THE DAGBON

SIPRI/OSI African Security and Governance Project

GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN GHANA:

CHIEFTAINCY CRISIS

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

SIPRI/OSI African Security and Governance Project
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

iii

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

About WACSI
The West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) was created by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) to reinforce the capacities of civil society in the region. The Institute was established to bridge the institutional and operational gaps within civil society. Vision: To strengthen civil society organisations as strategic partners for the promotion of democracy, good governance and national development in the sub region. Mission: The objective of the Institute is to strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of CSOs in the formulation of policies, the implementation and promotion of democratic values and principles in West Africa. The role of WACSI is to serve as a resource centre for training, research, experience sharing and dialogue for CSOs in West Africa. The Institute makes its plea through policy dialogue to discuss current issues affecting West African States. Reference documents are regularly published by the Institute and distributed to policy makers. www.wacsi.org

About SIPRI
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. SIPRI was established on the basis of a decision by the Swedish Parliament and receives a substantial part of its funding in the form of an annual grant from the Swedish Government. The Institute also seeks financial support from other organizations in order to carry out its broad research programme.
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

SIPRI’s structure comprises the Governing Board and the Director, Deputy Director, Research Staff Collegiums and support staff, together numbering around 50-60 people. SIPRI’s staff and Governing Board are international. Located in Stockholm, Sweden, SIPRI offers a unique platform for researchers from different countries to work in close cooperation. The Institute also hosts guest researchers and interns who work on issues related to the SIPRI research programmes. www.sipri.org

iv

v

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

Authors
DR. KEN AHORSU, Research Fellow and Lecturer in Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), University of Ghana, Legon DR. BONI YAO GEBE, Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer in International Relations, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), University of Ghana, Legon

Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction A brief history of the Dagbon Kingdom and the Dagbon chieftaincy National Politics and Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict in Post-Independence Ghana The Run up to and Aftermath of the Death of Ya Na Andani II Conclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY 3 7 9 13 17 28 31

Technical Support
CHARLES KOJO VANDYCK, Capacity Building Officer, West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) OMOLARA BALOGUN, Policy Advocacy Officer, West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) JIMM CHICK FOMUNJONG, Intern, West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI)

Editor
JOEY FOX, Editor, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

DISCLAIMER This research report is provided for information purposes only. Statements of fact have been obtained from sources considered reliable. Neither this report, nor any opinion expressed herein, is in any way meant to inflame passions. This report may not be reproduced, distributed or published by any recipient for any purpose without the express permission of the West Africa Civil Society Institute. Copyright © 2011 by WACSI All rights reserved. No part of this report may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For more information, contact: West Africa Civil Society Institute No. 9 Bingo Street; East Legon, P.O. Box AT 1956, Accra, Ghana Tel: +233 (0) 302.522.589/542.010 Email:info@wacsi.org

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

Executive Summary
The Dagbon Chieftaincy crisis predates modern Ghana and its current political institutions. The crisis revolves around the two family lines, or ‘gates’, to the kingship, the Abudu and Andani families, which have pitted children from the same royal ancestry against each other in an internecine conflict for the past 200 years. A significant episode in this struggle was the 27 March 2002 murder of Ya Na Yakubu Adani II, the ruler of Ghana’s the Dagbon Kingdom (Dagomba), along with more than 40 other high-profile individuals who served and advised in the palace. The various interventions made by the government, international and civil society bodies over the years to address the king’s murder, his burial and the royal succession have not resolved the conflict arising from the two gates. In fact, with the historical antecedents of succession disputes, political manipulation and government interference, often along ideological lines, all efforts to resolve the crisis and its underlying causes have only perpetuated violence, intraethnic animosities, destructive family feuds and endless struggles for royal supremacy. Two recent interventions include the setting up of the Wuaku Commission to identify those responsible for the assassination of the Ya Na and to recommend appropriate sanctions, and the Committee of Eminent Chiefs, which produced a ‘road map’ for the burial of Yakubu II and the enskinment (installation) of a king. Most of the recommendations emanating from these and other commissions and
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

3

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

committees of enquiry have woefully failed to resolve the root causes and associated challenges. Separate from resolving issues related to the murder and burial of the king, Yakubu II’s death has brought to the fore problems associated with the chieftaincy as an institution, such as its institutional relevance in a democratic political system and effect on democratic development; the appropriate methods of overcoming succession disputes and associated social turbulence and political instability; government interference in resolutions processes and whether the institution should be discarded in its entirety.

Policy Recommendations:
The recommendations outlined below are directed at the Government and Civil Society.

Government
€ Employ the instruments of intervention that encourage dialogue towards peaceful transformation of the conflict. € Depoliticize the crisis—if only to provide the basis for inter-party trust. In that regard, the criminal aspects of the crisis should be separated from the traditional aspects. Free from government interference, the security agencies, principally the police and the judiciary, must be given a free hand to prosecute the criminal aspects of the conflict. € Develop a comprehensive program of de-marginalization of Northern Ghana. The Government must proactively pursue policies that reduce the conditions for conflict and violence and establish an environment for social mobility, employment and wealth generation.

Key Findings:
€ Political manoeuvring and implicit actions by influential individuals linked to the two gates and supported by ruling political elites who have held sensitive positions in the immediate past might have contributed to the death of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II. € The incessant intrusions into the disputes by successive Ghanaian governments along ideological lines have also contributed to the complexity of the crisis. € There is a lack of a systematic structural and operational strategy that can transform the socio-economic conditions of the citizens of Northern Ghana towards peaceful co-existence and development.1

Civil Society
€ Develop a networked ‘think-tank’ to brainstorm the crisis on a sustained basis towards its peaceful resolution. With the National Peace Council (NPC) playing a coordinating role, the ‘think tank’ should constitute a variety of stakeholders, including civil society organizations, faith-based or religious groups and organizations, traditional authorities, academia and the media. However, the NPC must first be restructured and resourced with the requisite financial and technical support to make it responsive and proactive. Both restructuring the NPC and developing the think tank demand a comprehensive management plan that will require institutional and infrastructural support from the Government.

