Design vs operations On what Documentation/Deliverable (s) from a Design Department would I find; Nominal operating levels expected throughout

a plant, the normal operating ranges and hard Design limit bounds associated with maintaining saftey? Are Plant design factors of safety in sizing equipment necessarily consistent? Is there a "Standard" in Design Engineering Deliverables (Documentation and specifications) which mitigate against inconsistencies from the point of view of Operations vs. Design department? (relevant around or before Plant Commissioning) I ask the above questions from the point of view of Operations' need in response to a fault condition; using an adequate approach to plant compensenation by a shift in normal operating point to a new optimal based on limitations posed by a fault condition i.e.; reduced but sustained production level while still maintaining product quality withing specifications and Primarily safe operations. In shifting to a new 'optimal' the operator tries to steer away from being too close to driving a plant unstable, while acknowledging sufficient room for constricted operations within new hard-bound limits. This would potentially minimized downtime until scheduled time can be alotted to service fault adequately, after which Plant 'Design ' Optimal Operating conditions can be restored. How is an "awareness" of Plant-Process Design information (an understanding of this information) transferred to 'Operations' Department in a consistent, effective and efficient manner; increasing the effectivness of the 'Operations' where unusual plant conditions may arise? I expect that some might respond "Operations Manuals "....but how does one guarantee/measure that they are necessarily thorough? ...total shutdown vs. when operations can still be maintained at an economically justified reduced but safe level, while guaranteeing quality? Re: Design vs Operations Plant design established standards vs subjective judgment on factors of safety where a designer might choose to be more vs. less conservative.......and in turn the transfer of this information in an effective manner to the Plant Operations Engineering Deparment who are expected to be adequately and appropriately responsive to potentially all abnormal and normal conditions within guidelines of safety foremost while trying their best to keep their response economically feasible. I believe many issues are associated with this and formulating an answer might not be as straight- forward as indicating points to consider..which may themselves be open to further discussion. Hopefully the topic will stimulate a few points of view and discussion threads.

Re: Design vs Operation .. should be built up such that equipment sizing. Latterly. Such information must be provided in the form of operating instructions that emerge from the design documentation stage. This will provided the basis of an inventory of equipment and facilities. Then the systems design AND the documentation for it must be grown to maturity in parallel as modifications. The important part here is the Mass Balance as that will determine the capacity of the plant. project planning and even finance can be examined in more detail.. Industry has. Industries develop their own de-facto standards which the wise plant owner will build into any contract. It is therefore a matter of contractual agreement as to how the project proceeds and deals with the issues. But beware of 'engineering creep'! Safety Issues must be considered during the development of these documents and the limits. encouraged by simple and plain old 'good management'. There are no specific Regulations or Standards that I know of which attempt to regulate or even quantify such issues. explosion and fire protection and mitigation. An iterative process. management and operation of these plants which is used to determine how best to run them. Commissioning and Operations people must communicate well and assist each other. over the years. In parallel with this a Mass Balance computation of solids. Operating points and operating point limits MUST be determined and specified at this stage. enhancements and improvements are made. The Plant owner is ultimately responsible for the safety of the plant. coolants. constraints.. fuels.. somehow.. (Caviat Emptor. The effect on the process of integrating all such safety criteria that pertain to the type of plant being designed must be considered as part of that design process. Let the buyer beware!) Obviously there are Standards which must be complied with on general issues for example. precautions and effectiveness of such design considerations should emerge as a further parallel study to the above documents. These documents are generated in one form or another by design houses and should outline the complete process description with the aims and objectives of the plant clearly stated. The plant owner must therefore be satisfied that the designers have consider all aspects of appropriate (and perhaps inappropriate) plant operation. Design. developed specific approaches through a conceptual design stage and then a detail design stage where the designer and the plant owner must interact to ensure that what is being designed achieves the ambitions of who will pay for it with adequate safety from all aspects. expected energy usage etc. gasses.Re: Design vs Operations The Process Flow Diagram and Process Description form a set of key design documents comprising block diagrams and text respectively. P&IDs will be generated. liquids ... The question I believe can best be answered by citing 'experience' in the ownership. Operation outside these limits should perhaps be prevented by invoking appropriate safety systems.

