The govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none.

HELD: The SC has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on general welfare clause. 123 SCRA 569 (1983) F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in Bocaue. F: The ordinance was enacted for a twofold purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. the law was amended by RA 979 . maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. as orginally enacted. The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. they filed prohibition suits to stop the Mun. this petition for certiorari. to collect a fee for operating massage clinics separately from those operating barber ships and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might probably arise from the construction of separate rooms. While it is true that on 5/21/54. Hence. Villegas. 120 SCRA (1983) Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from Rendering Massage Services Valid. corp. Cruz v. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs. granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment. Bulacan.VV. Paras. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. HELD: A mun. RA 938. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. or the renewal of licenses to operate them.Constitutional Law II Velasco v. cabarets. and dance h alls in that mun.

" Moreover. transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. Sec. Due Process and Eminent Domain The taking by the State of private property in an expropriation proceeding must be: (1) for public use. C. It is not confined merely to use by the public at large (e. in the interest of national welfare or defense. and operation of billiard pools.Certiorari granted. 18. Taking either for public use or public purpose. circuses and other forms of entertainment. establish and operate vital industries and. 9. 1. and (3) upon observance of due process. even if it benefit a large group of people short of the public in general (e. upon payment of just compensation. the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation. The State may.g. Sec. Article XII. To construe the amendatory act as granting mun.w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs. not prohibition. corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Article III. theatrical performances.g. Public Use Public use is equivalent to public purpose. roads). It is enough that it serves a public purpose. Private property shall not be take for public use without just compensation. (2) with just compensation. VV. the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought . expropriating property for the relocation of squatters). Heirs of Juancho Ardona v.

Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987) F: On December 5. Sumulong v. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. (2) the land was covered by the land reform program. the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo. and the like. HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. As long as the purpose of the taking is public. the CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The "public use" requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing conditions. They brought this suit in the SC challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224. Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the expropriation of private lands for socialized housing.VV. The ontract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain. not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose. bridges. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public use. and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts. 1977.the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. then the power of eminent domain comes into play. The charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports complex. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been discarded. Among those lands sought to be expropriated are the petitioners' lands. Shortage in housing is a . The petititioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of roads. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property.

matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health. the environment and. EPZA v. Just compensation must be judicially determined Just Compensation Just compensation is the fair and reasonable equivalent of the loss sustained by the owner of the property due to the taking.VV. The property owner may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari. 2. 1259. be paid P15. in sum. Art. and 1313 are the same provisions which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The provisions on just compensation found in PD 1224.g. supra). 1250 of the Civil Code applied only to contractual obligations). whichever is lower. safety. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefitted. and using the conversion rates at the time of taking (because according to those cases. in the Ministerio and Amigable cases. it is the fair market value of the property measured at the time of the taking. the time of payment was in the 1960's. HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes . Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on judicial prerogatives. no matter how long ago it was taken (e. the time of the taking was in the 1920's. The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the property.00 per square meter. arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair and current market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. the general welfare. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development Corp.

the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation become political in nature and the courts must respect the decision. Manila. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. In this case. HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the NHA. PD 1669 and PD 1670. its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. The government on the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature or the President through Constitutional Law II his law-making powers exercises this power.impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property. following the decree. VV. Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987) F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo. the tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration of martial law when the land was much cheaper. its improvements and capabilities should be considered. The Tambunting subdivision is . The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection since by their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings. both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory.

Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980) F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project.summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. or question the amount of payments fixed by the decree. concurring: The judgment at bar now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v. Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation. LTA that the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken adn how much may be condemned thereof must be duly recognized. Due process must be observed De Knecht v. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared unconstitutional. Because of the protests of residents of the latter. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original . the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. 3. No deposit before the taking is required. originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Teehankee. There is not provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. leaving only as a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence. but the decision of the NHA are expressly declared beyond judicial review. The SC now rules that such singling out of properties does not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses the due process and equal protection and just compensation guarantees of the Constitution.VV. however. CJ. Later on.

plan. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines.VV. No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later. The case was remanded to the lower court. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but upon certiorari. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the expropriation. Appeal. on one hand. RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people. De Knecht. in 1983. when the Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. and progress and development. HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrayr and should not receive judicial aprpoval. The lower court denied tthe motion. on the other. the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. Republic v. it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people. but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets. 182 SCRA 142 (1990) F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities. among whom was petitioner. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not only . it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private properties for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the laws.

the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use . it appears that it was based on supervening events that occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings.Charo . Gutierrez. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way easements. When BP 340 was passed. RULING: In RP v. The social Constitutional Law II impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the subsequent legislative fiat. be subjected to an easement of right of way. without loss of title or possession. Napocor's lines have to pass the lands belonging to respondents. but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the owner of the condemned property. It is unquestionable that real property may. and possession of. ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmissin lines.by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain." In this case. the SC ruled that "Normally. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Moreover. 193 SCRA 1 (1991) F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines. NAPOCOR v. PLDT. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines. the expropriated property. through expropriation. the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of the title to.

use. For these reasons. XIII. are the criteria for determining just cmpensation. Just equiivalent has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. economic. whenever it is possible to make the assessment. the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less. No person shall be deprived of life. The price or value of the land and its character at the time of taking by the Govt. 1. ownership. than the money equivalent of said property. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. liberty or property without due process of law. the State shall regulate the acquisition. 1. III. reduce social. Equal Protection Art. Sec.Charo . To this end. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities . and disposition of property and its increments. D. XIII.of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of ts ordinary use. 2. Art. Sec. and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. 1. Sec. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity. Economic equality Art.

and peaceful concerted activities. and to expansion and growth. organized and unorganized. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes including conciliation.Art. XIII. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employersrecognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments. XII. certain areas of investments. and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. including the right to strike in accordance with law. 3. 10. collective bargaining and negotiations. when the national interest dictates. The Congress shall. humane conditions of work. They shall be entitle to security of tenure. Sec. and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency. The Congress shall enact measures . local and overseas. or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe. and living wage. The State shall afford full protection to labor. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization.based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making process affecting the rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Sec. Art.

practice. the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. VIII. and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.. and exclusive economic zone. territorial sea. and legal assistance to the underprivileged. In the grant of rights. privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. .that will encourage the formation and operation enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. Id. 2. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. the admission to the practice of law. Art. Sec. xxx The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters. Sec. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade. Art. 5. III. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. pleading. Sec. 11. the Integrated Bar. and procedure in all courts.

and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rights of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. There are areas of economic activity which can be limited to Filipinos. The Constitution itself acknowledges this in various places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII, Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art. XII, Sec. 10), to name a few. In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the SC upheld the validity of the law which nationalized the retail trade. For the protection of the law can be observed by the national interest. Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937) But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away for the simple reason that they cannot be deprived of a common means of livelihood, especially when they are admitted to the country as immigrants. In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978), the SC invalidated a city ordinance imposing a P500 permit fee for aliens who wish to engage in the pursuit of an occupation. The SC noted that this violated the uniformity of taxation, and deprived aliens of the right to earn a common livelihood. Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978) F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void. HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal protection of the laws.VV. In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979), Sec. 169 of the NIRC requiring manufacturers of skimmed milk (non-fat) to put on its label the

warning that the milk is harmful for infants, was struck down as unconstitutional on the ground that it did not require the same labeling in the case of filled milk (coco-fat added) At that time of the decision thought, the law was already inoperative. Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979) F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale of filled milk products. They brought an action in the CFI for a declaration of their rights in respect of section 169 of the Tax Code. This provision required that "all condensed skimmed milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers with the words: This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age. HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by RA 344. At any rate, Sec. 169 applied only to skimmed milk and not to filled milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not against manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus denying them the equal protection of the laws. VV. 2. Political equality Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. Art. IX, C, Sec. 10.Bona fide candidates to public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local officials who have received retirement benefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the term. It does not violate equal protection, for it gives younger blood the opportunity to run the local government. Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980) F: Sec. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that "any retired elective provincial, city ot municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term

of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired." Petitioner, Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of the law on the ground that it was contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantee of the Constitution. HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the application of the provision. No petition seeking his disqualification has been filed against him. His petition is a mere request for advisory opinion. Nevertheless, because of public interest, the question should be resolved. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments and therefore, not invalid. The retired employee in effect declares himself tired and unavailable for the same government work.VV. In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, the disqualification of candidates convicted or simply charged with national security offenses was struck down as unconstitutional, for violating the presumption of innocence and thus ultimately the equal political protection. Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980) F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and member of the bar, and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., as taxpayer and voter, sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of BP 52, sec. 4 of which provides for the disqualification as candidate of any person convicted of subversion, insurrection or rebellion or similar offenses. HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. They have no personal or substantial interest at stake and therefore no locus standi. Neither can they sue as taxpayers because the statute does not involve disbursement of public funds.VV. 3. Social equality Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities

by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.

Constitutional LawII II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Charo . went to the office of the petitioner. a SW. lists. RULING: YES.1. as shown in the warrant itself. Two packages of records & a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a . receipts." On the same date. Almeda. chits. 141 (1940) F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda. they could be held liable for perjury. obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac. Their affidavits were sufficient for. Almeda. accused of violating the Anti-Usury Law. charging usurious rates. swore that "he made his own personal investigation and ascertained that petitioner is lending money without a license. the Chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board. documents & other papers relating to her activities as userer. and after showing the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper. Requirements for Search Warrants Yee Sue Kuy v. de Garcia v. Salas. thereunder. & w/o the presence of the petitioner. PNs and other articles were seized and retained in the possession of the Anti-Usury Board. Almeda." The witness he presentted testified before the judge and swore that he knew that YEE was lending without a license because he personally investigated the victims who secured loans from the petitioner. house or store of the petitioner for certain books. judge. & the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usury Board. Receipt books. 65 Phil. proceeded w/ the execution thereof. in his application. The applicant. The existence of probable cause has been determined by the justice of the peace before issuing the warrant complained of. 689. accompanied by a captain of the PC. a SW was issued to search the store and premises of the petitioner. commanding any officer of the law "to search the person. who was ill and confined at that time. (1938) F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp. Almeda. ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied with. Locsin. 70 Phil. an agent of the Anti-Usury Board. Pasion vda. Tarlac.

under oath or affirmation. there was no case pending against the petitioner. the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o basis. the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce. The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are sought. By resolution. the prop Constitutional Law II seized were not delivered to the court w/c issued the warrant. the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. challenged the legality of the SW and the devolution of the documents demanded. the judge must examine. . as required by law. the resp. HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a SW to be valid. Instead. judge of CFI denied the petitioner's motion for the reason that though the SW was illegal. Separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner. to be nullified in these proceedings. to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed w/in the meaning of the law. (1) it must be issued upon probable cause. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against petitioner. together w/ the SW. IS THERE A WAIVER? No express waiver. Petitioner demanded the return of the documents seized. (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or another. In the instant case. Bu motion. they were turned over to the resp. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued.receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. pet. (3) in the determination of probable cause. & (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. if any. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. Even accepting the description of the prop.

IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None. To constitute a waiver of constitutional right. It is but a submission to the authority of the law. paraphernalia. Burgos v. waiver. (2) that the person involved had knowledge. she was sick & was not present when the warrant was served upon Salas. actual or constructive. HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with merit. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984) Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom F: On the basis of two warrants issued by the RTC of QC.RAM . right. the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. She could not have objected bec. (3) that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of the consti. of the existence of such right. The delay in making the demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result im implied. Petitioners brought and action to annul the warrants and compel the return of the things seized. It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. publication and distribution of the newspapers as well as papers and other literature seized on the ground that they were used in the commission of the crime of subversion. Certainly. motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing. cannot be waived by anyone except by the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and the We Forum were search and printing machines. being a personal one. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be . it must appear first that (1) the right exists.

the deposition of de Leon and his witness. and its pres. State of Texas.searched. Ruiz. As Judge Ruiz was then conducting a hearing. The deposition was later read to the judge who asked the witness to take an oath as to the truth of his statements. Clerk of Court. Examiner de Leon filed an application for a SW against Bache & Co. The judge then signed the SW and accordingly issued the same.) v. . 37 SCRA 823 (1971) F: The Com.VV. of Internal Revenue through Rev. VV.. Seggerman for violation of the provisons of the NIRC. (Phil. mimeographing machines and tape recorders. Logronio. was taken by the Dep. Bache & Co. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied. Broad statement in the application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. the application for a warrant must contain a specification stating with particularity the alleged subversive materials he has published or intending to publish. HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. Another factor that makes the search warrants constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. In Stanford v. the US SC declared this type of warrant void. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times. The judge did not personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied with. newspaper dummies. RULING: NO. typewriters. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985) F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable. video machines and tapes. When addressed to a newspaper publisher or editor. Corro v.

ammunitions and explosives in the premises of the PUP which were supposed to be in possession of Dr." The same holds true for the affidavit of Angeles. (2) As to the claim that the SW failed to particularly describe the place to be searched. the SW described the place as PUP. This is important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-importatnt question of w/n there was probable cause. the SC ruled that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can.Charo . with its address and specifically mentioned the offices of the "Dept. on account of his training. Moreover. and the judge must. ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. The probable cause required under the Constitution for the issuance of a search warrant must be in connection with one specific offense. 180 SCRA 69 (1990) F: Judge Dayrit. Dimagmaliw merely stated in his application that his knowledge was based "on gathered infrmation from verified sources. Prudente v. Dayrit. However. supported by a "Deposition of Witness. in writing and under oath. (1) The warant was not issued on the basis of personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness. in the case at bar. ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid. on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavit submitted. In enforcing the warrant. RULING: NO. issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of arms. Prudente. Prudente. was in the best position to conceive. before issuing the warrant. upon applicatin of P/Maj. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers.The judge did not have the opportunity to observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and to propound initial and follow-up questions which his judicial mind." executed by P/Lt. 3 fragmentation grenades were found in the bathroom of the office of Dr. Here. Angeles. the judge did not examine Angeles in the form of searching questions and answers. Dimagmaliw. the complainant and any witnesses he may produce. of Military Science and Tactics on the ground floor and the Office of the President at the 2nd floor and the other . What appears on the record are leading questions answereable by yes or no. with reasonable effort.

judge was invalid. it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest. they are treated as belonging to a single specie. Olaes v. The warrrant was issued for violation of PD 1866 which punishes several offenses." Although the specific section of the law is not stated. etc." was added to refer to ammunitions and explosives did not violate the rule on single offense. the warrant itself qualified the description of the offense as "illegal possession of firearms.rooms in that floor. the same are deemed inadmissible against them. An exception to the rule that a warant shall be issued for a single offense is when existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. for notwithstanding that possession of firearms." This suffices to cure the defect. there is no question at all that the specific offense alleged to have been committed as basis for determining probable cause is alleged. RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW states that it is in connection with "the violation of RA 6425. the Court declared that: " At the time the person is arrested. In People V. They also question the extrajudicial confession taken from them without according them the right to assistance of a counsel. if any. Furthermore. 155 SCRA 486 (1987) F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp. As to the extrajudicial confessions of the accused. While there was failure to state the particular provision of the law violated." it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "there is probable cause to believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his possession and control. he shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to . marijuana dried stalks which are suject of the offense stated above. The articles seized by virtue of the SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted as evidence for violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act." This is deemed sufficient. explosives and ammunitions are punished in different sections of the PD. People.Charo . the SW specifically described the place to be searched and the things to be seized. (3) There was also an issue as to w/n the SW was issued for one specific offense. The fact that the word "etc. Galit.

shall be inadmissible in evidence. The Court. meaning to say. in whole or in part. CA. or was meant to exercise. quasijudicial responsiibilities relative to offenses punishable by PD 1883." These requirements were even made stricter under the 1987 Constitution which provides that the rights of a person under custodial investigation cannot be waived except when made in writing and in the presence of counsel. ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be authorized by law" to issue warrants under the 1973 Constitition. Its undertaking is simply to determine w/n probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court. or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means . Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down. and that any statement he might make could be used against him. a relative. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested.by telephone if possible . . in reviewing the powers of the PASTF under its enabling law. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. prosecutorial powers. sees nothing that will reveal a legislative intendement to confer upon the body. whether exculpatory or inculpatory.counsel. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf The right to counsel may be waived but the wiaver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. and to recommend action of appropriate authorities. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. RULING: NO. by any person on his behalf. 171 SCRA 348 (1989) F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to serve as the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of dollar salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer.Charo . The Court agrees that PASTF exercises. to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse.or by letter or messenger.

PD 1636 as amended by PD 2002. following a final order of deportation." he stands invariably. having verified that she had no license to operate a recruitment agency. being used or intended to be used as the means of commiting illegal recruitment. Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly issue warrants of serach and seizure (or arrest ) under Art. who may issue warrants of arrest and search. Hence. for the purpose of deportation. now embodied in Art. He further ordered the seizure of the documents and paraphernalias. Although his office "is to see to it that justice if done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the accused. POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered the closure of the recruitment agency of Horty Salazar. The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022. Salazar v. may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. The Sec. III. is to make him both judge and jury in his own right. Achacoso. are the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments. the authorities must go through the judicial . it is only judges and no other. 183 SCRA 145 F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO 1022. Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution. 38 of the Labor Code? HELD: NO. when he is neither. the neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. This order was enforced on 26 January 1988. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Unlike a magistrate. 38 of the Labor Code. This makes to our mind and to that extent. as the accused's adversary and his accuser. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens. not being a judge. warrants of arrest. a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Under Art. of Labor . To permit him to issue warrrants and indeed. The "responsible officer" referred to under the Cosntitution is one not only possessing the necessary skills and competence but more significantly. whom the President of the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested. it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached judge to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. unconstitutional.and on that ground.

par. a. How could he even know what particular provision of each law had been violated? If he did not know this. 20 SCRA 385 (1967). this was a fishing expedition. there can be no valid search warrant. which violated the sanctity of domicile and privacy of communications. Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as would reasonably make a prudent man believe that a crime have been committed and that the documents or things sought to be searched and seized are in the possession of the person against whom the warrant is sought. unconstitutional and of no force and effect.process. Diokno. Existence of probable cause. the Tariff and Customs Code. 42 search warrants were issued for alleged violation of Central Bank Laws. and the Revised Penal Code. C of the Labor Code. . To that extent. In Stonehill v. we declare Art. the NIRC. Without probable cause. To establish the requirement of probable cause. how could it be determined if the person against whom the warrant was issued was probably Constitutional Law II guilty thereof? In truth. 38. The SC voided the warrants on the ground that it was impossible for the judge to have found probable cause in view of the number of laws alleged to have been violated by the petitioner.

(Phil) v. Villamiel. The examination conducted by the judge takes the form of searching questions. Likewise. Neither can it be based on a report. the judge suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to examine and take the testimony of the witnesses in his chambers. reiterating the 1937 case of Rodriguez v. 37 SCRA 823 (1971). only a judge can issue a warrant. asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they affirmed what they what they testified to. The determination of the reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be based on the affidavit of one who has personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. after which he issued the search warrant in question. in Burgos v. The testimony cannot be based on mere belief. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts that they are testifying to. Thus.the rule is: One crime. the warrant is void. like the clerk of court. So said the Court in Bache and Co. Lising. 133 SCRA 800 (1984). As determined by a judge Under the 1987 Constitution. the testimony based on investigation reports that certain items in the . when the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court in the middle of a hearing. in Corro v. In this case. After personally examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witness. Otherwise. the offensive and much abused phrase "and other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973 Constitution has been removed c. Chief of Staff. one warrant. After he was through with the hearing. b. d. he went back to his chambers and finding that the examination was finished. Ruiz. the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper We Forum was used for subversive were held to be not a personal knowledge and so was inadmissible. 137 SCRA 541 (1985). The requirement that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses means that the actual examination cannot be delegated to someone else.

tape recorders. papers to promote the objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines.Philippine Times were subversive were held to be not personal knowledge. thus making the warrant a general warrant. In Burgos v. the offensive material need not be set out in full. and the April 6 Movement" were held not to be particular descriptions. Chief of Staff. In the Tariff and Customs Code. Failure to state with particularity the place to be searched and items to be seized makes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void. printed matters. banners. leaflets. When Search May Be Made without a Warrant (a)When search is made of moving vehicles The reason is the person may escape easily if a warrant has to be applied for the mean time. The instruction to seize "subversive materials" is not valid because the determination of whether a material is subversive or not is not for the police officer to decide. e. It is enough if it specifies the issues and the title of the articles. customs agents are specifically authorized to search and seize vehicles even without a . a more detailed description of the physical features of the item is required to avoid delegating the appreciation of ideas. the Light a Fire Movement. and typewriters. thus making the warrants general warrants. the search and seizure of "printed copies and dummies of Philippine Times. When it comes to printed matters. articles. The matter is different if goods were searched and seized because of their intrinsic quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled). In Corro v. handbills. etc. than if the goods were searched for the ideas they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is sought). Lising. no unfettered discretion must be granted to him. The search warrant must describe particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 2." was again invalidated for the description was not at all particular or specific. In the latter case. and thus the search warrant issued was not valid. the description which read "subversive documents. and thus threaten free expression. subversive documents. leaflets.

At 12:00 noon.g. There is no question that when a child has been reported kidnapped in a community. the police can stop all cars and check if the detained child is in any one of them.g. apprehend a suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e..m.warrant Constitutional Law II Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending on the purpose (e. the reconstituted SC granted the motion for reconsideration and held that just because there was a valid arrest did not mean that the search was likewise valid. and within the time of the arrest.) A person arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything that proves the commission of the offense. was searched and some documents seized. In Nolasco v.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.-. having been wanted as high officers of the CPP. that is. Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30 a. (b)When search is an an incident to a valid arrest. Roque's apartment located 2 blocks away. Rule 126. Cruz Pano. But after the EDSA revolution. If the basis for allowing incidental searches is looked into. 12. To be valid. not separated by time or place from the arrest. It follows that the search can only be made within the area of control of the arrested person. probable cause that the criminal is inside the car). (Rules of Court. . the search must be "incidental" to the arrest. without a search warrant. one can see that this situation is not one involving a valid incidental search. 139 SCRA 152 (1985). The SC at first held that the search was valid even if the warrant issued was void for failing to describe with particularity the things to be seized. because it was an incident of a valid arrest. Sec.Search incident to lawful arrest.

