INTRODUCTION The most appropriate methodology suitable for scientific investigation and research has been an issue of controversy

among scholars, scientists and as well as philosophers of science. Ideologically, scholars are divided on the most appropriate methodology for determining empirical truth. Broadly categorized, the critical divide has been between inductive and deductive methodologies. Recent trends in philosophy of science discourse revolve around the problem of methodology of scientific inquiry, the factors that could enhance the advancement of science, the question of truth and certainty as well as the issue of rationality of scientific discoveries. More fundamental in this discourse is the methodological problem of scientific research. In fact, a number of ideologies have emerged in response to the challenges posed by the issue of methodology of science. The relativists, for instance, see scientific truth in terms of a period of reference, environment and orientation. To the realist (pragmatists), a statement in science is either true or false; there is no mid-way between the two. The instrumentalists are rather interested in the function that theories play in science. They see theories as necessary instruments in science, which essentially, are meant to make prediction with precision possible and to offer explanation of events in nature. Incidentally, Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, and others considered D the basis of scientific method. By this inductive approach to scientific method, one makes a series of observations and forms a universal generalization. If correct and stated in a sufficiently accurate way, an inductively arrived-at statement relieves others of the need for making so many observations and allows them to instead use the generalization to predict what will happen in specific circumstances in the future. The logical positivists, on their own, are interested both in the methodology of science (inductive) as well as the relationship between science and metaphysics. They also thought highly of the principle of inductive procedure as a basis for scientific knowledge. They, however, use their principles of verifiability and conformability to dismiss the propositions of metaphysics as nonsensical, and as having no bearing in the acquisition of knowledge.

Following the logical positivists, David Hume launched an attack on metaphysics which he saw as pure sophistry and illusion. But Hume criticized induction and argued against it as the best model or method of science. Karl Popper also condemned the inductive model of science and introduced the deductive method which he termed the µhypothetico-deductive method of science.  THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION The term induction is a process or method of reasoning in which the premises of an argument are believed to support the conclusion. It is the method of inferring general theories or laws from particular instances that have been observed. According to Kemeny, (1959, 93) induction is the ³process by which the scientist forms theory to explain the observed facts, it is a reasoning drawn from the past to the future in the expectation that the future will continue to behave in the same manner as in the past´. What this simply implies is that the fact that the sun rises every morning to the best of our knowledge in the past gives us the cause to believe that it will rise in such a way in the future. It is pertinent to mention that induction presupposes certain basic assumptions:     That there is a necessary connection between one event and another, that is, between a cause and its effect. That nature is uniform and behaves the same way anywhere and at all times. That the future will be like the past, and that what happened in the past will also happen in the future. That what we have observed to be the case in many instances will be the case in all instances. Aristotle was first to establish the mental process of inductive-deductive method as a class of reasoning. He views scientific inquiry as a progression from observation to generalizations and back to observations. To Aristotle, explanatory principles should be induced from observations. Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon both affirm Aristotle¶s inductive-deductive model of scientific method. Crombie (1953: 52) notes that Grosseteste refers to the inductive stage as a µresolution¶ of phenomena into constituent elements, and to the deductive stage as a µcomposition¶ in which these elements are combined to reconstruct the original phenomena. Losee (1993: 32) also mentions that Grosseteste method of induction specifies an inductive assent from statements about phenomena to elements from which the phenomena may be

reconstructed. In his book, The Opus Majus, Roger Bacon (1962: 615) also emphasizes that successful application of this inductive procedure depends on accurate and extensive factual knowledge. To him, the factual base of a science often may be augmented by active experimentation. In a similar vein, Francis Bacon, regarded as the champion of the inductive-experimental method, also advocates for the inductive process for scientific investigations. Like, Aristotle, Bacon sees science as a progression from observations to general principles and back to observations. However, Bacon criticizes Aristotle¶s on the basis that Aristotle¶s induction relies on simple enumeration; and secondly that Aristotle reduced science to deductive logic by overemphasizing the deduction of consequences from first principles. To Bacon, deductive arguments are of scientific value only if their premises have proper inductive support. (Losee 1993, 67). John Stuart Mill also systematized the inductive methods with his formulation of the five canons of induction. These include the method of agreement; the method of difference; the joint method of agreement and difference; the method of residues; and the method of concomitant variation. (Copi and Cohen 2006, 455) To Mill, these procedures are means of testing scientific hypotheses. They are the tools with which causal relations may be discovered, and canons with which causal connections may be proved. However, Copi and Cohen (2006) mention ³that Mill was wrong on both counts««.. That the methods are indeed of the very greatest importance, their role in science is not as majestic as he supposed.´ Jevon (1958) also criticizes Mill¶s claim that the justification of hypotheses is of inductive schemata. Jevon emphasizes that in order to show that a hypotheses has consequences that agree with what is observed is to utilize deductive arguments. In a similar vein, David Hume denies the logical admissibility of inductive reasoning by criticizing the theory of causality. In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume articulated his view that the inductive inference operates on the principle that the past acts as a reliable guide to the future (this is sometimes called the principle of the uniformity of nature). Although Hume did not use the word induction, but his critical analysis of the principle of causality was in fact a critical analysis of his inductive method.(Omoregbe 1996, 118). For Hume, ³every event, whether cause or effect, is utterly distinct and a separate entity in a word,

