Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

GUIDELINES FOR PORT SECURITY ASSESSMENT

JABATAN LAUT SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA IBU PEJABAT LAUT PETI SURAT 12 42007 PELABUHAN KLANG SELANGOR
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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

1 Introduction 1.1 This document serves as guidelines to Port Administrators and Port Facility Operators whom are required to conduct security assessments under SOLAS ’74, Chapter XI-2. These guidelines also provide for the establishment of port area and port facility security plan in accordance with the security assessment carried out. A model Port Area and Port Facility Security Plan is also included in these guidelines. 1.2 This document is to facilitate the compliance by Malaysian ships, ports and port facilities by 1st July 2004 in view of Malaysia being a Contracting State to the SOLAS ’74 Convention. 1.3 • • • • SOLAS Ch XI-2 and the ISPS Code shall apply to the following: passenger ships engaged on international voyages; cargo ships of 500 or more gross tonnes engaged on international voyages; mobile off-shore drilling units (MODUs) engaged on international voyages; and Port and port facilities that service the above categories of ships.

1.4 These guidelines for security assessment includes the criteria associated with risk identification and management. The effectiveness of security assessment, risk identification, development and management of the security plan require the commitment of all level of management as well as implementers. The auditing process for certification will include the assessment and commitment of top management. 2 Schedule of Submission 2.1 Security assessment and security plans should be submitted to certifying authority by 1st May 2004. However, Port Administrators and Port Facility Operators are advised to submit as soon as possible to ensure certification by 1st July 2004. The Marine Department is available for consultation in order to avoid any non-conformities and deficiencies prior to submission.

3 Key Definitions Used in this Guidance Paper
3. 1 Risk - the chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. It is measured in terms of consequences and likelihood. 3.2 Security Assessments – are risk assessments conducted and prepared in accordance with an internationally accepted risk assessment process. The assessment will provide the basis for preventive security planning. 3.3 Threat - a source of possible danger or harm, including a situation with the potential to cause commercial loss. In this document it refers to security threats, not other forms of threats such as natural disasters or global economic downturns not related to security incidents.

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

4 In respect of port security assessments and plans the following definitions apply: 4.1 Critical Infrastructure

4.1.1 Infrastructures within the port area which is critical to the port operation which without its presence can disrupt the operation of the port. 4.2 Security Designated Port Area

4.2.1 The Designated Authority shall declare areas of a port intended for use either wholly or partly in connection with the movement, loading, unloading, maintenance or provisioning of security regulated ships comprise a security designated port area. 4.2.2 An area controlled exclusively by the Malaysian Defence Force must not be included as part of a security designated port. 4.3 Port Administrator – the Regulatory Authority of the port.

4.3.1 For federal ports which have gazetted port authorities, these authorities will be the Port Administrator. 4.3.2 For Federal ports which do not have gazetted port authorities, the Marine Department will be the Port Administrator. 4.3.3 The State Authority will be the Port Administrator for those ports under state management. 4.4 Port Area Security Committee

4.4.1 A framework for communication and coordination of security arrangements. The Committee, chaired by the Port Administrator, should be composed of the port area security officer, port facility security officer, government institutions – immigration, customs, quarantine, marine department, police, etc; port marine service providers, facility owner/facility operator and facility users – key ship operators or agents. 4.4.2 This security committee is responsible for the development and implementation of the port area security plan. 4.5 Port Area Security Officer (PASO)

4.5.1 Port Area Security Officer (PASO) is a suitably qualified officer designated by the port administrator to facilitate the development, implementation, review and maintenance of a port security plan and for liaison with designated authority, port facility security officers and ship security officers, where appropriate. 4.6 Port facility

4.6.1 Port Facility is a location as determined by the Designated Authority where ship/port interface takes place which may include area of land or water, or land and

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

water, anchorages, waiting berths and approaches from seaward within a security designated port area (including any buildings, installations or equipment in or on the area) used either wholly or partly in connection with the loading or unloading of ships. The port facility area shall encompass the restricted water area and restricted land area. 4.7 Port facility operator

4.7.1 Port facility operator means an organisation who operates a port facility. 4.8 Port Facility Security Officer

4.8.1 Port Facility Security Officer means a suitably qualified officer designated by the port facility operator to facilitate the development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the port facility security plan and liaison with the ship security officers, company security officers, port area security officer (PASO) and other port facility security officers(PFSO).

5 ISPS Code and Designated Authority Requirements
5.1 The ISPS Code requires security assessments to establish threats, determine vulnerabilities and treat risks to assets, infrastructure and operations. This approach recognises that port administrators and operators are best placed to determine the vulnerabilities of their own assets, infrastructure and operations, identify appropriate preventive security measures and develop appropriate security plans. 5.2 Ports and Port facilities

5.2.1 Port security assessments will form the basis for port security plans, which are essential for the promotion and development of consistent preventive security measures across the port and for the treatment of systemic weaknesses in security arrangements within the port community. These assessments will determine high level strategic risks to assets, operations and activities within the port and could be used by port facility operators as the basis of their security assessment requirements. 5.2.2 This procedure will require the formation of Port Area Security Committees as the first step in a coordinated approach by ports and port facilities to their respective security assessment and planning requirements. A Port Area Security Committee, chaired by the Port Administrator, should comprise representatives from port area security officer, port facility security officer, government institutions - immigration, customs, quarantine, marine department, police, etc; port marine service providers, facility owner/facility operator and facility users – key ship operators or agents. These committees would be expected to meet on a regular basis to collectively ensure that both port and port facility security planning is progressing to meet the tight timeframes for submission of security plans by early 2004. 5.2.3 Port Administrators and port facility operators are strongly encouraged to work closely together to complete their respective security assessment and planning requirements. Generally, this could be reflected by an overarching port security

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

assessment, which incorporates individual port facility assessments. This approach would result in the development of a single security planning document that incorporates a port area security plan and individual port facility security plans that clearly identifies roles and responsibilities within the security designated port area. However, a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not practical for security assessments or plans for the maritime industry and accordingly local security assessment and planning arrangements to meet the ISPS Code requirements should be determined by both port administrators and port facility operators. 5.2.4 Port Administrators and port facility operators are also encouraged to consider the identification, analysis and treatment of security risks associated with other port marine service providers eg tugs, pilots and barges when undertaking a security assessment. It is considered preferable that risks identified in respect of port service providers be addressed in port area and port facility security plans.

6 Requirements Assessments
6.1

for

Port

Area

and

Port

Facility

Security

Security assessment submissions

6.1.1 A completed security assessment is to be submitted to the Designated Authority with the respective port area and port facility security plan. The security assessment should demonstrate those risks and /or threats identified have been adequately analysed and evaluated, and that appropriate preventive and mitigative security strategies have been selected for action against unacceptable or intolerable risks or circumstances. 6.1.2 The approved security assessments will need to be included as an attachment to port area and port facility security plans. Security assessments must be protected from unauthorised access due to the sensitive nature of their contents. 6.2 All security assessments submitted to the Designated Authority must include: • • • • • the date that the security assessment was completed or reviewed; specific details of the location of the port or port facility, or details of the ship to which the assessment applies. a short summary of how the assessment was conducted, including details of the risk management process adopted; the relevant skills and experience of the persons who participated and completed the assessment; and a short statement outlining the risk context (threat situation) relating to the port area or port facility, including a list of key assets, infrastructure and operations.

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

6.3

Port Area security assessments must also include the following: • • • • identification and evaluation of strategically important assets, infrastructure and operations that it is important to protect; identification of possible high level risks and/or threats to assets, infrastructure and operations, and the likelihood and consequences of their occurrence; identification, selection and prioritisation of strategic risk treatments (counter measures and procedural changes) and their level of effectiveness in reducing risk levels (including vulnerabilities); and identification and treatment of gaps in port wide security arrangements, including port infrastructure, human factors, policies and procedures.

6.4 Port Administrators who have control and responsibility for specific port facilities (e.g. common user berths) and other port operations such as defined anchorages, channels etc, may wish to assess them in conjunction with their port security assessment. The individual responsibilities of port facility operators must also be clearly identified in security assessment submissions. 6.5 Port facility security assessments must include the following elements: • • • • identification and evaluation of important assets, infrastructure and operations it is important to protect; identification of weaknesses, including human factors, in the infrastructure, policies and procedures; identification of possible risks and/or threats to assets, infrastructure and operations, and the likelihood and consequences of their occurrence, and identification, selection and prioritisation of risk treatments (counter measures and procedural changes) and their level of effectiveness in reducing risk levels (including vulnerabilities).

6.6

Combined and/or joint port facility security assessments

6.6.1 Port facility operators may wish to conduct a port facility security assessment covering more than one individual port facility for which they are legally responsible. Port facility operators should advise the Designated Authority of such an approach when conducting combined security assessments. They should also consider the following: • • Are the port facilities to be covered situated within the same geographic location? – i.e. a single security assessment is not appropriate where port facilities are located in different ports. Who has legal responsibility for the security operations of the port facilities to be covered by the security assessment? – i.e. port facility operators legally responsible for security arrangements should be part of the security assessment process. Are port facility operations similar in nature or design or linked in some way to each other, such as via the use of similar equipment or services? – i.e.

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

consideration needs to be made as to whether it is best to conduct separate security assessments where operations are significantly different. 6.6.2 Similarly, the requirement of a security assessment to cover individual port facilities does not preclude the carrying out of a joint security assessment collectively by several port facilities within a single port. This approach could also include shared port facilities, such as common user berths, for which port operators may have responsibility to complete assessments. 6.6.3 It would be expected that security assessment submissions are presented in an easy to read plain English format and that the key elements of the risk management process adopted are clearly identifiable.

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

7 The Security Assessment Process
7.1 The port area security assessment (PASA)
7.1.1 Introduction 7.1.1.1 The “Threat and Risk Analysis Matrix” (TRAM) is a simplified risk-based method and tool to assist in carrying out a PASA. It is but one of a number of tools and is given here by way of example. 7.1.1.2 Its purpose is to identify threats with a view to initiating and recommending countermeasures to deter, detect and reduce the consequence of any potential incident should it occur. Such an analysis may be a valuable aid to allocating resources, forward planning, contingency planning and budgeting. 7.1.1.3 The TRAM should be updated as often as changing circumstances may dictate to maintain its effectiveness. This task would, normally, fall under the remit of the Port Area Security Officer or the Port Facility Security Officer. 7.1.1.4 In addition to the more obvious threats, the list of potential targets should be as comprehensive as possible with due regard to the function(s) of the port, legal, political, social, geographic and economic environment of the country and the security environment specific to the port. 7.1.2 Assessment process 7.1.2.1 Table 1 is a blank version of the TRAM, which is used to illustrate the following explanation of the assessment process. 7.1.2.2 Potential targets (PT). Identify PT through assessment of functions and operations, vulnerable areas, key points or persons in the port and in the immediate environment that may, if subject to an unlawful act, detrimentally impact on the security, safety of personnel or function of the port. 7.1.2.3 Establish “ownership” of the identified PT. For example: • • • directly owned and controlled by the Port Administrator or Port Facility owner; directly owned by the Port Administrator but rented, leased, occupied and controlled by other parties; owned, controlled and operated by other parties;

7.1.2.4 Establish if there are any existing security measures, such as a perimeter fence, access control and/or security patrol or monitoring of the PT. If so, are they effective, can improvements be made? 7.1.2.5 Threat scenario (columns A and B of table 1). Assess all threats and threat scenarios from both internal and external sources to which the identified PT may be vulnerable (input from police, security and intelligence services is essential).

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

7.1.2.6 Threat scenarios (amongst many) that may be appropriate to consider: .1. Arson; .2. Attacks on ships from seaward while at berth or at anchor, or while at sea .3. Blockage of port entrances, channels, locks, approaches, waterways etc.; .4. Chemical, biological and/or nuclear attack; .5. Hijacking and hostage sieges, including piracy; .6. Sabotage or vandalism; .7. Smuggling of weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction; .8. Tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems, or stores; .9. Unauthorised access or use of a ship, including stowaways; .10. Unauthorised access to a secure area within a port area or port facility .11. Use of a ship or vehicle to transport explosives, hazardous goods or weapons. .12. Use of a ship to carry those intending to cause a security incident and their equipment; and .13. Use of a ship as a weapon or a means to cause damage or destruction. 7.1.2.7 Threat (column C of table 1). The probability of an incident occurring should be assessed on the following scale: • 3 = high; • 2 = medium; • 1 = low. 7.1.2.7.1 The allocation of a particular threat score may be based on specific information received or the known characteristics of the potential target. 7.1.2.8 Vulnerability (column D of table 1). The susceptibility and vulnerability of the PT to each threat may be assessed as follows: • 4 = No existing security measures/existing security measures are not effective (e.g. unrestricted access to target, target not monitored; personnel untrained; target easily damaged); • 3 = Minimal security measures (e.g. restricted areas not clearly identified; inadequate access control procedures; sporadic monitoring; no formal security training programme; target susceptible to certain types of damage); • 2 = Satisfactory security measures (e.g. restricted areas clearly identified and access is controlled; formal security training programme; adequate monitoring and threat awareness; target not easily damaged); • 1 = Fully effective security measures (e.g. all of “2” plus, capable of promptly scaling to higher security level as needed; target difficult to damage or has sufficient redundancy to prevent disruption if certain functions are damaged). 7.1.2.9 Impact. Assess the impact (consequence) of each potential incident on the PT and port should it occur. Specific “impacts” and priorities for a particular port may be substituted by the designated authority to meet the national security profile and requirements.

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

• 5 = Detrimental to security and safety (likely to cause loss of life, serious injuries and/or create widespread danger to public health and safety). • 4 = Detrimental to public safety and/or national prestige (likely to cause significant environmental damage and/or localized public health and safety). • 3 = Detrimental to the environment and/or economic function of the port (likely to cause sustained port-wide disruption and/or significant economic loss and/or damage to national prestige). • 2 = Detrimental to assets, infrastructure, utility and cargo security (likely to cause limited disruption to an individual asset, infrastructure or organization). • 1 = Detrimental to customer/port community confidence. 7.1.2.10 Risk score. Score is the product of threat x vulnerability x impact. 7.1.2.10.1 The highest score scenario will be: • Threat – High ………………………………….……… 3 • Vulnerability – No existing countermeasure…………. 4 • Impact – Potential loss of life/injury ………..………... 5 • Risk score …………..……………………………….… 60 7.1.2.10.2 The lowest score scenario will be: • Threat – Low ………..……………………………….. • Vulnerability – Fully compliant ………………….….. • Impact – Little ……………………………………….. • Risk score …………...…………………………….…. 1 1 1 1

7.1.2.11 Action priority (column G of table 1). Tabulating and listing the scores for each threat against each PT will assist in assessing the priority in which to deal with each potential incident. The process should lead to indications of actions required to deter, detect and mitigate the consequences of potential incidents, resources available or required and appropriate security measures.

7.2

Analysis of the Matrix

7.2.1 In assessing likely scenarios the history and modus operandi of illegal groups most likely to operate in the area should be considered when identifying the PT and determining and assessing the most appropriate security measures. 7.2.2 This is an assessed reduction of the score for each scenario based on the perceived effectiveness of the security measures when they have been put into effect. The result should give some guidance as to which actions and resources will have the greatest benefit in deterring attack of the PT. It may also indicate that some targets or threats do not need to be considered or that the security measure is not achievable because of resource or other constraints. 7.2.3 The TRAM for every potential target should be collated into one master matrix of similar threat scenarios and common security measures identified to give the maximum benefit. It may also be that some PT may be grouped together under one

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

security measure. For example one or more PT close together may be contained within one perimeter fence with one gate controller. It may be that a vulnerable operation in a remote part of the port can be moved into a more secure area. Every possible realistic action should be considered. 7.2.4 The completed TRAM together with a consolidated summary of all security measures that have been devised and are able to be implemented should form the basis from which the port security plan can be developed. 7.3 The port facility security assessments (PFSA)

7.3.1 For the Port Facility Security Assessment, the methods mentioned in paragraphs 7.1 and 7.2 are to be followed and similar matrix are to be used. 8 Assessment example

8.1 The following ten-step example (Table 1 below) is used to illustrate the possible working of a security assessment using the TRAM for a specific threat scenario – destroy port authority’s communication tower by explosives.

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

Table 1. Blank Threat and Risk Analysis Matrix (TRAM) Potential target: Person/place/location (identify each PT in the port area not covered by the PFSP or other official subordinate plan) Scenario No A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Threat Scenario

Threat

Vulnerability

Impact

Risk Score

Action Priority

B

C

D

E

F

G

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

Step 1 – List feasible scenario in column B Scenario No A 1 Threat Scenario B Destroy port authority’s communication tower by explosives Threat C Vulnerability D Impact E Risk Score F Action Priority G

Feasibility scenario as determined by current port security assessment

The tower is a critical component of port operational and commercial communications. It supports booster stations for local police and emergency service communications and, in addition the tower supports mobile telephone repeater services for the area. Currently the tower is protected from casual access or interference by a 2-metre high razor wire fence of 15 metre diameter and is located in a non-restricted area approximately 200 metres from the Harbour Masters Office. The facility is positioned on flat ground approachable from all sides, and a service road, that is accessible from the public area roads, passes within20 metres of the perimeter fence. Access to the compound is limited to maintenance and servicing of the tower components as required and seasonal ground maintenance including grass cutting by regular port approved contractors. There is a mobile security patrol that visits and checks for signs of damage or intrusion once by day and once by night. The tower could be easily damaged by an explosive device thrown over the fence, placed against the fence or a car bomb driven up to the compound or placed on the service approach road.

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

Step 2 – Assign a threat score to this scenario in column C Scenario No A 1 Threat Scenario B Destroy port authority’s communication tower by explosives Threat C 1 Vulnerability D Impact E Risk Score F Action Priority G

Threat score based on intelligence, security level, current deterrent measures and other relevant factors

This scenario has been given a threat score of “1-low” because no specific intelligence has been obtained that suggests communications facilities are being targeted at the present time. A score of “2-medium” or “3-high” may be given based upon intelligence.

Step 3 – Assign a vulnerability score to this scenario in column D Scenario Threat Scenario Threat Vulnerability No A B C D Destroy port authority’s 1 communication tower by 1 2 explosives
Vulnerability is the susceptibility of a potential target to a particular threat

Impact E

Risk Score F

Action Priority G

In this example, the threat is damage to the communications tower by explosives. Vulnerability is listed as “2-satisfactory security measures” because the facility’s existing perimeter fence and security patrol is considered a sufficient deterrent.

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

Step 4 – Assign impact score to this scenario in column E Scenario Threat Scenario Threat Vulnerability No A B C D 1 Destroy port authority’s communication tower by explosives 1 2

Impact E 3

Risk Score F

Action Priority G

Impact is the consequence of an incident – the effect on public health, safety or security, etc

In this example, impact is listed as “3-detrimental to the economic function of the port” because there is no back-up communication tower, so its loss would shut down the port for some time until repairs could be made, thus causing substantial economic loss. Impact may be further reduced if there is redundancy to the potential target (e.g. a back-up communications tower) or if a target may be easily repaired. Conversely, impact may increase if there is no redundancy, or if a target would be difficult to replace.

. Step 5 – Calculate the initial TRAM score in column F Scenario Threat Scenario Threat No A B C Destroy port authority’s 1 communication tower by 1 explosives
The initial score is calculated by multiplying columns C, D and E)

Vulnerability D 2

Impact E 3

Risk Score F 6

Action Priority G

In this example the initial score would be “6” (1 x 2 x 3 = 6).

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

Step 6 – Determine the action priority in column G(typically performed following several scenario calculations) Scenario No A 1 Threat Scenario B Destroy port authority’s communication tower by explosives Threat C 1 Vulnerability D 2 Impact E 3 Risk Score F 6 Action Priority G

The action priority is based on each scenario’s initial score

Establishing action priorities based on initial Risk scores is a quick way to distinguish between the various scenarios, and can help focus and allocate scarce resources, particularly when a large number of scenarios are assessed.

Step 7 – Determine new scores and action priorities base on changes to threat, vulnerability or impact Scenario No A 1 Threat Scenario B Destroy port authority’s communication tower by explosives Threat C 2 Vulnerability D 2 Impact E 3 Risk Score F 12 Action Priority G

A variety of factors may change an initial risk score

For example, an increase in threat from 1 (low) to 2 (medium), would raise the risk score from “6” to “12”, (column C increases from “1” to “2”, thus 2 x 2 x 3 = 12; see above). When the threat score increases, persons involved in developing security measures can use this table to recalculate how vulnerability or impact reduction measures may reduce the risk score. If “6” is deemed to be an acceptable level, then vulnerability reduction measures or impact reduction measures should be considered that will reduce the figures in columns D and E so as to give a risk score in column F of no higher than “6” .

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

Step 8 – Implementing measures to reduce vulnerability As described in Step 1, the tower is protected from casual access or interference by a 2-metre high razor wire fence of 15 metre diameter and is located in a non-restricted area approximately 200 metres from the Harbour Master’s Office. The facility is positioned on flat ground approachable from all sides, and a service road, that is accessible from the public area roads, passes within 20 metres of the perimeter fence. Access to the compound is limited to maintenance and servicing of the tower components as required and seasonal ground maintenance including grass cutting by regular port approved contractors. There is a mobile security patrol that visits and checks for signs of damage or intrusion once by day and once by night. With these measures, vulnerability was scored as “2”. However, if additional vulnerability reduction measures, such as a full-time on-site security force, or, changing the non-restricted area to a restricted area, the vulnerability score may be reduced from “2” to “1” fully effective security measures. Thus, with vulnerability in column D reduced from “2” to “1”, as shown below, a new risk score of “6” is produced. Scenario No A 1 Threat Scenario B Destroy port authority’s communication tower by explosives Threat C 2 Vulnerability D 1 Impact E 3 Risk Score F 6 Action Priority G

Step 9 – Implementing measures to reduce impact Reducing the impact will alter the figure in column E and reduce the overall risk. Similarly, reducing the figure in column E (impact) can also reduce the overall TRAM score at a higher security level. Recall that the tower is a critical component of port operational and commercial communications. It also supports booster stations for local police and emergency service communications. In addition the mast supports mobile telephone repeater services for the area. Assuming that there is no back-up communications tower, the impact of losing this tower was initially calculated as “3” in column E. However, if a back-up facility was available, it would create some redundancy, thereby reducing the impact of a loss. Thus, the new risk score, with impact reduced from “3” to “2” limited disruption to port organization due to communications redundancy, as shown below, produces a new TRAM score of “8”. While this is an improvement from “12”, the persons responsible for port security could then decide whether additional measures were needed.

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

Scenario No A 1

Threat Scenario B Destroy port authority’s communication tower by explosives

Threat C 2

Vulnerability D 2

Impact E 2

Risk Score F 8

Action Priority G

Step 10 – Implementing measures to reduce vulnerability and impact If both the vulnerability reduction measures and impact reduction measures discussed in this example were taken together, the total risk score would be reduced to “4”, well below the initial score of “6”. Scenario No A 1 Threat Scenario B Destroy port authority’s communication tower by explosives Threat C 2 Vulnerability D 1 Impact E 2 Risk Score F 4 Action Priority G

The persons doing the security assessment and persons charged with implementing security measures must determine the effectiveness of various vulnerability or impact reduction measures for their ports.

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Guidelines for port security assessment

Marine Department Headquarters, Malaysia

CATEGORISATION OF PORTS 5 types of ports have been tentatively categorised: 1. Type A – Terminal with container liner service bound for trunk line and terminal handles hazardous material i Monitors peripheral area, terminal area and water area of a facility by security guards and surveillance equipment ii In addition, access control will be automated by introducing appropriate identification system of the personnel and delivery cars 2. Type B – Terminal with liner service i Monitor peripheral area, terminal area and water area of a facility by security guards and surveillance equipment. 3. Type C – Terminal without regular service i Peripheral area, terminal area and water area of a facility will be monitored by security guards ii Minimum security equipment will also be installed 4. Type D – Terminal which rarely serves ships engaged on international voyage i Peripheral area, terminal area and water area of a facility will be monitored by security guards 5. Type PT – Passenger Terminal i Monitors peripheral area, terminal area and water area of a facility by security guards and surveillance equipment ii In addition, passenger baggage will be examined

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