€ The evidence from the analysis in this report suggests that the Dagbon crisis is unlikely to be resolved amicably through normal judicial processes.
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

1 In recent times, the Government of Ghana has began to embark on a series of coordinated development interventions In Northern Ghana by establishing the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA), to create sustainable employment, re-orient agriculture towards improving assets for the poor while adding-value to basic food and tree crops; invest in improved water resources, drainage and irrigation for year-round production. The main issue addressed is to provide a development strategy to bridge the development gap between the Northern Savannah Ecological Belt and the rest of the country.

4

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

5

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

Joint Recommendations
€ Design frameworks that may contribute to the transformation of the relational dynamics of Dagbon. In this regard, society needs to transform its approach to conflict resolution, moving away from confrontation and violence towards peaceful coexistence. This transformation entails developing and establishing a discourse on peace to counteract the violence-prone normative order and the discriminatory identities that engender it. € Design peace architecture for the people of Dagbon in particular and the people of Northern Ghana in general to eschew discriminatory traditions and practices that legitimise and valorise violence and injustice. The peace plan should promote tolerance, equality, justice and security for all, irrespective of ethnic group, religion or gender. € Interrogate the creation of an alternative framework for resolving the conflict. Stakeholders must take a critical look at a model that worked during the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) era. The model would develop a tripartite body to review official reports related to the conflict and work towards a consensual solution based on the reports’ recommendations. This model appears to suggest the potential of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process to bring the crisis to a closure. The stature of an ADR institution, composition and mandate as well as its political support base must be investigated.

Introduction
Ghana, like most post-colonial states, is a heterogeneous society characterised by the internal dualism of formal–informal, urban– countryside, and modern–traditional communities and institutions. The modern structures supersede but have not displaced the diverse socio-cultural, economic and political institutions and practices of pre-colonial ‘Ghana.’ In many instances, the enduring traditional structures complement the developmental and governance imperatives, especially in the rural and informal sectors. The role that the variegated traditional institutions and identities play in governance, security and development should not be underestimated. However, these often contradictory institutions and identities serve as potential fault-lines for violent conflict. Such conflicts undermine the sustainable development, governance and the security of Ghana.

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

Chieftaincy conflicts have been one of the main sources of communal conflicts. These conflicts have been characterised by

6

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

Although hailed as a haven of peace and a beacon of democracy within Africa, Ghana remains vulnerable to intermittent communal violence and inter-ethnic conflicts that harm its governance and security structures. These conflicts arise from— and, in turn, exacerbate—the state’s inability to control elements normally perceived as falling within its remit (Ken Ahorsu, 2007). While the whole of Ghana is susceptible to civil strife, the northern half of the country has been the main hotbed of conflicts that often pivot around land ownership, chieftaincy, religious intolerance, and ethnocentrism. Finding a lasting solution to the conflicts in Northern Ghana has proven largely futile.

7

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

the wanton destruction of life and property, development reversals, serious abuse of human rights, suffering especially among the vulnerable, and the relentless internal migration to the periurban periphery of Southern Ghana. The Dagbon chieftaincy conflict discussed in this paper is one of the most retrogressive and protracted conflicts in Northern Ghana, dating back to the mid-19th century. A crisis within this ongoing conflict erupted in March 2002, when more than 40 persons, including the Ya Na Yakubu Andani II were killed. Following the murders, a constellation of national and international mediators have strived to resolve the situation to no avail. The discourse on the Dagbon crisis has been very partisan, and polemical, often making objective analysis very difficult. This study seeks to achieve the following objectives: (a) to establish the main explanations for the conflict; (b) to identify and evaluate the main actors and the policies aimed at resolving the crisis; (c) to assess the efficacy, challenges and shortcomings of those policy interventions; (d) to identify the time frames of conflict escalation and its dynamics of in order to appreciate the seasonal factors that influence the conflict; (e) to identify all stakeholders in the conflict and seek their views on the way forward; and (f) to offer recommendations on ways forward.
The study applies content analysis to data gathered through interviews with stakeholders, such as opinion leaders, chiefs, government officials and institutions, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the judiciary, and peace activists involved in the Dagbon crisis. A literature review was carried out before primary data was collected. Visits were also made to places of relevance in Yendi, Tamale, and Kumasi.

A brief history of the Dagbon Kingdom and the Dagbon chieftaincy
Oral tradition has it that today’s Dagbon Kingdom originated from ancient Mali through marriages, wars, assassinations, betrayals, usurpation of power and migration (Tsikata and Seini Wayo, 2004). The Dagbon Kingdom was founded in 1403 by King Sitobu when the Gbewaa Kingdom was broken up into Mamprugu and Dagbon by King Gbewaa’s two sons. The Dagbon Kingdom is largest of the four kingdoms of Ghana’s Northern Region.2 Covering an area of 9,611 square miles and divided into eight administrative districts, Dagbon Kingdom accounts for more than half of the total population of the region. The people of Dagbon are called Dagomba. Yendi is the capital and the seat of the Ya Na, the King of Dagbon. The dynamics of the Dagbon crisis is a reflection of a historical trajectory of wars and empire-building, in terms of the structures built over the years, and the values, emotions, and passions the Dagomba people attach to these structures, especially chieftaincy. According to Dagbon traditional laws all lands in Dagbon are vested in the Ya Na, who is the apical head of authority and has the sole right of officiating the celebration of the Damba, and Chimsi Chugu
2 The Konkonba, Anufo, Basari, Bimoba, Zantasi, Kotokoli and Kabre ethnic groups that are regarded as the indigenous people conquered by the Dagomba also live in the Dagbon Kingdom.

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

The study is organised under the following sections: A Brief History of the Dagbon Kingdom and the Dagbon Chieftaincy; National Politics and the Dynamics of the Dagbon Crisis Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict in Post-Independence Ghana; The Run Up to and Aftermath of the Death of Ya Na Andani II and Conclusion.