every effect is a distinct event from its cause´ (Hume 1955, 118). Hume thus concludes that our inductive practices have no rational foundation, for no form of reason will certify it. To Hume, the assumed necessary connection between a cause and an effect derives from our habit of associating together two things that we have repeatedly seen occurring together in the past. Thus, it is an assumption that there is a necessary connection between them, that the first causes the second.  KARL POPPER Karl Popper (1902-1994) had been a leading theoretician of the origin of scientific thought and its demarcation from non-scientific thought in his native Austria before he was forced to leave because of the Nazi ascension to power. After World War II, he first went to teach and research in New Zealand, and then became a professor of philosophy at the London School of Economics. His theory of science relied heavily on the following idea: a scientific theory it scientific because it has met attempts to refute it. Refutability is key to the notion of being scientific  POPPER¶S ARGUMENT AGAINST INDUCTION Popper¶s contribution to philosophy of science is his attempt to deal with the philosophical problem of induction. Karl popper disputes the existence, necessity and validity of any inductive reasoning. He agrees with Hume that there is a no necessary connection between a cause and an effect, and that we can never draw a logically valid conclusion from some observed cases to all cases. Popper accepts Hume's conclusion that inductive inference (conclusion) is not rationally justifiable. He thus, rejects the principles of induction as ³superfluous, and that it must lead to logical inconsistencies´ (Popper 1977, 29). The principle, he argues, can lead to infinite regress. Nevertheless, Popper disagrees with Hume¶s observation that the assumed necessary connection derives from our habit of seeing two things together in the past. If induction originates from habit, where does habit itself originate from? But while Hume says habit originates from repetition, Popper disagrees and contends that habit is prior to repetition. To popper, habit is already formed before repetition begins. Thus, repetition cannot be the source of habit. Popper contends that habit arises from expectation, prior to repetition. He points out that we naturally expect regularity and uniformity from nature even before we begin to experience repetition. Thus, induction is not based on habit as Hume would have us believe, but on expectation which

is then followed by observation. This expectation is already a theory, which means that theory comes before observation, and not the other way round.  POPPER¶S FALSIFICATION Popper contends that theories are prior to observation, and they are derived from expectations. Theories are conjectures (assumptions) put forward to be tested by observation, to be falsified or corroborated by observation. Popper explains that a theory can never be confirmed by observation, it can only be corroborated, while the possibility of it been falsified in future remains open. If a theory fails to yield the expected result or if experience negates a theory, and it is falsified then it should be abandoned. Theories that have not yet been falsified, or those that have been repeatedly corroborated by experience can still be falsified by future experience and observation. Science, according to Popper proceeds by the method of conjectures and refutations, by trial and error. It is not founded on any solid rock. To Popper ³the empirical basis of objective science has nothing absolute about it. Science does not rest upon solid µbedrock¶; on the contrary, it is like a building erected on piles´. (Popper 1959, 11). Popper also contends that ³the belief in scientific certainty and in the authority of science is just wishful thinking. Science is fallible because science is human.´ (Popper 1945, 375). Popper admits that modern science has made tremendous progress. To Popper, this progress is not due to the method of induction. He argues that science does not employ the inductive method. Instead, science proceeds by the method of conjectures and refutations, trial and error. Thus, repeated observations and experiments function in science as tests of our conjectures or hypotheses, i.e., as attempted refutations.(Popper 1963, 55). To Popper, a scientific theory is by its nature falsifiable. The more falsifiable a theory is, the more scientific it becomes.  POPPER¶S HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE METHODOLOGY Popper rejects the traditional inductive model in science and replaces it with his own methodology, the µhypothetico-deductive methodology¶. Popper here reiterates that the methodology actually employed by scientists is not the inductive method but the hypotheticodeductive method.

Popper rejects the traditional inductive model and says that it is not the actual methodology of science. He replaces with what he claims to be the methodology actually used by science. According to Popper, the hypothetico-deductive method begins with a problem, followed by a theory as a tentative explanation or solution to the problem, experimentation or observation is then carried out with a view to falsifying the theory. The theory could then be falsified, refuted and then rejected, or it could be µcorroborated¶ by repeated experiment, in which cases it is accepted and used continuously. Popper insists that observation does not come before theory as it is believe in the traditional inductive methodology. On the contrary, theory comes before observation.(Popper 1963, 46). So, according to Popper, that one can start with pure observation alone without anything in the nature of a theory is meaningless and nonsensical. In Popper¶s methodology, only theoretical systems capable of being refuted by tests are scientific. Such systems are falsifiable by systematic experimentation. Therefore, for Popper, falsifiability and testability mean the same thing, since every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it. Logically, the characterisation of such falsifiable or testable systems involves the attempt to spell out the logical relations holding between a theory and the class of what Popper called µbasic statements¶. (Popper 1959, 100). A scientific theory is taken to be falsified if there are accepted basic statements which clash with it. Popper argues that if accepted basic statements contradict a theory, then they provide adequate grounds for its falsification only if they corroborate a falsifying hypothesis simultaneously. Thus, the experimental situation in which the scientist finds himself more often than not involves crucial experiments designed to decide between two hypotheses. In so far as these hypotheses differ in some way, the experiment has to corroborate one or the other, and such corroboration is effected when the competing hypotheses are confronted with accepted basic statements. (Anele 1997, 25) One of Popper¶s arguments against the theory of induction is his elaboration of the idea of corroboration. A theory is said to be corroborated so long as it does not contradict the accepted basic statements. To Popper, corroboration means confirmation in the process of testing scientific hypotheses. However, much corroboration is found if a hypotheses is still not conclusively proved true.(Flew 1979, 73). Popper compares two theories in order to find which one has lesser or greater verisimilitude. Popper explains that when two theories for example are

corroborated, the theory, which passes lots of tests, is likely to have greater verisimilitude. This implies that the theory, which has greater verisimilitude, has more truth and less falsehood. (Afisi 2003, 104). Popper maintains that a hypothesis which is falsifiable in a higher degree, or the simpler hypotheses, is also the hypothesis which is corroborated to a higher degree. If we have hypotheses A and B as competing theories at a point in time, and we know that B has survived severer tests than A, then B has greater verisimilitude i.e. more truth and less falsehood at that point in time.(Anele 1997, 26) Although, Popper is aware that the comparison of two statements or theories in terms of their degrees of corroboration is problematic, he says we can only speak roughly in terms of positive degrees of corroboration, negative degrees of corroboration, and the like.(Popper 1959, 268). This may render corroboration otiose in the logic of science. But Popper¶s strategy for preventing that is the articulation of some methodological rules; for instance the rule that a falsified theory should not receive a positive corroboration appraisal. It is pertinent to pause at this juncture in order to know whether Popper intends to use his idea of inventing theories of higher degrees of corroboration to be used in place of the idea of truth as the aim of science. This is because Popper had variously described the objective of scientific research programmes as ³discovery of truth´, ³explanation of reality´, ³invention of theories of greater verisimilitude´ among others. But in the Logic of Scientific Discovery, he was very skeptical in the use of µtruth¶ to characterize scientific theories. (Kraft 2004, 112). For Popper, the falsificationist methodology does not need the concepts of µtrue¶ and µfalse¶. Although, the concepts of true and false are regular logical concepts among scientists both concepts are timeless in the sense that when a statement is true or false, it is true or false forever. This explains the situation when, for instance, a theory which is taken to be true yesterday is now stated to be false today, in the light of new knowledge. What this simply implies is that the theory was true yesterday but became false today because a new discovered knowledge has made it false. However, the concept of corroboration is essentially different from this. We appraise a statement as corroborated with respect to some system of basic statements, a system accepted up to a particular point in time. In the words of popper:

The corroboration which a theory has received up to yesterday is logically not identical with the corroboration which a theory has received up to today. Thus we must attach a subscript, as it were, to every appraisal of corroboration- a subscript charaterising the system of basic statements to which the corroboration relates(for example, by the date of its acceptance). (Popper 1959, 275) It is clear from the foregoing that Popper¶s idea of corroboration of scientific theories is not the same with the concepts of truth and falsehood of scientific theories usually held by other scientists. This is because the concepts of true and false are free from temporal considerations, in their objective senses. But one and the same theories may have different corroboration values all of which can actually be true at the same time.  EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION Going by Popper¶s criticism of the inductive model of science one would appreciate his position upon the basis that deductive arguments are usually always rationally and logically true. In deductive logic, for instance: All human beings are mortal Socrates is a human being Therefore, Socrates is mortal The conclusion of this argument is derived logically from the premises. This argument is naturally, rationally, logically and necessarily true. This is as against the example of inductive argument in logic. One essential feature of inductive argument is that there is always a µgap¶ or an inductive leap from the premises to the conclusion of an argument. The conclusion of an inductive argument can only follow from the premises with some degree of probability. For instance: Cows are mammals and feed their young with milk Sheep are mammals and feed their young with milk Dogs are mammals and feed their young with milk Therefore, all mammals feed their young with milk from specific to general form general to specific

Nevertheless, we cannot categorically affirm that Popper¶s hypothetico-deductive methodology successfully solved the problem of induction in science. Popper¶s logical asymmetry between verification and falsification, we argue, is fraught with technical errors. The inconsistency in this analysis is that Popper condemns induction with the right hand and embraces it with the left. This asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability result only from the logical form of universal statements but Popper admits that they can also be contradicted by singular statements with the help of modus tollens of classical logic. To Popper, such an argument to the falsity of universal statements is the only strictly deductive kind of inference that proceeds, as it were, in the µinductive direction¶; that is, from singular to universal statements. (Popper 1977, 41). This, we say, is antithetical to Popper¶s absolute rejection of the inductive method Again, there is no denying the fact that every philosophical enterprise has a metaphysical basis. The inductive model of science is, in fact, a priori. The inductive reasoning constitutes the metaphysical foundation of modern science. The inductive model is supra-empirical in which no empirical investigation or experiment can establish. It is a probability based model of enquiry. Thus, we cannot rule out the traces of inductive processes in empirical science. Contrary to the contention of Hume and Popper, science actually employs the inductive method which is implied even in Popper¶s own hypothetico-deductive method. Popper¶s admittance of the importance of metaphysics to empirical science relates to his embrace of induction. In his words: I do not even go so far as to assert that metaphysics has no value for empirical science. for it cannot be denied that along with metaphysical ideas which have obstructed the advance of science there have been others-such as speculative atomism-which have aided it. And looking at the matter from the psycholological angle, I am inclined to think that scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of a purely speculative kind, and sometimes even quite hazy; a faith which is completely unwarranted from the point of view of science, and which, to that extent, is µmetaphysical¶. It is clear from the above that induction is implied in Popper¶s own hypothetico-deductive method. Even Popper¶s falsifiability and corroboration theses are arrived at inductively. It is therefore on this basis that we argue the thesis for the complementarity of both inductive and deductive methodology in scientific investigation. This is because it is this induction that enables scientists to predict the outcome of a scientific test. No doubt, prediction is one of the basic features of science. Prediction, which is embedded in probability, is essentially, one of the methods of induction. We can therefore conclude that inductive method cannot be totally

abandoned in science. We therefore reiterate that both deductive and inductive reasoning are the basic methodologies upon which scientific research and discoveries proceed.  POPPER ON REFUTATION AND CONFIRMATION Commonly, we assume a scientific theory is "true" because it has been "proven" through experiment. Popper made central to his theory the critique of a logical fallacy in this argument: If theory A predicts phenomenon p, and phenomenon p is observed through experiment, this does not "prove" that A is true. The reasoning is formally as follows: If A then p; p; Therefore A. This is a fallacy of reasoning, for p might occur for reasons other than A. However, Popper pointed out that the following reasoning is valid: If A then p; not-p; Therefore, not-A. In other words, a theory can be refuted by a negative instance of its predictions, but cannot be proved by positive ones. In this latter case, the theory can only be "confirmed" (and the more often predictions are true, and the more surprising they are, the more the theory is confirmed; even if it can never be fully proven).Consequently, Popper concluded:   We can always refute a theory, but We can at most confirm, but never prove a theory

In Popper's view, a scientist tests his or her theory by subjecting it to attempts to refute it. If the theory stands the test -- is not refuted -- it can be provisionally accepted; the more so if the test is difficult. But a scientific theory is never fully proved -- only mathematical, not scientific propositions can be proved, and even they are dependent on the axiom system upon which they are based. When a scientific theory is refuted, it is time to replace it. The cycle of provisional acceptance and eventual refutation make for theory progress. Popper is known for his attempt to repudiate (reject) the classical observationalist/inductivist form of scientific method in favour of empirical (pragmatic, experimental) falsification. He is also known for his opposition to the classical (traditional) justificationist account of knowledge which he replaced with critical rationalism, "the first non justificational philosophy of criticism in the history of philosophy´. As

well, he is known for his vigorous defense of liberal (free thinking) democracy and the principles of social criticism that he came to believe made a flourishing "open society" possible.  POPPER AND THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION Among his contributions to philosophy is his attempt to answer the philosophical problem of induction as emphasized strongly by David Hume. The problem, in basic terms, can be understood by example: given that the sun has risen every day for as long as anyone can remember, what is the rational proof that it will rise tomorrow? How can one rationally prove that past events will continue to repeat in the future, just because they have repeated in the past? Popper claims to have found a solution to the problem of induction. His reply is characteristic, and ties in with his criterion of falsifiability. He states that while there is no way to prove that the sun will rise, it is possible to formulate the theory that every day the sun will rise²if it does not rise on some particular day, the theory will be falsified and will have to be replaced by a different one. Until that day, there is no need to reject the assumption that the theory is true. Neither is it rational according to Popper to instead make the more complex assumption that the sun will rise until a given day, but will stop doing so the day after, or similar statements with additional conditions. Such a theory would be true with higher probability, because it cannot be attacked so easily: To falsify the first one, it is sufficient to find that sun has stopped rising; to falsify the second one, one additionally needs the assumption that the given day has not yet been reached. Popper held that it is the least likely, or most easily falsifiable, or simplest theory (attributes which he identified as all the same) that explains known facts that one should rationally prefer. His opposition to positivism, which held that it is the theory most likely to be true that one should prefer, here becomes very apparent. It is impossible, Popper argues, to ensure a theory to be true; it is more important that their falsity can be detected as easily as possible. Popper and Hume agreed that there is often a psychological belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, but both denied that there is logical justification for the supposition that it will, simply because it always has in the past. Popper writes: "I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified." (Conjectures and Refutations, p. 55)

To Popper, who was an anti-justificationist, traditional philosophy is misled by the false principle of sufficient reason. He thinks that no assumption can ever be or needs ever to be justified, so a lack of justification is not a justification for doubt. Instead, theories should be tested and scrutinized. It is not the goal to bless theories with claims of certainty or justification, but to eliminate errors in them: "there are no such things as good positive reasons; nor do we need such things [...] But [philosophers] obviously cannot quite bring [themselves] to believe that this is my opinion, let alone that it is right" (The Philosophy of Karl Popper, p. 1043). Popper coined the term critical rationalism to describe his philosophy. The term indicates his rejection of classical empiricism, and of the classical observationalist-inductivist account of science that had grown out of it. Popper argued strongly against the latter, holding that scientific theories are abstract in nature, and can be tested only indirectly, by reference to their implications. He also held that scientific theory, and human knowledge generally, is irreducibly conjectural or hypothetical, and is generated by the creative imagination in order to solve problems that have arisen in specific historio-cultural settings. Logically, no number of positive outcomes at the level of experimental testing can confirm a scientific theory, but a single counterexample is logically decisive: it shows the theory, from which the implication is derived, to be false. The term "falsifiable" does not mean something is made false, but rather that, if it is false, it can be shown by observation or experiment. Popper's account of the logical asymmetry between verification and falsifiability lies at the heart of his philosophy of science. It also inspired him to take falsifiability as his criterion of demarcation between what is and is not genuinely scientific: a theory should be considered scientific if and only if it is falsifiable. This led him to attack the claims of both psychoanalysis and contemporary Marxism to scientific status, on the basis that their theories are not falsifiable. Popper also wrote extensively against the famous Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. He strongly disagreed with Niels Bohr's instrumentalism and supported Albert Einstein's realist approach to scientific theories about the universe. Popper's falsifiability resembles Charles Peirce's nineteenth century fallibilism. In Of Clocks and Clouds (1966), Popper remarked that he wished he had known of Peirce's work earlier. In All Life, is Problem Solving, Popper sought to explain the apparent progress of scientific knowledge²how it is that our understanding of the universe seems to improve over time. This

problem arises from his position that the truth content of our theories, even the best of them, cannot be verified by scientific testing, but can only be falsified. Again, in this context the word 'falsified' does not refer to something being 'fake'; rather, that something can be (i.e., is capable of being) shown to be false by observation or experiment. Some things simply do not lend themselves to being shown to be false, and therefore are not falsifiable. If so, then how is it that the growth of science appears to result in a growth in knowledge? In Popper's view, the advance of scientific knowledge is an evolutionary process characterized by his formula: In response to a given problem situation (PS1), a number of competing conjectures (guess), or tentative theories (TT), are systematically subjected to the most rigorous attempts at falsification possible. This process, error elimination (EE), performs a similar function for science that natural selection performs for biological evolution. Theories that better survive the process of refutation are not more true, but rather, more "fit"²in other words, more applicable to the problem situation at hand (PS1). Consequently, just as a species' biological fitness does not ensure continued survival, neither does rigorous testing protect a scientific theory from refutation in the future. Yet, as it appears that the engine of biological evolution has produced, over time, adaptive traits equipped to deal with more and more complex problems of survival, likewise, the evolution of theories through the scientific method may, in Popper's view, reflect a certain type of progress: toward more and more interesting problems (PS2). For Popper, it is in the interplay between the tentative theories (conjectures) and error elimination (refutation) that scientific knowledge advances toward greater and greater problems; in a process very much akin to the interplay between genetic variation and natural selection. Where does "truth" fit into all this? As early as 1934 Popper wrote of the search for truth as "one of the strongest motives for scientific discovery." Still, he describes in Objective Knowledge (1972) early concerns about the much-criticized notion of truth as correspondence. Then came the semantic theory of truth formulated by the logician Alfred Tarski and published in 1933. Popper writes of learning in 1935 of the consequences of Tarski's theory, to his intense joy. The theory met critical objections to truth as correspondence and thereby rehabilitated it. The theory also seemed, in Popper's eyes, to support metaphysical realism and the regulative idea of a search for truth.

According to this theory, the conditions for the truth of a sentence as well as the sentences themselves are part of a metalanguage. So, for example, the sentence "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. Although many philosophers have interpreted, and continue to interpret, Tarski's theory as a deflationary theory, Popper refers to it as a theory in which "is true" is replaced with "corresponds to the facts". He bases this interpretation on the fact that examples such as the one described above refer to two things: assertions and the facts to which they refer. He identifies Tarski's formulation of the truth conditions of sentences as the introduction of a "metalinguistic predicate" and distinguishes the following cases: "John called" is true. "It is true that John called." The first case belongs to the metalanguage whereas the second is more likely to belong to the object language. Hence, "it is true that" possesses the logical status of a redundancy. "Is true", on the other hand, is a predicate necessary for making general observations such as "John was telling the truth about Phillip." Upon this basis, along with that of the logical content of assertions (where logical content is inversely proportional to probability), Popper went on to develop his important notion of verisimilitude or "truthlikeness". The intuitive idea behind verisimilitude is that the assertions or hypotheses of scientific theories can be objectively measured with respect to the amount of truth and falsity that they imply. And, in this way, one theory can be evaluated as more or less true than another on a quantitative basis which, Popper emphasizes forcefully, has nothing to do with "subjective probabilities" or other merely "epistemic" considerations. The simplest mathematical formulation that Popper gives of this concept can be found in the tenth chapter of Conjectures and Refutations. Here he defines it as: Where Vs (a) is the verisimilitude of a, CTv (a) is a measure of the content of truth of a, and CTf (a) is a measure of the content of the falsity of a. Knowledge, for Popper, was objective, both in the sense that it is objectively true (or truthlike), and also in the sense that knowledge has an ontological status (i.e., knowledge as object) independent of the knowing subject (Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, 1972).

He proposed three worlds (see Popperian cosmology): World One, being the physical world, or physical states; World Two, being the world of mind, or mental states, ideas, and perceptions; and World Three, being the body of human knowledge expressed in its manifold forms, or the products of the second world made manifest in the materials of the first world (i.e.±books, papers, paintings, symphonies, and all the products of the human mind). World Three, he argued, was the product of individual human beings in exactly the same sense that an animal path is the product of individual animals, and that, as such, has an existence and evolution independent of any individual knowing subjects. The influence of World Three, in his view, on the individual human mind (World Two) is at least as strong as the influence of World One. In other words, the knowledge held by a given individual mind owes at least as much to the total accumulated wealth of human knowledge, made manifest, as to the world of direct experience. As such, the growth of human knowledge could be said to be a function of the independent evolution of World Three. Many contemporary philosophers have not embraced Popper's Three World conjecture, due mostly, it seems, to its resemblance to Cartesian dualism. SUMMARY OF POPPER¶S VIEW The main concern of Karl Popper was the nature of science (How they work and how can we know that scientific knowledge is true). Theories and scientific rules are generalizations, one can collect examples that confirm lifetime, yet the theory can be false. Generally seek evidence that prove the theory, and if are those who do not are treated as irrelevant or distorted to fit the pose. Yet generalizations and abstractions are a tool powerful of human thought. We can predict events, respond to situations in a rational way we had never experienced and do connections between causes and effects. However the problem of certainty complete or almost complete remains. Popper argues that although completely accurate knowledge of world is impossible, there is objective knowledge about the world, and with the correct method, it can be approximated. The main point arises is that although we cannot confirm a generalization, it can be distorted. To accomplish this, the simplest is to find a counterexample to the generalization. He argues that it is more worthwhile seeking this type of evidence that those that fit the theory, as this can move faster in the Knowledge. This attitude causes a radical thought: Instead of clinging to ideas dead, we must seek new all the time, always subjecting the most severe criticism (critical rationalism).

It makes a clarification: Popper does not say that all arguments falsifiable are useless. There are many areas of human thought where may raise some very important things for which the criterion of falsification is appropriate. An example would be the ethics and religion. Popper critical rationalism applied in many fields, but especially in political and social philosophy. It was focused primarily on the nature of the authoritarian systems and how obstructed the pursuit of the ideals of humanity. Here you can find two basic ideas: the first is that the Progress requires that all ideas are subject to rigorous critical that false no progress. The second is that there is no way of inevitable progress. Human activity causes and intended consequences unintentional, the latter are unpredictable by nature. By Popper insists that an open society for political activities and social can be criticized freely. Critical rationalism can be summarized in the following points:      All theories and ideas should be subject to rigorous criticism, trying to falsify through the search for evidence contrary. Must be creative and adventurous with theories and ideas, provided when subjected to extensive criticism. Be alert to unpredictable consequences that can result from actions and be willing to change the ideas that resulted. Promote an open society through the creative thinking of open discussions and constant criticism. Always keep in mind that there is a principle of certainty absolute. Popper argues that human knowledge is limited. The reality is well above and is unknown. To try to shed light on it must make assumptions (which must be creative and audacious). These can be corroborated or falsified. The big difference with this is that they are opened and unstructured. It is important to note that an idea or theory that is corroborated does not mean that it will always remain so. Maybe in the future be falsifiable, which should be changed.  KUHN'S MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS Perhaps the best known philosopher of science in the last half century is Thomas Kuhn (19221996), who was for many years a professor of philosophy and history of science at MIT. Kuhn, who died just a few years ago, held his PhD in physics, but was asked as a young faculty

member to teach a course in history of science. He became fascinated with the process by which theories, once held to be true, were replaced by very different ones, also held to be true. For example, the view that all matter was made of Earth, Air, Water and Fire held sway for over two millennia; yet it now seems crude and even child-like in comparison to the modern theory of chemical elements. Nonetheless, it was held to be adequate for a much longer period of time. Thomas Kuhn was the next of the Twentieth Century to add to the history of the scientific method, by introducing the idea of paradigms. This particular idea was built around the idea that science developed conflicting theories about how everything worked. Experimentation would lead to one of these theories becoming dominant and accepted by the scientific community. Kuhn christened this a µscientific paradigm (model or standard).¶ He believed that a group of scientists would hold to a particular paradigm, often very stubbornly, until the body of evidence became so great that a µparadigm shift¶ became unavoidable. Scientists would then adopt the new paradigm and begin working within its constraints, although two paradigms were not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, some physicists believed that electrons were particles; others believed that electrons were waves. Eventually, physicists found that they acted as both and so the paradigms overlapped. Now, of course, quantum physics is opening up new definitions and the paradigm is shifting again. Psychology provides another perfect example of paradigm shift, in the form of the nature vs. nurture debate. Some psychologists argued that all behavior was inbuilt and dictated at birth, whilst others believed in the Tabula Rasa, a clean slate mind, where all programming was the result of upbringing, environmental stimuli and education. Currently, the current paradigm is that both have an important influence, and psychology and physiology seem to support this paradigm. For Kuhn, the problem was two-fold: (i) to explain why scientific theories are accepted, and (ii) to explain why scientific theories are replaced. These two aspects are intimately related, and the key concept that Kuhn develops is that of "paradigm" -- a reigning or dominant approach (seen as standard) to solving problems in a given area of science.

Kuhn presented his views in Structure of Scientific Revolutions (first edition 1962, second edition 1970). He argued that scientific revolutions proceed through the following stages: "Normal Science", that is to say every day, bread-and-butter science, is a "puzzle-solving" activity conducted under a reigning "paradigm". The paradigm is the example or model of a great scientific achievement (such as Newton's theory of gravity, or Einstein's theory of relativity) which provides an inspiration and a guide showing how to do scientific research. It is not quite an explicit set of rules and regulations (not a recipe or formula), but it does clearly "show the way". "Puzzle solving" is the normal or everyday activity of scientists, and consists of problems which are believed, in advance, to have a solution, if only enough ingenuity and effort is brought to bear, using the paradigm as a guide. An "anomaly"(irregularity) arises when a puzzle, considered as important or essential in some way, cannot be solved. The anomaly cannot be written off as just an ill-conceived research project; it continues to assert itself as a thorn in the side of the practicing scientists. The anomaly is a novelty (an innovation) that cannot be written off, and which cannot be solved. According to Newtonian mechanics, there should be a difference in the speed of light when it is issued from a moving source. Careful experiments in the late 19th century found no such difference, despite the most accurate of instruments. According to the Theory of the special creation of species, a divine being created each species separately and individually, perfectly adapted to its environment. The discovery of the fossil remains of species not corresponding to any existing species (extinct species) contradicted this key assumption of biology before Darwin. This opens up a period called the "crisis", during which time new methods and approaches are permitted, since the older ones have proved incapable of rising to the task at hand (solving the anomaly). Views and procedures previously considered heretical are temporarily permitted, in the hope of cracking the anomaly. One of these new approaches is successful, and it becomes the new paradigm through a "paradigm shift". This constitutes the core of the scientific revolution. The new paradigm is popularized in text-books, which serve as the instruction material for the next generation of scientists, who are brought up with the idea that the paradigm -- once new and revolutionary -- is just the way things are done.

The novelty of the scientific revolution recedes and disappears, until the process is begun anew with another anomaly-crisis-paradigm shift. Some Philosophical Aspects of Kuhn's Theory Kuhn also has made a number of major philosophical claims in the context of developing his model of how science produces revolutions in theory. I mention them here in passing, as just the critical examination of these claims could be the subject of a whole course: 1. Scientists cannot by themselves "translate" between and old and a new paradigm; these paradigms are "incommensurable", and can be (partially) translated only with the aid of historians and philosophers of science. For example, the explanation for combustion before the oxygen theory invoked a substance, widely accepted in the 18th century, known as "phlogiston", which was given off when a material burned. The modern theory explains the same phenomena as due to the taking-in of oxygen, not the expulsion of the non-existent "phlogiston". A student of chemistry would need a specialist to translate the older theory into modern terms, and even then, aspects of it would remain somewhat mysterious, since taken out of their 18th century context where they made sense. 2. Scientists escape the dominant paradigm which forms, as it were, their "skin", inside of which they conduct their research. Consequently, there is no "higher authority" that can adjudicate, or decide once and for all, competing truth-claims. All we have are the paradigms of today (the context for on-going research) and those of the past (partially translated by historians and philosophers of science). Not only can there be no absolute truth (true once and for all), but Kuhn makes the more radical claim that the concept of "truth" can be dispensed with entirely, replaced by that of "successful problem solving within a paradigm". Similarly, "objectivity" as a notion independent of the inquiring scientist has no meaning, and is replaced by the methods adopted as standard within the community of scientists. 3. Kuhn believed, however, that science progresses over time. This is not, however, a question of approaching or achieving "the truth" (see (2) above) but a matter of solving more problems under the current paradigm than under past ones. (Some old problems drop out as "pseudo-problems" for the new paradigm, but overall, more new problems get solved). 

SUMMARY OF KUHN¶S VIEW Thomas Kuhn began writing his book "The structure of scientific revolutions" when he was a graduate student in theoretical physics, and gave the drastic change in the physical history of science and, later, philosophy itself. For Kuhn a good scientific theory must be broad, fertile, accurate, simple and consistent. When applied, the scientist must go beyond the mere rationality should bring into play a subjective factor. For him this is the nature of scientific knowledge. One of the key terms defined is "paradigm." This is applied to two different ways: firstly, means the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, etc.., shared by members of a community given and on the other, denotes an element of such kind of constellation, concrete solutions to problems which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for resolving the remaining problems of normal science. A paradigm is shared by the members of a community scientific (those who practice a scientific specialty) and, conversely, a scientific community consists of people who share a paradigm. Here is the concept of "disciplinary matrix", "discipline" because it refers to the common possession of those who practice a particular discipline, "matrix" because it is composed of ordered elements of various natures, each of which requires a further specification. All or most of the objects of group commitments paradigms are paradigms or parts, which are constituent parts of the "Disciplinary matrix" and as such forms a whole and work together. Kuhn argues that scientific knowledge is contained in the theory and rule. Scientists solve puzzles modeling them on previous solutions of enigmas. The acquisition of a paradigm and the type of research that allows is a sign of maturity in the discovery of any given scientific field. Transitions paradigms are scientific revolutions and the transition successively from one to another is the usual pattern of development of a mature science. To be accepted as a paradigm a theory must seem better than their competitors. Their emergence affects the structure of the group practicing field. Not all theories belong to paradigms. Scientists usually develop many speculative and unarticulated theories before these or during crises, which could point the way to discovery. Only when the experiment and the theory of scoring are articulated then the discovery and theory becomes a paradigm. The crisis is the necessary precondition for the emergence of new theories. The decision to reject or accept a paradigm, and judgment leading to that decision, always involves a comparison of paradigms with nature and each other. To reject one paradigm

without replacing it with another is reject science itself. It is understood that all begin with the crisis confusion of a paradigm. For Kuhn there is no research without examples to the contrary. The enigma exists only because no paradigm completely solves all the problems. Crises weaken stereotypes and provide additional data necessary for a fundamental paradigm shift. Thus the transition a new paradigm is what Kuhn calls "scientific revolution". The term is defined as all those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which a old paradigm is replaced completely or in part, by a new incompatible, i.e., when an existing paradigm operate stops appropriate in the exploration of an aspect of nature. When this happens, inevitably means a conflict between the schools of scientific thought. T he natural scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible, but also unmatched what existed previously. To the Instead, the incomplete and imperfect fit between theory and data existing is what defines many of the puzzles that characterize the ³normal science´ (Kuhn describes as research firmly based on one or more past scientific achievements, recognized by some scientists for some time and used as the basis for subsequent practices, and written in scientific texts). The new paradigms are born from the old and incorporate much of the vocabulary and equipment previously used. Proponents of paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. In doing so, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look in the same direction from the same point. Each linguistic community can produce results complete his research that, even describable in words included in the same manner by the two groups cannot be explained the other community in its own terms. Only during periods of normal science, progress seems to be evident and the scientific community cannot see the fruits of their labor in any form. A scientific community is efficient to solve problems or enigma (mystery or puzzle) that defines their paradigm. The result of the resolution of these problems must be inevitably the process. When a scientific community rejects a previous paradigm resignation while most of the books and articles which includes such a paradigm. In conclusion one could say that Kuhn science is the result of a successive process in constant evolutions, which are located within different phenomena that scientists face when solving puzzles. All these are done in order to get closer to the truth. 

FEYERABEND The last of the three great philosophers behind the history of the scientific method is Paul Feyerabend, the scientific anarchist (revolutionary). As Popper had realized that science had split into many differing disciplines, Feyerabend realized that these disciplines had become too complex to define by one overarching method. In fact, Feyerabend believed that trying to force all scientific disciplines to follow a set of rules actually hampered science, creating false restrictions and barriers to progress. His famous philosophy of µAnything Goes¶ was an attempt to address this, by arguing that scientists should not be influenced by µarcane¶ philosophies. He pointed to physics as an example of this, lamenting the abundance of physicists who had no grasp of philosophy, arguing that if they did not understand it, how could they be constrained by it? His strongest argument against the scientific method was that, historically, many great discoveries would not have been made if constrained by the strict limitations of the scientific method, pointing to the work of Galileo and Copernicus. He believed that scientists often had to make up rules as they went along, adapting their methods to tackle new discoveries that could not be examined without breaking the established rules. He pointed out that scientific discovery progressed unevenly and that the greatest scientific leaps ignored the scientific method. If Copernicus, Darwin, Einstein or Wegener had stuck with the strict scientific method, they would never have published their theories and instead they would have become stuck in an endless loop of observation and experiment. They would have been consigned (agreed) to making small scientific leaps without ever gaining enough momentum and evidence to propose a grand and sweeping theory. Feyerabend is based on the failure of other theories to approximate science in a non-dogmatic. For him, the perfect society would be one in which one might think, explore and investigate freely and fairly, without influence of ideologies imposed. He believes in firm and unalterable principles and these have been infringed on several different occasions. Feyerabend considers that this is very good, as it enables progress and advancement of sciences. Even many times as needed, not only depart from a rule specific, but to adopt its opposite, to make real progress. Examples can be found in all methodologies: a caveman discovers that the wood (any type) can

be used to light a campfire. For a time he spends igniting fires and jumping around. One day after a storm, the caveman picks wet wood and realizes, after several attempts, it is impossible set fire to it. In this way he realizes that his initial hypothesis is falsifiable, and replaces it with another (you can set fire to any as long as wood is not wet). Now, the problem of counterfeiting is its inability to indicate exactly what part of the premise containing the error. So, how the caveman damp wood does is the cause of the fire is not lit, and not the soil is cold or something else. Such problems lead to Feyerabend. Their methodology is getting rid of these disadvantages opting to use all methodologies (Falsification, induction, etc.) And any other means to explain events and things that happen. Considers the idea of a fixed method or a set theory of rationality rests on a naive conception of man and his social environment. Feyerabend's core principle is: anything goes. He believes that all methodologies, even the most obvious, have its limits. The best way to do this is to demonstrate the limits and even irrationality, of any of the rules that the methodology considers Basic A clear example is Copernicus: he put the planet Earth motion mathematically distorting the Ptolemaic model of the orbits planets using the same rules of this mathematical paradigm. Then induced the Earth and other planets orbit the sun assuming that as the mathematics used to predict a circular motion, may also serve as evidence to explain his theory. Feyerabend argues that it is essential to have an external criterion critical, because if we want to investigate something that we continuously or a reality where we are engaged, we will be very difficult unless we use this criterion. It is very useful to invent a new conceptual clash with the experimental results that confuse the theoretical and to enter perceptions that are not part of the perceptual world existing In conclusion one could say that Feyerabend is in favor of some Thus, the method of Sherlock Holmes (Popper like), but instead of apply only when all else fails, it applies at all times. REFERENCES Anele Douglas, (1997) ³The Architectonics of Karl Popper¶s Falsificationist Methodology´, The Nigerian Journal Of Philosophy, Vol. 15 Nos. 1 & 2. Bacon Roger, (1962) ³The Opus Majus, trans. Robert B. Burke´ New York: Russell and Rusell. Crombie A.C. (1953), Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science

(1100-1700), Oxford: Clarendon Press Flew Anthony (1979), ³A Dictionary of Philosophy´ London: Pan Books Hume David (1955), Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Indianapolis: Bobbs Inc. Kraft Victor (2004), ³Popper and the Vienna Circle´ in Paul A. Shilpp, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Illinois: Open Court Kemeny Joseph (1959), A Philosopher¶s Look at science, Princeton: Nostrand Omoregbe Joseph (1996) Metaphysics Without Tears, Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Popper Karl (1945), The Open Society and its Enemies, London: Routledge and Kegan paul

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