Earlier that day. if the arrested officer has to first apply for a search warrant from a judge. there is no longer any danger that the captured may turn against the captor. Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant for rebellion against Milagros. xxx". Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985) F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group. At noon of the same day. 1984. . in the Nolasco case. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are and what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive. Milagros asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained. Nolasco v. papers and other records of the CPP.The law allows the arresting officer to search a person validly arrested (by frisking him for instance) because (a) a weapon held by the arrested person may be turned against his captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the crime. charges of subversion and rebellion were filed but the fiscal's office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. On the basis of the documents seized. HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to describe with particularity the things to be seized. as an incident of an arrest. a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. The arrest took place at 11:30 a. her premises were searched and 428 documents. Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. the search was conducted 30 minutes after the arrest. thus giving the officers discretion regarding what articles they should seize. the search would no longer be justified since there is no way for Roque to go back to the apartment and destroy the documents. There is absent a definite guideline as to what items might lawfully be seized. But the seizure of the articles could be justified as an incident of a valid arrest. NPA and NDF. and if the documents in the apartment were 2 blocks away. If. having been arrested already. It is a general rule that. of August 6.m. the place of premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without a search warrant. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant. The search warrant described the things to be seized as "Documents.

that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. The petitioner's house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. It is correct to say. (Mata v. to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. necessary for the witnesses themselves. judge did was question Capt. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to. Gonzales. to establish the applicant's claims. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record. however. if he knew and understood the same. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the ." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. Depositions were taken of the complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. 145 SCRA 687 (1986) F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. but this is not entirely true. 4 of the ROC. In any case. Sec.. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Bayona. By his own accounts. all that resp.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. by their own personal info. together w/ the affidavit presented to him. was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought." and only bec. he did not ask his own searching questions. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126. His application. therefore.(c)When things seized are within plain view of a searching party Roan v. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause. judge on 5/10/84. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others. personally known to him. standing alone. It was. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner RULING: Search warrant issued by resp.

judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns. who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. they are prohibited. 178 SCRA 362 (1989) F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of . One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp.--Petitioner should have. or how far he was from the window. or why his presence was not noticed at all. A SW is still necessary. the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. or if the acts related were really done openly. an offense is malum prohibitum. considering that these acts were against the law. the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Pita v. judge. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita." shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits. CA. we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the consitutional issues raised. there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. "this procedural flaw notwithstanding. or whether it was on the first floor or second floor. filed a motion to quash the search warrant by the resp. but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply bec. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida. in the full view of the witnesses. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. who both claimed to be "intelligence informers. Motion to Quash. We do not agree. Instead."RAM .--It does not follow that bec. judge. before coming to the SC. But as we said and did in Burgos. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities. except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp.witnesses and not of the applicant himself. Malum Prohibitum.

if in their opinion. The judge must determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's sound discretion. There is a greater reason in this case to reprobate the questioned raid. Among the publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos. a search warrant will issue. he seeks review with SC. two Metro Manila Dailies. they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. because speech is speech. distributors. the SC countermanded the orders of the RTC authorizing the serach of the remises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail. 188 SCRA 288 (1990) F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar. CA. a political case. and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. invoking the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. (d)Stop and Frisk Posadas v. otherwise. whether political or "obscene". pornographic. Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal HELD: YES. newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks.Mayor Ramon Bagatsng. by reason of a defective warrant. publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene. If probable cause exist. policemen seized and confiscated from dealers. valid or invalid. They must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action. in the complete absence of a warrant. magazines. The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a search warrant from the judge . In Burgos v Chief of Staff (133 SCRA 800) . both members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom . After his injunctive relief was dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA. an obscenity rap is in order. It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only through a judicial warrant .

were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes. or was actually committing. & 2 live ammunition for a . foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW . a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a commission of an offense. St. among others. Petitioner attempted to flee but was stopped by the 2. 5. w/o a SW. 38 cal..38 Smith & Wesson revolver. they did not know that he had committed. they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. the main thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure. R 113. ROC.22 cal. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1 caliber . & he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. the petition for review. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant. While they were w/in the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges. HELD: From Sec. just been committed. or when an offense has in fact. Petitioner was brought to the police station for further investigation. it is clear that an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person. The CA affirmed the appealed decision in toto. However. a smoke grenade. the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him. R 136 of ROC. gun. there are many instances where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o necessarily being preceded by an arrest. the offense. They did not know what its contents were.assigned w/ the Intelligence Task Force. gun. a decision was rendered finding petitioner guilty. w/ 2 rounds of live ammunition for a . is actually committing. when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed. The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. Davao City. Hence. or is attempting to commit an offense. 12. and trial on the merits. At the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee.

The US SC held in Terry v. there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same." In such a situation. futile and much too late. de Villa. . it was effected on the basis of a probable cause..RAM . the constitutionality of w/c has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee w/ the buri bag. As bet. unlike in the former. indeed. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a SW for the purpose. a warrantless search and seizure (S & S) conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereof in the case at bar." PETITION DENIED. Such an exercise may prove to be useless.. it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur. to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintaing the status quo while obtaining more info. (e)When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently. As the Sol-Gen said: "The assailed S & S may still be justified as akin to a 'stop and frisk' situation whose object is either to determine the identity of suspicious individuals or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officers seeks to obtain more info. there is no question that. Ohio that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances & in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.at military or police checkpoints. Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the person consented or did not object to . the latter is more reasonable considering that.

for it many happen that he did so only out of respect for the authorities. He also contends that he was not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation.the search. The team. People v. The accused admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer. The accused already pocketed the marked money and handed two foils to the police when he sensed the presence of police operatives. Accused contends that his arrest and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs was null and void. accused was arrested. accused was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. The seizure of the plastic bag was the result of the accused’s arrest inside the . The police pursued him and were able to subdue him. where he was forced to sign the photocopy of the marked money. as a consequence of which. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the plastic bag were valid. together with the accused. The waiver must be expressly made. He tried to escape by running inside his house. When appellant was asked to give a written statement. He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was prevented from doing so. There was no need for a warrant. The arrest that followed the hotpursuit was valid. a buybust operation was conducted by the police. During the investigation. He even showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. the Receipt of Property Seized. The policemen’s entry into the house of the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. and the Booking and Information Sheet. De lara F: After a surveillance conducted. RULING: YES. The policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant. The accused was caughtin flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation. proceeded to WPD headquarters for investigation.

People v. de Gracia. Surveillance was undertaken by the military along EDSA because of intelligence reports about a coup. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col. 1994) F: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion. but was acquitted of attempted homicide. and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. and for attempted homicide. RULING: NO. The team arrested appellant. A searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. five bundles of C-4 dynamites. Matillano. ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the accused during the investigation were admissible in evidence. There was no showing that accused was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing. 1989. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in gunfire killing one member of the team. 233 SCRA 716 (July 6. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. (The rejection of these evidence would not affect the conviction of the accused in view of the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt.house. They were then made to sign an inventory. written in . Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion. Matillano.)Bam. M-shells of different calibers.

The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team. Furthermore. When the military operatives raided the place. the military operatives. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. Prior to the raid. of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. In the first place. Accused was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms. Ruling: YES Constitutional Law II It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case. thereby compelling the former to break into the office. In addition. there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. the building and houses therein were deserted. it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and. taking into account the facts obtaining in this case.Tagalog. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. the raiding team had no opportunity . had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. Under the foregoing circumstances. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. under the situation then prevailing. the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so. for that matter. there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.

the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution.to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court. the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and . 170 SCRA 256 (1989) F: On 1/20/87. albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith. maintaining peace and order. Presidential Decree No. arson. as a specific offense. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code. At the time the offense charged in this case was committed under the governance of that law. economic and political dev't of the NCR. As part of its duty to maitain peace and order. There are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. 1866." Valmonte v. such as illegal possession of firearms. Consequently. Subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case. De Villa. and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social. homicide. 3. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder. the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting security operations w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral areas. 24 with variant elements. a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense. that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. or other offenses. Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target zonings. unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment. and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion.

w/o a SW and/ or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon. reasonably conducted. illegal. of the institution of said checkpoints. the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse.MM. committed specific violations of petitioners' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. especially at night or at dawn. discomfort and even irritation to the citizen. But. in the course of their routine checks. Petitioners aver that. the Valenzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary. True. considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt. was gaunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benfit of the public. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed. Those w/c are reasonable are not forbidden. or threatened to be infringed Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. the checkpoints during these abnormal times. however. capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints. HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that. when conducted . the former should prevail. at the cost of occasional inconveninece. in the interest of public security. the military. indeed. bec. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search w/c is.

Respondents stress 2 points. VII. they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights. De Villa. Police cannot respond to riots or violent . the remedy is not to stop all police actions. inj.:"The Pres. This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents"to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification. including the essential and legitimate ones. aretotal lies. the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. 17 of the Const. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. xxx HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable that some violations were actually committed. The 41 petitioners state that they are all of legal age.:"The Pres. second. Accdg. Guazon v. the resps. invasion or rebellion. 181 SCRA 623 (1990) F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. Resps. bureaus and offices. Petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. cite Art. Sec. 18." They also cite sec. to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public respondents from conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" in MM. shall be the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and whenever it becomes necessary. First. have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. And.w/in reasonable limits. bona fide residents of MM and Taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities." However. to the petitioners. shall have control of all the executive departments.

officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.000 from him. IAC. This demand was heard by Atty. no permanent relief can be given at this time. and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably committed and could be committed during future police actions. The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a TP's suit. there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted. Under the circumstances of this TP's suit. 145 SCRA 112 (1986) F: Complainant Atty. Where not one victim complains.demonstration if they do not move in sufficient numbers. and not one violator is properly charged. the kicking in of doors. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8. all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices bec. the problem is not initially for the SC. and other alleged acts w/c are shocking to the conscience. It is basically one for the executive departments and for the trial courts. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure. we have to temporarily restrain the alleged baning on walls. A show of force is sometimes necesary as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated. 4. Wire Tapping Gaanan v. the violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontation where search warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are easily procured. the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks. In the meantime. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard look by admin. Gaanan through a telephone .

Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line. by their very nature. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. . dictagraph. or recording a tel. they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping. extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. Since Atty. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because.Constitutional Law II extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. conversation. intercepting. is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension tel. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone. The tel. on WON an extension tel. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Atty. complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the AntiWiretapping Act (RA 4200). Furthermore. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case. or other devices enumerated in Sec. HELD: NO An extension tel.

Personal property to be seized. and (c) Used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense. in order to be punishable must stricly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature.S. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any evidence obtained in violation of secs. 5.A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property: (a) Subject matter of the offense. III for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding". 2. In Moncado v. through punishment. following the U. People's Court (1948).-.) 6. (Rules of Court. the evidence admitted. Sec. The evidence is absolutely useless. Consequently. without prejudice to any criminal. III. In such case. blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel. the SC. case of Wolf V. persons suchj as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate. Exclusionary Rule Art. (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense.A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage. sec. the mere act of listening . 3. xxx (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this (privacy of communication and correspondence) or the preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. rules that evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. In other words. One of the remedies of one who was victimized by an illegal search is to ask for the suppression of the things seized and the evidence illegally taken. What may be seized Rule 126. the admissibility of the evidence is not effected . users. 2 and 3 (1) of Art. Colorado. This has not always been the case. civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it.

when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in the Philippines. the party can ask for its return. to search the perons named and/ or the . following the U. depending on whether it is contraband or not. judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c they were officers. The victim may or may not get back the thing seized. the SC noting that the total suppression of the thing seized is the only effective means of ensuring the constitutional right which it seeks to preserve. criminal punishment. especially in the Philippines where violations were committed by those in power and were thus equipped with the pardoning power to water down the gravity of the other penalties imposed to violators of those constitutional rights. resistance). 20 SCRA 383 (1967) F: Upon application of the officers of the govt (resp. it would not be returned. directed to any peace officer. But if the thing is legal. Ohio 1969.S. even if no criminal prosecution has yet been filed. as in the Stonehill case Constitutional Law II Stonehill v. case of Maop v. It was in Stonehill v. The Court noted.by the illegality of the means by which it was acquired. Diokno. action for damages. prosecutors). several judges (resp. supra. the insufficiency of the other remedies (e. Diokno. and only its suppression can be asked for. It the thing is contraband.g.

(2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners. mandamus & injunction. as the "subject of the offense. but the injunction was maintained as regards those found & seized in the residences of petitioners. and to seize several personal prop. NIRC and the RPC. stolen or embezelled or the fruits of the offense." Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & void. ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations. insofar as the papers. The legality of a seizure can be contestedonl y by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied of by 3rd parties. The . HELD: (1) No. The writ was partially lifted or dissolved. w/n the search warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof are valid. said petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig. warehouses. (2) No. It was stated that the natural and juridical persons has committed a violation of CB laws. Sec. w/n petitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants. documents. separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. w/n said documents. and/ or residences. No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners." or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense" as violation of CB Laws. Two points must be stressed in connection w/ Art. 2 of the Consti: (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth therein. None of these requirements has been complied w/. said corporations have their respective personalities. action for certiorari. (3) If the answer in no. Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC). prohibition. III. TCC. 2 is no.premises of their offices. and things seized from the officers of the corporations. NIRC & RPC. & (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and the seizure made in pursuance thereof bec.

The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations. he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves.RAM . When he opened appellant's box. caprice or passion of peace officers.that the things to be seized be particularly described-. In Aberca v. By so doing. opened the boxes for final inspection. Search and Seizure by Private Persons People v. whatever their nature. following standard operating procedure. 7. he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. As a consequence. Civil Action for Damages A civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code.as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights-. they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims. 193 SCRA 57 (1991) F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts. one can indirectly inquire into the validity of the suspension of the privilege. Job Reyes (proprietor) & husband of Anita Reyes. Mr. violating a given provision of our criminal laws. He made an . a peculiar order emitted therefrom. it wasimpossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a probable cause. the court can nevertheless entertain an action not only against the task force but even against the top ranking officials who ordered the seizure. to recover damages for the illegal searches and seizures made in a despotic manner. or committed specificomi ssi ons. the SC held that even if the privilege of the writ is suspended. Ver. 8. General search warrants are outlawed bec. Marti. for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts. His curiosity aroused.averments thereof w/ respect to the offense committed wereabstract. Opening one of the bundles.

The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person. the factual considerations of the . Appellant. be invoked against the state? HELD: We hold in the negative. would like this Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case. ISSUE: May an act of a private individual. xxx (Villanueva v.opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. acting in a private capacity and w/o the intervention and participation of state authorities. Thereafter. the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him. the liberties guaranteed by the Consti. however. APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his consti. from interference by govt. In the absence of governmental interference. allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights. The arguments of appellant stands to fall on its own weight. First. Querubin.) The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the govt w/o the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures (S & S). an information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425. cannot be invoked against the State. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of the NBI. Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and requested a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. or the lack of it. rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and privacy of communication and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence. This constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person. whether citizen or alien.

the right against unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only the act of private individuals. In sum. Its concern is not the relation between individuals. it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. as distinguished from SEARCH warrants. as in the case at bar. the judge may rely simply on fiscal's . Reyes as a precautionary measure bef. is involved. Having observed that w/c is open. the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless S & S proscribed by the Consti. not law enforcers. is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Con Com. is not search. Such inspection was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST. where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof. the protection against unreasonable S & S cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it w/in the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the govt. 9. Job Reyes. Thus. the proprietor of the forwarding agency. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. and w/o the intervention of police authorities. Second. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Consti. It the search is made at the behest or inititiation of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes.: " xxx The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.) The constitutional proscription against unlawful S & S therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the govt and its agencies tasked w/ the enforcement of the law. who made the search/ inspection.case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal S & S of the prohibited merchandise. delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of Posts. Merely to observe and look at that w/c is plain sight is not search. xxx" (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner Bernas. between a private individual and other individuals.

before issuing the warrant. in writing and Constitutional Law II under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the records their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. 98 Phil.--Upon the filing of an information. Sec. (b)By the Municipal Trial Court.When warrant of arrest may issue.Examination of complainant. the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. Abbas. 4. (Rules of Court. 4 (on search warrants. record. if the judge is in doubt. The judge can issue the warrant on the basis of the information filed by the fiscal and the certification of probable cause. Sec. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers.) Rule 126. that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. he shall issue a warrant of arrest.-If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. he can always ask the fiscal to submit the records of the preliminary investigation.) Rule 112. 6.--(a) By the Regional Trial Court. The SC has allowed this practice in Amarga v. The requirement in the case of warrants of arrest is relaxed in that the judge can rely on the certification of the fiscal that the latter has conducted the preliminary investigation and has found probable cause on the part of the accused. Of course. 6 (on warrants of arrest) with Rule 126. noting that it has been practice long settled and that a judge can issue an order to arrest on the basis of the certificate. so he could determine for himself if. Sec. 739 (1956). on the basis of the .certification as to probable cause Compare Rule 112. Sec.--The judge must.

alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. there exists probable cause. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear. he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. after conducting a PI. To determine whether a WA should issue. he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists. Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Neverhteless. It he is satisfied with the affidavits. Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court. HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER.affidavits. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed. ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding. Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 739 (1956) F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua. that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused commited the crime charged. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. 5. legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. he need not summon the affiants. 98 Phil. a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not . Amarga v. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC. Abbas. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers. After the PI.

the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory. hid under her bed. the Pres. 2) and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Consti." has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Consti. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. 12. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. of the Phils. 1987 entitled "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you will recall. have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. III. who were publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star. is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal deniend his motion after finding a prima facie case against the petitioners and filed the case in court w/c thereafter issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners. based on the following statement in Beltran's column of Oct. now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. Beltran moved to dismiss the complaint. during the Aug. What the Consti. filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners. Beltran v." Instead of submitting his counteraffidavit. to issue warrants to "other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. instead. while the firing was going on-. for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.perhaps the first Commander-inChief of the AFP to have to do so. Sec. 167 SCRA 393 (1988) F: The Pres. but merely discretionary. upon the investigating judge to issue a WA. 29 coup attempt. Bam. HELD: The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" (Art. The fiscal should. underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause . This is not an accurate interpretation. Makasiar. Following established doctrine and procedure.

cases where an arrest can be made either by the peace officer or a private person without need of a warrant. Sec. Arrest without warrant. 144 SCRA 1 (1986). Sound policy dictates this procedure. or is attempting to commit an offense. he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Thus.) Rule 113. otherwise judges would be unduly laden w/ the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. When arrest may be made without a warrant Rule 113. issue a warrant of arrest. is actually committing. the person to be arrested has committed. sec. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail. in People v. arrest a person: (a) When. in his presence. or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause. The key element in the first case is that the offense was committed "in his presence".and. (Rules of Court. 5 talks of "citizen arrests". when lawful. Burgos. the arrest made by the constabulary without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of . on the basis thereof. 5. (b) When an offense.-. The key element in the second case is that he has "personal knowledge". has in fact just been committed. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment of place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112. without a warrant.A peace officer or a private person may. 7. xxx 10. Section. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

The offense must also be committed in his presence or w/in his view. The appellant was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Burgos. A . in order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant.38 caliber revolver was found buried under his house. and the gun and documents were ordered confiscated. There is no such personal knowledge in this case. (4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant is the testimony of Cesar M. Sec. Two arresting officers testified that the appellant had readily admitted ownership of the gun and the documents. III. The gun and subversive documents found by the officer and admitted by the former to be his were likewise held inadmissible because the admission violated the Miranda rule. as minimum. since there was no personal knowledge of the offense itself. HELD: (1) Under R 113. Hence the arrest of the appellant was illegal. as maximum. 144 SCRA 1 (1986) F: On the basis of info. but it was then already too late. is being committed. the appellant should be acquitted. on charges of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. . and it is uncorroborated and unreliable. to reclusion perpetua. (3) The prosecution argues that the appellant admitted ownership of the gun and claims that it was he who pointed to the place where the subversive documents were hidden. the arresting officer must have personal knowledge that the crime has been committed. (2) Consequently.information that he was a subversive was held unconstitutional. given by Cesar Masamlok. or is about to be committed. Sec. the incidental search and seizure were likewise illegal and the firearm and document are inadmissible in evidence. but the gun and the subversive documents must be confiscated. Davao del Sur. the appellant was arrested while plowing his farm in Tiguman. a. Subversive documents were also seized from a place near his house. his admission is inadmissible under [Art.] It is true that 6 days later he executed a confession before the fiscal w/ the assistance of counsel. However. as the appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights at that time. 12 (1). 5 (a). Strict enforcement of rule People v. 1982. on May 13.

They saw a tricycle with 3 persons on board. They also saw a male person come out of the said house and approach and talk to the driver of the tricycle. 232 SCRA 498 (April 25. . Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid? Ruling: YES. 5. they asked the male person. a team of policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters from the house located at 8199 Constancia St. Sec. The appellant contends that the police officers had no personal knowledge that he was indeed handing marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away from the alleged sale transaction. which the male person.. 8199 Constancia St. Pajilan together with his companions approached the male person and the tricycle driver and after introducing themselves as police officers. Metro Manila and requested that said person be apprehended. The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers was valid since it falls under the provisions of Rule 113. The male person brought out from his pockets 2 small plastic bags containing suspected marijuana leaves. a driver and 2 passengers. the driver and the passengers of the tricycle did. 1989) F: Pat. Rodriguez. they further saw the tricycle driver in turn give something to the male person. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the desk officer of Sub-Station I. The arrest therefore was not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied with. Michael Orbeta. a marijuana cigarette'. the tricycle driver and his 2 passengers to bring out the contents of their pockets. stop in front of the house at 8199 Constancia St. A peace officer or a private person may. when lawful. Arrest without warrant. Pat. After a while they saw the male person go back to the house and a little later come back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff of a cigarette.People v. 5(a) of the Rules of Court which provides: Sec. The tricycle driver brought out from his right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes. Acting on this phone call of desk officer Michael Orbeta. Makati. Makati. namely. who informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was selling marijuana at No.. Nothing illegal was found in the pockets of the 2 passengers of the tricycle.

further detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.without a warrant. w/o warrant were clearly justified. The exact location where this trading in drugs was taking place was given to them.. Ramos. arrest a person: (a) When. or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. when apprehended. Exceptions to strict enforcement (1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion Umil v. Ramos. 187 SCRA 311 (1990) These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed bef. under Sec. and that they are. Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Ave. the person to be arrested has committed. as amended is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagrante delicto. is actually committing. ROC. viz. The Court finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release onHC. in his presence. The police officers were tipped off by an informer about the illegal trade of the accused.. about a member of the NPA-Sparrow unit being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Q. in the act of committing an offense. (a) and (b) of Rule 113.C. 5. The persons in whose behalf these petitions forHC have been filed had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense. the Court. b. I In Umil v. It was found that the wounded person. The attendant circumstances taking place before their eyes led the police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually being committed. who was listed in the hospital . The 'suspicious stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to be marijuana after tests were conducted on them. An arrest w/o a warrant. the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. or is attempting to commit an offense. so that their arrests. pars. RIOU-CAPCOM received confidential info.

or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of rebellion. than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an info. Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA. who has been released on bail. the issuance of a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. the writ ofHC is no longer available II . since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a crim. However.records as Ronnie Javelon. the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. Upon positive identification by an eyewitness. Nor was he arrested after the commission of said offense for his arrest came a day after the shooting incident. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. The arrest. Enrile. insofar as Umil & Villanueva are concerned. As to Dural. is actually Rolando Dural. Obviously. to quell the rebellion. Thus. or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. an outlawed subversive organization. the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govt forces.) Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ Assault upon agents of persons in authority. case. need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause bef. Subversion being acontinuin g offense. therefore. responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before." The petition forHC. a member of the NPA liquidation squad. Dural was then transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM. The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements. is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed. is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict.

He was brought to CIS HQ for investigation. R.C." referring to RC and other members of the rebel group. antennae. charging her w/ viol. sister of Amelia Roque. for viol. When arrested. III . pursuant to a search warrant . this Court on behalf of Roque and Buenaobra. etc. among others. In view of the revelations made by Rogelio Ramos. In the course of the search were found several firearms. Amelia admitted ownership of the documents seized. Another info. They found firearms. Q. subversive documents.At about 8 PM. no. regular power supply. radio. Constantino (RC) could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to search the place. although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Dept. A petition forHC was filed bef. a search of the house was conducted at 5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. Also found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing the jumbled tel. the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place. "Ka Nelia. a former NPA. of the CPP. of Florida Roque. The military found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/ CPP. Buenaobra arrived at RC's house. of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Roque and also to Buenaobra. When confronted. aka. he readily submitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong. At the hearing. speaker and subversive documents. Accordingly. w/o warrant is also justified. w/c was granted. he refused to give a written statement. of PD 1866 was filed. When questioned. Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after w/c an info. same day." They went to the address on 8/13/88 and arrived at the place about 11 AM. ammunition. vouchers. the petition forHC on his behalf is now moot and academic. Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade at Camp Crame. the Constantino house in Marikina Heights was placed under military surveillance and on 8/12/88. journals.The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. ledgers.