8

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

9

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

or Eid-ul Adha festivals. The Ya Na also has the sole right of choosing celebrated Muslim scholars who performs spiritual functions for the Dagbon Kingdom, and appoints some sub-divisional and honorary chiefs. Dagbon chieftaincy tradition maintains that once a Ya Na is enskinned, he cannot be deskinned. In the past, when there is a consensus among the kingmakers to depose a recalcitrant king, the king is simply eliminated through poisoning. However, over time and the increasing difficulty for kingmakers to reach a consensus on such matters, a king has simply remained a king (Ladoucer, 1972). Efforts to resolve the perennial question of succession to kingship have been ongoing for centuries. In the 17th century, the Nayiri (king) of Mamprugu mediated a succession dispute through soothsaying (consulting the gods and ancestral spirits) and introduced the principle of limiting aspirants to the Ya Na Kingship to the chiefs of the Karaga, Savulugu and Mion communities (Ferguson et al, 1970). This became known as the ‘three chiefly succession gates.’ The Nayiri’s ruling also conformed to the age-old Dagbon succession tradition that only sons of previous kings can become kings. It also made soothsaying a mode of selecting the Ya Na. In the period 1824–1849 the primogenital tradition of unilateral family succession to the Ya-Na Skin was changed to an alternation of succession between the Abudu and Andani families (gates). This was done to incorporate the male descendants of Ya Na Yakubu I’s two wives. Ya Na Yakubu I’s two sons, Princes Abudu and Andani, rebelled against their father. The princes prevailed in the war but spared the life of their father and allowed him to remain Ya Na until his death (Ibrahim Mahama). Princes Abudu and Andani upon their victory seized and ascended the royal skin, or kingship, of Mion and Savulgu skins, respectively. After the death of Ya Na Yakubu I, the kingmakers of Dagbon decided on Mion Lana, Prince Abudu, as the successor to Ya Na. According to elderly Dagbon interviewees, the choice of Abudu was influenced by soothsaying, whereby the ancestral gods and spirits of the Dagbon forefathers residing in the soothsayer chose the most

appropriate prince as King. Oral narratives have it that princes Abudu and Andani fought many wars in their bid to consolidate their hold on power. Ya Na Abudulai I ruled for nineteen years, 1849– 1876. He was succeeded by Andani from 1876–1899. Succession to the throne was limited to the Abudu and Andani families, between whose descendant’s kingship has been shared since the death of Ya Na Andani in 1899. In 1930, the British colonial government—in a bid to document and stem the recurrent Ya Na succession conflict and in consultations with Dagbon chiefs—reaffirmed the 17th-century Nayiri solution of selecting the Ya Na from one of the three communities as chiefs. In the 1940s, in an effort by the British colonial administration to find lasting solution to the perennial succession crisis, the emergent educated royal elites of Dagbon, influenced by emergent nationalist politics, downplayed soothsaying in their efforts to secularise the selection criteria of Ya Na. In 1948, a Select Committee of eleven chiefs was established as replacement for the prior tradition of four kingmakers. The leitmotif that ran through the designs of the elite was that the kings were more amenable to social change and that national politics was more desirable to the ambitions of the educated princes. Thus, the educated and ambitious royals positioned themselves to exploit the opportunities pro-independence politics and thereby introduced the element of national politics into the Dagbon Chieftaincy crisis. The changes notwithstanding, the two royal families alternated the succession until 1954 when the Gbonlana (regent) Abudulai, a member of Abudu family, was selected by the committee to succeed his father Ya Na Mahama III. Under the Select Committee the old system that limited candidates to the occupants of the three-gate skins of Kraga, Savelagu and Mion was abolished. While the Abudu family argued favourably that the rotational system had been replaced by the Selection Committee by voting, the Andani family complained that they were prevented from ascension to Ya Na (Sibidow, 1970).

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

10

11

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

Since then the phenomenon of partitioning along pro-Abudu and proAndani allegiances emerged in Yendi. Since then, Ya Na Yakubu I’s decision in the mid-19th century, the dynamics of the Dagbon Chieftaincy has evolved into a conflict centring on the dispute between the two opposing families. Despite the important purposes chieftaincy serves in Ghana, polygamy and the attendant procreation of numerous male succession aspirants engender succession conflicts, damaging its effective functioning as an institution. Such intrinsic uncertainty facilitates internecine competitions and biased interpretation of traditions that sustain conflicts and discredit traditional institutions. The crisis reflects the fundamental and perennial weakness that traditional and charismatic governance confronts in its efforts to adapt to modernising values and the tendency of such institutions to remain static.

National Politics and Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict in PostIndependence Ghana
Since alternating the succession between the Abudu and Andani gates replaced the primogenital tradition of unilateral family succession to the Ya Na, to be a Dagomba has meant to be defined as either an Abudu or an Andani. Since post-1945 nationalism, the educated Abudu and Andani elites have aligned themselves with the main opposing United Party (UP) and Convention People’s Party (CPP) traditions of Ghanaian politics, respectively. The CPP was founded by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first prime minister and first president. Thus the royal succession crisis became intertwined with national politics, with each family garnering whatever political forces it could. Both sides boasted of competent elites around whom people unite to pursue their insular interests. The Andani family felt marginalised by the Selection Committee scheme and sought redress at the Dagbon State Council to no avail. After independence, the Andani family—a traditional ally of the ruling CPP government—petitioned against the perceived injustices by the Abudu family. The Andani family, under the House of Chiefs Act 1958, filed an appeal against the ruling of the Dagbon State Council. They called for the deskinment of Ya Na Abdulai III for not being properly enskined according to Dagbon traditions (Mahama

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

12

13

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

and Osman, 2005). Plausible though the Andani’s grievances might be, it contradicted a sacrosanct Dagbon tradition that upholds the inviolability of a Ya Na once he is enskined. The CPP set up the Justice Opoku-Afari Commission to investigate the crisis. Upon the Commission’s advice, the government passed the 1960 Legislative Instrument No. 59 (1960 LI 59) that, among others things, restored the Abudu–Andani rotational succession system. It also recommended that in addition to the chieftaincy rotating to the Andani on the death of Abudulai III, the Andani should have two chieftaincy terms to rectify past irregularities in the rotations that favoured the Abudu Gate. Ya Na Abudulai III died on 14 September 1967. On 21 November 1968, the Mion Lana Andani was reported unanimously selected by the Selection Committee to be enskinned as Ya Na Andani III. It appeared that the rotational succession system had been upheld and that the crisis was finally resolved. However, fourteen chiefs of the Dagbon Traditional Council later countered that they had actually chosen the Abudu Gbonlana as king. After two successive Abudu Kings with the advantage of appointing chiefs, it appeared the Dagbon Traditional Council was dominated by pro-Abudu chiefs. Nevertheless, Andani III was enskinned. In 1968 the ‘pro-Abudu’ National Liberation Council, which had two years earlier overthrown the CPP government, set aside the 1960 LI 59 and commissioned the Mate-Kole Committee to inquire into the crisis. Ya Na Andani III died on 14 March 1969. While in this one case, under 1960 LI 59, he would have been succeeded by an Andani, but instead the matter was to be resolved pending the completion of the Mate-Kole Committee’s enquiry.
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