That this degradation in efficiency when considering the cumulative of Plant assets working collectively can be regarded as a migration from Designed Plant performance or partial failure. Whereas it is straightforward to identify what maybe most plausible concerns in facilitating safety. However even within the realm of experience is the human factor and consequently.) In terms of a Plant I make an analogy "unit processes / modules" being synonymous to Unit Operations. but also trace inherent dependencies which may exist among such units and this becomes stringent for high assurance systems where for instance a particular Safety integrity Level must be proven to be adhered to. along with cross-discipline dependencies in design. should be fostered within proper and effective communication facilitated by “Management”. such representatives who offer some guidance as per expectations of the project. we then realize a shift in what may be deemed the Plant’s Designed Optimum operating point.Thanks very much for your answer. If we consider the condition monitoring within predictive maintenance. clearly suggests by “experience”. hierarchical process by which the various layers of safety are defined as per form and function incorporating the impact of components defined by various engineering disciplines involved in the collaborative effort between Designer and “Owner”? If so. after handover from Design. what tools are employed. For most cases this may occur after the Owner has accepted the Plant. The “owner” in the context of above. the effective Management of “quantity of information” in communication and effective use of this quantity information seems to be more so the issue. where possible software tools are devised to assist with the decision process. it is not enough to test modules or unit processes in isolation. assisting this decision making process? (As an example by analogy to a somewhat related field of software engineering. the awareness assisting effective decisions depends on the perspectives of different discipline-interest’s point of view and capacity to evaluate by considering various levels of granularity/detail. Within time constraint to produce design plans not all dependencies may be realized and infact remain hidden within design. Is there a systematic. Furthermore with time the Potential for failure increases and with this degradation in efficiency. But then just what is the reality? However. Operations are interested in maintaining quality within bounds of stability/safety and economic feasibility. Ideally the above as suggested. until exercised during operations. I have just a few comments as a follow up response. . then we are aware that there exists little relationship between the length of time an asset has been in service and the time when it will fail.

If “Operations” had a means of effectively assessing the “quantity of design information”. awareness of the perspective of any one of the other two and effective + efficient management of information seems key. the better the hazard study. the relevant dependencies pertaining to safety which have been redefined. SIL and emergency shutdown systems.In concert with the above. when tackling a new project. written in stone (figuratively) within Plant configuration. This discussion will probably not be very fruitful. while the original Plant design limits are still engrained. and absolutely vital. (There are many people who believe that a hazard study comprises solely of the HAZOP) . I believe the following may be of interest. The better the team. The path forward toward greater decision objectivity and assurance may well be integrating an experience-based structure as standard in decision assisted -. as the discussion is starting to move in the direction of safety systems. Effective Communication between Design. design. However. Operations and Maintenance. up until now is extremely relevant. a proper Hazard study actually consists of 6 steps. Re: Design vs Operations Everything that has been referred to. stable operating point. with safe “distance” from hard-bound limits. then it would be possible for them to assess a new feasible optimum economic.) In effect. but could be beneficial. and that it be as complete and meticulously as is humanly possible (and it need not be said that a lot will depend upon the team that is put together. of which only the third step is the actual HAZOP. Whenever tacking any new project / major modification. for someone who already has an existing plant. it is essential that a hazard study be done. operations and maintenance software tools . in the discussion. designed operational and hard bound safety limits would plausibly be shifted in reality.

are incorporated into the design. from the design / operating team to the operating team. and identifies significant hazards. identifies major environmental problems and assesses the suitability of the proposed site. In a new plant. regulations and codes of practice. Criteria for hazards and authorities are consulted. that all actions raised during earlier studies have been completed. and is a critical examination of plant operations. the PIDs are required. standards. and is there to ensure that equipment has been built as intended. control and operability problems. Step 5 (or Process Hazard Study 5) is carried out to examine the preparedness of the operating team.The steps could. This goes into a lot more depth. as well as reviewing safety measures. the project is likely to be handed over. It identifies all hazards associated with the process. and that there are no violations of the design intent.) It is also here. and really is crucial. and identifies detail hazard. and they better be as accurate as possible. Step 3 is the actual HAZOP. (Checks. Step 2 – Process Hazard Study 2 – This examines the plant items and equipment on a process flow sheet. This includes . in determining if you are covered for all scenarios that can affect your operation. as are regulations. Here. on completion of this study. to carry out the final commissioning of the project. where one would review the commissioning and operating instructions. be described as follows: Step 1 – Process Hazard Study 1 – Also known as the Concept Definition Phase Hazard study or Screening Risk Analysis. briefly. in order to do a proper HAZOP. especially from a safety perspective. It also identifies where redesign is appropriate. Step 4 is a design / construction review performed at the end of the construction phase.

whether the operating experience matches the original assumptions made. Safety instrumented systems and alarms must be fully operational and validated.documented final operating procedures and the required training. . It checks that all outstanding issues from previous studies have been completed. The final step (Process Hazard Study 6) is carried out a few months into the production phase. looks for significant deviations from the intended operating procedures and captures experience from the plat for future use.