They were asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunitions but they could not produce any. having been first conducted. Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. IV Ocaya v. head of the CPPNPA. At the PC stockade. The filing of an info. The records show that they were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunitions in their person when apprehended. an info. On 5/12/88. the agents found them to be loaded guns. On 8/15/88. is w/o merit. pistol were found in . inv. is sanctioned by Rule 112. In the course of the search. a petition forHC was filed bef. Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. A was identified as "Ka Ted. Nor did petitioners ask for prel. Ramos.. On 8/24/88. agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP Command. Aguirre. Hence. At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88. 125. there was no previous warrant. of PD 1866 was filed bef. Sec. The military noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked. 7. charging them w/ viol.Anonuevo v. w/o a prel. The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified. this Court Constitutional Law II HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully arrested bec. inv. ROC. There is also no merit in the contention that the info. conducted a search of a house located at Marikina Green Heights. RTC-Pasig." and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by their former comrades. after the informations had been filed against them in court. inv. they were brought to PC HQ for investigation.45 cal. RPC. filed against them are null and void for want of prel.. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunitions for a . A and C arrived at the house of RC w/c was still under surveillance. believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson. armed w/ a search warrant.

have not introduced any evidence to support their claim. When he went down to talk to them. Lim. Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of 11/23/88. ammunitions and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession. charging her w/ viol. through tri- . VI Espiritu v. 125 of the RPC. he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. but the men did not accede to his request. When he asked for the warrant. Anonuevo. while he was sleeping in his home located at Sta. of PD 1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig. RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed against him. prel. Mla. He demanded that his sister be allowed to accompany him. of PISTON.Vicky Ocaya's car. HELD: Vicky O. Sec. an info. 7. In the afternoon of 11/22/88. Casiple and Roque claim that the firearms. when O.. ROC. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Art. Mesa. The petitioners. charging him w/ viol. a petition forHC was filed on behalf of these 2. An info. when arrested. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is justified. however. was conducted bec. the men bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner type jeepney. could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition. but were planted by the military to justify their illegal arrest. Rivera was released from custody. Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. V The petitioners Ocaya. On 5/17/88. As pointed out by the Sol-Gen. No. of Art. did not belong to them. he was immediately put under arrest. pursuant to R112. during a press-con at the NPC "Deogracias E. inv. 142. They were brought to the PC HQ for investigation. no evil motive or ill will on the part of the arresting officers that could cause the said officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely. has been shown. On the other hand. the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition. Sec. but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed no less than by former comrades of the petitioners.

xxx On 2/1/89. picked up Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ for questioning. At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88. Station Commander. he may not be released on HC..media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on 11/23/88 xxx. filed w/ the competent court." Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in order to investigate him. it appearing that said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the Constitutional Law II respondents by reason of an info. the officers. For the detention to be perfectly legal. but he gave the lawmen his slip. The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime. HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police w/o warrant pursuant to Sec. R 113. one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang. the indubitable existence of a crime. 5 (b). and the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid info.. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on 12/28/88. filed against him w/ the RTC-Mkti. MM." Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in accordance w/ the provisions of R 113. and after investigation by the police. VII Nazareno v. where he was heard as saying. issued a resolution denying the petition forHC. Sec. In view thereof. MM. hanggang sa magkagulo na. the presiding judge of the RTC-Binan. "Bukas tuloy and welga natin . w/o warrant. it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristic of a crime and that the same grounds exist to beleive that the person sought to be detained participated . Muntinglupa. Regala pointed to Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of Bunye II. Laguna. He was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers. does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof. Upon questioning. after he was positively implicated by his co-accused. ROC. 5 (b). ROC..

v. the writ of HC will not be allowed. 202 SCRA 251 PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S DECISION PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990 The decision (on July 9. Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA. ROC. 5 (a). ROC. Ancheta. As the Court sees it. he was committing an offense. and for subversion w/c."from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition. Ramos. 4. in all petitions for HC. and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order. Jr.His arrest w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that. bec. re-examination or re-appraisal." (Peo. 1990) didnot rule that mere suspicion that one is a CPP or NPA is a valid ground for his arrest w/o warrant. w/ a view to its abandonment. The answer and the better practice would be.) On the Ilagan Doctrine.) VIII In all the petitions here considered." Umil v. criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. R 113. had jurisdiction or not to issue the process.therein. like rebellion is.. The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge. v." and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution in fact has been satisfied. the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-. . of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. as the court itself stated in Morales. Rolando Dural. or bef. w/in the contemplation of Sec. We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration. judgement or order of commitment. not to limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to w/n the court w/c issued the process. under Garcia v. (Sec. or if such person is charged before any court. Padilla. a continuing crime. whom the detained person is charged. Enrile.-. but rahter. when arrested. an outlawed org. judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case. where membership is penalized. R 102.

i. w/c means on actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. w/o warrant.. he was. simply bec. Said confidential info. or become less of a subversive." Sec. anywhere as agents or representative of an organized govt. confined in the St.e. or on 1/31/88. would have shot or would shoot other policemen. (2) a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javelon" was actually then being treated in said ... It has been ruled thatpersonal knowledge of facts in arrests w/o warrant must be based upon probable cause. ROC.Dural did not cease to be. Dural was identified as one of several persons who. is based on actual facts. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. at the time of arrest. given another opportunity. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers.A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. the day before his arrest. 2 CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bo. Dural. Agnes Hospital. It is in this sense that subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base w/c compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized govt is attained. coupled w/ good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST. had shot 2 CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. 5. R 113.His arrest was based on "probable cause. requires 2 conditions for a valid arrest w/o warrant: (1) the person to be arrested has just committed an offense and (2) the person arresting has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: (1) the day bef. received by the arresting officers. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. to the effect that an NPA was being treated for a gunshot wound was based Constitutional Law II on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficiently to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in said hospital. Caloocan City by 5 "sparrows" including Dural.

Ocaya. w/c confirmed the belief of the military that the info. and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communist equipment. (3) "Ronnie Javelon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Dural. second. Buenaobra. in their possession were . They were.hospital for for a gunshot wound. They were searched pursuant to a warrant issued by a court of law and were found w/ unlicensed firearms. as to their exact location and the names of RC and BT as residents and occupants thereof. He was placed under judicial custody. A few days after Dural's arrest. are also justified. he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. third. considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. he had chosen to remain in detention. Buenaobra.-. at the time of their arrests. Anonuevo and Casiple). their arrests. And at the time of the actual arrests. R. Buenaobra's petition is moot bec. they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first. Casiple & V. who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. W. 5 (a)..D. w/o warrant. caughtin flagrante delicto w/c justified their outright arrest w/o warrant under Sec. w/ info. explosives and/ or ammunitions on their persons. A few days after their arrests. The reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests w/o warrant was the info. the search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantino safehouse.. an info.The peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith. the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque. Roque. As to A. found in the safehouse was a person named RC. charging him w/ Double murder w/ assault against agents of persons in authority was filed in RTC-Caloocan City. given to the military that 2 safehouses (one occupied by RC and the other by Benito Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA for their operations. Anonuevo. ROC. R113. On 8/31/88. On good faith. therefore. informations were filed in court against said petitioners placing them w/in judicial custody and disposition.

" (US v. not for subversive or any "continuing offense. while Nazareno's arrest w/o warrant was made only on 12/28/88 or 14 days later. Many persons differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling w/in free speech guaranteed by the Consti. R 113 are met. was inciting to sedition. tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction. teh arrest falls under Sec. The power to arrest w/o warrant is w/o limitation as long as the requirements of Sec. 5 (b). has been provisionally dismissed and his bail cancelled. Sanchez.--Although the killing of Bunye II occured on 12/14/88. or soon thereafter. 5. for E. and/ or subversive documents. An arrest is in the nature of an administrative measure. the peace officers did not appear. w/o obviously becomes difficult at times. And then shortyly after their arrests. they were positively identified by their former comrades as CPP/ NPA members. wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen. arraignment asked the court a quo for reinvestigation. since it was only on 12/28/88 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those .) ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant. has in this case. NAZARENO'S ARREST. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our community." but for uttering the words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx hanggang sa magkagulo na" w/c in the perception of the arresting officers. ammunitions. the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest. at the time the words were uttered. Case against E. the court. and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/ NPA. w/o warrant. R113. but xxx upon the nature of the deed.) Supervening events made this case moot and academic.unlicensed firearms. But. is still another thing. had bef. "xxx The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime. In the balancing of authority and freedom.

e. R 113. To note these admissions. are supported by probable cause. (2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs People v. 195 SCRA 784 F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a “buy-bust” operation. is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were predicated. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS. The ten handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from the accused were submitted for examination. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition forHC. The trial court found Linsangan guilty.guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly. 5. his right . He was asked to sign his name on the two marked bills. on the other hand. one of the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial court erred in not holding that when the policemen required him to initial the marked bills. Linsangan. a case was filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. ROC. The two marked ten-peso bill were retrieved from him. i.. in compliance w/ Sec. After finding these positive for marijuana. ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION These admissions strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon w/c the arresting officers based their arrests w/o warrant. Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. and not to incriminate himself while under custodial investigation. even w/o a warrant (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of 14 days to prevent possible flight. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits. Upon appeal. HELD: Although the accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in his waist. to remain silent. they violated his constitutional right to counsel. Linsangan denied the charge.

the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana cigarettes. Immunity from arrest of members of Congress Art. 17 . Sec. they are presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular manner. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel.inco mmunic ad o. Their task of apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural technicalities to make it doubly so. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or sec. solitary. Sec. 11. (1) Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the marked bills. intimidation. violence. A Senator or Member of the House shall. threat. III. but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in the selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. 11. The trial court gave more credence to their categorical declarations than to the appellant’s denials. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. xxx B. That is as it should be for as law enforcers. 12. in all offenses punishable by not more than six (6) years imprisonment (prision correcional). or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture. he must be provided with one. be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session. force. shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. VI. Rights of Persons under custodial interrogation Art.against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime.

Right to counsel before and during the interrogation a) To mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness in his testimony. and their families. Source: Miranda v. b) To make him aware that this is an adversary system. 2. 4. and that the police are not acting in his interest. 384 U. a) To warn him of the consequences of waiving his right to remain silent. b) To overcome the inherent pressure of the interrogating atmosphere c) To show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to invoke his right. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section. since the inherent pressures initially overcome by the right to remain silent may again run unless coupled with the right to counsel. b) To lessen the possibility of coercion by the police. Right to remain silent a) To make him aware of it. 436 (1966) According to Chief Justice Warren. a) To inform him that if he does not have counsel or cannot afford one. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford counsel. 3. then one will be provided for him by the state. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent. he does not have to defend himself alone. where compulsion is forcefully potential and his will is likely to be subjugated. the officers must undertake to afford proper safeguards by the reading of the "Miranda rights" at the outset of the investigation to ensure that the statements made are truly the product of free choice Any person under custodial or police investigation has the right to be informed of the following rights: 1.hereof. anything he says can and will be used against him. Arizona. b) To inform him that his poverty is no .S. as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices. shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. when a defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures.

on the prosecution. people who could otherwise explain their innocence would be arrested. 2) "Custodial investigation" . ask him for an explanation as to what he saw without reading his Miranda rights. since the purpose of the interrogation is to evince evidence that can be used to prosecute the person. But once A arrests X and starts interrogating him in the police precinct. LJ 409 I. a policeman. . Act No. the Miranda rule is not yet applicable.when the investigation now focuses on the guilt of a person such that he is no longer allowed to leave the premise. but without being directed at anyone's guilt in particular. At this stage. for there can only be one purpose to the questioning. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART OF PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS. then his rights must now be read. 61 Phil. sees X running with a stained knife away from an apparently dead man. 2 (1988). 10. 4. therefore. (Sec. Mendoza. admissible in evidence. The early rule placed the burden of proving that the confession was voluntary and. as to assure him that his interrogators are willing to respect his rights amidst the pressure of custodial investigation. the rule has been that involuntary confessions are inadmissible in evidence against the accused. It is at this stage that the Miranda ruling is necessary. Although he may already know these rights. A police investigation consists of 2 stages: 1) "General exploratory investigation" when the investigation consists merely of general questions to find out who might be the culprit. when A.reason why he should lose his right to counsel. and that is to elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him. No. he can rung after X and having grabbed him..) The reading of these rights is required during "custodial investigation". The Right to Counsel During Custodial Investigations. Since the introduction of the American accusatorial system of criminal procedure in the Phils. The question is on whom the burden of proof is placed. 2 Law Rev. For instance. the purpose is not so much to inform him. (The reading of these rights is no less indispensable even if the person arrested is a prominent Constitutional lawyer. otherwise.

but also that it is false or untrue. de los Santos that "A confession. Act No. in Peo. the Court. for the law rejects the confession when. w/c placed the burden of proof on the accused to show that his confession was involuntary. xxx Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by law. v. even for the first time on appeal in the SC. v. The illegality of the means used in obtaining evidence does not affect its admissibility (Moncado v. code of 1916. People's Court. it is said that an "unconstitutional coercion will render inadmissible even the most unquestionably true inculpatory statements. v. such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. regardless of their truth.) THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases (Stonehill v. are null and void. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. not even when such force and violence he is compelled to tell the truth.619. Urro. Diokno) worked a parallel in the law of confession. w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to secure confessions. the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our . a further change took place when the SC held in Peo. xxx Indeed." xxx This is not bec. it was sufficient that the confession was given under conditions w/c accredit prima facie its admissibility. W/o expressly overruling its decision in de los Santos and Villanueva. went back to the former rule that involuntary or coerced confessions. in the US. the accused is compelled against his will to tell a falsehood. the Court stated "the admissibility of that kind of evidence depends not on the supposed illegal manner in w/c it is obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts or admission contained therein. Under the new rule. by force or violence or intimidation. Villanueva.) It was held that a confession not shown to have been voluntarily given could be objected to at any stage of the proceedings. In the later case of Peo. to be repudiated. must not only be proved to have been obtained by force and violence. In 1953.

and to assure the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege. w/c have been adopted by the Phil. Since the circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. SC: 1. should he choose to exercise it. This warning is intended to make him aware not only of the privilege but also of the consequences of foregoing it. to overcome the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. does not state at what stage of the interrogation . a person in custody may be interrogated. THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION At what stage of the police interrogation must the warnings be given? The Consti. By custodial interrogation. we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken to custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The purpose is to apprise him of his privilege not to be compelled to incriminate himself. Arizona requires certain warnings to be given by police interrogators bef. Miranda v. Richmond. The person in custody must be warned that anything he will say can and wilol be used against him. 2. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. Frankfurter. The person in custody must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain silent.a system in w/c the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth xxx.) THE MIRANDA RULE The prosecution may not use statements." (Rogers v. MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED AS MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL. it is indispensable that he has the assistance of counsel.criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system -. 3. unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. IN TURN. J. xxx II. stemming from custodial interrogation of the def.

the court specified that it is only at the custodial phase of the interrogation that its ruling applied. the suspect is taken into custody. 1973. With respect to confessions obtained bef.process they must be made. He was taken to police precint no. As the warnings are the means of insuring that the suspect is apprised of his rights so that any subsequent waiver of his rights can be "voluntary. and the police carries out a process of interrogation that leads itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. but in Miranda. Illinois. The first can be made provided that the waiver is "voluntary. for vagrancy. the accused was arrested. and/ or confessions or admissions from the accused. w/o a warrant. As the police line-up in this case was not part of the custodial inquest. Cruz. HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an interrogation. WAIVER OF RIGHTS Constitutional Law II It is important to distinguish bet. In Gamboa v. The next day. As the Court indicated in Escobedo v. it is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect. A waiver of rights will not be presumed. when the police officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit info. the petitioner was not entitled to counsel xxx. Hence. he was included in a police line-up of 5 detainees and was pointed to by the complainant as a complanion of the main suspect on the basis of w/c the accused was ordered to stay and sit in front of the complainant. 2 in Mla." it is obvious that there can be no valid waiver of the warnings. the rule that the suspect must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel . while the latter was interrogated. 17. knowing and intelligent" but the second cannot. The accused was then charged w/ robbery. III. Jan. The accused moved to dismiss the case against him on the ground that he had been denied the assistance of counsel during the line-up. this petition for certiorari. 1. His motion was denied. knowing and intelligent. the waiver of rights and the waiver of warnings.

provided they are voluntary. 3. 4. Galit was handed down. Does this mean there can be instances. With regard to confessions given after Feb. I have argued that it was not so limited but that it also embraced uncounselled statements. 2. IX. 1973. the rule is that the voluntariness of a waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel must be determined on a case-to-case basis. never be used by the prosecution. For "if a statement made wore in fact exculpatory. Although the previous Consti. using the traditional test of voluntariness. when the present Consti. spoke of confessions only. in fact. 1987. says. took effect. when the decision of Peo. requires that the waiver to be valid.does not apply. confession or admission. for a limited purpose? . are admissible.. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. but before March 20. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him." EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" conveys the idea that the rule excluding evidence illegally obtained is absolute. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE. the rule is that a waiver of the rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. v. must be made w/ the assistance of counsel. the Consti. 2. it could .. such confessions. to be valid.. albeit. No similar phraseology is used in the exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda rule. even though presented in evidence in a trial after the effectivity of the 1973 Consti. With respect to confessions obtained after Jan. 17. taking into account the circumstances under w/c the waiver was made. 1985. 2. the present Consti. With regard to confessions obtained after March 20. must be in writing and w/ the assistance of counsel. where uncounselled statements may nevertheless be admissible in evidence. statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. 1987. 1985 but before Feb. No distinction is made bet.

. US. claimed that what he had sold to a police officer was baking powder. Bolanos. The Court noted the cost imposed on the public by the rule. 211 SCRA 262 F: Bolanos was convicted for Murder. on his way to the Police Station. it may nevertheless be presented in evidence to impeach his credit. Quarles. that the giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions and this might lead in turn to fewer convictions. free from the risk of confrontation w/ prior inconsistent utterance In New York v." It held that the warnings were not themselves Constitutional rights but merely "prophylactic" measures to insure the right against self-incrimination. "There is public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted in evidence. It then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions than are necessary to avert an immediate threat to public safety. as a def. HELD: The trial court. it was held that although a confession obtained w/o complying w/ the Miranda rule was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing in chief the confessor's guilt. in admitting the extra- . People v. The accused was apprehended. Pagdalian was found dead. xxx. When answers are not actually coerced. as part of the scheme to defraud the purchaser xxx The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense. sustaining stab wounds. giving the warnings at the risk that public safety will be endangered and withholding the warnings at the risk that probative evidence will be excluded. they were informed that the deceased was with two companions. When the policemen inquired about the circumstances of the incident. ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the jeep was admissible in evidence. police officers must not be made to choose bet. on the previous night. Petitioner. in a prosecution for selling heroin. In such exigent circumstances. namely. Bolanos allegedly admitted that he killed Pagdalian because he was abusive. this social cost outweights the need for Miranda safeguards. In the vehicle where the accused boarded. The victim. the SC created a "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule.In Harris v.

232 SCRA 566 F: After he and his wife were individually hogtied and their house ransacked. Dionanao. it can be gleaned that when accused Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest. HELD: NO From the records. it disregarded the defenses interposed by the accused and convicted Bandula. Since the extra-judicial confession was the only basis for the conviction of the accused. Sidigo. Garay was found dead with 3 gunshot wounds . If at all. and Ejan were charged in court for robbery with homicide. The 3 other accused were acquitted for "insufficiency of evidence". hence admissible in evidence. For his death and the loss of their things on the occasion thereof. it appearing from the confession that acussed were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly represented by Counsel (Atty. to remain silent and to have a counsel of his choice. Bandula. they had no counsel present. Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession of Bandula conformed with the constitutional requisites for its validity. Atty. while already in police custody. violated his Constitutional right to be informed.Bam. counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with .judicial confession of the accused in evidence. People v. Bandula. the trial coust’s judgment was reversed. Zerna)". On the basis of the extrajudicial confessions (EJC) allegedly made by Bandula and Dionanao during their custodial investigation which the court found to "have all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible confession.

1973 2. 175 SCRA 216 (1989) It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights. Not applicable to statements given in administrative investigations People v. there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. by the witness who will later repeat the statement to the court) and thus the courts believe that such statements carry a high degree of credibility.. And counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Art III of the 1987 Constitution which protects the rights of the accused during custodial investigation. or explain a physical act. and 2 weeks later with respect to Bandula. which is a verbatim reproduction of . Zerna. and Statements which are evidence as to someone's state of mind. the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay.e. Res gestae is based on the belief that because certain statements are made naturally.Suzette. 12. Dy. 1. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed before January 17. 3.e. On top of this. they leave little room for misunderstanding/misinterpretation upon hearing by someone else( i. Not applicable to res gestae statements People v.respect to Dionanao. Evidence which can be admitted into evidence as Res gestae fall into three headings: Words or phrases which either form part of. or sets of rights. whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused and who is not an independent counsel. the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence. Ayson. spontaneously and without deliberation during the course of an event. 158 SCRA 111 (1988) Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things done") is an exception to the rule against Hearsay evidence. these are blatant violations of of Sec. namely: 1) the right against self-incrimination i. Certainly. Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to belie concoction. dealt with in the section.

e. to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right. is actually put to the witness. group of rights. mentioned in Section 20. are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.. which have been made more explicit. the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these rights. Rights in Custodial Interrogation Section 20. "suspects" under investigation by police authorities. It follows that the right may be waived. and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution. against self-incrimination. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self. i." Parenthetically. and . or better said.e. criminal. It must be claimed. Right Against Self-Incrimination The first right. or impliedly. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena.Section 18. incriminatory in character. expressly. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. i. "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. whether he be a party or not. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question.." i. as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense. the right can be claimed only when the specific question. whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena. or administrative proceeding.. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation.e. Article III of the 1935 Constitution." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense." is now embodied in Section 17. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. and 2) the right of a person in custodial interrogation. in any civil. It cannot be claimed at any other time." It simply secures to a witness.incrimination. However. is accorded to every person who gives evidence.

2) no force. or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. After such warnings have been given. that against self-incrimination which. Arizona. criminal. a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement. This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. violence. such opportunity afforded him. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U. civil.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding. or administrative. threat. and to be informed of such right. intimidation. and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. The objective is .this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence. no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. that he has the right to the presence of an attorney. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. as aforestated. the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law. Miranda rights He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent." Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. and 3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial.

to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted. b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. threat. It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation. not to be subjected to force." The rights above specified. has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence. to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor. subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. c) to testify in his own behalf. violence. a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court. by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. to repeat.incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights. for preliminary investigation)." And. but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way. as the term .to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere." or "incustody interrogation of accused persons. and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected. exist only in "custodial interrogations. and to be nformed thereof. and 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT a) to refuse to be a witness. intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will. d) WHILE TESTIFYING." Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As Regards Giving of Testimony In fine. as this Court has already stated. and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel. resulting in self.

The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20. Wade. Cruz June 27. describing the latter as a "mestizo. he was not yet under custodial investigation. 1988 Police line-up not part of custodial inquest F: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in Manila. petitioner was not yet entitled. his identification therein by Ongue is inadmissble. RULING: When the suspect was brought to the police station for indentification. Hatton. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play. there is every reason to doubt the regularity of the identification of the suspect by the witness.should be properly understood. Ongue identified Hatton not because he was certain that Hatton was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo in the station and because he was pointed by the police as the suspect. hence. he was included in a police line-up and was identified as one of the suspects in a robbery case. The following day. Thus. prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. technically. Hatton alleges that at the time that he was made to stand in the police line-up. were of no relevance to the inquiry. Hatton was pointed by Ongue as the assailant. Custodial Phase of Investigation Police Lineups Gamboa v. at such stage.up. without the assistance of counsel. However. Ongue was invited by the police to identify the suspect in a police line. Hence.VV. HELD: The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest. During the proceedings in the police station. was unconstitutional. US v. 388 US 218 (1967) People v. to counsel. he was not assisted by counsel. the right to counsel does not yet apply. 210 SCRA 1 F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while walking with several companions including Ongue who vaguely recognized the assailant. This cannot be considered as positive identification of the accused by the witness. 5." Two days later. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda . He was later charged with robbery and charged. 4. He moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the conduct of the line-up.

Respondent Judge sustained the objection on the ground that the right to counsel cannot be waived. waiver of right to counsel F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were prisoners at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. In this case. The date of execution of the statement before the municipal court was not indicated. they gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the killing. People v. saying "surrender po kami. that he had a right to counsel and that anything he said could be used for or against him and after asking whether he was willing to answer questions and he answered "yes. they attacked and killed Celso Saminado. a native of Samar. People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980) Public trial. They took the witness stand and . with full understanding of its consequences." Two days later. They were accused of murder and pleaded guilty. Rizal. When Roca was questioned on the incriminating answers in the statement. knowing and intelligent F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of murder in the CFI of Bulacan. they surrendered to the prison guard. Gumanti lang po kami. another prisoner. had not been shown to be fully acquainted with. The prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police who identified a statement of the accused during a police interrogation and his alleged waiver of the right to remain silent and to counsel. HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation may be waived provided the waiver is made intelligently and voluntarily." The statement was in Tagalog which the defendant. contending that Yupo's statement was given without the assistance of counsel. On June 14. The separate statement signed by the defendant stating he was made to read the opening statement containing the Miranda warnings and that they were explained to him all the more engenders doubt as to whether the defendant was properly informed of his right.Rights No valid waiver. Afterwards. after informing the suspect that he was under investigation. 1976. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980) Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is voluntary. the defense objected. the statement made only a perfunctory opening question.

he was told that he could hire a lawyer but not that one could be provided for him for free. he was willing to answer questions of the police. In another case where Avila was also a defendant. but the question itself was not since it spoke of a waiver only "for the moment. for security reasons. On review.affirmed their confessions. Tampus was sentenced to death while Avila to reclusion temporal. People v. His conviction was based solely on his extrajudicial confession which he disowned in court." As worded. Avila's trial be held in the National Penitentiary.That spontaneous statement. HELD: It is doubtful. HELD: The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial there. There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. the question suggested a tentativeness that belied the suspect's supposed permanent foregoing of his right to counsel. Tampus and Avila admitted their guilt. . By means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion. The truth is that shortly after the killing.VV. the two waived their right to remain silent and to counsel. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986) No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a 77-year-old woman and sentence to death. it was contended that Tampus was denied the right to a public trial and to counsel. The accused was warned in Tagalog that he had a right to remain silent and to counsel but despite this. was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. the right to public trial may be waived. His answer was categorical enough. Trial took place at the Penitentiary. Anyway. Moreover. the SC directed that. if indeed there was any waiver at all. given the tenor of the question whether there was a definite waiver by the suspect of his right to counsel. to be sure. elicited without interrogation. The confession was given to the police and subscribed before the clerk of court and contains a waiver.

