Hofstra University Model United Nations Conference

United Nations General Assembly Special Political and Decolonization Committee

Fourth Committee

Victoria Rametta Chairperson

1 Dear Delegates, I warmly welcome you to Special Political and Decolonization Committee at Hofstra Model United Nations 2012! My name is Victoria Rametta, a second year student at Hofstra University and a member of the Model UN club for two years. It is my very distinct pleasure to serve as your chair in this thought-provoking and rewarding committee in which there is great opportunity for you to think about and craft creative solutions to some of the world’s most intractable and important problems. It comes as no surprise to many that I am the chair of this committee considering my life revolves around politics. Since a very young age, my parents have always instilled in me the drive to become an engaged and contributing citizen. I have strived for that in everything that I do. Aside from my studies as a Political Science and Global Studies double major and keeping updated with daily news, I work hard to stay active on campus. I am a Senator of Student Government Association and Chairwoman of the Academic Affairs Committee, and I am involved in our College Libertarians Club. I am also studying Latin, for any of you would like to help me resurrect this dead language! In addition, I am Secretary of Model United Nations at Hofstra, which entails much preparation for the conferences we attend as a delegation as well as the conference we have created for you. This year our SPECPOL committee will concentrate on two very different and highly contentious topics discussed worldwide. The former colonization of the African continent more than a century ago has created much of the instability that is still seen today. In order for this beautiful region to someday flourish, the United Nations needs to establish creative, tangible ways to remedy these problems. The committee’s second topic, Kashmir, has been an issue of

2 dispute for some time. Finding a solution to this important problem will require addressing the interests of all parties involved. It is now your task to research and brain storm for possible ways in which both topics can be resolved on a world platform, the United Nations. I sincerely look forward to debating these controversial ideas and meeting my future committee delegates!

Best, Victoria Rametta vramet1@pride.hofstra.edu

3 Introduction to the Committee

The Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL) is the fourth committee within the General Assembly of the United Nations. It deals with a variety of subjects, including those related to decolonization, Palestinian refugees and human rights, peacekeeping, mine action, outer space, public information, atomic radiation and University for Peace. Hofstra High School Model United Nations Conference’s SPECPOL members will be asked to tackle two different topics of utmost international importance: the consequences of African decolonization and the dispute over Kashmir. Evidenced by continued turmoil throughout much of Africa, the effects of European colonization of the continent and the problems that arose from the process of decolonization remain a significant issue for not only Africa but for the entire international community. Delegates to SPECPOL will be asked to craft possible solutions to some of these pressing problems in Africa by examining and debating the humanitarian, governance, and political issues in the cases of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Delegates to SPECPOL will be faced with a range of challenges as the try to help address these complex problems that affects millions of people. The second topic, Kashmir, emerged as a result of a territorial dispute between Pakistan and India but has exploded into an issue that involves nuclear weapons and terrorism and that concerns the interests of many states, including the United States and China. The problem has lingered since 1947, and multiple past attempts to solve it have failed, including United Nationssponsored efforts. Any effort to address this very complex problem must address Pakistani and Indian interests, great power interests in the region, and, most importantly, the interests of the

4 Kashmiri people. Delegates to SPECPOL will thus face tremendous challenges in addressing this issue. But thoughtful approaches to the problem can help to settle this long-standing dispute and prevent further violent conflict in the region.

5 TOPIC A: The Effects of African Decolonization History By the turn of the 20th Century, nearly the entire African continent was under the rule of European colonial powers, which exploited the region for its resources for economic profit. In the 1950s, anti-colonial nationalist sentiment developed rapidly and challenged the old order. With a sympathetic international audience that was also quite hostile towards the colonial system, such struggles for autonomy were largely successful. After a wave of independence movements across most African nations in a second half of the 20th century, new domestic governments took control over their own internal and diplomatic affairs. The colonial legacies left behind by European powers, however, continue to prevent developing African nations from reaching the standards of infrastructure, living, and economic and political stability long ago achieved by the Western world.1 As a result of weak and often corrupt governments, some of the most violent wars and genocides known to mankind have taken place in Africa during the postcolonial era. Although the United Nations cannot take direct responsibility for all post-colonial affairs, the Fourth Committee is charged with the issue of political stability in former African colonies. During the colonial period, European powers followed mercantilist ideals and valued economic profit for the imperial center above all else. Their actions did not take into account the hundreds of varying tribes and languages spread across the continent, nor the future development and self-sustainability for any emerging nations. Much of Africa was left in a fragile state at the onset of the post-colonial era.

6 The artificial boundaries drawn by European powers have created many difficulties for African nations. European statesmen initially divided the African continent into respective “spheres of control” at the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference.2 No Africans were invited to take part in the conference. Furthermore, none of the meeting’s results and conclusions were made available to any Africans.3 The 14 states involved came to agreements that were entirely selfserving and paid no heed to the inherent ethnic tribal divisions on the continent. The map of Africa was redrawn based on political impositions by the colonial powers and remained so until the independence movement started to gain momentum in the mid-twentieth century. The quest for “minerals and markets” completely ignored the potential future volatility in a continent of mixed, ineffective, and often arbitrary boundaries.4 Wole Soyinka, the Nigerian writer and political activist, highlighted this problem in 1994 when he wrote, We should sit down with square-rule and compass and redesign the boundaries of African nations. If we thought we could get away without this redefinition of boundaries back when the Organization of African Unity was formed, surely the instance of Rwanda lets us know in a very brutal way that we cannot evade this historical challenge any longer.5 His comments came in the wake of one of the most brutal genocides known to mankind, Rwanda of 1994, but similar discourse has been common in the past decades. Several nations have played with the prospect of secession for certain regions within their borders. European interest in the continent is not surprising, however, when considering the vast economic potential in the many resources available for exploitation. The greater the resources in a nation, the higher the stakes for any given involved party; as a result, there was even greater violence. The example of conflict diamonds in Sub-Saharan Africa is widely known, yet resources play a role in more large-scale violence as well. 6

7 European occupiers did not entirely ignore the development of infrastructure in African colonies. In fact, with the example of transportation, most European powers even invested in developing a foundation for future use. But the highest priority for European powers was the exploitation of natural resources. As a result, the transport systems that were developed were designed almost exclusively around a center-to-edge model that expedited commerce beneficial to the colonial power, not developing the local economy. As a result of these actions during the colonial period, in the post-colonial period almost all African nations have struggled as globalization has progressed. In the realm of governance, colonial powers, concerned mostly with resource exploitation, paid little attention to constructing domestic institutions that could have provided a foundation for the post-colonial era. In addition, locals were very seldom included in domestic governance. Thus, following the somewhat rapid departure of most European powers, there was little local experience with governance. These policies are at least partly responsible for the governance problems many African states have face in the post-colonial era.

Case Study: Rwanda The 1994 Rwanda genocide is one of the most tragic events in human history. Roughly 800,000 Rwandans were killed in the space of just one hundred days, with the rest of the world doing very little to stop the violence. Though the tragedy certainly was not a direct result of African decolonization, the process of European colonization and the process by which Rwanda became independent played a critical role in setting the stage for this most dreadful event.7

8 Germany, in possession of Rwanda as a colony until World War I, first implemented military control, collected cash taxes, and established missionary schools to convert Rwandans to Catholicism.8 The Germans also exploited and acted to increase the ethnic division in Rwanda. After World War I, Belgium gained control of Rwanda and acted in very similar ways. Both German and Belgian colonists utilized the Rwandan people for labor, with the Belgians introducing coffee plantations, and exploited the ethnic divisions within Rwandan society as a governing method. Specifically, the German and Belgian colonizers of Rwanda in the early 1900s created a simplified categorization of the different tribes that were known as the Hutu and the Tutsi. The Tutsi, who were mostly taller, thinner, and who had political views that aligned more with Belgians, were the favored tribe within Rwanda. Obtaining the better jobs, preferential treatment, and some governmental control, the Tutsi were the dominant group in Rwanda for more than twenty years.10 With resentment against the Tutsi growing within the Hutu tribe, reform began in the intellectual community during the 1950s. The Bahutu Manifesto, a publication on the social aspects of the racial and ethnic problems in Rwanda, argued against the Tutsi domination of Rwanda under Belgian control. Similar expressions against Tutsi dominance, combined with the numerical superiority of the Hutu, led the Belgians to abruptly switch their support to the Hutus within the colony.11 Later in 1959, the Belgians allowed scattered riots against the Tutsi chiefs to turn into a small Hutu revolution, during which more than 20,000 Tutsis were killed.12 This point in history marked the beginning of the exclusion of the Tutsi from Rwandan politics and a growing authoritarianism under a new, centralized Hutu power structure.

9 In addition to the policy of reinforcing the divide between Hutus and Tutsis, Belgian colonial policy by design ensured that the indigenous population would not believe they were in a position to actually run the country. Only a small handful of Rwandans received the training necessary to attain high-level positions within the colonial/national administration, leaving European colonizers mostly in charge. One consequence of Belgian policy was that it paved the way for a small Hutu elite to consolidate power after 1959. Because of the fundamental inequalities produced, Belgian colonial policies were criticized by the UN. No concrete action, however, was taken to rectify the situation.13 Belgium ceded Rwanda independence in 1962. Under essentially authoritarian Hutu rule, with a few notable exceptions, the state enjoyed a period of peace between 1973 and 1990. The tensions between Hutus and Tutsis remained, however, and these exploded into one of the worst genocides the world has ever witnessed in 1994. UN Action in Rwanda When tensions again increased and Hutu militias killed approximately 300 Tutsi in 1992 and 1993, the UN took action and deployed an international force to supervise a new transitional government.14 The force, known as the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), was hardly successful and could do nothing to prevent the mass killings that began in 1994. After half-heartedly calling for a ceasefire, the majority of UNAMIR troops were removed from Rwanda, reducing their numbers from 2500 to 270. At the peak of the genocide, these UN troops were essentially powerless, and could do nothing to prevent the ongoing massacre. An estimated 800,000 people were killed between April and June 1994.15

10 The diplomatic process that took place during this period highlights serious problems with UN peacekeeping activities. The world seemingly sat back and allowed a devastating genocide to take place without intervening, though such events are exactly what the UN was created to prevent. During the genocide, a resolution was in fact drafted that called for the deployment of a maximum of 5500 men. This call for action, known as resolution 719 of 17 May 1994, was unfortunately not adopted by the United States.16 Since the U.S. is a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, stronger action that may have helped to limit the scope of the genocide was never taken. The U.S. not only did not help as much as they could, but in some ways made the situation worse. As the violence worsened in April 1994, the U.S. actually first demanded a full withdrawal. But amid the opposition of African nations -- and even opposition to this move by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright -- the U.S. instead lobbied for the dramatic drawdown of UNARMIR’s forces to 270. In 1998, President Bill Clinton apologized for the United States’ lack of strong leadership in the UN Security Council that may have stemmed the violence in Rwanda in 1994.17 One of the greatest weaknesses of the UN is its dependence on the world’s superpowers; all it takes is one to delay the efforts to end genocide, as seen in the case of Rwanda. In the end, genocide in Rwanda was not the result of an ancient and deep-seated hatred between the two ethnic groups. In fact, the Hutu and the Tutsi are virtually ethnically indistinguishable, speaking the same language and respecting the same tradtions and taboos. But Belgian colonization reinforced social categorization and exaggerated stereotypes in racial division. Without its tragic colonial past, it could be argued that Rwandans may not have played the ethnic card whenever political difficulty arose. The case of Rwanda demonstrates both the

11 effects of European colonization several decades after independence, and also what can go wrong when determining proper UN intervention under a pressing timeline. Rwanda has made progress since 1994, including improvements in infrastructure, healthcare, agriculture, and the economy. And even though ethnic tension has largely subsided, the effects of the 1994 genocide clearly still resonate within the state. However, Rwanda is working its way out of its tragic past.18 Even if Rwanda has advanced since 1994, given the almost unimaginable scope of the Rwandan tragedy, the Fourth Committee must keep this historical example in mind when outlining policy guidelines concerning the stability of African nations.

Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Congo The wars that have taken place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over the past two decades are complicated and highly interconnected with events in surrounding African nations. Though woefully underreported, these conflicts undeniably account for the greatest loss of human life due to warfare since World War II. Like neighboring Rwanda, Congo was a Belgian colony handled rather brutally and exploited by colonizers. Congo was largely abandoned by Belgium and the international community after its independence in 1960. After several years of weak and contested governance, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as it was named after independence, fell under two oppressive dictatorships. Africa’s second largest state, rich in copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold and other easily exploitable commodities, the DRC was pillaged for decades by these dictators to the detriment of its citizens. The brutal rule of these regimes -- combined with

12 the potential for immense wealth because of the exploitable resources -- has driven the postindependence conflict in the DRC. In 1960, Congolese voted for Joseph Kasavubu as President of the DRC. His country plagued by unrest after independence, Kasavubu was ousted in a 1965 coup led by Joseph Mobutu.25 In 1971 Mobutu – know as Mobutu Sese Soko from then on – renamed the DRC the Republic of Zaire, in a move reflective of his position that the Congo and its citizens should take on more “African” names.27 Mobutu was supported by the United States and Europe when he first took power and through much of the Cold War.28 He was able to maintain relative peace for a period considering the economic situation Zaire faced. But in 1977 rebels, reportedly backed by Angola, attempted to seize the sub-region of Zaire called Katanga. The rebels were, however, repelled with the help of French, Belgian, and Moroccan paratroops.29 Between 1978 and 1990, Mobutu attempted to suppress much of the country’s unrest, evean as demands for multi-party elections, international economic development, and human rights rose from the people. At the end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of international support for the Mobutu regime, outside pressure because of the regime’s brutal human rights practices, and severe economic decline combined to make Zaire increasingly vulnerable. Facing significant pressure from opposition groups, Mobutu agreed to limited reforms in the early 1990s – including an end to the ban on multiparty politics and a coalition government that included opposition figures. But Mobutu remained firmly in control. While Mobutu was abroad in 1997, however, Tutsi rebels captured much of eastern Zaire. They combined with other anti-Mobutu forces backed by Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Burundi and Eritrea to take the capital in May. With the Mobutu regime gone, Zaire again became known as the Democratic Republic of Congo. Laurent-Desire Kabila assumed the office of president.30 Many hoped that a revival would be seen in the

13 region.31 However, this “honeymoon” period would not last long. Over the next year, Kabila’s relations with his foreign backers deteriorated until large-scale violence erupted in August 1998. This violence in the DRC was partly a spillover from violence in Rwanda. At the close of the Rwandan genocide, Hutu militias known as interhamew, who were largely responsible for Rwanda’s ethnic cleansing, were driven across the border into the Congo. From here, the militias carried out cross-border raids on a regular basis, prompting a joint-sponsored invasion of the Congo by Rwanda and Uganda, eventually resulting in the fall of Mobutu in 1997. Rifts among the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) rebels supported by Uganda, Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebels backed by Rwanda, and the DRC forces of Kabila led to the violence in 1998. With three de facto segments controlling different parts of the DRC - one by Laurent Kabila, one by Rwandan rebels, and another by Ugandan rebels – by July 1999 it was clear there was a military stalemate. The parties agreed to the Lusaka Accord, which “called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, and ‘inter-Congolese dialogue’ for the purpose of a transitional government.” These provisions, however, were not fully implemented. Kabila attempted to block the deployment of U.N. troops and continued to suppress internal political activity.32 The death of Kabila in January 2001 led to his son Joseph Kabila’s assuming the presidency. Under the younger Kabila there was some progress in the DRC. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was deployed throughout the country and many foreign forces were evacuated. Rwanda forces, though reportedly still operating on a smaller scale, officially withdrew in 2002. Ugandan forces officially withdrew in May 2003.

14 In June 2003, President Kabila announced a transitional government line-up based on negotiations between the parties in South Africa in late 2002 and early 2003. While significant human rights issues within the DRC remained, Kabila did made some strides in liberalizing domestic political activity and economic reforms.33 In 2005, a new constitution in the DRC was approved by two-thirds of the Congolese people. While the constitution strengthened the role of the president in a variety of ways, it was the first step toward the first free, democratic, multiparty elections in the DRC held in July 2006. Kabila won these elections and has remained the President of the DRC since. Some reforms in the DRC have continued, but the state still faces many challenges. UN Action Since the two Congo Wars of the 1990s, the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been a high priority on the UN Security Council’s agenda. United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1291 (February 2000) created the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which authorized the deployment of more than five thousand troops to the DRC. MONUC was revised with SC Resolution 1856 which increased the authorized number of military personnel working for the mission to more than nineteen thousand. While the MONUC started slowly and has encountered a number of problems, it did assist the DRC government in establishing general peace and security. The Secretary General issued a report on April 1, 2010 that declared the Congo is entering a new phase in its transition towards peace consolidation. The Congolese government insisted on a new mandate, and SC resolution 1925 replaced MONUC with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). MONUSCO, while retaining much of MONUC’s mission, was designed to hold the gains made by the previous mission and

15 enhance the “cooperation relationship with the DRC government, its coordinated, regional approach to counter threats posed by armed groups in the country, and its stated logistical role in assisting the DRC in its electoral activities.”34 Perhaps the most significant clause of SC Resolution 1925, the most recent UN attempt to address stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, emphasizes that primary responsibility for “security, peace building, and development” still falls on the nation’s own government. Promoting non-military solutions is a priority for the government in attempting to stabilize threats from Congolese and foreign armed groups in certain regions. MONUSCO will continue to aid in the process with its maximum of 19,815 military personnel deployed in the country. Despite the size of this UN force, which the largest on the globe, thousands of Congolese sill die each month from starvation, disease, and violence directly related to instability. Moreover, although a republic in name, the DRC -- with a highly centralized government with tremendous executive power vested in the president -- still lacks some qualities of a stable democracy. Still, national and local elections in the DRC took place in late 2011 and are scheduled in 2012 as well. Congo suffers from serious corruption problems, coming in at 162 out of 178 on Transparency International’s rankings. While resolution 1925 places significant responsibility on a government with internal issues and a tenuous democratic election process, it makes no mention of plans for ensuring fair election processes in the upcoming years, nor does it make any guarantee that the DRC’s current government will be successful as the primary source for ensuring security and the stability in the nation. The case of the DRC demonstrates an important dynamic in many post-colonial situations: the potentially destabilizing effects that events in one African nation can have one another. The Rwandan genocide directly influenced the events of the next decade in the Congo.

16 Had international aid not eventually come, the crimes against humanity that were commonplace during the wars in the DRC might very well have continued to this day. As it stands, direct violence and the effects of war – starvation and widespread disease – in the DRC account for some 3.8 million deaths between 1998 and 2004.35 Particularly in regions where the people are ethnically similar, the nations have similar stakes in any conflict, and resources can come to play a large role, the United Nations must keep a watchful eye to prevent recurring violence. Furthermore, although there have been several UN initiatives in the recent past that have assisted African governments – including MONUC and MONUSCO in the DRC – very few have suggested viable ways to restructure flawed systems. As a result, missions that may be successful in the short run must be considered with respect to long-term prospects for African political stability in currently insecure nations and failed states.

Bloc Positions on the Effects of African Decolonization African Union: The majority of African states will be adamant about receiving increased aid from Western countries. Rather than cede control over their affairs, however, most will demand minimal international involvement in domestic governments. As can be noted in cases like Rwanda’s genocide, events in one nation can have profound destabilizing effects on its neighbors and the surrounding region. Therefore, any nation with close geographic, economic, or ethnic ties to a less stable state is still at risk. Particularly for broader economic goals, like increasing foreign investment in a region, universal stability is paramount.42

17 African nations that have been successful in establishing stable governments have become concerned with the amount of aid they will receive in the future. Botswana, for example, is a political model for Africa and has enjoyed several decades of economic growth. Its success is awe-inspiring in the midst of the world’s poorest continent. However, Botswana has on several occasions expressed fear of being ignored by Western governments in aid allocation due to its success by African standards. The states that have already been moderately successful in achieving political stability would look favorably upon aid rewards for their triumphs. In many African states, there is a sense of pride in having overcome the challenges of a colonial past. Therefore, even in the midst of conflict and development across the continent, those nations with relatively more stable governments will still seek to receive aid and support from the international community. European Union: The European Union (EU) has been particularly critical of many developments in African political structures, especially pertaining to fair elections. Although the EU has offered a helping hand in the past, there is a mounting interest in having increased accountability for internal affairs among African nations and making use of local perspectives. For humanitarian reasons, the majority of European nations wish to see Africa gain a firmer control over domestic state affairs. Africa is also a huge potential market for investments and exports, which can only come after political stability is achieved. The less developed and economically weaker states of Eastern Europe will disagree with their fellow EU member states over a few issues, including exactly how much aid to funnel into African development while they themselves still lag behind the Western world in these respects. The usual cohesion of the EU might be difficult to maintain through certain contentious case studies in Africa.43

18 Asia: With huge trade surpluses, this group of nations has been increasing its investments in Africa over the past years as various political conflicts have begun to subside. However, there must be some guarantee of continued stability to ensure that African nations receive economic attention from these emerging powers. China, for example, is expected to double its investments in Africa in the next few years44. These projections will only prove correct if the international community and Africa can combine to resolve various ongoing conflicts and stabilize weak political structures. United Sates: During the 1990s, United Nations missions in the Congo and other African nations were halted due to the United States’ reluctance to take immediate actions. This UN dependence on the US has proved costly in the past. Particularly in the aftermath of the recession, it is imperative that unwillingness on the part of one nation does not hamper efforts of the entire committee45. Instead of carrying the financial burden of missions in Africa, the United Sates will look to continue its missions in Africa, but will likely not lead any drastic new initiatives. The international community must be wary of any hesitancy on the part of the United States. Repeating situations like Rwanda and the Congo could prove detrimental for unstable African nations.

19 TOPIC B: Kashmir Kashmir has been a flashpoint of conflict between India and Pakistan since 1947. A regional dispute that has turned into a problem for the international community, the issue involves numerous states and other actors. With the assistance of the United Nations at times, the actors involved with the Kashmir issue have had many, even if not ideal, opportunities to resolve the issue. However, the territorial conflict and competing interests among Pakistan, India, and China to a smaller extent, have made it very difficult to create a binding agreement through the UN or another multilateral international forum. The Kashmiri people have tried to have a say in the matter, but they have been outnumbered or overpowered. History Ever since its formation in 1846, Kashmir has had ethnic, religious, and national disputes. The region of land between Pakistan, India, and China was founded by Raja Gulab Singh, the Maharaja. Although he was Hindu, he ruled a mostly Muslim region. A very diverse region, Kashmir consists of Buddhists in the east, Hindus, Sikhs, and some Muslims in the Jammu south, and Muslims in the Kashmir north.46 Many of the problems that exist in Kashmir root back to this religious and ethnic diversity. The current struggle over Kashmir began after India broke free of the British Empire and the partitionment in 1947. The partition of the subcontinent led to severe rioting, millions of Sikhs, Muslims, and Hindus finding themselves displaced or homeless, and up to half a million dead from communal violence.47 With this terrible start, problems between the newly independent Indian and Pakistani states quickly became epitomized by conflict over Kashmir.

20 The first Indo-Pakistani war started in 1947 with the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen from the Pakistani northwest frontier province. The Maharaja had not decided which British dominion to join after the subcontinent’s independence from the Empire and was facing revolt by some elements within Kashmir. He sought Indian military assistance after the Pakistani invasion and, in exchange, turned over powers of foreign affairs and defense to India.48 With UN assistance, the conflict between India and Pakistani forces ended on January 1, 1949. A ceasefire line was established and a UN mission was created (United Nations Military Observers Groups in India and Pakistan – UNMOGIP) to observe the ceasefire in Kashmir and Jammu. The UN also recommended that both sides adhere to a referendum in the state to decide the future of Kashmir: join India, join Pakistan, or remain independent. At the time of the conflict and into the 1950s, most Kashmiri people desired to join Pakistan, but the Hindu Maharaja continued to rely on India. As a result, Kashmir grew closer to India, with official accession to India ratified in 1954 and the creation of a new constitution modeled on the Indian one in 1957. According to the Instrument of Accession, Kashmir would join India as long as there was a plebiscite that allowed the Kashmiri people to vote on the issue. Such a vote to determine the region’s future was never scheduled. Still, since 1957, India has considered the part of Kashmir it controls as an integral part of the Indian union. Conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (and other issues) have continued ever since. In 1962, India and China fought a brief border war that resulted in China seizing Aksai Chin, the northeastern region of Jammu and Kashmir. Sensing Indian weakness, Pakistan began to exert pressure on Indian-controlled Kashmir. Ultimately, Pakistan and India fought another war short war in mid-late 1965 after Pakistan “launched a covert offensive across the ceasefire line into Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.”50 After a short time, India and

21 Pakistan agreed to a UN-sponsored ceasefire. Unfortunately, this ceasefire lasted 5 only years before the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, and the division of Bangladesh that only complicated relations between the two states.51 The United States, which had been supplying military aid to both India and Pakistan, began to withdraw from the region. Pakistan, needing financial aid, allied itself with Iran, Indonesia, and China. Having already fought multiple wars, India and Pakistan found some common ground with the 1972 Simla accord. This committed both sides to bilateral negotiations to address their outstanding issues. It also resulted in both sides agreeing to the existing ceasefire line in Kashmir, renaming it the Line of Control.52 Tensions within the region exploded in 1989 with the start of the Kashmir insurgency. Pakistan lent “moral and diplomatic” support to the armed resistance movement, and called the issue to be resolved through a UN-sponsored referendum. India, however, maintained that Pakistan supported the insurgency with military training and weapons. The armed groups continued to operate through the 1990s. Quite a few were (and continue to be) linked to radical Islamist movements. Many fighters arrived from Afghanistan, where they had just waged “Jihad” against the Soviet Union in the 1980s after its invasion of Afghanistan.53 The influx of radical Islamists shifted the focus of the dispute over Kashmir from a nationalistic one to one with mostly ideological and religious overtones. This change in tone would have significant implications for India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris. It also would put new emphasis on the wider implications of the conflict over Kashmir for the rest of the international community after the terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2011.

22 The fiftieth anniversary of independence ushered in a flurry of diplomatic activity to address the issues between India and Pakistan, especially the Kashmir issue. Talks in 1997 led to an announcement of an agenda for peace talks, but quickly ended up in stalemate. Efforts to find accommodation were further sidelined by the nuclear weapons tests by both India and Pakistan in 1998. Fears of a nuclear confrontation grew after this, and the international community punished sides with sanctions and other mechanisms. After this dangerous escalation, however, India and Pakistan seemingly made a step toward resolving the dispute: The February 1999 Lahore Declaration became the first major movement toward peace since the 1974 Simla agreement. The accord pledged to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.”54 These efforts were very shorted-lived, however. In May 1999, India launched air strikes against Pakistani-backed forces that had infiltrated Indian-controlled Kashmir. Reportedly, some 50,000 people were forced to evacuate territories near the Line of Control on both the Pakistani and Indian sides during the so-called Kargil War. With tensions mounting between these two nuclear powers, the United States pressured Pakistan to withdraw its forces and end the conflict. Tensions between India and Pakistan continued to be high in the aftermath of 9/11, with small-scale, insurgent-style attacks launched against Kashmiri-Indian targets a number of times in between 1999 and 2001. But in 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf (who had seized power in a coup against the civilian government in the wake of the Kargil War) pledged that Pakistan would not tolerate terrorists operating from Pakistani territory. Even though India remained skeptical of Pakistani intentions and Kashmir remained a contentious issue, some small steps toward resolution have been made. In 2002, Kashmir held more free and fair elections, with a high turnout.56 And in 2003, for the first time in fifteen years India and Pakistan agreed to

23 respect the cease fire along the Line of Control. They also built a bus service able to cross through different controlled parts of Kashmir in order to aid the relief for the 2005 earthquake. Other small confidence-building steps have been taken by both sides in the conflict, but Kashmir remains a very contentious issue that has the potential to turn violent with little notice.

UN Action In a failed attempt to remedy the problem of the land disputes between Pakistan and India, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 39, creating the Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) in 1948. Security Council Resolution 47 created an observer mission to the region to assist the Military Adviser of the UNCIP, the Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which arrived in Kashmir in 1949. The UNMOGIP mission was defined as reporting, as completely and impartially as possible, activities along the ceasefire line while avoiding any direct intervention. The 1949 Karachi Agreement solidified the ceasefire line and the observer mission. Following the 1951 termination of the UNCIP, Security Council Resolution 91 continued UNMOGIP’s observer mission in Kashmir. UNMOGIP’s mission was uninterrupted until the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, but in July 1972 when India and Pakistan agreed on the Line of Control, UNMOGIP resumed its mission. However, India, claiming that UNMOGIP’s mandate had expired, has since refuse to report to the mission while still providing some accommodations. This is in line with India’s position, held since 1971, that the UN should no longer be the route by which the problem of Kashmir is solved and that only a bilateral solution to the problem should be pursued. Pakistan, still hoping for UN help, continues to lodge complaints with UNMOGIP. Even with this dispute,

24 UNMOGIP continues to operate to this day with thirty-nine military observers and a small civilian staff.58 Around the same time that UNCIP was created by the Security Council, the so-called Dixon Plan emerged as a UN-sponsored attempt to mediate the conflict in 1950. This plan was to create one plebiscite and one referendum for the Kashmiri people to decide which nation to join or to become independent. Representatives from each district and from either government would answer the question of which state it would side with. Pakistan agreed to this plan, but India continued to state that Kashmir was already an integral part of its union, that the land of Kashmir already belonged to India.59 The notion of a plebiscite to settle the Kashmiri issue still enjoys support in Pakistan and among some of the Kashmiri people to this day. While the last decade has seen periods of improvement, the dispute over Kashmir is still a volatile issue. The UN’s previous attempts at brokering a peace over the issue have not been successful, but continued effort may contribute to settling the situation. Given the potentially grave issues involved – continued violence endured by the Kashmiri people, the potential for renewed conflict over Kashmir by two nuclear-armed states, and radical Islamist violence spurred by the Kashmir conflict spreading even further throughout the region and beyond – the entire international community has a stake in resolving this conflict.

25 Bloc Positions North America: Given its role in nearby Afghanistan since 2001, for the United States Kashmir “is one part of a wider regional dynamic that has direct implications for Washington’s ability to support a stable Afghan state and to address the threat posed by terrorist groups in Asia.”65 That is, the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and other issues is an important concern for the US, which has pushed for a wide regional dialogue. The Obama administration has stated, however, that the Kashmir topic is a bilateral issue that must be resolved by India and Pakistan primarily.66 It believes that peace talks can be successful in the region, as long as both governments are open to them. Under Secretary of State William Burns said, “The pace, scope and character of the dialogue is for India and Pakistan to define.”67 The Pakistani government voiced desires for Obama to bring up the Kashmir issue with India in November 2011. Still, certain Pakistani newspapers claim that the United States has taken a pro-India stance on the Kashmir issue mainly due to the increased nuclear tensions between the U.S. and Pakistan.68 Asia: Asian policy regarding Kashmir is largely influenced by China. In recent years, China has seemed to be hardening its stance because it wants to be included in negotiations. For example, it issued visas to residents of Indian territories and began major infrastructure projects there. An article in the Economist this year also discussed possible collusion between Pakistan and China.69 China recently moved its troops closer to the border with Pakistan’s territory after Pakistan ceded control of Gilgit and Baltistan to China. The effect of this is a political signal to India that China considers Kashmir a disputed territory, a shift from its previous position where

26 it agreed that Jammu and Kashmir were a part of India. This also may be a response to India’s efforts to get involved with the Tibet conflict.70 Middle East: The Middle East’s stance on Kashmir, although very important to resolving the conflict, is varied. Many countries surrounding the nation-states involved believe that fixing the rivalry over Kashmir would ameliorate India-Pakistan relations. This would allow Pakistan to help in the fight against terrorism and stop sheltering Afghan insurgents.71 This puts Afghanistan in a difficult situation, since the Kashmir problem is distracting the international community from other instabilities nearby. Other nations, like Turkey, take a simpler approach and back Pakistan, because “Turkey and Pakistan have always supported each others’ stances on international forums.”72 Europe: The European Union (EU) drastically changed its stance on the Kashmir issue several years ago. Following an EUreport entitled “Kashmir: Present Situation and Future Prospects,” EU policy began to focus on human rights abuses in Pakistan’s territory and rejected Pakistan’s calls for self-determination. Some believe that this was an attempt to improve EU-India strategic relations.73 The EU’s position on Kashmir is largely governed by its fear of the nuclear capabilities of the region. Most recently, the EU has declared Jammu and Kashmir “an integral and important part of India.” This decision was the product of a five-member team that visited the region to assess the situation, which noted human rights abuses in the region and highlighted the role of separatist groups.74

27

1

“Conflicts in Africa,” Global Issues, http://www.globalissues.org/article/84/conflicts-in-africaintroduction.
2 3

Ibid.

“The Scramble for Africa: Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 to Divide Africa,” Geography: Realms, Regions and Concepts, http://wysinger.homestead.com/berlinconference.html.
4 5

Ibid.

“Africa’s Colonial Boundaries Must be Redrawn,” University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Aticles_Gen/colon_bound.html.
6

This section relies heavily on information from the Harvard National Model United Nations Conference Background Guide 2011.
7

This section relies heavily on information from the Harvard National Model United Nations Conference Background Guide 2011.
8

Ibid.

10

BBC News, “Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened,” December 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.stm.
11 12

http://www.unsystem.org/ngls/documents/publications.en/voices.africa/number8/7sebahara.htm.

Destexhe, Alain, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York UP, 1995), 16.
13 14 15

Destexhe 43. Destexhe, 46.

BBC News, “Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened,” December 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.stm
16 17

Destexhe, 50.

Power, Samantha, “Bystanders to Genocide,” The Atlantic, September, 2001, 7. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/4571/7/
18

Ruxin, Josh, “16 Years After the Genocide, Rwanda Continues Forward,” , April 6, 2010, http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/16-years-after-the-genocide-rwanda-continues-forward/.
25

BBC News, Democratic Republic of Congo Profile, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa13286306, 10 January 2012.
27

The United States Department of the State, Bureau of African Affairs. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. Accessed September 30, 2011.
28

Hartung, William D. and Bridget Moix, Deadly Legacy: U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War, Arms Trade Resource Center, World Policy Institute, January 2000.

28

29 30

Ibid.

BBC News, Democratic Republic of Congo Profile, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa13286306, 10 January 2012.
31

Shah, Anup, “The Democratic Republic of Congo,” Global Issues, 21 Aug. 2010, <http://www.globalissues.org/article/87/the-democratic-republic-of-congo>.
32

The United States Department of the State, Bureau of African Affairs, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. Accessed September 30, 2011.
33 34 35 42 43 44

Ibid. Ibid. Global Security, “Congo Civil War,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/congo.htm. Ibid. Ibid.

“Economic Prosperity Brings Hope to Africa,” The Guardian Weekly, July 11, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jul/11/africa-recovery-global-recession.
45

Power, Samantha, “Bystanders to Genocide,”The Atlantic, September, 2001,7, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/4571/7/.
46

Bowers, Paul, “Kashmir,” International Affairs and Defence – House of Commons Library, March 30, 2004, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-library/Publications/Detail/?id=44299&lng=en.
47

BBC News, “India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/default.stm.
48 50 51

Ibid. Ibid.

Bowers, Paul, “Kashmir,” International Affairs and Defence – House of Commons Library, March 30, 2004,, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=44299&lng=en.
52

BBC News, “India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/default.stm
53 54 56

Ibid. Ibid.

Bowers, Paul, “Kashmir,” International Affairs and Defence – House of Commons Library, March 30, 2004, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-library/Publications/Detail/?id=44299&lng=en.
58

United Nations Military Observers Group for India and Pakistan, http://www.un.org.en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/index.shtml
59

Ibid.

29

65

Council on Foreign Relations, “How the Kashmir Dispute Affects Security in South Asia,” http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/kashmir-dispute-affects-security-south-asia/p19805.
66

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-10-07/india/28233562_1_india-and-pakistan-kashmirissue-bilaterally.
67

Mohan, C. Raja, “Kashmir Unrest,” http://www.indianexpress.com/news/kashmir-unrest-indiasinternal-issue-says-obama-administration/687660/2.
68

“Pakistan Hopes Obama will take up Kashmir issue,” http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_pakhopes-obama-will-take-up-kashmir-issue-during-india-visit_1448916.
69

Banyan, “Kashmir: the China Connection,” http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/08/china_and_kashmir.
70

Kapila, Subhas, “China’s Obtrusive Presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir,” http://janamejayan.wordpress.com/2010/09/14/chinas-obtrusive-presence-in-pakistan-subhash-kapila/.
71

Raza, Mohsin, “Kashmir is the Key to Peace in Afghanistan,” http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/wealthof-nations/2010/02/07/kashmir-is-the-key-to-peace-in-afghanistan.html.
72 73 74

“Turkey Fully Supports Pakistan,” http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?107806. “India and the EU,” http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/oct/07guest1.htm.

“EU Team Says Kashmir is part of India,” http://www.rttnews.com/ArticleView.aspx?Id=1140028&SMap=1Is.

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