heavily armed police and military contingent, forcibly ejected the Andani family members, who were in the Gbewaa Palace to perform the funeral rites of Ya Na Andani III. Over thirty-five members of the Andani family were killed (Mahama, 2009). On 12 September 1969, Prince Mahamadu Abudulai was enskined Ya Na (Mahamadu Abudulai IV). When the National Redemption Council (NRC) military government overthrew the PP government in 1972, the NRC instituted the 1972 Ollenu Committee to probe the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute and determine the legitimacy of the enskinment of both Ya Na Andani III and Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV. The 1974 Ollenu Committee’s report called for the recognition of (the deceased) Andani III as the rightfully enskined Ya Na and the deskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai IV. The Committee’s Report supported the rotational procedure of succession. The NRC government later passed a decree, NRCD 299 that prohibited all courts from adjudicating issues pertaining to the Dagbon Chieftaincy, especially the deskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai IV (Heritage, 2003). The decree appeared to have laid the Dagbon Crisis to rest by gagging the Ghanaian public. The Abudus’ quest for the reversal of the deskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai IV, however, continued. They exploited the possibilities that changes in government offered. The pro-CPP Peoples’ National Party (PNP) (and arguably pro-Andani family) of Dr. Hilla Limann refused to interrogate the Crisis; but the Provisional National Democratic Council (PNDC) repealed NRCD 299 Decree and set up a tripartite committee made up of representatives of the two families and the government. The PNDC referred the Ollenu Committee’s Report to the Supreme Court, which was upheld by a 6 to 1 ruling. Thus the rotational system was bolstered and elevated to the status of national law: However, the Supreme Court added a caveat to the ruling: Having regard to the Dagbon Constitution that deskinment is unknown in

The Progress Party (PP) government assumed power on 3 September 1969. The Mate-Kole Committee’s report was made public on 4 September 1969. It reversed the 1960 LI59. For the third time, the Abudu family favoured in what was supposed to be a rotational system of succession. The Mate-Kole Report resulted in fighting between the two families. On 9 September 1969, the Abudu family, aided a

14

15

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

(Dagbon), all persons who have ever occupied the Nam of Yendi shall without regard to how they ceased to be Ya Na be regarded as former Ya Na’s. Consequently their sons do not qualify for appointment to the gate skins of Savulugu, Karaga and Mion (Ghana Law Report (198486) Vol. 2, page 239). The Supreme Court’s caveat may have been in line with the Dagbon traditions but its subsequent interpretation by the two families inflamed passions, especially after the death of Mahamadu Abudulai IV in 1988. His death engendered many difficulties that reflect the contradictions and varied interpretations of traditions exacerbated by social change. Although Mahamadu Abudulai IV died while there was an incumbent Ya Na (Andani II), he nevertheless died a Ya Na. In Dagbon, a Ya Na who dies outside the Royal Palace shall not be buried in the Palace; neither can a funeral be performed at the Palace when there is a sitting Ya Na. The Abudus were, however, adamant that his funeral should and would be performed as that of a legitimate Ya Na in the Gbewaa Palace. The Abudu family claimed they built the Palace and that it was only proper that an Abudu Ya Na be buried in the Palace (Interviews, 9/2010). An Andani supporter counters: The confusion arose from a portion of the judgement of the Supreme Court which stated that the deposed Ya Na [Mahamadu Abudulai IV] should be regarded as a former Ya-Na. This ... was not only wrong in custom and law but contrary to the ratio decidendi [the rationale for the decision] ... The ratio decidendi nullified the enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai and confirmed the enskinment of Naa Yakubu [Andani] II in 1974. There could not be a “living former” Ya-Na in Dagbon when there was a sitting Ya-Na.
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

The Run up to and Aftermath of the Death of Ya Na Andani II
The contentions of the royal rights that came with the death of Mahamadu Abudulai IV served as the apical point of the Dagbon Crisis during the New Patriotic Party (NPP) regime (2000–2008). Precedents to the murder of Ya Na Andani II shed light on perceptions of complicity by the NPP Government. In Dagbon deliberations related to elections in 2000 centered on the Abudu–Andani divide and if the Ya Na would be deposed should the NPP come to power. The general elections were a straight fight between the incumbent National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the pro-UP/PP NPP.

3 This was confirmed by Elizabeth Ohene, Minister of State, on Joy FM Front Page Programme, Friday, March 29, 2002; and the former Minister of Interior, Hon. Malik Alhassan Yakubu that his NPP government was trying to assist the Abudu Family to perform the funeral of the ex-Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai at the Gbewaa Palace. He, however, clarified that: “there was not going to be any coercion.” See Ibrahim Mahama, The Murder of an African King, op. cit., pp.38-40.

16

17

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

The momentum of the elections was with the NPP, the party with which the Abudus were primarily aligned. Rumours circulated that NPP hierarchy had promised the Abudus that the NPP would help the Abudus perform Mahamadu Abudulai IV’s funeral rites at the Gbewaa Palace if voted into power. For the NPP to win the run-off, however, it needed the support of the other minority parties such as the CPP and the Peoples National
3

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

Convention (PNC)—meaning it needed Andani support. There is some evidence that Andani-CPP supporters threw their lot with their “arch-chieftaincy and political opponents, the Abudu family,” in the hope that such alliance might help end their political differences and consolidate the peace in Dagbon (Mahama; 2009). Inspite of this, the NPP Presidential candidate John A. Kufuor, on a campaign visit to the Gbewaa Palace, assured Ya Na Andani II that an NPP Government could not and would not pursue the burial of Mahamadu Abudulai IV at the Gbewaa Palace. The success of the NPP in 2000 emboldened and boosted the stature of the Abudus. The Abudu family and its sympathizers began to flex their muscles and challenge the supreme authority of Ya Na Andani II.