The NBI investigators covered Galit's face with a rag and then pushed it into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The confession in this case was traditionally involuntary. In People v. the SC. Enrile. 1985 to February 2. and so the SC did not need the Morales obiter in order to disallow the confession. The Galit Rule (March 20. The waiver must be made in the presence of counsel. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985) F: Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide by the Circuit Criminal Court. then the waiver found to be voluntary. 2. knowing and intelligent. quarrelling the morning after the crime. the adoption of the Morales obiter was also an obiter. however. the waiver should not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. which was obtained through torture. but that he waived these rights. 121 SCRA 538 (1983). People v. who was the mother of the witness' wife. 135 SCRA 485 (1985). The NBI investigators covered the . 1985 to Feb. knowing and intelligent and thus admissible. The principal prosecution witness testified that he heard the defendant and his wife. He said the defendant wanted to leave their house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene. Galit. reiterating a dictum in Morales v. Under the facts of the case. In the Galit case.Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a written confession showing that he was apprised of his right not only by the police but also by the fiscal. 1987. HELD: The confession of the defendant is inadmissible because it was obtained through torture. This rule applied from March 20. the accused Galit was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of his confession. b. Waiver of the right to counsel must be made with the assistance of counsel." The prosecution also presented the extrajudicial confession of the defendant. and that although the right to counsel may be waived. It was only after they had broken his will that he signed the confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as directed by the investigators. 1987) It is not enough that the confession is voluntary. ruled that no custodial investigation should be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel.

defendant's face with a rag and then pushed in into a toilet bowl full of human waste. that she was a member of the NPA and that she was wounded in the encounter. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. In this case. the Court was out to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. The trial court excluded the confession on the ground that the . however. Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule. It was two weeks after he executed the salaysay that his relatives were permitted to visit him. was laid to rest by the SC in People v. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Enrile. in whole or in part. in which she admitted through a leading question. The SC upheld the trial court's decision excluding the confession on the ground that the waiver of the Miranda rights was made without the assistance of counsel. and embraced its ruling. the prosecution sought to prove its charge of subversion against Asis by means of her confession given in the hospital. the Fiscal offered as evidence an extrajudicial confession given by her in the hospital. In that confession. The SC cited the case of Morales v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986) F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of subversion. she admitted. Sison. These constitute gross violations of his right. Galit. People v. Any statement obtained in violation of this. His statement does not contain any waiver or right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. shall be inadmissible in evidence. 142 SCRA 219 (1986). Ponce Enrile where it laid the procedure in custodial investigations: No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the precense of counsel engaged by the person arrested. through a leading question that she was a member of the NPA. The Court held that in People v. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or of anyone on his behalf. or by any person on his behalf. The defendant is from Samar and there is no showing that he understood Tagalog. which was decided en banc and concurred in by all the Justices except one who took no part. It was only after they had broken his will that the defendant signed the confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as directed by the investigators. At the trial.

Nabaluna et. HELD: In the case of People v. 2. III. Ponce Enrile that the right to counsel may be waived only with the assistance of counsel. was only a dictum. Enrile. ruled that the GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive effect. Galit. 142 SCRA 446 (1986). The prosecution contends that the ruling in Morales v. c. but these were not made in the presence of counsel. al. Nabaluna. III. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be . 196 SCRA 809 (1991) In People v. especially since in this case the trial court decision was already rendered before the SC pronouncement. Sec. Sison (1986) that this requirement is mandatory. the SC put to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. were convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis. 1987) Art. The SC. of extrajudicial confessions taken in 1977. People v. People v. HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right to counsel was made without the assistance of a counsel. Galit and People v. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel Art. 12. which was decided en banc and concurred in by all Justices except one who took no part. New rule on waiver (Feb. Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. among others. The SC has held in Morales v. Any statement obtained in violation of this procedure shall be inadmissible in evidence. People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987) F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on the basis of a confession and circumstantial evidence which the trial court found substantial to establish guilt. VV. Lim. Sec. Ponce Enrile.waiver of Miranda rights was made without the assistance of counsel. The confessions and the special counsel before whom the confessions were signed prove that the Miranda warnings were given. in allowing the confession.

or 1987 rule. that is. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on the prosecution The burden to prove that there was a valid waiver of the Miranda warning devolves upon the one seeking to present the confession. 6. Galit. any waiver must now be made (1) in writing. he must be provided with one. the SC noted that the stereotype "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form. Its tired punctilious. fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness . Jara. and (2) in the presence of counsel. on the prosecution. Investigators automatically type it together with "opo" as the answer. 144 SCRA 516 (1986).Constitutional Law II informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. This rule applies whether in the pre-Galit. In People v. Under the new Constitution.

the presumption is always against the waiver. In another case. fixed and artificial style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. 144 SCRA 516 (1986) F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara vda. The confessions were taken while the two were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and after two weeks of detention. the husband of the deceased. and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or model. convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and . the prosecution must prove with strong. punctilious. Whenever a Constitutional protection is waived by one entitled to that protection. People v. Jara. was found guilty of parricide. the presumption is always against the waiver.or even understanding on the part of the accused. Thus. de Bantigue on June 9. two of the appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara. free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Consequently. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection. The showing of a spontaneous. 1978. made extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. Two of the appellants. Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas. Its tired. the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession.

7. 401 U." There are two exceptions to the exclusionary rule. One. Harris v. xxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Sec. While it is not admissible to prove the guilt of the accused. 222 (1971). Supreme Court in Harris v. (For how can one waive what one does not know?) 2. He confessed to the crime during the police interrogation. What may be waived: The right to remain silent and to counsel. The SC allowed the prosecution to introduce the uncounselled statment to show that he was lying. but the confession was uncounselled. but not the right to be given "Miranda warnings" The right to remain silent and to counsel. That proof is missing in this case. he testified that what he sold was baking powder in order to defraud the police agent. But when Harris took the witness stand.S. 12. III.S. The right to be given the Miranda warnings. and so it was held as inadmissible in evidence. can be waived. 401 U. In justifying the admission of the . Two. New York. 8. it may be used against him to impeach his credibility by showing that he is lying in court. Sec. Harris was arrested for twice selling heroin to an undercover police agent. The right to counsel when making the waiver of the right to remain silent or to counsel. III. so ruled the U. 3(2)] the exclusionary rule reads: (any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding. Note than under [Art. 222 (1971) In this case. public safety. which are the effectuations of the Miranda rights. Impeach the credibility The unwarned or uncounselled confession is not totally without use. Exclusionary rule Art. What cannot be waived are: 1.voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. to impeach the credibility of the accused. New York.S.

1.testimony. and quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which the evidence in the possession of the government was obtained to his own advantage. The criticism hurled against this ruling is that while the police may be justified in forcing the assailant to say where the weapon is located. or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. Supreme Court in New York v. Sec. All persons. the Court excused the giving of the Miranda warning because the public safety required that the weapon had to be located before it could be used by the accused against those in the supermarket. before conviction. 2626 (1984). 2626 (1984). Thus ruled the U. 13. In the case. 104 S. continued the Court is that the shield provided by the Miranda rights cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense. Ct. III. providing himself with a shield against perjury and the contradiction of his untruths. C. Ct. shall. he is not justified to present this in evidence in the subsequent criminal prosecution. 104 S. New York v. When right may be invoked The right to bail is available from the . Public Safety Public Safety may justify the police in taking confessions without prior warning. Justice Burger said that it is one thing to say that the government cannot make an affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully obtained. Right to bail Art. The reason. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.S. be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required. the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. Quarles . Quarles.

such illegality was cured by the subsequent filing of a case in court. and this can be made anytime after arrest. so long as one is under arrest. overruling Morales v. The Constitution now provides. or that even if they were initially illegal. So ruled the SC in Heras Teehankee v. but the remedy afforded by law to the victim is not available. there is an implicit recognition that the arrest and detention. are valid.very moment of arrest (which may be before or after the filing of formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final judgement (which means after appeal). Bail and Habeas Corpus In the case of bail. 75 Phil.634 (1945). the People's Court Act amended Art. that the suspension . Under the 1987 Constitution. Thus. the arrest and detention remain illegal. otherwise the detainee is to be released. When the privilege of the writ is suspended. so that the prayer is to be released permanently from such illegal detention. In habeas corpus. No charge need be filed formally before one can file for bail. though the effect of the suspension has been considerably lessened to the need to file a case within 72 hours from the illegal arrest. the assumption is precisely that the arrest and detention are illegal. Rovica. 125 of the RPC to allow for a longer time to detain persons because of the impossibility of filing charges within the reglementary period due to the number of indictees. the prayer in bail is that one be released temporarily from such valid detention. Enrile. The case was unique in that after the war.

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the court's discretion to grant bail must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. or even detention that started as illegal but was cured by the filing of a case in court. 20). 26 SCRA 522 (1966). Habeas Corpus refers to illegal detention. In such a case. it is contended that when the 1987 Constitution denies the right to bail in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua. 2. When bail is a matter of right. and the automatic commutation of a death sentence to reclusion perpetua. according to People v. when it is a matter of discretion Bail is a matter of right in all cases not punishable by reclusion perpetua. The only time bail may be denied is when (a) the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus.Constitutional Law II of the privilege of the writ does not carry with it the suspension of the right to bail. With the abolition of the death penalty (III. San Diego. while bail refers to legal detention. it is meant to apply only . and (b) the evidence of guilt is strong. the order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by the conclusion on whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. It is a matter of discretion in case the evidence of guilt is strong.

(h) Forfeiture of other bonds. 6. (f) The weight of the evidence against the accused. (d) Character and reputation of the accused. later .Amount of bail. De Villa. Donato. but not limited to the following guidelines: (a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail. said the SC in De la Camara v. People v. The SC laid down the following guidelines in fixing the amount of bail in Villasenor v. Abano. Bail in courts-martial Commendador v. it becomes "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope. 41 SCRA 1 (1971).195 million imposed against Mayor Camara for charges of 12 murders and 12 frustrated murder was found excessive. 21 SCRA 312 (1967). (c) Penalty of the offense charged. Thus. 200 SCRA 80 (1991) 4.--The judge who issed the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily. Sec. In this case. guidelines. For if it includeds even those crimes which before and now are really punishable by reclusion perpetua. it should not be rendered nugatory be requiring a sum that is excessive. otherwise. (g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial. and (j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond. it would go against the very spirit of the Constitution. (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense. Standards for fixing bail Rule 114. Enage. (e) Age and health of the accused. 196 SCRA 130 (1991) 3. Excessive bail shall not be required. a bail of P1. (i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested. Where the right to bail exists. a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will" (Jackson).to those crimes which were once punishable by death.

then the State loses its right to order the forfeiture of the bond because it itself has breached its obligation to the surety. still he cannot be denied bail. 7. III. Health of the accused. 3. This reason . 6. 6. Character and reputation of the accused5. Ability of the accused to give the bail. 2. The Court gave 2 reasons why bail operates only within the country. One. namely to have the accused available whenever the court requires his presence. 4. 5. Penalty for the offense charged. 6 of Rule 114. The case leaves the question of allowing an accused under bail to go abroad for humanitarian reasons open-ended. thus affecting one of the conditions in the grant of bail. Two. as may be provided by law. Character and strength of the evidence. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested. 9.contained in sec. 10. 1. Probability of the accused appearing in trial. If the court thus allows his to leave. implicit in the bail is the agreement between the State and the surety that the State will do nothing to make it difficult for the surety to arrest the defendant upon order of the court. the accused may be placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason. Court of Appeals. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security. 8. Forfeiture of other bonds. Right to bail and right to travel abroadArt. In Manotoc v. the remedy in this case is to increase the amount of the bail (Siquiam v. or public health. Even when the accused has previously jumped bail. 142 SCRA 149 (1986). public safety. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. Sec. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. the SC disallowed a person released on bail to travel abroad for a business trip. Nature of the offense. Amparo).

The constitutional right to travel is not absolute. CA. to have a speedy. 6. He filed a petition for certiorari but his petition was also dismissed for lack of merit. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. but his request was denied by the courts. 14. III. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. 1 upon the accused to make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. What the Court found insufficient was the business trip. operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. He later asked for permission to leave the country for business reasons. He appealed to the SC. Waiver of the Right to Bail People v. However. In all criminal prosecutions.was not foreclosed by the Court. in one of which he was the president. to meet the witnesses face to face. which hinted that the accused could be allowed to leave if he had "sufficient reason". Manotoc v. 142 SCRA 149 (1986) F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of two corporations.VV. after arraignment. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. but is subject to lawful orders of the court. Donato. 198 SCRA 130 (1991) D. sec. Petitioner was charged with estafa. HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114. the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Sec. The firms were placed under a management committee by the SEC and petitioner was placed "on hold" by the Commission of Immigration. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. Rights during trial Art. trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been . impartial and public trial.

She positively identified the 2 accused as the persons who were with Catap who maltreated an unidentified person whom they had tied to an ipil-ipil tree and upon seeing her. 3 (e) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which now reverses the order of trial when the defendant admits the act but invokes a justifying or exempting circumstance. 1. Comelec. They were convicted by the court mainly on the basis of the testimony of Adelia Angeles. a judge who allowed the accused to present his evidence ahead of the prosecution. was reversed by the SC on the ground that this change in the order of trial violated the constitutional presumption of innocence which places the burden proof on the prosecution. 96 SCRA 322 (1980). This was further strengthened by the extrajudicial confession (EJC) of accused Castro to Police Corporal Dominador Cunanan that it was Catap who killed the . 42 SCRA 69 (1971). Only De Guzman and Castro were arrested and both pleaded not guilty. Presumption of innocence In People v. sec. Pepito. This ruling was modified by Rule 119. Castro and Catap were charged with murder for the killing of an unidentified person on Nov. for violating the presumption against innocence. 16. after the acused admitted the killing but invoked selfdefense. 231 SCRA 739 F: De Guzman. 95 SCRA 392 (1980). she testified that they untied the man and brought him towards the direction of the Pasig river which was only 3 houses away. de Guzman. People v. 1994. over the objection of the prosecution. In Alejandro v. Dramayo. the SC noted that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is a necessary corollary of the constitutional right to be presumed innocent. In Igot v.duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. a law disqualifying candidates charged with national security offences was struck down as unconstitutional.

(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. 85 Phil 752 (1952).) No matter how educated one may be. People v. Issue: W/N the constitutional presumption of innocenec of the accused has been overcome. the circumstantial evidence presented satisfied Sec. Holgado. III. While it is true that accused's EJC was made without the advice and assistance of counsel. Holgado. 4. hence inadmissible as evidence. and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond resonable doubt. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her . Sec. With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro to Police Cpl. Moreover in Peo v Alvarez. Right to be heard personally or by counselAdequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty (Art. Cunanan. there is no evidence that Cunanan had any motive to falsely testify against accused. HELD: YES Though there is no direct evidence to link the 3 accused to the killing of the unknown victim. he may not know how to establsih his innocence for the simple reason that he does not know the rules of evidence said the SC in People v. 85 Phil 752 (1952) F: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive. Rule 133 ROC namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance. it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused established through the testimonies of persons who heard it or who conducted the investigatiuon of the accused (Peo v Molas 218 SCRA 473). 2. the court ruled that an extrajudicial confession is admissible against a co-accused when it is used as a circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the participation of said co-accused in the crime committed. 11.victim and that he and de Guzman acted only as look-outs.

Sec. unaided by counsel. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Rule 112. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. to say the least." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. 6). Accused was convicted of a capital offense. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so . it was not prudent. without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned. and." Accused. particularly in the rules of procedure. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. section 3 (now Rule 116. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law. that: If the defendant appears without attorney. particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court. Ruling: Under the circumstances. and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information.personal liberty. and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. Ocampo to do so.. without counsel. One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law". the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. pleaded guilty and said that he was instructed by Mr. Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense. and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.

Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right to be heard(Rule 119. counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney. was accused of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Homeres. whereupon counsel for the defense offered to present evidence for the accused.could the defense still present its own evidence? In Abriol v. . (1949) F: Fidel Abriol. Sec.Constitutional Law II important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney. together with six other persons. 84 Phil 525. C.) Abriol v. and citing as authority the case of United States vs. Homeres. The provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of evidence by the defense. After hearing the arguments for and against the motion for dismissal. the SC ruled in the affirmative. 15. but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. De la Cruz. without allowing the accused to present evidence in their defense. Moscoso sustained the opposition of the provincial fiscal and. contending that the present procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in criminal cases from presenting any evidence after it had presented a motion for dismissal with or without reservation and after said motion had been denied. Q: What happens if the accused files a demurrer to the evidence of the prosecution (on the ground that the prosecution failed to tender a case) and this motion is denied -. the court held the proofs sufficient to convict and denied said motion. (1949). 279. 28 Phil.. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case. His Honor Judge S. contending that the right of the accused to present his evidence is a constitutional right which cannot be defeated by the dismissal of the motion of demurrer. 84 Phil 525.

There is no law nor "procedural practice" under which the accused may ever be denied the right to be heard before being sentenced. We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which could be invoked to place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in his defense before being sentenced. 2. But if the motion for dismissal is denied. of the Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. The main question to decide is whether the writ of habeas corpus lies in a case like the present.000. Of course if the accused has no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it. it being provided in Article II. The reason is that it is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to present evidence after the denial of their motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present evidence. Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. the provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and clearly guarantee to him that . 1. 2. On the contrary. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-petitioner to present proofs in his defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable error which resulted in denying to the said accused the due process of law guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution. the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has rested terminates the case then and there. Rule 118).convicted all of them and sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer seven years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2. the court has no alternative but to decide the case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone. section 1 (17). the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its right to present evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied.

and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding. 49 SCRA 281 (1973) Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal F: After prosecution presented its witnesses. The judge granted the motion. People v. The process against him in criminal case No.right. Up to the point when the prosecution rested. that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. he may be held under the custody of the law by being detained or admitted to bail until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided. Since there is a failure to prove the guilt of the accused. Rule 119. 1472 may stand should be resumed from the stage at which it was vitiated by the trial court's denial of his constitutional right to be heard. it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary as in the instant case invokes that rough. the case must be dismissed. in exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal. Such constitutional right is inviolate. the defense moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Although the sentence against the petitioner is void for the reasons hereinabove tated. . Donesa. and the court denies it to him. Issue: Did such dismissal operate as an acquittal of the accused? Ruling: YES A dismissal ordered after the termination of the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has the force and effect of an acquittal. the proceedings were valid and should be resumed from there. and it will be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant.

) 3. addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. If the court denies the motion for dismissal. Sec. the accusedappellant Ricardo Rio.. The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does . Dris. as Judge Cooley says. or (2) on motion of the accused filed with proper leave of court. manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty. III. Justice Malcolm.Paraphrasing Mr. in two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989. (Rules of Court. Rio. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court. Today said right is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for. to have assistance of counsel for the defense' ".. 201 SCRA 702 (1991) F: On 29 December 1989.Sec. "Two (2) of the basic privileges of the accused in a criminal prosecution are the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a preliminary examination. People v. Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) ont its own intitiative after givint the prosecution an opportunity to be heard. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.After the prosecution has rested its case. President Mckinley made the first a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to the Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right . Right to free legal assistance Art. he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. this is "perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused of crime. the accused may adduce evidence in his defense." "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. 11. Demurrer to evidence. 15.-.

" Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. the court must assign a counsel de oficio. and. It continues. the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps. It is for everyone. Even in a case. where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal." This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial court. whether rich or poor. even during appeal. After all.not include the right to be heard by counsel. It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more circumspect with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13. "those who have less in life must have more in law. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney. Its scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over another. the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant and for said counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective briefs. such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. . as in this case. for despite such withdrawal. particularly in the rules of procedure. or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney. the court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. with greater reason. such as the one at bar. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) so that courts will be above reproach and that never (if possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law. but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor. without counsel. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. In this spirit. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.

in the Municipality of Muntinlupa. The charge was . by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully. unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will. as counselde oficio. This claim was corroborated by the accused's brother. it is established that the accused. which reads as follows: That on or about the 24th day of March. allegedly. entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.upon submission of which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. the abovenamed accused. However. Metro Manila. it was the fourth time accused had abused complainant. HELD: On appeal. Leonido Manalo of the Makati CLAO office. appellant's counsel de oficio changed the theory of the defense. Metro Manila on 31 March 1984 when appellant claimed he was in Romblon. The accused claimed that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. assisted by Atty. duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. 1984. Alejandro of the province of Rizal. rebutted by the prosecution's submission of the voter's affidavit executed by the accused in Muntinlupa. From the records of the case. Amado Rio. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that the rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that. The new theory presented by counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on 24 March 1984.appellant was charged with the crime of rape in a verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio. This allegation as well as the fact that complainant failed to lock the door to the bathroom could only have been due to the fact that there was consent. xxx The trial court found the accusedappellant guilty of the crime of rape. The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded on alibi. On 26 June 1985. the accused-appellant. Philippines. at the arraignment. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. as aforestated. this claim was.

the rule in civil procedure. This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been consent from the complainant. for "public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's cause. he would not have changed the theory of the defense for such a shift can never speak well of the credibility of the defense." Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering jus- . so young and as yet uninitiated to the ways of the world. that is. the Court deems it more likely that this shift was caused by counselde oficio's preparation of the appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the case. would permit the occurrence of an incestuous relationship with an uncle. only because the complainant's mother caught them. according to defense counsel de oficio. had read the records and transcripts of the case thoroughly. on appeal. a brother of her very own mother. Moreover. whether acting de parte or de oficio. If the counsel de oficio had been more conscientious. which applies equally in criminal cases. Although the Solicitor General has suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get himself acquitted. The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients' causes. he would have known that the sudden shift would be violative of aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental to the cause of the accused-appellant (his client). If the appointed counsel for the accused.filed. The Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of the defense from one of total denial of the incident in question. for it would be an incredulous situation indeed to believe that one. This new version could only be attributed by the Court to the fact that counsel on appeal is different from the counsel in the trial court. with the alleged consent of the complainant. to one of participation. by way of alibi. is that a party may not shift his theory on appeal. fails to generate doubt as to the accused's guilt.

This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court. to the bar and to the public. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely intended to comply with the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The court then allowed the prosecution to present evidence despite the fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. who is sworn to uphold the law.tice in this jurisdiction. procedural due process requires that the accused must be informed why he is being prosecuted and what charge he must meet. a transgressor of its precepts. The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility owed to his client. he is expected to take such reasonable precaution in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional guidance as will not make him. People. he also serves the ends of justice. does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 77 SCRA 422 (1977) No valid trial in absentia without arraignment F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical injuries in the City Court of Cebu. petitioner failed to appear. The ethics of the profession require that counsel display warm zeal and great dedication to duty irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his fees. And a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client. While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws. After one postponement due to petitioner's failure to appear. the case was reset. Borja v. despite notice to his bondsman. 4. After the offended party had testified and . Any attempted presentation of a case without adequate preparation distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar. As noted in Vera v. Mendoza. Again.

HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion and his decision is void.presented documentary evidence. impartial and public trial (1) Speedy Trial The right to a speedy trial means one that is free from vexatious and oppressive delays. he was not informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. a case involving the prosecution for damage to property through reckless imprudence which had been pending for 6 years. orce rtiorari. compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense the accused may interpose. It is enough if it is conducted at a place where one's . Hence. and dismissal based on the denial of the right to speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. the last step taken being the start of the cross-examination of the complaining witness. While reasonable delay may be allowed as determined on a case to case basis. So said the SC in Acevedo v. this petition for certiorari. 5. Because petitioner was not arraigned. The remedy of the accused in this case is habeas corpus if he has been restrained of his liberty. The CFI affirmed the decision. thus acquitting the accused. an unreasonable delay on the part of the prosecution to present its case. 36 SCRA 247 (1970). to have his guilt determined within the shortest possible time. the court found petitioner guilty. The SC ordered the case dismissed with prejudice. Sarmiento. violates the right of the accused to a speedy trial. (2) Public Trial A public trial does not require that the entire public can witness the trial. who did not appear thereafter. prohibition or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. thereby causing the threat of penal liability to remain hanging over the head of the accused for an extended period of time. or otherwise. Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal proceeding. Its objective is to free the innocent person from anxiety and expense of a court litigation. Right to speedy.

relatives and friends can be accommodated and the public may know what is going on. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. The right is not absolute. 52 SCRA 143 (1970). . Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of the judge violative of the right to a public trial? Ruling: NO The defendants in this case agreed that the hearings be held in the chambers. Garcia v. On fourteen separate occasions this was the case and there was no objection on their part. is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial. one which thus far Constitutional Law II has remained unresolved. Domingo. 52 SCRA 143 (1970) The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. There was no evidence to substantiate the claim that any other person was excluded from the chambers. Domingo. the SC dismissed the contention of one party that the trial was conducted inside the chamber of the judge on the ground that the objection came too late (the party only complained after the 14th hearing) and that the place was agreed upon by the parties for their mutual convenience (the judge's room was air conditioned). The court can order the public out of the trial room in the interest of morality and order. In Garcia v.

" What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties. that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. xxx (3) Impartial trial One aspect of an impartial trial is a . without objection on the part of respondent policemen. too. No relationship to the parties need be shown. in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted. as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. it was in the latter's airconditioned chambers that the trial was held.The trial must be public. Where a trial takes place. no problem arises. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. and of the city court Judge. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right." Then. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. Moreover. as is quite usual. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. no matter with what offense he may be charged. Some are smaller than others. relatives and counsel present. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge. it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends.

The best means of confrontation is the process of cross-examination. it is inferrable from the phrase "trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused" This right to be present may. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and the production of evidence in his behalf) There are various means available to the parties to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and things needed in the prosecution or defense of a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and subpoena duces tecum: depositions and other modes of discovery. perpetuation of testimonies. the SC held that a civilian cannot be tried by a military court (in connection with the Light a Fire Movement) so long as the civil courts are open and operating. 1(c). In Tumey v. 150 SCRA 144 (1987). however.S. sec. be waived by the accused. it was held that a town mayor who was paid on the basis of the fine he imposes for every conviction for violation of the drinking laws. 6. Rule 115. unless his presence is . could not be an impartial judge. Military Commission. Trial in Absentia Although the right to be present is not explicit in the provision. In Olaguer v.neutral magistrate who exercises cold impartiality. 8. Another aspect of an impartial trial is an impartial tribunal bound by the Bill of Rights and the strict rules of evidence and procedure. 510 (1927). talks of 3 ways that the waiver may take place: (a) express waiver pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail bond. Right to confront witness The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to test the credibility of the witness. Under such a situation. even during Martial Law. he would be interested in convicting those he tries so he would earn more. 273 U. 7. Ohio.

The requisites of a valid trial in absentia are: (i) the accused has been arraigned. 77 SCRA 422 (1977). Waiver of the right to be present implies also waiver of the right to present evidence. (b) implied waiver when the accused without any justifiable cause is absent at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice. (ii) he was duly notified of the hearing.Constitutional Law II specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. In cases in which there have been a waiver of the right to be present. a case involving a charge for slight physical injuries where the accused failed to appear and so the trial court allowed the prosecution to present its evidence even if the accused has not yet been arraigned.VV. Mendoza. if the accused fails to attend trial (which presupposes arraignment). ruled the SC in Boria v. without any justifiable cause. Mendoza. the prosecution can proceed with the presentation of the evidence. There can be no valid trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned. HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia deprived petitioner of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. 77 SCRA 422 (1977). whether expressed or implied. Thus. Conviction without arraignment violates due process and ousts the court of its jurisdiction. and (iii) his failure to attend the trial is unjustified. the trial may be held "in absentia". Boria v. The indispensable requirement for trial in absentia is that it should come after arraignment. Arraignment is crucial because it informs the accued of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.supra. and . and (c) implied waiver when the accused under custody who had been notified of the date of trial escapes.

Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986) Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases F: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned. IV. to which he pleaded not guilty. cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. this petition. the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. the prisoner took advantage of the first information filed and succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release. III. the court may consider the case submitted for decision. 19 [now Art. (b) he has been duly notified of the trial.thereupon. The court will decide the case on the basis only of the prosecution's evidence. sec. The prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possible eventual conviction provided only that (a) he has been arraigned. Avanceña has been modified by Art. with no bail recommended. Salas. HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v. As a result of the reinvestigation. Trial commenced but while it was in progress. an amended information was filed. Hence. People v. So ruled the SC in People v. The respondent Judge denied the motion and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution] which allows trial in absentia. learning of the trickery. This does not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence because it does not mean that the judgment of the trial court will result in conviction. Nonetheless. 143 SCRA 163 (1986). The respondent Judge. But he was gone. sec. The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived . which further ruled that trial in absentia applies even to capital cases. the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia.

Provision for trial in absentia not a justification for jumping bail F: For repeated failure of the accused Dario Gamayon to appear. 84 SCRA 198 (1978). The defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial.except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. Prieto. respondent Judge declared the bail bond forfeited and required the bondsmen to produce the accused within thirty days and to show cause why no judgment . In People v. Just because th Constitution allows trial in absentia does not mean that the accused is now free to waive his right to be present during the trial. he runds the risk of having his bail bond forfeited. the SC ruled that trial in absentia does not justify the accused to jump bail.VV. If he does. Trial in absentia was introduced only in the 1973 Constitution to remedy a situation in which criminal prosecution could not move because the accused has either escaped or jumped bail.

sec. He argued that "if trial could be conducted after the accused has been arraigned and identified. IV. III. the conclusion is . who invoked the last sentence of Art. section 19 [now Art. However. on motion of defense counsel. respondent Judge reconsidered his order. 14(2)] on trial in absentia.Constitutional Law II should be rendered against them.

his presence during the trial is a duty only if the court orders his presence to enable the . Hence. jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated.inescapable that issuing an order of forfeiture of the bail bond is premature. 160 SCRA 1 (1988) In trial in absentia accused waives the right to present evidence and confront witnesses F: Teodoro dela Vega Jr. 2. (ii) entering a plea. When presence of the accused is a DUTY In People v. As we have consistently ruled. during which he pleaded not guilty. The lower court was correct in proceeding with the reception of evidence but it erred when is suspended the proceedings as to the respondent. It does not give the accused the right to jump bail.. Avancena. the case was set for hearing on Sept. together with five others. HELD: The innovation introduced by the present Constitution goes no further than to enable a judge to continue with the trial even if the accused is not present under the conditions therein specified. 1973 but he escaped. and (iii) promulgation of judgment. The court need not wait for the time until the accused finally decides to appear. He was tried in absentia. If the accused is in the custody of the law. Nazareno. 713. the accused has the right to be present at all stages the trial (from arraignment to rendition of judgment). (b) if he is in the custody of the law. To allow this delay is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia.G. presence in all stage is likewise a duty during (i) arraignment. 18. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case against his co-accused but it held in abeyance the proceedings against him in order to give him the chance to cross examine the witnesses against him and present evidence. this petition force rti orari. the following are the rules: 1.VV. This rule however has been modified. After arraignment. As things stand. 32 O. Generally. was charged with murder. Gimenez v. 9." The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari. the SC held that (a) the accused has the right to be present during trial. HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial? No.

regardless of the offense. c. (People v. and not to a merely physical activity. or are pre se ntati ve (Rule 120. c) Promulgation of judgment. unless it is for a light offense. III. whether of innocence or of guilt Rule 116.) 3. Priviledge against self incrimination Art. 6. but a failure to enter of record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. Sec. for identification People v. reiterating Aquino v.Arraignment and plea. Salas. he may be represented by his counsel or a personal emissary. HELD: The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. [Art. 12 (3)] 1. a. except that when the judgment is for a light offense. Sec. Military Commiission.prosecution witnesses to identify him. supra. 143 SCRA 163 (1986). Arraignment and plea. Scope of privilege: Compulsory Testimonial self-incrimination The privilege covers only testimonial incrimination obtained compulsorily.-xxx (b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Promulgation of sentence. infra. how made. modifying People v. It refers therefore to the use of the mental process and the communicative faculties. 17. Sec. III. regardless of whether the plea is guilty or not guilty. Although the accused is not in the custody of the law (and more so if he is in the custody of the law). Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record. in which case accused may appear by counsel. Avancena. Salas. 1. If the act is physical or . Sec.) E. During trial. b. b) Entering a plea. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any confession or admission obtained in violation of section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. infra. infra. his presence is required in the following cases: a) Arraignment.

and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined: seems no more to infringe the rule invoked. Issue: Whether or not the information that the accused has gonorrhea may be used against him Ruling: YES. F: This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions. He appeals the decision on the ground that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail and regarding the chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the accused with reference to a venereal disease. 23. Thus the accused can be required to allow a sample of a substance taken from his body (U.mechanical. It was discovered that the rape victim was infected by venereal disease so that the finding of venereal disease in the accused was material to his conviction. than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a thief. Tan Teng. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. the examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. v. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined.S. the accused can be compelled to allow or perform the act. Phil. 145 (1912)). there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as . had the defendant been found with stolen property upon his person. The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier. He was found guilty of the charge. The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection. and the result can be used in evidence against him.

not an exclusion of his body as evidence. Mr. .evidence against him. in his valuable work on evidence. whether voluntarily or by order. an admission of his guilt. in discussing the question before us. there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof. is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips. Moreover we are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself. it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege. The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. is competent. The objection. . (4 Wigmore. In other words. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated. Wigmore. taken from the defendant. in other words. had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime. the evidence if material. when it may be material. So also if the clothing which he wore. without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself. by reason of blood stains or otherwise. would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. against his will. and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion. said: If. . then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house. but testimonial compulsion. in principle. to extort communications from him. sec. it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control] in whatever form exercised. . for when he is exhibited. even if the order goes too far. could not be used against him as evidence. with all the tools and indicia of his crime. But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself.

Y. Constitutional Law II The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant even.) The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial. (People vs. 144 N.. 119. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses. for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. or upon trial. Such an application of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted. Gardner. can not violate the privilege granted under the . for the purpose of disclosing his identity.2263.

Mr. Coats [1885]. substance. it is possible that this method of determining pregnancy would violate due process as being too barbaric. The contention is that this was the result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth.S. (People v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735. is not testimony but his body his body itself.. (1917) Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a witness against himself. 62 (1920) F: The facts are not dispute. Summers. 75 Ga.Philippine Bill.) The accused can be made to take off her garments and shoes and be photographed. or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence.S. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance . or. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article. as in the Tan Teng case. because it does not call upon the accused as a witness it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. 96 Phil 244 (1950)). To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court. v. however. Villaflor v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the accused. taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. 41 Phil. Otadura. (Harris vs. 62 (1920)). 415. A woman accused of adultery can be compelled to show her body for physical investigation to see if she is pregnant (Villaflor v. 41 Phil. Summers. or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime. The accused can be ordered to expel the morphine from his mouth (U. Viewed against present standards. U. (1917)). v.

Salas and People v. Sara). The court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor. 34. Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant. 35. said respondent filed.of the city of Manila. Castillo. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. He contends that said six letters are the complainant's. 485 (1937) F: In connection with this administrative case. no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. [Bermudez v. violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights Ruling: The constitutional guaranty. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. 64 Phil. Indeed. but the . The corollary to the proposition is that. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. six letters which. for this involves the use of the mental process. Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. were marked as Exhibits 32. be decided as cases arise. to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. 36 and 37. is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. making the accused take dictation to get a specimen of her handwriting is not allowed. However. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. Castillo. for purposes of identification. The taking of footprint sample to see if it matches the ones found in the scene of the crime is allowed (People v.] Bermudez v. 64 Phil. of course. 485 (1937).

thereby denying the respondent's petition. In view of the foregoing consideration . one for all. it would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for perjury. It would violate her right against self. to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. did not compel her to submit to the trial required. The reason for the privilege appears evident. Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be forced to make a copy of the letters in her own handwriting Ruling: No. The complainant. then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally. then the evidence must be sought elsewhere.latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal Constitutional Law II Respondent required complainant to copy the letters in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person. it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it. The investigator. upholding the complainant. she had sworn to tell the truth before the investigator authorized to receive statements under oath. If such is its purpose. Were she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might write later that said documents had really been written by her. refused invoking her right not to incriminate herself. and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself. This court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter. in a criminal or any other case." It should be noted that before it was attempted to require the complainant to copy the six documents above-stated. or he should be asked. to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. and under said oath she asserted that the documents in question had not been written by her.incrimination. The constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

as it is hereby held. the trial court relied . They contended that they had not been shown a search warrant. They were charged with and convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs law. for this also involves the mental process. Forced reenactments like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against selfincrimination. Go. and the reenactment done by them of the circumstances surrounding the killing. the right is meant to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person. was acquitted. In concluding that a search warrant had been presented to the accused prior to the search. the house of the accused was searched. People v. People v. 154 SCRA 525 F: Villarojo. to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. the respondent's petition is denied. Olvis. Cademas and Sorela were convicted in the lower court of murder for the death of Bagon. Olvis. Upon the presentation of a search warrant. the alleged principal by inducement. in a criminal or any other case. 237 SCRA 73 F: After a buy-bust operation accused were arrested by the police. that the complainant is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her. But the accused were denied their right to counsel not once but twice when they were forced to re-enact the crime. Also requiring the accused to reenact the crime is not allowed. This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion but this has since been extended to any evidence communicative in nature acquired under circumstances of duress. and several prohibited drugs were seized. He cannot therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. The three accused were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial confessions executed by them in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI to handle appellants' case.and holding. RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible. They were made in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI and not of appellants' own choice. Essentially.

In what proceedings available The privilege is available in any proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not such document is admissible in evidence. signed by the accused. the accused were convicted of the crime charged against them. The second paragraph of the Certification is a self-incriminatory statment made at a time when the spouses were not assisted by counsel and under circumstances (in the course of or immediately after the search of the residence and seizure of quantities of shabu) which render intelligent waiver of their right against self-incrimination open to serious doubt. 2. To this extent. Board of Medical . the marked money. RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. In Pascual v. no force or intimidation had been exercised upon the spouses. subject to the control and custody of the accused (the spouses) and necessarily in their possession. The Court considers that there is nothing to prevent admission of the “Certification” to substantiate the fact that a search warrant issued by a judge had been brought to the attention of the spouses in the course of the raid or buy-bust operation carried out at their residence and that in the course thereof. for they may eventually lead to a criminal prosecution.on a document entitiled “Certificate of Reconduct of Search”. and shabu papaphernalia had been found by the police authorities at the residence of the Go spouses and therefore.The second paragraph of the Certification amounts to an implied admission that shabu. the “Certification” is a declaration against the Constitutional Law II interest and tacit admission of the crime charged. Notwithstanding such. even outside the court.

Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. now respondentappellant. made of record his objection. counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner. on February 12. Thereupon.appellee. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality. A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2. the SC held that the privilege against self-incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect. at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing." HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. Board of Medical Examiners. stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed. the Board of Examiners.. 1965. relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. filed on February 1. Jr. 28 SCRA 344 (1969). it was held that a doctor who was being investigated by a medical board for alleged malpractice and would lose his license if found guilty. such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or . took note of such a plea. Pascual v.Examiners. who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Respondentappellant. The constitutional guarantee. petitioner-appellee. through counsel. 28 SCRA 344 (1969) F: Arsenio Pascual. unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. petitioner-appellee. 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness. along with other rights granted an accused. In this case. finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself. 1965. could not be compelled to take the witness stand without his consent. for some an even greater deprivation.

incrimination F: The respondents led by General Fabian Ver and Major General Prospero Olivas testified before the Agrava Board looking into the killing of former Senator Benigno Aquino. sec. HELD: The persons summoned to testify before the Agrava Board were "under investigation for the commission of the offense" within the meaning of Art. the Sandiganbayan excluded the testimony." In the light of the above. To quote from Chief Justice Warren. 138 SCRA 274 (1985) A person can be compelled to testify provided he is given immunity co-extensive with the privilege against self. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice. They were subsequently accused of murder in two cases for the killing of Sen. More and more in line with the democratic creed. respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot. infra. The prosecution offered in evidence the testimony of Ver and Olivas before the Agrava Board. The private and public prosecutions filed petitions for certiorari. That right is the hallmark of our democracy.methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. Pamaran. consistently with the self-incrimination clause. In Galman v. Aquino and Rolando Galman. 12. Pamaran." Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment. Galman v.. must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. It is to be noted that . III. compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government . They were charged as accessories in both.." So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. but on the latter's objections. the privilege was held to extend to fact-finding investigation by anadhoc body.

Yet they were not informed or at the very least warned of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them may be used against them. The respondents were called to determine their probable involvement in the crime. The SC also said it cannot be contended that the privilege against self. 5 of PD 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. "Use and Fruit Immunity" v. that can only be supplied by the testimony of certain persons and the highly primed constitutional right not to make a person a witness against himself. it has to grant immunity by means of law to the persons testifying. Art. so as not to violate their right against self-incriminatrion. III. much less their right to remain silent. This is the only way to reconcile two conflicting values. The problem concerns the extent of immunity that the State must grant in order . public interest to get certain relevant information. provides that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 3. say.incrimination applies only to criminal prosecutions. The SC said it is not satisfied that when they testified they waived their constitutional right not be compelled to be a witness against themselves. sec.the framers of the Constitution did not adopt the Miranda reference to "custodial investigation." The subject matter dealt with and the questioning before the Agrava Board indubitably evinced purposes other than merely determining the surrounding facts and circumstances of the assassination. 175 SCRA 216 (1989). Through an immunity statute. supra. 17 of the Const. The first portion of Sec." Compare People v. the state in effect exchanges immunity for the testimony of a witness. "Transactional Immunity" When the State requires testimony to be made before a board or body. and gave power to the Board to punish refusal to testify. to legislation. Ayson.

even if the guilt of the person testifying can be proven by independent means.S. a person is exempted from the use of his testimony as well as the leads (fruits) that the testimony opened up in a criminal prosecution arising from what he testified on. With the validity of this limited immunity was raised. The immunity is from the prosecution. a person is given immunity from prosecution of the crime in connection with which he gave his testimony.S. and Zicarelli v. Thus. providing for transactional immunity. if the state can procure evidence. Use and Fruit Immunity In a use and fruit immunity. Congress in 1893 passed the Compulsory Testimony Act. In 1964. Thus. Transactional Immunity In a transactional immunity. ruled that the right is amply protected by the use and fruit immunity. SC in Murphy v. the SC ruled that the only way to respect the right against self-incrimination is to give transactional immunity.S. U. Waterfront Commission of New York hinted that it was not really necessary to give transactional immunity in order to protect the right against self incrimination. U. Hitchcock (1892). independent of the testimony and its fruits. This gave the U. it can prosecute the person testifying nevertheless.S. History in the United States In Councilman v. he can not be prosecuted anymore. The immunity in this case is from the testimony given. Thus. the SC in Castigas v. anything less violates the constitutional right. "Transactional immunity" can be found in the following . the U. In the Philippines There is no fixed rule in the Philippines.to protect the privilege against selfincrimination. Congress the cue to revise the Compulsory Testimony Act and provide for a "use and fruit immunity". not merely from the use of the testimony.

XIII. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions xxx (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient . Sec.Constitutional Law II Art.

Any testimony made. Exclusionary rule Art. the Sandiganbayan sustained the objection. supra. "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. it hinted that were it not for the provision in the decree conmpelling attendance and testimony on pain of being held in contempt. Aquino and Galman. Pamaran. xxx (3) Any confession or admission .D. When objected to. a case was file against Ver in the Sandiganbayan.D. and which was the subject-matter of Galman v. 1886. but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. "use and fruit immunity can be found in P. 5 grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board. In this case. every person summoned by the Board has to appear and testify on pain of being held in contempt. III. which grants "use immunity" and the other. But since the state needed the testimony. Pamaran. sec.VV 4. and one of the evidence presented was the testimony he made before the Board. Ver and other high-ranking AFP officials were made to testify before the Agrava Board investigating the double murder of Sen. the State must honor its obligation and disallow the use of the testimony in the criminal prosecution. Galman v. which grants what is known as "transactional immunity. which created the Agrava Fact Finding Board. 138 SCRA 274 (1985). The SC held that the testimony could not be used in a subsequent proceeding. Use and Fruit Immunity On the other hand.1886. it gave them immunity and so now. Under P. 12. was exempted from being "used" in a criminal prosecution.to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority. And so the matter was raised to the SC on certiorari. Sec. On the other hand. HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one. 138 SCRA 274 (1985)." The distinction between the two is: "Use immunity" prohibits use of a witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. the accused could have invoked the right against selfincrimination. in turn. PD 1886. Despite this however.

and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law. The court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. Chavez v. his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. is not admissible under the exclusionary rule. The paradigmatic application of the exclusionary rule is a traditionally coerced confession. When the privilege is violated by the court itself. to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. 5. Court of Appeals. by the police. the court is ousted of its jurisdiction." The trial court branded him "a self. on habeas corpus. should he fail in this. that is. say. too. then the testimony. Accused Chavez was made to testify as a witness for the prosecution without him being considered a state witness inspite of objections by his counsel. and not so much on uncounselled statement. all its proceedings are null and void. Roger Chavez was found guilty. Aforti ori.obtained in violationof this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Court of Appeals. 34 SCRA 663 (1968). that. 34 SCRA 663 (1968) F: The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled. testimony forced out of a person cannot be used in evidence against that person. by the judge. and it is as if no judgment has been rendered. There is his prayer.confessed culprit Constitutional Law II Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against selfincrimination was violated . As a matter of fact. Effect of denial of the privilege by court When the privilege against selfincrimination is violated outside of court. as already noted. A classic case is Chavez v. he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief.

Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure. unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted. occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. genuine will. unfettered exercise of his own free. it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. Pressure which operates to overbear his will. or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in . directly or indirectly. and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence. we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself. xxx With all these. of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him. Because. disable him from making a free and rational choice. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." Petitioner. it is mandatory. and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. it may be the product of unintentional statements.Ruling: YES The right agianst self-incrimination is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court". For. to remain silent. the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. Therefore. The constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity. in reality. it is his right to forego testimony. of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. as accused. it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right.

His testimony is not of his own choice. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Chavez went to the SC on habeas corpus. he claimed the right upon being called to testify. in spite of his objection that he had the right to remain silent and not to be a witness against himself. which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. the judgment became final and executory. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt. A court which denies the accused of his constitutional rights is ousted of its jurisdiction. He appealed but the lawyer failed to file the appellant's brief and so the appeal was dismissed. Nor could he escape testifying. Notes on the case: In this case. To him it was a case of compelled submission. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack. and he served his sentence. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. on the contrary. and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. Years later.Habeas corpus is proper to challenge a conviction where the consitutional rights of the accused were violated. And so he took the witness stand and was convicted by qualified theft.his own defense. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. he did not offer himself as a witness. the accused Chavez was compelled by the judge with the threat of being held in contempt to take the witness stand. contending that his convictioin was void because it was rendered on the basis of evidence obtained in the violation . The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void. this circumstance cannot be counted against him.

and must now thus submit himself to cross-examination. When the judge compelled the accused to take the witness stand. Ultimately. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial of civilians by military courts Animas v.of his right against self. Habeas Corpus. E. thus making the detention of Chavez illegal. and thus actionable by habeas corpus Constitutional Law II The case also illustrates the difference between the ordinary witness and the accused. invoking his right against selfincrimination. he cannot even be made to take the witness stand. for the only purpose of such is to incriminate him. is an extraordinary post-conviction. he is deemed to have waived his right. But in the case of the accused. midsentence.incrimination. the judgment of conviction and even the sentence were likewise void. the moment the accused agrees to take the stand. The SC granted the petition and released him. 146 SCRA 406 (1986) F: This petition challenges the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try twelve accused persons. he was ousted of his jurisdiction and all subsequent proceedings became void. The petitioners were charged with murder in connection with the alleged killing of . as shown by this case. A witness can be conmpelled to take the stand. for the offense devoid of any national security or political complexion and committed long before the proclamation of martial law. Minister of National Defense. only one of whom is in the military. he can only object to the questions as they come. The petition forhabe as corpus is such that it inquires into all questions of illegal detention. Of course. remedy.

27 is without jurisdiction over the criminal case Ruling: The military court is without jurisdiction. The crime for which the petitioners were charged was committed on November 10. 150 SCRA 144 Military trial of civilians void even under Martial Law if the civil courts are open F: . 1972 after martial law was proclaimed.R. 1971 long before the proclamation of martial law. Hon. 1983 and March 13. 1984) where the lone military personnel was ordered tried together with 19 civilians accused before a civil court. It is also clear from the records that the acts for which Sgt. " Illegal Possession of Firearms with Murder. 34. de Guzman v. There was no question about the case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil courts at the time. The accused were arrested almost a year later. 62798. December 22.Yanson. Olaguer v. It was only in 1974 that a "summary preliminary investigation" was conducted by a PC captain belonging to the Judge Advocate General Service. et al. Thereafter. No. by a military tribunal. but he modified the crime charged from "Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code" in Relation to Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential Decree No. the Judge Advocate General filed the corresponding charge sheet. considering that one of them. and martial law is a thing of the past. Alejandro R. 9. hopefully never more to return. Leopando. Animas was charged had nothing to do with the performance of official duty. Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No.during the November 11 elections. Now that it is already late 1986. petitioner Sgt. (G. the Minister of National Defense referred the case to the Military Tribunal's Branch of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned the same to respondent Military Commission No. Rodolfo Animas is a military personnel. Military Commission No. 1978. The petitioners were recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal. 27." On February 16. We apply the rule in Rolando A. at this time. there is no more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be retained. on September 21. a political leader.

Petitioners were found guilty of subversion by the respondent military commission and sentenced to death. Ponce-Enrile. Apart from these differences the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it. Judicial power exists only in the courts which have the exlcusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen. prohibition andmand amu s before the SC. HELD: In Aquino v. xxx "The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition. 160 SCRA 702 (1988) F: Habeas corpus proceedings were . but is a military officer. despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger. and renders offenses against the laws of war as well as those of a civil character.VV.certiorari. among others. selects its members and the counsel on both sides. Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. As explained by Justice Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is a pervasive one in military laws. triable by military tribunals. however demands that in all criminal cases prosecutions.xxx" Due process. questioning the jurisdiction of the military tribunal." Since we are not an enemy occupied territory and even on the premise that martial continues in force. the accused shall be entitled to. the SC held that "Martial law creates and exception to the general rules of exclusive jurisdiction. They filed a petition for habeas corpus. the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. a trial. Military Commission (1975). Cruz v. Military Commission supra: "Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the SC and insuch inferior courts as are established by law.

that crimes appear to have been committed.commenced in this Court on October 1. even during the period of martial law. It is not to be forgotten that the victims in offenses ascribed to the petitioners have as much interest as the State has to prosecute the alleged authors of the misdeeds. over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning. at which time the petitioners may apply for bail for their temporary release. this had neither been pleaded nor proved. It seems evident. Justice will be better served if the detention of such of the petitioners as are not hereby ordered released or excepted. All had been made to stand trial for common crimes before various courts martial. 157 are civilians. however. Issue: Whether or not military courts have jurisdiction over civilians Ruling: No As held in Olaguer: A military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction. and the necessary informations have been filed against them therein. Usman and Samu Gumal. and there are accusations against herein petitioners for those offenses. or establish that the same are baseless. if any of these offenses had any political color. and only 26 confirmed as military personnel. The State should be given a reasonable period of time to accomplish this transfer. The Solicitor General not unreasonably anticipates questions to arise as to the availability of certain defenses to the petitioners upon their prosecution before the civil courts. and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned The fact cannot be ignored. that no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting . as has already been done in the case of petitioners Imperial D. is continued until their cases are transferred to the ordinary courts having jurisdiction. however. Of the 217 prisoners. so as to entitle them to immediate release from detention. 1986 to test the legality of the continued detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. Olaguer cannot and does not operate to absolve the petitioners of these charges.

the Anti-Subversion Law (RA 1700) which declared the Communist Party of the Philippines a clear and present danger to Philippine security. which outlaws the Communist Party and other "subversive associations". ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder HELD: NO . dismissed the contention. G. holding that although the law mentions the CPP in particular. the legislature finds individuals or groups guilty. and punishes any person who "knowingly. Ferrer.an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would result from the retrial of the petitioners" cases. In People v. Through a statute. however. becomes or remains a member. its purpose is not to define a crime but only to lay a basis or to justify the legislative determination that membership in such organization is a crime because of the clear and present danger to national security. 48 SCRA 382 (1972) F: Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act. People v. The SC. A bill of attainder is of two kinds: (i) bill of attainder proper (legislative imposition of the death penalty) and (ii) bill of pains and penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty). Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second prosecution. willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself. Bills of attainder-Legislative adjudication of guilt Bill of Attainder A "bill of attainder" is a law which substitutes the legislative determination of guilt for a judicial determination. Ferrer." of the Party and of any other similar "subversive" organization. 48 SCRA 382 (1972). with. for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. and thus prohibited membership in such organization. without the benefit of being proven so in court. was contended to be a bill of attainder.

H. were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. Sec. After the case has been submitted for decision. In fact the Act applies not only to the CPP but to "any other organizatuiion having the same purposes and their successors". Indeed. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation. without more would suffice to secure their punishement. The term "CPP" is used solely for definition purposes. The right to a speedy disposition of cases complements the right to a speedy trial.A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial. so that technically the trial stage is terminated. Right to a speedy disposition of cases Art. willfully and by overt acts. the Constitution mandates that the judicial. 16. What it does is simply to declare the Party to an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition against membersip in the outlawed organization. it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Phils (CPP) of the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. quasijudicial.judicial or administrative body or tribunal must decide the case consistent with the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly. or administrative bodies. it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court. The constitutional ban against bill of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rulemaking and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. the . and that they joined with the specific intent to further its basic objectives. To carry out this mandate. as the law alone. quasi. III. Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

What the Consitution further prohibits is imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. VIII. Martinez. Debts and civil obligations Art. Sec. 15 (1). 18. the SC again upheld Batas Blg. When one is convicted of estafa and sent to prison. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) as not unconsitutional for being violative of the rule against nonimprisonment for debt. 2. 146 SCRA 323 (1986) F: BP 22 punishes any person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value. in Lozano v.Constitution in several other places provides periods for deciding a case: The Supreme Court has to decide cases within 24 months from the date of submission of the case for decision which is the date of filing of the last pleading [Art. 146 SCRA 123 (1986). Sec. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. however. which is a tax imposed on certain persons regardless of their property or business. It is. knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment. Martinez. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE A. 20. Lozano v. the imprisonment is not for the non. It is true that under this law deceit is not necessary. a valid exercise of the State of its power to determine what acts constitute a crime. Thus. Mere beliefs and aspirations Art. What the law prohibits is imprisonment for non-payment of a contractual obligation. What acts cannot be criminalized 1. III. The prohibition does not apply to non-payment of property taxes and taxes on privilege.payment of debt but for the deceit or abuse of confidence employed by the convict. Sec. which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds xxx" Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of BP 22 on the following grounds: 1) It offends the constitutional provision prohibiting .] III. III.

These demand deposits in the banks constitute the funds against which commercial papers are drawn. It is a law that retroacts to the day of the act so as to cause prejudice to the person performing the act. Recent statistics show that one third of the entire money supply of the country consists of currency in circulation. and 5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan prohibited amendment of the bill on 3rd reading. When a law is more favorable to the accused.. 22. ISSUE: W/N it is an ex post facto law. however.. it is allowed to retroact. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but as an offense against public order. 35 SCRA 428 F: This petition for declaratory was filed by Kay Villegas Kami Inc.imprisonment for debt. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. and thus could not have avoided the crime. claiming to be a duly recognized non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land. Ex Post Facto Law An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks to punish an act which. RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's right s and duties thereunder. when committed. HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished in BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. Acts which when done were innocent Art. HELD: NO An ex post facto law is one which: .payment of an obligation which the law punishes. 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause. Petitioner claims that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law. Inc. III. was not yet a crime or was not as heavily punished. In re Kay Villegas Kami. It is not the non. 3. 8. and praying for the detremination of the validity of Sec. 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers. 2) it impairs freedom of contract. Its unfairness consists in the fact that the person could not have known the act was criminal. Sec. The amount concerned justifies the legitimate concern of the state in preserving the integrity of the banking system.

III. 19. or a proclamation of amnesty. B. What punishments cannot be imposed 1. 2 Phil. 74 (1902)] This constitutional prohibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect.1. 4. and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that its provisions shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only. While it is true that Sec. 18 (2) No involuntary sevitudes in any form shall exist. and punishes such an act. Wolfe. or makes it greater than it was. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Excessive fines Art. 5. and 6. Sec. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled. 2. 8(a) thereof. Alters the legal rules of evidence. unless for compelling reasons . when committed. except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been convicted. III. Involuntary servitude Art. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law which was innocent when done. Aggravates a crime . 3. such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal. 18 penalizes a violation of any provisin of RA 6132 including Sec. nor cruel. degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. 2. the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful. Sec. [Quoting Mekin v.

it was against "cruel or unusual " penalty. or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions. After all. III. or those of antiquity. degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. 19.inco mmunic ad o. Secret detention places. and not to fix the concept of what is cruel to the standards of the present civilization. 19 (2).. due process prohibits barbaric and disproportionate penalties. Sec. force. the prohibition is against "cruel. in 1973. The employment of physical. Sec. shall be dealt with by law. the prohibition was against "cruel and unusual" penalty. threat. or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Sec. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Assuming that judgment has been rendered and the accused has been convicted the Constitution now further prescribes certain standards as to the punishment that can be meted out. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. the Congress hereafter provides for it. III. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed. Id. psychological or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee.involving heinous crimes. xxx (2) No torture. degrading and inhuman punishments Art. solitary. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed. in 1987. the Congress hereafter provides for it. nor cruel. intimidation.] In 1935. 12. 3. Cruel. so that what . [Art. degrading or inhuman" punishment. violence. This notion is supposed to expand and grow. The purpose in changing the phraseology is to allow for experimentation.

etc. 200 SCRA 11 (1991) F: . 900 (1953) the SC ruled that it was the form of punishment as fixed in antiquity (pillory desembowelment. And yet. dela Cruz. this was a form of penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.) and not its severity. The question concerns the penalty to be imposed in view of Art. The range of medium and minimum penalties remain the same. Lubreo. People v. III. Borja was sentenced and he served at the national penitentiary for 20 years before the case came to the SC. that constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty under the 1935 Constitution. Congress provides for it. it had become cruel by the lapse of time. sec. 19 which provides that "Neither shall the death penalty be imposed." HELD: Art. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. 170 SCRA 107 (1989) F: The accused are four of the 11 bodyguards of a mayor who killed three persons on suspicion that they were cattle rustlers. Borja 91 SCRA 340 (1979). 92 Phil.VV. Three appealed to the SC which found them equally liable for the killing. Whether the cruelty of a punishment depends on its form or whether it depends on its severity has been ambivalently answered by the SC: In People v. Although the sentence was initially valid.today is considered as acceptable may in the next generation be deemed as cruel penalty. Munoz. People v. Thus a disproportionate penalty (10 years imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual because it is only a matter of severity of an acceptable form of punishment (imprisonment). III. 248 of the RPC except insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty adn reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The penalty for murder under the RPC is reclusion temporal to death. The Court said that Borja had been living in the shadow of death. section 19 does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. They were found guilty of murder. The SC spoke in a different way in People v.

his defense of alibi would not prosper. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution and until such burden is sufficiently discharged . he filed an information for murder not only against remelito but also against Lucresio Lubreo. he forwarded the records of the case to the Office of Provincial Fiscal. and that therefore. An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. the lower court convicted Lucrecio on the basis of its conclusion that he was positively identified by witnesses Nenita Monter and Epifanio Pangatungan as one of the assailants. ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of innocence in favor of Lucrecio has been overturned by the prosecution HELD: NO. In the instant case.A complaint for homicide was filed with MTC of Del Carmen. . Thereafter. charging Remelito Lubreo along with crime of Homicide in connection with the killing of Mamerto Sanico. Trial Court find them guilty of the crime charged. the testimonies of the abovementioned witnesses did not categorically stated or proved that Lucrecio took part in hacking the victim. The fiscal conducted his own PI and on the basis thereof. the accused continues to enjoy the presumption of innocence. Surigao del Norte. Judge Gorgolon of said court conducted both the preliminary investigation and preliminary examination. Unfortunately.

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III. 5. 21. It is worse in the case of Pangatungan. he cannot be held for the acts of his co. III. Id. in the "reenactmment". Dacuycuy. the participation of Lucrecio is at one enveloped inserious doubt. There is evidently insufficient evidence to show the actual participation of Lucresio in teh crime. Sec 7. xxx (2) No torture. psychological. incommunicado and other forms of detention and the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities Art. C. she however candidly informed the court Lucresio was just standing by and she could not remmenber as to who actually hacked the victim. Sec.Constitutional Law II Though Monter categorically stated in her direct examination that she saw the accused Lucresio hacking the victim. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Sec. conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance. solitary. Secret detention places. Indefinite Imprisonments People v. 12. 19. (Rule 117..appellant. 173 SCRA 90 (1989). he never elaborated as to what "abetted in hacking " means. 4. supra. The protection against double jeopardy Art. violence. Elements of double jeopardy. He could not even specify the part of the body of Mamerto which was hit by Lucrecio. While he stated that "Lucrecio abetted in hacking as if they will come one after the other in hacking his mind (sic) and the neck". From her version. threat. Sec. or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Secret detention places. or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. solitary. There being no evidence of conspiracy. xxx (2) The employment of physical. . force. intimidation.inco mmunic ad o.

23 SCRA 249 (1968): (1) Court of competent jurisdiction. or dismissal of the case without the express consent. (3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party. the victim died. 5: (1) The graver offense developed die to "supervening facts" arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charged. of one of these offense (Crime A). Yorac. and an individual is convicted. because after the filing of the information. the SC allowed the amnedment of the information from its original cahrge of frustrated homicide. where the SC disallowed the amendment of the information from slight physical injuries to frustrated murder after the prosecution subjected the victim to another medical examination and found a wound. that it was the fault of the prosecution if they had an incompetent medical examination. (4) Conviction. . (2) The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information. (3) Arraignment and plea by the Accused.People v. acquittal. This overrules People v. Identity of offenses and identity of act When an act gives rise to two or more offense which are punished by the same authority. acquitted. People. in Melo v. 85 Phils. of the accused. Thus. or the case dismissed without his consent. (2) A Complaint or Information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. Subsequent prosecution is barred for the following: (1) Same offense (2) Attempt of the same offense (3) Frustration of the same offense (4) Offense necessarily included in the 1st offense (All the elements of the 2nd constitute some of the elements of the 1st offense)(5) Offense that necessarily includes the 1st offense (All the elements of the 1st constitute some of the elements of the 2nd offense) Exceptions to no. Obsania. 766 (1950).

Relova was prosecuted under an ordinance of Batangas City for the use of wiring to tap electricity without permission from the local authorities.there is no double jeopardy if he is charged of another offfense (Crime B) flowing from the same act. So the fiscal filed a case for theft of electricity under the RPC. there is no identity of offenses. Identity of Offenses: If a married man maintains as concubine a married woman not his wife. one punished by a law and the other punished by an ordinance. but the case was dismissed because the crime has prescribed. or the case dismissed without his consent. 138 SCRA 166 . then if an individual is convicted. For although the offenses were different. this is called double jeopardy by "identity of act. acquitted. Bocar. there is double jeopardy when there is an identity of act. of any of these offenses punished by one authority (Crime A by law). But when an act which give rise to two or more offenses is punished by two different authorities (a law and an ordinance). even if he is charged of another offense which is punished by the other auhtority (Crime B by ordinance). this is called double jeopardy by "identity of offenses". the two offenses coming from the same authority. And in this case. Relova. flowed from the same act. And yet he can be prosecuted for both because. Identity of Act: People v. both flowed from the same act.In People v. 48 SCRA 292 (1987). there is double jeopardy. Thus. Double jeopardy arises only when he is again charged of that same offense (Crime A). the act was punished by a law and an ordinance. two offenses arise." Sum: If only a law in involved. Thus. The SC ruled there was double jeopardy already. But is a law and an ordinance are involved. the man is guilty of both concubinage and adultery. or was ousted of its jurisdiction beccause it violated the right to due process of the parties. Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy If the court has no jurisdiction. there is double jeopardy only when there is an identity of offenses. the accused may again be charged. and so the second case could no longer be filed. because both offenses. From the same act (cohabiting with the married woman). the decision is null and void.

Sandiganbayan. the SC declared the criminal prosecution of the 26 accused in the AquinoGalman double murder case a "mistrial" after the SC commission found that the Sandiganbayan justices and the Tanodbayan prosecutors had been summoned by the President and instructed on how to conduct the trial. the SC. sec. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987) F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht violation of Ordinance No. The prosecution appealed contending the offense was different. Fourteen days later. The second sentence provides an exception: that the protection . III. 144 SCRA 43 (1986). He admitted installing the electric wiring devices found by the police in order to decrease the readings of electric current.(1985). Once the court deprives either party. This ousted the court of its juridsiction. although both may be based from the same facts. Thus. held that the move by the trial court of summarily dismissing a criminal case for theft on the ground that it merely involved a question of ownership deprived the prosecution of due process by denying it the chance to introduce its evidence. of a fighting chance. The court also dismissed this case on the ground of double jeopardy. 1 series of 1974 of Batangas City prohibiting the installation of electric wiring devices without authority from the city government. Two situations contemplated People v. then it is ousted from its jurisdiction. and double jeopardy would not apply. The first sentence of Art. The case was however dismissed on the ground that the offense had prescribed. the accused were ordered retried. In Galman v. the City Fiscal filed another case for theft against him. which in this case is the State. Due process is a right not only of the accused but also of the State. HELD: The contention has no merit. 21 states the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution. 1.

154 SCRA 175 (1987) Constitutional Law II F: Agapito Gonzales. do not make only one offense. The other accused. the offense defined in Sec. 3 requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. and (3) the second jeopardy must be for teh same offense. 11 RA 3060 and Art. 201(3) of the RPC. where the informatin allegedly contain the same allegations as the information in the first criminal case. he again moved to quash the information in one of the Criminal case on the ground of duble jeopardy.7. or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. as there was according to him. Court granted the motion. Branch VI. in relation to Sec. The 2 informations with which the accused was charged . accused Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. was accused of violating Sec. All these requisites do not exist in this case. Pangilinan. (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated. in two separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila. contrary to private repondent's allegation.VV. ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. together with Roberto Pangilinan. or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. Upon arraignment. Later. also pending aginst him another criminal case. HELD: NO It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy. 7 of the RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included inthe offense defined in Art 201 (3) of the RPC punishing the exhibition of indecent and . In other words. was not arraigned as he is still at large.against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under the national statute such as the RPC provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. City Court of Manila. Motion denied. People v. Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 cases on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense.

while the offense punished in Art. the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense . Sec. the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged.Suzette. the offense punished in Art 201(3) of the RPC is the public showing os indecent or immoral plays. or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of compentent jurisdiction. its public showing constitutes a crimnal offense. On the other hand. The motion picture may be indecent or immoral but if it has not been previously approved by the Board. Former conviction of acquittal. However. The elements of the 2 offenses are different.immoral motin pictures. The crime punished in RA 3060 is malum prohibitum in wh criminal intent need not ber proved because it is presumed.-When an accused has been convicted or acquitted. Rules of Court provisions Rule 117. 2. double jeopardy. which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense in the former complaint of information. 201(3) of the RPC is malum in se. The nature of both offenses also differs. upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge. The gravamen of the offense defined in RA 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion pictures which has not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. 7. or shows. scenes. not just motion pictures. acts.

which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission consituting the former charge; (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information; or (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party. In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfied or serves in whole or in part the judgement, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense. Melo v. People, 85 P 776 (1950) F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI, Rizal with frustrated homicide , for having allegedly inflicted upon Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On Dec. 29, 1949, at 8 am, accused pleaded not guilty to the offense chargde. At 10:15 am of the same day, Obillo died from his wounds. An amended information

Constitutional Law II was filed charging accused with consummated homicide. Accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy. Motion denied. ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. HELD: NO Double jeopardy means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. The phrase "the same offense" has always been construed to mean not only that the second offense

charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This rule of identity however does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inesistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the accused dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another offense, for the purpose of detremining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute a second jeopardy.Suzette. People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 SCRA 637 (1983) F: This is a petition to review the order of the City Court of Manila Branch XI, dismissing the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against Gapay, in a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy. Respondent court held that the accused having been previously tried and convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the resulting death of the victim would place the accused in double jeopardy. ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries. HELD: YES Well settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. However as held in the MELO

case, the rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of teh first prosecution , for the reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was inexistent. The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day the information was filed , and the accused was arraigned 2 days after or on October 20, 1972 . When the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on October 24, 1972, the accused was already in doubly jeopardy.Suzette. People v. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971) F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party being Lam Hock who, according to the medical cerificate issued by Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, was confined since April 8 1968 up to the present time for head injury in Occidental Negros Provincial Hspital. Accused pleaded guilty on April 16, 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days for arresto menor. On April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the same act against the aforesaid victim Lam Hock for upon further diagnosis, the healing period for the injuries caused to accused was found to be longer. A motion to quash was filed by the accused on the ground of double jeopardy. ISSUE: W/N the defendant, who had already been convicted of slight physical injuries for injuries inflicted on Lam Hock , and had served sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person HELD: NO. In order not to violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy, there is the indispensable requirement of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the defendant is responsible changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense

Constitutional Law II In this case, there is no supervening fact

which occurred to justify the non-existence of double jeopardy. The wound causing the delay in the healing of the injuries caused to the victim was already in existence at the time of the first examination of the doctor. Said delay was caused by the very superficial and inconclusive examination then made resulting to a later finding of fracture.Suzette. Barlongay: When defense of double jeopardy available.--(1) Dismissal based on isufficiency of evidence; (2) dismissal bec. of denial of accused's right to speedy trial; (3) accused is discharged to be a state witness. When defense of double jeopardy not available.--When the case is dismissed other than on the merits upon motion of the accused personally, or through counsel, such dismissal is regarded as w/ express consent of the accused, who is therefore deemed to have waived the right to plea double jeopardy. Yap v. Lutero, April 30, 1959 F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in violation of a city ordinance. Later he was charged again in another criminal case in the same court with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Yap moved to quash the latter information. Meanwhile, petitioner was acquitted in the first case. ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy. RULING: YES. From the viewpoint of Criminal Law, as distinguished from Constitutional or Political Law - the offenses with which petitioner was charged constitute, strictly different offenses, although, under certain conditions, one offense may include the other, and accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other. Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the second information were not established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in the first case of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in the first case, unless he pleaded double jeopardy.Charo . Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 F: The petitioners filed an action to nullify the proceedings on the trial of the AquinoGalman duble murder case alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting

Hence this appeal by the fiscal. 23 SCRA 249 F: The information filed by the fiscal alleged that through violence and intimidation. The SC dismissed. the legal shield of double jepardy. DJ cannot be invoked where the prosecution. Marcos used the overwhelming resources of the Government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in this case. the case has become moot and academic. However. Obsania had carnal knowledge of one Erlinda Dollente against the latter's will. The unwholly scenario for the acquittal of the accused after the rigged trial would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfying the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giviing them. The accused after pleading not guilty moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the first information was fatally defective for failing to allege "lewd desiigns. In legal contemplation. the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged. The criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents completely disqualified them and voidedab initio the SB verdict. coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as in this case is a void judgment. . Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the SC ruling. A dictated. RULING: The report of the Commission revealed that Pres." and that the amended information did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. through their acquittal.mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. People v. which represents the sovereign people in crimnal cases is denied due process. Respondents submitted that in view of the SB decision. The SC created the Vasquez Commisssion to look into petitioners' allegations. The motion of the defense was sustained by the judge. Obsania. the fiscal amended the complaint to allege therein that the offense was committed with lewd designs. It neither binds nor bars anyone. it is no judgment. double jeopardy does not attach where a criminal trial was a sham. Later. Meanwhile.

(2) a court of competent jurisdiction. or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. and (4) the defendant was acquitted. The only remaining and decisive issue in this case seems to be as to whether or not the case was dismissed without the prior consent of the accused. when the case is dismissed. or convicted. The SC ruled that as a general rule. other than on the .RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege "lewd designs" in the first information does not affect the sufficiency in substance of the information. for unchaste motives are deemed inherent in the very act of rape itself. the following requisites must have been obtained to invoke the constitutional protection against it: (1) a valid complaint or information. In any case. (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge. the lower court erred in dismissing the case by failing to distinguish between the concept of jurisdiction and insufficiency in substance of an indictment Constitutional Law II As to the question of double jeopardy.

and not the writ itself. the President may. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ. all the detaining office needs to do when he receives the writ of habeas corpus is to show to the court that the detainee is being detained for an offense covered by the suspension. Sec.. The case of herein accused falls under the general rule. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion. 18.merits. What is suspended is the privilege of the writ.. VII. such dismissal is to be ragarded as with the express consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed to have waived his right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is estopped from claiming such defense on appeal by the Government or in another indictment for the same offense. and the court cannot inquire any further to find out if . and to show cause why he should continue to be detained. The writ will always issue as a matter of course. when the public safety requires it. upon motion of the accused. when the public safety requires it. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. The exception to this is where the dismissal is sought by the accused on the ground that they were denied their right to a speedy trial and that the government failed to prosecute. (Art.) A "writ of heabeas corpus" is a writ directed to the person detaining another. D. 15. In case of invasion or rebellion. III. Sec. in which case double jeopardy will set in. The privilege of the writ ofhab eas corpus Art. any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within 3 days. The "privilege of the writ" is the right to have the immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty. But when the privilege of the writ is suspended. suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. commanding him to produce the body of the detainee at a designated time and place. for a period not exceeding 60 days. otherwise he shall be released.

supra. In Gumabon v. Thus. and had to report to the military. This rest of the section will be confined to habeas corpus as a remedy in all other offenses. supra. Under the Conmstitution. rape. Director of Prison. Chavez v. for these common crimes are absorbed by rebellion.Chief clause of the President. 39 P 778 (1919) Habeas corpus is available not only for those who are in actual detention but even for those whose liberty is merely restrained. while those who appealed were now free. or other common crimes. resulting in a new ruling in People v. Lukban. etc. 141 SCRA 233 (1986). As a result.the detention is legal. in Moncupa v. some persons who were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with homicide. the SC granted habeas corpus to petitioner who. though temporarily released. the privilege of the writ is an extraordinary remedy to question the illegality of the arrest or detention. rape. or any other restraint to liberty. The SC . it is the last recourse to get someone out of his illegal detention. The other accused. habeas corpus was the remedy of one whose confinement was the result of a void judgnment of conviction arrived at after the judge violated due process by compelling him to take the stand and testify against himself. however. When all else is lost. The writ of habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy In Chavez v. 2. 24 SCRA 633 (1986). the Court can now require the detaining officer to produce the body of the detainees and show cause why he should not be released. supra. 37 SCRA 420 (1971). Court of Appeals. this is so only for 3 days. appealed their conviction. Court of Appeals. could not change his residence. 1. The suspension of the privilege of the writ applied only to crimes related to invasion or rebellion. Hernandez to the effect that there can be no complex crim of rebellion with homicide. could not be interviewed by media. could not travel outside Metro Manila. An extensive discussion was made under the Commander-in. those who did not remained in jail. Functions of the writ Villavicencio v. Enrile. After 3 days. In general as already noted above.. did not appeal their conviction and so were sentenced accordingly.

4. of expression. victims of tortures Art. 3.ruled that those who conrtinued to languish in jail could avail of habeas corpus to question the legality of their continued detention pursuant to the ruling in People v. Id. III. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. Lansang v. IV. Suspension of the privilege Art.that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. 2. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Art. Garcia. III. 3. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees Free Market Place of Ideas 1. Sec. 12. Sec. and rehabilitation of. Compensation to. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. xxx (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices. VII. 11. and their families. and the truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely . 18. or of the press. Affirmative rights 1. Sec. Sec.. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievance. Sec. 12. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. Hernandez. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights Art. 18. xxx A. xxx (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctionsfor violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices. III. they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-. and their families. Free access to the courts Art. 42 SCRA 488 (1971) E. III. Sec. For the discovery of political truth When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths.

which is possible only when everyone can speak their minds out and compete in the free market place of ideas. the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" were padlocked and sealed. with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Bustos. United States. 250 U. For self government United States v.supra HELD: As a consequence of the search and seizure. (1919) The theory behind freedom of expression is the principle that ours is a democratic society. Abrams v. 616. 37 P 731 (1918) Burgos v. means of public opinion.can be carried out. (Justice Holmes. Chief of Staff. alert and even militant press is essential for the . This state of being is patenly anathematic to a democratic framework where a free. 133 SCRA 800 (1984). 2.S. and so the only way to rule ultimately is by. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioner's freedom to express themselves in print.

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380 US 51 (1964) 3. (New York v. Sanidad v. giving the government a heavy burden to show justification for the imposition of such restraint. Sullivan. The most significant expression is the law on libel. New York Times v.Constitutional Law II political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. COMELEC. United States (1971). Prior Restraints Thus any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality. also in New York Times v. Pentagon and Bantam Books v. Publication of Pentagon Papers). 181 SCRA 529 (1990) Subsequent Punishment And even subsequent punishment is tempered by the greater interest of promoting free public opinion. . For individual protection B.

Sullivan. Public policy. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper comment. And just as factual error afforded no warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free. legal moral or social duty). The falsity of some of the factual statements and alleged defamations do not qualify the role. and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. which the defense can overcome by proving the truth of the defamatory statement (which in the case of public officials may or may not constitute a crime. uncer the Revised Penal Code. and that it may well include vehement. and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. by haphazard imitation. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. Bustos. when the defense proves that the communication is privileged. any defamatory statement is presumed to be malicious (malice-in-law). Content-Based Restrictions 1. the same is true of injury to official reputation. have evolved certain tests to regulate the contents of speech. the Philippine Supreme Court. (New York Times v. United States v. If the communication is only qualifiedly privileged (Art. robust and wide-open. 354 enumerates the 2 instances: fair and true reporting of an official proceeding. welfare of society. caustic. the prosecution cannot even prove malice-in-fact. the burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove malice-in-fact.We consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to debate on public issues being uninhibited. 731 (1918). If the communication is absolutely privileged (as in parliamentary freedom of speech). so long as related to the conduct of his office) and good motive. 51 (1964) The interest of society and good government demands a full discussion of public affairs. C. Supreme Court and. Test of validity of content-based restrictions The U. Dangerous Tendency Test: When the .S. [Justice Malcom. such a presumption of malice does not arise because of the greater public interest involved.] While. 380 U.S.

in the exercise of its discretion. but this latter test consider the weighing of values. quoting Judge Learned Hand. the court cannot intrude. Grave-but-improbable danger:Whe the r the gravity of the evil. It is a question of proximity and degree.legislative body has determined generally. [Gitlow v. 249 US 47 (1919). the general provision of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific utterance if its natural and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might prohibit. In such cases. in contrast to the clear and present danger rule which applies when the speech is not prohibited by statute. New York. [Schenck v. 341 US 494 (1951). in and itself. is not open to consideration. Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.] This test was meant to supplant the clear and present danger. The speech itself may not be dangerous. this test was supposed to apply when there is a statute. Inciting to sedition. When the legislature has decided that one who advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime.]The emphasis of the test is the nature of the circumstances under which it is uttered. United States." Or saying "Fire" in a crowded movie house. They both emphasize the circumstances of the speech. 142.]Example: Art. As it evolved. United States. [Dennis v. discounted by its improbability. that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of a substantive evil that they may be punished. justifies such an invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. to bring the substantive evils. As Holmes said: "Many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight. the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely. 268 US 652 (1925). Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees of free speech and .

[Brandenburg v. (Gonzales v. 2. Balancing of Interest Test: The court must undertake the delicate and difficult task of weighing the circumstances and appraising the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA 316 (1984) F: Petitioners are . Applications of tests in various contexts a. Speaker may. Involves an appoint of the competing interest. Cruz Pano. (Freund.] The test emphasizes the very words uttered: (a) What words did he utter? (b) What is the likely result of such utterance? It criticizes the clear and present danger test for being top dependent on the circumstances. and is likely to incite or produce such action. Capulong and Enrile. Freedom of expression and national security Babst v. 134 SCRA 438 (1985). (2) the availability of more moderate controls than those the State has imposed. except where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action. for instance. cited in Salonga v. it is a question of balancing the freedom of expression of the producer and the right to privacy of Enrile. COMELEC. 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v. 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)] The test applied when two legitimate values not involving national secuirty crimes compete.S. (not in VV's revised outline) Balancing of Factors Test:The truth is theat the clear-and-present danger test is oversimplified judgement unless it takes into account also a number of other factors: (1) the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the occasion for speech or political activity. [American Communication Ass'n v. United States in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter). quoted in Dennis v.press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation. Douds. Ohio. and perhaps (3) the specific intent with which the speech is launched. 444 (1969). 395 U. when tested show no incitement but you know the speaker is inciting to sedition. Comelec) In Aver v.

it is not idle to note that. one can be held liable for what one has said if it causes damage to the rights of others. an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. who Constitutional Law II were the publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star. In addition. Makasiar. beliefs. one of them was charged with libel by a General who sought to recover P10 million in damages. they were summoned by military authorities for interrogation regarding their work. associations and even private lives. Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: The Test of "Actual Malice" Read Revised Penal Code. Be that as it may. HELD: The petition has become moot and academic. Beltran v. sentiments. feelings. 167 SCRA 393 (1988) F: The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners. b. Soliven v. Libel is the most common form of subsequent punishment. 1987 totle "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration": "If you recall. during the August 29 coup attempt. Articles 353354 and 361-362 Freedom of expression and libel Freedom of speech versus right to reputation." . On different dates in July 1980.journalists and columnists. Makasiar. They brought an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from questioning them and from filing libel suits on matters that had been the subject of inquiry by the NIB. Although one cannot be prevented from saying something before he actually says it. 12. such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance as when it comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers and the designate interrogation site is a military camp. under certain circumstances. however. the President hid under her bed while the firing was going on perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief to do so. based on the following statement in Beltran's column of Oct. while ordinarily.

Manuel v. this petition for certiorari. As an index of good faith. Cruz-Pano. HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and substantive law. This became the basis of an action for libel brought against petitioner and his clients.Beltran did not submit a counter affidavit and instead. The complaint was addressed to the official who had authority over them and could impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on the press freedom. Later. the charge is defective. the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point. the Bulletin Today published a news item based on petitioner's letter to ASAC. The fiscal denied his motion. it is difficult to believe that the petitioner. could have by himself caused the publication. moved to dismiss the complaint. HELD: xxx (3) As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel bec. The letter constitutes privileged communication. an ordinary citizen without known ties to newspaper. But the agents were exonerated so petitioner filed criminal charges of robbery. Petitioner said the agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace and bracelet and her son's wristwatch plus HK$ 70. It was sent by petitioner in his capacity as lawyer in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients. Petitioner moved to quash the case but his motion was denied. Thus. He could also invke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the public service. the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties. 172 SCRA 225 (1989) Libel suits based on official criticisms should be dismissed outright unless made in bad faith F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti-Smuggling Action Center denouncing abuses allegedly committed by ASAC agents against petitioner's clients. It does not appear either that the . directly to the addressee without any funfare nor publicity. the letter was sent privately.VV. Petitioner found prosecutors unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for damages against the agents. As for the news report. of the privileged character of the publication.

Court of Appeals. claiming of murders there.report was paid for like an advertisement. complained that the article portrayed them as exploiters of sugar workers. The . The trial court denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition force rtiorari in the IAC which was dismissed. An article must be sufficiently. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986) F: Petitioner was sued for libel in connection with the publication in the Feb. Hence. in order to be deemed libelous. it cannot be libelous. HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class. 23. it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or allembracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the article was not libelous since it did not single any particular individual. 1981 issue of Newsweek of the article "An Island of Fear. this appeal to the SC. specific or at least sweeping as to apply to all members of a group. the report referring as it does to an official act is within the realm of privileged and is protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Sola.VV. v. An erratum was published by the This Week magazine.VV. 34 SCRA 116 (1970) The pictures of a former mayor was inadvertently published and mistaken for another man who was a sanitary inspector and fooled the authorities about the Babuyan Islands. The disputed portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never singled out Sola. so that he can bring the action separately if need be. Lopez v. Newsweek Inc. sugar planters of Bacolod." The plaintiffs. so they could go and he could be rescued. made in good faith and without comments or remarks. the news item is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding. the mayor. Thus. At any rate. or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him. Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles "Island of fear in the Visayas" did not specify any individual.

c. Bustos is a landmark decision antedating by forty years a similar decision of the US Supreme Court to the effect that a libel prosecution must survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press. Bustos was careful to point out that qualified privilege and this is one instance may be "lost by proof of malice. quoting Quisumbing v. this petition force rtiorari. Justice Malcolm in US v. vis-à-vis private respondent. Mercado v. He filed another motion which was also denied. they should not be held to account. since the error in in this case could have been checked consideringing that this was a weekly magazine and not a daily uisumbing v. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy . CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982) F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of a telegram which he sent to the Secretary of Public Works requesting investigation of Mrs. The prosecution should be given a chance to prove malice. 96 Phil 510 (1955) Newspapers should be given leeway and tolerance to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. Fernando. The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as the bona fides of petitioner. In the preparation of stories. Lopez. found for plaintiff. HELD: US v. Thus. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care.mand amu s and prohibition in the SC." What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is his conduct." He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his communication was privileged. to a point of suppression. press reporters and editors usually have to race to their deadlines. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. but his motion was denied.SC. However. . but with reduced damages. Virginia Mercado of the Public Service Commission "as we have reason to believe that she has enriched herself thru corrupt practices xxx. however.

petitioner admitted that in the picture produced. Petitioner paid P5. Maria Soto vda.000. de Gonzales. w/o limitations. HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. indeed. Nelly Amante. In the case at bar. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to fictional or novelized representation of a person. it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. however. together w/ her sister and mother. It is not. In the particular circumstances presented and considering the obligations assumed by petitioner under the agreement. Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that he was forced to enter into the agreement only to avoid financial loss caused by delay in the showing of the movie and the relatives of Padilla did not have a property right in the life of M. w/c was affirmed by the CA. petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film bec. and a certain "Auring" as Padilla's girl friend. Subsequently.000 but as he failed to pay the balance agreed upon. while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present the true-tolife story of Moises Padilla. he was sued. xxx Nelly Amane who was a half-sister of Padilla objected to the movie on the ground that it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private and family life. [In the agreement signed by him. he had "exploited the life story of Moises Padilla for pecuniary gain. and .Lagunzad v. use and develope the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the pictures. no matter how a public figure he or she may be. Judgement was rendered against him by the trial court. Padilla since Padilla was a public figure. and other profit motives. occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit. Being a public figure does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. 92 SCRA 476 (1979) F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla story based on a book written by Rodriguez. w/o it. the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particular bec. Gonzales. the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of private concern. including scenes about his mother. Freedom of expression." in consideration of P20.

1988 F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution. sued to enjoin the filming because he did . a public figure. after all. The Judge should have stayed his hand considering that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear and present danger.. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of facts." a documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his right to privacy. who had previously been asked for the use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer. a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. Enrile. But the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from making the movie making reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. this action for certiorari. persons portraying some of MOISES PADILLA's kin.. in the PICTURE's case. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth.(had) encroached upon the privacy of Moises Padilla's immediate family. He is. HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion pictures and to exhibit them." The subject matter of the movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce Enrile. What is involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. and (had) in fact included. Ltd."] Ayer Productions Pty. Capulong April 29. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical account. v. Petitioners contended that the movie would not involve his private life not that of his family. This. Because of the preferred character of speech and of expression. Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day revolution.

The SC lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it amounted to prior restraint.not want any mention of his and his family's name. But in Lagunzad. Symbolic Expression-The Flagburning case Flag burning when done to express dissent is protected speech. 60 Phil 265 (1939) A person can be held liable for making comments on a pending case (sub judice) which have the tendency to impair or obstruct the orderly administration of justistice. Fernandez. and (2) defined . the orderly administration of justice. a state or national flag. Freedom of expression and administration of justice (contempt of court) In re Ramon Tulfo. although Moises Padilla was also a public figure. it was nevertheless a valid exercise of speech which did not significantly destroy. 170 SCRA 1 (1989) Cabansag v. d. such comment is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression. Alarcon. F: Respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration where he burned an American flag while protesters chanted. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute which (1) prohibited the desecration of. In Ayer. which is no better if imposed by the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiatical officials. thus his name can be used so long as only his public life is dwelled only. It held that although such a letter should have been sent to the SC and not the PAC. the movie dealth with both the public and private lives of Moises Padilla. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury. April 17. the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of history and this cannot be changed or altered. People v. was lifted by the SC. e. 102 Phil 152 (1957) A contempt imposed by the court on the party who sent a letter to the Presidential Action Committee complaining about the delay in the disposition of the agrarian case. among other things. AM NO. 90-4-1545-0. But if the case is not pending. Sandiganbayan. 1990 Zaldivar v. although several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning.

because the statute (1) was too broad for First Amendment purposes as it related to breaches of the peace. and (c) the flag burning does not fall within the small class of "fighting words Constitutional Law II that are likely to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace. A state court of appeals affirmed. (2) the state's interest in preventing breaches of the peace was not implicated on the record in this case. ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is unconstitutional HELD: YES. and (2) was not adequately supported by the state's purported interest in preserving a symbol of unity. and (3) the state's asserted interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity does not justify the . given that this flag burning was the culmination of a political demonstration and that the state conceded that the protester's conduct was expressive. (b) it cannot be presumed that an audience which takes serious offense at a particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace. since (a) no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of the flag burning. holding that the desecration statute as applied violated the defendant's right to freedom of speech under the Federal Constitution's First Amendment. Decision Affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed.desecration as the physical mistreatment of such objects in a way which the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover the act. Johnson's conviction was inconsistent with the First Amendment under the particular circumstances because (1) Johnson's conduct was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to implicate the First Amendment.

Gonzales v. since (a) the attempted restriction on expression is content-based. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed. The Board committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. Movies Censorship While prior restraint is the general rule.conviction. public morals. HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. The petitioner brought an action. Censorship is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety. unlike newspapers which are read by people separated by walls. but only against impairments that would cause serious offenses to others and is aimed at protecting onlookers from being offended by the ideas expressed by the prohibited activity. given that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances. The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films. Katigbak. public health or any other legitimate public interest. it has a greater impact on the audience and produces instant reaction for the ideas it presents. f. it may not foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it and by criminally punishing a person for burning the flag as a means of political protest. rather the presumption is against its validity. and thus subject to the most exacting scrutiny. 137 SCRA 356 (1985) F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only. and (b) although the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag. However there is not enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing and . For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exception. censorship in the movies is tolerated because by the nature of the medium. claiming violation of their freedom of expression.

applying contemporary community standards. the dominant appeal us to the prurient interest. would find that the work. lacks serious literary. appeals to the prurient interest. and it is such that one is likely to listen to what is being said . the Board can only classify. California. CIR. But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive and intrusive influence of the medium on people who watch its programs without having to pay anything.VV. If closed down. Dans. Thus on this score. v. using contemporary community standards. On the issue of obscenity. political or scientific value. (Miller v. the owners enjoy the rights to due process according to the standards set in Ang Tibay v. The only case whe the Board of Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil against national security or public morals or other public interest. taken as a whole. it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining a narrow view of obscenity. the SC held that radio broadcast also enjoys the protection of the freedom of expression. the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity. (Miller v. 137 SCRA 647. 37 L. But radio deserves greater regulation than newspapers because it could invade the privacy of everyone for no fee. Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in some part and to label "For Adults". artistic. Radio Broadcast In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. California). (2) Whether the work depicts or describes. taken as a whole.caressing each other like lesbians.) g. In all other cases. but it lacked the votes to rules that the abuse was grave. The SC rules that movies are within the constitutional protection of freedom of expression. so that censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law. 2d 419. Tests of obscenity: (1) Whether the average person. Ed. the test being whether. in a patently offensive way. (3) Whether the work.

Necessarily. Sec. Freedom of Information Art. 2) All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. 137 SCRA 647 (1985) F: The petitioners filed this action to compel respondent government officials to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE after it had been closed for allegedly having been used to incite the people to sedition. for the guidance of the inferior courts and administrative bodies. h. HELD: The case has been moot and academic. III. The right of the people to information on matters of public . The petitioner contended that it was denied due process because no hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. However. However. the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and print media. 3) The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite listeners to violently overthrow it. and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. CIR should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed. 7. This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast media have a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Dans. the following guidelines must be observed: 1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings as laid down in Ang Tibay v. before the Court could promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a motion to withdraw its action on the ground that it had sold the radio station to Manuel Pastrana and that the National Telecommunications Commission had expressed its willingness to grant the requisite license.Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V.

Garcia v. But it is subject to reasonable conditions by the custodian of the records. [US v. COMELEC. 391 US 367 (1968). The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation f media of communication and information. COMELEC. 207 SCRA 1 (1992) F: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were prevented from selling and donating space or air time for political advertisements under RA 6646. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest. 177 SCRA 374 (1989) D. The . Access to official records. 207 SCRA 712 (1992)] 1. BOI. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Dimaano. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. official acts.concern shall be recognized. or decisions. RULING: NO. O'brien. and to documents and papers pertaining to. Baldoza v. subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. shall be afforded the citizen. Regulation of political campaign National Press Club v. as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development. adopted in Adiong v. and if the incidental restriction on alleged freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Content-Neutral Restrictions O'brien test: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government. transactions. 71 SCRA 14 (1976) Access of official records (the docket book) for any lawful purpose (to look into the criminal cases for a report on the peace and order situation of the municipality) is guaranteed.

the expression becomes a statement by the owner. in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. RULING: NO." Of course. 207 SCRA 712 (1992) F: Petitoner. which in this case is a privately owned . Adiong. Under the clear and present danger rule. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. and space. the law limits the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided. time. the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedoom of an individual to express his preference and." as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities. and the right to reply. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehichle. by displaying it on his car. The posting of decals amd stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial government or public interest. and limits their location or publication to authorized posting areas. a 1992 senatorial candidate. Adiong v. Morever. must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. assails Comelec Resolution No. bears a clear and reasonable connection with the objective set out in the Constitution. The limitation however. public or private. to convince others to agree with him. COMELEC. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. primarily his own and not of anybody else. 2347 insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places. Significantly. ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional. The restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property.fundamental purposes of such power are to ensure "equal opportunity.

The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the application. order. and no appeal can be taken by the local authorities anymore. and he has proof of this. (5) sound system to be used (6)purpose. then he can deny the application. It must also have a statement of the duties of the rallyists. (2) date and time. 580) A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Office of the Mayor at least.. He should hold a hearing during which the applicant can be heard. The courts have 24 hours to act on the petition. and (iii) campuses of state universities (which are left to university authorities) The application must be in writing and must include: (1) names of the organizers and leaders. another cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be deprived of his property without due proocess of law. (ii) inside a private property (provide with consent of the owner). then it is enough for filing purposes if a copy is posted in the premises. he should not deny the application right away. But no permit from the mayor is required in case the rally is going to be held in (i) freedom parks. The applicant can then go to any court other than the Supreme Court for the review of the decision of denial of the mayor. But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear and present danger" to public peace. health.vehicle. During the rally. If the Mayor refuses to accept the application. If after hearing he is still not satisfied that no danger exists. or in any case if the applicant is satisfied with the decision. If the judgment is a reversal of the denial. 2. it is deemed granted. But if the decision is not satisfactory to the applicant. five working days before the day of the rally. then he has 48 hours from receipt to appeal to the SC. Freedom of Assembly Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. place and street. In consequence of this prohibition. the judgment becomes final and executory immediately. The written application is filed with the Office of the Mayor. the police must be limited to maintaining peace and order and so . Acknowledgemet is given of its receipt. etc. (3) size (4)manner of the use of the street. If he does not act.

the police must not disperse the crowd right away but first give a warning. and (c) to cooperate with local authorities in maintaining peace and order. and discussing public questions. If they anticipate trouble. If violence persists. time out of time have been used for purposes of assembly. The validity of the permit system has been upheld by the Court. they must give a second warning. but they cannot use violence. subject only to reasonable regulation. (a) it is concered only with the time. provided. If still violence continues.must stay away by 100 meters from the rallyists. They can carry no firearm except a nighstick. communicating thought betwee citizens. but they are allowed protective devices. Constitutional Law II Notes: The freedom to use public places to peaceably assemble is best expressed thus: "Wherever the title or steets and parks may rest. Penalty is imposed only on the leaders and organizers. CIO) Although under a "permit system". place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not vest on the licensing authority unfettered discretion in choosing the groups which could use the public place and discriminate others. When trouble actually erupts. As held by the SC in Primicias vs . the police must call the attention of the leader of the rallyists. with their names visibly written. the police can disperse the crowd. If a rally does not have a permit. before one can use a public place." (Justice Roberts. only then can they fight back. one must first obtain prior permit from the proper authorities. they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and. (b) to police their own rank. the principle has always been that one has the right to a permit. Hague v. They must be in full uniform. Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform the members of their duty under the law.

and a rally to protest election anomalies might threaten breaches of the peace and disruption of public order. The Mayor denied the application on the ground that passions still run high due to the recent election. Thus. RULING: NO. ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit. Primicias vs Fugoso. convenience and welfare. denying the Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions raised by the recent national election were still high and a rally to protest election anomalies could only exacerbate the matter. to compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila to issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. 80 Phil." The Court quoted with approval the decision in the American case Cox v. can be construed only to mean the power to regulate. with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to . 71 F: This is an action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Primicias. place. to a consideration of the time. campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties. 71.Fugoso. place. was overturned by the court. State of New Hampshire. which means and includes the power to control. and to restrain but cannot be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit. 80 Phil. the licensing authorities are strictly limited. where. as the statute is construed by the state courts. and manner of the parades socially to secure public order. " a statute requiring persons using public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press. and manner of the parade or procession. govern. the City Ordinance of Manila giving authority to the Mayor to issue permits for parades should be construed to be limited to the time. in the issuance of licenses. The police power granted to the Mayor under the Ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board pursuant to its authority under the Revised Administrative Code which pertains to the use of streets and public places.

injuries to a score of other persons and the closing down of schools. in Navarro v. . an association of students. Petitioner contended that the right of the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances may be exercised without the prior necessity of securing a permit from the government and that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without the corresponding right to use public places for that purpose. workers and peasants. Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on the ground that the same constitutes a violation of their right to freedom of assembly. and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. loss of a few lives." But under the same ordinance. acting in behalf of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP). HELD: NO. Respondent Mayor denied the application to hold the rally on the date and time specified by petitioners in view of the events that transpired during the last demonstration held by them which ended in the destruction of public and private property. offices and many stores. Navarro v...provide proper policing. He has expressed willingness to grant the permit for the peaceful assembly during certain days and time. on a finding that everytime there was an announced rally. 31 SCRA 730 (1970). Villegas. The respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a permit amounted to a violation of petitioner`s right to freedom of assembly. 31 SCRA 730 (1970) F: The petitioner. and at a place when they would not disrupt the normal activities of the community. stores closed and business was gravely affected because of violent incidents. the SC. The Mayor suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens near Intramuros for its rally and that the rally be held during weekends and earlier during the day so that it may end before dark. Villegas. upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a group during weekdays. It found the policy of the mayor to allow rallies only during weekends to be reasonable. applied for a permit from the Mayor of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda.

whose tenets are opposed to those of the petitioners. the majority upheld the mayor's denial of permit to members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use of a klosk within the town plaza in order to avoid any untoward incident with members of the Roman Catholic Church. ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid. In Ignacio v. 125 SCRA 553 (1983). 346 (1956) F: The Mayor denied a permit to the members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to use the kiosk in the town plaza for the purpose of holding a public lecture on the ground that the permit. if granted. The Court did not rule on the validity of the ordinance of Manila prohibiting any rally within 200 meters from any foreign embassy as . and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies.B. Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application for a permit unconditionally. the SC found no basis for the denial of permit to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a march from Luneta to the street fronting the U. may give rise to disturbance of the religious ceremonies being performed by the Catholic Church which was said to be within hearing distance from the kiosk and which might lead to any untoward incident with members of the rival denomination.The respondent mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order. Ela. Embassy. Experience in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations have shown that they pose a clear and imminent danger of public disorders. It affirmed the general rule that the use of streets is free to all.L. 346 (1956). which. 99 Phil. In J. Ignacio v. Reyes v. Charo.S. and whose church is very near the klosk. it has no means of preventing. 99 Phil. petitioner has manifested. given the report of the NPD that adequate security measures were provided by the police. Ela. breaches of the peace. It found the fear entertained by city authorities that the rallyists might be agirated by provocateurs to be unfounded. criminal acts. Bagatsing.

absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to the holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta. Bagatsing. from Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. A statute requiring persons to secure a special license to use public streets for a procession is not unconstitutional. the SC upheld the power of the city authorities to close JP Laurel Street fronting Malacanang from all rallies as a form of "area restriction". may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment.a means of complying with the Geneva Convention that requires the host country to protect the premises and personnel of the embassy. there was yet no action on his request to hold a rally. HELD: Free speech. 1983 starting 2 p. sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. The licensing of authorities are strictly limited to the consideration of the time. Barangan. the applicant can question the denial in the lower court. 135 SCRA 514 (1985)." There can be no legal objection. 26. There is to be no previous retraint whether in the form of libel suits. place and manner and the authorities are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse a permit. in order to protect the President . Reyes v.B. 20. and (iii) appeal can be made to the SC on an expedited procedure . on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition.L. He filed this petition because as of Oct.m. Neither can there be objection to the use of the streets up to gates of the US Embassy. which can try questions of fact and law. 125 SCRA 553 (1983) F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes. like free press. prosecution for damages. In German v. Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which applies must do so within a sufficient time so the authority can have time to act: (ii) if a disagreement arises over a denial of a permit. or contempt proceedings unless there is a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.

students and employees. 2. The rallyists in this case purported to merely worship at St. They wore yellow T-shirts and. 1984 the petitioners who were businessmen. based on the incident in the early 70s when the gates of the palace were almost stormed. met on JP Laurel Street in Manila for the ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St. the consent of the owner of the place must be acquired. They were stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the Presidential Security Command. Jude's. They brought an action formand amu s. In case a rally is held in a private place. marched on the street and shouted anti-government invectives. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985) F: On Oct. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds. no permit from the mayor is required. their fists clenched and chants of anti-government investives support the government's claim that the petitioners purpose was not really to worship at the chapel but to hold an anti-government demonstration close to . with clenched fists. HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers.Constitutional Law II and his family. However. German v.

The excitement of the occasion. HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the students to enroll. the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. 13 SCRA 94 (1985) F: Petitioners were officers and members of the Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta . the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should be taken into consideration. They were suspended for one academic year. In Malabanan v. Ramento. 129 SCRA 359 (1984) and Arreza v. On the scheduled date. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. On appeal. GAUP. rreza v. the SC upheld the right to expression of students who held a rally in a private university. But there is a need to pass squarely on the constitutional question. classes and office work was disturbed.the residence of the President. Ramento. The petitioners were not restrained in their freedom of religion but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. 129 SCRA 359 (1984) F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. 13 SCRA 94 (1985). their suspension was condoned. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. But since they held it beyond the time granted in a place other than the one allowed by the administration. The threat to their lives is constant and felt throughout the world. The need to secure the safety of heads of states cannot be overemphasized. they were found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. GAUP. They expressed in a vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a result. The restricted use of JP Laurel Street is justified. Respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of suspension. Suspending them for one year is out of proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of views was expected. Malabanan v.

They would be ineffective if during the rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. Grievances . the labor unions involved intensified the pickets they had been conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Court and set up picket quarters. They take into account the excitement of the occasion. v. the propensity of speakers to exaggerate. Notes: Note that while the permit system is not allowed in the case of publication. were let loose. 1982. the measure is constitutionally acceptable. So as long as only the incidents of speech are regulated. that is quite understandable. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541 (1987) hile these cases were pending in the SC. Ramento: "If in the course of such demonstration. 28. xxx" The refusal of the university to enroll the students is a highly disproportionate penalty. it is allowed in the case of assembly. Inc. When required to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. At any rate. at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises. But in assembly regulation is allowed because it is needed by the very nature of the expression. when people use streets. utterances. even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. There is very little possibility or justification for the regulation of news. In publication. They were refused enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. with an enthusiastic audience goading them on. at times even vitriolic. HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. they may deprive other groups which want to use the streets too. The remedy in this case is prosecution or subsequent punishment. the exuberance of youth. censorship is presumptively unconstitutional. HELD: As held in Malabanan v. their lawyer apologized and assured that the above incident would not be repeated.University Foundation. Nestle Phils. extremely critical.

8. The SSSEA went on strike bec. walkouts and other temporary work stoppages. 3. they are not allowed to strike. "parties have a constitutional right to have the causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal. associations. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the public sector Art. uninfluenced by publication or public clamor xxx" The acts of respondents are not only an affront to the dignity of this Court but equally a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. alleging that the officers and members of the latter staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS building preventing non-striking employees from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting business w/ SSS. The restraining order w/c was previously issued was converted into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. to form unions. The inclusion of the right to unionize in this article is ill-advised because while the right to unionize is an economic and labor right. or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. SSS failed to act on the union's demands. including those employed in the public and private sectors. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. through appropriate petitions or pleadings in keeping with the respect due the courts as impartial administrators of justice.must be ventilated in the proper channels. The latter held that since the employees of SSS are govt employees. Moreover. w/c motion was denied.e. Sec. i. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. III. the right to association in general is a civil. against petitioners SSSEA. like workers in the private .political right. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to do so. The right of the people. SSS Employees Assn vs CA. HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes. Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public employees cannot engage in collective bargaining and strike. 175 SCRA 686 (1989) F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj.

employment are fixed by law. to accede to their demands. in order to pressure the Govt. workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion of law. the administrative heads of govt w/c fix the terms and conditions of employment. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet. In govt employment. owned and controlled corporations with original charters. As now provided under Sec. the terms and conditions of employment in the Govt. are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation. including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. where properly given delegated power. it is the legislature and. EEs to Self-Organization which took effect after the initial dispute arose. And this is effected through .sector. Relations bet. The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. workers in the private sector and govt employees w/ regard to the right to strike? Since the terms and conditions of govt. however. the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. 4. govt.

and regulations. Garcia. RULING: NO. rules. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of the students. program because they felt that "her frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class. This status of the individual teacher is as important as the status of the institution to which he belongs and through which he disseminates learning. 68 SCRA 277 (1975) F: The FAC of the Loyola School of Theology refused to readmit petitioner. Faculty of Admission. in its M. one must distinguish between autonomy of the university. Garcia assailled her expulsion for being unreasonable. In considering the problems of academic freedom. The collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it. both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. On other hand. The school decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. The personal aspect of the freedom consists of the right of each university teacher to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it." that it would be "to the best interest (of the petitioner) to work with a faculty that is more compatible with her orientation. Academic Freedom Garcia v. that the reasons given therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear that her conduct constituted a violation of the school's regulations and grave misconduct. as a corporate body. and the freedom of the individual university teacher. the internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions: (a) admission and .statutes or administrative circulars. not through CBA's E. The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment by institutions of higher learning of the right to academic freedom.A. ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled bymanda mus to readmit petitioner.

examination of students; (b) curricula for courses of study; (c) appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure. It is the business of a university to proviide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which the four essential freedoms of a university prevail - to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. For the above reason,manda mus is not available for the petitioner. There is no duty on the part of the School to admit her to study since the School clearly has the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations. There are standards to meet and policies to pursue. What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a right. UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989) F: In 1972, the UP BOR approved the establishment of the UPCB Highshool to serve, among others, "as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting." However, the Dept of Professional Education in Baguio was never organized. So, the BOR decided to phase out UPCBHS for failing to attain the conditions for its creation. The UPCBHS Foundation Inc. sought to restrain the University from phasing out the UPCBHS. ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher learning such as the UP? rULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of academic freedom. Private respondent invokes the right to quality education and to free secondary education. The rights invoked by private respondent may be asserted only as against the

Government through the DECS. UP was created under its charter to provide advanced tertiary education. An institute of higher learning cannot be compelled to provide for secondary education. It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of higher learning enjoys academic freedom. UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditionalities. Failing on such conditions, UP can order its abolition on academic grounds.Charo . UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993 F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel Elizalde and the Tasaday representative filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against UP Professors Jerome Bailen and Zeus Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday find and made a proposition in various conferences attended by them that Elizalde merely fabricated the discovery of the Tasadays. UP intervened, aaserting its duty to protect the respondents as faculty members for acts and utterances made in the exercise of academic freedom. The lower court denied UP's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Hence this petition. RULING: With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring the Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community, the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. The complaint was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiff's dignity and honor. Indeed, it is beyond the province of the court to make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint for damages, the court may find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls within the field of the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that its proper role and function is the determination of legal issues. V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion; or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall

be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. A. Non-Establishment Clause The clause prohibits excessive government entanglement with, endorsement or disapproval of religion [Vicoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburg ACLU, 492 US 574 (1989).] The clause prohibits the State from establishing a religion. In assessing the validity of the law, the questions to be asked are: a. Is the purpose of the law religious, or is it secular? b. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance religion? c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an excessive entaglement between the State and religious matters in religion? The Non-Establishment clause is violated when the State gives any manifest support to any one religion, even if nothing is done against the individual. It is likewise violated if the State favors all religions, for there may be atheists who are not so favored. 1. Operation of sectarian schools While the ownership, creation and management of educational institutions must be in the hands of Filipinos or 60% Filipinoowned corporations, sectarian schools and those run by religious groups and missions board are exempted from these requirements, provided the administration is in the hands of Filipinos, who could be sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2).] 2. Religious instruction in public schools Provided it is upon the written petition of the parents and it is at no cost to the State (although this is not entirely possible, because the use of classrooms and electricity are costs in the State), religious instruction in public elementary and secondary schools during class hours, by one approved by the authorities of the religion of the child or ward is allowed. [Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3).] Religion can even be integrated in the school curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).] 3. Anti-evolution laws In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97

(1968), the SC held that the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution cannot be prohibited from public shools by parents whose religions finds the theory offensive. 4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967), the SC disallowed the conducting of an interdenominational prayer before the start of classes in public schools as, violative of the Non- Establishment clause. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967) F: The respondent Board of Education upon the recommendation of the State Board of Regents, directed the School's District principal to cause the recitation in public schools of a brief, denominationally neutral prayer. Its observance on the part of the students was voluntary. RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York, by using its public school system to encourage the recitation of the Regent's prayer has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. The prayer was composed by govt officials as part of a

Constitutional Law II governmental program to further religious beliefs. The constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion means at least that it is not part of the business of the government to compose official prayers for any group to recite as part of a religious program carried on by the govt. The clauses of the 1st Amendment which prohibit laws respecting an establishment of religion and abridging the free exercise thereof, although overlapping in certain instances, forbids two diff kinds

of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The stablishment clause, unlike the free exercise clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion, whether or not those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals. It rests on the belief that a union of govt and religion tends to destroy govt and to degrade religion, and upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religion and religious persecutions go hand in hand. In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), it likewise disallowed the reading of a passage from the bible without comment in public schools as contrary to the Non- Establishment clause. Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) The issue was whether the establishment clause was violated by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule of the Board of Commissioners of Baltimore adopted pursuant to statutory authority requiring the reading without comment, at the opening of each school day, of verses from the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's prayer by the students in unison. The students and parents may refuse to participate in the school exercises. These exercises were prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend school and held in school buildings under the supervision and participation of teachers employed in those schools. RULING: YES, the establishment clause was violated. The establishment clause prohibits a state from placing official support behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies and the free exercise clause guarantees the right of every person to freely choose his own course with reference to religious training, teaching and observance, free from any compulsion from the State. The test in determining whether a legislative enactment violates

the Establishment clause which withdraws all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof, is the PURPOSE and the PRIMARY EFFECT of the enactment. If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the First Amendment. To withstand the strictures of the establishment clause, there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. The place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid. This is particularly so where the State's recognition of the pervading religious character of the exercise is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version of the Bible as well as from a recent amendment permitting non-attendance at the exercises, none of those factors being consistent with the contention that the Bible is used either as an instrument for non-religious moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects. 5. tax exemption Art. VI, Sec. 28. xxx (3) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927) is modified to the extent now that the property must be "actually, directly and exclusively" used for religious purposes to be exempt. If not for religious purposes, educational purposes. Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51

Except in large cities where the density of the population and the development of commerce require the use of large tracts of land for buildings. 64 Phil. in the case of a convent. ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal RULING: NO. [Art. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. accdg to the evidence. 29 (2)] But in Aglipay v. neither is it used for commercial purposes and. is now being used as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities. is the owner and occupant of a parcel of land in San Nicolas. On the north side is an old cemetery and the base of what was once a tower. government orphanage. The exemption in the payment of the land tax mandated in the Constitution in favor of the religious entities refers to the home of the priest who presides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. while it is no longer used as such. the convent and an adjacent lot used as vegetable garden. penal institution. It therefore must include not only the land actually occupied by the church but also the adjacent ground destined for the ordinary incidental uses of man. except in those cases provided in the Constitution: priests assigned in the AFP. represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia. Therefore. VI. Ruiz. the SC held that the stamp printed by the government showing the map of the Philippines with a rosary to commemorate the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress to be held in Manila did not violate the Non- .Phil. It also comes within the exemption. or leprosarium. which comes under the tax exemption. The Prov. Public aid to religion The payment or use of public money or property for any religious institution or clergy is not allowed. a vegetable garden belongs to a house and. 352 (1927) F: The plaintiff. its use is limited to the necessities of the priest. Sec. 201 (1937). Board imposed a tax on the whole land. Ilocos Norte. 6. The same constitutes an incidental use in religious functions. As to the lot which was formerly the cemetery. On the south siide is a part of the church yard. the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.

Church. Ind. the dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion pointed out that the mayor disapproved the application for a permit not so much because he was afraid that breach of peace would ensue but because he wrongly though the kiosk should be used for public purposes only and not for religious purposes. The purpose in issuing the stamps was to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country. Head of the Phil. Act 4052 contemplated no religious purpose in view. sought to restrain respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. The Director issued the stamps under the provisions of Act 4052 which appropriates public funds for the cost of the plates and printing of the stamps. In Ignacio v. benefit or support of any sect or religion. Aglipay. 201 (1937) F: The petitioner. supra.Establishment clause because its main purpose. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of the stamps was done in violation of the Constitutional provision that no public money or property shall be appropriated for the use. The stamp contained a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila. ISSUE: W/N petitioner's contention is tenable. and whatever benefit it gave the Catholic Church was only incidental. The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the country and its people. 64 Phil. Mons. and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Crusade. Ruiz. Ela. was to call the world's attention to Manila as the site of an international congress. Aglipay v." What was emphasized was not the event but Manila. When the Jehovah's Witness . What it gave the Director of Posts was the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous to the government. RULING: NO. the resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic Church was merely incidental and was not the aim and purpose of the government. It was obvious that while the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character.

219 SCRA 256 (1993) Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to salute the flag Constitutional Law II F: All the ptetitioners in these cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag. 1955 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Order No. ISSUE: W/N school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both private and public). Free Exercise Clause 1. B. then the non-establishment clause is not violated. on account of their religious beliefs.members use the public squares. Flag Salute Ebranilag v. for refusing. since the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and by Dept. to take part in the flag . 8 dated July 21. they are no different from ordinary pedestrians or promenaders who use the street: that they are performing religious acts is only incidental. So long as the use of public property is only incidentalally and temporarilly for religious purposes and so long as the use is such as to be reasonably compatible with the use to which other members of the community are similarly entitled. Division Superindentent of Schools of Cebu. The tests then are (1) Is the use of the public facility compatible with general use? (2) Is the resulting benefit to the religious group only incidental.

they do not engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in exercising their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. health or any other legitimate public interest. flag and reciting the patriotic pledge. if they should commit breaches of peace by action that offend the sensibilities. through the iron hand of the law. the expulsion of the pets. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag. saluting the Phil. National Anthem. to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs. will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. of other persons. HELD: NO. xxx The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent. of a serious evil to public safety. the school authorities have the power to discipline them. is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights w/c guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship. expulsion is unwarranted. moral. during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school. However. xxx xxxForcing a small religious group. Absent such a threat to public safety. As there is no disruption. both religious and patriotic. They quietly stand at attention during the ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. and recite the patriotice pledge. sing the national anthem. . xxx Although petitioners do not participate in the compulsory flag ceremony.ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Phil. from the schools is not justified. that the state has a right and duty to prevent.

City of Manila. ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid ruLING: NO.Compare West V. To sustain the compulsory flag salute. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines American Bible Society v. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. 101 P 386 (1957) F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution . It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by the Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. Here the power of compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify an effort even to muffle expression. the flag salute is a form of utterance. we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his mind left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind. The Court applies the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. consider the flag as a graven image which they are forbidden to salute under their religious beliefs. The State asserts the power to condition access to public education. 319 US 624 (1943) F: The State Board required public school pupils to salute the flag of the United States while reciting a pledge of allegiance under penalty of expulsion entailing liability of both pupil and parents to be proceeded against for unlawful absence. 2. Barnette. Appellees. It requires an affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. In connection with pledges. Board of Education v. members of the Jehovah's Witnesses.

The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to plaintiff society. 59 SCRA 54 (1974) F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory. The City Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise without securing the necessary license and paying the requisite fee in violation of the City ordinance. as well as its right to disseminate religious beliefs. HELD: YES. Exemtion from union shop Victoriano v. The power to tax the exercise of the privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. he resigned from the respondent labor union on the ground that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which he is a member prohibits union membership. Plaintiff protested against this requirement as constituting a restraint upon the exercise of religion. The mark up can only be treated as contributions by the faithfuls to the religious cause. 3. Victoriano brought this action for injunction. Elizalde Rope Workers Union. As the union demanded his dismissal from employment pursuant to a closed shop agreement. The union . Those who can tax the exercise of religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied to petitioner is unconstutional for being in restraint of petitioner's right to free exercise of religion. It claimed that it is not engaged in business which necessitates the securing of a license as it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles. it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship. but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting from the closed-shop contracts members of religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any labor organization. for in so doing. It is true that the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same.and sale of bibles and religious articles. In 1962.

Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978) F: In 1971. persons receiving salaries from provincial funds. Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980) Right to travel This is not the first time petitioner Jovito . Disqualification from local government office Pamil v. as may be provided by law. Congress acted merely to relieve persons of the burden imposed by union security agreements. III.appealed. Fr. III of the 1935 Constitution. or public health. Justice Teehankee held that section 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code. 4. Justice Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on the exercise of the right to run for public office contrary to Art. Seven justices held that section 2175 is no longer operative. the statute musr have a secular purpose and that purpose must not directly advance or diminish the interest of any religion. It does not impair the obligation of contracts for not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligation of the parties but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into such contracts. A petition was filed against him on the basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that "in nocase shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. public safety. Five justices held that section 2175 is constitutional. It has been held that in order to withstand objections based on this ground. Bohol. soldiers in active service. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Albuquerque. or contractors for public works. HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive." The CFI dismissed the petition on the ground that the ineligibility has been impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code. Neither does the law constitute an establishment of religion. Sec. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Art. HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of association. VI.

in view of the likelihood that this Court may be faced again with the same situation. Salonga v. Manglapus. it is desirable that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. xxx arcos v. the case became moot and academic. which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel. it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted petitioner. but it is the Court's well considered view that the right to return may be considered as a generally . RULING: The right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the provisions of the Constitution respecting one's liberty of abode and right to travel. Nonetheless. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. independent from although related to the right to travel. 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760 (1989) F: This petition formandamu s and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. The freedom to travel is one of the most cherished.Salonga came to the SC by way of amanda mus proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. a totally distinct right under international law. Respondents argue the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. Madella. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. In the motion to dismiss filed by the Solicitor General. The present petition is likewise moot and academic. Essentially. In the first case. the right involved is the right to return to one's country.

is part of the law of the land. and under our Constitution. . In that context. it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the Intl. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.e. against being arbitrarily deprived thereof. However. such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or not.accepted principle of international law. i. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel.