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research panel omitted a warning that massive tsunami could hit northeastern Japan "at any moment" from a report prior to the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, having earlier planned to include it, a ministry document showed Tuesday. The Earthquake Research Committee had presented the report eight days before the March 11 disaster to an unofficial meeting among the ministry, Tokyo Electric Power Co. and two other utilities but ended up not publicizing it, according to the document, obtained by Kyodo News via a freedom-of-information request, and people involved. Committee members decided to delete the warning as they viewed it "inappropriate to use the same expression" as that used to describe an expected major earthquake in the Tokai region, central Japan, which was regarded "more imminent." Reference to the possible quake in the Pacific off eastern Japan was further weakened at the request of power utilities at the March 3 meeting, they said. Comprising more than a dozen members, mostly academics, the panel was compiling the report as part of a review of its long-term evaluation on the frequency of big quakes in the region ranging from the Sanriku coast in northeastern Japan to the Boso Peninsula in Chiba Prefecture. The draft report had a new article entitled "from the sea off Miyagi Prefecture to the sea off Fukushima Prefecture" and said a temblor that entails gigantic tsunami could occur at any moment based on recent research that such tsunami hit the coast four times over the past 2,500 years. But after some argued that such an expression could be linked with the projected Tokai quake, which was said to be 87 percent likely to occur within 30 years, it was weakened to simply noting that a major quake could occur off the Pacific coastline in eastern Japan.
References to research having found tsunami-caused sediment at a rate of every 450 to 800 years, and that 500 years had passed since the latest major quake were also deleted. After the March 2011 disaster, the committee under the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry estimated that the quake, if it were predictable beforehand, was 10 to 20 percent likely to occur within 30 years as of March 11 last year. (Mainichi Japan) February 28, 2012
Panel issues report on Fukushima nuclear accident
An independent panel investigating the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant has issued a report based on interviews with about 300 people, including Japanese and US government officials and nuclear experts. It has pointed out that the government and the plant's operator were ill-prepared to deal with a crisis. The 6-member panel of experts from the private sector has been studying how the Japanese government and Tokyo Electric Power Company responded to the nuclear accident in March last year. The power company's officials refused to be interviewed. The report released on Tuesday criticizes the government's response as off-the-cuff and too late. The late response is blamed on the government's failure to anticipate a nuclear accident triggered by an earthquake and tsunami that occurred simultaneously, which rendered its crisis management manual useless. The report says the problem was compounded by the lack of basic legal knowledge on the part of the government's senior officials. The report also points to delays in providing the prime minister's office with accurate information, as well as insufficient support by nuclear experts. The report urges immediate debate on improving such problems. The report condemns the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency for its failure to train professionals in safety. It says the agency could not draw up plans to put the Fukushima plant under control due to a shortage of both personnel and ideas. The report blames Tokyo Electric for increasing the damage by not immediately switching to an alternative cooling system after realizing that the emergency condenser wasn't working. It also says the company took too much time to start the vent procedure to avert a major crisis. The head of the panel, Koichi Kitazawa, says the investigation has revealed what was going on inside the prime minister's office and elsewhere at the time of the accident. He pointed out an institutional defect in Japan's system to address a crisis, a problem that needs to be fixed as soon as possible. Tuesday, February 28, 2012 18:57 +0900 (JST)
Panel: Cabinet members unaware of SPEEDI An independent panel investigating the Fukushima nuclear accident has found that the prime minister did not know about the government's system that can predict the spread of radioactive materials quickly. The 6-member panel of experts is due to issue a report on the disaster on Tuesday. The report says former Prime Minister Naoto Kan and 4 other politicians blame the science ministry officials for not informing them about the system called SPEEDI. Former Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano said he found out about it in a media report around March 15 last year. At the time, the No.2 reactor at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant was spewing radioactive materials. Edano said bureaucrats told him later that they decided not to inform him about SPEEDI because its calculation was not credible due to the lack of precise data on radiation. Former industry minster Banri Kaieda said it is most regrettable that he could not instruct officials to submit data on radiation dispersion because he did not know about the system. The panel charges in its report that SPEEDI was used as a tool to assure local residents about the safety of nuclear power generation and to obtain their consent to build the plant. It also says the system should have been used more effectively to reduce the residents' exposure to radiation as much as possible. Hirotada Hirose, an expert on emergency information, said bureaucrats should be primarily blamed for failing to inform. He says Cabinet ministers should also be criticized for their inability to manage the crisis. Tuesday, February 28, 2012 06:01 +0900 (JST)
Miscommunications made things worse
An independent panel investigating the accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant has issued a report showing in detail how miscommunications helped deepen mistrust among key players in the crisis management. The nuclear accident started when the Fukushima Daiichi plant had a station blackout---a loss of all its power sources. The government saw that providing mobile sources of electricity was its top priority. On the night of March 11th, government officials were scrambling to get as many power supply trucks as possible from around the country to the Fukushima plant. Despite their efforts, the officials saw that Tokyo Electric Power was having a hard time restoring electricity to the plant. The report says they became frustrated. Yukio Edano, who served as Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time, testifies that he thought power supply trucks had arrived at the site already and he could not understand why electricity had not yet been restored. He said he asked Tokyo Electric Power a number of times, but the utility could not explain why. He says it was then that he started wondering if he could trust the TEPCO officials. The report also describes how Prime Minister Kan and other officials started losing their faith in government-chosen nuclear experts in the first days of the crisis. On the morning of March 12th, Kan took a helicopter to the Fukushima plant, accompanied by Nuclear Safety Commission Chairman Haruki Madarame.
Kan asked what could happen if the core of a nuclear reactor melted. Madarame said hydrogen would be generated in a chemical reaction, but that nitrogen inside the containment vessel would prevent a hydrogen explosion. Eight hours later, a hydrogen explosion occurred at the Number One Reactor, and this led to Kan totally losing faith in Madarame. Kan started relying on outside experts for advice, by appointing a number of them as special cabinet advisors. A staffer in the Prime Minister's office told the investigation panel that he thought Kan's appointment of outsiders was a serious problem. The staffer thought it was utterly inappropriate for academics without any official responsibilities and whose specialist knowledge is uncertain to be involved in major policy decisions. Tuesday, February 28, 2012 22:05 +0900 (JST)
Panel blasts Kan's response to disaster
An independent panel investigating last March's nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant has criticized former Japanese prime minister Naoto Kan over his response to the disaster. Panel head Koichi Kitazawa told reporters at the Japan National Press Club on Tuesday that Kan interfered excessively in workers' efforts to bring the plant under control. Kitazawa said such interference included having a say in the size of batteries to be used.
Kitazawa added that Kan failed to disclose information appropriately, leading to widespread public mistrust of the government. Kitazawa did say, however, that Kan deserves credit for rushing to the main office of the plant's operator, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, to urge it not to abandon the facility. Kitazawa said Kan's action made the firm decide to keep 50 workers at the plant, helping to avert a worstcase scenario. Kitazawa also noted that Japan ignored various warning signs from abroad concerning nuclear safety after the 9-11 terrorist attacks and failed to see the need for measures for what the country considered 100 percent safe. Kitazawa said he cannot hope for nuclear safety in Japan as long as this mindset remains. Panel member Keiichi Tadaki said the government created the myth that nuclear plants are absolutely safe, mainly to counter anti-nuclear activists. But Tadaki said the government was bound by its own myth and became too inflexible to accept the latest technological ideas. Tuesday, February 28, 2012 20:36 +0900 (JST)
Edano advised Kan not to visit Fukushima
The morning after last year's March 11th Fukushima nuclear disaster, then Prime Minister Naoto Kan flew to the disaster site by helicopter, although his spokesman advised him not to do so,
warning of criticism from the opposition. A report issued on Tuesday by an investigating panel cites vivid accounts of Kan and others at the prime minister's official residence in the first days of the disaster. Early on March 12th, Prime Minister Kan took a helicopter ride to personally visit the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. He was frustrated that the plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company, had not started a venting operation to ease pressure inside the pressure vessel of Reactor Number One. Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano tried to talk Kan out of the visit. He said that with such a visit the prime minister would be definitely criticized politically. Then, Kan said to Edano, "Which is more important, facing political criticism, or being able to put a reactor under control?" Edano replied, "If you understand, then please go ahead." The report also cites a conversation between Prime Minister Kan and Nuclear Safety Commission Chairman Haruki Madarame over a hydrogen explosion that occurred at Reactor Number One shortly after 3:30 PM on March 11th. Kan asked Chairman Madarame to explain why this happened even though he had told Kan that an explosion would never occur. Madarame simply moaned, burying his head in his hands. The panel's report quotes Madarame as saying that when he saw the image of the explosion on TV, he immediately knew it was a hydrogen explosion. He said he was stunned and speechless because he had told Kan that morning that there would be no hydrogen explosion. Later at a quarter to 6 that evening, Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano held a news conference and with no sufficient information available about what had happened, only acknowledged that some sort of explosion had occurred. Edano recalled that it was the most difficult news conference he had ever held. Before dawn on March 15th, nuclear fuel became exposed and the danger of an explosion was pointed out. TEPCO made an inquiry to the prime minister's official residence, which sounded like a wish to withdraw its personnel from the disaster site. At around 3:30 AM, Prime Minister Kan and key cabinet ministers met to assess the situation. Kan said that if TEPCO abandoned its job of pumping water into the reactor and if radioactive substances kept spreading into the atmosphere, then the whole of eastern Japan could be in serious trouble. With that remark by the Prime Minister, the cabinet meeting decided to put his advisor, Goshi Hosono, on standby at TEPCO headquarters. Tuesday, February 28, 2012 21:52 +0900 (JST)
Nuclear accident "off-site" center under review
A Japanese government panel is proposing the setting up of 2 separate centers to help local communities respond to any future nuclear power plant accident. What is known as the off-site emergency response center failed to function properly when the Fukushima nuclear disaster occurred on March 11th last year. A rise in levels of radiation and the impact of the tsunami and earthquake prevented officials from local municipalities gathering at the off-site center, about 5 kilometers away from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Creating 2 centers to reinforce the functions of such an off-site center is one of the draft recommendations submitted by a working panel of the Nuclear Safety Commission on Tuesday. One would serve as a nerve center to give local residents information and instructions for evacuation. It would be set up in a prefectural office building sufficiently away from the plant, to avoid the risk of radiation. A second center would be built not very far from the power plant to serve as a front base to monitor radiation levels and conduct the actual evacuation of people. The panel says procedures must be clarified in advance to allow local officials to make decisions without government instructions when an accident is worsening. The panel says local communities should always have experts to help them make proper and prompt decisions in time of need, and use multiple emergency communication lines. After final recommendations, expected in about 2 weeks, the government will set new national guidelines for nuclear disaster response. Tuesday, February 28, 2012 20:36 +0900 (JST)
METI to introduce equipment to remove most radioactive materials at Fukushima plant
Workers at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant stand around the radioactive water decontamination system "Sally" in this photo provided by TEPCO. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) said on Feb. 27 that it would introduce equipment in the first half of next fiscal year that is capable of removing almost all kinds of radioactive substances from contaminated water piled up or stored on the premises of the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant. METI made the decision when it held a meeting to discuss medium- and long-term measures toward the decommissioning of the crippled Fukushima nuclear power station. The work to purify water contaminated with high levels of radiation has so far been carried out mainly to remove cesium-137, which has a long half-life and constitutes a great risk to health. Under the plan for Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), the operator of the Fukushima nuclear plant, new equipment designed to have radioactive substances absorbed into activated charcoal to further reduce the levels of radiation will be introduced to remove not only cesium-137 but also other radioactive substances. When 62 kinds of radioactive substances that measured more than one hundredth of the legal limit of radiation in contaminated water were tested, it was confirmed that the equipment was capable at present of removing 57 kinds of radioactive substances and reducing their levels of radiation below their detection limits. The equipment will be used to remove and reduce the concentrations of radioactive substances contained in water below the legal limit for releasing it into the ocean, but METI said, "We will discuss with local governments, people and others whether to actually release it into the ocean." Click here for the original Japanese story (Mainichi Japan) February 28, 2012
経済産業省は２７日、東京電力福島第１原発の廃炉までの中長期対策に関する対策会議を開 き、東電が敷地内にある放射性汚染水に含まれるほぼすべての種類の放射性物質を取り除く設 備を来年度前半にも導入する計画を明らかにした。 高濃度汚染水の浄化では現在、「セシウム１３７」を主に除去している。東電の計画では、 活性炭などに吸着させる設備を新たに導入し、他の放射性物質も除去する。 放射性物質６２種類について試験したところ、現時点で５７種類を検出限界値未満に除去で きることが確かめられた。この設備を使って、海に放出できる法定基準以下まで浄化するが経 産省は「放出するかどうかは地元と協議する」と説明した。 また経産省は、同原発１～３号機の建屋から大気中に放出されている放射性物質の量は直近 で毎時０・１億ベクレルと、昨年１２月上旬の約０・６億ベクレルからさらに減少したと発表 した。【関東晋慈】 毎日新聞 2012年2月28日 東京朝刊
Panel on nuclear crisis criticizes inspections conducted merely as formality
In this March 12, 2011 image made from video from NTV Japan via APTN, smoke rises from Unit 1 of the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture. (AP Photo/NTV Japan via APTN)
An independent fact-finding panel on the crisis at the tsunami-hit Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant has pointed the finger at safety inspections that are conducted on nuclear plants merely as a formality as well as the government's vertically-structured administrative system. In a report, the panel also pointed out that the current system under which private power companies operate nuclear power plants in accordance with the government's policy has given rise to moral hazards regarding safety regulations and obscured where responsibility lies. As a symbolic example of the harmful effects of the government's vertically structured administrative setup, the panel's report cited a delay in the government's announcement of data on the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), which predicts how radioactive substances will spread. The panel devoted 16 pages of the 400-page
report to describe the problem. The government decided on March 16, 2011, that the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry would compile data on radiation doses and that the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) would announce the data, which it points out obscured the responsibility for releasing such data. The ministry claimed that the NSC agreed to the division of roles. However, NSC Chairman Haruki Madarame testified that the ministry decided on the division of roles without consulting NSC and forced it to announce SPEEDI data. The panel assumes that the ministry shifted the role of announcing SPEEDI data to the NSC without consulting its members. "The possibility cannot be ruled out that the ministry's response, which suggests that it tried to evade responsibility, contributed to the delay in announcing data," the report says. The panel attributed a delay in the monitoring of radiation from aircraft until March 25 to a lack of cooperation between the Nuclear Safety Technology Center, which carried out the monitoring, and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which flew helicopters for the work. Furthermore, the panel pointed out that a lack of communication between multiple government organizations that inspect nuclear power plants has allowed them to conduct safety inspections merely as a formality, as a result of which they failed to take effective measures to respond to the nuclear crisis. The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and its affiliate, the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), and the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry and its affiliate, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, conducted inspections on nuclear plants, according to the panel's report.
In this March 15, 2011 photo released by Tokyo Electric Power Co., smoke rises from the badly damaged Unit 3 reactor, left, next to the Unit 4 reactor covered by an outer wall at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear complex in Okuma, northeastern Japan. (AP Photo/ Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
"These bodies did not have smooth communications with each other. Each of them only did what they were supposed to do and failed to effectively respond to the accident," it states. The report also says that safety inspections on nuclear plants are inadequate. "Inspection bodies were supposed to merely copy everything from documents compiled by electric power companies and check if they've inspected their nuclear plants according to the procedures," the report quotes a JNES inspector as saying. "Those involved in safety inspections can't see the forest for the trees," it quotes a senior official of JNES as telling the panel. (Mainichi Japan) February 28, 2012
Report takes former PM Kan to task over Fukushima nuke disaster handling
Former Prime Minister Naoto Kan speaks to the nation after the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011. (Mainichi)
The office of former Prime Minister Naoto Kan came in for scathing criticism in a Feb. 27 report on the handling of the Fukushima nuclear crisis' opening days, with the document accusing the PM's office of "grandstanding" and causing "useless confusion."
The report, put together by the private Fukushima nuclear disaster independent investigative committee, concludes that the Prime Minister's Office's first response to the meltdowns at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant "increased the risk of worsening the situation through stress and useless confusion." Furthermore, "grandstanding led to badly muddled crisis management measures" which did little or nothing to help prevent a worsening of the disaster. The report also rebuked the highest levels of government for meddling in emergency response measures. The investigative committee, which began its work in September last year, is made up of six scientists and legal experts. Fukushima No. 1 plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) refused to cooperate with the committee's inquiries. One focus of the report is the Prime Minister's Office's dispatch of electricity trucks to the No. 1 plant when it lost all power in the March 11, 2011 tsunami, knocking out the reactors' cooling systems. When the trucks arrived, there were no electrical cords to hook them up to the plant. "That's the point at which we (the government) began to distrust TEPCO," then Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano (now economy, trade and industry minister) is quoted as saying in the report. However, the investigators concluded that government distrust of TEPCO was a factor behind the direct intervention of the PM's Office. The report also stated that "Orders by the Prime Minister's Office and industry ministry that gas building up in the reactor vessels be vented right away (to reduce pressure) were not at all helpful," citing the loss of power at the plant and the fact that TEPCO was waiting for local residents to be evacuated. The report also takes Kan to task over the injection of sea water into the No. 1 reactor, stating that he confused the situation and risked making it far worse when, at a meeting at around 6 p.m. on March 12, he "vehemently" expressed worries that the injection would cause the reactor to go critical again and ordered a reappraisal of the planned operation. Fukushima No. 1 plant chief Masao Yoshida, however, began injecting sea water at 7:04 p.m., and ignored orders from both the Prime Minister's Office and TEPCO's Tokyo headquarters to stop. "Had Yoshida obeyed the order from the Prime Minister's Office, there was a real danger that the operation would have been started too late," the report states. However, it furthermore concludes that the fact Yoshida took action in direct opposition to government and TEPCO orders was "a very serious risk in terms of crisis management." The report is not entirely damning of Kan's actions, however, stating that his refusal on March 15 to allow TEPCO to abandon the nuclear plant "in the end compelled TEPCO to remain steadfast" as the crisis unfolded. On the other hand, the report also states that Kan was aware he was making Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan Chairman Haruki Madarame and his Cabinet ministers uncertain about any objections they had to his decisions with his strong, top-down command style and
insistence on his own opinions. Furthermore, as leader, Kan's "self-assertion was a positive in that he could judge the situation and implement countermeasures, but was a negative in that it became a form of psychological control of others involved and caused a withering of their roles in the crisis. Click here for the original Japanese story (Mainichi Japan) February 28, 2012
民間事故調：福島第１原発 官邸初動対応 が混乱の要因
2012 2 27 22 22 2 28 10 7 東日本大震災の発生を受け、国民に向け呼びかける菅直人首相＝首相官邸で２０１１年３月１ １日午後４時５５分、藤井太郎撮影 東京電力福島第１原発事故を調査してきた民間の「福島原発事故独立検証委員会（民間事故 調）」（北沢宏一委員長）は２７日、菅直人首相（事故発生 当時）ら官邸の初動対応を「無 用な混乱やストレスにより状況を悪化させるリスクを高めた。場当たり的で、泥縄的な危機管 理」と指摘する報告書をまとめた。 官邸の指示が事故の拡大防止にほとんど貢献しなかったと 総括。緊急事態の際の政府トップによる現場への介入を戒めた。 民間事故調は、科学者や法曹関係者ら６人の有識者が委員を務め、昨年の９月から調査して いた。東電側は聴取を拒否した。 報告書によると、原発のすべての電源が失われた際、官邸主導で手配された電源車が、コ ードをつなげず現地で役に立たなかった。枝野幸男官房長官 （同）は「東電への不信はそれぐ らいから始まっている」と、事故当日から東電への不信感が政府側に生まれていたと証言。報 告書はこうした不信感が、官邸の 現場への介入の一因になったと分析した。 原子炉格納容器の圧力を下げるため気体を外に出す「ベント」が遅れたことについては、東 電が現地の住民避難の完了を待っていたことや電源喪失が原 因だったと指摘。「官邸の決定や 経済産業相の命令、首相の要請がベントの早期実現に役立ったと認められる点はなかった」と した。 １号機への海水注入では、１２日午後６時ごろの会議で、注入による再臨界の可能性を菅氏 が「強い調子」で問いただし、再検討を指示していた。海水 注入は既に午後７時４分に始ま っており、第１原発の吉田昌郎所長（同）は官邸と東電本店の中断指示を無視し注入を続け た。報告書は「官邸の中断要請に従っ ていれば、作業が遅延した可能性がある危険な状況だ った」との見方を示した。同時に、吉田氏の行動についても「官邸及び東電本店の意向に明確 に反する対応 を現場が行ったことは、危機管理上の重大なリスクを含む問題」と批判した。
一方、菅氏が昨年３月１５日に東電に「（福島第１原発からの）撤退なんてありえません よ」と、第１原発にとどまるように強く求めたことについては、「結果的に東電に強い覚悟を 迫った」と評価した。 また、菅氏の官邸での指揮に関し「強く自身の意見を主張する傾向」が班目（まだらめ）春 樹原子力安全委員長や閣僚らの反論を「躊躇（ちゅう ちょ）」させたとの認識も示した。さら に「トップリーダーの強い自己主張は、物事を決断し実行するための効果という正の面、関係 者を萎縮させるなど心理的 抑制効果という負の面があった」と言及した。【笈田直樹】
・首相官邸の現場介入によって、１号機のベント（排気）などで無用の混乱を招き、事故の悪 化リスクを高めた可能性。介入の背景は、マニュアルの想定不備や官邸の認識不足▽東電や保 安院への不信感▽被害拡大の危機感▽菅直人前首相の政治手腕など ・０１年の米同時多発テロを教訓にした新たな規制内容を未反映 ・菅前首相は昨年３月２２日、原子力委員会の近藤駿介委員長に「最悪シナリオ」の想定を依 頼 ・地震当時、原発構内の作業員は「この原発は終わった。東電は終わりだ」と顔面蒼白（そう はく） ・緊急時迅速放射能影響予測システム（ＳＰＥＥＤＩ）の運用や結果の公表を巡り、文部科学 省が原子力安全委員会に役割分担させるなど責任回避を念頭にした組織防衛的な兆候が散見 ・航空機モニタリングで、文科省と防衛省の連携が不十分 【ことば】福島原発事故独立検証委員会 東京電力福島第１原発事故の原因などについて民間の立場で検証しようと、財団法人が設立 した組織。通称・民間事故調。委員は元検事総長の但木敬一 弁護士ら民間人６人。研究者や弁 護士ら約３０人から成るワーキンググループがあり、菅直人前首相ら政治家や官僚ら３００人 余りから意見を聴取した。原発事 故をめぐっては政府、国会、日本原子力学会なども独自に調 査している。法律に基づいて設置された国会の事故調は、証人喚問といった強い権限がある。 ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
【検証・大震災】菅前首相はそのとき、何を考え、どう行動したか。証言をもとに構成 した 【写真特集】破壊された原子炉建屋、汚染水タンクの山…福島第１原発 空から見た３ キロ圏の惨状（２月２６日撮影） 【原発、現在はどうなってるの】２月公開の福島第１原発の写真と映像 【すべてはここから】津波に襲われる福島第１原発の画像公開 【震災議事録】緊急本部も未作成か 原子力本部に続き 【議事録未作成】「作られていると」枝野氏、思い込みと釈明 ＜福島第１原発＞東電 震災後の対応ドキュメント
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