Interior, Hon. Malik Yakubu, all from the Abudu family. Six district chief executives of the eight administrative districts in Dagbon were either members or supporters of the Abudu family. The Abudu family dominated the national security apparatus. The appointment of Abudus as district chief executives in all but one district in Dagbon meant that the Abudus also dominated the district security committees.

One of Ghana’s most widely read newspapers, The Chronicle, questioned the security mechanism of Ghana:
“There have been gaps of incredulity with the information that almost the entire top echelon of the National Security apparatus is composed of one gate in the Northern Region, especially the Abudu Gate. General Hamidu and the respected former Minister of Interior Honourable Malik Alhassan are Abudus. The former blowman of Recce Regiment, Major Sulemana, the regent of Tolon, is also in a Senior Position at the office of National Security. The Vice President who by virtue of the constitutional dictates heads the Security Council is also a Dagomba affiliated to the Abudu Gate. Only the Chief Director and the National Security Coordinator are Akans. It is an imbalance that is a recipe for problems. Right under the watch of these men, the nation watched as the horrors of Yendi were visited on us.” (The Chronicle, May 7, 2002). The Abudu family pressed the NPP Government for the fulfilment of what it believed to be its electoral promises. The demands virtually amounted to establishing the Bolin Lana (the head of the Abudus) as a parallel paramount status as the Ya Na—contrary to the Dagbon customs and traditions. The thorniest demand was the issue of the funeral of the former Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai in the Gbewaa Palace during the tenure of a living Ya Na. Police and the Wuaku Commission reports said both families began stockpiling arms in anticipation of violence. The situation worsened when the Abudu-dominated security agencies banned the celebration

The Wuaku Commission captured the momentous linkage the NPP victory had in escalating the Crisis:
“Deeply intertwined with the local [Abudu–Andani] rivalry was the intrusion of national politics into chieftaincy matters in Dagbon. The Abudu royal gate, believed to be historically sympathetic to the BusiaDanquah political tradition from which the reigning [NPP] emerged, considered the NPP victory in the 2000 elections as an opportunity to boost its political stature at the local front and re-launched grievance previously held in abeyance. Thus they started contesting the Ya Na’s monopolistic control over certain events and ceremonies including the traditional Bugum and Eid-ul-Adha festivals. The Ya Na’s sole control over these festivals had never been called to question” (Wuaku Commission Report, p. 65).
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

Again, the political appointments during the NPP government, whether by design or coincidence, helped to fan perceptions of NPP interference in the Dagbon crisis and inflamed passions on the Andani side. The vice-president of the NPP government was an Abudu sympathizer. The NPP administration appointed three ministers and two deputy ministers from Dagbon, including the Minister of

18

19

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

of the Bugum festival on 23 March 2002 on the basis that “there was tension mounting in Yendi Township with allegations and counter allegations from both sides” without first discussing the situation with Ya Na Andani II and the Regional Minister, a non-Abudu (Wuaku Commission Report). DISEC imposed a dusk to dawn curfew in Yendi from 24 to 26 March 2002 and cancelled the Ya Na Andani II’s programmes for the celebration. Ya Na Andani II conferred with the Regional Minister, who revoked curfew and asked for the festival to be celebrated as scheduled. The Palace of the Ya Na was, however, attacked by the Abudus from March 25 to 27 when Ya Na Andani II and forty others were killed. Within hours after the murder of Ya Na Andani II, the government declared a state of emergency in the Dagbon Traditional Area, banned the procurement and possession of offensive weapons in the catchment area, called for restraint on the part of all parties, and deployed a large contingent of military and police forces in addition to the military detachment already stationed in. The curfew was renewed on a monthly basis and was completely lifted in 2010 under the NDC government. The government dispatched a special team of police investigators, headed by Chief Superintendent David Asante Appeatu. Constitutionally, government can only be a facilitator and guarantor of peace in Chieftaincy issues. Given the allegations of complicity against the NPP government and the highly political sensitive nature that the crisis had assumed, the Andani family, the minority group in parliament, members of the Council of State, and other civil society groups called on the government to set up a non-partisan Commission of Inquiry of high integrity with the objective of identifying the perpetrators. Radical elements within the Andanis contended that there could be no peace after the odious crime; while the mainstream asked for entombment, justice and appointment of a regent as conditions for peace.

The Wuaku Commission Inquiry to the Death of Ya Na Andani II
On April 25, 2002, the NPP Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Justice Wuaku, (a retired Supreme Court Judge, and two members Prof. Kwesi Yankah of University of Ghana and Mrs. Florence Brew, an Educationist) to inquire about the events and resultant deaths in Yendi from the 25 to 27 March 2002 and to identify those responsible, and to recommend appropriate actions against any person judged to be responsible. The Wuaku Commission Report established that “The Gbewaa Palace was set ablaze by the Abudus ... In an attempt to escape from the encircling blaze and gunfire, many Andanis either received serious gunshot wounds or was shot dead.” “The late Ya Na and all those killed within the Palace and its environs were killed by Abudu fighters. ... that arms had been imported into Yendi and parts of Dagbon area over a long period of time was known by the security agencies who however, did not mount any operation to retrieve them. ... that even though the Ya Na made two frantic requests for security intervention on 27th March, these were not timeously honoured. ... that certain coincidences and lapses on the part of the security agencies and Ghana Telecom, that impeded effective intervention in the crisis, are unacceptable to the Commission” (Wuaku Commission Report). “The police surprisingly turned away several fugitives seeking refuge at the police station ... the commission notes with regret the relative indifference and inaction of key state and government agencies during the crisis. Apart from the inaction of the security agencies, key government functionaries were not at post or claimed to be indisposed at the height of the crisis. ... The Minister for the Interior at the time, Alhaji Malik Yakubu Alhassan, was indisposed for most part of the crisis. But he was available to receive the application for the imposition of the ban and curfew. The Ghana Police was reasonably effective in monitoring but not in arresting the crisis ... The functioning of the

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

20

21

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

military detachment in Yendi was not at its optimum either. They had a malfunctioning rifle and faulty batteries in the armoured vehicle. And when they sought reinforcement from Tamale what came was the wrong military gear. The Ghana Telecom lines were down on 25th March when the crisis began and were restored on 27th March when the carnage was over” (Wuaku Commission Report). “That Yidana Sugri and Iddrisu Gyamfo (both Abudus) were seen on 27th March holding severed parts of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II soon after the Ya Na had been killed. ... That Yidana Sugri and Iddrisu Gyamfo should be presumed to have killed the Ya Na... That on this score, Idrisu Iddi alias Mbadugu, former Zalinko Lana, is an accessory to the killing of Ya Na.” The Wuaku Commission recommended their arrest and prosecution. It also recommended the arrest and prosecution of several other individuals for their alleged involvement in offences such as conspiracy to murder, attempted murder, causing unlawful damage, assault, ‘arson’ (i.e. causing unlawful damage to property), illegal possession of weapons, and unlawful military training. The Commission also urged the government to address the security shortcomings that the crisis has uncovered and to promote the process of genuine reconciliation, including the need to ensure as a matter of urgency the funeral of Mahamadu Abudulai IV (the former Ya Na who died in 1988) is performed and that the body of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II be properly preserved and buried according to custom.

Bolin Lana and head of the Abudus in Yendi—was also found innocent. The NPP government accepted the general findings and recommendations of the Commission.
The Commission’s description of the carnage in Yendi as a ‘war’ is probably informed by the circumstantial evidence that arms had been imported into Yendi and that the situation before the Bugum Festival merited the declaration of emergency by the security agencies. However, the Commission’s subsequent recommendation that persons that were presumed to have killed the Ya Na persons should be tried was quite controversial; since crimes committed during war are war crimes and are handled differently from crimes such as murder.

According to the Andani family, “it is indeed strange and incredible that the Wuaku Commission which described the events leading to the murder of the Ya Na as a ‘three-day war’ came to a shocking conclusion that ‘two people should be presumed the killers of the Ya Na ... there is no such thing as presumption in the offense of murder. A person can only be charged with the offense of murder if he/she intentionally and unlawfully kills another person.... to charge Yidana Sugri and Iddrisu Jahinfo as the presumed murderers of the Ya Na will be an exercise in futility. ... after three days of bombardment of the Gbewaa Palace by members and supporters of the Abudu family, it is indeed incredulous for the Commission to say that only two people should be presumed as the persons responsible for the end result.”
5

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

4

4 Wuaku Commission Report cited in Government White Paper on the Wuaku Commission Report, December 23, 2002, p. 2.

5 The Andani Family’s Response to the Wuaku Commissions Finding cited in Abrahim Mahama, 2009, pp. 116-117.

22

23

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

The Commission did not recommend compensations for the victims. “Having considered the totality of evidence before the Commission, we have come to the conclusion that the events that took place in Yendi on 25th, 26th and 27th March, 2002 were criminal acts of an act of war fought between two Gates for which individuals from both Gates are blameable.” The Commission exonerated the Abudus in high government positions of any guilt in the absence of evidence. Mahamadu Abudulai III—the

The accused were eventually arrested and tried, but given the contradictions, the accused were discharged for lack of prosecution. The Commission’s Report did not remove the suspicion of government collusion in the death of Ya Na Andani II and members of his party.

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

The Committee of Eminent Chiefs Effort to Resolve the Crisis
In keeping with Ghana’s constitution, chieftaincy is in principle an independent body of government and above national government and politics. Chieftaincy disputes are to be settled at the Regional House of Chiefs, National House of Chiefs and eventually at the Court of Appeal levels, in that pecking-order. Many of the interviewees however believe that although traditional institutions serve very important purposes in national development and governance processes, the chieftaincy institution itself is bedevilled with mundane and serious disputes that undermine national development. After the Dagbon carnage, the government upgraded the Chieftaincy Secretariat at the Ministry of Interior to a Ministry of Chieftaincy in 2005 to create a greater capacity to address its weaknesses. In 2003, the government appointed the Committee of Eminent Chiefs to resolve the traditional chieftaincy differences between the two factions. The Committee negotiations were based on Court rulings and the various Committee reports on the Dagbon crisis. It brought together parties to the conflict, the UNDP, Ministries of Interior and Chieftaincy. The UNDP was the main facilitator of the process. In 2005, based largely upon the Wuaku Commission Report and interpretation of traditional issues, and consultation with the various parties to the conflict, the Committee crafted a ‘road map’ for the return of peace to Dagbon. The map called on all parties to exercise restraint; that the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II should be given a fitting burial; the Andani family should appoint a regent; the funeral of the former Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV should be performed at the Gbewaa Palace; and the funeral of the late Yakubu Andani II should be performed; after which a heir to the throne should be chosen. The Committee stated that only the Andani regent should be regarded as the Regent of Dagbon. The late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II was buried in the Gbewaa Palace in March 2006 and his eldest son, Kampakuyana Andani, made the

Regent of Dagbon. However, the funeral rites of the former Ya Na Na Mahamadu Abudulai II, considered critical to the peace process, have stalled (Ghanaian Times, May 27, 2008: 3). The greatest obstacle facing the eminent chiefs is the unwillingness of both families to make significant compromises. While many interviewees expressed faith in the Eminent Chiefs, others are critical and pessimistic that the road map is not comprehensive enough to resolve and transform the Dagbon Chieftaincy crisis.

Civil Society Organisations
Civil society organisations (CSOs), including faith-based groups, non-governmental organizations, specialised UN agencies, and individuals on their own initiatives and in collaboration with the state have played diverse but important roles in mitigating the adverse effects of the Dagbon crisis. They often influence the agenda and nature of the mediation and negotiation processes of the parties to the conflict and government and the various committees by their criticisms, admonishments, and view points on issues. Faith-based organisations such the Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Christian Council, the Office of the Chief Imam, Ghana Pentecostal Council, and their specialised peace organisations, have used their presence in the localities to champion peaceful resolution of conflicts. CSOs have used humanitarian interventions to assuage the suffering of victims. They have organised trainings for opinion leaders and chiefs in conflict resolution and restorative justice. CSOs were very instrumental through their collaboration with other stakeholders, such as Ghana’s development partners, and the World Council of Churches to end the Dagbon crisis. These efforts have culminated, for instance, in the formation of the National Peace Committee made up of both families. NGOs also often play invaluable roles across the spectrum of conflict management and peace-building. In the chieftaincy crisis such as in Dagbon, where dysfunctional perceptions between feuding parties and government are almost palpable, NGOs serve as critical trust-building

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

24

25

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

actors in conflict-management processes. CSOs have often built upon the trust and confidence they have won through their humanitarian interventions in crisis situations to address substantive issues that would have otherwise been impossible. One of the greatest problems CSOs face is their inability to codify their results into enforceable legal documents as governments are able to. Besides, politicians and governments are often suspicious of the ‘true’ objectives and influence CSOs, especially NGOs, bring to bear on these processes.

One of the greatest hurdles to peace in Dagbon remains the funeral of the former Ya Na Mahamadu Abdulai IV, and the eventual decision on which family qualifies to succeed following the murder of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II. The way, manner and timing of these two issues will largely determine the untying of the Gordonian knot of the Dagbon Crisis.

The NDC Government and Management of the Dagbon Crisis
In 2009 the NDC Government succeeded the NPP Government. During the elections, the NDC made electoral promises to the Ghanaians that if voted to power the NDC would prosecute Ya Na Yakubu Andani II’s murderers. The NDC has since reiterated its commitment to the role of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs and the Road Map. Fourteen suspects have since been arrested and are being prosecuted. The issues that have emerged surround the centrality of the Wuaku Commission to the trial. Almost, all those interviewed consented that for true peace and reconciliation to prevail in Dagbon, justice is a prerequisite. However, some interviewees were concerned that, although there is the need for justice, the partisan and patronising manner in which the NDC Government promised justice, necessarily undermines present efforts, in terms of trust, and credibility. Given the politicisation and hardening of positions by the factions in the crisis, the putative effect that the quest of justice in retributive terms might have on the longterm peace, reconciliation and transformation of the Dagbon Crisis remains unclear. The final ruling of the courts on the culpability of the defendants will certainly influence the parties’ perception of the government and their opponents.

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

26

27

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

Conclusion
Given the historically differentiated rates of development between the southern and northern parts of Ghana, the prevalence of violent conflicts in the northern parts of Ghana serves as a double tragedy. The violent conflicts reverse the development clock and drive away potential resources necessary for the regions’ development. The northern regions constitute the main food basket of the nation and their instability undermines Ghana’s food security. The conflicts equally adversely affects Ghana’s neighbours such as Burkina Faso, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire since the ethnic groups such as Bimoba, Kokomba, Kasena, Moshie, Chamba, Basari of northern Ghana share cultural affinities with groups in neighbouring countries. Instability in one area affects relationships and human mobility between and among the ethnic groups in question. The Dagomba chieftaincy crisis, however, was affected by cross-border gun-running only. Attempts at resolving the Dagbon Chieftaincy crisis dates back to the pre-colonial era, however, the conflict re-ignites, especially whenever there is a change of government. This is largely due to three factors: (a) governments often draw their support and legitimacy from mobilising differing and competing sub-national identities; (b) because the two gates, Abudu and Andani have found it expedient and strategic to align themselves with the main opposing political traditions of Ghana; and (c) both families have mostly conceptualised the crisis in zero-sum equations and are not reluctant to use violence to achieve their goals.

Ironically, traditional institutions form an invaluable integral part of the governance and security architecture of Ghana. However, the volatility of chieftaincy remains one of the main sources of conflict in Ghana. Owing to the obduracy of ambitious elites, the volatility of defining traditions, attempts to adapt the Dagbon institutions to exigencies of social change, and the two families’ politicisation of the resultant succession crisis by associating with the two opposing political traditions of Ghana, the Dagbon chieftaincy crisis has simmered on without an enduring solution. The inflamed nature of the relationship between the two families and the attendant mutual mistrust almost makes any political and negotiated solution impossible. Sub-national identities and national politics in post-colonial states, such as Ghana, are often inter-linked in an intricate and puzzling way. Life and politics in Ghana often does not conform to an institutionalised bureaucratic system but more personalised manner beyond institutionalised regulations. The absence of bureaucratic limits and the reality that political power is the surest way to social mobility makes politics susceptible to factional contentions aimed at controlling governance institutions. Politics often involves organising sub-national groups for support. Since most Ghanaians owe allegiance to traditional institutions, especially chieftaincy, these institutions are largely influenced by, and subsequently, influence national politics. This makes public space at the local and national levels, realms of contestation, self-categorisation creating ‘boundaries’ between groups, and accentuating differences. This sociological underpinning of politics poses a perceptual dilemma to governments in times of upheavals as they are often perceived as nepotism; and indifferent when governments do not intervene.
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

28

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

29

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

In summary, the research makes these important findings:
(i) Since independence there has been a process of mutual mobilisation of state power by factions in the competition for chieftaincy positions; National political elite have exploited such factional fights in their own struggle for state power;

(ii)

Bibliography
Ahorsu, Ken, ‘Field Report on the 1994 Konkonba-NanumbaDagomba-Gonja Conflicts,’ LECIAD, University of Ghana, Legon, 1999, unpublished monograph. Ahorsu, Ken, ‘the Political Economy of Post-Cold War Conflicts in Sub Saharan Africa: The Natural Resources Factor’, Ph. D. Thesis, University of Kent, (2007). Austin, Dennis, Politics in Ghana: 194s6-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). Bening, R. B, ‘Development of Education in Northern Ghana,’ Ghana Social Science Journal, vol. 1/2 (1972), pp. 21-42. Bhaskar, Roy, The Posssibility of Naturalism (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989). Boafo-Arthur, Kwame, ‘Chiefs in Ghana: Challenges and Prospects in the 21st Century,’ African and Asian Studies, vol. 2, no.2 (2003). Brukum, N. J. K., ‘Ethnic Conflict in Northern Ghana: A Study of the Gonja District 1980-1994,’ in Mike Oquaye (ed.), Democracy, Politics and Conflict Resolution in Contemporary Ghana (Accra: Gold-Type Publications Ltd., 1995), pp. 138-153. Brukum, N. J. K., Chieftaincy and Conficts in Northern Ghana, Department of History, University of Ghana, Legon, Mimeograph (1995).

(iii) This mutual cooptation has complicated the Dagbon chieftaincy crisis and transformed it into a tragic cycle of strife and destruction following closely the cycle of elite competition at the national level; (iv) (v) Judicial solutions have not been effective; and Civil society interventions have failed to resolve the conflict including the Committee of Eminent Chiefs which has not been effective.

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

30

31

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

Dickson, K. B., ‘Background to the problems of Economic Development in Northern Ghana, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 58/4 (1968), pp. 686-696. Duncan-Johnstone, and Blair, Enquiry into the Constitution and Organisation of the Dagbon Kingdom, (Accra: 1936). Ewusi, K., ‘Levels of Regional Development in Ghana, Social Indicators Research, vol3/1 (1976), pp. 75-100. Ferguson, Phyllis and Ivor Wilks, ‘Chiefs, Consultations and the British in Northern Ghana,’ in Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime, (eds.) West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status Under Colonial Rule and Independence (New York: African Publishing Corporation/ Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1970). Giddens, Anthony, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism London: Macmillan, 1981). Giddens, Anthony, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1971). Giddens, Anthony, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1979). Giddens, Anthony, Human Societies: A Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). Giddens, Anthony, Politics, Sociology and Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

Giddens, Anthony, The Constitution of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984). Giddens, Anthony, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity Press,1985). Giddens, Anthony, The Third Way and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). Giddens, Anthony, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: PolityPress, 1998). Gyimah-Boadi, E. and Asante, R., Minorities in Ghana,’ Commission on Human Rights Working Group on Minorities, United Nations, New York, (2003). Harre, R. And Stearns, P., Discursive Psychology in Practice (London: Sage Publications, 1995) Iddi, M. D., ‘The Ya-Na of the Dagomba’ Institute of African Studies, (University of Ghana, Legon: Accra: 1968) Iliasu, A, ‘Asante Relations with Dagomba: 1740-1874’ the Social Science Journal, vol.1:2 (1970). Jabri, Vivienne, ‘Agency, Structure, and the Question of Power in Conflict Resolution’ Paradigms, Vol. 9 No. 2, (Winter 1995) pp. 54-55. Jabri, Vivienne, Discourse On Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

Giddens, Anthony, Runaway World: How Globalisation is Shaping Our Lives (London: Profile Books, 2002). Giddens, Anthony, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

Jönsson, Julia, ‘The Overwhelming Minority: Traditional Leadership and Ethnic Conflict in Ghana’s Northern Region,’ CRISE Working Paper No 30, Department of International Development, University of Oxford (February 2007) Kriesberg, Louis, Constructive Conflicts (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996)

32

33

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

Ladouceur, Paul Andre, ‘The Yendi Chieftaincy Dispute,’ Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 1, 1 (1972), pp. 97-117. Ladouceur, Paul Andre, Chiefs and Politicians: The Politics of Regionalism in Northern Ghana (New York/London; Logman, (1979). Mahama, Andani and Alhassan Osman Noble, ‘Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis: The Truth and Hard Facts,’ GhanaHomepage (November 5, 2005) ghanaweb.com/.../artikel.php? ID=93656 acessed on 13/9/2010 Mahama, Ibrahim, ‘Ya-Na, the African King of Power,’ 1995 (Unpublished Manuscript) Mahama, Ibrahim, Murder of an African King: Ya-Na Yakubu II (New York: Vantage Press, 2009). Manokiam, Madeline, Tribes of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast (1952) Ninsin, Kwame, ‘Conflict as a Pursuit of Liberty,’ in Mike Oquaye (ed.), Democracy, Politics and Conflict Resolution in Contemporary Ghana (Accra: Gold-Type Publications Ltd., 1995). Oquaye Mike, (ed.), Democracy, Politics and Conflict Resolution in Contemporary Ghana (Accra: Gold-Type Publications Ltd., 1995), pp. 138-153. Oteng, Kwaku, ‘Eminent Chiefs to Meet Over Dagbon Crisis,’ Ghanamma.com, http://www.ghanamma.com/index.php?... Accessed on 13/9/2010
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

Sibidow, Background to the Yendi Skin Crisis, (Accra: 1970), Mimeograph. Songsore, Jacob, ’Towards Building a Model of Urban Growth Dynamics: the Case of Large Northern Ghanaians Towns,’ Universitas, University of Ghana (1977), pp. 116-124. Songsore, Jacob, Intraregional and Interregional Labour Migrations in Historical Perspective: the Case of North-Western Ghana, University of Port Harcourt, Faculty of Social Sciences, Occasional Papers, Series No. 1 (1983). Songsore, Jacob, Structural Crisis, Dependent Capitalist Development and Regional Inequality in Ghana,’ ISS Occasional Papers, No. 71, Institute of Social Studies, the Hague (1979). Tamakloe, E. F., A Brief History of the Dagomba People, (Accra: 1931). The Mate-Kole Committee Report, 1969. Tsikata, Dzodzi, and Wayo Seini, ‘Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts in Ghana,’ CRISE Working Paper No 30, Department of International Development, University of Oxford (February 2004). Wendt, Alexander, ‘Levels of analysis vs. agents and structures: part III,’ Review of International Studies, 18 (1992), p. 181-185. Wendt, Alexander, ‘The Agency-Structure Problem in International Relations’ International Organisation 41: 2 (1987), pp. 335-70.

Sibawey, Mugisu, ‘Blame Kutu Acheampong for Dagbon Crisis,’ Modern Ghana News, (August 29, 2003) modernghana.com/.../blamekutu-ache... accessed on 13/9/2010

34

35

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

Quansah, Kwasi Obiri, ‘The Dagbon crisis in perspective,’ GhanaHomepage (April 12, 2006), ghanaweb.com/.../article. php?ID=102527, accessed on 13/9/2010.

Daily Newspapers (2002 to date reviewed). Ghanaian Times Daily Graphic Ghanaian Chronicle

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

36

37

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

WEST AFRICA CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE

38

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis

West Africa Civil Society Institute NO. 9 Bingo Street, East Legon P.O. Box AT 1956 Achimota, Accra, Ghana Tel: +233. 30. 2542010 +233. 30. 2522589 Fax: +233. 30. 2522588. Website: www.wacsi.org

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful